@astrasyncai/verification-gateway 4.6.0 → 5.1.0

package/dist/edge-core/index.mjs

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 // src/version.ts
-var SDK_VERSION = "4.6.0";
+var SDK_VERSION = "5.0.0";
 
 // src/http.ts
 var SDK_USER_AGENT = `astrasync-sdk/${SDK_VERSION}`;
@@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ function detectPlatformFingerprint(input) {
   return matchPlatformSignature(PLATFORM_AGENT_SIGNATURES, input);
 }
 
-// src/access-levels.ts
+// src/trust-levels.ts
 function getTrustLevel(score) {
   if (score >= 80) return "PLATINUM";
   if (score >= 60) return "GOLD";
@@ -328,11 +328,6 @@ function getCachedWellKnownUrls(apiBaseUrl) {
 // src/verify.ts
 var DEFAULT_CONFIG = {
   apiBaseUrl: "https://astrasync.ai/api",
-  // v2.3.9 (defect #30): default for unconfigured callers is `'none'` (no
-  // access). Pre-rename this defaulted to `'guidance'`, which combined with
-  // a route gated at `'guidance'` to silently let unverified traffic
-  // through (`hasMinimumAccess('guidance', 'guidance') === true`).
-  defaultAccessLevel: "none",
   // minTrustScore + minTrustScoreForFull deprecated in v2.3.0 — server decides.
   // cacheTtl deliberately unset. When undefined, cacheResult applies the 60s
   // default; the caller's explicit value is honoured for cacheable results.
@@ -489,6 +484,14 @@ function extractCredentials(headers, query) {
   }
   return credentials;
 }
+function mcpGuidance(urls) {
+  if (!urls?.mcpEndpoint) return void 0;
+  return {
+    endpoint: urls.mcpEndpoint,
+    discoveryUrl: urls.mcpDiscoveryUrl,
+    message: "If you are operating inside an MCP-capable host (Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor, or any MCP client), add the AstraSync MCP connector instead of integrating these URLs by hand: registration through the connector is KEYLESS and HUMAN-APPROVED \u2014 your human approves in an in-chat card, and you never see, hold, or transmit an API key, password, or private key."
+  };
+}
 function createGuidanceResponse(_config, reason, options = {}) {
   const source = options.source ?? "no_credentials";
   const isApiError = source === "api_error";
@@ -515,11 +518,17 @@ function createGuidanceResponse(_config, reason, options = {}) {
     registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? "",
     documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? "",
     steps: [
+      // MCP steering leads when the hosted bridge is advertised — the
+      // connector is the agent-actionable path (keyless, human-approved).
+      ...urls?.mcpEndpoint ? [
+        `Fastest path (inside an MCP host): add the AstraSync MCP connector at ${urls.mcpEndpoint} \u2014 keyless, human-approved registration`
+      ] : [],
       "Register for an AstraSync account",
       "Create and register your agent",
       "Add your ASTRA-ID to request headers",
       "Retry your request"
-    ]
+    ],
+    ...mcpGuidance(urls) && { mcp: mcpGuidance(urls) }
   };
   return {
     // Round-18 G4: createGuidanceResponse fires for unverified-agent path or
@@ -527,13 +536,6 @@ function createGuidanceResponse(_config, reason, options = {}) {
     // policy is not evaluated (we never reached the gate).
     identityVerified: false,
     policyAllowed: false,
-    // v2.3.9 (defect #30): denials grant `'none'`, NEVER a positive band.
-    // Adapters additionally short-circuit on `!identityVerified ||
-    // !policyAllowed` before the gate check, but the access level still has
-    // to be honest at the data layer so downstream consumers (SDK adapters
-    // in other languages, custom integrations) inherit the correct
-    // semantics.
-    accessLevel: "none",
     guidance,
     denialReasons: reason ? [reason] : ["No valid agent credentials provided"],
     // Round-10 (#47, O5): on API-error fallback, surface a typed failure so
@@ -627,7 +629,6 @@ async function callVerifyAccessAPI(config, request) {
         attemptId: typeof data?.attemptId === "string" ? data.attemptId : void 0,
         access: {
           allowed: false,
-          accessLevel: "none",
           reason: "endpoint_deactivated",
           failures: [
             {
@@ -690,7 +691,7 @@ async function verify(config, request, options) {
   if (!deprecationWarningShown && (config.minTrustScore !== void 0 || config.minTrustScoreForFull !== void 0)) {
     deprecationWarningShown = true;
     console.warn(
-      "[VerificationGateway] minTrustScore / minTrustScoreForFull are deprecated in v2.3.0 and have no effect. Server is now the single source of truth for access-level decisions (the SDK reads access.accessLevel from the verify-access response). To gate access to an endpoint, configure the endpoint's trust_score_requirement server-side."
+      "[VerificationGateway] minTrustScore / minTrustScoreForFull are deprecated in v2.3.0 and have no effect. Server is now the single source of truth for access decisions (verified ID + runtime challenge + PDLSS + trust score). To gate access to an endpoint, configure the endpoint's trust_score_requirement server-side."
     );
   }
   if (mergedConfig.cacheTtl !== 0 && !options?.bypassCache) {
@@ -736,14 +737,6 @@ async function verify(config, request, options) {
     const result2 = {
       identityVerified: idVerifiedFromBackend,
       policyAllowed: false,
-      // v2.3.9 (defect #30): denials grant `'none'`, NEVER a positive band.
-      // Pre-rename this hardcoded `'guidance'`, which conflated with the
-      // colocated `guidance: {...}` help-payload object below and let
-      // denied requests pass any route gated at `'guidance'` because
-      // `hasMinimumAccess('guidance', 'guidance') === true`. Adapters now
-      // ALSO short-circuit on `!identityVerified || !policyAllowed` before
-      // the gate check — belt-and-braces.
-      accessLevel: "none",
       // 3.6.0: the server now emits top-level denialReasons on every deny
       // path — prefer it verbatim; the failure-message reconstruction remains
       // as the fallback for older backends.
@@ -754,7 +747,10 @@ async function verify(config, request, options) {
       guidance: {
         message: apiResponse.access?.reason || "Access denied by PDLSS policy",
         registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? "",
-        documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? ""
+        documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? "",
+        // 5.1.0: anonymous callers land on this branch — steer MCP-hosted
+        // agents to the connector (this is what the edge deny body surfaces).
+        ...mcpGuidance(urls) && { mcp: mcpGuidance(urls) }
       },
       verifiedAt: /* @__PURE__ */ new Date(),
       // Extract sessionId so decisions can be recorded for denials too
@@ -792,7 +788,6 @@ async function verify(config, request, options) {
     trustScore: apiResponse.organization.trustScore
   } : void 0;
   const verificationContext = apiResponse.verificationContext;
-  const accessLevel = apiResponse.access?.accessLevel ?? "standard";
   const result = {
     // 4.5.0 (probe F1): read idVerified from verificationContext with the
     // SAME absent⇒false default as the deny branch. The previous `!== false`
@@ -804,7 +799,6 @@ async function verify(config, request, options) {
     // this load-bearing must never be defaulted on.
     identityVerified: apiResponse.verificationContext?.idVerified === true,
     policyAllowed: true,
-    accessLevel,
     agent,
     developer,
     organization,
@@ -831,7 +825,6 @@ async function verify(config, request, options) {
   };
   if (result.recommendation === "deny") {
     result.policyAllowed = false;
-    result.accessLevel = "none";
     result.denialReasons = serverDenialReasons ?? result.recommendationReasons ?? ["Access denied by AstraSync recommendation"];
     result.guidance = result.runtimeChallenge ? {
       message: `Verification failed: ${result.runtimeChallenge.reason || "runtime challenge failed"}`,
@@ -1120,8 +1113,17 @@ var PROTOCOL_MESSAGES = {
   "platform-ua": "This traffic was identified as a platform AI agent without AstraSync credentials. Register the agent to access this property with a verified identity.",
   "x-astra": "The presented AstraSync credentials failed verification or were denied by this property\u2019s access policy."
 };
+function fallbackMcpEndpoint(origin) {
+  try {
+    const host = new URL(origin).hostname.replace(/^www\./, "");
+    if (host === "astrasync.ai" || host.endsWith(".astrasync.ai")) return `https://mcp.${host}/mcp`;
+  } catch {
+  }
+  return void 0;
+}
 function buildDenyBody(outcome, apiBaseUrl) {
   const origin = apiBaseUrl.replace(/\/api\/?$/, "");
+  const mcpEndpoint = outcome.guidance?.mcp?.endpoint || fallbackMcpEndpoint(origin);
   const protocolMessage = (outcome.protocol && PROTOCOL_MESSAGES[outcome.protocol]) ?? "This request could not be verified by AstraSync.";
   return {
     success: false,
@@ -1138,7 +1140,14 @@ function buildDenyBody(outcome, apiBaseUrl) {
         // well-known cache is cold — empty means "use the fallback".
         message: outcome.guidance?.message || "Register this agent with AstraSync to receive verifiable credentials.",
         registrationUrl: outcome.guidance?.registrationUrl || `${origin}/register`,
-        documentationUrl: outcome.guidance?.documentationUrl || `${origin}/docs/edge-adapter`
+        documentationUrl: outcome.guidance?.documentationUrl || `${origin}/docs/edge-adapter`,
+        ...mcpEndpoint && {
+          mcp: {
+            endpoint: mcpEndpoint,
+            discoveryUrl: outcome.guidance?.mcp?.discoveryUrl || `${mcpEndpoint.replace(/\/mcp$/, "")}/.well-known/mcp.json`,
+            message: outcome.guidance?.mcp?.message || "Inside an MCP host? Add the AstraSync MCP connector at this endpoint instead of the registration URL \u2014 registration through the connector is keyless and human-approved (your human approves in an in-chat card; you never handle credentials)."
+          }
+        }
       }
     }
   };
@@ -1178,7 +1187,6 @@ var ASAT_HEADERS = {
   trustScore: "X-AstraSync-Trust-Score",
   agentId: "X-AstraSync-Agent-Id",
   developerId: "X-AstraSync-Developer-Id",
-  permissions: "X-AstraSync-Permissions",
   observedDecision: "X-AstraSync-Observed-Decision"
 };
 var STRIP_HEADER_PREFIXES = ["x-astrasync-", "x-astra-verified-hop"];
@@ -1227,12 +1235,11 @@ function applyOutcome(options, outcome, policy) {
 }
 function asatHeaders(outcome) {
   if (!outcome.asat) return {};
-  const { trustScore, agentId, developerId, accessLevel } = outcome.asat;
+  const { trustScore, agentId, developerId } = outcome.asat;
   return {
     ...trustScore !== void 0 && { [ASAT_HEADERS.trustScore]: String(trustScore) },
     ...agentId && { [ASAT_HEADERS.agentId]: agentId },
-    ...developerId && { [ASAT_HEADERS.developerId]: developerId },
-    ...accessLevel && { [ASAT_HEADERS.permissions]: accessLevel }
+    ...developerId && { [ASAT_HEADERS.developerId]: developerId }
   };
 }
 function verifiedHopHeader(outcome) {
@@ -1440,8 +1447,7 @@ function outcomeFromVerifyResult(classification, result) {
   outcome.asat = {
     trustScore: result.agent?.trustScore,
     agentId: result.agent?.astraId,
-    developerId: result.developer?.astradId,
-    accessLevel: result.accessLevel
+    developerId: result.developer?.astradId
   };
   return outcome;
 }