@automattic/vip 4.1.4 → 4.1.6

package/internal/parity/import_validate_sql_scenario_test.go

@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
-//go:build parity
-
-package parity
-
-import (
-	"path/filepath"
-	"sort"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-// TestM6bImportValidateSQLScenarios discovers every YAML matching
-// import-validate-sql-* and runs the Go binary against it. Local-only
-// validator: no mock GraphQL server needed.
-func TestM6bImportValidateSQLScenarios(t *testing.T) {
-	yamlDir := "../../testdata/parity"
-	entries, err := filepath.Glob(yamlDir + "/import-validate-sql-*.yaml")
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("glob: %v", err)
-	}
-	sort.Strings(entries)
-	if len(entries) == 0 {
-		t.Fatal("no import-validate-sql scenarios found — testdata moved?")
-	}
-
-	goBin := buildVipNextWithVersion(t, "test", "test")
-
-	for _, path := range entries {
-		name := strings.TrimSuffix(filepath.Base(path), ".yaml")
-		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			scenario, err := LoadScenario(path)
-			if err != nil {
-				t.Fatalf("LoadScenario: %v", err)
-			}
-			if scenario.ExpectedDrift != nil {
-				t.Skipf("expected drift (%s); skipping assertion", scenario.ExpectedDrift.Reason)
-				return
-			}
-			res, err := Run(RunSpec{
-				Binary: goBin,
-				Argv:   scenario.Argv,
-				Env:    FixtureEnv(scenario.Env),
-			})
-			if err != nil {
-				t.Fatalf("Run: %v", err)
-			}
-			if res.ExitCode != scenario.Expect.ExitCode {
-				t.Errorf("exit=%d, want %d; stderr=%q stdout=%q",
-					res.ExitCode, scenario.Expect.ExitCode, res.Stderr, res.Stdout)
-			}
-			// Wire-level content assertions per scenario.
-			switch name {
-			case "import-validate-sql-clean":
-				if !strings.Contains(res.Stdout, "clean") {
-					t.Errorf("clean scenario stdout missing 'clean':\n%s", res.Stdout)
-				}
-			case "import-validate-sql-multisite-warn":
-				if !strings.Contains(res.Stdout, "multi-site") {
-					t.Errorf("multisite scenario stdout missing 'multi-site':\n%s", res.Stdout)
-				}
-			case "import-validate-sql-dangerous-stmt":
-				if !strings.Contains(res.Stdout, "DROP DATABASE") {
-					t.Errorf("dangerous-stmt scenario stdout missing DROP DATABASE finding:\n%s", res.Stdout)
-				}
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}

package/internal/parity/keychain.go

@@ -1,538 +0,0 @@
-//go:build parity
-
-package parity
-
-// Keychain plumbing for the Node-vs-Go differential scenario.
-//
-// WHY THIS EXISTS
-//
-// The Node CLI has NEVER had an environment escape hatch for credentials.
-// `Token.get()` reads the OS credential store and nothing else, so the only way
-// to put an identity in front of the real Node binary is to write a real
-// keychain entry.
-//
-// An earlier version of this comment said Node 4.1.0 "removed
-// VIP_TOKEN_OVERRIDE". That was wrong. The variable never existed upstream:
-// `git log --all -S VIP_TOKEN_OVERRIDE` on Automattic/vip returns ZERO commits.
-// It had been hand-injected into this repo's vendored copy of
-// src/lib/token.ts (4 lines, gated on NODE_ENV=test) so that the harness would
-// authenticate — i.e. the reference implementation was edited to make the test
-// pass. The 4.0.4 -> trunk sync deleted that local edit, which is what made the
-// differential start failing. Do not reintroduce it.
-//
-// DOES THIS WORK IN CI?
-//
-// Yes, and it was measured rather than assumed. Node picks its backend at
-// runtime: getKeychain() (src/lib/keychain.ts:12-23) constructs Secure, probes
-// it with a throwaway getPassword, and falls back to Insecure — a configstore
-// JSON file under $XDG_CONFIG_HOME/configstore/vip-go-cli.json — if anything
-// throws. On linux/amd64 with node:22, exercising the REAL vendored
-// dist/lib/keychain.js:
-//
-//   - without libsecret: `require('@github/keytar')` throws at load in ~30ms;
-//   - with libsecret-1-0 installed and no D-Bus session (the shape of a GitHub
-//     Actions runner): the module loads, and the probe REJECTS in ~82ms with
-//     "Cannot spawn a message bus without a machine-id".
-//
-// Both land on Insecure, both in well under a second, and neither hangs. A
-// seed written by one process was then read back by a SEPARATE process — which
-// is exactly the harness/CLI split — and deleted cleanly, leaving the store
-// file empty.
-//
-// That is why the shim below drives getKeychain() instead of a backend: the
-// credential lands wherever the CLI will look for it, on every platform,
-// without the harness having to know which backend won. nodeKeychainOpTimeout
-// covers the remaining unknown — a future backend that blocks instead of
-// throwing becomes a loud skip, not a hung CI job.
-//
-// WHY THAT IS SAFE HERE
-//
-// Node derives its service name from API_HOST (Token.getServiceName,
-// src/lib/token.ts:119-129). The differential pins API_HOST to an httptest
-// server on 127.0.0.1 with an ephemeral port, so every run gets a service name
-// that no human ever typed and that cannot collide with a real credential.
-// Every keychain operation in this file asserts that property FIRST
-// (assertEphemeralParityService) — a positive match, not a denylist. A name
-// like "vip-go-cli" or "vip-go-cli:http---localhost-4000" is refused outright.
-//
-// A previous incarnation of this pattern left 727 orphaned entries behind, so
-// there are three nets. First, the whole test binary shares ONE credential
-// (differential_test.go): the number a run creates is a constant, not a
-// function of how many scenarios exist. Second, TestMain tears that credential
-// down after m.Run() whether the suite passed, failed or panicked. Third, a
-// pre-run and a post-run sweep collect anything a killed run stranded and
-// anything the CLIs under test wrote for themselves (see keychain_test.go).
-//
-// NOTHING IN THIS FILE EVER PRINTS A SECRET. Tokens travel to the node shim on
-// stdin (never argv, never the environment), the shim redacts the secret out of
-// any error message it emits, and enumeration uses `security dump-keychain`
-// WITHOUT -d so no password material is ever decrypted or displayed.
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"context"
-	"errors"
-	"fmt"
-	"os"
-	"os/exec"
-	"path/filepath"
-	"regexp"
-	"runtime"
-	"strconv"
-	"strings"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/Automattic/vip/internal/keychain"
-	"github.com/Automattic/vip/internal/rechallenge"
-)
-
-// nodeKeychainService is Node's SERVICE constant (src/lib/token.ts:14).
-const nodeKeychainService = "vip-go-cli"
-
-// nodeProductionAPIHost is Node's PRODUCTION_API_HOST
-// (src/lib/api/constants.ts:1). Node omits the host suffix for this endpoint.
-const nodeProductionAPIHost = "https://api.wpvip.com"
-
-// nodeNonAlphanumeric mirrors Node's API_HOST.replace(/[^a-z0-9]/gi, '-')
-// (src/lib/token.ts:123). The /i flag makes it case-insensitive, so uppercase
-// letters survive — the class below is spelled out rather than folded.
-var nodeNonAlphanumeric = regexp.MustCompile(`[^a-zA-Z0-9]`)
-
-// NodeKeychainService reproduces Token.getServiceName (src/lib/token.ts:119-129)
-// exactly:
-//
-//	let service = SERVICE;                                  // 'vip-go-cli'
-//	if ( PRODUCTION_API_HOST !== API_HOST ) {
-//	    const sanitized = API_HOST.replace( /[^a-z0-9]/gi, '-' );
-//	    service = `${ SERVICE }:${ sanitized }`;
-//	}
-//	return `${ service }${ modifier }`;
-//
-// modifier is "" for the token entry and "-uuid" for the analytics anon-id
-// entry that Token.uuid() creates (src/lib/token.ts:82).
-//
-// Note there is deliberately NO trailing-slash normalisation: Node does not do
-// any, so neither does this. Go's own keychain.ServiceNameForHost DOES trim a
-// trailing slash, which is a (harmless here, real elsewhere) divergence.
-func NodeKeychainService(apiHost, modifier string) string {
-	service := nodeKeychainService
-	if apiHost != nodeProductionAPIHost {
-		service = nodeKeychainService + ":" + nodeNonAlphanumeric.ReplaceAllString(apiHost, "-")
-	}
-	return service + modifier
-}
-
-// minEphemeralPort is the low-water mark of the ephemeral port range across the
-// platforms this suite runs on: Linux starts at 32768, macOS and Windows at
-// 49152. An httptest server (net.Listen on 127.0.0.1:0) always lands at or
-// above this; a service name a human configured — a local Parker on :4000, the
-// dead-loopback :1, the hostile-env :9 — never does.
-const minEphemeralPort = 32768
-
-// ephemeralParityServiceRe is the POSITIVE assertion that gates every keychain
-// write and delete in this package. A service name must be:
-//
-//   - one of the two CLI namespaces (vip-go-cli for Node, vip-next-cli for Go),
-//   - optionally the Go elevated-token namespace (":elevated"),
-//   - scoped to a host, and that host must be exactly http://127.0.0.1:<port>
-//     sanitised to http---127-0-0-1-<port> — "localhost" is NOT accepted,
-//   - optionally suffixed "-uuid" (Node's analytics anon-id entry).
-//
-// The port is then range-checked against minEphemeralPort. Both conditions must
-// hold; there is no denylist anywhere and no way to opt a name past this.
-var ephemeralParityServiceRe = regexp.MustCompile(
-	`^vip-(?:go|next)-cli(?::elevated)?:http---127-0-0-1-([0-9]{1,5})(?:-uuid)?$`)
-
-// IsEphemeralParityService reports whether name is a credential this harness is
-// permitted to create and destroy.
-//
-// It refuses, among everything else, all of these real credentials:
-//
-//	vip-go-cli                                (no host scope)
-//	vip-go-cli-uuid                           (no host scope)
-//	vip-next-cli-uuid                         (no host scope)
-//	vip-go-cli:http---127-0-0-1-4000-uuid     (port 4000 < 32768)
-//	vip-go-cli:http---localhost-4000          (host is not 127.0.0.1)
-//	vip-go-cli:http---localhost-4000-uuid     (host is not 127.0.0.1)
-//	vip-go-cli:http---127-0-0-1-9-uuid        (port 9 < 32768)
-//	vip-next-cli:http---127-0-0-1-9-uuid      (port 9 < 32768)
-func IsEphemeralParityService(name string) bool {
-	m := ephemeralParityServiceRe.FindStringSubmatch(name)
-	if m == nil {
-		return false
-	}
-	port, err := strconv.Atoi(m[1])
-	if err != nil {
-		return false
-	}
-	return port >= minEphemeralPort && port <= 65535
-}
-
-// assertEphemeralParityService is the guard every mutating call runs first.
-func assertEphemeralParityService(op, name string) error {
-	if IsEphemeralParityService(name) {
-		return nil
-	}
-	return fmt.Errorf(
-		"parity keychain: refusing to %s %q — only credentials scoped to an ephemeral "+
-			"loopback port (vip-{go,next}-cli[:elevated]:http---127-0-0-1-<port>[-uuid], "+
-			"port >= %d) may be touched by the harness",
-		op, name, minEphemeralPort)
-}
-
-// ErrKeychainUnsupported is returned by the /usr/bin/security-backed
-// enumeration and deletion helpers on platforms that do not have it.
-//
-// It does NOT mean the differential cannot run there. Seeding and deleting go
-// through Node's own keychain layer (see nodeKeychainScript) and work
-// everywhere Node does; this error only marks the macOS-specific ORPHAN SWEEP
-// as unavailable. Callers must therefore treat it as "nothing to sweep", never
-// as a failure and never as a reason to skip a scenario.
-//
-// The asymmetry that leaves behind, stated plainly: on macOS a run killed
-// mid-flight (SIGKILL, ^C) leaves a keychain item that the next run's pre-run
-// sweep collects. On Linux the equivalent orphan is one JSON key inside
-// ~/.config/configstore/vip-go-cli.json, and there is no sweep for it — the
-// key is removed by the normal teardown, but not recovered if the process is
-// killed before teardown. That is deliberate: enumerating configstore means
-// reaching into a private field of the vendored Insecure backend, and the
-// exposure it would buy back is one key on a CI runner that is destroyed at
-// the end of the job.
-var ErrKeychainUnsupported = errors.New(
-	"parity keychain: the orphan sweep is only implemented on macOS")
-
-const securityBin = "/usr/bin/security"
-
-// ParityKeychainServices lists every service name a differential run against
-// apiHost can bring into existence — the set that must be cleaned up.
-//
-// Two are Node's (src/lib/token.ts): the token entry the harness seeds, and the
-// "-uuid" analytics entry Token.uuid() creates on its own. trackEvent() calls
-// Token.uuid() unconditionally (src/lib/tracker.ts:55), BEFORE the DO_NOT_TRACK
-// check further down the stack, so that entry appears even with telemetry off.
-//
-// Two are Go's, taken from the production derivations so they cannot drift:
-// the auth store's entry and the rechallenge elevated-token cache.
-func ParityKeychainServices(apiHost string) []string {
-	return []string{
-		NodeKeychainService(apiHost, ""),
-		NodeKeychainService(apiHost, "-uuid"),
-		keychain.ServiceNameForHost(apiHost),
-		rechallenge.ServiceNameForHost(apiHost),
-	}
-}
-
-// nodeKeychainScript drives NODE'S OWN keychain layer — dist/lib/keychain.js,
-// the compiled src/lib/keychain.ts — rather than reaching for a backend
-// directly.
-//
-// That indirection is the whole point. getKeychain() tries Secure (keytar) and
-// falls back to Insecure (a configstore JSON file) when Secure throws
-// (src/lib/keychain.ts:12-23). Which one wins depends on the host: macOS gets
-// Secure, a headless Linux CI runner with no usable secret service gets
-// Insecure. Seeding through the same function the CLI reads through means the
-// harness cannot write to a store the CLI will not consult — the seed lands
-// wherever the read will look, by construction, on every platform.
-//
-// It also preserves the property the previous keytar-direct version had: an
-// entry created by /usr/bin/security carries an ACL partition list of
-// "apple-tool:" only, and a later read from node blocks on a GUI authorisation
-// prompt. Writing through node gives the item the partition list node can read.
-//
-// The secret arrives on stdin — not argv (visible in ps) and not the
-// environment. Every error message has the secret spliced out before it is
-// printed, so a backend failure can never leak the token.
-const nodeKeychainScript = `
-const { getKeychain } = require(process.env.VIP_PARITY_KEYCHAIN_DIST + '/lib/keychain.js');
-const service = process.env.VIP_PARITY_KEYCHAIN_SERVICE;
-const op = process.env.VIP_PARITY_KEYCHAIN_OP;
-const secret = op === 'set' ? require('node:fs').readFileSync(0, 'utf8') : '';
-const redact = err => {
-  const text = String((err && err.stack) || (err && err.message) || err);
-  return secret ? text.split(secret).join('<redacted>') : text;
-};
-(async () => {
-  const keychain = await getKeychain();
-  if (op === 'delete') {
-    await keychain.deletePassword(service);
-    process.stdout.write('DELETED:' + keychain.constructor.name);
-    return;
-  }
-  await keychain.setPassword(service, secret);
-  const readBack = await keychain.getPassword(service);
-  process.stdout.write((readBack === secret ? 'VERIFIED:' : 'MISMATCH:') + keychain.constructor.name);
-})().catch(err => { process.stderr.write(redact(err)); process.exit(1); });
-`
-
-// nodeKeychainOpTimeout bounds every call into Node's keychain layer.
-//
-// On macOS the whole round trip is ~25ms and on a keytar-less host the
-// Insecure fallback is ~15ms (both measured). The budget is enormous next to
-// that on purpose: it exists solely so a credential backend that BLOCKS rather
-// than throwing — libsecret waiting on a D-Bus session that will never
-// autolaunch is the plausible Linux case — turns into a loud skip instead of a
-// CI job that hangs until the runner's own timeout kills it.
-const nodeKeychainOpTimeout = 60 * time.Second
-
-// ErrKeychainSeedMismatch means the write reported success but the value read
-// back was not the value written. That is a harness bug (a wrong service name,
-// a wrong account), not a hostile environment, so callers should FAIL on it
-// rather than skip.
-var ErrKeychainSeedMismatch = errors.New(
-	"parity keychain: seeded entry did not read back as written")
-
-// SeedNodeKeychainToken writes token into the credential the Node CLI reads for
-// apiHost, through Node's own keychain layer.
-//
-// The caller MUST register cleanup for ParityKeychainServices(apiHost) BEFORE
-// calling this, so a partial write is still collected.
-//
-// A non-nil error other than ErrKeychainSeedMismatch means the credential store
-// could not be driven at all (no node, no dist/, no usable backend, a locked
-// keychain, a backend that timed out); the caller turns that into a loud skip.
-func SeedNodeKeychainToken(nodeBin, apiHost, token string) error {
-	service := NodeKeychainService(apiHost, "")
-	if err := assertEphemeralParityService("write", service); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	if token == "" {
-		return errors.New("parity keychain: refusing to seed an empty token")
-	}
-	out, err := runNodeKeychainOp(nodeBin, service, "set", token)
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	if !strings.HasPrefix(out, "VERIFIED:") {
-		return fmt.Errorf("%w: service %q (backend reported %q)", ErrKeychainSeedMismatch, service, out)
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-// DeleteNodeKeychainService removes name through Node's own keychain layer.
-//
-// This is the platform-portable half of cleanup: DeleteParityKeychainService
-// below shells out to /usr/bin/security and therefore only exists on macOS,
-// but on a Linux runner the credential lives in a configstore JSON file that
-// only Node knows the path of. Deleting through getKeychain() removes exactly
-// the key that was written, whichever backend holds it.
-func DeleteNodeKeychainService(nodeBin, name string) error {
-	if err := assertEphemeralParityService("delete", name); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	_, err := runNodeKeychainOp(nodeBin, name, "delete", "")
-	return err
-}
-
-func runNodeKeychainOp(nodeBin, service, op, secret string) (string, error) {
-	dist, err := nodeDistDir(nodeBin)
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	root, ok := nodeModulesRoot(nodeBin)
-	if !ok {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("parity keychain: no node_modules above %s; run `npm ci`", nodeBin)
-	}
-
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), nodeKeychainOpTimeout)
-	defer cancel()
-
-	cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "node", "-e", nodeKeychainScript)
-	cmd.Dir = root
-	// The shim gets the scrubbed fixture environment plus the operands, and
-	// explicitly NO credential: it receives the secret on stdin instead.
-	cmd.Env = FixtureEnv(map[string]string{
-		"VIP_PARITY_KEYCHAIN_DIST":    dist,
-		"VIP_PARITY_KEYCHAIN_SERVICE": service,
-		"VIP_PARITY_KEYCHAIN_OP":      op,
-		"VIP_TOKEN_OVERRIDE":          "",
-	})
-	if secret != "" {
-		cmd.Stdin = strings.NewReader(secret)
-	}
-
-	var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
-	cmd.Stdout = &stdout
-	cmd.Stderr = &stderr
-
-	runErr := cmd.Run()
-	if ctx.Err() != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("parity keychain: %s %q timed out after %s — the credential "+
-			"backend blocked instead of failing", op, service, nodeKeychainOpTimeout)
-	}
-	if runErr != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("parity keychain: node could not %s %q (%v): %s",
-			op, service, runErr, strings.TrimSpace(stderr.String()))
-	}
-	return stdout.String(), nil
-}
-
-// nodeDistDir maps the CLI entrypoint to the compiled tree that holds
-// lib/keychain.js (dist/bin/vip.js -> dist).
-func nodeDistDir(binPath string) (string, error) {
-	dist := filepath.Dir(filepath.Dir(binPath))
-	if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(dist, "lib", "keychain.js")); err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("parity keychain: %s has no lib/keychain.js "+
-			"(derived from NODE_VIP_BIN=%s); run `npm ci`", dist, binPath)
-	}
-	return dist, nil
-}
-
-// nodeModulesRoot walks up from the Node entrypoint to the directory that owns
-// node_modules (dist/bin/vip.js -> dist/bin -> dist -> <root>).
-func nodeModulesRoot(binPath string) (string, bool) {
-	dir := filepath.Dir(binPath)
-	for {
-		if info, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(dir, "node_modules")); err == nil && info.IsDir() {
-			return dir, true
-		}
-		parent := filepath.Dir(dir)
-		if parent == dir {
-			return "", false
-		}
-		dir = parent
-	}
-}
-
-// DeleteParityKeychainService removes every credential stored under name.
-//
-// It deletes by SERVICE rather than by (service, account) on purpose: Go's auth
-// store writes a second item under the same service with the account
-// "<service>:legacy-fallback-disabled" (internal/auth/store.go:128), and a
-// (service, account) delete would leave it behind. The service name itself is
-// what the guard validates, so removing everything under it is bounded.
-//
-// A name that is already absent is not an error — cleanup must be idempotent.
-func DeleteParityKeychainService(name string) error {
-	if err := assertEphemeralParityService("delete", name); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	if runtime.GOOS != "darwin" {
-		return ErrKeychainUnsupported
-	}
-	for {
-		// No -g/-w: attributes only, so nothing is ever decrypted or printed.
-		out, err := exec.Command(securityBin, "delete-generic-password", "-s", name).CombinedOutput()
-		if err != nil {
-			if strings.Contains(string(out), "could not be found") {
-				return nil
-			}
-			return fmt.Errorf("parity keychain: delete %q: %v: %s",
-				name, err, strings.TrimSpace(string(out)))
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-// CleanupParityKeychainServices deletes each name, guard first. It keeps going
-// after a failure so one bad name cannot strand the rest, and returns the
-// joined error.
-func CleanupParityKeychainServices(names []string) error {
-	var errs []error
-	for _, name := range names {
-		if err := DeleteParityKeychainService(name); err != nil {
-			errs = append(errs, err)
-		}
-	}
-	return errors.Join(errs...)
-}
-
-// CleanupParityCredentials removes every credential a differential run against
-// apiHost can have created, on any platform.
-//
-// It runs BOTH deletion paths because they cover different ground:
-//
-//   - Node's own keychain layer knows where Node put the entry, which on a
-//     host without a usable secret service is a configstore JSON file that
-//     /usr/bin/security cannot see at all;
-//   - /usr/bin/security deletes by SERVICE, which collects the SECOND item Go's
-//     auth store writes under the same service with the account
-//     "<service>:legacy-fallback-disabled" (internal/auth/store.go) — a
-//     (service, account) delete through Node would leave that behind.
-//
-// ErrKeychainUnsupported from the macOS-only path is not an error: on Linux
-// there is simply nothing for it to do. Everything else is reported, and the
-// function keeps going so one failure cannot strand the rest.
-func CleanupParityCredentials(nodeBin, apiHost string) error {
-	var errs []error
-	for _, name := range ParityKeychainServices(apiHost) {
-		if nodeBin != "" {
-			if err := DeleteNodeKeychainService(nodeBin, name); err != nil {
-				errs = append(errs, err)
-			}
-		}
-		if err := DeleteParityKeychainService(name); err != nil &&
-			!errors.Is(err, ErrKeychainUnsupported) {
-			errs = append(errs, err)
-		}
-	}
-	return errors.Join(errs...)
-}
-
-// svceLine matches the service attribute in `security dump-keychain` output:
-//
-//	    "svce"<blob>="vip-go-cli:http---127-0-0-1-63145-uuid"
-var svceLine = regexp.MustCompile(`^\s*"svce"<blob>="(.*)"\s*$`)
-
-// listKeychainServices enumerates the service names in the user's keychain
-// search list.
-//
-// `security dump-keychain` WITHOUT -d dumps attributes only. It never decrypts
-// a password and never prompts. Values that are not printable ASCII come back
-// as 0x… hex instead of a quoted string and are simply not matched — every
-// service name this harness cares about is plain ASCII.
-func listKeychainServices() ([]string, error) {
-	if runtime.GOOS != "darwin" {
-		return nil, ErrKeychainUnsupported
-	}
-	// dump-keychain exits non-zero when any keychain in the search list is
-	// unreadable while still dumping the rest, so a non-empty stdout wins over
-	// the exit status.
-	out, err := exec.Command(securityBin, "dump-keychain").Output()
-	if len(out) == 0 && err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("parity keychain: dump-keychain: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	var services []string
-	seen := map[string]bool{}
-	for _, line := range strings.Split(string(out), "\n") {
-		m := svceLine.FindStringSubmatch(line)
-		if m == nil || seen[m[1]] {
-			continue
-		}
-		seen[m[1]] = true
-		services = append(services, m[1])
-	}
-	return services, nil
-}
-
-// SweepEphemeralParityKeychain deletes every credential whose service name
-// passes IsEphemeralParityService, and returns the names it removed.
-//
-// This is the orphan collector. A test binary that is killed (SIGKILL, a
-// panicking child, ^C) never runs t.Cleanup, so entries survive; running this
-// at the START of a run collects them, and running it at the END collects
-// anything the CLIs under test wrote for themselves — the Go binary creates
-// vip-next-cli:<host> and vip-next-cli:elevated:<host> entries during the login
-// and rechallenge scenarios, which no per-test cleanup knows about.
-//
-// It cannot touch a real credential: a name only qualifies if it is scoped to
-// 127.0.0.1 on a port in the ephemeral range, which is a shape only a
-// throwaway httptest server produces.
-func SweepEphemeralParityKeychain() ([]string, error) {
-	services, err := listKeychainServices()
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	var removed []string
-	var errs []error
-	for _, name := range services {
-		if !IsEphemeralParityService(name) {
-			continue
-		}
-		if err := DeleteParityKeychainService(name); err != nil {
-			errs = append(errs, err)
-			continue
-		}
-		removed = append(removed, name)
-	}
-	return removed, errors.Join(errs...)
-}