@blamejs/core 0.15.13 → 0.15.15

package/lib/log.js

@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ function _normalizeLevel(level) {
     return level;
   }
   if (typeof level === "string") {
-    if (LEVELS[level] === undefined) {
+    if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(LEVELS, level)) {
       throw new LogError("log/bad-level",
         "level must be one of " + LEVEL_NAMES.join(", "));
     }
@@ -587,7 +587,7 @@ function _escapeC0Controls(s) {
 function _bootMinLevel() {
   // allow:raw-process-env — see header comment above
   var raw = process.env.BLAMEJS_BOOT_LOG_LEVEL || process.env.LOG_LEVEL || "info";
-  return LEVELS[raw] != null ? LEVELS[raw] : LEVELS.info;
+  return Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(LEVELS, raw) ? LEVELS[raw] : LEVELS.info;
 }
 
 /**

package/lib/mail-agent.js

@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ async function _dispatchOrLocal(ctx, method, args, localFn) {
   var mode = ctx.dispatch.mode;
   if (mode === "local") return localFn(ctx, args);
   if (mode === "auto") {
-    if (HEAVY_METHODS[method] && ctx.dispatch.queue) return _enqueueMethod(ctx, method, args);
+    if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(HEAVY_METHODS, method) && ctx.dispatch.queue) return _enqueueMethod(ctx, method, args);
     return localFn(ctx, args);
   }
   // mode === "queue" — explicit queue dispatch.
@@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ async function _dispatchOrLocal(ctx, method, args, localFn) {
       "agent." + method + ": dispatch.mode='queue' requires opts.dispatch.queue");
   }
   // Sync-result methods refuse until orchestrator's result-bus lands.
-  if (!HEAVY_METHODS[method]) {
+  if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(HEAVY_METHODS, method)) {
     throw new MailAgentError("mail-agent/queue-result-bus-deferred",
       "agent." + method + ": queue mode for sync-result methods wires at v0.9.21 " +
       "(b.agent.orchestrator). Use mode='local' or mode='auto' until then.");

package/lib/mail-arf.js

@@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ function parse(rawMessage, opts) {
   // Surface non-normalized fields under extraFields for operator
   // visibility (X-* tags ESPs add for routing diagnostics, etc.).
   Object.keys(fieldMap).forEach(function (k) {
-    if (!KNOWN_FIELDS[k]) extraFields[k] = fieldMap[k];
+    if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(KNOWN_FIELDS, k)) extraFields[k] = fieldMap[k];
   });
 
   var event = {

package/lib/mail-auth.js

@@ -1122,7 +1122,7 @@ function _parseDmarcRecord(text) {
     else if (key === "aspf")  policy.aspf = val.toLowerCase();
     else if (key === "np") {
       var npVal = val.toLowerCase();
-      if (!DMARCBIS_VALID_NP[npVal]) {
+      if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(DMARCBIS_VALID_NP, npVal)) {
         throw new MailAuthError("mail-auth/dmarcbis-bad-tag",
           "DMARC np= must be one of none|quarantine|reject, got " + JSON.stringify(val));
       }
@@ -1130,7 +1130,7 @@ function _parseDmarcRecord(text) {
     }
     else if (key === "psd") {
       var psdVal = val.toLowerCase();
-      if (!DMARCBIS_VALID_PSD[psdVal]) {
+      if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(DMARCBIS_VALID_PSD, psdVal)) {
         throw new MailAuthError("mail-auth/dmarcbis-bad-tag",
           "DMARC psd= must be one of y|n|u, got " + JSON.stringify(val));
       }
@@ -2017,7 +2017,7 @@ function authResultsEmit(opts) {
     }
     var method = String(r.method || "").toLowerCase();
     var result = String(r.result || "").toLowerCase();
-    if (!AR_VALID_METHODS[method]) {
+    if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(AR_VALID_METHODS, method)) {
       throw new MailAuthError("mail-auth/ar-bad-method",
         "authResults.emit: unknown method '" + r.method + "'");
     }
@@ -2173,15 +2173,38 @@ function _extractFromHeaders(headerBlock) {
     // one of several authors (the §6.6.1 forbidden move), so the
     // field is treated as unparsable instead.
     address = value.trim();
-    if (/[\s,]/.test(address)) address = null;
+    // An RFC 5322 addr-spec cannot contain whitespace, commas, or the
+    // group / route markers ; : < > — their presence means a list, a
+    // display-name, or RFC 5322 group syntax (`display-name: mailbox ;`),
+    // not a single bare addr-spec.
+    if (/[\s,;:<>]/.test(address)) address = null;
   }
   var at = address ? address.lastIndexOf("@") : -1;
   var domain = (at > 0 && address && at < address.length - 1)
     ? address.slice(at + 1).toLowerCase()
     : null;
+  // The domain drives the DMARC policy lookup + alignment check. A value that
+  // is not a syntactically valid DNS hostname (a trailing ';', group-syntax
+  // soup, or other bytes that slipped the filters) would silently miss the
+  // policy record and defeat DMARC (CWE-290). Require a real hostname;
+  // otherwise treat From as unparsable — the caller fails closed (permerror →
+  // reject).
+  if (domain && !_isValidFromHostname(domain)) domain = null;
   return { count: count, address: address || null, domain: domain };
 }
 
+// Strict, bounded DNS-hostname check (ASCII / A-label form, as DMARC lookups
+// use). Anchored with a length lookahead and tempered labels — linear time, no
+// catastrophic backtracking. Requires at least two labels (a dot).
+var _FROM_HOSTNAME_RE =
+  /^(?=.{1,253}$)([a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?\.)+[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?$/i;
+function _isValidFromHostname(host) {
+  // Bound the length before the regex test (max DNS name is 253 octets) — the
+  // pattern is already anchored + tempered, but bounding untrusted input before
+  // any .test() is the framework convention.
+  return typeof host === "string" && host.length <= 253 && _FROM_HOSTNAME_RE.test(host);
+}
+
 async function inboundVerify(opts) {
   validateOpts.requireObject(opts, "inbound.verify", MailAuthError, "mail-auth/inbound-bad-input");
   validateOpts(opts, ["ip", "helo", "mailFrom", "message", "dnsLookup", "domainExists",

package/lib/mail-bimi.js

@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ var lazyRequire = require("./lazy-require");
 var networkDnsResolver = lazyRequire(function () { return require("./network-dns-resolver"); });
 var safeBuffer = require("./safe-buffer");
 var markupTokenizer = require("./markup-tokenizer");
+var x509Chain = require("./x509-chain");
 var structuredFields = require("./structured-fields");
 var safeUrl = require("./safe-url");
 var validateOpts = require("./validate-opts");
@@ -399,7 +400,7 @@ function validateTinyPsSvg(svgBytes) {
       }
       // Any element name starting with "animate" is animation (covers
       // future SMIL extensions not in the static list above).
-      if (name.indexOf("animate") === 0 && !TINY_PS_FORBIDDEN_TAGS[name]) {
+      if (name.indexOf("animate") === 0 && !Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(TINY_PS_FORBIDDEN_TAGS, name)) {
         _vio("element-forbidden",
           "<" + name + "> animation element is forbidden in Tiny-PS");
       }
@@ -492,10 +493,14 @@ function _tokenizeTinyPsSvg(s) {
     if (lt > pos) tokens.push({ type: "text", raw: s.slice(pos, lt) });
 
     if (s.startsWith("<!--", lt)) {
-      var endC = s.indexOf("-->", lt + 4);
+      // WHATWG comment end ("--!>" + abrupt "<!-->" / "<!--->"), matching a
+      // browser parsing inline SVG — so an element smuggled past an early
+      // terminator can't slip the Tiny-PS validation (mXSS differential).
+      // Fails closed on an unterminated comment.
+      var endC = markupTokenizer.htmlCommentEnd(s, lt);
       if (endC === -1) throw new Error("unterminated comment");   // allow:bare-error-throw — caught by outer try/catch and re-thrown as MailBimiError("bimi/svg-tiny-ps-violation")
-      tokens.push({ type: "comment", raw: s.slice(lt, endC + 3) });
-      pos = endC + 3;
+      tokens.push({ type: "comment", raw: s.slice(lt, endC) });
+      pos = endC;
       continue;
     }
     if (s.startsWith("<![CDATA[", lt)) {
@@ -823,11 +828,10 @@ function _verifyCertChain(leaf, intermediates, anchors) {
 
     for (var ai = 0; ai < anchors.length; ai += 1) {
       var anchor = anchors[ai];
-      if (current.checkIssued(anchor)) {
-        try {
-          if (current.verify(anchor.publicKey)) return { ok: true };
-        } catch (_e) { /* fall through to next anchor */ }
-      }
+      // issuerValidlyIssued enforces basicConstraints cA:TRUE on the anchor
+      // in addition to the issuance + signature checks, so a non-CA cert
+      // cannot mint a VMC (basicConstraints bypass, CVE-2002-0862 class).
+      if (x509Chain.issuerValidlyIssued(anchor, current)) return { ok: true };
     }
     if (current.checkIssued(current)) {
       return { ok: false, reason: "self-signed root not in trust-anchor bundle" };
@@ -837,13 +841,9 @@ function _verifyCertChain(leaf, intermediates, anchors) {
     for (var ii = 0; ii < intermediates.length; ii += 1) {
       var cand = intermediates[ii];
       if (cand === current) continue;
-      if (current.checkIssued(cand)) {
-        try {
-          if (current.verify(cand.publicKey)) {
-            nextIssuer = cand;
-            break;
-          }
-        } catch (_e) { /* fall through */ }
+      if (x509Chain.issuerValidlyIssued(cand, current)) {
+        nextIssuer = cand;
+        break;
       }
     }
     if (nextIssuer === null) {

package/lib/mail-bounce.js

@@ -448,7 +448,7 @@ function handler(opts) {
   opts = opts || {};
   var vendor = opts.vendor;
   var customParser = typeof opts.parser === "function" ? opts.parser : null;
-  if (!customParser && (typeof vendor !== "string" || !VENDORS[vendor])) {
+  if (!customParser && (typeof vendor !== "string" || !Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(VENDORS, vendor))) {
     throw _err("handler/bad-config",
       "mailBounce.handler requires { vendor } (one of " +
       Object.keys(VENDORS).join(", ") + ") or { parser }");
@@ -761,7 +761,7 @@ function _parseDsn(rawMessage) {
     throw _err("bounce/dsn-malformed",
       "mailBounce.dsn.parse: per-recipient group missing Final-Recipient");
   }
-  if (action && !DSN_ACTIONS[action]) {
+  if (action && !Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(DSN_ACTIONS, action)) {
     throw _err("bounce/dsn-malformed",
       "mailBounce.dsn.parse: Action token '" + action + "' is not RFC 3464 §2.3.3");
   }
@@ -825,7 +825,7 @@ function _buildDsn(opts) {
   validateOpts.requireNonEmptyString(opts.finalRecipient,
     "mailBounce.dsn.build: opts.finalRecipient", MailBounceError, "bounce/dsn-malformed");
   var action = String(opts.action || "failed").toLowerCase();
-  if (!DSN_ACTIONS[action]) {
+  if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(DSN_ACTIONS, action)) {
     throw _err("bounce/dsn-malformed",
       "mailBounce.dsn.build: opts.action must be one of " +
       Object.keys(DSN_ACTIONS).join(" / ") + "; got '" + action + "'");

package/lib/mail-crypto-smime.js

@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ var lazyRequire  = require("./lazy-require");
 var audit        = lazyRequire(function () { return require("./audit"); });
 var nodeCrypto   = require("node:crypto");
 var validateOpts = require("./validate-opts");
+var x509Chain    = require("./x509-chain");
 var cms          = require("./cms-codec");
 var asn1         = require("./asn1-der");
 var pqcSoftware  = require("./pqc-software");
@@ -297,7 +298,8 @@ function verify(opts) {
   // verification failure (bad alg, missing signed-attrs, message-
   // digest mismatch, signature mismatch); reaching the next line
   // means the per-signer verify succeeded.
-  var siResult = _verifySignerInfo(sd.signerInfos[0], msgBytes, opts.signerPublicKey, opts.audit);
+  var siResult = _verifySignerInfo(sd.signerInfos[0], msgBytes, opts.signerPublicKey, opts.audit,
+    sd.encapContent && sd.encapContent.eContentType);
   // Trust-anchor chain validation when operator supplies roots. The
   // signer cert is in sd.certificates (its serialNumber matches the
   // sid's serialNumber); intermediate certs are also in
@@ -336,7 +338,7 @@ function verify(opts) {
 // signer's signature, masking real multi-signer envelopes as a single
 // false-failure). verifyAll now iterates `sd.signerInfos` directly and
 // calls this helper per index with the matching per-signer key.
-function _verifySignerInfo(si, msgBytes, signerPublicKey, auditHandle) {
+function _verifySignerInfo(si, msgBytes, signerPublicKey, auditHandle, eContentType) {
   var sigAlg = _oidToSigAlg(si.sigAlgOid);
   if (!sigAlg) {
     throw new MailCryptoError("mail-crypto/smime/bad-sig-alg",
@@ -365,6 +367,26 @@ function _verifySignerInfo(si, msgBytes, signerPublicKey, auditHandle) {
       "smime.verify: recomputed message digest does not match signedAttrs.messageDigest " +
       "(message was tampered or signed-attrs were swapped)");
   }
+  // RFC 5652 §11.1: when signedAttrs are present the contentType attribute
+  // MUST be present and MUST equal the SignedData eContentType. The TSA
+  // sibling enforces this; S/MIME omitted it, so a SignerInfo with a missing
+  // or mismatched contentType still verified — a cross-protocol content-type
+  // binding gap. The check runs over signedAttrs, which the signature below
+  // covers, so a tampered attribute also fails the signature.
+  if (eContentType) {
+    var ctOid = _extractContentTypeOid(si.signedAttrsRaw);
+    if (!ctOid) {
+      _audit(auditHandle, "mail.crypto.smime.verify_fail", "denied", { reason: "no-content-type-attr" });
+      throw new MailCryptoError("mail-crypto/smime/no-content-type-attr",
+        "smime.verify: signedAttrs missing the contentType attribute (RFC 5652 §11.1)");
+    }
+    if (ctOid !== eContentType) {
+      _audit(auditHandle, "mail.crypto.smime.verify_fail", "denied", { reason: "content-type-mismatch" });
+      throw new MailCryptoError("mail-crypto/smime/content-type-mismatch",
+        "smime.verify: signedAttrs.contentType (" + ctOid + ") does not match eContentType (" +
+        eContentType + ")");
+    }
+  }
   var ok;
   try {
     ok = sigAlg.pqc.verify(
@@ -471,7 +493,10 @@ function _verifyTrustChain(sd, trustAnchorCertsPem, signerPublicKey, auditHandle
     // Stop when we've reached a trust anchor.
     for (var ri = 0; ri < roots.length; ri += 1) {
       var r = roots[ri];
-      if (current.issuer === r.subject) {
+      // Enforce basicConstraints cA:TRUE on the issuing root in addition to
+      // the DN match + signature — a non-CA cert can never be a chain issuer
+      // (basicConstraints bypass, CVE-2002-0862 class).
+      if (current.issuer === r.subject && x509Chain.isCaCert(r)) {
         try {
           if (current.verify(r.publicKey)) {
             void auditHandle;
@@ -480,12 +505,12 @@ function _verifyTrustChain(sd, trustAnchorCertsPem, signerPublicKey, auditHandle
         } catch (_e) { /* fall through to next root */ }
       }
     }
-    // Find an intermediate whose subject == current.issuer.
+    // Find an intermediate whose subject == current.issuer (and that is a CA).
     var found = null;
     for (var hi = 0; hi < chain.length; hi += 1) {
       var h = chain[hi];
       if (h === current) continue;
-      if (h.subject === current.issuer) {
+      if (h.subject === current.issuer && x509Chain.isCaCert(h)) {
         try {
           if (current.verify(h.publicKey)) { found = h; break; }
         } catch (_e) { /* try next */ }
@@ -574,7 +599,8 @@ function verifyAll(opts) {
       throw new MailCryptoError("mail-crypto/smime/missing-key",
         "verifyAll: no public key supplied for SignerInfo serial " + serialHex);
     }
-    var siRes = _verifySignerInfo(si, msgBytes, pub, opts.audit);
+    var siRes = _verifySignerInfo(si, msgBytes, pub, opts.audit,
+      sd.encapContent && sd.encapContent.eContentType);
     results.push({
       serialHex: serialHex,
       sigAlgOid: si.sigAlgOid,
@@ -621,6 +647,42 @@ function _extractSerialHex(sidBytes) {
 
 // RFC 5652 §11.2 messageDigest OID.
 var OID_MESSAGE_DIGEST = "1.2.840.113549.1.9.4";
+// RFC 5652 §11.1 contentType signed-attribute OID.
+var OID_CONTENT_TYPE_ATTR = "1.2.840.113549.1.9.3";
+
+// Extract the contentType signed-attribute's OID value from a signedAttrs
+// SET, or null if absent / malformed. Mirrors _extractMessageDigest's walk
+// but the attribute value is an OID (the eContentType), not an OCTET STRING.
+function _extractContentTypeOid(signedAttrsRaw) {
+  var node;
+  try { node = asn1.readNode(signedAttrsRaw); }
+  catch (_e) { return null; }
+  if (node.tag !== asn1.TAG.SET) return null;
+  var attrs;
+  try { attrs = asn1.readSequence(node.value); }
+  catch (_e) { return null; }
+  for (var i = 0; i < attrs.length; i += 1) {
+    var attr = attrs[i];
+    if (attr.tag !== asn1.TAG.SEQUENCE) continue;
+    var children;
+    try { children = asn1.readSequence(attr.value); }
+    catch (_e) { continue; }
+    if (children.length < 2) continue;
+    var oid;
+    try { oid = asn1.readOid(children[0]); }
+    catch (_e) { continue; }
+    if (oid !== OID_CONTENT_TYPE_ATTR) continue;
+    var valuesSet = children[1];
+    if (valuesSet.tag !== asn1.TAG.SET) continue;
+    var valueChildren;
+    try { valueChildren = asn1.readSequence(valuesSet.value); }
+    catch (_e) { continue; }
+    if (valueChildren.length === 0) continue;
+    try { return asn1.readOid(valueChildren[0]); }
+    catch (_e) { return null; }
+  }
+  return null;
+}
 
 function _extractMessageDigest(signedAttrsRaw) {
   // signedAttrsRaw is `31 LL VV...` — the universal SET-tagged blob
@@ -821,4 +883,7 @@ module.exports = {
   // validation (a cert matches the verified signer key iff its SPKI public
   // key equals, or has as a suffix, the raw signer key bytes).
   _certKeyMatches:     _certKeyMatches,
+  // Exposed for tests — RFC 5652 §11.1 contentType signed-attr extraction
+  // (verify binds it to the eContentType).
+  _extractContentTypeOid: _extractContentTypeOid,
 };

package/lib/mail-deploy.js

@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ function mtaStsPublish(opts) {
     throw new MailDeployError("mail-deploy/bad-domain",
       "mtaStsPublish: opts.domain must be a valid hostname");
   }
-  if (!STS_MODES[opts.mode]) {
+  if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(STS_MODES, opts.mode)) {
     throw new MailDeployError("mail-deploy/bad-mode",
       "mtaStsPublish: opts.mode must be 'enforce' | 'testing' | 'none'");
   }
@@ -730,14 +730,14 @@ function _validateTlsRptReport(raw, ctx) {
       var sRaw = summary["total-successful-session-count"];
       var fRaw = summary["total-failure-session-count"];
       if (sRaw !== undefined) {
-        if (typeof sRaw !== "number" || !isFinite(sRaw) || sRaw < 0 || Math.floor(sRaw) !== sRaw) {
+        if (!numericBounds.isNonNegativeFiniteInt(sRaw)) {
           throw new TlsRptParseError("mail-tlsrpt/bad-summary",
             "parseTlsRptReport: policies[" + i + "].summary.total-successful-session-count must be a finite non-negative integer");
         }
         totalSuccess += sRaw;
       }
       if (fRaw !== undefined) {
-        if (typeof fRaw !== "number" || !isFinite(fRaw) || fRaw < 0 || Math.floor(fRaw) !== fRaw) {
+        if (!numericBounds.isNonNegativeFiniteInt(fRaw)) {
           throw new TlsRptParseError("mail-tlsrpt/bad-summary",
             "parseTlsRptReport: policies[" + i + "].summary.total-failure-session-count must be a finite non-negative integer");
         }
@@ -776,7 +776,11 @@ function _validatePolicy(p, idx) {
       "parseTlsRptReport: policies[" + idx + "].policy missing");
   }
   var pType = policy["policy-type"];
-  if (!TLSRPT_POLICY_TYPES[pType]) {
+  // hasOwnProperty, not `TLSRPT_POLICY_TYPES[pType]`: a remote MTA's report JSON
+  // controls pType, and a bracket lookup on the plain-object allowlist resolves
+  // inherited members ("constructor"/"__proto__"/"toString") to truthy, passing
+  // an out-of-vocabulary policy-type (prototype shadowing).
+  if (typeof pType !== "string" || !Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(TLSRPT_POLICY_TYPES, pType)) {
     throw new TlsRptParseError("mail-tlsrpt/bad-policy",
       "parseTlsRptReport: policies[" + idx + "].policy.policy-type '" + pType +
       "' not in {sts, tlsa, no-policy-found}");
@@ -805,7 +809,7 @@ function _validatePolicy(p, idx) {
         throw new TlsRptParseError("mail-tlsrpt/bad-failure-detail",
           "parseTlsRptReport: policies[" + idx + "].failure-details[" + k + "] must be an object");
       }
-      if (typeof fd["result-type"] === "string" && !TLSRPT_RESULT_TYPES[fd["result-type"]]) {
+      if (typeof fd["result-type"] === "string" && !Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(TLSRPT_RESULT_TYPES, fd["result-type"])) {
         // Unknown result-type — surface as audit metadata but don't
         // refuse; RFC 8460 §4.4 result-type registry can grow over
         // time and we shouldn't break on new IANA entries.

package/lib/mail-dkim.js

@@ -167,13 +167,24 @@ function _parseHeaders(rawHeaders) {
 
 // ---- Hashing + signing ----
 
-function _bodyHashB64(body, algorithm, canonBody) {
+function _bodyHashB64(body, algorithm, canonBody, lcap) {
   var canonicalized = canonBody === "simple"
     ? _canonBodySimple(body)
     : _canonBodyRelaxed(body);
   var hashName = "sha256";  // both rsa-sha256 and ed25519-sha256 hash with sha256
-  return nodeCrypto.createHash(hashName)
-    .update(canonicalized).digest("base64");
+  var hash = nodeCrypto.createHash(hashName);
+  // RFC 6376 §3.4.5 — the l= body-length count is octets of the body AFTER
+  // canonicalization. Canonicalize first, then truncate the canonicalized
+  // octet stream to lcap (slicing the raw body before canonicalizing diverges
+  // whenever relaxed canon changes the byte count within the first lcap
+  // octets — WSP-run collapse, trailing-WSP strip, CRLF normalization).
+  if (typeof lcap === "number" && isFinite(lcap) && lcap >= 0) {
+    var buf = Buffer.from(canonicalized, "utf8");
+    hash.update(lcap < buf.length ? buf.subarray(0, lcap) : buf);
+  } else {
+    hash.update(canonicalized);
+  }
+  return hash.digest("base64");
 }
 
 function _signString(strToSign, privateKey, algorithm) {
@@ -674,15 +685,17 @@ function _verifySingleSignature(rfc822, parsedHeaders, sigHeader, keyTags, sigTa
 
   var split = _splitHeadersBody(rfc822);
   var body = split.body;
+  var lcap;
   if (sigTags.l !== undefined) {
     // The framework refuses l= at SIGN-time per the M3AAWG / Gmail /
     // Microsoft 365 guidance (v0.7.18). On VERIFY, an `l=` tag on an
     // inbound signature signals append-after-signature exposure —
     // operators decide acceptance. Honor the cap for the body hash so
     // the signature still validates against legitimate senders that
-    // use l=, but flag in the result.
-    var lcap = parseInt(sigTags.l, 10);
-    if (isFinite(lcap) && lcap >= 0) body = body.slice(0, lcap);
+    // use l=, but flag in the result. The cap is octets of the
+    // CANONICALIZED body (RFC 6376 §3.4.5), applied inside _bodyHashB64.
+    var parsedL = parseInt(sigTags.l, 10);
+    if (isFinite(parsedL) && parsedL >= 0) lcap = parsedL;
   }
 
   // 1. Body-hash check.
@@ -690,7 +703,7 @@ function _verifySingleSignature(rfc822, parsedHeaders, sigHeader, keyTags, sigTa
   if (typeof expectedBh !== "string") {
     return { result: "permerror", errors: ["DKIM-Signature missing bh="] };
   }
-  var actualBh = _bodyHashB64(body, algorithm, canonBody);
+  var actualBh = _bodyHashB64(body, algorithm, canonBody, lcap);
   if (actualBh !== expectedBh) {
     return { result: "fail", errors: ["body hash mismatch"] };
   }

package/lib/mail-greylist.js

@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ var COMPLIANCE_POSTURES = gateContract.ALL_STRICT_POSTURES;
 function create(opts) {
   opts = opts || {};
   var profile = gateContract.resolveProfileName(opts, COMPLIANCE_POSTURES, DEFAULT_PROFILE);
-  if (!PROFILES[profile]) {
+  if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(PROFILES, profile)) {
     throw new MailGreylistError("mail-greylist/bad-profile",
       "create: unknown profile '" + profile + "'");
   }
@@ -323,9 +323,7 @@ function create(opts) {
  * @example
  *   b.mail.greylist.compliancePosture("hipaa");   // → "strict"
  */
-function compliancePosture(posture) {
-  return COMPLIANCE_POSTURES[posture] || null;
-}
+var compliancePosture = gateContract.makePostureAccessor(COMPLIANCE_POSTURES);
 
 function _hashFingerprint(cidr, mailFrom, rcptTo) {
   // Namespace-hash so the on-disk key is unlinkable to the PII

package/lib/mail-helo.js

@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ var LOCALHOST_REFUSED = Object.freeze({
 async function evaluate(ctx, opts) {
   opts = opts || {};
   var profile = gateContract.resolveProfileName(opts, COMPLIANCE_POSTURES, DEFAULT_PROFILE);
-  if (!PROFILES[profile]) {
+  if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(PROFILES, profile)) {
     throw new MailHeloError("mail-helo/bad-profile",
       "evaluate: unknown profile '" + profile + "'");
   }
@@ -453,9 +453,7 @@ function _emitAudit(auditImpl, action, metadata) {
  * @example
  *   b.mail.helo.compliancePosture("hipaa");   // → "strict"
  */
-function compliancePosture(posture) {
-  return COMPLIANCE_POSTURES[posture] || null;
-}
+var compliancePosture = gateContract.makePostureAccessor(COMPLIANCE_POSTURES);
 
 module.exports = {
   evaluate:                evaluate,

package/lib/mail-journal.js

@@ -180,9 +180,9 @@ function create(opts) {
     throw new MailJournalError("mail-journal/bad-vault",
       "b.mail.journal.create: opts.vault must be a b.vault handle");
   }
-  if (!opts.legalHold || typeof opts.legalHold.isOnHold !== "function") {
+  if (!opts.legalHold || typeof opts.legalHold.isHeld !== "function") {
     throw new MailJournalError("mail-journal/bad-legal-hold",
-      "b.mail.journal.create: opts.legalHold must be a b.legalHold handle (must expose isOnHold)");
+      "b.mail.journal.create: opts.legalHold must be a b.legalHold handle (must expose isHeld)");
   }
   if (!opts.db || typeof opts.db.runSql !== "function") {
     throw new MailJournalError("mail-journal/bad-db",
@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ function create(opts) {
   async function record(req) {
     validateOpts.requireObject(req, "mail.journal.record",
       MailJournalError, "mail-journal/bad-record");
-    if (!ALLOWED_DIRECTIONS[req.direction]) {
+    if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(ALLOWED_DIRECTIONS, req.direction)) {
       throw new MailJournalError("mail-journal/bad-direction",
         "mail.journal.record: opts.direction must be 'inbound' | 'outbound' | 'internal'");
     }
@@ -300,11 +300,13 @@ function create(opts) {
 
     var regimesJson = JSON.stringify(opts.regimes);
     var floorUntil  = archivedAt + floorMs;
-    // legal_hold is omitted from the INSERT so the column's
-    // `NOT NULL DEFAULT 0` applies (the prior inline `0` SQL literal) — b.sql
-    // binds every value it is given, so leaving the column out keeps the row
-    // unsealed-at-rest default without binding a redundant constant. b.sql
-    // quotes every column + binds every remaining value as a placeholder.
+    // Auto-derive the legal-hold flag from the registry: an entry whose actor is
+    // under an active legal hold is born held, exempt from retention expiry even
+    // after the floor passes (the doc's "every entry carries a legalHold flag").
+    // setLegalHold remains the manual override. isHeld already treats a lapsed
+    // (retainUntil-expired) hold as not-held, so a stale hold won't over-flag.
+    var actorHeld = !!opts.legalHold.isHeld(req.actorId);
+    // b.sql quotes every column + binds every value as a placeholder.
     var insBuilt = _t("insert").values({
       journal_id:     journalId,
       direction:      req.direction,
@@ -314,6 +316,7 @@ function create(opts) {
       size_bytes:     sizeBytes,
       regimes:        regimesJson,
       floor_until:    floorUntil,
+      legal_hold:     actorHeld ? 1 : 0,
       storage_key:    storageKey,
       sealed_payload: sealedBlob,
     }).toSql();

package/lib/mail-mdn.js

@@ -162,14 +162,14 @@ function build(opts) {
   validateOpts.requireNonEmptyString(opts.finalRecipient,
     "mailMdn.build: opts.finalRecipient", MailMdnError, "mdn/missing-required-field");
   var disposition = String(opts.disposition || "").toLowerCase();
-  if (!DISPOSITION_TYPES[disposition]) {
+  if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(DISPOSITION_TYPES, disposition)) {
     throw _err("mdn/missing-required-field",
       "mailMdn.build: opts.disposition must be one of " +
       Object.keys(DISPOSITION_TYPES).join(" / ") +
       "; got '" + String(opts.disposition) + "'");
   }
   var actionMode = String(opts.actionMode || "manual-action").toLowerCase();
-  if (!ACTION_MODES[actionMode]) {
+  if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(ACTION_MODES, actionMode)) {
     throw _err("mdn/missing-required-field",
       "mailMdn.build: opts.actionMode must be one of " +
       Object.keys(ACTION_MODES).join(" / ") +
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ function build(opts) {
   // Accept the canonical mixed-case form too — RFC 3798 §3.2.6.2 uses
   // `MDN-sent-manually` / `MDN-sent-automatically`. Compare lower-case
   // for robustness; emit canonical mixed-case in the output.
-  if (!SENDING_MODES[sendingMode]) {
+  if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(SENDING_MODES, sendingMode)) {
     throw _err("mdn/missing-required-field",
       "mailMdn.build: opts.sendingMode must be one of " +
       "MDN-sent-manually / MDN-sent-automatically; got '" +
@@ -395,7 +395,11 @@ function parse(rawMessage) {
       "mailMdn.parse: message/disposition-notification missing Disposition");
   }
   var disposition = _parseDisposition(dispositionField);
-  if (!disposition || !DISPOSITION_TYPES[disposition.type]) {
+  // hasOwnProperty: the Disposition token comes from an untrusted inbound MDN, so
+  // a bracket lookup lets "constructor"/"__proto__" pass as a valid type (proto
+  // shadowing).
+  if (!disposition || typeof disposition.type !== "string" ||
+      !Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(DISPOSITION_TYPES, disposition.type)) {
     throw _err("mdn/parse-failed",
       "mailMdn.parse: Disposition type token not in RFC 3798 §3.2.6 vocabulary; got '" +
       (disposition && disposition.type) + "'");

package/lib/mail-rbl.js

@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ function create(opts) {
       "create: opts.resolver must be a b.network.dns.resolver.create() instance");
   }
   var profile = gateContract.resolveProfileName(opts, COMPLIANCE_POSTURES, DEFAULT_PROFILE);
-  if (!PROFILES[profile]) {
+  if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(PROFILES, profile)) {
     throw new MailRblError("mail-rbl/bad-profile",
       "create: unknown profile '" + profile + "'");
   }
@@ -314,9 +314,7 @@ function reverseIp(ip) {
  * @example
  *   b.mail.rbl.compliancePosture("hipaa");   // → "strict"
  */
-function compliancePosture(posture) {
-  return COMPLIANCE_POSTURES[posture] || null;
-}
+var compliancePosture = gateContract.makePostureAccessor(COMPLIANCE_POSTURES);
 
 function _validateZoneNames(zones) {
   for (var i = 0; i < zones.length; i += 1) {

package/lib/mail-scan.js

@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ function create(opts) {
   numericBounds.requirePositiveFiniteInt(opts.port, "mail.scan.create.port",
     MailScanError, "mail-scan/bad-port", { max: 65535 });   // TCP port-number range cap
   var protocol = opts.protocol || DEFAULT_PROTOCOL;
-  if (!ALLOWED_PROTOCOLS[protocol]) {
+  if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(ALLOWED_PROTOCOLS, protocol)) {
     throw new MailScanError("mail-scan/bad-protocol",
       "mail.scan.create.protocol must be 'icap' or 'clamav-instream'; got '" + protocol + "'");
   }
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ function create(opts) {
       MailScanError, "mail-scan/bad-service");
   }
   var profile = gateContract.resolveProfileName(opts, COMPLIANCE_POSTURES, DEFAULT_PROFILE);
-  if (!PROFILES[profile]) {
+  if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(PROFILES, profile)) {
     throw new MailScanError("mail-scan/bad-profile",
       "mail.scan.create.profile: unknown '" + profile + "' (valid: strict / balanced / permissive)");
   }
@@ -448,9 +448,7 @@ function create(opts) {
  * @example
  *   b.mail.scan.compliancePosture("hipaa");   // → "strict"
  */
-function compliancePosture(posture) {
-  return COMPLIANCE_POSTURES[posture] || null;
-}
+var compliancePosture = gateContract.makePostureAccessor(COMPLIANCE_POSTURES);
 
 function _emitScanResult(auditImpl, rv) {
   if (rv.verdict === "clean") {