@astrasyncai/verification-gateway 4.6.0 → 5.1.0

package/dist/bin/astrasync.js

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ var SDK_VERSION;
 var init_version = __esm({
   "src/version.ts"() {
     "use strict";
-    SDK_VERSION = "4.6.0";
+    SDK_VERSION = "5.0.0";
   }
 });
 
@@ -5065,15 +5065,15 @@ var init_local = __esm({
   }
 });
 
-// src/access-levels.ts
+// src/trust-levels.ts
 function getTrustLevel(score) {
   if (score >= 80) return "PLATINUM";
   if (score >= 60) return "GOLD";
   if (score >= 40) return "SILVER";
   return "BRONZE";
 }
-var init_access_levels = __esm({
-  "src/access-levels.ts"() {
+var init_trust_levels = __esm({
+  "src/trust-levels.ts"() {
     "use strict";
   }
 });
@@ -5204,6 +5204,14 @@ function cacheResult(request2, result, configuredTtl, counterpartyId) {
     expiresAt: Date.now() + ttlSeconds * 1e3
   });
 }
+function mcpGuidance(urls) {
+  if (!urls?.mcpEndpoint) return void 0;
+  return {
+    endpoint: urls.mcpEndpoint,
+    discoveryUrl: urls.mcpDiscoveryUrl,
+    message: "If you are operating inside an MCP-capable host (Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor, or any MCP client), add the AstraSync MCP connector instead of integrating these URLs by hand: registration through the connector is KEYLESS and HUMAN-APPROVED \u2014 your human approves in an in-chat card, and you never see, hold, or transmit an API key, password, or private key."
+  };
+}
 function createGuidanceResponse(_config, reason, options = {}) {
   const source = options.source ?? "no_credentials";
   const isApiError = source === "api_error";
@@ -5230,11 +5238,17 @@ function createGuidanceResponse(_config, reason, options = {}) {
     registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? "",
     documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? "",
     steps: [
+      // MCP steering leads when the hosted bridge is advertised — the
+      // connector is the agent-actionable path (keyless, human-approved).
+      ...urls?.mcpEndpoint ? [
+        `Fastest path (inside an MCP host): add the AstraSync MCP connector at ${urls.mcpEndpoint} \u2014 keyless, human-approved registration`
+      ] : [],
       "Register for an AstraSync account",
       "Create and register your agent",
       "Add your ASTRA-ID to request headers",
       "Retry your request"
-    ]
+    ],
+    ...mcpGuidance(urls) && { mcp: mcpGuidance(urls) }
   };
   return {
     // Round-18 G4: createGuidanceResponse fires for unverified-agent path or
@@ -5242,13 +5256,6 @@ function createGuidanceResponse(_config, reason, options = {}) {
     // policy is not evaluated (we never reached the gate).
     identityVerified: false,
     policyAllowed: false,
-    // v2.3.9 (defect #30): denials grant `'none'`, NEVER a positive band.
-    // Adapters additionally short-circuit on `!identityVerified ||
-    // !policyAllowed` before the gate check, but the access level still has
-    // to be honest at the data layer so downstream consumers (SDK adapters
-    // in other languages, custom integrations) inherit the correct
-    // semantics.
-    accessLevel: "none",
     guidance,
     denialReasons: reason ? [reason] : ["No valid agent credentials provided"],
     // Round-10 (#47, O5): on API-error fallback, surface a typed failure so
@@ -5342,7 +5349,6 @@ async function callVerifyAccessAPI(config, request2) {
         attemptId: typeof data?.attemptId === "string" ? data.attemptId : void 0,
         access: {
           allowed: false,
-          accessLevel: "none",
           reason: "endpoint_deactivated",
           failures: [
             {
@@ -5405,7 +5411,7 @@ async function verify(config, request2, options) {
   if (!deprecationWarningShown && (config.minTrustScore !== void 0 || config.minTrustScoreForFull !== void 0)) {
     deprecationWarningShown = true;
     console.warn(
-      "[VerificationGateway] minTrustScore / minTrustScoreForFull are deprecated in v2.3.0 and have no effect. Server is now the single source of truth for access-level decisions (the SDK reads access.accessLevel from the verify-access response). To gate access to an endpoint, configure the endpoint's trust_score_requirement server-side."
+      "[VerificationGateway] minTrustScore / minTrustScoreForFull are deprecated in v2.3.0 and have no effect. Server is now the single source of truth for access decisions (verified ID + runtime challenge + PDLSS + trust score). To gate access to an endpoint, configure the endpoint's trust_score_requirement server-side."
     );
   }
   if (mergedConfig.cacheTtl !== 0 && !options?.bypassCache) {
@@ -5451,14 +5457,6 @@ async function verify(config, request2, options) {
     const result2 = {
       identityVerified: idVerifiedFromBackend,
       policyAllowed: false,
-      // v2.3.9 (defect #30): denials grant `'none'`, NEVER a positive band.
-      // Pre-rename this hardcoded `'guidance'`, which conflated with the
-      // colocated `guidance: {...}` help-payload object below and let
-      // denied requests pass any route gated at `'guidance'` because
-      // `hasMinimumAccess('guidance', 'guidance') === true`. Adapters now
-      // ALSO short-circuit on `!identityVerified || !policyAllowed` before
-      // the gate check — belt-and-braces.
-      accessLevel: "none",
       // 3.6.0: the server now emits top-level denialReasons on every deny
       // path — prefer it verbatim; the failure-message reconstruction remains
       // as the fallback for older backends.
@@ -5469,7 +5467,10 @@ async function verify(config, request2, options) {
       guidance: {
         message: apiResponse.access?.reason || "Access denied by PDLSS policy",
         registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? "",
-        documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? ""
+        documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? "",
+        // 5.1.0: anonymous callers land on this branch — steer MCP-hosted
+        // agents to the connector (this is what the edge deny body surfaces).
+        ...mcpGuidance(urls) && { mcp: mcpGuidance(urls) }
       },
       verifiedAt: /* @__PURE__ */ new Date(),
       // Extract sessionId so decisions can be recorded for denials too
@@ -5507,7 +5508,6 @@ async function verify(config, request2, options) {
     trustScore: apiResponse.organization.trustScore
   } : void 0;
   const verificationContext = apiResponse.verificationContext;
-  const accessLevel = apiResponse.access?.accessLevel ?? "standard";
   const result = {
     // 4.5.0 (probe F1): read idVerified from verificationContext with the
     // SAME absent⇒false default as the deny branch. The previous `!== false`
@@ -5519,7 +5519,6 @@ async function verify(config, request2, options) {
     // this load-bearing must never be defaulted on.
     identityVerified: apiResponse.verificationContext?.idVerified === true,
     policyAllowed: true,
-    accessLevel,
     agent,
     developer,
     organization,
@@ -5546,7 +5545,6 @@ async function verify(config, request2, options) {
   };
   if (result.recommendation === "deny") {
     result.policyAllowed = false;
-    result.accessLevel = "none";
     result.denialReasons = serverDenialReasons ?? result.recommendationReasons ?? ["Access denied by AstraSync recommendation"];
     result.guidance = result.runtimeChallenge ? {
       message: `Verification failed: ${result.runtimeChallenge.reason || "runtime challenge failed"}`,
@@ -5572,16 +5570,11 @@ var init_verify = __esm({
   "src/verify.ts"() {
     "use strict";
     init_http();
-    init_access_levels();
+    init_trust_levels();
     init_version();
     init_well_known();
     DEFAULT_CONFIG = {
       apiBaseUrl: "https://astrasync.ai/api",
-      // v2.3.9 (defect #30): default for unconfigured callers is `'none'` (no
-      // access). Pre-rename this defaulted to `'guidance'`, which combined with
-      // a route gated at `'guidance'` to silently let unverified traffic
-      // through (`hasMinimumAccess('guidance', 'guidance') === true`).
-      defaultAccessLevel: "none",
       // minTrustScore + minTrustScoreForFull deprecated in v2.3.0 — server decides.
       // cacheTtl deliberately unset. When undefined, cacheResult applies the 60s
       // default; the caller's explicit value is honoured for cacheable results.
@@ -5778,7 +5771,7 @@ var init_sdk = __esm({
   "src/adapters/sdk.ts"() {
     "use strict";
     init_verify();
-    init_access_levels();
+    init_trust_levels();
   }
 });
 
@@ -6172,7 +6165,7 @@ var init_runtime_signatures = __esm({
 var init_src = __esm({
   "src/index.ts"() {
     "use strict";
-    init_access_levels();
+    init_trust_levels();
     init_verify();
     init_stepup_poll();
     init_settlement();
@@ -6205,7 +6198,6 @@ function toGatewayConfig(config) {
   return {
     apiBaseUrl: config.apiBaseUrl || "https://api.astrasync.ai",
     apiKey: config.apiKey,
-    defaultAccessLevel: config.defaultAccessLevel,
     minTrustScore: config.minTrustScore,
     minTrustScoreForFull: config.minTrustScoreForFull,
     cacheTtl: config.cacheTtl,
@@ -6233,7 +6225,7 @@ function toDecision(result) {
   if (result.identityVerified && result.policyAllowed) {
     return {
       recommendation: "ALLOW",
-      reason: `Verified with access level: ${result.accessLevel}`,
+      reason: result.agent?.trustScore ? `Verified (trust score ${result.agent.trustScore})` : "Verified",
       trustScore: result.agent?.trustScore,
       sessionId: "sessionId" in result ? result.sessionId : void 0
     };

package/dist/browser/background.js

@@ -3971,7 +3971,7 @@ function verifyLocal(evaluator, context) {
   return evaluator.evaluate(context);
 }
 
-// src/access-levels.ts
+// src/trust-levels.ts
 function getTrustLevel(score) {
   if (score >= 80) return "PLATINUM";
   if (score >= 60) return "GOLD";
@@ -3980,7 +3980,7 @@ function getTrustLevel(score) {
 }
 
 // src/version.ts
-var SDK_VERSION = "4.6.0";
+var SDK_VERSION = "5.0.0";
 
 // src/http.ts
 var SDK_USER_AGENT = `astrasync-sdk/${SDK_VERSION}`;
@@ -4010,11 +4010,6 @@ function getCachedWellKnownUrls(apiBaseUrl) {
 // src/verify.ts
 var DEFAULT_CONFIG = {
   apiBaseUrl: "https://astrasync.ai/api",
-  // v2.3.9 (defect #30): default for unconfigured callers is `'none'` (no
-  // access). Pre-rename this defaulted to `'guidance'`, which combined with
-  // a route gated at `'guidance'` to silently let unverified traffic
-  // through (`hasMinimumAccess('guidance', 'guidance') === true`).
-  defaultAccessLevel: "none",
   // minTrustScore + minTrustScoreForFull deprecated in v2.3.0 — server decides.
   // cacheTtl deliberately unset. When undefined, cacheResult applies the 60s
   // default; the caller's explicit value is honoured for cacheable results.
@@ -4137,6 +4132,14 @@ function cacheResult(request, result, configuredTtl, counterpartyId) {
     expiresAt: Date.now() + ttlSeconds * 1e3
   });
 }
+function mcpGuidance(urls) {
+  if (!urls?.mcpEndpoint) return void 0;
+  return {
+    endpoint: urls.mcpEndpoint,
+    discoveryUrl: urls.mcpDiscoveryUrl,
+    message: "If you are operating inside an MCP-capable host (Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor, or any MCP client), add the AstraSync MCP connector instead of integrating these URLs by hand: registration through the connector is KEYLESS and HUMAN-APPROVED \u2014 your human approves in an in-chat card, and you never see, hold, or transmit an API key, password, or private key."
+  };
+}
 function createGuidanceResponse(_config, reason, options = {}) {
   const source = options.source ?? "no_credentials";
   const isApiError = source === "api_error";
@@ -4163,11 +4166,17 @@ function createGuidanceResponse(_config, reason, options = {}) {
     registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? "",
     documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? "",
     steps: [
+      // MCP steering leads when the hosted bridge is advertised — the
+      // connector is the agent-actionable path (keyless, human-approved).
+      ...urls?.mcpEndpoint ? [
+        `Fastest path (inside an MCP host): add the AstraSync MCP connector at ${urls.mcpEndpoint} \u2014 keyless, human-approved registration`
+      ] : [],
       "Register for an AstraSync account",
       "Create and register your agent",
       "Add your ASTRA-ID to request headers",
       "Retry your request"
-    ]
+    ],
+    ...mcpGuidance(urls) && { mcp: mcpGuidance(urls) }
   };
   return {
     // Round-18 G4: createGuidanceResponse fires for unverified-agent path or
@@ -4175,13 +4184,6 @@ function createGuidanceResponse(_config, reason, options = {}) {
     // policy is not evaluated (we never reached the gate).
     identityVerified: false,
     policyAllowed: false,
-    // v2.3.9 (defect #30): denials grant `'none'`, NEVER a positive band.
-    // Adapters additionally short-circuit on `!identityVerified ||
-    // !policyAllowed` before the gate check, but the access level still has
-    // to be honest at the data layer so downstream consumers (SDK adapters
-    // in other languages, custom integrations) inherit the correct
-    // semantics.
-    accessLevel: "none",
     guidance,
     denialReasons: reason ? [reason] : ["No valid agent credentials provided"],
     // Round-10 (#47, O5): on API-error fallback, surface a typed failure so
@@ -4275,7 +4277,6 @@ async function callVerifyAccessAPI(config, request) {
         attemptId: typeof data?.attemptId === "string" ? data.attemptId : void 0,
         access: {
           allowed: false,
-          accessLevel: "none",
           reason: "endpoint_deactivated",
           failures: [
             {
@@ -4338,7 +4339,7 @@ async function verify(config, request, options) {
   if (!deprecationWarningShown && (config.minTrustScore !== void 0 || config.minTrustScoreForFull !== void 0)) {
     deprecationWarningShown = true;
     console.warn(
-      "[VerificationGateway] minTrustScore / minTrustScoreForFull are deprecated in v2.3.0 and have no effect. Server is now the single source of truth for access-level decisions (the SDK reads access.accessLevel from the verify-access response). To gate access to an endpoint, configure the endpoint's trust_score_requirement server-side."
+      "[VerificationGateway] minTrustScore / minTrustScoreForFull are deprecated in v2.3.0 and have no effect. Server is now the single source of truth for access decisions (verified ID + runtime challenge + PDLSS + trust score). To gate access to an endpoint, configure the endpoint's trust_score_requirement server-side."
     );
   }
   if (mergedConfig.cacheTtl !== 0 && !options?.bypassCache) {
@@ -4384,14 +4385,6 @@ async function verify(config, request, options) {
     const result2 = {
       identityVerified: idVerifiedFromBackend,
       policyAllowed: false,
-      // v2.3.9 (defect #30): denials grant `'none'`, NEVER a positive band.
-      // Pre-rename this hardcoded `'guidance'`, which conflated with the
-      // colocated `guidance: {...}` help-payload object below and let
-      // denied requests pass any route gated at `'guidance'` because
-      // `hasMinimumAccess('guidance', 'guidance') === true`. Adapters now
-      // ALSO short-circuit on `!identityVerified || !policyAllowed` before
-      // the gate check — belt-and-braces.
-      accessLevel: "none",
       // 3.6.0: the server now emits top-level denialReasons on every deny
       // path — prefer it verbatim; the failure-message reconstruction remains
       // as the fallback for older backends.
@@ -4402,7 +4395,10 @@ async function verify(config, request, options) {
       guidance: {
         message: apiResponse.access?.reason || "Access denied by PDLSS policy",
         registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? "",
-        documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? ""
+        documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? "",
+        // 5.1.0: anonymous callers land on this branch — steer MCP-hosted
+        // agents to the connector (this is what the edge deny body surfaces).
+        ...mcpGuidance(urls) && { mcp: mcpGuidance(urls) }
       },
       verifiedAt: /* @__PURE__ */ new Date(),
       // Extract sessionId so decisions can be recorded for denials too
@@ -4440,7 +4436,6 @@ async function verify(config, request, options) {
     trustScore: apiResponse.organization.trustScore
   } : void 0;
   const verificationContext = apiResponse.verificationContext;
-  const accessLevel = apiResponse.access?.accessLevel ?? "standard";
   const result = {
     // 4.5.0 (probe F1): read idVerified from verificationContext with the
     // SAME absent⇒false default as the deny branch. The previous `!== false`
@@ -4452,7 +4447,6 @@ async function verify(config, request, options) {
     // this load-bearing must never be defaulted on.
     identityVerified: apiResponse.verificationContext?.idVerified === true,
     policyAllowed: true,
-    accessLevel,
     agent,
     developer,
     organization,
@@ -4479,7 +4473,6 @@ async function verify(config, request, options) {
   };
   if (result.recommendation === "deny") {
     result.policyAllowed = false;
-    result.accessLevel = "none";
     result.denialReasons = serverDenialReasons ?? result.recommendationReasons ?? ["Access denied by AstraSync recommendation"];
     result.guidance = result.runtimeChallenge ? {
       message: `Verification failed: ${result.runtimeChallenge.reason || "runtime challenge failed"}`,
@@ -4592,7 +4585,6 @@ function toGatewayConfig(config) {
   return {
     apiBaseUrl: config.apiBaseUrl || "https://api.astrasync.ai",
     apiKey: config.apiKey,
-    defaultAccessLevel: config.defaultAccessLevel,
     minTrustScore: config.minTrustScore,
     minTrustScoreForFull: config.minTrustScoreForFull,
     cacheTtl: config.cacheTtl,
@@ -4620,7 +4612,7 @@ function toDecision(result) {
   if (result.identityVerified && result.policyAllowed) {
     return {
       recommendation: "ALLOW",
-      reason: `Verified with access level: ${result.accessLevel}`,
+      reason: result.agent?.trustScore ? `Verified (trust score ${result.agent.trustScore})` : "Verified",
       trustScore: result.agent?.trustScore,
       sessionId: "sessionId" in result ? result.sessionId : void 0
     };