@blamejs/core 0.7.18 → 0.7.20

package/lib/config-drift.js

@@ -1,301 +1,301 @@
-"use strict";
-/**
- * config-drift — boot-time config-baseline capture + signed sidecar +
- * next-boot drift detection.
- *
- * The framework's audit chain captures DATA writes (every row, every
- * key change). It does NOT capture RUNTIME CONFIG (the operator
- * silently changed `allowedOrigins` 3 weeks ago and we have no
- * signal). config-drift fills that gap: at every boot, the operator
- * passes the baseline config snapshot they want tracked. The
- * primitive hashes it with SHA3-512, signs the digest with the audit-
- * signing key, and writes the result to a sidecar at
- * `<dataDir>/config-baseline.sig`. On the next boot, the sidecar is
- * loaded + verified + diffed against the new snapshot. Drift surfaces
- * as an audit event (`config.drift.detected`); no boot block — the
- * operator may have a legitimate reason to change config and the
- * framework's job is to make the change auditable, not to refuse to
- * start.
- *
- *   var configDrift = b.configDrift.create({
- *     dataDir: "/data",
- *     audit:   b.audit,
- *   });
- *
- *   await configDrift.checkpoint({
- *     // operator decides what's tracked. JSON-stringifiable.
- *     allowedOrigins: ["https://app.example.com"],
- *     csp:            "default-src 'self'",
- *     auditMode:      b.audit.getMode(),
- *     vaultMode:      b.vault.getMode(),
- *     dbAtRest:       b.db.getAtRestMode(),
- *   });
- *   // → { signed: true, drifted: false, previousAt: 1730000000000 }
- *
- * The signed sidecar uses b.auditSign — same SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256f keypair
- * the audit chain anchors on. An attacker who flips a config value
- * would also need to forge the signing key to update the sidecar
- * cleanly; otherwise next-boot verify catches the tamper.
- *
- * Validation:
- *   - create() opts: throw at boot on bad shape
- *   - checkpoint() snapshot: must be a JSON-serialisable object
- *   - sidecar verify failure (tampered, key rotated, missing pubkey)
- *     surfaces as `config.baseline.tamper` audit event AND the call
- *     returns { tamper: true } so the operator can decide whether
- *     to refuse boot
- */
-var fs = require("node:fs");
-var path = require("node:path");
-var auditSign = require("./audit-sign");
-var canonicalJson = require("./canonical-json");
-var crypto = require("./crypto");
-var lazyRequire = require("./lazy-require");
-var safeJson = require("./safe-json");
-var validateOpts = require("./validate-opts");
-var { defineClass } = require("./framework-error");
-
-var audit = lazyRequire(function () { return require("./audit"); });
-
-var ConfigDriftError = defineClass("ConfigDriftError", { alwaysPermanent: true });
-var _err = ConfigDriftError.factory;
-
-var SIDECAR_NAME = "config-baseline.sig";
-var SIDECAR_VERSION = 1;
-
-// Stable JSON serialization via the shared lib/canonical-json walker.
-// Deterministic key order so the same snapshot always hashes to the same
-// digest. Pre-v0.6.67 the in-line implementation silently lost Date /
-// Map / Set / Buffer / BigInt content; the shared walker handles all
-// of those + circular refs. Same bytes as audit-chain / audit-tools /
-// pagination would produce for the same input.
-function _stableStringify(value) { return canonicalJson.stringify(value); }
-
-function _hashSnapshot(snapshot) {
-  return crypto.sha3Hash(_stableStringify(snapshot));
-}
-
-function _diffShallow(prev, next) {
-  // For drift reporting only — names the keys that changed without
-  // dumping the full snapshot (which may carry sensitive values like
-  // a CSP nonce-derivation key). Operators reading the drift event
-  // get "these keys changed" + a hash on each side.
-  var changed = [];
-  var added = [];
-  var removed = [];
-  var allKeys = {};
-  Object.keys(prev || {}).forEach(function (k) { allKeys[k] = true; });
-  Object.keys(next || {}).forEach(function (k) { allKeys[k] = true; });
-  Object.keys(allKeys).forEach(function (k) {
-    var inPrev = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(prev || {}, k);
-    var inNext = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(next || {}, k);
-    if (inPrev && !inNext) { removed.push(k); return; }
-    if (!inPrev && inNext) { added.push(k); return; }
-    if (_stableStringify(prev[k]) !== _stableStringify(next[k])) changed.push(k);
-  });
-  return { changed: changed, added: added, removed: removed };
-}
-
-function create(opts) {
-  opts = opts || {};
-  validateOpts(opts, [
-    "dataDir", "audit", "baseline", "criticalKeys", "ignoreKeys",
-  ], "configDrift");
-  validateOpts.requireNonEmptyString(opts.dataDir, "create: opts.dataDir", ConfigDriftError, "BAD_OPT");
-  var dataDir = opts.dataDir;
-  var auditOn = opts.audit !== false;
-  var auditInstance = (opts.audit && opts.audit !== true) ? opts.audit : null;
-  // Multi-baseline support — each operator-named baseline lives in its
-  // own sidecar so production / staging / disaster-recovery deploys
-  // each track their own drift independently.
-  var baselineName = (typeof opts.baseline === "string" && opts.baseline.length > 0)
-    ? opts.baseline : "default";
-  // Critical-keys allowlist: drift in these keys raises severity to
-  // "high" in the audit emission so SIEM rules can page on them
-  // separately from cosmetic drift. null = every key is treated as
-  // high severity (the safer default).
-  var criticalKeys = Array.isArray(opts.criticalKeys) ? opts.criticalKeys.slice() : null;
-  // Ignore-keys: drift in these keys is excluded from drift detection
-  // (e.g. operator-tracked metadata that legitimately changes per
-  // boot). Captured in the snapshot but never flagged.
-  var ignoreKeys = Array.isArray(opts.ignoreKeys) ? opts.ignoreKeys.slice() : [];
-  var sidecarPath = path.join(dataDir,
-    baselineName === "default" ? SIDECAR_NAME : ("config-baseline-" + baselineName + ".sig"));
-
-  function _emit(action, info, outcome) {
-    if (!auditOn) return;
-    var sink = auditInstance || audit();
-    try {
-      sink.safeEmit({
-        action:   action,
-        outcome:  outcome,
-        metadata: info || {},
-        reason:   info && info.reason ? info.reason : null,
-      });
-    } catch (_e) { /* audit best-effort */ }
-  }
-
-  function _readSidecar() {
-    if (!fs.existsSync(sidecarPath)) return null;
-    var raw;
-    try { raw = fs.readFileSync(sidecarPath, "utf8"); }
-    catch (_e) { return null; }
-    var parsed;
-    try { parsed = safeJson.parse(raw); }
-    catch (_e) { return { unreadable: true }; }
-    if (!parsed || parsed.version !== SIDECAR_VERSION) return { unreadable: true };
-    if (typeof parsed.digestHex !== "string" || typeof parsed.signatureBase64 !== "string" ||
-        typeof parsed.publicKeyPem !== "string" || typeof parsed.snapshot !== "object") {
-      return { unreadable: true };
-    }
-    return parsed;
-  }
-
-  function _writeSidecar(snapshot, digestHex) {
-    // Sign over the digest (not the snapshot bytes directly) so the
-    // sidecar stays small even when the snapshot is large.
-    var signature = auditSign.sign(digestHex);
-    var payload = {
-      version:          SIDECAR_VERSION,
-      capturedAt:       Date.now(),
-      digestHex:        digestHex,
-      signatureBase64:  Buffer.from(signature).toString("base64"),
-      publicKeyPem:     auditSign.getPublicKey(),
-      snapshot:         snapshot,
-    };
-    var tmp = sidecarPath + ".tmp";
-    fs.writeFileSync(tmp, JSON.stringify(payload, null, 2));
-    fs.renameSync(tmp, sidecarPath);
-  }
-
-  function _verifySidecar(parsed) {
-    // Verify the recorded signature against the recorded public key
-    // first — this catches tampering with the digest+sig pair on its
-    // own. Then verify the digest matches a re-hash of the recorded
-    // snapshot — catches tampering with the snapshot field.
-    var sigBuf = Buffer.from(parsed.signatureBase64, "base64");
-    if (!auditSign.verify(parsed.digestHex, sigBuf, parsed.publicKeyPem)) {
-      return { ok: false, reason: "signature-invalid" };
-    }
-    if (_hashSnapshot(parsed.snapshot) !== parsed.digestHex) {
-      return { ok: false, reason: "digest-mismatch" };
-    }
-    return { ok: true };
-  }
-
-  async function checkpoint(snapshot) {
-    if (!snapshot || typeof snapshot !== "object" || Array.isArray(snapshot)) {
-      throw _err("BAD_OPT", "checkpoint: snapshot must be a plain object");
-    }
-    var newDigest = _hashSnapshot(snapshot);
-
-    var existing = _readSidecar();
-    if (existing && existing.unreadable) {
-      _emit("config.baseline.unreadable",
-        { sidecar: sidecarPath, reason: "sidecar present but malformed or wrong version" },
-        "warning");
-      _writeSidecar(snapshot, newDigest);
-      return { signed: true, drifted: false, tamper: false, previousAt: null, reason: "sidecar-unreadable-rewritten" };
-    }
-    if (!existing) {
-      _writeSidecar(snapshot, newDigest);
-      _emit("config.baseline.captured",
-        { digestHex: newDigest, capturedAt: Date.now() }, "success");
-      return { signed: true, drifted: false, tamper: false, previousAt: null };
-    }
-
-    var verified = _verifySidecar(existing);
-    if (!verified.ok) {
-      _emit("config.baseline.tamper",
-        { sidecar: sidecarPath, reason: verified.reason, previousAt: existing.capturedAt },
-        "failure");
-      // DO NOT auto-rewrite on tamper — let the operator inspect first.
-      return { signed: false, drifted: false, tamper: true, reason: verified.reason, previousAt: existing.capturedAt };
-    }
-
-    if (existing.digestHex === newDigest) {
-      // No drift; refresh capturedAt so the sidecar timestamp moves
-      // forward each successful boot (operator can see "last verified
-      // clean at <T>" in the file).
-      _writeSidecar(snapshot, newDigest);
-      return { signed: true, drifted: false, tamper: false, previousAt: existing.capturedAt };
-    }
-
-    var diff = _diffShallow(existing.snapshot, snapshot);
-    // Filter ignore-keys out of the drift report.
-    function _stripIgnored(arr) {
-      return arr.filter(function (k) { return ignoreKeys.indexOf(k) === -1; });
-    }
-    diff.changed = _stripIgnored(diff.changed);
-    diff.added   = _stripIgnored(diff.added);
-    diff.removed = _stripIgnored(diff.removed);
-    if (diff.changed.length === 0 && diff.added.length === 0 && diff.removed.length === 0) {
-      // All drift was in ignore-keys — refresh sidecar without
-      // emitting a drift event.
-      _writeSidecar(snapshot, newDigest);
-      return { signed: true, drifted: false, tamper: false,
-        previousAt: existing.capturedAt, ignoredOnly: true };
-    }
-    // Severity classification: HIGH when any drifted key is in
-    // criticalKeys (or no allowlist is configured — every key is
-    // critical by default). LOW when criticalKeys is set and none
-    // of the drifted keys are in it.
-    var severity = "high";
-    if (criticalKeys !== null) {
-      var anyCritical = false;
-      var allDrifted = diff.changed.concat(diff.added, diff.removed);
-      for (var di = 0; di < allDrifted.length; di++) {
-        if (criticalKeys.indexOf(allDrifted[di]) !== -1) { anyCritical = true; break; }
-      }
-      severity = anyCritical ? "high" : "low";
-    }
-    _emit("config.drift.detected",
-      {
-        baseline:          baselineName,
-        previousDigestHex: existing.digestHex,
-        currentDigestHex:  newDigest,
-        previousAt:        existing.capturedAt,
-        keysChanged:       diff.changed,
-        keysAdded:         diff.added,
-        keysRemoved:       diff.removed,
-        severity:          severity,
-      },
-      severity === "high" ? "failure" : "warning");
-    _writeSidecar(snapshot, newDigest);
-    return {
-      signed:      true,
-      drifted:     true,
-      tamper:      false,
-      severity:    severity,
-      previousAt:  existing.capturedAt,
-      diff:        diff,
-    };
-  }
-
-  function read() {
-    var existing = _readSidecar();
-    if (!existing || existing.unreadable) return null;
-    var verified = _verifySidecar(existing);
-    return {
-      capturedAt:    existing.capturedAt,
-      digestHex:     existing.digestHex,
-      snapshot:      existing.snapshot,
-      verified:      verified.ok,
-      tamperReason:  verified.ok ? null : verified.reason,
-    };
-  }
-
-  return {
-    checkpoint:        checkpoint,
-    read:              read,
-    sidecarPath:       sidecarPath,
-  };
-}
-
-module.exports = {
-  create:            create,
-  ConfigDriftError:  ConfigDriftError,
-  // Test-only export for hashing — operators don't need this directly.
-  _hashSnapshot:     _hashSnapshot,
-  _stableStringify:  _stableStringify,
-};
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * config-drift — boot-time config-baseline capture + signed sidecar +
+ * next-boot drift detection.
+ *
+ * The framework's audit chain captures DATA writes (every row, every
+ * key change). It does NOT capture RUNTIME CONFIG (the operator
+ * silently changed `allowedOrigins` 3 weeks ago and we have no
+ * signal). config-drift fills that gap: at every boot, the operator
+ * passes the baseline config snapshot they want tracked. The
+ * primitive hashes it with SHA3-512, signs the digest with the audit-
+ * signing key, and writes the result to a sidecar at
+ * `<dataDir>/config-baseline.sig`. On the next boot, the sidecar is
+ * loaded + verified + diffed against the new snapshot. Drift surfaces
+ * as an audit event (`config.drift.detected`); no boot block — the
+ * operator may have a legitimate reason to change config and the
+ * framework's job is to make the change auditable, not to refuse to
+ * start.
+ *
+ *   var configDrift = b.configDrift.create({
+ *     dataDir: "/data",
+ *     audit:   b.audit,
+ *   });
+ *
+ *   await configDrift.checkpoint({
+ *     // operator decides what's tracked. JSON-stringifiable.
+ *     allowedOrigins: ["https://app.example.com"],
+ *     csp:            "default-src 'self'",
+ *     auditMode:      b.audit.getMode(),
+ *     vaultMode:      b.vault.getMode(),
+ *     dbAtRest:       b.db.getAtRestMode(),
+ *   });
+ *   // → { signed: true, drifted: false, previousAt: 1730000000000 }
+ *
+ * The signed sidecar uses b.auditSign — same SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256f keypair
+ * the audit chain anchors on. An attacker who flips a config value
+ * would also need to forge the signing key to update the sidecar
+ * cleanly; otherwise next-boot verify catches the tamper.
+ *
+ * Validation:
+ *   - create() opts: throw at boot on bad shape
+ *   - checkpoint() snapshot: must be a JSON-serialisable object
+ *   - sidecar verify failure (tampered, key rotated, missing pubkey)
+ *     surfaces as `config.baseline.tamper` audit event AND the call
+ *     returns { tamper: true } so the operator can decide whether
+ *     to refuse boot
+ */
+var fs = require("node:fs");
+var path = require("node:path");
+var auditSign = require("./audit-sign");
+var canonicalJson = require("./canonical-json");
+var crypto = require("./crypto");
+var lazyRequire = require("./lazy-require");
+var safeJson = require("./safe-json");
+var validateOpts = require("./validate-opts");
+var { defineClass } = require("./framework-error");
+
+var audit = lazyRequire(function () { return require("./audit"); });
+
+var ConfigDriftError = defineClass("ConfigDriftError", { alwaysPermanent: true });
+var _err = ConfigDriftError.factory;
+
+var SIDECAR_NAME = "config-baseline.sig";
+var SIDECAR_VERSION = 1;
+
+// Stable JSON serialization via the shared lib/canonical-json walker.
+// Deterministic key order so the same snapshot always hashes to the same
+// digest. Pre-v0.6.67 the in-line implementation silently lost Date /
+// Map / Set / Buffer / BigInt content; the shared walker handles all
+// of those + circular refs. Same bytes as audit-chain / audit-tools /
+// pagination would produce for the same input.
+function _stableStringify(value) { return canonicalJson.stringify(value); }
+
+function _hashSnapshot(snapshot) {
+  return crypto.sha3Hash(_stableStringify(snapshot));
+}
+
+function _diffShallow(prev, next) {
+  // For drift reporting only — names the keys that changed without
+  // dumping the full snapshot (which may carry sensitive values like
+  // a CSP nonce-derivation key). Operators reading the drift event
+  // get "these keys changed" + a hash on each side.
+  var changed = [];
+  var added = [];
+  var removed = [];
+  var allKeys = {};
+  Object.keys(prev || {}).forEach(function (k) { allKeys[k] = true; });
+  Object.keys(next || {}).forEach(function (k) { allKeys[k] = true; });
+  Object.keys(allKeys).forEach(function (k) {
+    var inPrev = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(prev || {}, k);
+    var inNext = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(next || {}, k);
+    if (inPrev && !inNext) { removed.push(k); return; }
+    if (!inPrev && inNext) { added.push(k); return; }
+    if (_stableStringify(prev[k]) !== _stableStringify(next[k])) changed.push(k);
+  });
+  return { changed: changed, added: added, removed: removed };
+}
+
+function create(opts) {
+  opts = opts || {};
+  validateOpts(opts, [
+    "dataDir", "audit", "baseline", "criticalKeys", "ignoreKeys",
+  ], "configDrift");
+  validateOpts.requireNonEmptyString(opts.dataDir, "create: opts.dataDir", ConfigDriftError, "BAD_OPT");
+  var dataDir = opts.dataDir;
+  var auditOn = opts.audit !== false;
+  var auditInstance = (opts.audit && opts.audit !== true) ? opts.audit : null;
+  // Multi-baseline support — each operator-named baseline lives in its
+  // own sidecar so production / staging / disaster-recovery deploys
+  // each track their own drift independently.
+  var baselineName = (typeof opts.baseline === "string" && opts.baseline.length > 0)
+    ? opts.baseline : "default";
+  // Critical-keys allowlist: drift in these keys raises severity to
+  // "high" in the audit emission so SIEM rules can page on them
+  // separately from cosmetic drift. null = every key is treated as
+  // high severity (the safer default).
+  var criticalKeys = Array.isArray(opts.criticalKeys) ? opts.criticalKeys.slice() : null;
+  // Ignore-keys: drift in these keys is excluded from drift detection
+  // (e.g. operator-tracked metadata that legitimately changes per
+  // boot). Captured in the snapshot but never flagged.
+  var ignoreKeys = Array.isArray(opts.ignoreKeys) ? opts.ignoreKeys.slice() : [];
+  var sidecarPath = path.join(dataDir,
+    baselineName === "default" ? SIDECAR_NAME : ("config-baseline-" + baselineName + ".sig"));
+
+  function _emit(action, info, outcome) {
+    if (!auditOn) return;
+    var sink = auditInstance || audit();
+    try {
+      sink.safeEmit({
+        action:   action,
+        outcome:  outcome,
+        metadata: info || {},
+        reason:   info && info.reason ? info.reason : null,
+      });
+    } catch (_e) { /* audit best-effort */ }
+  }
+
+  function _readSidecar() {
+    if (!fs.existsSync(sidecarPath)) return null;
+    var raw;
+    try { raw = fs.readFileSync(sidecarPath, "utf8"); }
+    catch (_e) { return null; }
+    var parsed;
+    try { parsed = safeJson.parse(raw); }
+    catch (_e) { return { unreadable: true }; }
+    if (!parsed || parsed.version !== SIDECAR_VERSION) return { unreadable: true };
+    if (typeof parsed.digestHex !== "string" || typeof parsed.signatureBase64 !== "string" ||
+        typeof parsed.publicKeyPem !== "string" || typeof parsed.snapshot !== "object") {
+      return { unreadable: true };
+    }
+    return parsed;
+  }
+
+  function _writeSidecar(snapshot, digestHex) {
+    // Sign over the digest (not the snapshot bytes directly) so the
+    // sidecar stays small even when the snapshot is large.
+    var signature = auditSign.sign(digestHex);
+    var payload = {
+      version:          SIDECAR_VERSION,
+      capturedAt:       Date.now(),
+      digestHex:        digestHex,
+      signatureBase64:  Buffer.from(signature).toString("base64"),
+      publicKeyPem:     auditSign.getPublicKey(),
+      snapshot:         snapshot,
+    };
+    var tmp = sidecarPath + ".tmp";
+    fs.writeFileSync(tmp, JSON.stringify(payload, null, 2));
+    fs.renameSync(tmp, sidecarPath);
+  }
+
+  function _verifySidecar(parsed) {
+    // Verify the recorded signature against the recorded public key
+    // first — this catches tampering with the digest+sig pair on its
+    // own. Then verify the digest matches a re-hash of the recorded
+    // snapshot — catches tampering with the snapshot field.
+    var sigBuf = Buffer.from(parsed.signatureBase64, "base64");
+    if (!auditSign.verify(parsed.digestHex, sigBuf, parsed.publicKeyPem)) {
+      return { ok: false, reason: "signature-invalid" };
+    }
+    if (_hashSnapshot(parsed.snapshot) !== parsed.digestHex) {
+      return { ok: false, reason: "digest-mismatch" };
+    }
+    return { ok: true };
+  }
+
+  async function checkpoint(snapshot) {
+    if (!snapshot || typeof snapshot !== "object" || Array.isArray(snapshot)) {
+      throw _err("BAD_OPT", "checkpoint: snapshot must be a plain object");
+    }
+    var newDigest = _hashSnapshot(snapshot);
+
+    var existing = _readSidecar();
+    if (existing && existing.unreadable) {
+      _emit("config.baseline.unreadable",
+        { sidecar: sidecarPath, reason: "sidecar present but malformed or wrong version" },
+        "warning");
+      _writeSidecar(snapshot, newDigest);
+      return { signed: true, drifted: false, tamper: false, previousAt: null, reason: "sidecar-unreadable-rewritten" };
+    }
+    if (!existing) {
+      _writeSidecar(snapshot, newDigest);
+      _emit("config.baseline.captured",
+        { digestHex: newDigest, capturedAt: Date.now() }, "success");
+      return { signed: true, drifted: false, tamper: false, previousAt: null };
+    }
+
+    var verified = _verifySidecar(existing);
+    if (!verified.ok) {
+      _emit("config.baseline.tamper",
+        { sidecar: sidecarPath, reason: verified.reason, previousAt: existing.capturedAt },
+        "failure");
+      // DO NOT auto-rewrite on tamper — let the operator inspect first.
+      return { signed: false, drifted: false, tamper: true, reason: verified.reason, previousAt: existing.capturedAt };
+    }
+
+    if (existing.digestHex === newDigest) {
+      // No drift; refresh capturedAt so the sidecar timestamp moves
+      // forward each successful boot (operator can see "last verified
+      // clean at <T>" in the file).
+      _writeSidecar(snapshot, newDigest);
+      return { signed: true, drifted: false, tamper: false, previousAt: existing.capturedAt };
+    }
+
+    var diff = _diffShallow(existing.snapshot, snapshot);
+    // Filter ignore-keys out of the drift report.
+    function _stripIgnored(arr) {
+      return arr.filter(function (k) { return ignoreKeys.indexOf(k) === -1; });
+    }
+    diff.changed = _stripIgnored(diff.changed);
+    diff.added   = _stripIgnored(diff.added);
+    diff.removed = _stripIgnored(diff.removed);
+    if (diff.changed.length === 0 && diff.added.length === 0 && diff.removed.length === 0) {
+      // All drift was in ignore-keys — refresh sidecar without
+      // emitting a drift event.
+      _writeSidecar(snapshot, newDigest);
+      return { signed: true, drifted: false, tamper: false,
+        previousAt: existing.capturedAt, ignoredOnly: true };
+    }
+    // Severity classification: HIGH when any drifted key is in
+    // criticalKeys (or no allowlist is configured — every key is
+    // critical by default). LOW when criticalKeys is set and none
+    // of the drifted keys are in it.
+    var severity = "high";
+    if (criticalKeys !== null) {
+      var anyCritical = false;
+      var allDrifted = diff.changed.concat(diff.added, diff.removed);
+      for (var di = 0; di < allDrifted.length; di++) {
+        if (criticalKeys.indexOf(allDrifted[di]) !== -1) { anyCritical = true; break; }
+      }
+      severity = anyCritical ? "high" : "low";
+    }
+    _emit("config.drift.detected",
+      {
+        baseline:          baselineName,
+        previousDigestHex: existing.digestHex,
+        currentDigestHex:  newDigest,
+        previousAt:        existing.capturedAt,
+        keysChanged:       diff.changed,
+        keysAdded:         diff.added,
+        keysRemoved:       diff.removed,
+        severity:          severity,
+      },
+      severity === "high" ? "failure" : "warning");
+    _writeSidecar(snapshot, newDigest);
+    return {
+      signed:      true,
+      drifted:     true,
+      tamper:      false,
+      severity:    severity,
+      previousAt:  existing.capturedAt,
+      diff:        diff,
+    };
+  }
+
+  function read() {
+    var existing = _readSidecar();
+    if (!existing || existing.unreadable) return null;
+    var verified = _verifySidecar(existing);
+    return {
+      capturedAt:    existing.capturedAt,
+      digestHex:     existing.digestHex,
+      snapshot:      existing.snapshot,
+      verified:      verified.ok,
+      tamperReason:  verified.ok ? null : verified.reason,
+    };
+  }
+
+  return {
+    checkpoint:        checkpoint,
+    read:              read,
+    sidecarPath:       sidecarPath,
+  };
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  create:            create,
+  ConfigDriftError:  ConfigDriftError,
+  // Test-only export for hashing — operators don't need this directly.
+  _hashSnapshot:     _hashSnapshot,
+  _stableStringify:  _stableStringify,
+};