@bongos/core 1.21.174 → 1.21.176

package/scripts/gds/grade-smoke.js

@@ -1,205 +1,7 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env node
-// Subagent grader smoke test — GDS-V3 task V3.R18 (#209) → MAS Phase 1 #395.
-//
-// Runs two synthetic ship scenarios end-to-end through the v3 multi-shot
-// subagent grader (the worker panel, cross-family model, unanimous-PASS gate).
-// Asserts:
-//
-//   - Known-GOOD ship: a tiny, complete change → grade passes (unanimous
-//                      across all shots), both axes >= threshold, zero blockers.
-//   - Known-BAD ship:  a deliberately half-finished change with a TODO and
-//                      a value_summary that overpromises → grade fails,
-//                      issues[] is non-empty and names the gap.
-//
-// Hits the real Claude API at the v3-default model (Sonnet 4.6) × shots.
-// NOT run in CI. Run manually after grader changes:
-//
-//   node scripts/gds/grade-smoke.js
-//
-// Expected wall time: 60-180 seconds per scenario (shots run in parallel; the
-// slowest shot gates). Cost ~$0.30-$0.90 total against the subscription.
-
-const grader = require('../../modules/grading/grader');
-
-// -------- Scenarios --------
-
-const GOOD_TASK = {
-  id: 99001,
-  title: 'Add a tiny pure helper: hoursBetween(start, end)',
-  description: `Add a single pure helper to src/util/time.js that returns the
-number of hours between two Date instances, rounded to one decimal place.
-Acceptance:
-- Function is exported.
-- Returns a number, NOT a Date or a string.
-- Negative differences are returned negative (end < start → negative result).
-- One unit test in tests/util.mjs covers two cases (positive + negative).
-Out of scope: anything to do with timezones; calendar-aware durations.`,
-  kind: 'feature',
-  discipline: 'engineer',
-  version_id: 'GDS-V3',
-};
-const GOOD_VALUE_SUMMARY =
-  'Added hoursBetween(start, end) helper that returns one-decimal hours between two Dates, with tests covering positive and negative diffs.';
-const GOOD_CHANGED_FILES = ['src/util/time.js', 'tests/util.mjs'];
-const GOOD_DIFF = `diff --git a/src/util/time.js b/src/util/time.js
-new file mode 100644
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/src/util/time.js
-@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
-+// Pure helper — no timezone awareness, no calendar math.
-+function hoursBetween(start, end) {
-+  const ms = end.getTime() - start.getTime();
-+  return Math.round((ms / 36e5) * 10) / 10;
-+}
-+
-+module.exports = { hoursBetween };
-diff --git a/tests/util.mjs b/tests/util.mjs
-new file mode 100644
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/tests/util.mjs
-@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
-+import { strict as assert } from 'node:assert';
-+import { createRequire } from 'node:module';
-+const require = createRequire(import.meta.url);
-+const { hoursBetween } = require('../src/util/time.js');
-+
-+const a = new Date('2026-05-13T10:00:00Z');
-+const b = new Date('2026-05-13T13:30:00Z');
-+assert.equal(hoursBetween(a, b), 3.5);
-+assert.equal(hoursBetween(b, a), -3.5);
-+
-+console.log('time helper ok');
-`;
-
-const BAD_TASK = {
-  id: 99002,
-  title: 'Wire up real cost-allocation for art-pipeline tasks (Stripe-backed billing)',
-  description: `Replace the placeholder cost ledger with a real Stripe-backed billing flow.
-Acceptance:
-- New table billing_charges captures one row per art-pipeline ship with
-  stripe_charge_id, amount_cents, currency, status.
-- POST /api/bongos/cost on art-pipeline tasks creates a Stripe charge against
-  the configured Hermeslines customer and writes the billing_charges row.
-- A failure to charge rolls the cost-log insert back so we never claim a
-  charge that didn't happen.
-- One smoke test that exercises the charge → row → rollback paths.
-Out of scope: refund flow.`,
-  kind: 'feature',
-  discipline: 'engineer',
-  version_id: 'GDS-V3',
-};
-const BAD_VALUE_SUMMARY =
-  'Wired up real Stripe-backed billing for art-pipeline cost allocation.';
-const BAD_CHANGED_FILES = ['src/bongos/billing.js'];
-const BAD_DIFF = `diff --git a/src/bongos/billing.js b/src/bongos/billing.js
-new file mode 100644
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/src/bongos/billing.js
-@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
-+// TODO(V3.R18 smoke): hook up the Stripe SDK.
-+// For now this is a stub so the ship can land — the actual Stripe call,
-+// the billing_charges table, the smoke test, and the rollback path are
-+// all still to do.
-+
-+async function chargeForArtShip(taskId, amountCents) {
-+  // FIXME: doesn't actually charge anything.
-+  console.log('would charge', taskId, amountCents);
-+  return { stripe_charge_id: 'demo_' + taskId, status: 'demo' };
-+}
-+
-+module.exports = { chargeForArtShip };
-`;
-
-// -------- Helpers --------
-
-function summarize(result, label) {
-  console.log('');
-  console.log('===========================================================');
-  console.log(`${label}`);
-  console.log('===========================================================');
-  console.log(`passed:     ${result.passed}`);
-  console.log(`score:      ${result.score}/10 (threshold ${result.threshold})`);
-  console.log(`functional_fidelity: ${result.rubric_scores?.functional_fidelity ?? '-'}/10`);
-  console.log(`code_quality:        ${result.rubric_scores?.code_quality ?? '-'}/10`);
-  console.log(`confidence:          ${result.signals?.confidence ?? '-'}`);
-  // v3 multi-shot aggregated result exposes total_ms (wall time across N
-  // parallel shots); v2 single-shot exposed run_ms. Prefer total_ms; fall
-  // back to run_ms so single-shot diagnostics still print something.
-  console.log(`wall_ms:             ${result.signals?.total_ms ?? result.signals?.run_ms ?? '-'}`);
-  if (result.signals?.shot_count) {
-    console.log(`shots:               ${result.signals.shot_count}× (aggregation: ${result.signals.shot_aggregation ?? '?'})`);
-  }
-  if (result.issues?.length) {
-    console.log(`issues (${result.issues.length}):`);
-    for (const it of result.issues) {
-      console.log(`  [${it.severity || '?'}] ${it.file || '?'} — ${it.summary || ''}`);
-    }
-  }
-  if (result.signals?.parse_error || result.signals?.schema_error || result.signals?.subprocess_error) {
-    console.log(`signals.parse_error:      ${result.signals.parse_error ?? false}`);
-    console.log(`signals.schema_error:     ${result.signals.schema_error ?? false}`);
-    console.log(`signals.subprocess_error: ${result.signals.subprocess_error ?? null}`);
-  }
-  console.log('');
-  console.log('--- notes_md ---');
-  console.log(result.notes_md);
-}
-
-// -------- Main --------
-
-(async () => {
-  console.log(`Running subagent grader smoke (v${grader.VERSION}, model=${grader.DEFAULT_GRADER_MODEL}, ${grader.WORKERS.DEFAULT_PANEL.length}-worker panel, threshold=${grader.THRESHOLD})`);
-  console.log(`Two scenarios will run sequentially. Each runs the ${grader.WORKERS.DEFAULT_PANEL.length}-worker panel.`);
-
-  let assertFailures = 0;
-
-  // Scenario 1: known-GOOD ship
-  console.log('\n>>> Scenario 1: known-GOOD ship (tiny, complete change)');
-  const good = await grader.gradeSubagent({
-    task: GOOD_TASK,
-    valueSummary: GOOD_VALUE_SUMMARY,
-    diff: GOOD_DIFF,
-    changedFiles: GOOD_CHANGED_FILES,
-  });
-  summarize(good, 'Scenario 1: known-GOOD');
-  if (!good.passed) {
-    console.error('ASSERT FAIL: known-GOOD ship did not pass the grader.');
-    assertFailures++;
-  }
-  const goodBlockers = (good.issues || []).filter((i) => i.severity === 'blocker').length;
-  if (goodBlockers > 0) {
-    console.error(`ASSERT FAIL: known-GOOD ship has ${goodBlockers} blocker issues.`);
-    assertFailures++;
-  }
-
-  // Scenario 2: known-BAD ship
-  console.log('\n>>> Scenario 2: known-BAD ship (TODO/FIXME, value_summary overpromises)');
-  const bad = await grader.gradeSubagent({
-    task: BAD_TASK,
-    valueSummary: BAD_VALUE_SUMMARY,
-    diff: BAD_DIFF,
-    changedFiles: BAD_CHANGED_FILES,
-  });
-  summarize(bad, 'Scenario 2: known-BAD');
-  if (bad.passed) {
-    console.error('ASSERT FAIL: known-BAD ship passed the grader (it should not).');
-    assertFailures++;
-  }
-  if ((bad.issues || []).length === 0) {
-    console.error('ASSERT FAIL: known-BAD ship produced zero issues — expected at least one.');
-    assertFailures++;
-  }
-
-  console.log('');
-  console.log('===========================================================');
-  if (assertFailures === 0) {
-    console.log('Smoke OK — grader gate works as expected (good passes, bad fails with issues).');
-    process.exit(0);
-  } else {
-    console.error(`Smoke FAILED — ${assertFailures} assertion(s) did not hold.`);
-    process.exit(1);
-  }
-})().catch((err) => {
-  console.error('Smoke crashed:', err);
-  process.exit(2);
-});
+// scripts/gds/grade-smoke.js — @bongos-forwarder (task 1004848). Generated by
+// scripts/bongos/codemod-rename-scripts-gds.js; do not edit.
+// The real script is scripts/bongos/grade-smoke.js. This forwarder keeps callers that still name
+// the old path working, and warns once so they get repointed. Task 1003706 removes it.
+'use strict';
+require('../bongos/forwarder.js').forward(module, 'grade-smoke.js');

package/scripts/gds/home-isolation-guard.js

@@ -1,126 +1,6 @@
+// scripts/gds/home-isolation-guard.js — @bongos-forwarder (task 1004848). Generated by
+// scripts/bongos/codemod-rename-scripts-gds.js; do not edit.
+// The real script is scripts/bongos/home-isolation-guard.js. This forwarder keeps callers that still name
+// the old path working, and warns once so they get repointed. Task 1003706 removes it.
 'use strict';
-
-// scripts/gds/home-isolation-guard.js — setting HOME for a child process isolates
-// nothing on Windows (task 1003763).
-//
-// THE DEFECT, three times now. os.homedir() reads USERPROFILE on win32 and never
-// consults HOME, so `env: { ...process.env, HOME: tmp }` leaves the child looking at
-// the DEVELOPER'S REAL home — and therefore their real CLI session.
-//
-//   tests/cli_sessions.mjs  (task 1003760) — DESTROYED the developer's live session.
-//   tests/cli_surface.mjs   (task 1003941) — guidance printers took the authenticated
-//                                            branch, so the test failed for a false
-//                                            reason on any signed-in Windows box.
-//   tests/cli_package.mjs   (task 1003763) — an unauthenticated-path assertion could
-//                                            pass because the machine was signed in.
-//
-// The last two are the dangerous shape: a test that isolates nothing does not
-// announce itself, it just quietly stops testing what its comment says it tests.
-//
-// WHY A GUARD AND NOT THREE FIXES. Three sites, three separate tasks, each found by
-// accident. tests/memory_pull.mjs, tests/redteam_patrol.mjs and
-// tests/setup_device_flow_fallback.mjs already do it correctly, so the convention
-// exists and is simply easy to miss — which is the definition of something CI should
-// hold rather than a reviewer.
-
-const fs = require('node:fs');
-const path = require('node:path');
-
-const REPO_ROOT = path.resolve(__dirname, '..', '..');
-const TESTS_DIR = path.join(REPO_ROOT, 'tests');
-
-// WHAT COUNTS AS A SPAWN ENV. Only a literal that SPREADS process.env and assigns
-// HOME — that is the shape every real defect had. Two narrowings, both learned by
-// getting this wrong on the first run against the tree:
-//
-//   - COMMENTS ARE STRIPPED. All three fixed files now explain the bug by QUOTING
-//     the broken line, so a raw text scan reports the very files that fixed it.
-//   - A HELPER'S CALL SITE IS NOT A SPAWN ENV. tests/setup_smoke.mjs passes
-//     `{ HOME: fakeHome }` to its own runSetup(), which adds USERPROFILE itself.
-//     Requiring `...process.env` in the same literal distinguishes 'building a
-//     child's environment' from 'passing an option to a function', and flags the
-//     helper rather than each of its callers — which is where the fix belongs.
-const HOME_ASSIGN_RE = /(^|[{,\s])HOME\s*:/;
-const USERPROFILE_RE = /(^|[{,\s])USERPROFILE\s*:/;
-const PROCESS_ENV_RE = /\.\.\.process\.env/;
-
-// Strip line and block comments so prose ABOUT the bug is not read as the bug.
-// Errs toward keeping text (a guard should fail loud, not quiet): only the two
-// unambiguous comment forms are removed.
-function stripComments(src) {
-  return String(src || '')
-    .replace(/\/\*[\s\S]*?\*\//g, '')
-    .replace(/(^|[^:])\/\/.*$/gm, '$1');
-}
-
-// Files where HOME is the SUBJECT rather than an isolation mechanism, named in task
-// 1003763. An allowlist entry is a claim that the file means something else by HOME,
-// so each one says which.
-const ALLOW = new Map([
-  ['scrubber_corpus.mjs', "HOME:'/root' is literal corpus DATA — a string the scrubber is asked to redact, not an env handed to a child"],
-  ['lib_sh_resolution.mjs', 'exercises POSIX shell HOME resolution; HOME is the thing under test, and a win32 variable would change the subject'],
-  ['home_isolation_guard.mjs', "this guard's OWN tests carry the broken shape as fixture strings — it must not report its own corpus, the same way category-advisory-guard.js had to stop matching its own filename"],
-]);
-
-// PURE — the lines that build a child env with HOME and no USERPROFILE. Exported so
-// the matching is testable without the tree: a scanner whose pattern silently stops
-// matching reports a clean repo, which is the failure mode this whole file is about.
-function offendingLines(src) {
-  const lines = stripComments(src).split('\n');
-  const out = [];
-  for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
-    if (!HOME_ASSIGN_RE.test(lines[i])) continue;
-    // A literal can wrap: read a small window either side for its companions.
-    const window = lines.slice(Math.max(0, i - 4), i + 5).join('\n');
-    if (!PROCESS_ENV_RE.test(window)) continue;   // an option object, not a child env
-    if (USERPROFILE_RE.test(window)) continue;    // already isolated properly
-    out.push({ line: i + 1, text: lines[i].trim() });
-  }
-  return out;
-}
-function checkHomeIsolation() {
-  const name = 'a child env that sets HOME also sets USERPROFILE (task 1003763)';
-  let names = [];
-  try {
-    names = fs.readdirSync(TESTS_DIR).filter((f) => f.endsWith('.mjs'));
-  } catch (e) {
-    return { name, ok: true, hardFail: false, violations: [], warnings: [`tests/ unreadable: ${e.message}`], note: 'skipped.' };
-  }
-  // The scan must not pass by finding nothing.
-  if (names.length === 0) {
-    return {
-      name, ok: false, hardFail: true,
-      violations: ['no tests/*.mjs found at all — that is a broken scan, not a clean one'],
-      warnings: [], note: 'the scan produced an empty file set.',
-    };
-  }
-
-  const violations = [];
-  let scanned = 0;
-  let sitesSeen = 0;
-  for (const n of names) {
-    const src = fs.readFileSync(path.join(TESTS_DIR, n), 'utf8');
-    scanned += 1;
-    const hits = offendingLines(src);
-    if (HOME_ASSIGN_RE.test(stripComments(src)) && PROCESS_ENV_RE.test(stripComments(src))) sitesSeen += 1;
-    if (ALLOW.has(n)) continue;
-    for (const h of hits) {
-      violations.push(`tests/${n}:${h.line} sets HOME for a child without USERPROFILE — \`${h.text.slice(0, 90)}\`. `
-        + 'On Windows os.homedir() reads USERPROFILE and ignores HOME, so this isolates NOTHING: the child sees the '
-        + 'developer\'s real home and real session, and an unauthenticated-path assertion can pass because the machine '
-        + 'happens to be signed in. Set USERPROFILE (and HOMEDRIVE/HOMEPATH) to the same directory.');
-    }
-  }
-
-  return {
-    name,
-    ok: violations.length === 0,
-    hardFail: violations.length > 0,
-    violations,
-    warnings: [],
-    note: `${scanned} test file(s) scanned, ${sitesSeen} of them build a child env with HOME; ${ALLOW.size} allowlisted where HOME is the subject rather than the isolation. `
-      + 'Three separate tasks (1003760, 1003941, 1003763) fixed this one site at a time before it was worth a check.',
-  };
-}
-
-module.exports = { checkHomeIsolation, offendingLines, stripComments, ALLOW, HOME_ASSIGN_RE, USERPROFILE_RE, PROCESS_ENV_RE };
+require('../bongos/forwarder.js').forward(module, 'home-isolation-guard.js');

package/scripts/gds/hooks/pre-push.js

@@ -1,211 +1,7 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env node
-// scripts/gds/hooks/pre-push.js — client-side push gate (SEC #863).
-//
-// Invoked via the tracked .husky/pre-push wrapper. Inert until a clone runs
-// scripts/gds/install-git-hooks.js (from /builder-setup), which points
-// core.hooksPath at .husky/ — activation is per-clone (task 1002608; ADR 0043
-// §"G-2/G-17 resolution"). The published core artifact excludes .husky/
-// (publish-manifest.js PROTECTED_TOPOLOGY_EXCLUDE) — instance topology.
-// This is LAYER 1 of the #863 fix — fast, cooperative, blocks
-// the honest builder before a bad push ever leaves the machine. It is NOT a
-// trust boundary on its own (a builder can `git push --no-verify` or delete the
-// hook); the authoritative net is the post-push main audit + the deploy-side
-// gate (scripts/gds/main-audit.js, LAYER 3), which read the REAL git history and
-// REAL builder ranks server-side. Layer 1 exists so the common case never even
-// gets that far.
-//
-// Two rules:
-//   1. NOBODY pushes refs/heads/main directly. Under Option A (ADR 0043) the
-//      GDS lands graded work; a builder pushing main bypasses the grader, the
-//      confirm gate, parallel-safety, and credits — exactly the #863 incident.
-//      Override for the server/operator deploy identity only: <PREFIX>_ALLOW_MAIN_PUSH=1
-//      (BONGOS_ on a vanilla instance; the legacy OTB_ALLOW_MAIN_PUSH is still read).
-//   2. A builder BELOW Metic may not push a diff that touches a permission-
-//      sensitive path (rank / permission / ship-grade / deploy / migration
-//      machinery — see src/bongos/permission-path-check.js).
-//
-// git invokes pre-push with argv: <remoteName> <remoteURL>, and feeds the refs
-// being pushed on STDIN, one per line: "<localRef> <localSha> <remoteRef> <remoteSha>".
-
+// scripts/gds/hooks/pre-push.js — @bongos-forwarder (task 1004848). Generated by
+// scripts/bongos/codemod-rename-scripts-gds.js; do not edit.
+// The real script is scripts/bongos/hooks/pre-push.js. This forwarder keeps callers that still name
+// the old path working, and warns once so they get repointed. Task 1003706 removes it.
 'use strict';
-
-const { execSync } = require('node:child_process');
-const path = require('node:path');
-
-const ppc = require(path.join(__dirname, '..', '..', '..', 'src', 'bongos', 'permission-path-check.js'));
-const { apiCall, productName } = require(path.join(__dirname, '..', 'cli-lib.js'));
-// The main-push override resolves through the branded prefix, the same reader
-// push-main.js's canonical spelling is written for (task 1001441).
-const { resolveEnv, envPrefix } = require(path.join(__dirname, '..', '..', '..', 'src', 'instance-config.js'));
-
-const ZERO = /^0+$/;
-const MAIN_REF = 'refs/heads/main';
-
-// The ONE exit code that means "the gate deliberately blocked this push". Any
-// other non-zero exit is a CRASH, and .husky/pre-push translates it back to a
-// warn-and-allow (task 1002725 / idea 1000704).
-//
-// WHY a reserved code and not the conventional 1: node itself exits 1 on a
-// syntax error / unhandled rejection, so `1` cannot distinguish "we decided to
-// block" from "the gate fell over". Reserving an unusual code means the wrapper
-// only ever fails CLOSED on a decision this file actually made — every other
-// shape (127 native abort, 134 SIGABRT, 1 syntax error) reads as a crash and
-// fails OPEN, which is this layer's documented design (the post-push main audit
-// is the fail-closed net).
-const BLOCK_EXIT_CODE = 13;
-
-// Sentinel returned by block() so each call site can `return block([...])` and
-// stop the sweep. run() must never call process.exit() itself — see the note on
-// the entrypoint at the bottom of this file.
-const BLOCKED = Symbol('blocked');
-
-function git(args) {
-  try {
-    return execSync(`git ${args}`, { encoding: 'utf8', stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'ignore'] }).trim();
-  } catch (_) {
-    return '';
-  }
-}
-
-// Files changed in a push line. New-branch pushes (remoteSha all-zero) diff
-// against origin/main so we see what the branch ADDS, not its whole history.
-function changedFilesFor(localSha, remoteSha) {
-  if (ZERO.test(localSha)) return []; // branch deletion — nothing to inspect
-  let range;
-  if (ZERO.test(remoteSha)) {
-    const base = git('rev-parse --verify --quiet origin/main') || git('rev-parse --verify --quiet main');
-    range = base ? `${base}...${localSha}` : localSha;
-  } else {
-    range = `${remoteSha}..${localSha}`;
-  }
-  const out = git(`diff --name-only ${range}`);
-  return out ? out.split('\n').map((s) => s.trim()).filter(Boolean) : [];
-}
-
-// #863-followup (finding #15): cli-lib's apiCall uses a bare fetch with no
-// timeout, so a slow/hung GDS API would block EVERY legit push that touches a
-// protected path (the hook awaits liveRank before deciding). Cap it: if /me
-// doesn't answer within LIVE_RANK_TIMEOUT_MS, treat rank as unknown — the
-// caller then warns-and-allows (the post-push main audit is the fail-closed
-// net), so a flaky API degrades to "audit catches it" rather than "nobody can
-// push."
-const LIVE_RANK_TIMEOUT_MS = 4000;
-
-async function liveRank() {
-  let timer = null;
-  try {
-    const timeout = new Promise((resolve) => { timer = setTimeout(() => resolve('__timeout__'), LIVE_RANK_TIMEOUT_MS); });
-    const res = await Promise.race([
-      apiCall('GET', '/api/bongos/me', null, { allowUnauthenticated: true }),
-      timeout,
-    ]);
-    // The loser of the race must be cleared. This used to leak: process.exit()
-    // tore the loop down regardless, so nobody noticed. Now that the hook exits
-    // NATURALLY (task 1002725), an armed 4s timer would hold every
-    // protected-path push open for the full timeout after the API already
-    // answered.
-    if (timer) clearTimeout(timer);
-    if (res === '__timeout__') {
-      console.error(`\n\x1b[33m⚠ permission gate: GDS /me did not respond within ${LIVE_RANK_TIMEOUT_MS}ms — treating rank as unknown.\x1b[0m`);
-      return null;
-    }
-    if (res && res.ok) return res.data?.builder?.rank ?? null;
-  } catch (_) { /* offline / no session */ } finally { if (timer) clearTimeout(timer); }
-  return null;
-}
-
-function block(lines) {
-  console.error(`\n\x1b[31m✖ push blocked by the ${productName()} permission gate (SEC #863)\x1b[0m`);
-  for (const l of lines) console.error('  ' + l);
-  console.error('');
-  process.exitCode = BLOCK_EXIT_CODE;
-  return BLOCKED;
-}
-
-async function run() {
-  // The operator / server deploy identity is the ONLY thing allowed to push
-  // main, and it sets this env explicitly. (Belt-and-braces; under full Option A
-  // builders never push main at all.)
-  const allowMain = resolveEnv('ALLOW_MAIN_PUSH') === '1';
-
-  const stdin = require('node:fs').readFileSync(0, 'utf8');
-  const refs = stdin.split('\n').map((l) => l.trim()).filter(Boolean).map((l) => {
-    const [localRef, localSha, remoteRef, remoteSha] = l.split(/\s+/);
-    return { localRef, localSha, remoteRef, remoteSha };
-  });
-  if (refs.length === 0) return; // nothing to push
-
-  // Rule 1: no direct push to main.
-  if (!allowMain) {
-    for (const r of refs) {
-      if (r.remoteRef === MAIN_REF && !ZERO.test(r.localSha)) {
-        return block([
-          'Direct pushes to `main` are not allowed.',
-          'The GDS lands graded work for you: run `/builder-ship` on your claimed task.',
-          'A direct push to main skips the grader, the confirm gate, parallel-safety, and',
-          'credits — this is exactly the breach SEC #863 closes (ADR 0043).',
-          '',
-          `(Operator/deploy identity only: set ${envPrefix()}_ALLOW_MAIN_PUSH=1 to override.)`,
-        ]);
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Rule 2: a sub-Metic builder may not push permission-sensitive paths.
-  const allChanged = new Set();
-  for (const r of refs) {
-    for (const f of changedFilesFor(r.localSha, r.remoteSha)) allChanged.add(f);
-  }
-  const changedFiles = [...allChanged];
-  const protectedHits = ppc.matchProtected(changedFiles);
-  if (protectedHits.length === 0) return; // nothing sensitive — fast path
-
-  const rank = await liveRank();
-  if (rank === null) {
-    // Couldn't resolve rank (offline / no session). Warn but allow — the
-    // post-push main audit (layer 3) re-checks with the real DB rank and is the
-    // fail-closed enforcement. We do NOT hard-block here to avoid bricking a
-    // Metic/Archon working offline.
-    console.error('\n\x1b[33m⚠ permission gate: could not confirm your rank (offline or no GDS session).\x1b[0m');
-    console.error('  This push touches permission-sensitive paths:');
-    for (const h of protectedHits.slice(0, 10)) console.error(`    - ${h.file}`);
-    console.error('  Allowing the push; the server-side audit will re-check with your real rank.\n');
-    return;
-  }
-
-  const result = ppc.checkPermissionPaths({ changedFiles, builderRank: rank });
-  if (result.hardFail) {
-    return block([
-      `Your rank '${rank}' is below Metic and may not modify permission-sensitive surfaces:`,
-      ...protectedHits.slice(0, 12).map((h) => `  - ${h.file}  (matches ${h.glob})`),
-      '',
-      'These files define the rank ladder, the trust boundary, the ship/grade gates,',
-      'the deploy path, and DB migrations. If a change here is genuinely needed,',
-      'raise it with an Archon — do not edit it from a sandbox/newcomer rank (ADR 0016, ADR 0043).',
-    ]);
-  }
-}
-
-// Only run when invoked directly (the husky wrapper does `node pre-push.js`).
-// Requiring this file (e.g. a test importing matchProtected logic) must NOT
-// read stdin or call process.exit.
-//
-// NOTE (task 1002725): nothing on this path may call process.exit(). Calling it
-// after liveRank()'s fetch aborts the process natively on Windows —
-// "Assertion failed: !(handle->flags & UV_HANDLE_CLOSING), file src\win\async.c"
-// — because undici's handles are still closing when the loop is torn down. The
-// abort exits 127 BEFORE the .catch() below can run, so the fail-open guarantee
-// was silently inverted into "no Windows builder can push anything at all".
-// Setting process.exitCode and letting the loop drain naturally is what keeps
-// this hook's own error handling reachable.
-if (require.main === module) {
-  run().catch((e) => {
-    // A hook crash must not silently allow a bad push of protected paths, but it
-    // also must not brick all pushes on an unrelated bug. Fail OPEN with a loud
-    // warning — the post-push audit remains the fail-closed net.
-    console.error(`\n⚠ permission pre-push hook errored (${e.message}); allowing push. The server-side audit still applies.\n`);
-    process.exitCode = 0;
-  });
-}
-
-module.exports = { run, BLOCK_EXIT_CODE };
+require('../../bongos/forwarder.js').forward(module, 'hooks/pre-push.js');