@blamejs/core 0.15.13 → 0.15.15

package/lib/auth/password.js

@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ function policy(opts) {
   // Apply named profile FIRST, then operator opts on top so the
   // operator can override profile defaults per-field.
   if (typeof opts.profile === "string" && opts.profile.length > 0) {
-    if (!POLICY_PROFILES[opts.profile]) {
+    if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(POLICY_PROFILES, opts.profile)) {
       throw new AuthError("auth-password/bad-policy",
         "policy.profile must be one of " + Object.keys(POLICY_PROFILES).join("/") +
         ", got " + JSON.stringify(opts.profile));

package/lib/auth/saml.js

@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ function _verifyXmldsig(envelope, signatureNode, certPem) {
   }
   var sigMethodNode = _findChild(signedInfo, "SignatureMethod");
   var sigAlgo = sigMethodNode && _attr(sigMethodNode, "Algorithm");
-  if (!SUPPORTED_SIG[sigAlgo]) {
+  if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(SUPPORTED_SIG, sigAlgo)) {
     throw new AuthError("auth-saml/unsupported-sig-alg",
       "Unsupported SignatureMethod: " + sigAlgo);
   }
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ function _verifyXmldsig(envelope, signatureNode, certPem) {
   var refId = refUri.substring(1);
   var digestMethodNode = _findChild(refNode, "DigestMethod");
   var digestAlgo = digestMethodNode && _attr(digestMethodNode, "Algorithm");
-  if (!SUPPORTED_DIGEST[digestAlgo]) {
+  if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(SUPPORTED_DIGEST, digestAlgo)) {
     throw new AuthError("auth-saml/unsupported-digest",
       "Unsupported DigestMethod: " + digestAlgo);
   }
@@ -695,7 +695,7 @@ function create(opts) {
         if (nbHok && isFinite(Date.parse(nbHok) / 1000) &&                                          // ms→s
             Date.parse(nbHok) / 1000 > nowSec + clockSkewSec) continue;                             // ms→s
         var recipHok = _attr(scdHok, "Recipient");
-        if (recipHok && recipHok !== opts.assertionConsumerServiceUrl) continue;
+        if (!recipHok || recipHok !== opts.assertionConsumerServiceUrl) continue;   // §3.1→§4.1.4.2 — Recipient is mandatory; absent fails the endpoint binding
         hokOk = true;
         break;
       }
@@ -711,8 +711,11 @@ function create(opts) {
         var nb = Date.parse(notBefore) / 1000;                                                  // ms→s
         if (isFinite(nb) && nb > nowSec + clockSkewSec) continue;
       }
+      // §4.1.4.2 — a Bearer SubjectConfirmationData delivered to an ACS MUST
+      // carry a Recipient equal to this SP's ACS URL. Absent Recipient fails
+      // the endpoint binding (treated as a mismatch), not silently skipped.
       var recipient = _attr(scd, "Recipient");
-      if (recipient && recipient !== opts.assertionConsumerServiceUrl) {
+      if (!recipient || recipient !== opts.assertionConsumerServiceUrl) {
         continue;
       }
       var inResponseTo = _attr(scd, "InResponseTo");
@@ -745,25 +748,52 @@ function create(opts) {
       var cNotOnOrAfter = _attr(conditions, "NotOnOrAfter");
       if (cNotBefore) {
         var cnb = Date.parse(cNotBefore) / 1000;                                                // ms→s
-        if (isFinite(cnb) && cnb > nowSec + clockSkewSec) {
+        // Fail CLOSED on a present-but-unparseable bound (mirrors the Bearer
+        // SCD path at line ~708) instead of skipping the window via isFinite().
+        if (!isFinite(cnb)) {
+          throw new AuthError("auth-saml/conditions-bad-timestamp",
+            "Conditions NotBefore is present but unparseable");
+        }
+        if (cnb > nowSec + clockSkewSec) {
           throw new AuthError("auth-saml/conditions-not-yet-valid",
             "Conditions NotBefore is in the future");
         }
       }
       if (cNotOnOrAfter) {
         var cnoa = Date.parse(cNotOnOrAfter) / 1000;                                            // ms→s
-        if (isFinite(cnoa) && cnoa < nowSec - clockSkewSec) {
+        if (!isFinite(cnoa)) {
+          throw new AuthError("auth-saml/conditions-bad-timestamp",
+            "Conditions NotOnOrAfter is present but unparseable");
+        }
+        if (cnoa < nowSec - clockSkewSec) {
           throw new AuthError("auth-saml/conditions-expired",
             "Conditions NotOnOrAfter has passed");
         }
       }
-      var ar = _findChild(conditions, "AudienceRestriction", SAML_NS.assertion);
-      if (ar) {
-        var audiences = _findAllChildren(ar, "Audience", SAML_NS.assertion).map(_textContent);
+    }
+    // Audience binding — a signed assertion is bound to THIS SP via
+    // AudienceRestriction. A missing Conditions or AudienceRestriction means
+    // it is not bound here (audience-confusion: an assertion minted for another
+    // SP). Fail closed when an audience is configured; opt out only via
+    // vopts.requireAudienceRestriction === false.
+    if (audience && vopts.requireAudienceRestriction !== false) {
+      var ars = conditions
+        ? _findAllChildren(conditions, "AudienceRestriction", SAML_NS.assertion) : [];
+      if (ars.length === 0) {
+        throw new AuthError("auth-saml/no-audience-restriction",
+          "verifyResponse: assertion has no AudienceRestriction binding it to \"" +
+          audience + "\" (audience-confusion defense; set requireAudienceRestriction:false to opt out)");
+      }
+      // SAML core §2.5.1.4: multiple <AudienceRestriction> elements are
+      // AND-combined — the SP must be a member of the Audience set of EVERY
+      // one. Checking only the first let an IdP that narrowed the assertion to
+      // a DIFFERENT audience in a later restriction be accepted here.
+      for (var ari = 0; ari < ars.length; ari += 1) {
+        var audiences = _findAllChildren(ars[ari], "Audience", SAML_NS.assertion).map(_textContent);
         if (audiences.indexOf(audience) === -1) {
           throw new AuthError("auth-saml/wrong-audience",
-            "Audience \"" + audience + "\" not in assertion's AudienceRestriction (got " +
-            JSON.stringify(audiences) + ")");
+            "Audience \"" + audience + "\" not in AudienceRestriction #" + (ari + 1) +
+            " of " + ars.length + " (got " + JSON.stringify(audiences) + ")");
         }
       }
     }
@@ -1897,7 +1927,7 @@ function _verifyEmbeddedXmlDsig(xml, idpVerifyKey, idpVerifyAlg, expectedRootLoc
   // Allow either sha3-512 (framework default) or the SHA-2 family.
   var digestAlgName;
   if (digestUri === "http://www.w3.org/2007/05/xmldsig-more#sha3-512") digestAlgName = "sha3-512";
-  else if (SUPPORTED_DIGEST[digestUri]) digestAlgName = SUPPORTED_DIGEST[digestUri];
+  else if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(SUPPORTED_DIGEST, digestUri)) digestAlgName = SUPPORTED_DIGEST[digestUri];
   else {
     throw new AuthError("auth-saml/unsupported-digest",
       "_verifyEmbeddedXmlDsig: DigestMethod " + digestUri + " not supported");

package/lib/auth/sd-jwt-vc.js

@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ function issue(opts) {
       "issue: algorithm must be one of " + SUPPORTED_ALGS.join(", "));
   }
   var hashAlg = opts.hashAlg || DEFAULT_HASH_ALG;
-  if (!SUPPORTED_HASH_ALGS[hashAlg]) {
+  if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(SUPPORTED_HASH_ALGS, hashAlg)) {
     throw new AuthError("auth-sd-jwt-vc/bad-hash",
       "issue: hashAlg must be one of " + Object.keys(SUPPORTED_HASH_ALGS).join(", "));
   }
@@ -413,8 +413,8 @@ async function verify(presentation, opts) {
   validateOpts.requireObject(opts, "auth.sdJwtVc.verify", AuthError);
   validateOpts(opts, [
     "issuerKeyResolver", "audience", "nonce",
-    "now", "expectedVct", "maxClockSkewSec",
-    "requireKeyBinding",
+    "now", "expectedVct", "expectedIssuer", "maxClockSkewSec",
+    "requireKeyBinding", "requireExp",
     "keyAttestationVerifier", "requireKeyAttestation",
   ], "auth.sdJwtVc.verify");
 
@@ -528,6 +528,15 @@ async function verify(presentation, opts) {
     throw new AuthError("auth-sd-jwt-vc/iat-future",
       "verify: iat is in the future (clock skew?)");
   }
+  // SD-JWT-VC makes `exp` OPTIONAL, so the default only checks it when present.
+  // Operators with a time-bounded trust expectation (esp. for FOREIGN issuers
+  // resolved via issuerKeyResolver) pass requireExp:true to fail closed on a
+  // missing / non-numeric exp — mirroring jwt-external's unconditional exp
+  // requirement (a credential that never expires is accepted otherwise).
+  if (opts.requireExp === true && typeof jwtParsed.payload.exp !== "number") {
+    throw new AuthError("auth-sd-jwt-vc/missing-exp",
+      "verify: requireExp is set but the credential has no numeric exp claim");
+  }
   if (typeof jwtParsed.payload.exp === "number" && jwtParsed.payload.exp < nowSec - skew) {
     throw new AuthError("auth-sd-jwt-vc/expired",
       "verify: token is expired");
@@ -556,7 +565,7 @@ async function verify(presentation, opts) {
   // to its own DEFAULT_HASH_ALG (`sha3-512`) which broke verification
   // against spec-conformant issuers when `_sd_alg` was omitted.
   var hashAlg = jwtParsed.payload._sd_alg || "sha-256";
-  if (!SUPPORTED_HASH_ALGS[hashAlg]) {
+  if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(SUPPORTED_HASH_ALGS, hashAlg)) {
     throw new AuthError("auth-sd-jwt-vc/bad-hash",
       "verify: _sd_alg \"" + hashAlg + "\" not supported");
   }
@@ -638,6 +647,17 @@ async function verify(presentation, opts) {
     jwtExternal._assertAlgKtyMatch(kbAlg, holderKey);
     var holderKeyObj = bCrypto.importPublicJwk(holderKey);
     var kbParsed = _verifyJwt(maybeKbJwt, holderKeyObj, kbAlg);
+    // A KB-JWT proves holder possession of THIS presentation's bytes (sd_hash),
+    // but binds it to a verifier + a fresh challenge only via aud + nonce. If
+    // the caller processes a KB-JWT without supplying both, the aud/nonce
+    // compares below would silently skip — making the presentation replayable
+    // and acceptable at any verifier. Fail CLOSED: require both (oid4vp always
+    // supplies them). RFC: SD-JWT-VC §KB-JWT / OIDC4VP nonce binding.
+    if (typeof opts.audience !== "string" || opts.audience.length === 0 ||
+        typeof opts.nonce !== "string" || opts.nonce.length === 0) {
+      throw new AuthError("auth-sd-jwt-vc/missing-replay-binding",
+        "verify: a KB-JWT requires opts.audience + opts.nonce to bind the presentation to this verifier and a fresh challenge (replay / audience-redirection defense)");
+    }
     // Constant-time compares: the nonce is a verifier-issued replay-defense
     // value, so a short-circuiting !== leaks a matching-prefix timing oracle.
     // Matches the sd_hash check below (the framework's hash/token discipline).

package/lib/auth/status-list.js

@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ var _fromB64url = bCrypto.makeBase64UrlDecoder({
 });
 
 function _validateBits(bits) {
-  if (!SUPPORTED_BIT_SIZES[bits]) {
+  if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(SUPPORTED_BIT_SIZES, bits)) {
     throw new StatusListError("status-list/bad-bits",
       "statusList: bits must be 1, 2, 4, or 8 (draft §6.1.1) — got " + bits);
   }
@@ -249,7 +249,19 @@ async function fromJwt(token, opts) {
     list: {
       size:     size,
       bits:     bits,
-      get:      function (idx) { return _getAt(inflated, bits, idx); },
+      // Bounds-check the relying-party status read, mirroring create().get. An
+      // out-of-range index must FAIL CLOSED (throw): _getAt over-reads the buffer
+      // and returns 0 for an out-of-bounds index, and status 0 = VALID — so a
+      // credential whose status_list index points past the list would otherwise
+      // read as "not revoked", a revocation bypass.
+      get:      function (idx) {
+        if (typeof idx !== "number" || idx < 0 || idx >= size || (idx >> 0) !== idx) {
+          throw new StatusListError("status-list/bad-index",
+            "statusList.fromJwt get: idx out of range — got " + idx + ", size=" + size +
+            " (an out-of-range status index fails closed, never reads as status 0/valid)");
+        }
+        return _getAt(inflated, bits, idx);
+      },
       snapshot: function () { return { size: size, bits: bits, bytes: Buffer.from(inflated) }; },
     },
     claims: claims,

package/lib/auth/step-up.js

@@ -386,7 +386,15 @@ function parseChallenge(headerValue) {
     if (key === "error")              out.error     = val;
     else if (key === "scope")         out.scope     = val;
     else if (key === "acr_values")    out.acrValues = val.split(/\s+/);
-    else if (key === "max_age")       out.maxAge    = parseInt(val, 10);
+    else if (key === "max_age") {
+      // Defensive: a malformed max_age (non-numeric / negative) from the
+      // server's challenge must not land as NaN — a downstream `age > maxAge`
+      // comparison against NaN is always false and would silently mis-handle
+      // the freshness requirement. Omit it unless it parses to a non-negative
+      // integer, so callers fall back to their own default.
+      var ma = parseInt(val, 10);
+      if (isFinite(ma) && ma >= 0) out.maxAge = ma;
+    }
   });
   return out;
 }

package/lib/auth-bot-challenge.js

@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ var C = require("./constants");
 var lazyRequire = require("./lazy-require");
 var requestHelpers = require("./request-helpers");
 var validateOpts = require("./validate-opts");
+var numericBounds = require("./numeric-bounds");
 var { AuthBotChallengeError } = require("./framework-error");
 
 var observability = lazyRequire(function () { return require("./observability"); });
@@ -67,7 +68,7 @@ function _requireFunction(name, val) {
 }
 
 function _requirePositiveInt(name, val) {
-  if (typeof val !== "number" || !isFinite(val) || val < 1 || Math.floor(val) !== val) {
+  if (!numericBounds.isPositiveFiniteInt(val)) {
     throw new AuthBotChallengeError("auth-bot-challenge/bad-opt",
       name + ": expected positive integer, got " + JSON.stringify(val));
   }
@@ -272,7 +273,25 @@ function create(opts) {
 
   // ---- Internal staircase advance ----
 
-  async function _advanceFailure(key, req) {
+  // Per-key serialization: the failure staircase is a read→increment→write on
+  // an async store, so concurrent recordFailure calls for the SAME key would
+  // both read N and both write N+1 (lost update), letting an attacker fire
+  // parallel failures to stay under the challenge / lockout thresholds. A
+  // per-key promise chain applies advances for a key sequentially. (Cross-node
+  // atomicity additionally needs an atomic store; this fixes the in-process
+  // race the gate actually depends on.)
+  var _advanceChains = new Map();
+  function _advanceFailure(key, req) {
+    var prev = _advanceChains.get(key) || Promise.resolve();
+    var run = prev.then(function () { return _doAdvanceFailure(key, req); },
+                        function () { return _doAdvanceFailure(key, req); });
+    var tail = run.then(function () {}, function () {});
+    _advanceChains.set(key, tail);
+    tail.then(function () { if (_advanceChains.get(key) === tail) _advanceChains.delete(key); });
+    return run;
+  }
+
+  async function _doAdvanceFailure(key, req) {
     var now = clock();
     var state = await _readState(key) || {
       stage: STATE_NEW, failures: 0, challengedAt: null, passedAt: null,

package/lib/backup/bundle.js

@@ -160,14 +160,18 @@ async function create(opts) {
       },
     });
     var checksum = bCrypto.checksum(plain);
-    var encResult = await bCrypto.encryptWithFreshSalt(plain, passphrase);
+    // Bind the ciphertext to this blob's canonical relativePath as AEAD
+    // associated data. A blob copied to a different manifest entry (the
+    // restore-corruption / blob-remap attack) then fails the Poly1305 tag on
+    // restore — tamper-evident even on an unsigned bundle (manifest.aadBound).
+    var encResult = await bCrypto.encryptWithFreshSalt(plain, passphrase, entry.relativePath);
     var encPath = _encryptedPathFor(entry.relativePath);
     var destFull = nodePath.join(outDir, encPath);
     atomicFile.ensureDir(nodePath.dirname(destFull));
     atomicFile.writeSync(destFull, encResult.encrypted, { fileMode: 0o600 });
 
     var kind = entry.kind || "raw";
-    if (!backupManifest.VALID_KINDS[kind]) {
+    if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(backupManifest.VALID_KINDS, kind)) {
       throw new BackupBundleError("backup-bundle/bad-kind",
         "create: files[" + i + "].kind must be one of raw, vault-sealed, plaintext (got '" + kind + "')");
     }
@@ -205,6 +209,7 @@ async function create(opts) {
     vaultKeyEnc:  wrappedVk.encrypted.toString("base64"),
     files:        fileEntries,
     metadata:     opts.metadata || undefined,
+    aadBound:     true,   // every blob above was sealed with its relativePath as AEAD AAD
   });
   // Sign the manifest with the audit-sign keypair so a tampered
   // manifest fails verification on restore. The signer is best-

package/lib/backup/crypto.js

@@ -117,7 +117,21 @@ async function deriveKey(passphrase, saltHex, opts) {
   return hash;
 }
 
-async function encryptWithPassphrase(plaintext, passphrase, saltHex) {
+// Normalize optional associated-authenticated-data (AAD) into the
+// Uint8Array the AEAD expects, or undefined when none. AAD is NOT encrypted
+// but IS authenticated: ciphertext sealed under one AAD fails the Poly1305
+// tag when decrypted under a different AAD. Backup file blobs pass their
+// canonical relativePath so a blob remapped to a different manifest entry is
+// cryptographically rejected (the blob-remap / restore-corruption defense).
+function _aadBytes(aad) {
+  if (aad === undefined || aad === null) return undefined;
+  if (Buffer.isBuffer(aad)) return new Uint8Array(aad);
+  if (typeof aad === "string") return new Uint8Array(Buffer.from(aad, "utf8"));
+  throw new BackupCryptoError("backup-crypto/bad-aad",
+    "associated data must be a Buffer or string");
+}
+
+async function encryptWithPassphrase(plaintext, passphrase, saltHex, aad) {
   if (!Buffer.isBuffer(plaintext) && typeof plaintext !== "string") {
     throw new BackupCryptoError("backup-crypto/bad-plaintext",
       "encryptWithPassphrase: plaintext must be a Buffer or string");
@@ -125,11 +139,11 @@ async function encryptWithPassphrase(plaintext, passphrase, saltHex) {
   var plainBuf = Buffer.isBuffer(plaintext) ? plaintext : Buffer.from(plaintext, "utf8");
   var key = await deriveKey(passphrase, saltHex);
   var nonce = nodeCrypto.randomBytes(NONCE_BYTES);
-  var ct = xchacha20poly1305(new Uint8Array(key), nonce).encrypt(new Uint8Array(plainBuf));
+  var ct = xchacha20poly1305(new Uint8Array(key), nonce, _aadBytes(aad)).encrypt(new Uint8Array(plainBuf));
   return Buffer.concat([nonce, Buffer.from(ct)]);
 }
 
-async function decryptWithPassphrase(encrypted, passphrase, saltHex) {
+async function decryptWithPassphrase(encrypted, passphrase, saltHex, aad) {
   if (!Buffer.isBuffer(encrypted)) {
     throw new BackupCryptoError("backup-crypto/bad-input",
       "decryptWithPassphrase: encrypted must be a Buffer");
@@ -143,11 +157,11 @@ async function decryptWithPassphrase(encrypted, passphrase, saltHex) {
   var ct    = encrypted.subarray(NONCE_BYTES);
   var plain;
   try {
-    plain = xchacha20poly1305(new Uint8Array(key), new Uint8Array(nonce))
+    plain = xchacha20poly1305(new Uint8Array(key), new Uint8Array(nonce), _aadBytes(aad))
       .decrypt(new Uint8Array(ct));
   } catch (e) {
     throw new BackupCryptoError("backup-crypto/decrypt-failed",
-      "XChaCha20-Poly1305 decryption failed (wrong passphrase or tampered ciphertext): " +
+      "XChaCha20-Poly1305 decryption failed (wrong passphrase, tampered ciphertext, or blob remapped to a different path): " +
       ((e && e.message) || String(e)));
   }
   return Buffer.from(plain);
@@ -155,11 +169,12 @@ async function decryptWithPassphrase(encrypted, passphrase, saltHex) {
 
 // Convenience for the common "encrypt this with a fresh salt" pattern.
 // Returns the salt as hex so callers can store it alongside the
-// ciphertext in the bundle manifest.
-async function encryptWithFreshSalt(plaintext, passphrase) {
+// ciphertext in the bundle manifest. `aad` (optional) is bound as AEAD
+// associated data (see _aadBytes).
+async function encryptWithFreshSalt(plaintext, passphrase, aad) {
   var salt = nodeCrypto.randomBytes(SALT_BYTES);
   var saltHex = salt.toString("hex");
-  var encrypted = await encryptWithPassphrase(plaintext, passphrase, saltHex);
+  var encrypted = await encryptWithPassphrase(plaintext, passphrase, saltHex, aad);
   return { encrypted: encrypted, salt: saltHex };
 }
 

package/lib/backup/index.js

@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ var os = require("node:os");
 var nodePath = require("node:path");
 var bCrypto = require("../crypto");
 var atomicFile = require("../atomic-file");
+var C = require("../constants");
 var backupBundle = require("./bundle");
 var frameworkFiles = require("../framework-files");
 var backupManifest = require("./manifest");
@@ -721,11 +722,16 @@ function create(opts) {
         try {
           await storage.readBundle(bundleId, stagingDir);
           manifestPath = nodePath.join(stagingDir, "manifest.json");
-          if (!nodeFs.existsSync(manifestPath)) {
-            throw new BackupError("backup/test-no-manifest",
-              "manifest.json missing under restored bundle " + bundleId);
-          }
-          manifest = backupManifest.parse(nodeFs.readFileSync(manifestPath, "utf8"));
+          // Capped fd-bound read inside the scheduled restore-drill tick: an
+          // oversized manifest must not OOM the scheduler worker.
+          manifest = backupManifest.parse(atomicFile.fdSafeReadSync(manifestPath, {
+            maxBytes: C.BYTES.mib(4), encoding: "utf8",
+            errorFor: function (kind) {
+              if (kind === "enoent") return new BackupError("backup/test-no-manifest", "manifest.json missing under restored bundle " + bundleId);
+              if (kind === "too-large") return new BackupError("backup/test-bad-manifest", "manifest.json too large under restored bundle " + bundleId);
+              return new BackupError("backup/test-no-manifest", "manifest.json unreadable under restored bundle " + bundleId + ": " + kind);
+            },
+          }));
           // Verify the manifest signature so a tampered backup test
           // surfaces here, not as a regulator finding later.
           sigVerification = backupManifest.verifySignature(manifest, {
@@ -837,11 +843,17 @@ function verifyManifestSignature(target, opts) {
   var manifest;
   if (typeof target === "string") {
     var manifestPath = nodePath.join(target, "manifest.json");
-    if (!nodeFs.existsSync(manifestPath)) {
-      throw new BackupError("backup/no-manifest",
-        "verifyManifestSignature: manifest.json missing at " + manifestPath);
-    }
-    try { manifest = backupManifest.parse(nodeFs.readFileSync(manifestPath, "utf8")); }
+    // Capped fd-bound read OUTSIDE the parse try (so a missing/oversized manifest
+    // surfaces backup/no-manifest|bad-manifest, not a generic parse error).
+    var manifestRaw = atomicFile.fdSafeReadSync(manifestPath, {
+      maxBytes: C.BYTES.mib(4), encoding: "utf8",
+      errorFor: function (kind) {
+        if (kind === "enoent") return new BackupError("backup/no-manifest", "verifyManifestSignature: manifest.json missing at " + manifestPath);
+        if (kind === "too-large") return new BackupError("backup/bad-manifest", "verifyManifestSignature: manifest.json too large");
+        return new BackupError("backup/bad-manifest", "verifyManifestSignature: unreadable: " + kind);
+      },
+    });
+    try { manifest = backupManifest.parse(manifestRaw); }
     catch (e) {
       throw new BackupError("backup/bad-manifest",
         "verifyManifestSignature: parse failed: " + ((e && e.message) || String(e)));
@@ -2187,19 +2199,28 @@ bundleAdapterStorage.fsAdapter = function (fsOpts) {
       // mode 0o600 matches the v0.12.9 directory-format readback
       // discipline — backup payloads carry operator-owned bytes
       // (potentially PHI / PCI / GDPR-scoped); owner-only is the
-      // strict posture. wx is not set here because writeFile is
-      // the storage primitive (operators legitimately rewrite the
-      // same key, e.g. resuming a multipart upload); upper layers
-      // (writeBundle's `bundle-exists` check) enforce no-overwrite
-      // at the bundle level.
-      nodeFs.writeFileSync(path, bytes, { mode: 0o600 });
+      // strict posture. Overwrite of an existing key stays allowed
+      // (operators legitimately rewrite the same key, e.g. resuming a
+      // multipart upload); upper layers (writeBundle's `bundle-exists`
+      // check) enforce no-overwrite at the bundle level. writeSync's
+      // atomic rename preserves that overwrite semantic while refusing a
+      // symlink pre-planted at `path` (CWE-59) and never leaving a torn
+      // payload — a bare writeFileSync did both.
+      atomicFile.writeSync(path, bytes, { fileMode: 0o600 });
     },
     async readFile(key) {
       var path = _keyPath(key);
-      if (!nodeFs.existsSync(path)) {
-        throw new BackupError("backup/no-key", "fsAdapter: key not found: " + JSON.stringify(key));
-      }
-      return nodeFs.readFileSync(path);
+      // Capped fd-bound read (no existsSync check-then-read window): fetches a
+      // whole bundle payload, so an oversize/swapped file is an OOM lever. 8 GiB
+      // matches the writeBundle maxBundleBytes ceiling.
+      return atomicFile.fdSafeReadSync(path, {
+        maxBytes: C.BYTES.gib(8),
+        errorFor: function (kind) {
+          if (kind === "enoent") return new BackupError("backup/no-key", "fsAdapter: key not found: " + JSON.stringify(key));
+          if (kind === "too-large") return new BackupError("backup/key-too-large", "fsAdapter: payload for key " + JSON.stringify(key) + " exceeds the read cap");
+          return new BackupError("backup/no-key", "fsAdapter: key " + JSON.stringify(key) + " unreadable: " + kind);
+        },
+      });
     },
     async listKeys(prefix) {
       var out = [];

package/lib/backup/manifest.js

@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ function _validateFileEntry(f, idx, errors) {
   if (!_isHex(f.salt, true)) {
     errors.push("files[" + idx + "].salt: required hex string");
   }
-  if (typeof f.kind !== "string" || !VALID_KINDS[f.kind]) {
+  if (typeof f.kind !== "string" || !Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(VALID_KINDS, f.kind)) {
     errors.push("files[" + idx + "].kind: must be one of raw, vault-sealed, plaintext");
   }
 }
@@ -239,6 +239,11 @@ function create(opts) {
   if (opts.metadata && typeof opts.metadata === "object" && !Array.isArray(opts.metadata)) {
     manifest.metadata = Object.assign({}, opts.metadata);
   }
+  // Marks that every file blob was sealed with its relativePath as AEAD
+  // associated data (the blob-remap defense). Set on all bundles this version
+  // writes; absent on legacy bundles, which restore decrypts without AAD.
+  // Carried into the signed payload so it cannot be flipped on a signed bundle.
+  if (opts.aadBound === true) manifest.aadBound = true;
   var v = validate(manifest);
   if (!v.ok) {
     throw new BackupManifestError("backup-manifest/invalid",
@@ -271,6 +276,7 @@ function _canonical(manifest, includeSignature) {
     }),
   };
   if (manifest.metadata) canonical.metadata = manifest.metadata;
+  if (manifest.aadBound === true) canonical.aadBound = true;
   // Signature block lives alongside the rest of the manifest fields
   // and is itself stable-ordered. Sign-time canonicalization (the
   // bytes the audit-sign keypair signs) excludes the signature field

package/lib/break-glass.js

@@ -120,10 +120,13 @@ function _appSqlOpts() { return { dialect: clusterStorage.dialect(), quoteName:
 // Populated on first access per-table; invalidated on policy.set/delete.
 var policyCache = new Map();    // table -> policy
 var initialized = false;
-// Framework-wide trustProxy setting (set at init). When true, the
-// break-glass primitive consults X-Forwarded-For to populate the
-// grant row's `ip` field — same trust boundary as middleware.
-var _trustProxy = false;
+// Framework-wide client-IP resolver (built at init). The grant row's `ip`
+// field is a security control — a grant is pinned to the IP that minted it
+// and re-checked on redeem. X-Forwarded-For is forgeable, so the binding is
+// meaningful only when resolution is peer-gated: operators declare their
+// reverse proxies via init({ trustedProxies }) or own resolution via
+// init({ clientIpResolver }). Default resolves the socket address only.
+var _ipResolver = requestHelpers.trustedClientIp();
 
 // Factor lockout — wrap auth.lockout so a hostile actor brute-forcing
 // TOTP codes against break-glass gets shut out after a few failures.
@@ -457,28 +460,45 @@ async function migrate(table, opts) {
  * @related   b.breakGlass.policy.set, b.breakGlass.grant
  *
  * One-shot boot wiring. Clears the in-memory policy cache, resets the
- * factor-lockout counter, and records the framework-wide trustProxy
- * boundary so subsequent `grant()` calls populate the grant row's `ip`
- * field from `X-Forwarded-For` only when proxies are trusted. Operators
- * call this once at boot, before any policy / grant / unseal call —
- * every other primitive throws `breakglass/not-initialized` until init
- * has run.
+ * factor-lockout counter, and records how the grant row's `ip` field is
+ * resolved. That IP is a security binding — the grant pins to it at mint
+ * and re-checks it on redeem — so resolution is peer-gated: declare your
+ * reverse proxies via `trustedProxies` (CIDRs; X-Forwarded-For honored
+ * only from a trusted peer) or own resolution via `clientIpResolver`. A
+ * bare `trustProxy` is refused — a forgeable pin is no pin. Operators call
+ * this once at boot, before any policy / grant / unseal call — every other
+ * primitive throws `breakglass/not-initialized` until init has run.
  *
  * @opts
- *   trustProxy: boolean,   // honor X-Forwarded-For when populating grant.ip (default false)
+ *   trustedProxies:   string|string[],          // CIDRs of your reverse proxies — peer-gates X-Forwarded-For
+ *   clientIpResolver: function(req): string|null,  // own grant-IP resolution
  *
  * @example
- *   b.breakGlass.init({ trustProxy: true });
+ *   b.breakGlass.init({ trustedProxies: ["10.0.0.0/8"] });
  *   // → undefined  (init returns nothing; throws on bad opts)
  */
 function init(opts) {
   opts = opts || {};
-  validateOpts(opts, ["trustProxy"], "breakGlass.init");
+  validateOpts(opts, ["trustProxy", "trustedProxies", "clientIpResolver"], "breakGlass.init");
+  var resolver;
+  try {
+    resolver = requestHelpers.trustedClientIp({
+      trustedProxies:   opts.trustedProxies,
+      clientIpResolver: opts.clientIpResolver,
+    });
+  } catch (e) {
+    throw new BreakGlassError("breakglass/bad-opt", e.message);
+  }
+  if ((opts.trustProxy === true || typeof opts.trustProxy === "number") && !resolver.peerGated) {
+    throw new BreakGlassError("breakglass/bad-opt",
+      "trustProxy is spoofable — a grant pinned to a forgeable X-Forwarded-For is no " +
+      "pin at all. Declare your reverse proxies via trustedProxies: [\"10.0.0.0/8\", …] " +
+      "or supply clientIpResolver(req).");
+  }
   initialized = true;
   policyCache.clear();
   _factorLockout = null;
-  _trustProxy = opts.trustProxy === true || typeof opts.trustProxy === "number"
-    ? opts.trustProxy : false;
+  _ipResolver = resolver;
 }
 
 function _resetForTest() {
@@ -490,7 +510,7 @@ function _resetForTest() {
   }
   _factorLockout = null;
   _factorLockoutCache = null;
-  _trustProxy = false;
+  _ipResolver = requestHelpers.trustedClientIp();
 }
 
 function _requireInit() {
@@ -1119,11 +1139,10 @@ async function grant(opts) {
   var nowMs    = Date.now();
   var grantId  = "bg-" + generateToken(GRANT_ID_BYTES);
   var sessionId = (opts.req && opts.req.session && opts.req.session.id) || null;
-  // Honor the framework-wide trustProxy setting from init() — same
-  // boundary as middleware. Without trustProxy, X-Forwarded-For is
-  // ignored as attacker-forgeable, and the grant pins to the socket
-  // remoteAddress only.
-  var ipFromReq = requestHelpers.clientIp(opts.req, { trustProxy: _trustProxy });
+  // Peer-gated client-IP resolution from init() (trustedProxies /
+  // clientIpResolver). Without it, X-Forwarded-For is ignored as
+  // attacker-forgeable and the grant pins to the socket remoteAddress only.
+  var ipFromReq = _ipResolver.resolve(opts.req);
 
   var grantRow = {
     _id:                grantId,
@@ -1218,7 +1237,7 @@ function _enforceGrantPins(policy, grantRow, redeemReq, actorFor) {
         "captured at mint (fail-closed) — re-mint from a request whose client " +
         "IP the framework can resolve", true);
     }
-    var redeemIp = requestHelpers.clientIp(redeemReq, { trustProxy: _trustProxy });
+    var redeemIp = _ipResolver.resolve(redeemReq);
     if (redeemIp !== grantRow.ip) {
       audit.safeEmit({
         action:   "breakglass.unsealrow",