@astrasyncai/verification-gateway 4.6.0 → 5.1.0

package/dist/index.mjs

@@ -4,32 +4,7 @@ var __export = (target, all) => {
     __defProp(target, name, { get: all[name], enumerable: true });
 };
 
-// src/access-levels.ts
-var ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY = {
-  none: 0,
-  restricted: 1,
-  "read-only": 2,
-  standard: 3,
-  full: 4,
-  internal: 5
-};
-var ACCESS_LEVEL_DESCRIPTIONS = {
-  none: "No access - credentials required",
-  restricted: "Restricted access - registration prompt only",
-  "read-only": "Read-only access - can browse but not modify",
-  standard: "Standard access - normal operations per PDLSS policy",
-  full: "Full access - all operations for high-trust agents",
-  internal: "Internal access - organization member privileges"
-};
-var DEFAULT_TRUST_THRESHOLDS = {
-  none: 0,
-  restricted: 0,
-  "read-only": 20,
-  standard: 40,
-  full: 70,
-  internal: 0
-  // Internal is based on org membership, not score
-};
+// src/trust-levels.ts
 var TRUST_LEVEL_RANGES = {
   BRONZE: { min: 0, max: 39 },
   SILVER: { min: 40, max: 59 },
@@ -42,91 +17,9 @@ function getTrustLevel(score) {
   if (score >= 40) return "SILVER";
   return "BRONZE";
 }
-function hasMinimumAccess(actual, required) {
-  return ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY[actual] >= ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY[required];
-}
-function getAccessLevelForScore(trustScore, thresholds = DEFAULT_TRUST_THRESHOLDS) {
-  if (trustScore >= thresholds.full) return "full";
-  if (trustScore >= thresholds.standard) return "standard";
-  if (trustScore >= thresholds["read-only"]) return "read-only";
-  return "restricted";
-}
-function determineAccessLevel(verified, trustScore, isOrgMember, customThresholds) {
-  if (!verified) {
-    return "none";
-  }
-  if (isOrgMember) {
-    return "internal";
-  }
-  const thresholds = {
-    ...DEFAULT_TRUST_THRESHOLDS,
-    ...customThresholds
-  };
-  return getAccessLevelForScore(trustScore, thresholds);
-}
-function getCapabilities(accessLevel) {
-  switch (accessLevel) {
-    case "none":
-      return {
-        canRead: false,
-        canWrite: false,
-        canDelete: false,
-        canAdmin: false,
-        canAccessInternal: false
-      };
-    case "restricted":
-      return {
-        canRead: false,
-        canWrite: false,
-        canDelete: false,
-        canAdmin: false,
-        canAccessInternal: false
-      };
-    case "read-only":
-      return {
-        canRead: true,
-        canWrite: false,
-        canDelete: false,
-        canAdmin: false,
-        canAccessInternal: false
-      };
-    case "standard":
-      return {
-        canRead: true,
-        canWrite: true,
-        canDelete: false,
-        canAdmin: false,
-        canAccessInternal: false
-      };
-    case "full":
-      return {
-        canRead: true,
-        canWrite: true,
-        canDelete: true,
-        canAdmin: false,
-        canAccessInternal: false
-      };
-    case "internal":
-      return {
-        canRead: true,
-        canWrite: true,
-        canDelete: true,
-        canAdmin: true,
-        canAccessInternal: true
-      };
-    default:
-      return {
-        canRead: false,
-        canWrite: false,
-        canDelete: false,
-        canAdmin: false,
-        canAccessInternal: false
-      };
-  }
-}
 
 // src/version.ts
-var SDK_VERSION = "4.6.0";
+var SDK_VERSION = "5.0.0";
 
 // src/http.ts
 var SDK_USER_AGENT = `astrasync-sdk/${SDK_VERSION}`;
@@ -208,11 +101,6 @@ function getCachedWellKnownUrls(apiBaseUrl) {
 // src/verify.ts
 var DEFAULT_CONFIG = {
   apiBaseUrl: "https://astrasync.ai/api",
-  // v2.3.9 (defect #30): default for unconfigured callers is `'none'` (no
-  // access). Pre-rename this defaulted to `'guidance'`, which combined with
-  // a route gated at `'guidance'` to silently let unverified traffic
-  // through (`hasMinimumAccess('guidance', 'guidance') === true`).
-  defaultAccessLevel: "none",
   // minTrustScore + minTrustScoreForFull deprecated in v2.3.0 — server decides.
   // cacheTtl deliberately unset. When undefined, cacheResult applies the 60s
   // default; the caller's explicit value is honoured for cacheable results.
@@ -375,6 +263,14 @@ function extractCredentials(headers, query) {
 function hasCredentials(credentials) {
   return !!(credentials.astraId || credentials.apiKey || credentials.jwt);
 }
+function mcpGuidance(urls) {
+  if (!urls?.mcpEndpoint) return void 0;
+  return {
+    endpoint: urls.mcpEndpoint,
+    discoveryUrl: urls.mcpDiscoveryUrl,
+    message: "If you are operating inside an MCP-capable host (Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor, or any MCP client), add the AstraSync MCP connector instead of integrating these URLs by hand: registration through the connector is KEYLESS and HUMAN-APPROVED \u2014 your human approves in an in-chat card, and you never see, hold, or transmit an API key, password, or private key."
+  };
+}
 function createGuidanceResponse(_config, reason, options = {}) {
   const source = options.source ?? "no_credentials";
   const isApiError = source === "api_error";
@@ -401,11 +297,17 @@ function createGuidanceResponse(_config, reason, options = {}) {
     registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? "",
     documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? "",
     steps: [
+      // MCP steering leads when the hosted bridge is advertised — the
+      // connector is the agent-actionable path (keyless, human-approved).
+      ...urls?.mcpEndpoint ? [
+        `Fastest path (inside an MCP host): add the AstraSync MCP connector at ${urls.mcpEndpoint} \u2014 keyless, human-approved registration`
+      ] : [],
       "Register for an AstraSync account",
       "Create and register your agent",
       "Add your ASTRA-ID to request headers",
       "Retry your request"
-    ]
+    ],
+    ...mcpGuidance(urls) && { mcp: mcpGuidance(urls) }
   };
   return {
     // Round-18 G4: createGuidanceResponse fires for unverified-agent path or
@@ -413,13 +315,6 @@ function createGuidanceResponse(_config, reason, options = {}) {
     // policy is not evaluated (we never reached the gate).
     identityVerified: false,
     policyAllowed: false,
-    // v2.3.9 (defect #30): denials grant `'none'`, NEVER a positive band.
-    // Adapters additionally short-circuit on `!identityVerified ||
-    // !policyAllowed` before the gate check, but the access level still has
-    // to be honest at the data layer so downstream consumers (SDK adapters
-    // in other languages, custom integrations) inherit the correct
-    // semantics.
-    accessLevel: "none",
     guidance,
     denialReasons: reason ? [reason] : ["No valid agent credentials provided"],
     // Round-10 (#47, O5): on API-error fallback, surface a typed failure so
@@ -513,7 +408,6 @@ async function callVerifyAccessAPI(config, request) {
         attemptId: typeof data?.attemptId === "string" ? data.attemptId : void 0,
         access: {
           allowed: false,
-          accessLevel: "none",
           reason: "endpoint_deactivated",
           failures: [
             {
@@ -576,7 +470,7 @@ async function verify(config, request, options) {
   if (!deprecationWarningShown && (config.minTrustScore !== void 0 || config.minTrustScoreForFull !== void 0)) {
     deprecationWarningShown = true;
     console.warn(
-      "[VerificationGateway] minTrustScore / minTrustScoreForFull are deprecated in v2.3.0 and have no effect. Server is now the single source of truth for access-level decisions (the SDK reads access.accessLevel from the verify-access response). To gate access to an endpoint, configure the endpoint's trust_score_requirement server-side."
+      "[VerificationGateway] minTrustScore / minTrustScoreForFull are deprecated in v2.3.0 and have no effect. Server is now the single source of truth for access decisions (verified ID + runtime challenge + PDLSS + trust score). To gate access to an endpoint, configure the endpoint's trust_score_requirement server-side."
     );
   }
   if (mergedConfig.cacheTtl !== 0 && !options?.bypassCache) {
@@ -622,14 +516,6 @@ async function verify(config, request, options) {
     const result2 = {
       identityVerified: idVerifiedFromBackend,
       policyAllowed: false,
-      // v2.3.9 (defect #30): denials grant `'none'`, NEVER a positive band.
-      // Pre-rename this hardcoded `'guidance'`, which conflated with the
-      // colocated `guidance: {...}` help-payload object below and let
-      // denied requests pass any route gated at `'guidance'` because
-      // `hasMinimumAccess('guidance', 'guidance') === true`. Adapters now
-      // ALSO short-circuit on `!identityVerified || !policyAllowed` before
-      // the gate check — belt-and-braces.
-      accessLevel: "none",
       // 3.6.0: the server now emits top-level denialReasons on every deny
       // path — prefer it verbatim; the failure-message reconstruction remains
       // as the fallback for older backends.
@@ -640,7 +526,10 @@ async function verify(config, request, options) {
       guidance: {
         message: apiResponse.access?.reason || "Access denied by PDLSS policy",
         registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? "",
-        documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? ""
+        documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? "",
+        // 5.1.0: anonymous callers land on this branch — steer MCP-hosted
+        // agents to the connector (this is what the edge deny body surfaces).
+        ...mcpGuidance(urls) && { mcp: mcpGuidance(urls) }
       },
       verifiedAt: /* @__PURE__ */ new Date(),
       // Extract sessionId so decisions can be recorded for denials too
@@ -678,7 +567,6 @@ async function verify(config, request, options) {
     trustScore: apiResponse.organization.trustScore
   } : void 0;
   const verificationContext = apiResponse.verificationContext;
-  const accessLevel = apiResponse.access?.accessLevel ?? "standard";
   const result = {
     // 4.5.0 (probe F1): read idVerified from verificationContext with the
     // SAME absent⇒false default as the deny branch. The previous `!== false`
@@ -690,7 +578,6 @@ async function verify(config, request, options) {
     // this load-bearing must never be defaulted on.
     identityVerified: apiResponse.verificationContext?.idVerified === true,
     policyAllowed: true,
-    accessLevel,
     agent,
     developer,
     organization,
@@ -717,7 +604,6 @@ async function verify(config, request, options) {
   };
   if (result.recommendation === "deny") {
     result.policyAllowed = false;
-    result.accessLevel = "none";
     result.denialReasons = serverDenialReasons ?? result.recommendationReasons ?? ["Access denied by AstraSync recommendation"];
     result.guidance = result.runtimeChallenge ? {
       message: `Verification failed: ${result.runtimeChallenge.reason || "runtime challenge failed"}`,
@@ -820,7 +706,6 @@ async function quickVerify(config, credentials) {
   return {
     identityVerified: result.identityVerified,
     policyAllowed: result.policyAllowed,
-    accessLevel: result.accessLevel,
     reason: result.denialReasons?.[0]
   };
 }
@@ -1850,7 +1735,6 @@ function defaultOnDenied(result, _req, res) {
     error: {
       code: !result.identityVerified ? "UNAUTHORIZED" : "INSUFFICIENT_ACCESS",
       message: result.denialReasons?.[0] || "Access denied",
-      accessLevel: result.accessLevel,
       guidance: result.guidance,
       // Round-10: aggregated per-dimension detail + correlation handle.
       failures: result.failures,
@@ -1966,11 +1850,11 @@ function createMiddleware(options) {
       }
       const wellKnownUrls = config.apiBaseUrl ? await getWellKnownUrls(config.apiBaseUrl).catch(() => void 0) : void 0;
       const credentials = customExtractCredentials ? customExtractCredentials(req) : defaultExtractCredentials(req);
-      const shouldEnforce = routeConfig.minAccessLevel !== "none";
-      if (routeConfig.minAccessLevel === "none" && (!config.evaluateAlwaysIfCredentialed || !credentials.astraId)) {
+      const shouldEnforce = !routeConfig.observe;
+      if (routeConfig.observe && (!config.evaluateAlwaysIfCredentialed || !credentials.astraId)) {
         if (config.setPassThroughHeader) {
           res.setHeader("X-Astra-Gateway-Mode", "unenforced");
-          res.setHeader("X-Astra-Gateway-Reason", "route-none");
+          res.setHeader("X-Astra-Gateway-Reason", "route-observe");
         }
         beaconPassThrough?.(req);
         return next();
@@ -2007,7 +1891,6 @@ function createMiddleware(options) {
         const result2 = {
           identityVerified: false,
           policyAllowed: false,
-          accessLevel: "none",
           denialReasons: preCheckFailures.map((f) => f.message),
           guidance: {
             message: "Request exceeds counterparty-defined PDLSS limits.",
@@ -2170,7 +2053,6 @@ function createMiddleware(options) {
         const result = {
           identityVerified: false,
           policyAllowed: false,
-          accessLevel: "none",
           denialReasons: [`Verification middleware internal error: ${errorClass}`],
           failures: [
             {
@@ -2499,7 +2381,7 @@ function createMiddleware2(options) {
       beaconPassThrough?.(request, pathname);
       return NextResponse.next();
     }
-    if (routeConfig.minAccessLevel === "none") {
+    if (routeConfig.observe) {
       beaconPassThrough?.(request, pathname);
       return NextResponse.next();
     }
@@ -2529,7 +2411,6 @@ function createMiddleware2(options) {
       const preCheckResult = {
         identityVerified: false,
         policyAllowed: false,
-        accessLevel: "none",
         denialReasons: preCheckFailures.map((f) => f.message),
         guidance: {
           message: "Request exceeds counterparty-defined PDLSS limits.",
@@ -2667,7 +2548,6 @@ function createMiddleware2(options) {
     }
     response.headers.set("X-AstraSync-Identity-Verified", result.identityVerified.toString());
     response.headers.set("X-AstraSync-Policy-Allowed", result.policyAllowed.toString());
-    response.headers.set("X-AstraSync-Access-Level", result.accessLevel);
     if (result.agent) {
       response.headers.set("X-AstraSync-Agent-Id", result.agent.astraId);
     }
@@ -2683,9 +2563,7 @@ var sdk_exports = {};
 __export(sdk_exports, {
   VerificationGatewayClient: () => VerificationGatewayClient,
   createClient: () => createClient,
-  getCapabilities: () => getCapabilities,
   getTrustLevel: () => getTrustLevel,
-  hasMinimumAccess: () => hasMinimumAccess,
   verifyOnce: () => verifyOnce
 });
 var VerificationGatewayClient = class {
@@ -2693,7 +2571,6 @@ var VerificationGatewayClient = class {
     this.config = {
       apiBaseUrl: options.apiBaseUrl,
       apiKey: options.apiKey,
-      defaultAccessLevel: options.defaultAccessLevel,
       minTrustScore: options.minTrustScore,
       minTrustScoreForFull: options.minTrustScoreForFull,
       cacheTtl: options.cacheTtl,
@@ -2742,26 +2619,6 @@ var VerificationGatewayClient = class {
   async quickVerify(credentials) {
     return this.executeWithRetry(() => quickVerify(this.config, credentials));
   }
-  /**
-   * Check if an agent has a specific access level.
-   *
-   * @deprecated 3.2.0 — the access-level band is informational only; it no
-   * longer gates in the middleware adapters (post-3.1.0 feedback #1). This
-   * explicit opt-in query still works, but prefer gating on the server-side
-   * policy decision (identity + policy + trust) or per-route `minTrustScore`.
-   * Explicit per-route condition→constraint rules are the Phase-2 successor.
-   */
-  async hasAccess(credentials, requiredLevel) {
-    const result = await this.quickVerify(credentials);
-    return hasMinimumAccess(result.accessLevel, requiredLevel);
-  }
-  /**
-   * Get capabilities for a verified agent
-   */
-  async getCapabilities(credentials) {
-    const result = await this.quickVerify(credentials);
-    return getCapabilities(result.accessLevel);
-  }
   /**
    * Verify a specific ASTRA-ID
    */
@@ -5492,18 +5349,13 @@ function mcpToPdlss(parsed, requestPath, headerPurpose, headerAction, toolGate)
   }
   return { purpose, action, resource, purposeSource, actionSource };
 }
-function mcpRiskTier(parsed) {
-  if (parsed.isInitialize || parsed.method === "notifications/initialized") return "none";
-  if (parsed.isIntrospection) return "none";
-  if (parsed.method === "resources/read") return "read-only";
-  if (parsed.isToolCall) return "standard";
-  return "standard";
+function mcpDefaultEnforced(parsed) {
+  if (parsed.isInitialize || parsed.method === "notifications/initialized") return false;
+  if (parsed.isIntrospection) return false;
+  return true;
 }
 
 // src/adapters/mcp.ts
-function normalizeToolGate(gate) {
-  return typeof gate === "string" ? { minAccessLevel: gate } : gate;
-}
 function readSingleHeader(value) {
   if (typeof value === "string") return value;
   if (Array.isArray(value)) return value[0];
@@ -5556,7 +5408,6 @@ function defaultMcpDenied(result, req, res) {
       code: !result.identityVerified ? -32e3 : -32001,
       message: result.denialReasons?.[0] ?? "Access denied",
       data: {
-        accessLevel: result.accessLevel,
         guidance: result.guidance,
         // Round-10: aggregated per-dimension detail + correlation handle.
         failures: result.failures,
@@ -5569,20 +5420,19 @@ function defaultMcpDenied(result, req, res) {
     }
   });
 }
-function resolveMinAccessLevel(parsed, opts) {
+function resolveGate(parsed, opts) {
   if (!parsed.toolName) {
-    if (opts.methodGates && opts.methodGates[parsed.method] !== void 0) {
-      return { level: opts.methodGates[parsed.method], source: "methodGate" };
+    const methodGate = opts.methodGates?.[parsed.method];
+    if (methodGate !== void 0) {
+      return methodGate === "observe" ? { enforce: false, source: "methodGate" } : { enforce: true, config: methodGate, source: "methodGate" };
     }
-    return { level: "none", source: "discovery_default" };
+    return { enforce: false, source: "discovery_default" };
   }
-  if (opts.toolGates && opts.toolGates[parsed.toolName] !== void 0) {
-    return {
-      level: normalizeToolGate(opts.toolGates[parsed.toolName]).minAccessLevel,
-      source: "toolGate"
-    };
+  const toolGate = opts.toolGates?.[parsed.toolName];
+  if (toolGate !== void 0) {
+    return toolGate === "observe" ? { enforce: false, source: "toolGate" } : { enforce: true, config: toolGate, source: "toolGate" };
   }
-  return { level: mcpRiskTier(parsed), source: "tier" };
+  return { enforce: mcpDefaultEnforced(parsed), source: "tier" };
 }
 function createMcpMiddleware(options) {
   const {
@@ -5602,15 +5452,6 @@ function createMcpMiddleware(options) {
     prefetchWellKnown(config.apiBaseUrl).catch(() => {
     });
   }
-  if (toolGates) {
-    for (const [toolName, gate] of Object.entries(toolGates)) {
-      if (typeof gate === "string") {
-        console.warn(
-          `[VerificationGateway/MCP] toolGates['${toolName}'] uses the bare-string shorthand ('${gate}'). Gated tools need a PDLSS purpose (else PDLSS_PURPOSE_REQUIRED 400) and evaluate purpose-only without a declared action. Use the object form instead: { minAccessLevel: '${gate}', purpose: '...', action: '...' }.`
-        );
-      }
-    }
-  }
   return async (req, res, next) => {
     try {
       if (skip) return next();
@@ -5659,7 +5500,7 @@ function createMcpMiddleware(options) {
           return next();
         }
       }
-      const { level: minAccessLevel } = resolveMinAccessLevel(parsed, {
+      const gateDecision = resolveGate(parsed, {
         toolGates,
         methodGates
       });
@@ -5668,16 +5509,15 @@ function createMcpMiddleware(options) {
         req.query
       );
       if (effectiveAstraId) credentials.astraId = effectiveAstraId;
-      const shouldEnforce = minAccessLevel !== "none";
-      if (minAccessLevel === "none" && (!config.evaluateAlwaysIfCredentialed || !credentials.astraId)) {
+      const shouldEnforce = gateDecision.enforce;
+      if (!shouldEnforce && (!config.evaluateAlwaysIfCredentialed || !credentials.astraId)) {
         if (config.setPassThroughHeader) {
           res.setHeader("X-Astra-Gateway-Mode", "unenforced");
-          res.setHeader("X-Astra-Gateway-Reason", "mcp-tier-none");
+          res.setHeader("X-Astra-Gateway-Reason", "mcp-observe");
         }
         return next();
       }
-      const rawGate = parsed.toolName && toolGates?.[parsed.toolName];
-      const gate = rawGate ? normalizeToolGate(rawGate) : void 0;
+      const gate = gateDecision.config;
       const headerPurpose = readSingleHeader(req.headers["x-astra-purpose"]);
       const headerAction = readSingleHeader(req.headers["x-astra-action"]);
       const pdlss = mcpToPdlss(
@@ -5813,7 +5653,6 @@ function createMcpMiddleware(options) {
         const result = {
           identityVerified: false,
           policyAllowed: false,
-          accessLevel: "none",
           denialReasons: [`MCP middleware internal error: ${errorClass}`],
           failures: [
             {
@@ -6568,8 +6407,6 @@ function detectRuntime(userAgent) {
   return void 0;
 }
 export {
-  ACCESS_LEVEL_DESCRIPTIONS,
-  ACCESS_LEVEL_HIERARCHY,
   AgentClient,
   AstraSync,
   AstraSyncError,
@@ -6577,7 +6414,6 @@ export {
   CAPTURE_SCHEMA_VERSION,
   ChallengeHandler,
   DEFAULT_EDGE_CONFIG,
-  DEFAULT_TRUST_THRESHOLDS,
   KYDRequiredError,
   MAX_HEADERS,
   MAX_HEADER_VALUE_BYTES,
@@ -6604,7 +6440,6 @@ export {
   deriveConnectionFromHeaders,
   detectPlatformFingerprint,
   detectRuntime,
-  determineAccessLevel,
   express_exports as express,
   extractApiKeyFormat,
   extractCredentials,
@@ -6612,14 +6447,11 @@ export {
   extractPlatformHeaders,
   fetchEdgeConfig,
   fetchRoutes,
-  getAccessLevelForScore,
   getCachedWellKnownUrls,
-  getCapabilities,
   getEdgeConfig,
   getTrustLevel,
   getWellKnownUrls,
   hasCredentials,
-  hasMinimumAccess,
   isEdgeConfig,
   isVerifiedHopValidFor,
   matchEdgePathRule,