@automattic/vip 4.1.4 → 4.1.6

package/internal/devenv/hostops/e2e_test.go

@@ -1,429 +0,0 @@
-//go:build devenv_e2e
-
-// Package hostops e2e harness — the Plan 3 manual integration gate (Task 11).
-//
-// This is NOT a normal unit test: it drives the REAL proxy + hostops Go code
-// against a live Docker daemon and performs the two host-privileged operations
-// (trusting the local CA in the System keychain + editing /etc/hosts) under a
-// single macOS admin prompt. Because there is no `vip dev-env` command wired to
-// these packages yet (Plans 4/5), this harness is the only way to exercise the
-// real code paths end-to-end before that wiring lands.
-//
-// It is gated behind the `devenv_e2e` build tag so it never runs in CI or a
-// normal `go test ./...`. Run it explicitly on a macOS machine with Docker:
-//
-//	go test -tags devenv_e2e -run TestProxyHostopsE2E -v \
-//	    -timeout 5m ./internal/devenv/hostops/
-//
-// You will be asked for your admin password ONCE (setup: trust CA + add the
-// /etc/hosts entry) and ONCE more at teardown (untrust + remove the entry).
-//
-// What it proves:
-//   - proxy.EnsureNetwork / Ensure (real Docker bind + fallback ports)
-//   - proxy.EnsureCA / EnsureCert (embedded gen-certs.sh in a one-shot)
-//   - proxy.ExtractCA (docker cp the CA PEM to the host)
-//   - hostops.Apply: ONE elevation does both trust + /etc/hosts (production path)
-//   - a plain `curl https://example.vipdev.lndo.site[:port]/` succeeds with
-//     ssl_verify_result=0 — i.e. SYSTEM trust + /etc/hosts both work, no
-//     --cacert/--resolve crutches.
-//
-// Everything it creates is named with the production proxy names and removed in
-// teardown (the proxy container, the throwaway nginx backend, the shared
-// network, and the certs/proxy_config volumes).
-package hostops
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"crypto/sha256"
-	"crypto/x509"
-	"encoding/hex"
-	"encoding/pem"
-	"os"
-	"os/exec"
-	"runtime"
-	"strconv"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/Automattic/vip/internal/devenv/compose"
-	"github.com/Automattic/vip/internal/devenv/dockercli"
-	"github.com/Automattic/vip/internal/devenv/e2esafety"
-	"github.com/Automattic/vip/internal/devenv/proxy"
-)
-
-const (
-	e2eDomain   = compose.DefaultDomain  // vipdev.lndo.site
-	e2eHost     = "example." + e2eDomain // example.vipdev.lndo.site
-	e2eWeb      = "vip-dev-env-e2e-web"  // throwaway backend container
-	e2eCertCN   = e2eHost
-	e2eBasename = "example"
-
-	resourceBackendContainer = "backend-container"
-	resourceProxyContainer   = "proxy-container"
-	resourceProxyNetwork     = "proxy-network"
-	resourceCertsVolume      = "certs-volume"
-	resourceConfigVolume     = "config-volume"
-	resourceTrustedCA        = "trusted-ca"
-	resourceManagedHosts     = "managed-hosts"
-	resourceCAHostFile       = "ca-host-file"
-	resourcePortsState       = "ports-state-file"
-)
-
-func TestProxyHostopsE2E(t *testing.T) {
-	if runtime.GOOS != "darwin" {
-		t.Skipf("e2e trust path is macOS-only; GOOS=%s", runtime.GOOS)
-	}
-	if _, err := exec.LookPath("docker"); err != nil {
-		t.Skip("docker not found in PATH")
-	}
-
-	ctx := context.Background()
-	r := &dockercli.Runner{} // tees child output to os.Stdout/os.Stderr (Log nil)
-
-	before := captureE2ESnapshot(t, ctx, r)
-	if err := before.RequireClean(); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	owned := e2esafety.Snapshot{}
-	t.Cleanup(func() { teardownOwned(t, ctx, r, owned) })
-
-	// 1. Shared network + proxy container (real Docker bind + fallback ports).
-	if err := proxy.EnsureNetwork(ctx, r); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("EnsureNetwork: %v", err)
-	}
-	recordOwned(t, owned, captureE2ESnapshot(t, ctx, r), resourceProxyNetwork)
-	ports, err := proxy.Ensure(ctx, r, proxy.EnsureOptions{Domain: e2eDomain})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("proxy.Ensure: %v", err)
-	}
-	recordOwned(t, owned, captureE2ESnapshot(t, ctx, r),
-		resourceProxyContainer, resourceCertsVolume,
-		resourceConfigVolume, resourcePortsState)
-	t.Logf("proxy bound: http=%d https=%d (note: ListenProbe cannot bind <1024 as "+
-		"non-root, so 80/443 are pre-skipped to fallbacks unless run as root)", ports.HTTP, ports.HTTPS)
-	if ports.HTTPS == 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("no https port chosen: %+v", ports)
-	}
-
-	// 2. CA + per-env leaf cert (SANs incl. the wildcard, mirroring CertSANs).
-	if err := proxy.EnsureCA(ctx, r); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("EnsureCA: %v", err)
-	}
-	if err := proxy.EnsureCert(ctx, r, proxy.CertRequest{
-		Basename:   e2eBasename,
-		CommonName: e2eCertCN,
-		SANs:       []string{e2eHost, "*." + e2eDomain, "localhost"},
-	}); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("EnsureCert: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	// 3. Extract the CA PEM to the host (what hostops.Apply will trust).
-	caPath, err := proxy.ExtractCA(ctx, r, proxy.CAHostPath())
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("ExtractCA: %v", err)
-	}
-	recordOwned(t, owned, captureE2ESnapshot(t, ctx, r), resourceCAHostFile)
-	t.Logf("extracted CA -> %s", caPath)
-
-	// 4. Throwaway nginx backend with the Plan-2 secured-router labels.
-	if err := r.Docker(ctx, append([]string{
-		"run", "-d", "--name", e2eWeb, "--network", compose.ProxyNetwork,
-	}, webLabels()...)...); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("start backend: %v", err)
-	}
-	recordOwned(t, owned, captureE2ESnapshot(t, ctx, r), resourceBackendContainer)
-
-	// 5. THE PRODUCTION ONE-ELEVATION PATH: trust CA + add /etc/hosts in one prompt.
-	t.Log(">>> macOS will now prompt for your admin password ONCE (trust CA + /etc/hosts) <<<")
-	if err := Apply(PrivilegedPlan{
-		GOOS:     runtime.GOOS,
-		CAPath:   caPath,
-		HostsAdd: []string{e2eHost},
-	}); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("hostops.Apply (one-elevation trust+hosts): %v", err)
-	}
-	recordOwned(t, owned, captureE2ESnapshot(t, ctx, r), resourceTrustedCA, resourceManagedHosts)
-
-	// 6. Verify the privileged state landed.
-	assertKeychainHasCA(t)
-	assertEtcHostsHas(t, e2eHost)
-
-	// 7. Plain HTTPS through the system trust store + /etc/hosts (no crutches).
-	url := "https://" + e2eHost
-	if ports.HTTPS != 443 {
-		url += ":" + strconv.Itoa(ports.HTTPS)
-	}
-	assertHTTPSTrusted(t, url)
-}
-
-// webLabels returns the secured (https/tls) Traefik router labels for the
-// throwaway nginx backend (port 80), matching compose/labels.go's scheme for
-// id "nginx-example".
-func webLabels() []string {
-	const id = "nginx-example"
-	rule := "HostRegexp(`" + e2eHost + "`)"
-	kv := map[string]string{
-		"traefik.enable": "true",
-		"traefik.http.routers." + id + "-secured.entrypoints":                       "https",
-		"traefik.http.routers." + id + "-secured.rule":                              rule,
-		"traefik.http.routers." + id + "-secured.tls":                               "true",
-		"traefik.http.routers." + id + "-secured.service":                           id + "-secured-service",
-		"traefik.http.services." + id + "-secured-service.loadbalancer.server.port": "80",
-	}
-	var out []string
-	for k, v := range kv {
-		out = append(out, "--label", k+"="+v)
-	}
-	out = append(out, "nginx:alpine")
-	return out
-}
-
-// assertHTTPSTrusted polls curl (system trust, no --cacert/--resolve) until the
-// TLS handshake verifies the cert against the trusted CA. The key signal is
-// ssl_verify_result=0; the HTTP status only needs to be non-000 (a route
-// reached a backend), since traefik may take a moment to register the router.
-func assertHTTPSTrusted(t *testing.T, url string) {
-	t.Helper()
-	deadline := time.Now().Add(20 * time.Second)
-	var last string
-	for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
-		out, _ := exec.Command("curl", "--noproxy", "*", "-sS", "-o", "/dev/null",
-			"-w", "%{http_code} %{ssl_verify_result}", url).CombinedOutput()
-		last = strings.TrimSpace(string(out))
-		fields := strings.Fields(last)
-		if len(fields) == 2 && fields[1] == "0" && fields[0] != "000" {
-			t.Logf("HTTPS OK (system-trusted): %s -> http=%s ssl_verify=0", url, fields[0])
-			return
-		}
-		time.Sleep(2 * time.Second)
-	}
-	t.Fatalf("HTTPS via system trust did not verify within timeout: %s (last: %q)", url, last)
-}
-
-func assertKeychainHasCA(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Helper()
-	out, err := exec.Command("security", "find-certificate", "-c", "WPVIP Local CA",
-		"/Library/Keychains/System.keychain").CombinedOutput()
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("CA not found in System keychain after Apply: %v\n%s", err, out)
-	}
-	t.Log("CA present in System keychain ✓")
-}
-
-func assertEtcHostsHas(t *testing.T, host string) {
-	t.Helper()
-	out, err := exec.Command("grep", "-F", host, etcHosts).CombinedOutput()
-	if err != nil || !strings.Contains(string(out), host) {
-		t.Fatalf("/etc/hosts missing %q after Apply: %v\n%s", host, err, out)
-	}
-	t.Logf("/etc/hosts has %s -> 127.0.0.1 ✓", host)
-}
-
-func captureE2ESnapshot(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, r *dockercli.Runner) e2esafety.Snapshot {
-	t.Helper()
-	return e2esafety.Snapshot{
-		resourceBackendContainer: dockerObjectIdentity(t, ctx, r, "container", e2eWeb, "{{.Id}}"),
-		resourceProxyContainer:   dockerObjectIdentity(t, ctx, r, "container", proxy.ProxyContainerName, "{{.Id}}"),
-		resourceProxyNetwork:     dockerObjectIdentity(t, ctx, r, "network", compose.ProxyNetwork, "{{.Id}}"),
-		resourceCertsVolume:      dockerObjectIdentity(t, ctx, r, "volume", proxy.ProxyCertsVolume, "{{.Name}}|{{.CreatedAt}}"),
-		resourceConfigVolume:     dockerObjectIdentity(t, ctx, r, "volume", proxy.ProxyConfigVolume, "{{.Name}}|{{.CreatedAt}}"),
-		resourceTrustedCA:        trustedCAIdentity(t),
-		resourceManagedHosts:     managedHostsIdentity(t, etcHosts),
-		resourceCAHostFile:       fileIdentity(t, proxy.CAHostPath()),
-		resourcePortsState:       fileIdentity(t, proxy.PortsStatePath()),
-	}
-}
-
-func dockerObjectIdentity(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, r *dockercli.Runner, kind, name, format string) string {
-	t.Helper()
-	out, err := r.DockerOut(ctx, kind, "inspect", "--format", format, name)
-	if err == nil {
-		identity := strings.TrimSpace(string(out))
-		if identity == "" {
-			t.Fatalf("docker %s inspect returned an empty identity for %q", kind, name)
-		}
-		return identity
-	}
-
-	listFormat := "{{.Name}}"
-	var listed []byte
-	var listErr error
-	if kind == "container" {
-		listFormat = "{{.Names}}"
-		listed, listErr = r.DockerOut(ctx, kind, "ls", "--all", "--filter", "name="+name, "--format", listFormat)
-	} else {
-		listed, listErr = r.DockerOut(ctx, kind, "ls", "--filter", "name="+name, "--format", listFormat)
-	}
-	if listErr != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("docker %s lookup for %q failed after inspect error: %v", kind, name, listErr)
-	}
-	for _, candidate := range strings.Split(strings.TrimSpace(string(listed)), "\n") {
-		if candidate == name {
-			t.Fatalf("docker %s %q exists but its identity could not be inspected: %v", kind, name, err)
-		}
-	}
-	return ""
-}
-
-func trustedCAIdentity(t *testing.T) string {
-	t.Helper()
-	out, err := exec.Command("security", "find-certificate", "-a", "-c", "WPVIP Local CA", "-p",
-		"/Library/Keychains/System.keychain").CombinedOutput()
-	if err != nil {
-		if strings.Contains(string(out), "could not be found") {
-			return ""
-		}
-		t.Fatalf("read trusted WPVIP Local CA: %v: %s", err, strings.TrimSpace(string(out)))
-	}
-	block, rest := pem.Decode(out)
-	if block == nil {
-		t.Fatal("trusted WPVIP Local CA is not valid PEM")
-	}
-	if len(strings.TrimSpace(string(rest))) != 0 {
-		t.Fatal("multiple WPVIP Local CA certificates found; refusing ambiguous ownership")
-	}
-	cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(block.Bytes)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("parse trusted WPVIP Local CA: %v", err)
-	}
-	return hashIdentity(cert.Raw)
-}
-
-func managedHostsIdentity(t *testing.T, path string) string {
-	t.Helper()
-	b, err := os.ReadFile(path)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("read hosts file %s: %v", path, err)
-	}
-	content := string(b)
-	if strings.Count(content, beginMarker) != strings.Count(content, endMarker) {
-		t.Fatalf("malformed managed hosts block in %s", path)
-	}
-	if strings.Count(content, beginMarker) > 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("multiple managed hosts blocks found in %s; refusing ambiguous ownership", path)
-	}
-	start := strings.Index(content, beginMarker)
-	end := strings.Index(content, endMarker)
-	if start < 0 && end < 0 {
-		return ""
-	}
-	if start < 0 || end < start {
-		t.Fatalf("malformed managed hosts block in %s", path)
-	}
-	end += len(endMarker)
-	if end < len(content) && content[end] == '\n' {
-		end++
-	}
-	return hashIdentity([]byte(content[start:end]))
-}
-
-func fileIdentity(t *testing.T, path string) string {
-	t.Helper()
-	b, err := os.ReadFile(path)
-	if os.IsNotExist(err) {
-		return ""
-	}
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("read %s: %v", path, err)
-	}
-	return hashIdentity(b)
-}
-
-func hashIdentity(b []byte) string {
-	sum := sha256.Sum256(b)
-	return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
-}
-
-func recordOwned(t *testing.T, owned, current e2esafety.Snapshot, names ...string) {
-	t.Helper()
-	for _, name := range names {
-		if current[name] == "" {
-			t.Fatalf("created resource %s has no identity", name)
-		}
-		owned[name] = current[name]
-	}
-}
-
-func teardownOwned(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, r *dockercli.Runner, owned e2esafety.Snapshot) {
-	t.Helper()
-	current := captureE2ESnapshot(t, ctx, r)
-
-	removeDocker := func(key string, args ...string) {
-		if !e2esafety.CanRemove(owned[key], current[key]) {
-			if owned[key] != "" {
-				t.Logf("%s identity changed; refusing removal (manual cleanup may be required)", key)
-			}
-			return
-		}
-		if err := r.Docker(ctx, args...); err != nil {
-			t.Logf("remove owned %s: %v", key, err)
-		}
-	}
-	removeDocker(resourceBackendContainer, "rm", "-f", e2eWeb)
-	removeDocker(resourceProxyContainer, "rm", "-f", proxy.ProxyContainerName)
-	removeDocker(resourceConfigVolume, "volume", "rm", proxy.ProxyConfigVolume)
-	removeDocker(resourceCertsVolume, "volume", "rm", proxy.ProxyCertsVolume)
-	removeDocker(resourceProxyNetwork, "network", "rm", compose.ProxyNetwork)
-
-	var scriptLines []string
-	if e2esafety.CanRemove(owned[resourceTrustedCA], current[resourceTrustedCA]) &&
-		e2esafety.CanRemove(owned[resourceCAHostFile], current[resourceCAHostFile]) {
-		if argv, err := untrustCommand(runtime.GOOS, proxy.CAHostPath()); err == nil {
-			scriptLines = append(scriptLines, shellJoin(argv))
-		} else {
-			t.Logf("owned trusted CA cannot be removed automatically: %v", err)
-		}
-	} else if owned[resourceTrustedCA] != "" {
-		t.Log("trusted CA or extracted CA identity changed; refusing untrust (manual cleanup may be required)")
-	}
-	if e2esafety.CanRemove(owned[resourceManagedHosts], current[resourceManagedHosts]) {
-		scriptLines = append(scriptLines, stripBlockScript())
-	} else if owned[resourceManagedHosts] != "" {
-		t.Log("managed hosts identity changed; refusing removal (manual cleanup may be required)")
-	}
-	if len(scriptLines) > 0 {
-		t.Log(">>> sudo will prompt once to remove only identity-matched privileged state <<<")
-		if err := runElevatedScript("#!/bin/sh\nset -e\n" + strings.Join(scriptLines, "\n") + "\n"); err != nil {
-			t.Logf("owned privileged teardown failed: %v", err)
-		}
-	}
-
-	removeOwnedFile := func(key, path string) {
-		if !e2esafety.CanRemove(owned[key], current[key]) {
-			if owned[key] != "" {
-				t.Logf("%s identity changed; refusing file removal (manual cleanup may be required)", key)
-			}
-			return
-		}
-		if err := os.Remove(path); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
-			t.Logf("remove owned %s: %v", key, err)
-		}
-	}
-	removeOwnedFile(resourceCAHostFile, proxy.CAHostPath())
-	removeOwnedFile(resourcePortsState, proxy.PortsStatePath())
-}
-
-// runElevatedScript runs a /bin/sh script once under a single sudo prompt.
-// Test-only mirror of Apply's exec, used for teardown (which must untrust —
-// something Apply/PrivilegedPlan does not model).
-func runElevatedScript(script string) error {
-	f, err := os.CreateTemp("", "vip-dev-env-e2e-teardown-*.sh")
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	name := f.Name()
-	defer os.Remove(name)
-	if _, err := f.WriteString(script); err != nil {
-		f.Close()
-		return err
-	}
-	if err := f.Close(); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	cmd := exec.Command("sudo", "/bin/sh", name)
-	cmd.Stdin = os.Stdin
-	cmd.Stdout = os.Stdout
-	cmd.Stderr = os.Stderr
-	return cmd.Run()
-}

package/internal/devenv/hostops/elevate.go

@@ -1,248 +0,0 @@
-package hostops
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-	"os"
-	"os/exec"
-	"strings"
-)
-
-// etcHosts is the real hosts file the elevated script rewrites (as root). The
-// unit-tested EnsureHosts/RemoveHosts in hosts.go are path-injected; the
-// privileged path uses this fixed location.
-const etcHosts = "/etc/hosts"
-
-// PrivilegedPlan describes the host-privileged operations to run under a single
-// elevation: trusting the CA (CAPath) and/or rewriting the managed /etc/hosts
-// block (HostsAdd) or removing it (HostsRemove).
-type PrivilegedPlan struct {
-	GOOS   string
-	CAPath string
-	// HostsAdd is the list of hostnames to write into the managed /etc/hosts block.
-	// WARNING: wildcard hostnames (e.g. *.example.test) are valid TLS SANs but are
-	// NOT valid /etc/hosts entries — the resolver ignores them. Callers (Plan 4)
-	// must filter wildcard SANs out of CertSANs before passing them here.
-	HostsAdd    []string
-	HostsRemove bool
-}
-
-// shellQuote single-quotes s for safe POSIX-sh interpolation.
-func shellQuote(s string) string {
-	return "'" + strings.ReplaceAll(s, "'", `'\''`) + "'"
-}
-
-// shellJoin shell-quotes each argv element and joins them with spaces.
-func shellJoin(argv []string) string {
-	q := make([]string, len(argv))
-	for i, a := range argv {
-		q[i] = shellQuote(a)
-	}
-	return strings.Join(q, " ")
-}
-
-// stripBlockScript emits sh that removes the managed block from /etc/hosts via a
-// temp file, overwriting through a redirect (not mv) so the file keeps its
-// existing ownership/permissions.
-func stripBlockScript() string {
-	return fmt.Sprintf(`__vip_tmp="$(mktemp)"
-sed -e '/^%s$/,/^%s$/d' '%s' > "$__vip_tmp"
-cat "$__vip_tmp" > '%s'
-rm -f "$__vip_tmp"
-`, beginMarker, endMarker, etcHosts, etcHosts)
-}
-
-// buildPrivilegedScript returns a single /bin/sh program performing all of the
-// plan's privileged operations, to be run once under elevation. Trust runs
-// first; the /etc/hosts rewrite happens in-script (as root). Returns an error
-// if the OS is unsupported for trust or a hostname is invalid.
-func buildPrivilegedScript(plan PrivilegedPlan) (string, error) {
-	var b strings.Builder
-	b.WriteString("#!/bin/sh\nset -e\n")
-	if plan.CAPath != "" {
-		argv, err := trustCommand(plan.GOOS, plan.CAPath)
-		if err != nil {
-			return "", err
-		}
-		b.WriteString(shellJoin(argv) + "\n")
-	}
-	// HostsAdd takes precedence over HostsRemove when both are set.
-	switch {
-	case len(plan.HostsAdd) > 0:
-		if err := validateHosts(plan.HostsAdd); err != nil {
-			return "", err
-		}
-		b.WriteString(stripBlockScript())
-		b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("cat >> %s <<'__VIP_HOSTS_EOF__'\n", etcHosts))
-		b.WriteString(renderBlock(plan.HostsAdd))
-		b.WriteString("__VIP_HOSTS_EOF__\n")
-	case plan.HostsRemove:
-		b.WriteString(stripBlockScript())
-	}
-	return b.String(), nil
-}
-
-// windowsHostsPath is the hosts file PowerShell edits (from native Windows or
-// WSL via powershell.exe). $env:SystemRoot expands at runtime.
-const windowsHostsPath = `$env:SystemRoot\System32\drivers\etc\hosts`
-
-// buildWindowsScript returns a PowerShell program that (optionally) trusts the
-// CA via certutil and rewrites the managed block in the Windows hosts file.
-// Mirrors buildPrivilegedScript but for the Windows target (native + WSL).
-func buildWindowsScript(plan PrivilegedPlan) (string, error) {
-	var b strings.Builder
-	b.WriteString("$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'\n")
-	if plan.CAPath != "" {
-		b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("certutil -addstore -f Root %s\n", psQuote(plan.CAPath)))
-	}
-	switch {
-	case len(plan.HostsAdd) > 0:
-		if err := validateHosts(plan.HostsAdd); err != nil {
-			return "", err
-		}
-		b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("$hf = \"%s\"\n", windowsHostsPath))
-		b.WriteString("$lines = if (Test-Path $hf) { Get-Content $hf } else { @() }\n")
-		b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("$out = @(); $in = $false\nforeach ($l in $lines) { if ($l.Trim() -eq %s) { $in = $true; continue }; if ($l.Trim() -eq %s) { $in = $false; continue }; if (-not $in) { $out += $l } }\n", psQuote(beginMarker), psQuote(endMarker)))
-		b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("$out += %s\n", psQuote(beginMarker)))
-		for _, h := range plan.HostsAdd {
-			b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("$out += %s\n", psQuote("127.0.0.1 "+h)))
-		}
-		b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("$out += %s\n", psQuote(endMarker)))
-		b.WriteString("Set-Content -Path $hf -Value $out -Encoding ASCII\n")
-	case plan.HostsRemove:
-		b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("$hf = \"%s\"\n", windowsHostsPath))
-		b.WriteString("if (Test-Path $hf) { $lines = Get-Content $hf; $out = @(); $in = $false\n")
-		b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("foreach ($l in $lines) { if ($l.Trim() -eq %s) { $in = $true; continue }; if ($l.Trim() -eq %s) { $in = $false; continue }; if (-not $in) { $out += $l } }\n", psQuote(beginMarker), psQuote(endMarker)))
-		b.WriteString("Set-Content -Path $hf -Value $out -Encoding ASCII }\n")
-	}
-	return b.String(), nil
-}
-
-// psQuote single-quotes s for PowerShell (doubling embedded single quotes).
-func psQuote(s string) string {
-	return "'" + strings.ReplaceAll(s, "'", "''") + "'"
-}
-
-// planActions describes, in plain language, what a privileged plan will change —
-// used to tell the user why a UAC / sudo prompt is about to appear.
-func planActions(plan PrivilegedPlan) []string {
-	var a []string
-	if plan.CAPath != "" {
-		a = append(a, "trust the local development HTTPS certificate")
-	}
-	switch {
-	case len(plan.HostsAdd) > 0:
-		a = append(a, "add local hostnames to your hosts file")
-	case plan.HostsRemove:
-		a = append(a, "remove local hostnames from your hosts file")
-	}
-	return a
-}
-
-// joinAnd joins phrases into "a", "a and b", or "a, b, and c".
-func joinAnd(items []string) string {
-	switch len(items) {
-	case 0:
-		return ""
-	case 1:
-		return items[0]
-	case 2:
-		return items[0] + " and " + items[1]
-	default:
-		return strings.Join(items[:len(items)-1], ", ") + ", and " + items[len(items)-1]
-	}
-}
-
-// Apply runs the plan's privileged operations under a SINGLE elevation,
-// dispatching by runtime context: ctxWindows (native Windows / WSL) edits the
-// Windows hosts file + cert store via powershell.exe RunAs; everything else
-// (macOS / native Linux) edits /etc/hosts via sudo /bin/sh.
-func Apply(plan PrivilegedPlan) error {
-	if currentContext() == ctxWindows {
-		return applyWindows(plan)
-	}
-	return applyUnix(plan)
-}
-
-// applyWindows writes the PowerShell script to a temp .ps1 and runs it elevated.
-// From native Windows AND from WSL, `powershell.exe` is invokable; Start-Process
-// -Verb RunAs triggers the UAC prompt and edits the Windows hosts/cert store.
-func applyWindows(plan PrivilegedPlan) error {
-	script, err := buildWindowsScript(plan)
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	f, err := os.CreateTemp("", "vip-dev-env-priv-*.ps1")
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	name := f.Name()
-	defer os.Remove(name)
-	if _, err := f.WriteString(script); err != nil {
-		f.Close()
-		return err
-	}
-	if err := f.Close(); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	if actions := planActions(plan); len(actions) > 0 {
-		fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "\nAdministrator access is needed to %s.\nApprove the Windows (UAC) prompt to continue...\n", joinAnd(actions))
-	}
-	inner := fmt.Sprintf("$p = Start-Process powershell -Verb RunAs -Wait -PassThru -ArgumentList '-NoProfile','-ExecutionPolicy','Bypass','-File','%s'; exit $p.ExitCode", name)
-	cmd := exec.Command("powershell.exe", "-NoProfile", "-Command", inner)
-	cmd.Stdin, cmd.Stdout, cmd.Stderr = os.Stdin, os.Stdout, os.Stderr
-	if err := cmd.Run(); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	if plan.CAPath != "" {
-		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "Local HTTPS certificate trusted. Restart your browser for it to take effect.")
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-// applyUnix runs the plan's privileged operations under a SINGLE elevation — one
-// `sudo /bin/sh <script>` invocation, i.e. one password prompt for both the CA
-// trust and the /etc/hosts edit. Not unit-tested (it prompts/execs); exercised
-// by the Task 11 integration harness.
-//
-// We use sudo rather than macOS osascript's "with administrator privileges"
-// even on darwin: osascript elevates in a context detached from the login GUI
-// session, where `security add-trusted-cert` cannot authorize System-keychain
-// trust settings ("SecTrustSettingsSetTrustSettings: the authorization was
-// denied since no user interaction was possible") — it adds the cert but leaves
-// it untrusted. sudo from the terminal keeps the session context, so the
-// Security Agent can authorize the trust change. vip is always run from a
-// terminal, so a TTY for the sudo prompt is available. (Validated 2026-06-19;
-// see docs/superpowers/notes/2026-06-18-traefik-openssl-cert-contract.md.)
-func applyUnix(plan PrivilegedPlan) error {
-	script, err := buildPrivilegedScript(plan)
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	f, err := os.CreateTemp("", "vip-dev-env-priv-*.sh")
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	name := f.Name()
-	defer os.Remove(name)
-	if _, err := f.WriteString(script); err != nil {
-		f.Close()
-		return err
-	}
-	if err := f.Close(); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	if actions := planActions(plan); len(actions) > 0 {
-		fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "\nAdministrator access is needed to %s.\nYou may be prompted for your password...\n", joinAnd(actions))
-	}
-	cmd := exec.Command("sudo", "/bin/sh", name)
-	cmd.Stdin = os.Stdin
-	cmd.Stdout = os.Stdout
-	cmd.Stderr = os.Stderr
-	if err := cmd.Run(); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	if plan.CAPath != "" {
-		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "Local HTTPS certificate trusted. Restart your browser for it to take effect.")
-	}
-	return nil
-}