@conarium-ai/core 0.1.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +131 -0
- package/LICENSE +21 -0
- package/README.md +387 -0
- package/SECURITY.md +226 -0
- package/bin/conarium-anchor-service.mjs +77 -0
- package/bin/conarium-anchor-upgrade.mjs +108 -0
- package/bin/conarium-coverage.mjs +425 -0
- package/bin/conarium-doctor.mjs +480 -0
- package/bin/conarium-init.mjs +184 -0
- package/bin/conarium-reconcile.mjs +441 -0
- package/bin/conarium-stamp.mjs +161 -0
- package/bin/conarium-verify.mjs +610 -0
- package/conarium.config.json +43 -0
- package/deploy/anchor-service/README.md +79 -0
- package/deploy/anchor-service/conarium-anchor.service +21 -0
- package/deploy/anchor-service/dry-run.mjs +122 -0
- package/deploy/anchor-service/ecosystem.config.cjs +21 -0
- package/deploy/anchor-service/env.example +11 -0
- package/dist/anchor-service.d.ts +39 -0
- package/dist/anchor-service.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/anchor-service.js +278 -0
- package/dist/anchor-service.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/anchor.d.ts +123 -0
- package/dist/anchor.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/anchor.js +246 -0
- package/dist/anchor.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/audit-hash.d.ts +4 -0
- package/dist/audit-hash.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/audit-hash.js +12 -0
- package/dist/audit-hash.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/audit.d.ts +104 -0
- package/dist/audit.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/audit.js +391 -0
- package/dist/audit.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/config.d.ts +273 -0
- package/dist/config.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/config.js +44 -0
- package/dist/config.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/docs.d.ts +23 -0
- package/dist/connectors/docs.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/docs.js +140 -0
- package/dist/connectors/docs.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/index.d.ts +10 -0
- package/dist/connectors/index.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/index.js +37 -0
- package/dist/connectors/index.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/jira.d.ts +16 -0
- package/dist/connectors/jira.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/jira.js +67 -0
- package/dist/connectors/jira.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/openapi.d.ts +28 -0
- package/dist/connectors/openapi.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/openapi.js +447 -0
- package/dist/connectors/openapi.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/postgres.d.ts +17 -0
- package/dist/connectors/postgres.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/postgres.js +131 -0
- package/dist/connectors/postgres.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/slack.d.ts +16 -0
- package/dist/connectors/slack.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/slack.js +65 -0
- package/dist/connectors/slack.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/supabase_rest.d.ts +35 -0
- package/dist/connectors/supabase_rest.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/supabase_rest.js +153 -0
- package/dist/connectors/supabase_rest.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/zion.d.ts +24 -0
- package/dist/connectors/zion.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/connectors/zion.js +76 -0
- package/dist/connectors/zion.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/console.d.ts +30 -0
- package/dist/console.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/console.js +257 -0
- package/dist/console.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/coverage.d.ts +100 -0
- package/dist/coverage.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/coverage.js +175 -0
- package/dist/coverage.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/executor.d.ts +12 -0
- package/dist/executor.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/executor.js +77 -0
- package/dist/executor.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/governance.d.ts +124 -0
- package/dist/governance.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/governance.js +977 -0
- package/dist/governance.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/http.d.ts +48 -0
- package/dist/http.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/http.js +221 -0
- package/dist/http.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/index.d.ts +3 -0
- package/dist/index.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/index.js +25 -0
- package/dist/index.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/keys.d.ts +51 -0
- package/dist/keys.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/keys.js +174 -0
- package/dist/keys.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/license.d.ts +35 -0
- package/dist/license.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/license.js +122 -0
- package/dist/license.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/llm-gate.d.ts +17 -0
- package/dist/llm-gate.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/llm-gate.js +19 -0
- package/dist/llm-gate.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/openapi_connector.d.ts +6 -0
- package/dist/openapi_connector.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/openapi_connector.js +145 -0
- package/dist/openapi_connector.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/pseudonymize.d.ts +19 -0
- package/dist/pseudonymize.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/pseudonymize.js +25 -0
- package/dist/pseudonymize.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/rate_limit.d.ts +41 -0
- package/dist/rate_limit.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/rate_limit.js +66 -0
- package/dist/rate_limit.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/receipt.d.ts +161 -0
- package/dist/receipt.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/receipt.js +210 -0
- package/dist/receipt.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/scripts/discover_schema.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/scripts/discover_schema.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/scripts/discover_schema.js +75 -0
- package/dist/scripts/discover_schema.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/scripts/dogfood_prove.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/scripts/dogfood_prove.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/scripts/dogfood_prove.js +41 -0
- package/dist/scripts/dogfood_prove.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/search_policy.d.ts +23 -0
- package/dist/search_policy.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/search_policy.js +79 -0
- package/dist/search_policy.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/server.d.ts +29 -0
- package/dist/server.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/server.js +379 -0
- package/dist/server.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/tokens.d.ts +14 -0
- package/dist/tokens.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/tokens.js +58 -0
- package/dist/tokens.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/types.d.ts +132 -0
- package/dist/types.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/types.js +2 -0
- package/dist/types.js.map +1 -0
- package/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md +42 -0
- package/docs/CONSENT-BINDING-SPEC.md +136 -0
- package/docs/CONSENT-BINDING-SPEC.md.anchors.jsonl +1 -0
- package/docs/PRIOR-ART.md +213 -0
- package/docs/PRIOR-ART.md.anchors.jsonl +3 -0
- package/docs/RECEIPT-SPEC.md +301 -0
- package/docs/RECEIPT-SPEC.md.anchors.jsonl +1 -0
- package/docs/dogfood/2026-07-31-anchor.anchors.jsonl +1 -0
- package/docs/dogfood/2026-08-06-reconcile.md +140 -0
- package/docs/plans/2026-07-02-redteam-harness.md +416 -0
- package/docs/specs/2026-07-02-redteam-harness-design.md +90 -0
- package/docs/superpowers/TODO-gate1-f4.md +23 -0
- package/docs/superpowers/plans/2026-07-29-conarium-receipt-plan.md +200 -0
- package/docs/superpowers/plans/2026-07-29-katman0-kapanis-plan.md +231 -0
- package/docs/superpowers/plans/2026-07-31-per-user-identity.md +667 -0
- package/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-07-29-conarium-receipt-design.md +202 -0
- package/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-07-31-per-user-identity-design.md +144 -0
- package/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-01-coverage-proof-design.md +139 -0
- package/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-05-receipt-meta-provenance-design.md +116 -0
- package/examples/claude-desktop-config.json +9 -0
- package/examples/cursor-mcp-settings.json +10 -0
- package/package.json +99 -0
- package/scripts/audit-chain-check.mjs +119 -0
- package/scripts/conarium_sabah_brief.mjs +107 -0
- package/scripts/gen-test-vectors.mjs +193 -0
- package/scripts/pg-snapshot.sql +27 -0
- package/scripts/start-mcp-c1.mjs +70 -0
- package/test-vectors/001-single-receipt/receipts.jsonl +1 -0
- package/test-vectors/002-chain-of-three/receipts.jsonl +3 -0
- package/test-vectors/003-tampered-field/receipts.jsonl +1 -0
- package/test-vectors/004-prevhash-break/receipts.jsonl +2 -0
- package/test-vectors/005-seq-gap/receipts.jsonl +2 -0
- package/test-vectors/006-bad-signature/receipts.jsonl +1 -0
- package/test-vectors/007-schema-invalid/receipts.jsonl +1 -0
- package/test-vectors/008-unsigned-no-pubkey/receipts.jsonl +1 -0
- package/test-vectors/009-unsigned-but-pubkey-given/receipts.jsonl +1 -0
- package/test-vectors/README.md +92 -0
- package/test-vectors/expected-hashes.json +24 -0
- package/test-vectors/keys/vector-key.SECRET-TEST-ONLY.pem +6 -0
- package/test-vectors/keys/vector-key.pub.pem +3 -0
- package/test-vectors/keys/vector-key.pub.pem.keyid +1 -0
- package/test-vectors/manifest.json +95 -0
package/CHANGELOG.md
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# Changelog
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## Unreleased
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Nothing yet — 0.1.0 is the current cut.
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## 0.1.0 — 2026-08-13
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First product cut. The npm package is **not published yet**; this describes
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what the git tree and `npm pack` tarball contain. Do not read "npx works"
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into this entry.
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### Added — install without us in the loop
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- `conarium-init` (`bin/conarium-init.mjs`): writes a fail-closed
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`conarium.config.json`, an Ed25519 key pair, and the `.keyid` sidecars the
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verifier needs. Refuses to overwrite without `--force`. Never prints the
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private key. Exit 0/1/2 (outside the receipt exit-code namespace).
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- `conarium-doctor` version section: prints the installed version from
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`package.json`. With a network, GETs `registry.npmjs.org/@conarium-ai/core/latest`
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(2s timeout, errors are warnings). `--no-net` makes **zero** requests.
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Telemetry none — the request is a version number, nothing is sent.
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- Offline license verifier (`src/license.ts`): JCS + Ed25519, same construction
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as receipts. Missing/invalid/expired → `community`. No feature gates, no
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keygen, no payments.
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- `package.json` `files` allowlist: the tarball is `dist`, `bin`, `scripts`,
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`docs`, `examples`, `test-vectors`, `deploy`, plus the license/readme files —
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not CI workflows or the marketing site. `scripts/` is included because
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`conarium-reconcile` references `scripts/pg-snapshot.sql`.
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- `deploy/anchor-service/`: systemd unit, pm2 ecosystem, `.env.example`, dry-run
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script. **Deploy itself is not this release.**
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### Added — conarium-reconcile v0.1: two-sided coverage (bypass detection)
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- New standalone CLI `bin/conarium-reconcile.mjs` (zero imports from `src/`):
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reconciles the database's **own per-role query counters** (reference:
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`pg_stat_statements`, snapshot helper `scripts/pg-snapshot.sql`) against the
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in-window receipts. A DB-recorded query pattern no receipt covers exits 40:
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*access was recorded by the database but not receipted* — gateway bypassed or
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receipt sink failed; the tool states the fact, not the intent.
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- Honesty rules carried over from the coverage declaration: per-pattern/per-table
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matching (never per call count — PostgREST fans one request into several
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statements), nothing silently cleared (unattributable patterns fail the run),
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unreliable windows refused (counter regression → exit 20), unassigned receipts
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make findings explicitly non-definitive.
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- `test/spec_exitcode_drift.mjs` now guards **all three** CLIs
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(verify / coverage / reconcile) against the RECEIPT-SPEC exit-code tables;
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proven to fail in both directions.
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- RECEIPT-SPEC known gap #2 updated: bypass detection is now addressed with
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stated limits (DB counters are trusted, dedicated role required).
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### Fixed — HMAC signature contiguity (the HMAC half of F1)
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- `validateChain` rejected **unsigned legacy entries** as corrupt whenever an HMAC key was
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present: `entry.signature !== expected` was the only check, so a missing signature failed
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it. Any audit sink written before signing existed became unopenable the moment HMAC was
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configured — the server would not boot. This is the same conflation F1 fixed for Ed25519
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in July (*"cannot be verified with this key"* ≠ *"tampered"*), left open on the HMAC side.
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It hit production on 2026-08-05 and forced HMAC to be disabled, which in turn left the
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install exposed to the strip-all attack that HMAC is the documented mitigation for
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(RECEIPT-SPEC known gap #4).
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- Now symmetric with Ed25519: unsigned entries **before** the first signed entry are legacy
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and accepted; an unsigned entry **after** a signed one is a signature-removal attempt and
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is rejected; a present-but-wrong signature is always rejected. Signature *presence* counts
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toward contiguity even without a key, so "drop the key, then strip the signatures" fails.
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### Changed — Receipt v0.3: meta provenance
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- `model` and `client` now carry a `source` field alongside the value:
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`protocol` (measured from MCP `initialize`), `operator-declared` (declared in config,
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**not** verified by Conarium), or `undeclared` (`null` fields — nothing invented).
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- **`audit.receiptModel` / `audit.receiptClient` are no longer required.** Previously,
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configuring `receiptSink` without both fields threw at construction, which kept receipt
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generation permanently off: model identity does not exist in the MCP protocol, so it
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could only ever come from an operator's declaration. Receipts are now emitted and the
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missing field is recorded as `undeclared` instead of being invented.
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- Verifier accepts `0.1`, `0.2` and `0.3`; older receipts remain verifiable (regression-locked).
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It reports undeclared counts: `ok: 3 receipt(s) verified (2 with undeclared model)`.
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- ⚠️ Ed25519 remains **required** for receipts — this was not relaxed.
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- Spec: `docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-05-receipt-meta-provenance-design.md`
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### Added — Receipt v0.1 (verifiable audit receipts)
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- Ed25519 key management (`src/keys.ts`) with `.keyid` sidecars
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- Portable receipt schema + JCS canonicalize + hash (`src/receipt.ts`)
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- Independent offline verifier: `bin/conarium-verify.mjs`
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- Transparency-log anchor interface + scheduler (`src/anchor.ts`; Memory sink for tests, Rekor-shaped sink stub)
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- Spec: `docs/RECEIPT-SPEC.md`
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### Changed
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- **BREAKING — Connectors are fail-closed.** `policy.allowConnectors` is
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now a strict allow-list: if it is missing or empty, **no** connector is
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permitted (previously an empty list meant "allow all"). This matches the
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existing default-deny posture of `allowTables` — the product's stated position
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is "Nothing is allowed unless you allow it", and the connector path was the one
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exception that contradicted it. `bootDeps` now refuses to start when connectors
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are configured but `allowConnectors` is empty, naming the missing field and the
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connectors it should list — so an operator blames the changed default, not
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their own policy. **Migration:** add `policy.allowConnectors: ["connector1", "connector2"]`
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to your config (or remove the connectors). `denyConnectors` still takes
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precedence over `allowConnectors`.
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- Audit signing is **fail-closed**: without `CONARIUM_AUDIT_HMAC_KEY` or
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`CONARIUM_AUDIT_SIGNING_KEY`, writes throw unless `CONARIUM_AUDIT_UNSIGNED=1`
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is set explicitly (was: silent skip). Capability is checked at **construction**
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as well as `log()` (GATE 1 / F3).
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- Audit entries may carry Ed25519 `sig` alongside legacy HMAC `signature`.
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- `validateChain` treats missing `sig` / foreign `keyId` as out-of-scope (legacy /
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rotation), not tampering (GATE 1 / F1).
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### Added — OpenTimestamps anchoring (Katman 0 / A)
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- `OpenTimestampsSink` + sidecar `<sink>.anchors.jsonl` (hash-only; opt-in via
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`CONARIUM_ANCHOR_SINK=opentimestamps`)
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- `bin/conarium-anchor-upgrade.mjs` (pending → bitcoin)
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- `conarium-verify --anchor-check` verifies OTS against chain head (pending warns)
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- Rekor explicitly rejected; RFC3161 deferred — see `docs/RECEIPT-SPEC.md` §Anchoring
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### Docs (GATE 2)
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- Official claim: English is canonical; Turkish kept as translation (G2-1).
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- Known gaps §4: in-file sig stripping + HMAC/anchor reduction — *in-file çözülemez* (G2-2).
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- `writeKeyPairFiles` now returns `publicKeyIdPath` (G2-3).
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### Fixed (GATE 1 follow-up / F5)
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- `validateChain` Ed25519 **contiguity**: after the first signed line, missing
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`sig` is corrupt; foreign `keyId` accepted when present in the trust store.
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- Multi-keyId trust store: current signing pubkey + `CONARIUM_AUDIT_TRUST_PUBKEYS`.
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- See `docs/superpowers/TODO-gate1-f4.md` (F4 text; implemented as F5).
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package/LICENSE
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MIT License
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Copyright (c) 2026 Emek Can Doğru (Conarium)
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Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
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of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
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in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
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to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
|
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9
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+
copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
|
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|
+
furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
|
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+
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+
The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
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+
copies or substantial portions of the Software.
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+
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+
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
|
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IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
|
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FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
|
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AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
|
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+
LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
|
|
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|
+
OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
|
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SOFTWARE.
|
package/README.md
ADDED
|
@@ -0,0 +1,387 @@
|
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1
|
+
<div align="center">
|
|
2
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<h1>Conarium</h1>
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<p><strong>The Third Eye for Your Company's Data.</strong></p>
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<p>A self-hosted, governed gateway that lets AI coding assistants (Cursor, Copilot, Claude) touch your real data—without exposing a single secret—and hands you a signed, independently verifiable receipt of every access.</p>
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<p>
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<a href="https://conarium.dev"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Website-conarium.dev-5a8cff?style=for-the-badge" alt="Website" /></a>
|
|
8
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+
<a href="https://github.com/dogrucanemek-alt/conarium/blob/main/LICENSE"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-f2d79a?style=for-the-badge" alt="License" /></a>
|
|
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|
+
<a href="https://github.com/dogrucanemek-alt/conarium/blob/main/LICENSE"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-f2d79a?style=for-the-badge" alt="License" /></a>
|
|
10
|
+
<img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Status-Early%20Access-ff6f80?style=for-the-badge" alt="Early Access" />
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</p>
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</div>
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+
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<br/>
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The site lives at [conarium.dev](https://conarium.dev); this repository is the product.
|
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+
|
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## 👁️ The Problem
|
|
19
|
+
|
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+
Point Cursor or Copilot at a production database and it drinks the raw stream—SSNs, credit cards, salaries, and live keys. One rogue prompt can expose your most sensitive tables. Security teams simply can't allow that.
|
|
21
|
+
|
|
22
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+
## 🛡️ The Solution: Conarium
|
|
23
|
+
|
|
24
|
+
Conarium acts as a high-performance **MCP (Model Context Protocol) Proxy**. It sits directly between the AI Assistant and your databases, evaluating policies in milliseconds to enforce row limits and mask PII (Personally Identifiable Information) on the wire.
|
|
25
|
+
|
|
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+
The AI gets the context it needs to write code, but never sees your secrets.
|
|
27
|
+
|
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28
|
+
### Key Features
|
|
29
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+
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|
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- **Inline PII Masking:** Emails, IDs, cards, and secrets are redacted in the response stream (`[MASKED]`) before the model sees a single character.
|
|
31
|
+
- **Allow / Deny Lists:** Whitelist what AI can access. Your `secrets` and `financials` tables stay invisible.
|
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- **Row Caps:** Hard per-query limits. Prevent the silent exfiltration of millions of rows.
|
|
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- **Immutable Audit Ledger:** Every access is logged (who, what, when, rows, decision). Hash-chained and PII-safe — no raw PII ever written to the logs.
|
|
34
|
+
- **Verifiable Receipts (v0.1):** Ed25519-signed, independently verifiable receipts — see below.
|
|
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- **Per-person masking profiles:** what to mask for an AI agent is not what to mask for the data controller. A named profile relaxes masking for one identified person, and the receipt records which profile applied — see below.
|
|
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|
+
- **Coverage & Reconciliation:** a signed coverage declaration over the receipt chain (`conarium-coverage`), plus two-sided reconciliation against the database's own query counters (`conarium-reconcile`) — DB-recorded activity that no receipt covers is surfaced instead of staying invisible.
|
|
37
|
+
- **100% Self-Hosted:** Runs entirely on your infrastructure. Your data never crosses your perimeter.
|
|
38
|
+
- **MCP-Native:** Works out of the box with **Cursor**, **GitHub Copilot**, **Claude Code**, and **Codex**.
|
|
39
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+
|
|
40
|
+
### Verifiable Receipts
|
|
41
|
+
|
|
42
|
+
Conarium can emit portable **receipts** (Art. 12 / 19 shaped) that a third party
|
|
43
|
+
verifies offline with a single file — no Conarium install required.
|
|
44
|
+
|
|
45
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+
**Official claim (do not widen):** A Conarium Receipt proves that records have
|
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+
**not been altered, deleted, reordered, or backdated after they were created**.
|
|
47
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+
It does **not** prove they were correct at the moment of creation.
|
|
48
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+
|
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49
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+
*(TR)* Conarium Makbuzu, kayıtların **oluşturulduktan sonra değiştirilmediğini,
|
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|
+
silinmediğini, yeniden sıralanmadığını ve geriye dönük tarihlenmediğini**
|
|
51
|
+
kanıtlar. **Oluşturma anında doğru olduğunu kanıtlamaz.**
|
|
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|
+
|
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+
```bash
|
|
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+
# Generate an Ed25519 keypair (private PEM + .pub.pem + .keyid sidecars)
|
|
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|
+
node -e "import('./dist/keys.js').then(k=>console.log(JSON.stringify(k.writeKeyPairFiles('audit-ed25519','cnr-2026-07'),null,2)))"
|
|
56
|
+
|
|
57
|
+
export CONARIUM_AUDIT_SIGNING_KEY=./audit-ed25519.pem
|
|
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|
+
|
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# Verify a receipt chain (exit 0 = intact)
|
|
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|
+
npx conarium-verify ./receipts.jsonl --pubkey ./audit-ed25519.pub.pem
|
|
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+
|
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# Optional: check OpenTimestamps sidecar (pending → exit 0 + warning; missing → 14)
|
|
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|
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npx conarium-verify ./receipts.jsonl --pubkey ./audit-ed25519.pub.pem --anchor-check
|
|
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|
+
```
|
|
65
|
+
|
|
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Opt-in anchoring: `CONARIUM_ANCHOR_SINK=opentimestamps`. Upgrade pending proofs later with
|
|
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|
+
`npx conarium-anchor-upgrade ./audit.jsonl.anchors.jsonl`.
|
|
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|
+
|
|
69
|
+
### Per-person masking profiles
|
|
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+
|
|
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Masking that is correct for an AI agent is wrong for the person who owns the data.
|
|
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+
The owner asking *"which customer owes the most"* needs the name; the assistant
|
|
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summarising revenue does not. Answering that with a global on/off switch would
|
|
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|
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disable the product's only real guarantee, so masking resolves **per person**:
|
|
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|
+
|
|
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+
```jsonc
|
|
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+
{
|
|
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|
+
"policy": {
|
|
79
|
+
"allowTables": ["zion.customers", "zion.orders"],
|
|
80
|
+
"maskColumns": ["*.customer_name", "*.email", "*.phone"], // default: everyone
|
|
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|
+
"maxRows": 100,
|
|
82
|
+
|
|
83
|
+
"profiles": {
|
|
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|
+
// The controller sees customer names; email and phone stay masked.
|
|
85
|
+
"controller-full": { "maskColumns": ["*.email", "*.phone"], "maxRows": 1000 }
|
|
86
|
+
},
|
|
87
|
+
"actorProfiles": { "emekcan": "controller-full" }
|
|
88
|
+
}
|
|
89
|
+
}
|
|
90
|
+
```
|
|
91
|
+
|
|
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|
+
Deliberately narrow, because this is the one feature that can *loosen* protection:
|
|
93
|
+
|
|
94
|
+
- A profile may override **`maskColumns`, `maxRows` and `maskLabelledNames` — and
|
|
95
|
+
nothing else.** Table, tool and connector permissions stay global; a profile can
|
|
96
|
+
never widen what is reachable, only what is legible within it.
|
|
97
|
+
- **Per-user tokens only.** An actor authenticated with a shared token never
|
|
98
|
+
receives a profile. "Whoever holds this string sees unmasked PII" is precisely
|
|
99
|
+
the failure this product exists to prevent.
|
|
100
|
+
- **Fail-closed everywhere else:** no actor, unlisted actor, or a profile name that
|
|
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|
+
does not exist all fall back to the base policy, never to a wider one.
|
|
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|
+
- **The content scanners still run.** The email / national-ID / phone / card /
|
|
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|
+
secret detectors are not overridable at all, so those stay masked in free text
|
|
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|
+
no matter which profile applied. Name masking is the one detector a profile can
|
|
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|
+
switch off (`maskLabelledNames: false`), because the controller reading their
|
|
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|
+
own customer list is the case this feature exists for.
|
|
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|
+
- **The receipt says which profile applied** — `policy.id` becomes
|
|
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|
+
`conarium.policy/<profile>`, inside the signed hash. An access made under a
|
|
109
|
+
relaxed profile cannot later be presented as having been fully masked. This is
|
|
110
|
+
what keeps the audit story honest: the point was never "nobody sees PII", it is
|
|
111
|
+
"every access is governed, and the evidence says under which rules."
|
|
112
|
+
|
|
113
|
+
### Names in free text
|
|
114
|
+
|
|
115
|
+
Every other identifier has a shape. An email has an `@`, a national ID has a
|
|
116
|
+
checksum, a card has a length — a regex decides, and the decision reproduces.
|
|
117
|
+
A name has no shape, so `maskColumns` was the only thing catching one, and a name
|
|
118
|
+
typed into a free-text `note` reached the model verbatim.
|
|
119
|
+
|
|
120
|
+
Two deterministic passes close the part of that gap that can be closed honestly:
|
|
121
|
+
|
|
122
|
+
| Pass | What triggers it | Example |
|
|
123
|
+
|---|---|---|
|
|
124
|
+
| **Carry-over** | The value is one **this policy already masks** in some column | `customer_name` is masked, so `note: "Ayşe Demir called"` is masked too — including across rows |
|
|
125
|
+
| **Labelled** | The **text itself** marks it: a title or a field label | `Sn. Ahmet Yılmaz`, `Yetkili: Ayşe Demir`, `customer: John Smith` |
|
|
126
|
+
|
|
127
|
+
**What this does not do, deliberately: a bare name in running prose is not
|
|
128
|
+
detected.** "Ahmet called yesterday" goes through. Catching that needs NER — a
|
|
129
|
+
model, a dictionary and a confidence score — and every decision this gateway
|
|
130
|
+
makes is meant to be reproducible from the rule alone, by someone who does not
|
|
131
|
+
trust us. A probabilistic masker would also be a probabilistic *receipt*. Tools
|
|
132
|
+
that do run NER (Presidio-based ones, for instance) cover more entity types; they
|
|
133
|
+
buy that with a confidence threshold. Neither position dominates — this one is
|
|
134
|
+
stated so an auditor knows which one they are holding.
|
|
135
|
+
|
|
136
|
+
Carry-over ignores values under three characters (a two-character value matches
|
|
137
|
+
everywhere and would shred the output) and matches on Unicode word boundaries, so
|
|
138
|
+
`Ali` is masked in `Ali onayladı` but not inside `Kalite`.
|
|
139
|
+
|
|
140
|
+
### Coverage & reconciliation (bypass detection)
|
|
141
|
+
|
|
142
|
+
Receipts prove what went **through** the gateway. Reconciliation asks the database
|
|
143
|
+
what it saw, and compares:
|
|
144
|
+
|
|
145
|
+
```bash
|
|
146
|
+
# One-sided: signed coverage declaration over a period + declared scope
|
|
147
|
+
npx conarium-coverage ./declaration.json --pubkey ./audit-ed25519.pub.pem --receipts ./receipts.jsonl
|
|
148
|
+
|
|
149
|
+
# Two-sided: reconcile the DB's own per-role query counters against receipts.
|
|
150
|
+
# Snapshots come from pg_stat_statements (scripts/pg-snapshot.sql), taken at
|
|
151
|
+
# window start and window end with a dedicated DB role per gateway instance.
|
|
152
|
+
npx conarium-reconcile --before before.json --after after.json --receipts ./receipts.jsonl
|
|
153
|
+
# exit 0 = every DB query pattern in the window is covered by receipts
|
|
154
|
+
# exit 40 = the DB recorded activity no receipt covers — the gateway may have
|
|
155
|
+
# been bypassed, or the receipt sink failed
|
|
156
|
+
```
|
|
157
|
+
|
|
158
|
+
The language is deliberate: absence is reported as **"access NOT RECORDED"** /
|
|
159
|
+
**"not receipted"**, never "no access occurred" — an absent record is ambiguous
|
|
160
|
+
by nature, and a tool that pretends otherwise is lying to its auditor.
|
|
161
|
+
|
|
162
|
+
Run against our own production ERP the day it shipped, including a real bypass we
|
|
163
|
+
performed on ourselves and the tool caught:
|
|
164
|
+
[`docs/dogfood/2026-08-06-reconcile.md`](docs/dogfood/2026-08-06-reconcile.md).
|
|
165
|
+
|
|
166
|
+
Full schema, exit codes, and known gaps: [`docs/RECEIPT-SPEC.md`](docs/RECEIPT-SPEC.md).
|
|
167
|
+
|
|
168
|
+
### Implementing the format yourself
|
|
169
|
+
|
|
170
|
+
The receipt is meant to outlive this implementation, so it ships with
|
|
171
|
+
conformance vectors — nine frozen cases plus a machine-readable manifest in
|
|
172
|
+
[`test-vectors/`](test-vectors/):
|
|
173
|
+
|
|
174
|
+
```bash
|
|
175
|
+
npm run test:vectors # our verifier against the frozen cases
|
|
176
|
+
```
|
|
177
|
+
|
|
178
|
+
Point your own verifier at each `receipts.jsonl`, pass the arguments listed in
|
|
179
|
+
`manifest.json`, and compare the exit code. `expected-hashes.json` gives the
|
|
180
|
+
canonical JCS → SHA-256 hashes so you can check your canonicalisation without
|
|
181
|
+
needing our private key, which is deliberately not published.
|
|
182
|
+
|
|
183
|
+
The vectors found two things in this repository on their first run: a schema
|
|
184
|
+
check that reported a structurally invalid receipt as *tampered*, and a wrong
|
|
185
|
+
assumption of ours about unsigned receipts. Both are now frozen as cases 007
|
|
186
|
+
and 008.
|
|
187
|
+
|
|
188
|
+
### Anchoring your chain (optional)
|
|
189
|
+
|
|
190
|
+
`conarium-stamp` anchors a file to the OpenTimestamps calendars, and
|
|
191
|
+
`conarium-anchor-upgrade` fills in the Bitcoin block height once it lands.
|
|
192
|
+
Those two are all most setups need.
|
|
193
|
+
|
|
194
|
+
If you would rather expose anchoring as a small service — for several
|
|
195
|
+
gateways, or to hand an auditor a stable URL —
|
|
196
|
+
[`bin/conarium-anchor-service.mjs`](bin/conarium-anchor-service.mjs) is one:
|
|
197
|
+
it submits hashes, retains proofs, serves the raw `.ots` at a permanent path,
|
|
198
|
+
and upgrades pending anchors on a timer.
|
|
199
|
+
|
|
200
|
+
It is code you run, not a service we operate — there is no hosted instance to
|
|
201
|
+
sign up for. It also serves the raw proof precisely so a third party can verify
|
|
202
|
+
with the reference OpenTimestamps client and ignore the service entirely. An
|
|
203
|
+
anchoring endpoint you have to trust would defeat the purpose of anchoring.
|
|
204
|
+
|
|
205
|
+
Signing is fail-closed: set `CONARIUM_AUDIT_SIGNING_KEY` and/or
|
|
206
|
+
`CONARIUM_AUDIT_HMAC_KEY`, or explicitly `CONARIUM_AUDIT_UNSIGNED=1` for throwaway setups.
|
|
207
|
+
Key rotation: keep prior public PEMs in `CONARIUM_AUDIT_TRUST_PUBKEYS` (`,` / `;`
|
|
208
|
+
separated). After the first signed audit line, every later line must carry `sig`.
|
|
209
|
+
|
|
210
|
+
### Where this sits among similar projects
|
|
211
|
+
|
|
212
|
+
Conarium is **not** the first project to produce signed, verifiable receipts for AI
|
|
213
|
+
activity. [Acta](https://github.com/VeritasActa/Acta),
|
|
214
|
+
[Emilia Protocol](https://github.com/emiliaprotocol/emilia-protocol),
|
|
215
|
+
[AuthProof](https://github.com/Commonguy25/authproof-sdk),
|
|
216
|
+
[Agent Receipts](https://github.com/agent-receipts) and
|
|
217
|
+
[Invariant SVR](https://github.com/Jasonleonardvolk/invariant-svr) all do a form of this,
|
|
218
|
+
and some are ahead of us on standardisation — Acta and Emilia both have IETF
|
|
219
|
+
Internet-Drafts. Related research: Aegon (arXiv 2604.06693), Decentralised Trust Layers
|
|
220
|
+
(ACM Web Conf 2026), and ISO/IEC TS 27560:2023 for signed consent records.
|
|
221
|
+
|
|
222
|
+
Those receipts attest to what an agent **did**. A Conarium receipt attests to what the
|
|
223
|
+
model was **prevented from seeing** — because the component that masks the data is the
|
|
224
|
+
same component that signs the record. Enforcement and evidence are one part here, not
|
|
225
|
+
two systems that have to be reconciled.
|
|
226
|
+
|
|
227
|
+
What we will defend: Conarium is the only implementation we are aware of that combines
|
|
228
|
+
all three of **(1) inline enforcement** (policy + masking), **(2) a portable,
|
|
229
|
+
offline-verifiable receipt** of that enforcement, and **(3) coverage
|
|
230
|
+
reconciliation** — checking the database's own query counters against the receipt
|
|
231
|
+
chain, so access that bypassed the gateway is surfaced instead of staying
|
|
232
|
+
invisible. Signing receipts without enforcing is common; enforcing without
|
|
233
|
+
portable receipts is common; reconciling both sides against the data source's
|
|
234
|
+
own bookkeeping is the part we have not found elsewhere. Measured end to end on
|
|
235
|
+
a real operating company's live ERP — 121,374 records, 121,366 identities
|
|
236
|
+
masked, 485,496 fields masked, zero leaked to the model
|
|
237
|
+
([Governance Report 001](https://conarium.dev/report-001.html)).
|
|
238
|
+
|
|
239
|
+
That claim is hedged on purpose, and [`docs/PRIOR-ART.md`](docs/PRIOR-ART.md) is the
|
|
240
|
+
evidence behind it: ten projects checked on 6 August 2026, what each one has, the
|
|
241
|
+
closest academic prior art ([Sello / *Notarized Agents*](https://arxiv.org/html/2606.04193v1),
|
|
242
|
+
which names this gap better than we did), and nine things we could **not** verify. If
|
|
243
|
+
you know of an implementation combining all three, open an issue and it will be
|
|
244
|
+
corrected.
|
|
245
|
+
|
|
246
|
+
---
|
|
247
|
+
|
|
248
|
+
## 🏗️ Architecture (The Trifecta)
|
|
249
|
+
|
|
250
|
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Conarium operates on a strict tripartite architecture, balancing power between three pillars:
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```mermaid
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graph LR
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A([AI Assistant\nCursor / Copilot]) -- "MCP Query" --> B{The Gateway\nConarium Proxy};
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B -- "Intercept & Parse" --> C[The Engine\nGovernance & Regex];
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C -- "Execute Query" --> D[(Your Database\nPostgres)];
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D -- "Raw Data" --> C;
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C -- "Mask & Cap" --> B;
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B -- "Sanitized Data" --> A;
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C -. "Write Log" .-> E[The Ledger\nAudit DB];
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style A fill:#05070f,stroke:#5a8cff,stroke-width:2px,color:#fff
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style B fill:#05070f,stroke:#ff6f80,stroke-width:2px,color:#fff
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style C fill:#05070f,stroke:#6fe0e0,stroke-width:2px,color:#fff
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style D fill:#05070f,stroke:#f2d79a,stroke-width:2px,color:#fff
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style E fill:#05070f,stroke:#838dad,stroke-width:2px,color:#fff
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```
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1. **The Gateway:** A proxy that speaks fluently to LLM assistants.
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2. **The Engine:** Evaluates JSON policies, regex scans, and row caps in milliseconds.
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3. **The Ledger:** An immutable audit log recording every query and decision.
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---
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## 🚀 Quick Start
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Conarium runs from source today. `@conarium-ai/core` is **not on the npm
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registry yet** — do not expect `npx @conarium-ai/core` to work until it is
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published. The commands below are what works now.
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```bash
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# 1. Clone & install
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git clone https://github.com/dogrucanemek-alt/conarium.git
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cd conarium
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npm install && npm run build
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+
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# 2. Write a fail-closed skeleton (config + Ed25519 pair + .keyid sidecars)
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node bin/conarium-init.mjs
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export CONARIUM_AUDIT_SIGNING_KEY="$PWD/audit-ed25519.pem"
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+
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# 3. Check the install before trusting it
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node bin/conarium-doctor.mjs --no-net
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+
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# 4. Point the generated conarium.config.json at your read-only DSN,
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# fill policy.allowTables, then run the governed MCP gateway
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npm start
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|
+
```
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+
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+
`conarium-init` refuses to overwrite existing files unless you pass `--force`.
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It never prints the private key — only its path.
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+
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When the package is on npm, the same binaries will ship in the tarball
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(`conarium-init`, `conarium-doctor`, `conarium-verify`). Until then, run them
|
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+
from this repository as above.
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+
|
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|
+
### Before you file a bug: run the doctor
|
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|
+
|
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|
+
`conarium-doctor` checks the things that fail quietly. Two of them matter most:
|
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+
a **missing config file does not stop the gateway** — it starts with zero
|
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|
+
connectors and governs nothing — and a **connector that cannot connect is logged,
|
|
311
|
+
not raised**, so the process looks healthy while serving nothing. The doctor also
|
|
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|
+
catches the missing `<pubkey>.keyid` sidecar, which makes every receipt verify as
|
|
313
|
+
`13` (reads like tampering, isn't).
|
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|
+
|
|
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|
+
It exits `0` when clean and `1` when something is wrong, so it can gate a
|
|
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|
+
deployment. **It never prints a secret** — passwords, tokens and key material are
|
|
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|
+
reported as shape only (`postgresql://appuser@db.internal:5432/prod (password
|
|
318
|
+
set, not shown)`), which means the output is safe to paste into an issue or an
|
|
319
|
+
email.
|
|
320
|
+
|
|
321
|
+
Conarium speaks MCP over **stdio**, so your AI assistant launches it as a command. Add this to your MCP client config (e.g. Cursor):
|
|
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|
+
|
|
323
|
+
```json
|
|
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|
+
{
|
|
325
|
+
"mcpServers": {
|
|
326
|
+
"conarium": { "command": "node", "args": ["dist/index.js"] }
|
|
327
|
+
}
|
|
328
|
+
}
|
|
329
|
+
```
|
|
330
|
+
|
|
331
|
+
## ⚙️ Configuration (Policy as Code)
|
|
332
|
+
|
|
333
|
+
Control access using a simple `conarium.json` policy file:
|
|
334
|
+
|
|
335
|
+
```json
|
|
336
|
+
{
|
|
337
|
+
"maxRows": 50,
|
|
338
|
+
"allowTables": ["public.customers", "public.orders"],
|
|
339
|
+
"denyTables": ["public.secrets", "public.financials"],
|
|
340
|
+
"maskColumns": ["email", "ssn", "*.card", "*.api_key"],
|
|
341
|
+
"allowConnectors": ["postgres-main", "docs"]
|
|
342
|
+
}
|
|
343
|
+
```
|
|
344
|
+
|
|
345
|
+
Anything not in `allowTables` is denied by default; matched `maskColumns` are redacted to `[MASKED]` before the data ever reaches the model.
|
|
346
|
+
|
|
347
|
+
> **Connectors are fail-closed.** `allowConnectors` is a strict allow-list:
|
|
348
|
+
> if it is missing or empty, **no** connector is permitted (previously an empty
|
|
349
|
+
> list meant "allow all"). If you configure connectors, you must list them here —
|
|
350
|
+
> otherwise the server refuses to start and tells you exactly which field to add.
|
|
351
|
+
> `denyConnectors` still takes precedence over `allowConnectors`.
|
|
352
|
+
|
|
353
|
+
## 🗺️ Roadmap
|
|
354
|
+
|
|
355
|
+
Conarium is **early access** — and honest about what's real:
|
|
356
|
+
|
|
357
|
+
**Shipping now:** governed MCP gateway (stdio + HTTP) · deterministic PII masking,
|
|
358
|
+
including labelled names in free text · allow/deny + row caps · per-person masking
|
|
359
|
+
profiles · immutable hash-chained audit ledger · Ed25519-signed receipt per access
|
|
360
|
+
with an offline verifier · signed coverage declarations · two-sided reconciliation
|
|
361
|
+
against the database's own counters · OpenTimestamps anchoring and an optional
|
|
362
|
+
anchoring service · conformance vectors · Postgres, Supabase, docs, OpenAPI, Jira
|
|
363
|
+
and Slack connectors · `conarium-init` / `conarium-doctor` from source (npm
|
|
364
|
+
publish is the remaining step before `npx` works).
|
|
365
|
+
|
|
366
|
+
**Next:** consent binding ([spec published](docs/CONSENT-BINDING-SPEC.md), no code —
|
|
367
|
+
patent review first) · a second independent implementation of the receipt format ·
|
|
368
|
+
per-user identity bound to an identity provider rather than an operator token map ·
|
|
369
|
+
publishing `@conarium-ai/core` to npm so `npx conarium-init` works without a clone.
|
|
370
|
+
|
|
371
|
+
**Deliberately not planned**, so nobody waits for it:
|
|
372
|
+
|
|
373
|
+
- **LLM-based "semantic" masking.** The gate is deterministic on purpose. A
|
|
374
|
+
probabilistic mask would make a probabilistic receipt, which is not a receipt.
|
|
375
|
+
- **Hosted cloud console.** Self-hosted is the claim; a hosted console would put
|
|
376
|
+
us in the data path we tell you we are not in.
|
|
377
|
+
- **SOC 2.** It audits organisations that hold customer data. We never receive
|
|
378
|
+
yours. If that ever stops being true, this line changes first.
|
|
379
|
+
|
|
380
|
+
Known gaps are listed in the README above and in
|
|
381
|
+
[`docs/RECEIPT-SPEC.md`](docs/RECEIPT-SPEC.md) rather than hidden here.
|
|
382
|
+
|
|
383
|
+
## 📜 License
|
|
384
|
+
|
|
385
|
+
MIT — all of it, including the verifier, the reconciliation tooling and the
|
|
386
|
+
anchoring service. There is no feature held back for a paid tier; what
|
|
387
|
+
[conarium.dev](https://conarium.dev) sells is support, not access to code.
|