@blamejs/core 0.15.13 → 0.15.15

package/lib/cbor.js

@@ -55,10 +55,17 @@
 
 var C = require("./constants");
 var safeBuffer = require("./safe-buffer");
+var boundedMap = require("./bounded-map");
 var { defineClass } = require("./framework-error");
 
 var CborError = defineClass("CborError", { alwaysPermanent: true });
 
+// Hoisted so the map-decode loop's per-key uniqueness guard doesn't allocate a
+// closure per key (the decode hot path).
+function _throwDuplicateKey() {
+  throw new CborError("cbor/duplicate-key", "cbor.decode: duplicate map key (RFC 8949 §5.6)");
+}
+
 var DEFAULT_MAX_DEPTH = 64;                                                            // nesting depth, not a size
 var ABSOLUTE_MAX_DEPTH = 256;                                                          // nesting depth ceiling, not a size
 var DEFAULT_MAX_BYTES = C.BYTES.mib(16);
@@ -127,6 +134,7 @@ function _encodeFloat(value) {
 // exponent must fit the half range and the low 13 mantissa bits must
 // be zero (half has a 10-bit mantissa vs float32's 23).
 function _doubleToHalfBits(value) {
+  if (value === 0) return Object.is(value, -0) ? 0x8000 : 0x0000;                       // ±zero → half zero (sign-preserving); -0 must not fall to the subnormal path
   var fbuf = Buffer.alloc(4);
   fbuf.writeFloatBE(value, 0);
   if (fbuf.readFloatBE(0) !== value) return -1;                                        // not exact in float32 → not in float16
@@ -177,8 +185,10 @@ function _encodeValue(value, opts) {
     // Exact integers within the safe range encode as CBOR integers;
     // an integer-VALUED number beyond 2^53 (e.g. 1e300) has lost
     // integer precision and is a float — encode it as a float (use a
-    // bigint for exact 64-bit CBOR integers).
-    if (Number.isInteger(value) && Math.abs(value) <= Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER) {
+    // bigint for exact 64-bit CBOR integers). NEGATIVE ZERO is excluded:
+    // CBOR integers have no -0, so encoding -0 as the uint 0 would silently
+    // drop the sign; it falls through to the float branch (float16 -0.0).
+    if (Number.isInteger(value) && !Object.is(value, -0) && Math.abs(value) <= Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER) {
       return value >= 0 ? _head(0, value) : _head(1, -1 - value);
     }
     if (!isFinite(value) && !opts.allowNonFinite) {
@@ -337,7 +347,11 @@ function _need(state, n) {
 
 function _readArgument(state, ai) {
   // ai is the low-5-bits additional info. Returns the argument as a
-  // Number (or BigInt for 8-byte values beyond Number range).
+  // Number (or BigInt for 8-byte values beyond Number range). Non-minimal
+  // (non-canonical) heads are tolerated here by design — strict canonical
+  // enforcement is the opt-in `requireDeterministic` mode (round-trip compare);
+  // duplicate keys encoded non-minimally are caught value-based in the map
+  // decoder regardless of mode (RFC 8949 §5.6).
   if (ai < CBOR_AI_1BYTE) return ai;
   if (ai === CBOR_AI_1BYTE) { _need(state, 1); var v1 = state.buf[state.pos]; state.pos += 1; return v1; }
   if (ai === 25) { _need(state, 2); var v2 = state.buf.readUInt16BE(state.pos); state.pos += 2; return v2; }
@@ -410,17 +424,26 @@ function _decodeItem(state, depth) {
     case 5: {                                                                           // map
       var mlen = _lenOf(_readArgument(state, ai));
       var m = new Map();
-      var seen = [];
+      // O(1) duplicate-key detection (RFC 8949 §5.6) keyed on the CANONICAL
+      // re-encoding of each decoded key — not its raw input bytes. A per-key
+      // Buffer.compare scan over a `seen` array is O(n²), and cbor.decode runs on
+      // raw attacker bytes BEFORE any signature check on every COSE / CWT / EAT /
+      // mdoc verify path, so a large distinct-key map is an unauthenticated
+      // algorithmic-complexity DoS (CWE-407). Keying on the canonical encoding
+      // (rather than the input bytes) also closes the bypass where the SAME key
+      // value is sent twice with different (e.g. non-minimal) encodings to dodge
+      // a byte-wise dup check and silently last-value-win — both copies
+      // re-encode identically here and the duplicate is caught regardless of the
+      // requireDeterministic mode.
+      var seen = new Set();
       for (var j = 0; j < mlen; j++) {
         var keyStart = state.pos;
         var key = _decodeItem(state, depth + 1);
-        var keyBytes = state.buf.slice(keyStart, state.pos);
-        for (var s = 0; s < seen.length; s++) {
-          if (Buffer.compare(seen[s], keyBytes) === 0) {
-            throw new CborError("cbor/duplicate-key", "cbor.decode: duplicate map key (RFC 8949 §5.6)");
-          }
-        }
-        seen.push(keyBytes);
+        var keyId;
+        try { keyId = encode(key).toString("latin1"); }
+        catch (_e) { keyId = "raw:" + state.buf.toString("latin1", keyStart, state.pos); }
+        boundedMap.requireAbsentMember(seen, keyId, _throwDuplicateKey);
+        seen.add(keyId);
         var val = _decodeItem(state, depth + 1);
         m.set(key, val);
       }

package/lib/cdn-cache-control.js

@@ -376,9 +376,13 @@ function parse(headerValue) {
         }
         continue;
       }
-      var n = Number(val);
-      if (isFinite(n) && n >= 0) {
-        out[_camel(key)] = Math.floor(n);
+      // RFC 9111 delta-seconds is 1*DIGIT — Number() would also accept hex
+      // ("0x10"), exponential ("1e3"), and surrounding whitespace, which are
+      // not valid cache-directive values. Round-trip parseInt to require pure
+      // decimal digits.
+      var n = parseInt(val, 10);
+      if (Number.isFinite(n) && n >= 0 && String(n) === val) {
+        out[_camel(key)] = n;
       }
       continue;
     }

package/lib/cert.js

@@ -125,7 +125,9 @@ function _createSealedDiskStorage(opts) {
     async readSealed(relPath) {
       var p = nodePath.join(rootDir, relPath + ".sealed");
       if (!nodeFs.existsSync(p)) return null;
-      var sealed = nodeFs.readFileSync(p);
+      // Cap + fd-bound (sealed cert/key envelope is well under 256 KiB). NO
+      // refuseSymlink: the sealed store may be operator-mounted.
+      var sealed = atomicFile.fdSafeReadSync(p, { maxBytes: C.BYTES.kib(256) });
       var plain = vaultStore.unseal(sealed);
       return Buffer.isBuffer(plain) ? plain : Buffer.from(plain);
     },
@@ -139,7 +141,7 @@ function _createSealedDiskStorage(opts) {
     async readMeta(certName) {
       var p = nodePath.join(_certDir(certName), "meta.json");
       if (!nodeFs.existsSync(p)) return null;
-      try { return safeJson.parse(nodeFs.readFileSync(p, "utf8"), { maxBytes: C.BYTES.kib(16) }); }
+      try { return safeJson.parse(atomicFile.fdSafeReadSync(p, { maxBytes: C.BYTES.kib(16), encoding: "utf8" }), { maxBytes: C.BYTES.kib(16) }); }
       catch (e) {
         // meta.json is a derived index (expiry + fingerprint), not a
         // source of truth — the sealed cert is. A corrupt meta must not
@@ -429,7 +431,7 @@ function create(opts) {
   function _loadOrGenerateAccountKey() {
     // Read sealed account JWK; generate + persist if absent.
     var sealedBuf = nodeFs.existsSync(nodePath.join(storage.rootDir, "account/jwk.json.sealed"))
-      ? nodeFs.readFileSync(nodePath.join(storage.rootDir, "account/jwk.json.sealed"))
+      ? atomicFile.fdSafeReadSync(nodePath.join(storage.rootDir, "account/jwk.json.sealed"), { maxBytes: C.BYTES.kib(64) })
       : null;
     if (sealedBuf) {
       var jwk;

package/lib/cli.js

@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ var os = require("node:os");
 var nodePath = require("node:path");
 var apiSnapshot = require("./api-snapshot");
 var argParser = require("./arg-parser");
+var atomicFile = require("./atomic-file");
 var auditChain = require("./audit-chain");
 var auditTools = require("./audit-tools");
 var backup = require("./backup");
@@ -1484,7 +1485,10 @@ async function _runMtls(args, ctx) {
           validityDays: daysP,
         });
         if (outPath) {
-          nodeFs.writeFileSync(outPath, p12.p12, { mode: 0o600 });
+          // Atomic, symlink-refusing write — a bare writeFileSync follows a
+          // symlink an attacker pre-planted at the operator-supplied --out
+          // path (CWE-59) and could expose the client key bundle through it.
+          atomicFile.writeSync(outPath, p12.p12, { fileMode: 0o600 });
           report.write("p12 written: " + outPath);
         } else {
           // No --out: stream the bytes to stdout for piping. Operators

package/lib/cloud-events.js

@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
  */
 
 var nodeCrypto = require("node:crypto");
+var numericBounds = require("./numeric-bounds");
 var validateOpts = require("./validate-opts");
 var rfc3339 = require("./rfc3339");
 var safeJson = require("./safe-json");
@@ -265,7 +266,7 @@ function parse(envelope) {
   for (var j = 0; j < keys.length; j += 1) {
     var key = keys[j];
     if (REQUIRED_ATTRS.indexOf(key) !== -1) continue;
-    if (KNOWN_OPTIONAL_ATTRS[key]) continue;
+    if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(KNOWN_OPTIONAL_ATTRS, key)) continue;
     extensions[key] = envelope[key];
   }
 
@@ -309,7 +310,7 @@ function _extIssue(name, v) {
   if (v === null) return null;
   if (typeof v === "string" || typeof v === "boolean") return null;
   if (typeof v === "number") {
-    if (!isFinite(v) || Math.floor(v) !== v) return "extension '" + name + "' must be an integer (CloudEvents has no float type)";
+    if (!numericBounds.isFiniteInt(v)) return "extension '" + name + "' must be an integer (CloudEvents has no float type)";
     if (v < INT_MIN || v > INT_MAX) return "extension '" + name + "' integer out of 32-bit range";
     return null;
   }

package/lib/cluster-storage.js

@@ -327,9 +327,13 @@ var _activeTx = null;
 // synchronous this runs atomically to completion with no interleaving.
 function _localExec(sql, params) {
   var stmt = _localDb().prepare(sql);
-  // Heuristic: if the statement returns rows (SELECT or has RETURNING),
-  // use .all(); otherwise .run() and report changes as rowCount.
-  if (/^\s*SELECT\b/i.test(sql) || /\bRETURNING\b/i.test(sql)) {
+  // Choose .all() vs .run() by whether the statement returns rows. A leading-
+  // keyword check (`^\s*SELECT`) mis-routes a WITH (CTE) read — "WITH c AS (...)
+  // SELECT ..." does not start with SELECT — to .run(), which on node:sqlite
+  // silently returns only a changes count and DROPS the rows. The shared
+  // CTE/EXPLAIN-aware classifier resolves the effective verb (and a top-level
+  // RETURNING) so every row-returning statement reaches the caller via .all().
+  if (externalDb._statementReturnsRows(sql)) {
     var rows = stmt.all.apply(stmt, params || []);
     return { rows: rows, rowCount: rows.length };
   }

package/lib/codepoint-class.js

@@ -356,9 +356,26 @@ function firstControlCharOffset(s, opts) {
   return -1;
 }
 
+// Decode HTML numeric character references (hex &#x..; and decimal &#..;) just
+// enough to expose a scheme hidden behind entity-encoding. The trailing
+// semicolon is OPTIONAL — a browser decodes `&#106avascript:` (no semicolon)
+// the same as `javascript:`, so a semicolon-required decoder lets the
+// no-semicolon form bypass a scheme allowlist. Shared so guard-html / guard-svg
+// / guard-markdown cannot drift on this (the bug class that shipped one buggy
+// + one correct copy).
+var NUMERIC_ENTITY_RE_G = /&#(?:x([0-9a-f]+)|(\d+));?/gi;
+function decodeNumericEntities(s) {
+  return String(s == null ? "" : s).replace(NUMERIC_ENTITY_RE_G, function (m, hex, dec) {
+    var cp = hex !== undefined ? parseInt(hex, 16) : parseInt(dec, 10);
+    if (!isFinite(cp) || cp < 0 || cp > 0x10FFFF) return m;
+    try { return String.fromCodePoint(cp); } catch (_e) { return m; }
+  });
+}
+
 module.exports = {
   isForbiddenControlChar:  isForbiddenControlChar,
   firstControlCharOffset:  firstControlCharOffset,
+  decodeNumericEntities:   decodeNumericEntities,
   isAsciiAlnum:      isAsciiAlnum,
   isUnreserved:      isUnreserved,
   hex4:              hex4,

package/lib/compliance-eaa.js

@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ function create(opts) {
       throw new ComplianceEaaError("compliance-eaa/bad-decl",
         "compliance.eaa.declareCriterion: decl must be an object with { conformance, note? }");
     }
-    if (!VALID_CONFORMANCE[decl.conformance]) {
+    if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(VALID_CONFORMANCE, decl.conformance)) {
       throw new ComplianceEaaError("compliance-eaa/bad-conformance",
         "compliance.eaa.declareCriterion: conformance must be one of " + Object.keys(VALID_CONFORMANCE).join(", "));
     }

package/lib/compliance-sanctions.js

@@ -368,13 +368,14 @@ function create(opts) {
 
     for (var c = 0; c < index.length; c++) {
       var candidate = index[c];
-      // Type filter: when input.type is set, skip candidates of
-      // the wrong type unless candidate is an entity (entities can
-      // be matched regardless to catch operator-side type errors).
-      if (input.type && candidate.type !== input.type &&
-          candidate.type !== "entity") {
-        continue;
-      }
+      // A sanctions screen MUST over-match on the legally-operative NAME. The
+      // operator-asserted input.type is an unverified counterparty
+      // self-classification, NOT data-driven non-match confidence — using it to
+      // EXCLUDE a name hit inverts the screen to under-match (a false negative
+      // that processes a payment which should have been blocked). So never skip
+      // a candidate on type; the name match runs against every record and the
+      // type mismatch is surfaced as a non-dispositive `typeMatch` signal on
+      // each hit for operator triage.
 
       var bestForCandidate = { score: 0, name: "" };
       for (var qi = 0; qi < queryNames.length; qi++) {
@@ -404,6 +405,7 @@ function create(opts) {
           listed:    candidate.listedAt,
           programs:  candidate.programs,
           type:      candidate.type,
+          typeMatch: input.type ? candidate.type === input.type : null,
           country:   candidate.country,
         });
       }

package/lib/compliance.js

@@ -953,7 +953,7 @@ var REGIME_MAP = Object.freeze({
  *   b.compliance.describe("not-a-real-posture");   // → null
  */
 function describe(posture) {
-  return REGIME_MAP[posture] || null;
+  return Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(REGIME_MAP, posture) ? REGIME_MAP[posture] : null;
 }
 
 // POSTURE_DEFAULTS — per-posture configuration knobs that primitives

package/lib/config-drift.js

@@ -35,7 +35,6 @@
  * @card
  *   Monitor + alert when runtime config diverges from a declared baseline.
  */
-var nodeFs = require("node:fs");
 var nodePath = require("node:path");
 var auditSign = require("./audit-sign");
 var canonicalJson = require("./canonical-json");
@@ -45,6 +44,7 @@ var safeJson = require("./safe-json");
 var validateOpts = require("./validate-opts");
 var { defineClass } = require("./framework-error");
 var atomicFile = require("./atomic-file");
+var C = require("./constants");
 
 var audit = lazyRequire(function () { return require("./audit"); });
 var auditEmit = require("./audit-emit");
@@ -163,9 +163,13 @@ function create(opts) {
   var _emit = auditEmit.gatedReasonEmitter({ audit: auditOn, sink: auditInstance });
 
   function _readSidecar() {
-    if (!nodeFs.existsSync(sidecarPath)) return null;
+    // Capped fd-bound read (no existsSync check-then-read window): the signed
+    // config-baseline sidecar is parsed + verified, so a tampered multi-GB file
+    // would OOM the reader before signature verify. refuseSymlink stays OFF: the
+    // data dir may be a symlink-mounted volume (k8s PVC). Any read failure
+    // (missing / too-large) → null, the existing "no baseline yet" behavior.
     var raw;
-    try { raw = nodeFs.readFileSync(sidecarPath, "utf8"); }
+    try { raw = atomicFile.fdSafeReadSync(sidecarPath, { maxBytes: C.BYTES.mib(1), encoding: "utf8" }); }
     catch (_e) { return null; }
     var parsed;
     try { parsed = safeJson.parse(raw); }
@@ -190,9 +194,12 @@ function create(opts) {
       publicKeyPem:     auditSign.getPublicKey(),
       snapshot:         snapshot,
     };
-    var tmp = sidecarPath + ".tmp";
-    nodeFs.writeFileSync(tmp, JSON.stringify(payload, null, 2));
-    atomicFile.renameWithRetry(tmp, sidecarPath);
+    // Atomic, symlink-refusing write. The previous hand-rolled form staged
+    // into a PREDICTABLE temp name (`sidecarPath + ".tmp"`) via a plain
+    // writeFileSync, so an attacker could pre-plant a symlink at that exact
+    // path and have the signed sidecar written through it (CWE-59 / CWE-377).
+    // writeSync uses a CSPRNG temp name opened O_EXCL | O_NOFOLLOW.
+    atomicFile.writeSync(sidecarPath, JSON.stringify(payload, null, 2), { fileMode: 0o600 });
   }
 
   function _verifySidecar(parsed) {
@@ -367,7 +374,10 @@ function verifyVendorIntegrity(opts) {
   var libVendorDir  = opts.libVendorDir  || nodePath.join(__dirname, "vendor");
   var manifestPath  = opts.manifestPath  || nodePath.join(libVendorDir, "MANIFEST.json");
   var raw;
-  try { raw = nodeFs.readFileSync(manifestPath, "utf8"); }
+  // Capped fd-bound read of the vendor MANIFEST.json (operator-bundled, install-
+  // time). refuseSymlink OFF — the vendored tree ships read-only and an install
+  // may symlink lib/. The cap precedes the alloc.
+  try { raw = atomicFile.fdSafeReadSync(manifestPath, { maxBytes: C.BYTES.mib(4), encoding: "utf8" }); }
   catch (_e) {
     throw _err("VENDOR_MANIFEST_MISSING",
       "vendor MANIFEST.json missing at " + manifestPath, true);
@@ -397,7 +407,11 @@ function verifyVendorIntegrity(opts) {
       var abs = nodePath.isAbsolute(rel) ? rel : nodePath.join(libVendorDir, relInVendor);
       var actual;
       try {
-        var bytes = nodeFs.readFileSync(abs);
+        // Capped fd-bound read (raw bytes — hashing, no encoding). Sanity ceiling
+        // so a corrupted/huge vendored file is a read-failed mismatch (caught
+        // below) rather than an OOM in the boot integrity loop. NO refuseSymlink
+        // (vendored tree ships read-only; installs may symlink lib/).
+        var bytes = atomicFile.fdSafeReadSync(abs, { maxBytes: C.BYTES.mib(64) });
         actual = "sha256:" + require("node:crypto")
           .createHash("sha256").update(bytes).digest("hex");
       } catch (_e) {

package/lib/content-credentials.js

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 var nodeCrypto = require("node:crypto");
 var C = require("./constants");
 var bCrypto = require("./crypto");
+var x509Chain = require("./x509-chain");
 var canonicalJson = require("./canonical-json");
 var safeJson = require("./safe-json");
 var validateOpts = require("./validate-opts");
@@ -1103,7 +1104,7 @@ function attachIdentityAssertion(opts) {
   validateOpts.requireObject(opts, "contentCredentials.attachIdentityAssertion", ContentCredentialsError);
   validateOpts(opts, ["binding", "subject", "referencedAssertions", "privateKeyPem", "audit"],
     "contentCredentials.attachIdentityAssertion");
-  if (typeof opts.binding !== "string" || !IDENTITY_BINDINGS[opts.binding]) {
+  if (typeof opts.binding !== "string" || !Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(IDENTITY_BINDINGS, opts.binding)) {
     throw ContentCredentialsError.factory("content-credentials/bad-identity-binding",
       "attachIdentityAssertion: binding must be one of " + Object.keys(IDENTITY_BINDINGS).join(" / "));
   }
@@ -1217,7 +1218,7 @@ function verifyIdentityAssertion(assertion, publicKeyPem, opts) {
     return _fail("public-key-required");
   }
   var sp = assertion.signer_payload;
-  if (!sp || typeof sp !== "object" || typeof sp.binding !== "string" || !IDENTITY_BINDINGS[sp.binding] ||
+  if (!sp || typeof sp !== "object" || typeof sp.binding !== "string" || !Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(IDENTITY_BINDINGS, sp.binding) ||
       !Array.isArray(sp.referenced_assertions)) {
     return _fail("signer-payload-shape");
   }
@@ -1334,9 +1335,10 @@ function _verifyIdentityX509Chain(certChainPem, trustAnchorsPem) {
   // only direct-root / self-signed leaves.
   for (var li = 0; li < certs.length - 1; li += 1) {
     var child = certs[li], parent = certs[li + 1];
-    var linked = false;
-    try { linked = child.checkIssued(parent) && child.verify(parent.publicKey); }
-    catch (_eLink) { linked = false; }
+    // issuerValidlyIssued enforces basicConstraints cA:TRUE on the parent in
+    // addition to the issuance + signature linkage — a non-CA cert cannot be
+    // an intermediate issuer (basicConstraints bypass, CVE-2002-0862 class).
+    var linked = x509Chain.issuerValidlyIssued(parent, child);
     if (!linked) { return { ok: false, reason: "broken-chain" }; }
   }
   // The top of the presented chain must chain to (or BE) a trust anchor.
@@ -1347,8 +1349,9 @@ function _verifyIdentityX509Chain(certChainPem, trustAnchorsPem) {
     if (top.fingerprint256 === anchor.fingerprint256) {
       chained = true;   // top of the chain IS the anchor (root-in-chain or self-signed leaf == anchor)
     } else {
-      try { chained = top.checkIssued(anchor) && top.verify(anchor.publicKey); }
-      catch (_eChk) { chained = false; }
+      // issuerValidlyIssued enforces basicConstraints cA:TRUE on the anchor
+      // in addition to issuance + signature (basicConstraints bypass class).
+      chained = x509Chain.issuerValidlyIssued(anchor, top);
     }
     if (chained) {
       if (now < anchor.validFromDate.getTime() || now > anchor.validToDate.getTime()) {
@@ -1427,7 +1430,7 @@ function cacImplicitLabel(opts) {
     throw new ContentCredentialsError("cac-implicit-label/bad-content-id",
       "cacImplicitLabel: contentId must match [A-Za-z0-9._:/-]");
   }
-  if (typeof opts.contentKind !== "string" || !CAC_KIND_ENUM[opts.contentKind]) {
+  if (typeof opts.contentKind !== "string" || !Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(CAC_KIND_ENUM, opts.contentKind)) {
     throw new ContentCredentialsError("cac-implicit-label/bad-content-kind",
       "cacImplicitLabel: contentKind must be one of " +
       Object.keys(CAC_KIND_ENUM).join("/"));

package/lib/content-digest.js

@@ -99,9 +99,12 @@ function create(body, opts) {
   if (!Array.isArray(algos) || algos.length === 0) throw new ContentDigestError("content-digest/bad-arg", "contentDigest.create: opts.algorithms must be a non-empty array");
   var members = algos.map(function (a) {
     var name = String(a).toLowerCase();
-    var nodeAlg = ACTIVE[name];
+    // hasOwnProperty: the algorithm name is operator/caller input; a bracket
+    // lookup lets "constructor"/"toString" inherit a truthy value off the
+    // prototype and pass the support check (proto shadowing).
+    var nodeAlg = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(ACTIVE, name) ? ACTIVE[name] : undefined;
     if (!nodeAlg) {
-      if (DEPRECATED[name]) throw new ContentDigestError("content-digest/insecure-algorithm", "contentDigest.create: '" + name + "' is a deprecated/insecure digest algorithm (RFC 9530 §6); use sha-256 or sha-512");
+      if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(DEPRECATED, name)) throw new ContentDigestError("content-digest/insecure-algorithm", "contentDigest.create: '" + name + "' is a deprecated/insecure digest algorithm (RFC 9530 §6); use sha-256 or sha-512");
       throw new ContentDigestError("content-digest/unsupported-algorithm", "contentDigest.create: unsupported digest algorithm '" + name + "'");
     }
     var digest = nodeCrypto.createHash(nodeAlg).update(bytes).digest("base64");
@@ -154,8 +157,12 @@ function verify(fieldValue, body, opts) {
     var kvp = structuredFields.parseKeyValuePiece(m);
     var name = kvp.key;
     var raw = kvp.value.trim();
+    // hasOwnProperty: `name` is the algorithm token from the untrusted inbound
+    // Content-Digest header; a bracket lookup lets "constructor"/"__proto__"
+    // inherit a truthy value off the prototype and reach createHash (proto
+    // shadowing).
+    if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(ACTIVE, name)) continue;  // ignore legacy / unknown entries
     var nodeAlg = ACTIVE[name];
-    if (!nodeAlg) continue;                                  // ignore legacy / unknown entries
     if (raw.length < 2 || raw.charAt(0) !== ":" || raw.charAt(raw.length - 1) !== ":") {
       throw new ContentDigestError("content-digest/bad-field", "contentDigest.verify: '" + name + "' value is not an RFC 8941 byte sequence (:base64:)");
     }
@@ -172,7 +179,7 @@ function verify(fieldValue, body, opts) {
     if (!Array.isArray(opts.required)) throw new ContentDigestError("content-digest/bad-arg", "contentDigest.verify: opts.required must be an array");
     for (var r = 0; r < opts.required.length; r++) {
       var req = String(opts.required[r]).toLowerCase();
-      if (!ACTIVE[req]) throw new ContentDigestError("content-digest/unsupported-algorithm", "contentDigest.verify: required algorithm '" + req + "' is not a modern digest");
+      if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(ACTIVE, req)) throw new ContentDigestError("content-digest/unsupported-algorithm", "contentDigest.verify: required algorithm '" + req + "' is not a modern digest");
       if (!seen[req]) throw new ContentDigestError("content-digest/missing-algorithm", "contentDigest.verify: required digest '" + req + "' is not present");
     }
   }

package/lib/cookies.js

@@ -96,7 +96,11 @@ function _validateValue(value) {
   // Length cap before the regex test (defense in depth — the regex
   // here is a simple character class, but the same discipline that
   // bounds longer regexes elsewhere applies).
-  if (value.length > MAX_VALUE_LENGTH || FORBIDDEN_VALUE_RE.test(value)) {
+  // Byte length, not value.length (UTF-16 code units): the cap bounds the
+  // on-the-wire Set-Cookie size, and a multibyte value is 2-4x larger in bytes
+  // than chars, so a char-count check under-enforces and a 4096-char value can
+  // emit a ~12 KiB+ header.
+  if (Buffer.byteLength(value, "utf8") > MAX_VALUE_LENGTH || FORBIDDEN_VALUE_RE.test(value)) {
     throw new CookieError("cookies/invalid-value",
       "cookie value is too long or contains forbidden control character (CRLF/NUL/;/,)");
   }
@@ -108,7 +112,11 @@ function _validateValue(value) {
 // header — never trust unscrubbed values reach the wire.
 function _scrubAttr(s) {
   if (typeof s !== "string") return s;
-  return s.replace(/[\r\n\0]/g, "");                                             // allow:duplicate-regex — CR/LF/NUL header-injection rejection appears in cookies / mail / security-headers; each is the boundary primitive for its domain
+  // `;` joins Set-Cookie attributes, so an unscrubbed `;` in Path/SameSite is
+  // attribute injection (e.g. Path=/x; HttpOnly). Domain is regex-validated
+  // upstream; Path/SameSite only flow through here, so strip `;` alongside the
+  // CR/LF/NUL header-injection set.
+  return s.replace(/[\r\n\0;]/g, "");                                            // allow:duplicate-regex — CR/LF/NUL(+;) header-injection rejection appears in cookies / mail / security-headers; each is the boundary primitive for its domain
 
 }
 

package/lib/cose.js

@@ -110,6 +110,24 @@ function _algParamsFor(algId) {
   }
 }
 
+// RFC 9053 §2 binds each ECDSA alg to ONE curve. node:crypto will happily
+// verify a sha512 (ES512-shape) signature against a P-256 key as
+// self-consistent, so without this check a COSE_Sign1 declaring ES512 but
+// carrying a P-256 key passes when ES512 is allowlisted — an alg/curve
+// confusion (the COSE sibling of jwt-external._assertAlgKtyMatch). EdDSA /
+// ML-DSA carry their parameters in the KeyObject and need no binding.
+var _ES_ALG_CURVE = { ES256: "prime256v1", ES384: "secp384r1", ES512: "secp521r1" };
+function _assertEcAlgCurve(algName, key) {
+  var want = _ES_ALG_CURVE[algName];
+  if (want === undefined) return;                                                       // not an ECDSA alg — nothing to bind
+  var got = (key && key.asymmetricKeyDetails && key.asymmetricKeyDetails.namedCurve) || null;
+  if (key.asymmetricKeyType !== "ec" || got !== want) {
+    throw new CoseError("cose/alg-curve-mismatch",
+      "cose: alg '" + algName + "' requires an EC key on " + want +
+      ", got " + (key.asymmetricKeyType === "ec" ? got : key.asymmetricKeyType));
+  }
+}
+
 function _bstr(x) {
   return safeBuffer.toBuffer(x, {
     errorFactory: function (code, msg) { return new CoseError(code, msg); },
@@ -169,6 +187,7 @@ async function sign(payload, opts) {
   var algId = ALG_NAME_TO_ID[opts.alg];
   var params = _algParamsFor(algId);
   var key = _toKeyObject(opts.privateKey, "private");
+  _assertEcAlgCurve(opts.alg, key);                                                      // RFC 9053 alg↔curve binding — refuse e.g. ES512 over a P-256 key
 
   var protMap = new Map();
   protMap.set(HDR_ALG, algId);
@@ -352,6 +371,7 @@ async function verify(coseSign1, opts) {
   var key = opts.publicKey
     ? _toKeyObject(opts.publicKey, "public")
     : _toKeyObject(opts.keyResolver(protMap, unprotected), "public");
+  _assertEcAlgCurve(algName, key);                                                      // RFC 9053 alg↔curve binding
 
   var externalAad = opts.externalAad == null ? Buffer.alloc(0) : _bstr(opts.externalAad);
   var toBeSigned = _toBeSigned(protectedBstr, externalAad, payload);

package/lib/crdt.js

@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
 
 var bCrypto = require("./crypto");
 var safeJson = require("./safe-json");
+var numericBounds = require("./numeric-bounds");
 var { defineClass } = require("./framework-error");
 
 var CrdtError = defineClass("CrdtError", { alwaysPermanent: true });
@@ -52,7 +53,7 @@ function _replicaId(opts) {
   return id;
 }
 function _posInt(n, label) {
-  if (typeof n !== "number" || !isFinite(n) || n < 0 || Math.floor(n) !== n) throw new CrdtError("crdt/bad-value", "crdt: " + label + " must be a non-negative integer");
+  if (!numericBounds.isNonNegativeFiniteInt(n)) throw new CrdtError("crdt/bad-value", "crdt: " + label + " must be a non-negative integer");
   return n;
 }
 function _maxMerge(a, b) {