@amg555/frameforge-mcp 2.7.6 → 2.7.7

package/.agent/skills/gstack-ios-qa/SKILL.md.tmpl

@@ -1,297 +0,0 @@
----
-name: ios-qa
-preamble-tier: 3
-version: 1.0.0
-description: |
-  Live-device iOS QA for SwiftUI apps. Connects to a real iPhone or iPad via
-  USB CoreDevice IPv6 tunnel, reads Swift source to understand every screen, then
-  runs a vision-driven agent loop: screenshot → analyze → decide → act →
-  verify → repeat. All interaction happens via HTTP to an embedded
-  StateServer in the app under test. Optionally exposes the device over
-  Tailscale so remote agents (OpenClaw, Codex, any HTTP-capable agent) can
-  run iOS QA from anywhere without touching the hardware.
-  Use when asked to "ios qa", "test my iPhone app", "test my iPad app",
-  "find bugs on the device", or "qa the iOS app". (gstack)
-voice-triggers:
-  - "iOS quality check"
-  - "test the iPhone app"
-  - "test the iPad app"
-  - "run iOS QA"
-allowed-tools:
-  - Bash
-  - Read
-  - Write
-  - Edit
-  - Grep
-  - Glob
-  - AskUserQuestion
-triggers:
-  - ios qa
-  - test the iphone app
-  - test the ipad app
-  - test my ios app
-  - find bugs on the device
-  - qa the ios app
----
-
-{{PREAMBLE}}
-
-# Live-device iOS QA
-
-This skill drives a real iPhone or iPad via USB. The agent reads your Swift source,
-generates typed state accessors, deploys a debug bridge, and runs a closed
-find→fix→verify loop. No simulator, no XCTest, no WebDriverAgent.
-
-## Architecture
-
-```
-       ┌──────────────────────┐   USB CoreDevice (IPv6)   ┌──────────────────┐
-       │ gstack-ios-qa daemon │ ────────────────────────▶ │ iOS app          │
-       │ (Mac, bun/TS)        │   bearer + X-Session-Id   │ StateServer      │
-       │                      │                           │ (loopback only)  │
-       │ - boot token rotate  │                           │ - /tap /swipe    │
-       │ - session minting    │                           │ - /type /state   │
-       │ - audit + redact     │                           │ - /snapshot      │
-       └──────────────────────┘                           └──────────────────┘
-                ▲
-                │ Tailscale (optional, --tailnet)
-                │
-       ┌──────────────────────┐
-       │ Remote agent         │
-       │ (OpenClaw, etc.)     │
-       └──────────────────────┘
-```
-
-The iOS app's `StateServer` binds loopback only (`::1` + `127.0.0.1`). Tailnet
-ingress is exclusively the Mac daemon's job. The daemon validates Tailscale
-identities via the local `tailscaled` socket and mints short-lived session
-tokens (default 1h) for remote agents.
-
-## Prerequisites
-
-- macOS (the daemon uses `devicectl` from Xcode).
-- iPhone or iPad connected via USB, paired and trusted. With more than one
-  connected, pick one before starting the daemon:
-  `export GSTACK_IOS_TARGET_UDID=<udid>` (`xcrun devicectl list devices` shows
-  UDIDs). Otherwise the daemon refuses to guess, lists each device with its
-  UDID, and prints that export line.
-- Xcode + Swift toolchain installed (`swift --version` reports >= 5.9).
-- App source available on disk, with at least one `@Observable` class.
-- For remote-control mode: Tailscale installed and the user logged in.
-
-## Phase 0: Session warm-start (optional)
-
-If `~/.gstack/ios-qa-session.json` exists and the device is still connected,
-skip Phase 1-2 and jump to Phase 3. The session cache holds the rotated token,
-UDID, tunnel address, and accessor hash. Invalidate the cache when:
-
-- The user passes `--cold` to force a full bootstrap.
-- The accessor hash mismatch is detected on first state query.
-- The daemon reports the cached UDID is no longer connected.
-
-```bash
-GSTACK_STATE_ROOT=$(~/.claude/skills/gstack/bin/gstack-paths --get GSTACK_STATE_ROOT); : "${GSTACK_STATE_ROOT:?gstack-paths failed; reinstall with ./setup or /gstack-upgrade}"
-SESSION="$GSTACK_STATE_ROOT/ios-qa-session.json"
-if [ -f "$SESSION" ] && [ "$COLD" != "1" ]; then
-  CACHED_UDID=$(python3 -c "import json,os; d=json.load(open(os.path.expanduser('$SESSION'))); print(d['udid'])")
-  CACHED_PORT=$(python3 -c "import json,os; d=json.load(open(os.path.expanduser('$SESSION'))); print(d['daemon_port'])")
-  if curl -sf "http://127.0.0.1:$CACHED_PORT/healthz" > /dev/null; then
-    echo "Warm start: daemon alive, device $CACHED_UDID connected"
-  fi
-fi
-```
-
-## Phase 1: Read source, plan codegen
-
-1. Before changing the app or replacing an installed build, verify that the
-   bridge is compatible with the project:
-   - The generator currently supports file-scope `@Observable` classes only;
-     `ObservableObject`, `@StateObject`, and other observation models do not
-     produce accessors.
-   - The documented dependency wiring assumes a SwiftPM app manifest. For an
-     `.xcodeproj` or `.xcworkspace`, do not invent package or target wiring.
-   If either requirement is unmet, stop the bridge bootstrap without modifying
-   the app. Preserve any installed production or TestFlight build. Prefer an
-   existing real-device XCUITest harness; when a separate QA build is needed,
-   use an isolated bundle identifier and non-production entitlements so it can
-   coexist with the production app. Report fixture-driven state, provider UI,
-   and actual external-provider success as distinct evidence tiers.
-2. Walk the app source (passed as `--source <dir>`) and identify all `@Observable`
-   classes. Note any property immediately preceded by the generator marker
-   comment `// @Snapshotable` — those are the snapshot-eligible fields. The
-   marker is a comment so it composes with the `@Observable` macro. Each
-   marked field must belong to a file-scope observable class and be a writable
-   instance `var` with an explicit type and an internal or public setter.
-   Snapshot types are JSON-native scalars (`String`, `Bool`, integer widths,
-   `Float`, `Double`, `CGFloat`), arrays, String-keyed dictionaries, and their
-   Optional compositions. Keys must be unique across observable classes.
-   Codegen stops with a source diagnostic instead of emitting a broken or
-   lossy harness when any of these constraints is violated.
-3. Show the user the accessor list and ask whether to install the DebugBridge
-   SPM dependency into their `Package.swift` (one AskUserQuestion).
-
-## Phase 2: Bootstrap the device bridge
-
-1. Generate the canonical local bridge package, typed accessors, and installed
-   version marker with one deterministic command:
-   ```bash
-   ~/.claude/skills/gstack/bin/gstack-ios-qa-regen \
-     --app-source "<source-dir>" \
-     --bridge-dir "<source-dir>/DebugBridge"
-   ```
-   The regenerator also removes the explicit obsolete flat-file set created by
-   older ios-sync versions, preventing a stale second harness from remaining
-   in the app target.
-   Source control: `DebugBridge/` is generated; never hand-edit it. Commit it
-   when teammates or CI build the Debug configuration without gstack (re-run
-   the regenerator after a gstack upgrade); otherwise add `DebugBridge/` to
-   `.gitignore` and have each developer run the regenerator. Tell the user
-   which one you picked.
-2. Add the generated `DebugBridge` local SPM dependency to the app's
-   `Package.swift`. The package
-   ships three Debug-config-only library products:
-   - `DebugBridgeCore` (Swift, cross-platform) — StateServer + bridge protocols.
-   - `DebugBridgeTouch` (Objective-C, iOS-only) — KIF-derived in-process touch
-     synthesis with iOS 18+ `_UIHitTestContext` SwiftUI hit-testing.
-   - `DebugBridgeUI` (Swift, iOS-only) — Screenshot / Elements / Mutation
-     bridge implementations.
-   The app target depends on `DebugBridgeUI` with `.when(configuration: .debug)`
-   (transitively pulls in Core + Touch). Release builds refuse to link these
-   targets.
-3. Wire the bridges from the `@main` App init, gated on `#if DEBUG`:
-   ```swift
-   #if DEBUG
-   import DebugBridgeCore
-   #if canImport(UIKit)
-   import DebugBridgeUI
-   // Install resolvers before StateServer opens its listener.
-   DebugBridgeUIWiring.installAll()
-   #endif
-   // Replace AppState/AppStateAccessor with the type discovered in Phase 1.
-   DebugBridgeManager.shared.start(
-       appState: appState,
-       register: AppStateAccessor.register
-   )
-   #endif
-   ```
-4. Build + deploy to the device with `xcodebuild -scheme <SchemeName>
-   -destination 'platform=iOS,id=<UDID>' build install`.
-5. Launch via `devicectl device process launch --device <UDID> <bundle-id>`.
-   On launch the StateServer writes a one-use boot token to a 0600 file in the
-   app's `tmp/`; the daemon copies it out with `devicectl`. The token is never
-   printed to `os_log`. If the app cannot write that file, it logs `NOT READY`
-   and the daemon reports `boot_token_unavailable` with the cause.
-6. Spawn the Mac-side daemon (on-demand) — `gstack-ios-qa-daemon`. Daemon
-   acquires an exclusive flock on `~/.gstack/ios-qa-daemon.pid`. If another
-   daemon is alive, the second invocation discovers its port and connects.
-7. Daemon immediately calls `POST /auth/rotate` on the iOS StateServer with a
-   fresh in-memory-only token. Rotation deletes the boot-token file, so a copy
-   taken after this point is a dead credential.
-   If a fresh daemon finds the app running after another daemon consumed that
-   one-use token, it verifies the bundle owner, relaunches the target once,
-   waits for the new token, verifies ownership again, and then rotates.
-
-## Phase 3: Vision-driven agent loop
-
-Each iteration:
-
-1. `GET /screenshot` (via daemon) → save PNG.
-2. `GET /elements` → accessibility tree.
-3. `GET /state/snapshot` (only `// @Snapshotable` fields) → current state.
-4. Decide next action based on what's on the screen vs the test goal.
-5. `POST /session/acquire` to grab the device lock.
-6. Execute `POST /tap`, `/swipe`, `/type`, or `POST /state/<key>` write.
-7. Re-screenshot; compare; record finding if buggy.
-8. `POST /session/release` once the iteration is done.
-
-Each authenticated mutating request through the tailnet listener (if remote
-mode is active) writes an audit row to
-`~/.gstack/security/ios-qa-audit.jsonl`.
-
-## Modes
-
-**Local-USB mode (default).** Daemon binds loopback only; no Tailscale
-required. The spawning skill gets full-surface access. Best for solo
-development.
-
-**Tailnet mode (`--tailnet`).** Daemon additionally binds the Tailscale
-interface (never `0.0.0.0`). Requires `tailscaled` to be running locally and
-the daemon to be able to read `/var/run/tailscale.sock`. Fails closed if the
-socket is missing, permission-denied, or returns an unparseable WhoIs
-response. Remote agents hit `POST /auth/mint` over tailnet, daemon
-canonicalizes identity via WhoIs, checks the allowlist file, mints a
-session token. See `ios-qa/docs/tailscale-acl-example.md`.
-
-**Capability tiers (tailnet mode).** Minted tokens default to `interact`
-(taps, swipes, types). Higher tiers require explicit owner mint:
-
-- **observe:** `/screenshot`, `/elements`, `GET /state/*`, `/healthz`,
-  `/session/heartbeat`.
-- **interact:** observe + `/tap`, `/swipe`, `/type`.
-- **mutate:** interact + `POST /state/<key>`.
-- **restore:** mutate + `POST /state/restore`.
-
-Owner mints via `gstack-ios-qa-mint --remote <identity> --capability <tier>`
-on the Mac. Self-service mint over tailnet only succeeds for already-allowlisted
-identities.
-
-**Recording mode (`--recording`).** DebugOverlay renders a small diagonal
-"AGENT DEMO" watermark in a corner so screencasts are unambiguous about the
-device being agent-driven.
-
-## Demo mode
-
-If the user says "demo", "demo mode", "show me", or "I want to see it
-working", run in **DEMO MODE**. This changes how the agent interacts with
-the app:
-
-**DEMO MODE OVERRIDES ALL OTHER RULES.** When demo mode is active, the
-agent MUST drive every action through visible UI (`/tap`, `/swipe`, `/type`)
-and NEVER use `POST /state/*` writes to skip steps. Viewers see the agent
-type every key, tap every button. The on-device DebugOverlay attribution
-chip shows "Driven by Claude Code (demo)" or the remote agent identity.
-
-In demo mode, the screencap rate is bumped to 4fps so the recording feels
-live.
-
-## Failure modes + recovery
-
-| Symptom | Likely cause | Action |
-|---|---|---|
-| `curl: connection refused` to daemon | daemon crashed | Re-run `/ios-qa`; spawn-race lock will fail closed |
-| `403 identity_not_allowed` from `/auth/mint` | identity missing from allowlist | Run `gstack-ios-qa-mint --remote <identity>` on the Mac |
-| `409 schema_mismatch` on `/state/restore` | snapshot from older app build | Discard the snapshot; re-capture |
-| `503 device_disconnected` / `504 upstream_timeout` from proxy | USB route dropped, app stopped, or app relaunched | Daemon probes the running app with its session bearer and keeps the session (no relaunch, app state intact). It bootstraps only when the app rejected the bearer (401), is not running, or a different device is now selected. A lost `/tap`/`/swipe`/`/type` response is never replayed: check the screen before retrying. If it persists, reconnect/unlock the device |
-| `multiple_devices` at bootstrap | iPhone and iPad (or two devices) connected, no target set | Run the printed `export GSTACK_IOS_TARGET_UDID=<udid>`, then restart the daemon |
-| `boot_token_unavailable ... could not write` | app's `tmp/` not writable | Fix the app container, relaunch the app |
-| App relaunched after the daemon restarted | a new daemon has no session bearer and the one-use boot token is gone | Expected: the first bootstrap relaunches the app once; keep one daemon alive for a session |
-| `429 rate_limited` from `/auth/mint` | >10 mints/min from one identity | Wait 60s; check audit log for anomalies |
-| `413 body_too_large` on `/state/restore` | snapshot >1MB | Increase `--max-body` or trim snapshot |
-
-## Known limits
-
-Device-verified by users, not fixable in the bridge today. Plan around them:
-
-- **SwiftUI gestures on iOS 26.** In-process synthesized touches report success
-  but never reach a SwiftUI `DragGesture` (for example a `Canvas` driven by
-  drag input), even with phase-separated touches (seen on iOS 26.5). Buttons and
-  UIKit controls still respond. For gesture-driven views, have the app expose
-  its input handlers to the bridge under `#if DEBUG` and drive them through a
-  state write, or cover the flow with an XCUITest harness.
-- **`/swipe` scrolls only.** It moves the nearest enclosing `UIScrollView` and
-  returns `false` when there is none; it is not a drag. Custom pan or drag
-  views need the input-routing approach above.
-- **`/elements` on iOS 26.** The in-process SwiftUI accessibility tree is often
-  not materialized: an iPhone 12 Pro on iOS 26.3.1 returned only the three
-  hosting views, with no identifiers or labels. Locate controls from the
-  screenshot and tap by coordinate.
-- **iPad windows.** iPad sessions work like iPhone sessions, but the overlay
-  and window selection have not been verified with Stage Manager or multiple
-  scenes; report what you see.
-
-## Cleanup
-
-Use `/ios-clean` to remove the DebugBridge SPM dependency and all `#if DEBUG`
-wiring before a Release build. This is a convenience flow; the structural
-Release-build guard (Package.swift `.when(configuration: .debug)` + CI
-`swift build -c release` check) is the safety-critical path.

package/.agent/skills/gstack-ios-qa/daemon/src/allowlist.ts

@@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
-// Allowlist file at ~/.gstack/ios-qa-allowlist.json. The single source of
-// truth for who can call what at which capability tier.
-//
-// Self-service mint over tailnet ONLY succeeds for identities present in the
-// allowlist. Owner-granted mint (CLI on the Mac) is what writes new entries
-// to the allowlist. Self-service mint NEVER auto-allowlists.
-
-import { readFile, writeFile, mkdir } from 'fs/promises';
-import { join, dirname } from 'path';
-import type { Allowlist, AllowlistEntry, Capability } from './types';
-import { capabilityCovers } from './types';
-import { resolveStateRoot } from '../../../lib/state-root';
-
-export function defaultAllowlistPath(): string {
-  return process.env.GSTACK_IOS_ALLOWLIST_PATH
-    ?? join(resolveStateRoot(), 'ios-qa-allowlist.json');
-}
-
-export async function loadAllowlist(path: string = defaultAllowlistPath()): Promise<Allowlist> {
-  let raw: string;
-  try {
-    raw = await readFile(path, 'utf-8');
-  } catch (err: unknown) {
-    const e = err as { code?: string };
-    if (e.code === 'ENOENT') {
-      return { version: 1, entries: [] };
-    }
-    throw err;
-  }
-  // Empty-file path (mktemp default, partial write, manual `: > file`): treat
-  // as "no entries yet" rather than a parse error. The first grant will fill
-  // it in atomically via saveAllowlist.
-  if (raw.trim() === '') {
-    return { version: 1, entries: [] };
-  }
-  const parsed = JSON.parse(raw) as Allowlist;
-  if (parsed.version !== 1 || !Array.isArray(parsed.entries)) {
-    throw new Error('invalid_allowlist');
-  }
-  return parsed;
-}
-
-export async function saveAllowlist(allowlist: Allowlist, path: string = defaultAllowlistPath()): Promise<void> {
-  await mkdir(dirname(path), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
-  await writeFile(path, JSON.stringify(allowlist, null, 2) + '\n', { mode: 0o600 });
-}
-
-/**
- * Look up an identity in the allowlist. Returns the entry if present AND
- * not expired. Lookup is exact-match on canonicalized identity.
- */
-export function findEntry(allowlist: Allowlist, identity: string): AllowlistEntry | null {
-  const now = Date.now();
-  for (const entry of allowlist.entries) {
-    if (entry.identity !== identity) continue;
-    if (entry.expires_at) {
-      const exp = Date.parse(entry.expires_at);
-      if (Number.isFinite(exp) && exp < now) continue;
-    }
-    return entry;
-  }
-  return null;
-}
-
-/**
- * Check whether an identity has at least the requested capability tier.
- * Returns false on missing/expired entries OR insufficient tier.
- */
-export function hasCapability(allowlist: Allowlist, identity: string, need: Capability): boolean {
-  const entry = findEntry(allowlist, identity);
-  if (!entry) return false;
-  return entry.capabilities.some(c => capabilityCovers(c, need));
-}
-
-/**
- * Owner-granted mint path. Adds (or upgrades) an allowlist entry.
- */
-export async function grantIdentity(opts: {
-  identity: string;
-  capability: Capability;
-  ttlSeconds?: number | null; // null/undefined = no expiry
-  note?: string;
-  path?: string;
-}): Promise<Allowlist> {
-  const path = opts.path ?? defaultAllowlistPath();
-  const allowlist = await loadAllowlist(path);
-  const existingIdx = allowlist.entries.findIndex(e => e.identity === opts.identity);
-  const expiresAt = opts.ttlSeconds && opts.ttlSeconds > 0
-    ? new Date(Date.now() + opts.ttlSeconds * 1000).toISOString()
-    : null;
-  const newEntry: AllowlistEntry = {
-    identity: opts.identity,
-    capabilities: [opts.capability],
-    expires_at: expiresAt,
-    note: opts.note,
-  };
-  if (existingIdx >= 0) {
-    allowlist.entries[existingIdx] = newEntry;
-  } else {
-    allowlist.entries.push(newEntry);
-  }
-  await saveAllowlist(allowlist, path);
-  return allowlist;
-}
-
-/**
- * Revoke an identity from the allowlist.
- */
-export async function revokeIdentity(identity: string, path: string = defaultAllowlistPath()): Promise<Allowlist> {
-  const allowlist = await loadAllowlist(path);
-  allowlist.entries = allowlist.entries.filter(e => e.identity !== identity);
-  await saveAllowlist(allowlist, path);
-  return allowlist;
-}

package/.agent/skills/gstack-ios-qa/daemon/src/audit.ts

@@ -1,97 +0,0 @@
-// Audit + attempts logging. Reuses the same rotation primitives as
-// browse/src/tunnel-denial-log.ts (10MB rotation, 5 generations).
-
-import { mkdir, appendFile, stat, rename, readFile } from 'fs/promises';
-import { join, dirname } from 'path';
-import { createHash } from 'crypto';
-import type { AuditRow, AttemptRow } from './types';
-import { resolveStateRoot } from '../../../lib/state-root';
-
-const MAX_BYTES = 10 * 1024 * 1024;
-const MAX_GENS = 5;
-
-export function defaultAuditPath(): string {
-  return process.env.GSTACK_IOS_AUDIT_PATH
-    ?? join(resolveStateRoot(), 'security', 'ios-qa-audit.jsonl');
-}
-
-export function defaultAttemptsPath(): string {
-  return process.env.GSTACK_IOS_ATTEMPTS_PATH
-    ?? join(resolveStateRoot(), 'security', 'attempts.jsonl');
-}
-
-let _saltCache: string | null = null;
-
-async function loadDeviceSalt(): Promise<string> {
-  if (_saltCache) return _saltCache;
-  const path = join(resolveStateRoot(), 'security', 'device-salt');
-  try {
-    _saltCache = (await readFile(path, 'utf-8')).trim();
-  } catch {
-    // No salt; generate ephemeral. Real install writes one via /setup.
-    const { randomBytes } = await import('crypto');
-    _saltCache = randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
-  }
-  return _saltCache!;
-}
-
-async function rotateIfNeeded(path: string): Promise<void> {
-  try {
-    const s = await stat(path);
-    if (s.size < MAX_BYTES) return;
-  } catch {
-    return; // file doesn't exist yet
-  }
-  // Rotate: path → path.1 → path.2 → ... → path.MAX_GENS
-  for (let i = MAX_GENS - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
-    const src = i === 0 ? path : `${path}.${i}`;
-    const dst = `${path}.${i + 1}`;
-    try {
-      await rename(src, dst);
-    } catch {
-      // best-effort
-    }
-  }
-}
-
-export async function writeAudit(row: AuditRow, path: string = defaultAuditPath()): Promise<void> {
-  await mkdir(dirname(path), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
-  await rotateIfNeeded(path);
-  await appendFile(path, JSON.stringify(row) + '\n', { mode: 0o600 });
-}
-
-// Non-reversible identifier for tokens/identities in logs and API responses.
-// Same device salt as the attempts log, so ids correlate across both.
-export async function saltedHash(raw: string): Promise<string> {
-  const salt = await loadDeviceSalt();
-  return createHash('sha256').update(salt + ':' + raw).digest('hex').slice(0, 16);
-}
-
-export async function writeAttempt(opts: {
-  rawIdentity: string;
-  endpoint: string;
-  reason: AttemptRow['reason'];
-  path?: string;
-}): Promise<void> {
-  const hash = await saltedHash(opts.rawIdentity);
-  const row: AttemptRow = {
-    ts: new Date().toISOString(),
-    identity_canon: hash,
-    endpoint: opts.endpoint,
-    reason: opts.reason,
-  };
-  const path = opts.path ?? defaultAttemptsPath();
-  await mkdir(dirname(path), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
-  await rotateIfNeeded(path);
-  await appendFile(path, JSON.stringify(row) + '\n', { mode: 0o600 });
-}
-
-// Sanitize-replacer for JSON responses — mirrors browse's sanitize-replacer.ts.
-// Strips lone UTF-16 surrogate halves that would otherwise reach the
-// Anthropic API as \uD800-style escapes and trigger 400.
-export function sanitizeReplacer(_key: string, value: unknown): unknown {
-  if (typeof value !== 'string') return value;
-  // Replace lone high surrogates not followed by low surrogates, and lone
-  // low surrogates not preceded by high surrogates.
-  return value.replace(/[\uD800-\uDBFF](?![\uDC00-\uDFFF])|(?<![\uD800-\uDBFF])[\uDC00-\uDFFF]/g, '�');
-}

package/.agent/skills/gstack-ios-qa/daemon/src/auth-mint.ts

@@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
-// /auth/mint endpoint handler. Two trust models, kept distinct:
-//
-// 1. Self-service mint: caller's tailnet identity (from WhoIs) must already
-//    be in the allowlist. NEVER auto-allowlists.
-// 2. Owner-granted mint: not on /auth/mint at all — that's the CLI
-//    `gstack-ios-qa-mint --remote <identity>` writing to the allowlist file.
-
-import { SessionTokenStore } from './session-tokens';
-import { hasCapability, loadAllowlist } from './allowlist';
-import { writeAttempt } from './audit';
-import type { Capability } from './types';
-import { capabilityCovers } from './types';
-
-export interface MintRequest {
-  capability?: Capability; // requested tier; default 'interact'
-  device_udid?: string;
-}
-
-export interface MintResponse {
-  session_token: string;
-  expires_at: number;
-  capability: Capability;
-}
-
-export interface MintError {
-  error: 'identity_not_allowed' | 'capability_insufficient' | 'rate_limited';
-}
-
-export async function mintForCaller(opts: {
-  callerIdentity: string;
-  request: MintRequest;
-  tokenStore: SessionTokenStore;
-  allowlistPath?: string;
-  attemptsPath?: string;
-  endpoint?: string;
-}): Promise<MintResponse | MintError> {
-  const allowlist = await loadAllowlist(opts.allowlistPath);
-  const wantedCap: Capability = opts.request.capability ?? 'interact';
-
-  // Must be in the allowlist.
-  if (!hasCapability(allowlist, opts.callerIdentity, 'observe')) {
-    await writeAttempt({
-      rawIdentity: opts.callerIdentity,
-      endpoint: opts.endpoint ?? '/auth/mint',
-      reason: 'identity_not_allowed',
-      path: opts.attemptsPath,
-    });
-    return { error: 'identity_not_allowed' };
-  }
-
-  // Must have at least the requested capability.
-  if (!hasCapability(allowlist, opts.callerIdentity, wantedCap)) {
-    await writeAttempt({
-      rawIdentity: opts.callerIdentity,
-      endpoint: opts.endpoint ?? '/auth/mint',
-      reason: 'capability_insufficient',
-      path: opts.attemptsPath,
-    });
-    return { error: 'capability_insufficient' };
-  }
-
-  // Find the entry to determine the highest tier they can hold.
-  const entry = allowlist.entries.find(e => e.identity === opts.callerIdentity);
-  // Mint at the requested tier, capped at the highest granted tier.
-  const grantedTier = entry?.capabilities.find(c => capabilityCovers(c, wantedCap)) ?? wantedCap;
-
-  const result = opts.tokenStore.mint({
-    identity: opts.callerIdentity,
-    capability: grantedTier,
-    deviceUdid: opts.request.device_udid ?? null,
-    origin: 'self_service',
-  });
-
-  if ('error' in result) {
-    await writeAttempt({
-      rawIdentity: opts.callerIdentity,
-      endpoint: opts.endpoint ?? '/auth/mint',
-      reason: 'rate_limited',
-      path: opts.attemptsPath,
-    });
-    return { error: 'rate_limited' };
-  }
-
-  return {
-    session_token: result.token,
-    expires_at: result.expires_at,
-    capability: result.capability,
-  };
-}