@blamejs/core 0.7.1 → 0.7.18

package/lib/middleware/require-auth.js

@@ -1,104 +1,104 @@
-"use strict";
-/**
- * require-auth middleware — gates routes that require an authenticated
- * user. Mount AFTER attachUser; this middleware reads `req.user` and
- * either lets the request through or rejects it.
- *
- * Rejection shape:
- *   - JSON-preferring caller (Accept includes application/json, or
- *     X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest):
- *     401 application/json with { error: "Authentication required." }
- *   - Browser-preferring caller, when opts.redirectTo is set:
- *     302 with Location header
- *   - Otherwise:
- *     401 text/plain
- *
- * Note: the Content-Type of the REQUEST is intentionally NOT a signal.
- * A server-to-server POST with `Content-Type: application/json` and no
- * `Accept` header should get the same response shape as any other
- * unauthenticated request — Content-Type describes what the client
- * SENT, not what they want back. Operators with a non-default
- * preference contract supply opts.prefersJson.
- *
- * Always emits `auth.required.denied` audit event on rejection (when
- * opts.audit !== false). The event records request method + path +
- * client IP — keys-only, no body content.
- *
- * Options:
- *   {
- *     redirectTo:    null         (optional URL for browser redirects;
- *                                   when set, prefersJson()=false rejections
- *                                   produce 302 instead of 401 text/plain)
- *     prefersJson:   function     (optional override; defaults to checking
- *                                   Accept / X-Requested-With / Content-Type)
- *     errorMessage:  'Authentication required.'
- *     audit:         true         (emit auth.required.denied on reject)
- *   }
- */
-var lazyRequire = require("../lazy-require");
-var requestHelpers = require("../request-helpers");
-var validateOpts = require("../validate-opts");
-var audit = lazyRequire(function () { return require("../audit"); });
-
-function _defaultPrefersJson(req) {
-  var h = req.headers || {};
-  if (typeof h.accept === "string" && h.accept.indexOf("application/json") !== -1) return true;
-  if (h["x-requested-with"] === "XMLHttpRequest") return true;
-  return false;
-}
-
-function create(opts) {
-  opts = opts || {};
-  validateOpts(opts, [
-    "redirectTo", "prefersJson", "errorMessage", "audit",
-  ], "middleware.requireAuth");
-  var redirectTo  = opts.redirectTo  || null;
-  var prefersJson = typeof opts.prefersJson === "function"
-    ? opts.prefersJson
-    : _defaultPrefersJson;
-  var msg     = opts.errorMessage || "Authentication required.";
-  var auditOn = opts.audit !== false;
-
-  return function requireAuth(req, res, next) {
-    if (req.user) return next();
-
-    if (auditOn) {
-      try {
-        audit().emit({
-          action:   "auth.required.denied",
-          outcome:  "denied",
-          actor:    requestHelpers.extractActorContext(req),
-          reason:   "no authenticated user on request",
-          metadata: { method: req.method, path: req.pathname || (req.url || "").split("?")[0] },
-        });
-      } catch (_e) { /* audit best-effort */ }
-    }
-
-    if (prefersJson(req)) {
-      if (typeof res.writeHead === "function") {
-        res.writeHead(requestHelpers.HTTP_STATUS.UNAUTHORIZED,
-          { "Content-Type": "application/json" });
-        res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: msg }));
-      }
-      return;
-    }
-    if (redirectTo) {
-      if (typeof res.writeHead === "function") {
-        // 302 Found — RFC 7231 §6.4.3. Not in HTTP_STATUS table.
-        res.writeHead(302, { "Location": redirectTo });
-        res.end();
-      }
-      return;
-    }
-    if (typeof res.writeHead === "function") {
-      res.writeHead(requestHelpers.HTTP_STATUS.UNAUTHORIZED,
-        { "Content-Type": "text/plain" });
-      res.end(msg);
-    }
-  };
-}
-
-module.exports = {
-  create:               create,
-  _defaultPrefersJson:  _defaultPrefersJson,
-};
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * require-auth middleware — gates routes that require an authenticated
+ * user. Mount AFTER attachUser; this middleware reads `req.user` and
+ * either lets the request through or rejects it.
+ *
+ * Rejection shape:
+ *   - JSON-preferring caller (Accept includes application/json, or
+ *     X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest):
+ *     401 application/json with { error: "Authentication required." }
+ *   - Browser-preferring caller, when opts.redirectTo is set:
+ *     302 with Location header
+ *   - Otherwise:
+ *     401 text/plain
+ *
+ * Note: the Content-Type of the REQUEST is intentionally NOT a signal.
+ * A server-to-server POST with `Content-Type: application/json` and no
+ * `Accept` header should get the same response shape as any other
+ * unauthenticated request — Content-Type describes what the client
+ * SENT, not what they want back. Operators with a non-default
+ * preference contract supply opts.prefersJson.
+ *
+ * Always emits `auth.required.denied` audit event on rejection (when
+ * opts.audit !== false). The event records request method + path +
+ * client IP — keys-only, no body content.
+ *
+ * Options:
+ *   {
+ *     redirectTo:    null         (optional URL for browser redirects;
+ *                                   when set, prefersJson()=false rejections
+ *                                   produce 302 instead of 401 text/plain)
+ *     prefersJson:   function     (optional override; defaults to checking
+ *                                   Accept / X-Requested-With / Content-Type)
+ *     errorMessage:  'Authentication required.'
+ *     audit:         true         (emit auth.required.denied on reject)
+ *   }
+ */
+var lazyRequire = require("../lazy-require");
+var requestHelpers = require("../request-helpers");
+var validateOpts = require("../validate-opts");
+var audit = lazyRequire(function () { return require("../audit"); });
+
+function _defaultPrefersJson(req) {
+  var h = req.headers || {};
+  if (typeof h.accept === "string" && h.accept.indexOf("application/json") !== -1) return true;
+  if (h["x-requested-with"] === "XMLHttpRequest") return true;
+  return false;
+}
+
+function create(opts) {
+  opts = opts || {};
+  validateOpts(opts, [
+    "redirectTo", "prefersJson", "errorMessage", "audit",
+  ], "middleware.requireAuth");
+  var redirectTo  = opts.redirectTo  || null;
+  var prefersJson = typeof opts.prefersJson === "function"
+    ? opts.prefersJson
+    : _defaultPrefersJson;
+  var msg     = opts.errorMessage || "Authentication required.";
+  var auditOn = opts.audit !== false;
+
+  return function requireAuth(req, res, next) {
+    if (req.user) return next();
+
+    if (auditOn) {
+      try {
+        audit().emit({
+          action:   "auth.required.denied",
+          outcome:  "denied",
+          actor:    requestHelpers.extractActorContext(req),
+          reason:   "no authenticated user on request",
+          metadata: { method: req.method, path: req.pathname || (req.url || "").split("?")[0] },
+        });
+      } catch (_e) { /* audit best-effort */ }
+    }
+
+    if (prefersJson(req)) {
+      if (typeof res.writeHead === "function") {
+        res.writeHead(requestHelpers.HTTP_STATUS.UNAUTHORIZED,
+          { "Content-Type": "application/json" });
+        res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: msg }));
+      }
+      return;
+    }
+    if (redirectTo) {
+      if (typeof res.writeHead === "function") {
+        // 302 Found — RFC 7231 §6.4.3. Not in HTTP_STATUS table.
+        res.writeHead(302, { "Location": redirectTo });
+        res.end();
+      }
+      return;
+    }
+    if (typeof res.writeHead === "function") {
+      res.writeHead(requestHelpers.HTTP_STATUS.UNAUTHORIZED,
+        { "Content-Type": "text/plain" });
+      res.end(msg);
+    }
+  };
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  create:               create,
+  _defaultPrefersJson:  _defaultPrefersJson,
+};

package/lib/middleware/security-headers.js

@@ -1,116 +1,116 @@
-"use strict";
-/**
- * Security headers middleware. Sets the headers every modern app should
- * send, regardless of content. Deliberately strict by default — operators
- * who need to soften a header opt in explicitly per option.
- *
- *   Strict-Transport-Security        — force HTTPS (HSTS); 2-year max-age + includeSubDomains + preload
- *   X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff  — block MIME sniffing
- *   X-Frame-Options: DENY            — prevent clickjacking via iframes
- *   Referrer-Policy: no-referrer     — don't leak full URL to outbound links
- *   Permissions-Policy               — disable common-attack APIs (camera, geolocation, payment, etc.)
- *   Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin
- *   Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy: require-corp   (off by default — breaks images from CDNs)
- *   Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy: same-origin
- *   Origin-Agent-Cluster: ?1        — origin-keyed agent cluster; extra process isolation
- *   X-DNS-Prefetch-Control: off     — don't pre-resolve DNS for off-page links
- *   Content-Security-Policy          — operator-supplied; framework provides a safe default that
- *                                       only allows same-origin and prevents inline scripts
- *
- * These are the OWASP-aligned defaults. Apps that need different policies
- * (e.g. allow-list for analytics scripts, embed iframes from a known
- * partner) override per-option without losing the others.
- *
- * Options:
- *   {
- *     hsts:                 '<value>' or false to disable
- *     contentTypeOptions:   'nosniff' or false
- *     frameOptions:         'DENY' | 'SAMEORIGIN' or false
- *     referrerPolicy:       '<value>' or false
- *     permissionsPolicy:    '<value>' or false
- *     coop / coep / corp:   '<value>' or false
- *     originAgentCluster:   '?1' (default) or '?0' or false
- *     dnsPrefetchControl:   'off' (default) or 'on' or false
- *     csp:                  '<full CSP string>' or false to disable
- *   }
- */
-
-var requestHelpers = require("../request-helpers");
-var validateOpts = require("../validate-opts");
-
-var DEFAULT_PERMISSIONS = [
-  "accelerometer=()", "ambient-light-sensor=()", "autoplay=()",
-  "camera=()", "display-capture=()", "encrypted-media=()", "fullscreen=(self)",
-  "geolocation=()", "gyroscope=()", "magnetometer=()", "microphone=()",
-  "midi=()", "payment=()", "picture-in-picture=()", "publickey-credentials-get=()",
-  "screen-wake-lock=()", "sync-xhr=()", "usb=()", "web-share=()", "xr-spatial-tracking=()",
-];
-
-// Strict CSP — no 'unsafe-inline' on script-src OR style-src. Operators
-// with inline styles / scripts wire `b.middleware.cspNonce()` and use
-// `{{ cspNonce }}` in their views (or req.cspNonce in handlers); the
-// nonce hooks into the policy via the `csp` opt or a custom value.
-// Operators in transitional environments who genuinely need inline
-// styles set `csp` explicitly to the loose form.
-var DEFAULT_CSP =
-  "default-src 'self'; " +
-  "script-src 'self'; " +
-  "style-src 'self'; " +
-  "img-src 'self' data:; " +
-  "font-src 'self'; " +
-  "connect-src 'self'; " +
-  "frame-ancestors 'none'; " +
-  "base-uri 'self'; " +
-  "form-action 'self'; " +
-  "object-src 'none';";
-
-function create(opts) {
-  opts = opts || {};
-  validateOpts(opts, [
-    "hsts", "contentTypeOptions", "frameOptions", "referrerPolicy",
-    "permissionsPolicy", "coop", "coep", "corp",
-    "originAgentCluster", "dnsPrefetchControl", "csp", "trustProxy",
-  ], "middleware.securityHeaders");
-  var trustProxy = opts.trustProxy === true || typeof opts.trustProxy === "number"
-    ? opts.trustProxy : false;
-  var hsts = opts.hsts === undefined ? "max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload" : opts.hsts;
-  var ctOpts = opts.contentTypeOptions === undefined ? "nosniff" : opts.contentTypeOptions;
-  var frameOpts = opts.frameOptions === undefined ? "DENY" : opts.frameOptions;
-  var refPolicy = opts.referrerPolicy === undefined ? "no-referrer" : opts.referrerPolicy;
-  var permPolicy = opts.permissionsPolicy === undefined ? DEFAULT_PERMISSIONS.join(", ") : opts.permissionsPolicy;
-  var coop  = opts.coop === undefined ? "same-origin" : opts.coop;
-  var coep  = opts.coep === undefined ? false : opts.coep;
-  var corp  = opts.corp === undefined ? "same-origin" : opts.corp;
-  var oac   = opts.originAgentCluster === undefined ? "?1" : opts.originAgentCluster;
-  var dpc   = opts.dnsPrefetchControl === undefined ? "off" : opts.dnsPrefetchControl;
-  var csp   = opts.csp === undefined ? DEFAULT_CSP : opts.csp;
-
-  return function securityHeaders(req, res, next) {
-    if (typeof res.setHeader !== "function") return next();
-    // RFC 6797 §7.2: HSTS over plain HTTP is meaningless (UAs ignore
-    // it). Skip the header on non-TLS requests so dev-over-HTTP doesn't
-    // surface confusing "Strict-Transport-Security on http://" lines.
-    // requestProtocol respects trustProxy — operators behind a TLS
-    // terminator opt in to read X-Forwarded-Proto.
-    if (hsts && requestHelpers.requestProtocol(req, { trustProxy: trustProxy }) === "https") {
-      res.setHeader("Strict-Transport-Security", hsts);
-    }
-    if (ctOpts)     res.setHeader("X-Content-Type-Options", ctOpts);
-    if (frameOpts)  res.setHeader("X-Frame-Options", frameOpts);
-    if (refPolicy)  res.setHeader("Referrer-Policy", refPolicy);
-    if (permPolicy) res.setHeader("Permissions-Policy", permPolicy);
-    if (coop)       res.setHeader("Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy", coop);
-    if (coep)       res.setHeader("Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy", coep);
-    if (corp)       res.setHeader("Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy", corp);
-    if (oac)        res.setHeader("Origin-Agent-Cluster", oac);
-    if (dpc)        res.setHeader("X-DNS-Prefetch-Control", dpc);
-    if (csp)        res.setHeader("Content-Security-Policy", csp);
-    next();
-  };
-}
-
-module.exports = {
-  create:               create,
-  DEFAULT_PERMISSIONS:  DEFAULT_PERMISSIONS,
-  DEFAULT_CSP:          DEFAULT_CSP,
-};
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * Security headers middleware. Sets the headers every modern app should
+ * send, regardless of content. Deliberately strict by default — operators
+ * who need to soften a header opt in explicitly per option.
+ *
+ *   Strict-Transport-Security        — force HTTPS (HSTS); 2-year max-age + includeSubDomains + preload
+ *   X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff  — block MIME sniffing
+ *   X-Frame-Options: DENY            — prevent clickjacking via iframes
+ *   Referrer-Policy: no-referrer     — don't leak full URL to outbound links
+ *   Permissions-Policy               — disable common-attack APIs (camera, geolocation, payment, etc.)
+ *   Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin
+ *   Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy: require-corp   (off by default — breaks images from CDNs)
+ *   Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy: same-origin
+ *   Origin-Agent-Cluster: ?1        — origin-keyed agent cluster; extra process isolation
+ *   X-DNS-Prefetch-Control: off     — don't pre-resolve DNS for off-page links
+ *   Content-Security-Policy          — operator-supplied; framework provides a safe default that
+ *                                       only allows same-origin and prevents inline scripts
+ *
+ * These are the OWASP-aligned defaults. Apps that need different policies
+ * (e.g. allow-list for analytics scripts, embed iframes from a known
+ * partner) override per-option without losing the others.
+ *
+ * Options:
+ *   {
+ *     hsts:                 '<value>' or false to disable
+ *     contentTypeOptions:   'nosniff' or false
+ *     frameOptions:         'DENY' | 'SAMEORIGIN' or false
+ *     referrerPolicy:       '<value>' or false
+ *     permissionsPolicy:    '<value>' or false
+ *     coop / coep / corp:   '<value>' or false
+ *     originAgentCluster:   '?1' (default) or '?0' or false
+ *     dnsPrefetchControl:   'off' (default) or 'on' or false
+ *     csp:                  '<full CSP string>' or false to disable
+ *   }
+ */
+
+var requestHelpers = require("../request-helpers");
+var validateOpts = require("../validate-opts");
+
+var DEFAULT_PERMISSIONS = [
+  "accelerometer=()", "ambient-light-sensor=()", "autoplay=()",
+  "camera=()", "display-capture=()", "encrypted-media=()", "fullscreen=(self)",
+  "geolocation=()", "gyroscope=()", "magnetometer=()", "microphone=()",
+  "midi=()", "payment=()", "picture-in-picture=()", "publickey-credentials-get=()",
+  "screen-wake-lock=()", "sync-xhr=()", "usb=()", "web-share=()", "xr-spatial-tracking=()",
+];
+
+// Strict CSP — no 'unsafe-inline' on script-src OR style-src. Operators
+// with inline styles / scripts wire `b.middleware.cspNonce()` and use
+// `{{ cspNonce }}` in their views (or req.cspNonce in handlers); the
+// nonce hooks into the policy via the `csp` opt or a custom value.
+// Operators in transitional environments who genuinely need inline
+// styles set `csp` explicitly to the loose form.
+var DEFAULT_CSP =
+  "default-src 'self'; " +
+  "script-src 'self'; " +
+  "style-src 'self'; " +
+  "img-src 'self' data:; " +
+  "font-src 'self'; " +
+  "connect-src 'self'; " +
+  "frame-ancestors 'none'; " +
+  "base-uri 'self'; " +
+  "form-action 'self'; " +
+  "object-src 'none';";
+
+function create(opts) {
+  opts = opts || {};
+  validateOpts(opts, [
+    "hsts", "contentTypeOptions", "frameOptions", "referrerPolicy",
+    "permissionsPolicy", "coop", "coep", "corp",
+    "originAgentCluster", "dnsPrefetchControl", "csp", "trustProxy",
+  ], "middleware.securityHeaders");
+  var trustProxy = opts.trustProxy === true || typeof opts.trustProxy === "number"
+    ? opts.trustProxy : false;
+  var hsts = opts.hsts === undefined ? "max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload" : opts.hsts;
+  var ctOpts = opts.contentTypeOptions === undefined ? "nosniff" : opts.contentTypeOptions;
+  var frameOpts = opts.frameOptions === undefined ? "DENY" : opts.frameOptions;
+  var refPolicy = opts.referrerPolicy === undefined ? "no-referrer" : opts.referrerPolicy;
+  var permPolicy = opts.permissionsPolicy === undefined ? DEFAULT_PERMISSIONS.join(", ") : opts.permissionsPolicy;
+  var coop  = opts.coop === undefined ? "same-origin" : opts.coop;
+  var coep  = opts.coep === undefined ? false : opts.coep;
+  var corp  = opts.corp === undefined ? "same-origin" : opts.corp;
+  var oac   = opts.originAgentCluster === undefined ? "?1" : opts.originAgentCluster;
+  var dpc   = opts.dnsPrefetchControl === undefined ? "off" : opts.dnsPrefetchControl;
+  var csp   = opts.csp === undefined ? DEFAULT_CSP : opts.csp;
+
+  return function securityHeaders(req, res, next) {
+    if (typeof res.setHeader !== "function") return next();
+    // RFC 6797 §7.2: HSTS over plain HTTP is meaningless (UAs ignore
+    // it). Skip the header on non-TLS requests so dev-over-HTTP doesn't
+    // surface confusing "Strict-Transport-Security on http://" lines.
+    // requestProtocol respects trustProxy — operators behind a TLS
+    // terminator opt in to read X-Forwarded-Proto.
+    if (hsts && requestHelpers.requestProtocol(req, { trustProxy: trustProxy }) === "https") {
+      res.setHeader("Strict-Transport-Security", hsts);
+    }
+    if (ctOpts)     res.setHeader("X-Content-Type-Options", ctOpts);
+    if (frameOpts)  res.setHeader("X-Frame-Options", frameOpts);
+    if (refPolicy)  res.setHeader("Referrer-Policy", refPolicy);
+    if (permPolicy) res.setHeader("Permissions-Policy", permPolicy);
+    if (coop)       res.setHeader("Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy", coop);
+    if (coep)       res.setHeader("Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy", coep);
+    if (corp)       res.setHeader("Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy", corp);
+    if (oac)        res.setHeader("Origin-Agent-Cluster", oac);
+    if (dpc)        res.setHeader("X-DNS-Prefetch-Control", dpc);
+    if (csp)        res.setHeader("Content-Security-Policy", csp);
+    next();
+  };
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  create:               create,
+  DEFAULT_PERMISSIONS:  DEFAULT_PERMISSIONS,
+  DEFAULT_CSP:          DEFAULT_CSP,
+};