@adcp/sdk 12.0.0 → 12.0.2

package/dist/lib/signing/replay.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/signing/replay.ts"],"sourcesContent":["export type ReplayInsertResult = 'ok' | 'replayed' | 'rate_abuse';\n\n/**\n * Replay cache of verified `(keyid, scope, nonce)` tuples, keyed by the\n * canonical `@target-uri` (per adcp#2460). Scoping by endpoint prevents a\n * signature captured on one path (e.g. `/create_media_buy`) from being\n * replayed against another (e.g. `/update_media_buy`) under the same keyid\n * — RFC 9421 §7.2.2 treats `@target-uri` as the endpoint identity, and the\n * signer binds it into the signature base, so the replay cache must scope\n * by the same dimension the signature commits to.\n *\n * Custom implementations MUST partition their storage by `(keyid, scope)`\n * — treating `scope` as part of the primary key — not just by `keyid`.\n */\nexport interface ReplayStore {\n  has(keyid: string, scope: string, nonce: string, now: number): Promise<boolean>;\n  isCapHit(keyid: string, scope: string, now: number): Promise<boolean>;\n  /**\n   * Atomically check-and-insert. MUST return `'replayed'` if the nonce was\n   * already present for `(keyid, scope)`, otherwise insert and return `'ok'`\n   * (or `'rate_abuse'` if the cap is hit). The check and the insert MUST be\n   * a single uninterruptable operation — concurrent verifier calls racing\n   * the same nonce must see exactly one `'ok'` and the rest `'replayed'`.\n   *\n   * For in-memory stores Node's single-threaded event loop provides the\n   * atomicity for free. **Multi-replica adopters writing Redis / Postgres\n   * stores MUST implement this as a single atomic operation** (e.g. Redis\n   * `SET NX EX`, Postgres `INSERT ... ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING RETURNING`,\n   * a `WATCH/MULTI/EXEC` transaction). Implementing as `await has(...)`\n   * then `await write(...)` opens a TOCTOU window where two replicas both\n   * see \"not replayed\" and both insert — silently accepting the same\n   * signature twice within the window.\n   */\n  insert(keyid: string, scope: string, nonce: string, ttlSeconds: number, now: number): Promise<ReplayInsertResult>;\n}\n\nexport interface InMemoryReplayStoreOptions {\n  /**\n   * Maximum retained (unexpired) nonces per `(keyid, scope)` before `insert`\n   * returns `rate_abuse`. Defaults to 100,000 — enough headroom for real\n   * traffic without turning the verifier into a DoS amplifier when a hot\n   * `(keyid, scope)` pair sits near the cap. See issue #582.\n   */\n  maxEntriesPerKeyid?: number;\n  /**\n   * Prune granularity in seconds. Entries are grouped by\n   * `floor(expiresAt / bucketSizeSeconds)`; whole buckets are evicted in one\n   * step when their latest expiry has passed. 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Keyed by `compositeKey(keyid, scope)` when a scope\n   * is supplied, or just `keyid` when the caller wants every scope under a\n   * keyid to report capped. `isCapHit` checks both forms so tests that pre-\n   * arm a cap without knowing the exact scope still work.\n   */\n  private readonly forcedCapHit = new Set<string>();\n\n  constructor(options: InMemoryReplayStoreOptions = {}) {\n    this.capPerKeyid = options.maxEntriesPerKeyid ?? 100_000;\n    this.bucketSize = options.bucketSizeSeconds ?? 60;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Force `isCapHit` to return true for the given keyid (across every scope)\n   * or the specific `(keyid, scope)` pair when `scope` is supplied. Used by\n   * conformance vectors to pre-arm the rate-abuse path without actually\n   * flooding the cache.\n   */\n  setCapHitForTesting(keyid: string, scope?: string): void {\n    this.forcedCapHit.add(scope === undefined ? keyid : compositeKey(keyid, scope));\n  }\n\n  async has(keyid: string, scope: string, nonce: string, now: number): Promise<boolean> {\n    const state = this.state.get(compositeKey(keyid, scope));\n    if (!state) return false;\n    this.prune(state, now);\n    return state.nonces.has(nonce);\n  }\n\n  async isCapHit(keyid: string, scope: string, now: number): Promise<boolean> {\n    if (this.forcedCapHit.has(keyid)) return true;\n    if (this.forcedCapHit.has(compositeKey(keyid, scope))) return true;\n    const state = this.state.get(compositeKey(keyid, scope));\n    if (!state) return false;\n    this.prune(state, now);\n    return state.nonces.size >= this.capPerKeyid;\n  }\n\n  async insert(\n    keyid: string,\n    scope: string,\n    nonce: string,\n    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+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/signing/replay.ts"],"sourcesContent":["export type ReplayInsertResult = 'ok' | 'replayed' | 'rate_abuse';\n\n/**\n * Replay cache of verified `(keyid, scope, nonce)` tuples, keyed by the\n * canonical `@target-uri` (per adcp#2460). Scoping by endpoint prevents a\n * signature captured on one path (e.g. `/create_media_buy`) from being\n * replayed against another (e.g. `/update_media_buy`) under the same keyid\n * — RFC 9421 §7.2.2 treats `@target-uri` as the endpoint identity, and the\n * signer binds it into the signature base, so the replay cache must scope\n * by the same dimension the signature commits to.\n *\n * Custom implementations MUST partition their storage by `(keyid, scope)`\n * — treating `scope` as part of the primary key — not just by `keyid`.\n */\nexport interface ReplayStore {\n  has(keyid: string, scope: string, nonce: string, now: number): Promise<boolean>;\n  isCapHit(keyid: string, scope: string, now: number): Promise<boolean>;\n  /**\n   * Atomically check-and-insert. MUST return `'replayed'` if the nonce was\n   * already present for `(keyid, scope)`, otherwise insert and return `'ok'`\n   * (or `'rate_abuse'` if the cap is hit). The check and the insert MUST be\n   * a single uninterruptable operation — concurrent verifier calls racing\n   * the same nonce must see exactly one `'ok'` and the rest `'replayed'`.\n   *\n   * For in-memory stores Node's single-threaded event loop provides the\n   * atomicity for free. **Multi-replica adopters writing Redis / Postgres\n   * stores MUST implement this as a single atomic operation** (e.g. Redis\n   * `SET NX EX`, Postgres `INSERT ... ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING RETURNING`,\n   * a `WATCH/MULTI/EXEC` transaction). Implementing as `await has(...)`\n   * then `await write(...)` opens a TOCTOU window where two replicas both\n   * see \"not replayed\" and both insert — silently accepting the same\n   * signature twice within the window.\n   */\n  insert(keyid: string, scope: string, nonce: string, ttlSeconds: number, now: number): Promise<ReplayInsertResult>;\n}\n\nexport interface InMemoryReplayStoreOptions {\n  /**\n   * Maximum retained (unexpired) nonces per `(keyid, scope)` before `insert`\n   * returns `rate_abuse`. Defaults to 100,000 — enough headroom for real\n   * traffic without turning the verifier into a DoS amplifier when a hot\n   * `(keyid, scope)` pair sits near the cap. See issue #582.\n   */\n  maxEntriesPerKeyid?: number;\n  /**\n   * Prune granularity in seconds. Entries are grouped by\n   * `floor(expiresAt / bucketSizeSeconds)`; whole buckets are evicted in one\n   * step when their latest expiry has passed. Keeps amortized has/insert/\n   * isCapHit at O(1) per `(keyid, scope)` pair regardless of entries-per-pair.\n   */\n  bucketSizeSeconds?: number;\n}\n\ninterface Bucket {\n  nonces: Set<string>;\n  latestExpiry: number;\n}\n\ninterface KeyState {\n  nonces: Set<string>;\n  buckets: Map<number, Bucket>;\n  lastPrunedBucket: number;\n}\n\n/** Join `(keyid, scope)` into the in-memory map key. NUL is never legal in\n * either a JWK kid (RFC 7517) or a URL — using it as a separator makes the\n * join unambiguous without escaping. */\nfunction compositeKey(keyid: string, scope: string): string {\n  return `${keyid}\\x00${scope}`;\n}\n\nexport class InMemoryReplayStore implements ReplayStore {\n  private readonly state = new Map<string, KeyState>();\n  private readonly capPerKeyid: number;\n  private readonly bucketSize: number;\n  /**\n   * Forced-cap test hook. Keyed by `compositeKey(keyid, scope)` when a scope\n   * is supplied, or just `keyid` when the caller wants every scope under a\n   * keyid to report capped. `isCapHit` checks both forms so tests that pre-\n   * arm a cap without knowing the exact scope still work.\n   */\n  private readonly forcedCapHit = new Set<string>();\n\n  constructor(options: InMemoryReplayStoreOptions = {}) {\n    this.capPerKeyid = options.maxEntriesPerKeyid ?? 100_000;\n    this.bucketSize = options.bucketSizeSeconds ?? 60;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Force `isCapHit` to return true for the given keyid (across every scope)\n   * or the specific `(keyid, scope)` pair when `scope` is supplied. Used by\n   * conformance vectors to pre-arm the rate-abuse path without actually\n   * flooding the cache.\n   */\n  setCapHitForTesting(keyid: string, scope?: string): void {\n    this.forcedCapHit.add(scope === undefined ? keyid : compositeKey(keyid, scope));\n  }\n\n  async has(keyid: string, scope: string, nonce: string, now: number): Promise<boolean> {\n    const state = this.state.get(compositeKey(keyid, scope));\n    if (!state) return false;\n    this.prune(state, now);\n    return state.nonces.has(nonce);\n  }\n\n  async isCapHit(keyid: string, scope: string, now: number): Promise<boolean> {\n    if (this.forcedCapHit.has(keyid)) return true;\n    if (this.forcedCapHit.has(compositeKey(keyid, scope))) return true;\n    const state = this.state.get(compositeKey(keyid, scope));\n    if (!state) return false;\n    this.prune(state, now);\n    return state.nonces.size >= this.capPerKeyid;\n  }\n\n  async insert(\n    keyid: string,\n    scope: string,\n    nonce: string,\n    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package/dist/lib/signing/request-context.mjs

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
-import { fileURLToPath as __adcpFileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { dirname as __adcpDirname } from 'node:path';
-import { createRequire as __adcpCreateRequire } from 'node:module';
-const __filename = __adcpFileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
-const __dirname = __adcpDirname(__filename);
-const require = __adcpCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
 function requestContextFromExpress(req, options = {}) {
   const host = normalizeHost(req.get("host"));
   if (!host) {

package/dist/lib/signing/request-context.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/signing/request-context.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Adapter helpers that construct the `{ method, url }` shape used when\n * binding RFC 9421 derived components to an inbound request.\n *\n * Why this exists: RFC 9421 `@authority` / `@target-uri` canonicalization\n * requires an absolute URL. Express handlers ship `req.url` /\n * `req.originalUrl` as path-only, so adopters reconstruct via\n * `${req.protocol}://${req.get('host')}${req.originalUrl}`. But `req.protocol`\n * lies behind a TLS-terminating proxy unless `trust proxy` is set, and\n * `req.get('host')` is attacker-controllable absent a Host allowlist. A\n * hostile peer that controls these headers can rebind a signature to\n * `attacker.example.com` while the operator believes they're signing for\n * `seller.example.com`.\n *\n * These helpers make the safe path the default path — pass them an inbound\n * request handle from your platform and they emit a hardened `{ method, url }`\n * shape for request or webhook verification.\n */\n\n/**\n * Minimal Express request shape this helper consumes. Kept narrow so\n * `@adcp/sdk` doesn't pull in `@types/express`; importing Express's own\n * `Request` type is safe in adopter code, since structural typing accepts\n * the wider shape anywhere this narrower one is expected.\n */\nexport interface ExpressRequestLike {\n  readonly method: string;\n  readonly protocol: string;\n  readonly originalUrl: string;\n  /** Express's typed `Request.get('host')` overload. */\n  get(name: 'host'): string | undefined;\n}\n\nexport interface RequestContextFromExpressOptions {\n  /**\n   * Allowed `Host` header values. When set, the helper throws if the\n   * inbound `Host` doesn't match. Strongly recommended in production —\n   * absent this, a hostile peer controlling the `Host` header can rebind\n   * the signature origin (see file header).\n   *\n   * Each entry is compared verbatim against `req.get('host')` after\n   * trimming and lowercasing. Include port suffixes where applicable\n   * (`api.example.com:8080`).\n   */\n  hostAllowlist?: ReadonlyArray<string>;\n\n  /**\n   * When `true` (default), the helper throws if the reconstructed URL\n   * scheme is not `https`. AdCP request / webhook signatures bound to\n   * `http://` will fail strict-HTTPS verifier profiles, so this catches\n   * the misconfig at construction time. Disable only for local dev /\n   * loopback mock servers.\n   */\n  forceHttps?: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Construct a hardened `{ method, url }` from an Express request.\n *\n * **You MUST configure `app.set('trust proxy', ...)`** with the IPs of\n * your trusted reverse proxies before relying on this helper. Without\n * `trust proxy`, Express returns the literal `req.connection.remoteAddress`\n * for `req.protocol` and `req.ip` — which a TLS-terminating proxy will\n * always set to the proxy's address, leaving you blind to whether the\n * original request actually arrived over HTTPS. This helper trusts what\n * Express tells it; the operator is responsible for telling Express what\n * to trust.\n *\n * Throws when the `Host` header is missing, doesn't match `hostAllowlist`,\n * or when the scheme is not `https` (unless `forceHttps: false`).\n */\nexport function requestContextFromExpress(\n  req: ExpressRequestLike,\n  options: RequestContextFromExpressOptions = {}\n): { method: string; url: string } {\n  const host = normalizeHost(req.get('host'));\n  if (!host) {\n    throw new TypeError(\n      'requestContextFromExpress: Host header is missing. ' +\n        'Express returned no `host` — either the inbound request omitted it, or your reverse proxy stripped it.'\n    );\n  }\n  if (options.hostAllowlist && !hostMatchesAllowlist(host, options.hostAllowlist)) {\n    throw new TypeError(\n      `requestContextFromExpress: Host \"${host}\" is not in hostAllowlist. ` +\n        `A hostile peer may be trying to rebind your signature origin via Host-header injection. ` +\n        `Add the legitimate value to hostAllowlist, or fix your proxy's Host handling.`\n    );\n  }\n  const protocol = req.protocol;\n  const forceHttps = options.forceHttps !== false;\n  if (forceHttps && protocol !== 'https') {\n    throw new TypeError(\n      `requestContextFromExpress: protocol is \"${protocol}\", not \"https\". ` +\n        `Set app.set('trust proxy', ...) so Express sees the X-Forwarded-Proto header, ` +\n        `or pass forceHttps: false for local dev (loopback / mock-server testing).`\n    );\n  }\n  // Defense-in-depth: reject userinfo in originalUrl. A malicious middleware\n  // could mutate req.originalUrl to inject `user@` between host and path —\n  // canonicalAuthority would then sign the userinfo-bearing variant. Express\n  // doesn't normally carry userinfo here but we check rather than trust.\n  if (/[@]/.test(req.originalUrl.split('?')[0] ?? '')) {\n    throw new TypeError('requestContextFromExpress: originalUrl path must not embed userinfo (@).');\n  }\n  return { method: req.method, url: `${protocol}://${host}${req.originalUrl}` };\n}\n\n/**\n * Fetch / Workers / Deno / Bun `Request` shape. `request.url` is already\n * an absolute URL per WHATWG spec, so there's no host-spoofing surface\n * here — the runtime owns URL construction, not the caller.\n */\nexport interface FetchRequestLike {\n  readonly method: string;\n  readonly url: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Construct `{ method, url }` from a Fetch / WHATWG `Request`. Trivial\n * passthrough; included for API symmetry with the Express / Lambda\n * helpers. No proxy hardening needed — `request.url` is the absolute URL\n * the runtime constructed from the wire, and Workers / Deno / Bun all\n * terminate TLS at the edge so `https` is honest.\n */\nexport function requestContextFromFetch(request: FetchRequestLike): { method: string; url: string } {\n  // WHATWG accepts `https://user:pw@host/path` as a valid Request URL and\n  // echoes it back verbatim. `canonicalAuthority` would then sign the\n  // userinfo-bearing form, splitting the signature namespace between\n  // userinfo and userinfo-stripped variants of the same logical origin.\n  // Reject at construction time — userinfo never belongs in a signed\n  // `@authority` / `@target-uri`.\n  let parsed: URL;\n  try {\n    parsed = new URL(request.url);\n  } catch {\n    throw new TypeError(`requestContextFromFetch: request.url \"${request.url}\" is not a parseable URL.`);\n  }\n  if (parsed.username || parsed.password) {\n    throw new TypeError(\n      'requestContextFromFetch: request.url must not embed userinfo. ' +\n        'A signed @authority component with userinfo creates a verifier-splitting confusion vector.'\n    );\n  }\n  return { method: request.method, url: request.url };\n}\n\n/**\n * AWS Lambda API Gateway v2 / ALB event shape. Narrow rather than\n * importing `@types/aws-lambda` — adopter code that ships against the\n * full Lambda types can pass the wider object verbatim.\n */\nexport interface LambdaRequestEvent {\n  readonly requestContext: {\n    readonly domainName?: string;\n    readonly http?: { readonly method?: string };\n    readonly httpMethod?: string;\n  };\n  readonly rawPath?: string;\n  readonly rawQueryString?: string;\n  readonly path?: string;\n  readonly httpMethod?: string;\n  readonly queryStringParameters?: { readonly [key: string]: string | undefined };\n}\n\nexport interface RequestContextFromLambdaOptions {\n  /**\n   * Same semantics as the Express helper — allowed `domainName` values.\n   * Lambda's `event.requestContext.domainName` is set by API Gateway from\n   * the matched custom-domain configuration; it's not attacker-controllable\n   * the way Express's `req.get('host')` is, but pinning it still catches\n   * misrouted traffic (e.g. one tenant's Lambda receiving another tenant's\n   * domain via a misconfigured shared API Gateway).\n   */\n  hostAllowlist?: ReadonlyArray<string>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Construct `{ method, url }` from an AWS Lambda API Gateway v2 / ALB\n * event. Reads `requestContext.domainName` for the authority, `rawPath` +\n * `rawQueryString` for the target (v2 / ALB), falling back to `path` +\n * `queryStringParameters` reconstruction (v1).\n *\n * Always emits `https://` — Lambda is not addressable over plain HTTP\n * through API Gateway / ALB in any documented configuration.\n */\nexport function requestContextFromLambda(\n  event: LambdaRequestEvent,\n  options: RequestContextFromLambdaOptions = {}\n): { method: string; url: string } {\n  const domainName = event.requestContext.domainName;\n  if (!domainName) {\n    throw new TypeError(\n      'requestContextFromLambda: event.requestContext.domainName is missing. ' +\n        'API Gateway v2 / ALB events should always carry this; ' +\n        'is this event shaped like something else?'\n    );\n  }\n  const host = normalizeHost(domainName);\n  if (!host) {\n    throw new TypeError('requestContextFromLambda: domainName is empty after normalization.');\n  }\n  if (options.hostAllowlist && !hostMatchesAllowlist(host, options.hostAllowlist)) {\n    throw new TypeError(\n      `requestContextFromLambda: domainName \"${host}\" is not in hostAllowlist. ` +\n        `Multi-tenant API Gateway misroute? Add the legitimate value, or fix the API mapping.`\n    );\n  }\n  const method = event.requestContext.http?.method ?? event.requestContext.httpMethod ?? event.httpMethod;\n  if (!method) {\n    throw new TypeError('requestContextFromLambda: HTTP method is missing from the event.');\n  }\n  const path = event.rawPath ?? event.path ?? 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IPv6 brackets are preserved so the\n * allowlist entry and the inbound value agree on bracket presence.\n */\nfunction normalizeHost(raw: string | undefined): string {\n  if (!raw) return '';\n  let h = raw.trim().toLowerCase();\n  // Strip trailing dot from FQDN. 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+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/signing/request-context.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Adapter helpers that construct the `{ method, url }` shape used when\n * binding RFC 9421 derived components to an inbound request.\n *\n * Why this exists: RFC 9421 `@authority` / `@target-uri` canonicalization\n * requires an absolute URL. Express handlers ship `req.url` /\n * `req.originalUrl` as path-only, so adopters reconstruct via\n * `${req.protocol}://${req.get('host')}${req.originalUrl}`. But `req.protocol`\n * lies behind a TLS-terminating proxy unless `trust proxy` is set, and\n * `req.get('host')` is attacker-controllable absent a Host allowlist. A\n * hostile peer that controls these headers can rebind a signature to\n * `attacker.example.com` while the operator believes they're signing for\n * `seller.example.com`.\n *\n * These helpers make the safe path the default path — pass them an inbound\n * request handle from your platform and they emit a hardened `{ method, url }`\n * shape for request or webhook verification.\n */\n\n/**\n * Minimal Express request shape this helper consumes. Kept narrow so\n * `@adcp/sdk` doesn't pull in `@types/express`; importing Express's own\n * `Request` type is safe in adopter code, since structural typing accepts\n * the wider shape anywhere this narrower one is expected.\n */\nexport interface ExpressRequestLike {\n  readonly method: string;\n  readonly protocol: string;\n  readonly originalUrl: string;\n  /** Express's typed `Request.get('host')` overload. */\n  get(name: 'host'): string | undefined;\n}\n\nexport interface RequestContextFromExpressOptions {\n  /**\n   * Allowed `Host` header values. When set, the helper throws if the\n   * inbound `Host` doesn't match. Strongly recommended in production —\n   * absent this, a hostile peer controlling the `Host` header can rebind\n   * the signature origin (see file header).\n   *\n   * Each entry is compared verbatim against `req.get('host')` after\n   * trimming and lowercasing. Include port suffixes where applicable\n   * (`api.example.com:8080`).\n   */\n  hostAllowlist?: ReadonlyArray<string>;\n\n  /**\n   * When `true` (default), the helper throws if the reconstructed URL\n   * scheme is not `https`. AdCP request / webhook signatures bound to\n   * `http://` will fail strict-HTTPS verifier profiles, so this catches\n   * the misconfig at construction time. Disable only for local dev /\n   * loopback mock servers.\n   */\n  forceHttps?: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Construct a hardened `{ method, url }` from an Express request.\n *\n * **You MUST configure `app.set('trust proxy', ...)`** with the IPs of\n * your trusted reverse proxies before relying on this helper. Without\n * `trust proxy`, Express returns the literal `req.connection.remoteAddress`\n * for `req.protocol` and `req.ip` — which a TLS-terminating proxy will\n * always set to the proxy's address, leaving you blind to whether the\n * original request actually arrived over HTTPS. This helper trusts what\n * Express tells it; the operator is responsible for telling Express what\n * to trust.\n *\n * Throws when the `Host` header is missing, doesn't match `hostAllowlist`,\n * or when the scheme is not `https` (unless `forceHttps: false`).\n */\nexport function requestContextFromExpress(\n  req: ExpressRequestLike,\n  options: RequestContextFromExpressOptions = {}\n): { method: string; url: string } {\n  const host = normalizeHost(req.get('host'));\n  if (!host) {\n    throw new TypeError(\n      'requestContextFromExpress: Host header is missing. ' +\n        'Express returned no `host` — either the inbound request omitted it, or your reverse proxy stripped it.'\n    );\n  }\n  if (options.hostAllowlist && !hostMatchesAllowlist(host, options.hostAllowlist)) {\n    throw new TypeError(\n      `requestContextFromExpress: Host \"${host}\" is not in hostAllowlist. ` +\n        `A hostile peer may be trying to rebind your signature origin via Host-header injection. ` +\n        `Add the legitimate value to hostAllowlist, or fix your proxy's Host handling.`\n    );\n  }\n  const protocol = req.protocol;\n  const forceHttps = options.forceHttps !== false;\n  if (forceHttps && protocol !== 'https') {\n    throw new TypeError(\n      `requestContextFromExpress: protocol is \"${protocol}\", not \"https\". ` +\n        `Set app.set('trust proxy', ...) so Express sees the X-Forwarded-Proto header, ` +\n        `or pass forceHttps: false for local dev (loopback / mock-server testing).`\n    );\n  }\n  // Defense-in-depth: reject userinfo in originalUrl. A malicious middleware\n  // could mutate req.originalUrl to inject `user@` between host and path —\n  // canonicalAuthority would then sign the userinfo-bearing variant. Express\n  // doesn't normally carry userinfo here but we check rather than trust.\n  if (/[@]/.test(req.originalUrl.split('?')[0] ?? '')) {\n    throw new TypeError('requestContextFromExpress: originalUrl path must not embed userinfo (@).');\n  }\n  return { method: req.method, url: `${protocol}://${host}${req.originalUrl}` };\n}\n\n/**\n * Fetch / Workers / Deno / Bun `Request` shape. `request.url` is already\n * an absolute URL per WHATWG spec, so there's no host-spoofing surface\n * here — the runtime owns URL construction, not the caller.\n */\nexport interface FetchRequestLike {\n  readonly method: string;\n  readonly url: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Construct `{ method, url }` from a Fetch / WHATWG `Request`. Trivial\n * passthrough; included for API symmetry with the Express / Lambda\n * helpers. No proxy hardening needed — `request.url` is the absolute URL\n * the runtime constructed from the wire, and Workers / Deno / Bun all\n * terminate TLS at the edge so `https` is honest.\n */\nexport function requestContextFromFetch(request: FetchRequestLike): { method: string; url: string } {\n  // WHATWG accepts `https://user:pw@host/path` as a valid Request URL and\n  // echoes it back verbatim. `canonicalAuthority` would then sign the\n  // userinfo-bearing form, splitting the signature namespace between\n  // userinfo and userinfo-stripped variants of the same logical origin.\n  // Reject at construction time — userinfo never belongs in a signed\n  // `@authority` / `@target-uri`.\n  let parsed: URL;\n  try {\n    parsed = new URL(request.url);\n  } catch {\n    throw new TypeError(`requestContextFromFetch: request.url \"${request.url}\" is not a parseable URL.`);\n  }\n  if (parsed.username || parsed.password) {\n    throw new TypeError(\n      'requestContextFromFetch: request.url must not embed userinfo. ' +\n        'A signed @authority component with userinfo creates a verifier-splitting confusion vector.'\n    );\n  }\n  return { method: request.method, url: request.url };\n}\n\n/**\n * AWS Lambda API Gateway v2 / ALB event shape. Narrow rather than\n * importing `@types/aws-lambda` — adopter code that ships against the\n * full Lambda types can pass the wider object verbatim.\n */\nexport interface LambdaRequestEvent {\n  readonly requestContext: {\n    readonly domainName?: string;\n    readonly http?: { readonly method?: string };\n    readonly httpMethod?: string;\n  };\n  readonly rawPath?: string;\n  readonly rawQueryString?: string;\n  readonly path?: string;\n  readonly httpMethod?: string;\n  readonly queryStringParameters?: { readonly [key: string]: string | undefined };\n}\n\nexport interface RequestContextFromLambdaOptions {\n  /**\n   * Same semantics as the Express helper — allowed `domainName` values.\n   * Lambda's `event.requestContext.domainName` is set by API Gateway from\n   * the matched custom-domain configuration; it's not attacker-controllable\n   * the way Express's `req.get('host')` is, but pinning it still catches\n   * misrouted traffic (e.g. one tenant's Lambda receiving another tenant's\n   * domain via a misconfigured shared API Gateway).\n   */\n  hostAllowlist?: ReadonlyArray<string>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Construct `{ method, url }` from an AWS Lambda API Gateway v2 / ALB\n * event. Reads `requestContext.domainName` for the authority, `rawPath` +\n * `rawQueryString` for the target (v2 / ALB), falling back to `path` +\n * `queryStringParameters` reconstruction (v1).\n *\n * Always emits `https://` — Lambda is not addressable over plain HTTP\n * through API Gateway / ALB in any documented configuration.\n */\nexport function requestContextFromLambda(\n  event: LambdaRequestEvent,\n  options: RequestContextFromLambdaOptions = {}\n): { method: string; url: string } {\n  const domainName = event.requestContext.domainName;\n  if (!domainName) {\n    throw new TypeError(\n      'requestContextFromLambda: event.requestContext.domainName is missing. ' +\n        'API Gateway v2 / ALB events should always carry this; ' +\n        'is this event shaped like something else?'\n    );\n  }\n  const host = normalizeHost(domainName);\n  if (!host) {\n    throw new TypeError('requestContextFromLambda: domainName is empty after normalization.');\n  }\n  if (options.hostAllowlist && !hostMatchesAllowlist(host, options.hostAllowlist)) {\n    throw new TypeError(\n      `requestContextFromLambda: domainName \"${host}\" is not in hostAllowlist. ` +\n        `Multi-tenant API Gateway misroute? Add the legitimate value, or fix the API mapping.`\n    );\n  }\n  const method = event.requestContext.http?.method ?? event.requestContext.httpMethod ?? event.httpMethod;\n  if (!method) {\n    throw new TypeError('requestContextFromLambda: HTTP method is missing from the event.');\n  }\n  const path = event.rawPath ?? event.path ?? '/';\n  // Lambda's domainName won't carry a trailing dot in supported configs but\n  // we normalize here so a future shape change can't bypass the allowlist.\n  let url = `https://${host}${path}`;\n  if (event.rawQueryString) {\n    url += `?${event.rawQueryString}`;\n  } else if (event.queryStringParameters) {\n    const params = Object.entries(event.queryStringParameters)\n      .filter(([, v]) => v !== undefined)\n      .map(([k, v]) => `${encodeURIComponent(k)}=${encodeURIComponent(v as string)}`);\n    if (params.length) url += `?${params.join('&')}`;\n  }\n  return { method, url };\n}\n\n/**\n * Normalize a Host / domainName value for allowlist comparison. Lowercase\n * + trim handle the obvious cases; trailing-dot stripping closes a\n * documented Host-header bypass where `example.com.` is a distinct string\n * from `example.com` on some stacks. IPv6 brackets are preserved so the\n * allowlist entry and the inbound value agree on bracket presence.\n */\nfunction normalizeHost(raw: string | undefined): string {\n  if (!raw) return '';\n  let h = raw.trim().toLowerCase();\n  // Strip trailing dot from FQDN. 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package/dist/lib/signing/revocation-https.mjs

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
-import { fileURLToPath as __adcpFileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { dirname as __adcpDirname } from 'node:path';
-import { createRequire as __adcpCreateRequire } from 'node:module';
-const __filename = __adcpFileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
-const __dirname = __adcpDirname(__filename);
-const require = __adcpCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
 import { ssrfSafeFetch } from "../net/index.mjs";
 import { RequestSignatureError } from "./errors.mjs";
 const DEFAULT_GRACE_SECONDS = 300;

package/dist/lib/signing/revocation-https.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/signing/revocation-https.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { ssrfSafeFetch } from '../net';\nimport { RequestSignatureError } from './errors';\nimport type { RevocationStore } from './revocation';\nimport type { RevocationSnapshot } from './types';\n\nexport interface HttpsRevocationStoreOptions {\n  /**\n   * Grace period, in seconds, beyond `next_update` during which a cached\n   * snapshot is still considered fresh enough to serve. After this grace the\n   * store fails closed with `request_signature_revocation_stale` rather than\n   * silently returning a possibly-wrong answer. Default 300s.\n   */\n  graceSeconds?: number;\n  /**\n   * Minimum seconds between refetch attempts — protects a counterparty\n   * revocation endpoint from being hammered when `next_update` lies in the\n   * past. Default 30s.\n   */\n  minRefetchIntervalSeconds?: number;\n  /**\n   * Reject any incoming snapshot whose `next_update` is more than this many\n   * seconds after `updated` — a hostile or misconfigured origin could\n   * otherwise return `next_update: \"9999-12-31Z\"` and disable the grace\n   * check indefinitely. Default 7 days (604800s).\n   *\n   * NOTE: LARGER values LOOSEN the bound. The default 7 days is already\n   * tight; only raise it if a specific counterparty publishes longer-lived\n   * snapshots for an operationally justified reason. Lowering to hours or\n   * minutes is a hardening move; raising to months is not.\n   */\n  maxValidityWindowSeconds?: number;\n  /**\n   * Expected issuer. When set, refuses any snapshot whose `issuer` field\n   * doesn't match — protects against a mis-pointed revocation URL serving\n   * a snapshot from a different authority. When unset, any `issuer` value\n   * is accepted.\n   */\n  expectedIssuer?: string;\n  /** Allow `http://` / private-IP revocation URLs (dev loops only). Default false. */\n  allowPrivateIp?: boolean;\n  /** Clock override for deterministic tests. Returns epoch seconds. */\n  now?: () => number;\n}\n\ninterface SnapshotState {\n  revokedKids: Set<string>;\n  revokedJtis: Set<string>;\n  /** Parsed from `RevocationSnapshot.updated` (epoch seconds). */\n  updated: number;\n  /** Parsed from `RevocationSnapshot.next_update` (epoch seconds). */\n  nextUpdate: number;\n}\n\nconst DEFAULT_GRACE_SECONDS = 300;\nconst DEFAULT_MIN_REFETCH_INTERVAL_SECONDS = 30;\nconst DEFAULT_MAX_VALIDITY_WINDOW_SECONDS = 7 * 24 * 3600;\n\n/**\n * Revocation store that fetches and caches an AdCP revocation snapshot from\n * an HTTPS URL.\n *\n * Behavior:\n *   - Lazy first-fetch on the first `isRevoked()` call.\n *   - Once cached, subsequent `isRevoked()` calls read from memory. When\n *     `now` passes the snapshot's `next_update`, the next call triggers a\n *     refresh (throttled by `minRefetchIntervalSeconds`).\n *   - On refresh failure with an existing snapshot: keep the stale snapshot\n *     until `now > next_update + graceSeconds`, then fail closed with\n *     `request_signature_revocation_stale` — better to reject requests than\n *     silently serve a snapshot we know is past grace.\n *   - Runs through the SSRF-safe fetch primitive: an attacker-supplied\n *     revocation URL can't resolve into the host's private network.\n *\n * Callers that want aggressive background polling can call `refresh()` on\n * their own interval; the store's default pull-model avoids running a timer.\n */\nexport class HttpsRevocationStore implements RevocationStore {\n  private readonly url: string;\n  private readonly grace: number;\n  private readonly minRefetchInterval: number;\n  private readonly maxValidityWindow: number;\n  private readonly expectedIssuer: string | undefined;\n  private readonly allowPrivateIp: boolean;\n  private readonly now: () => number;\n  private snapshot: SnapshotState | undefined;\n  private lastFetchAttempt = 0;\n  private inFlight: Promise<void> | undefined;\n\n  constructor(url: string, options: HttpsRevocationStoreOptions = {}) {\n    this.url = url;\n    this.grace = options.graceSeconds ?? 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package/dist/lib/signing/revocation.mjs

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
-import { fileURLToPath as __adcpFileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { dirname as __adcpDirname } from 'node:path';
-import { createRequire as __adcpCreateRequire } from 'node:module';
-const __filename = __adcpFileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
-const __dirname = __adcpDirname(__filename);
-const require = __adcpCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
 class InMemoryRevocationStore {
   revokedKids = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
   constructor(snapshot) {

package/dist/lib/signing/revocation.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/signing/revocation.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type { RevocationSnapshot } from './types';\n\nexport interface RevocationStore {\n  isRevoked(keyid: string): Promise<boolean>;\n}\n\nexport class InMemoryRevocationStore implements RevocationStore {\n  private revokedKids = new Set<string>();\n\n  constructor(snapshot?: RevocationSnapshot) {\n    if (snapshot) this.load(snapshot);\n  }\n\n  load(snapshot: RevocationSnapshot): void {\n    this.revokedKids = new Set(snapshot.revoked_kids);\n  }\n\n  async isRevoked(keyid: string): Promise<boolean> {\n    return this.revokedKids.has(keyid);\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":"AAMO,MAAM,wBAAmD;AAAA,EACtD,cAAc,oBAAI,IAAY;AAAA,EAEtC,YAAY,UAA+B;AACzC,QAAI,SAAU,MAAK,KAAK,QAAQ;AAAA,EAClC;AAAA,EAEA,KAAK,UAAoC;AACvC,SAAK,cAAc,IAAI,IAAI,SAAS,YAAY;AAAA,EAClD;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,UAAU,OAAiC;AAC/C,WAAO,KAAK,YAAY,IAAI,KAAK;AAAA,EACnC;AACF;","names":[]}

package/dist/lib/signing/server.mjs

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
-import { fileURLToPath as __adcpFileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { dirname as __adcpDirname } from 'node:path';
-import { createRequire as __adcpCreateRequire } from 'node:module';
-const __filename = __adcpFileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
-const __dirname = __adcpDirname(__filename);
-const require = __adcpCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
 import {
   buildResponseSignatureBase,
   buildSignatureBase,

package/dist/lib/signing/server.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/signing/server.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Server-side signing surface: what a seller running an AdCP agent needs to\n * verify inbound RFC 9421 signatures — verifier pipeline, Express-shaped\n * middleware, pluggable JWKS / replay / revocation stores, and the error\n * taxonomy.\n *\n * Paired with `@adcp/sdk/signing/client` (signer / fetch wrapper /\n * capability cache). The aggregate `@adcp/sdk/signing` barrel re-exports\n * both for back-compat.\n */\nexport {\n  buildResponseSignatureBase,\n  buildSignatureBase,\n  canonicalAuthority,\n  canonicalMethod,\n  canonicalTargetUri,\n  formatSignatureParams,\n  getHeaderValue,\n  type RequestLike,\n  type ResponseLike,\n  type SignatureParams,\n} from './canonicalize';\nexport { computeContentDigest, contentDigestMatches, parseContentDigest } from './content-digest';\nexport {\n  requestContextFromExpress,\n  requestContextFromFetch,\n  requestContextFromLambda,\n  type ExpressRequestLike,\n  type FetchRequestLike,\n  type LambdaRequestEvent,\n  type RequestContextFromExpressOptions,\n  type RequestContextFromLambdaOptions,\n} from './request-context';\nexport { jwkToPublicKey, verifySignature } from './crypto';\nexport {\n  RequestSignatureError,\n  type RequestSignatureErrorCode,\n  ResponseSignatureError,\n  type ResponseSignatureErrorCode,\n  WebhookSignatureError,\n  type WebhookSignatureErrorCode,\n} from './errors';\nexport { StaticJwksResolver, type JwksResolver } from './jwks';\nexport { HttpsJwksResolver, type HttpsJwksResolverOptions } from './jwks-https';\nexport {\n  BrandJsonJwksResolver,\n  BrandJsonResolverError,\n  type BrandAgentType,\n  type BrandJsonJwksResolverOptions,\n  type BrandJsonResolverErrorCode,\n} from './brand-jwks';\nexport { parseSignature, parseSignatureInput, type ParsedSignature, type ParsedSignatureInput } from './parser';\nexport {\n  InMemoryReplayStore,\n  type InMemoryReplayStoreOptions,\n  type ReplayInsertResult,\n  type ReplayStore,\n} from './replay';\nexport {\n  PostgresReplayStore,\n  REPLAY_CACHE_MIGRATION,\n  getReplayStoreMigration,\n  sweepExpiredReplays,\n  type PostgresReplayStoreOptions,\n  type SweepExpiredReplaysOptions,\n} from './postgres-replay-store';\nexport {\n  RedisReplayStore,\n  type RedisReplayStoreOptions,\n  type ReplayRedisBackendClient,\n  type ReplayRedisLikeClient,\n} from './redis-replay-store';\nexport { InMemoryRevocationStore, type RevocationStore } from './revocation';\nexport { HttpsRevocationStore, type HttpsRevocationStoreOptions } from './revocation-https';\nexport {\n  ALLOWED_ALGS,\n  CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS,\n  MANDATORY_COMPONENTS,\n  MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS,\n  REQUEST_SIGNING_TAG,\n  RESPONSE_MANDATORY_COMPONENTS,\n  RESPONSE_SIGNING_TAG,\n  type AdcpJsonWebKey,\n  type ContentDigestPolicy,\n  type RevocationSnapshot,\n  type VerifiedSigner,\n  type VerifierCapability,\n  type VerifyResult,\n} from './types';\nexport { verifyRequestSignature, type VerifyRequestOptions } from './verifier';\nexport {\n  createWebhookVerifier,\n  verifyWebhookSignature,\n  WEBHOOK_MANDATORY_COMPONENTS,\n  WEBHOOK_SIGNING_TAG,\n  type CreateWebhookVerifierOptions,\n  type VerifyWebhookOptions,\n  type VerifyWebhookResult,\n} from './webhook-verifier';\nexport { createExpressVerifier, type ExpressLike, type ExpressMiddlewareOptions } from './middleware';\nexport {\n  finalizeResponseSignature,\n  prepareResponseSignature,\n  signResponse,\n  type PreparedResponseSignature,\n  type SignedResponse,\n  type SignResponseOptions,\n} from './signer';\nexport { signResponseAsync } from './signer-async';\nexport {\n  resolveAgent,\n  getAgentJwks,\n  createAgentJwksSet,\n  AgentResolverError,\n  attackerInfluencedFields,\n  ATTACKER_INFLUENCED,\n  readBrandJsonUrl,\n  readIdentityPosture,\n  type AgentResolution,\n  type AgentProtocol,\n  type AgentResolverErrorCode,\n  type AgentResolverErrorDetail,\n  type AgentEntry,\n  type AgentJwksResult,\n  type CapabilitiesWithBrandJsonUrl,\n  type CreateAgentJwksSetOptions,\n  type FetchCapabilitiesFn,\n  type GetAgentJwksOptions,\n  type IdentityKeyOriginPurpose,\n  type IdentityKeyOrigins,\n  type IdentityPosture,\n  type ResolveAgentOptions,\n  type TraceStep,\n} from './agent-resolver';\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;AAUA;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,OAIK;AACP,SAAS,sBAAsB,sBAAsB,0BAA0B;AAC/E;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,OAMK;AACP,SAAS,gBAAgB,uBAAuB;AAChD;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EAEA;AAAA,EAEA;AAAA,OAEK;AACP,SAAS,0BAA6C;AACtD,SAAS,yBAAwD;AACjE;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,OAIK;AACP,SAAS,gBAAgB,2BAA4E;AACrG;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,OAIK;AACP;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,OAGK;AACP;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,OAIK;AACP,SAAS,+BAAqD;AAC9D,SAAS,4BAA8D;AACvE;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,OAOK;AACP,SAAS,8BAAyD;AAClE;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,OAIK;AACP,SAAS,6BAA8E;AACvF;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,OAIK;AACP,SAAS,yBAAyB;AAClC;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,OAgBK;","names":[]}
+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/signing/server.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Server-side signing surface: what a seller running an AdCP agent needs to\n * verify inbound RFC 9421 signatures — verifier pipeline, Express-shaped\n * middleware, pluggable JWKS / replay / revocation stores, and the error\n * taxonomy.\n *\n * Paired with `@adcp/sdk/signing/client` (signer / fetch wrapper /\n * capability cache). The aggregate `@adcp/sdk/signing` barrel re-exports\n * both for back-compat.\n */\nexport {\n  buildResponseSignatureBase,\n  buildSignatureBase,\n  canonicalAuthority,\n  canonicalMethod,\n  canonicalTargetUri,\n  formatSignatureParams,\n  getHeaderValue,\n  type RequestLike,\n  type ResponseLike,\n  type SignatureParams,\n} from './canonicalize';\nexport { computeContentDigest, contentDigestMatches, parseContentDigest } from './content-digest';\nexport {\n  requestContextFromExpress,\n  requestContextFromFetch,\n  requestContextFromLambda,\n  type ExpressRequestLike,\n  type FetchRequestLike,\n  type LambdaRequestEvent,\n  type RequestContextFromExpressOptions,\n  type RequestContextFromLambdaOptions,\n} from './request-context';\nexport { jwkToPublicKey, verifySignature } from './crypto';\nexport {\n  RequestSignatureError,\n  type RequestSignatureErrorCode,\n  ResponseSignatureError,\n  type ResponseSignatureErrorCode,\n  WebhookSignatureError,\n  type WebhookSignatureErrorCode,\n} from './errors';\nexport { StaticJwksResolver, type JwksResolver } from './jwks';\nexport { HttpsJwksResolver, type HttpsJwksResolverOptions } from './jwks-https';\nexport {\n  BrandJsonJwksResolver,\n  BrandJsonResolverError,\n  type BrandAgentType,\n  type BrandJsonJwksResolverOptions,\n  type BrandJsonResolverErrorCode,\n} from './brand-jwks';\nexport { parseSignature, parseSignatureInput, type ParsedSignature, type ParsedSignatureInput } from './parser';\nexport {\n  InMemoryReplayStore,\n  type InMemoryReplayStoreOptions,\n  type ReplayInsertResult,\n  type ReplayStore,\n} from './replay';\nexport {\n  PostgresReplayStore,\n  REPLAY_CACHE_MIGRATION,\n  getReplayStoreMigration,\n  sweepExpiredReplays,\n  type PostgresReplayStoreOptions,\n  type SweepExpiredReplaysOptions,\n} from './postgres-replay-store';\nexport {\n  RedisReplayStore,\n  type RedisReplayStoreOptions,\n  type ReplayRedisBackendClient,\n  type ReplayRedisLikeClient,\n} from './redis-replay-store';\nexport { InMemoryRevocationStore, type RevocationStore } from './revocation';\nexport { HttpsRevocationStore, type HttpsRevocationStoreOptions } from './revocation-https';\nexport {\n  ALLOWED_ALGS,\n  CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS,\n  MANDATORY_COMPONENTS,\n  MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS,\n  REQUEST_SIGNING_TAG,\n  RESPONSE_MANDATORY_COMPONENTS,\n  RESPONSE_SIGNING_TAG,\n  type AdcpJsonWebKey,\n  type ContentDigestPolicy,\n  type RevocationSnapshot,\n  type VerifiedSigner,\n  type VerifierCapability,\n  type VerifyResult,\n} from './types';\nexport { verifyRequestSignature, type VerifyRequestOptions } from './verifier';\nexport {\n  createWebhookVerifier,\n  verifyWebhookSignature,\n  WEBHOOK_MANDATORY_COMPONENTS,\n  WEBHOOK_SIGNING_TAG,\n  type CreateWebhookVerifierOptions,\n  type VerifyWebhookOptions,\n  type VerifyWebhookResult,\n} from './webhook-verifier';\nexport { createExpressVerifier, type ExpressLike, type ExpressMiddlewareOptions } from './middleware';\nexport {\n  finalizeResponseSignature,\n  prepareResponseSignature,\n  signResponse,\n  type PreparedResponseSignature,\n  type SignedResponse,\n  type SignResponseOptions,\n} from './signer';\nexport { signResponseAsync } from './signer-async';\nexport {\n  resolveAgent,\n  getAgentJwks,\n  createAgentJwksSet,\n  AgentResolverError,\n  attackerInfluencedFields,\n  ATTACKER_INFLUENCED,\n  readBrandJsonUrl,\n  readIdentityPosture,\n  type AgentResolution,\n  type AgentProtocol,\n  type AgentResolverErrorCode,\n  type AgentResolverErrorDetail,\n  type AgentEntry,\n  type AgentJwksResult,\n  type CapabilitiesWithBrandJsonUrl,\n  type CreateAgentJwksSetOptions,\n  type FetchCapabilitiesFn,\n  type GetAgentJwksOptions,\n  type IdentityKeyOriginPurpose,\n  type IdentityKeyOrigins,\n  type IdentityPosture,\n  type ResolveAgentOptions,\n  type TraceStep,\n} from './agent-resolver';\n"],"mappings":"AAUA;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,OAIK;AACP,SAAS,sBAAsB,sBAAsB,0BAA0B;AAC/E;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,OAMK;AACP,SAAS,gBAAgB,uBAAuB;AAChD;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EAEA;AAAA,EAEA;AAAA,OAEK;AACP,SAAS,0BAA6C;AACtD,SAAS,yBAAwD;AACjE;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,OAIK;AACP,SAAS,gBAAgB,2BAA4E;AACrG;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,OAIK;AACP;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,OAGK;AACP;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,OAIK;AACP,SAAS,+BAAqD;AAC9D,SAAS,4BAA8D;AACvE;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,OAOK;AACP,SAAS,8BAAyD;AAClE;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,OAIK;AACP,SAAS,6BAA8E;AACvF;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,OAIK;AACP,SAAS,yBAAyB;AAClC;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,OAgBK;","names":[]}

package/dist/lib/signing/signer-async.mjs

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
-import { fileURLToPath as __adcpFileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { dirname as __adcpDirname } from 'node:path';
-import { createRequire as __adcpCreateRequire } from 'node:module';
-const __filename = __adcpFileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
-const __dirname = __adcpDirname(__filename);
-const require = __adcpCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
 import {
   assertProviderPurpose,
   assertWebhookProviderPurpose,

package/dist/lib/signing/signer-async.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/signing/signer-async.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type { RequestLike, ResponseLike } from './canonicalize';\nimport type { SigningProvider } from './provider';\nimport type {\n  SignedRequest,\n  SignedResponse,\n  SignRequestOptions,\n  SignResponseOptions,\n  SignWebhookOptions,\n} from './signer';\nimport {\n  assertProviderPurpose,\n  assertWebhookProviderPurpose,\n  finalizeRequestSignature,\n  finalizeResponseSignature,\n  prepareRequestSignature,\n  prepareResponseSignature,\n  prepareWebhookSignature,\n} from './signer';\n\n/**\n * Async variant of `signRequest` that delegates the actual signature\n * production to a {@link SigningProvider}. Reuses\n * {@link prepareRequestSignature} and {@link finalizeRequestSignature} from\n * the sync path so canonicalization cannot drift between the two —\n * `provider.sign(payload)` is the only difference, and it may dispatch to\n * KMS / HSM / Vault and add 10–50 ms of network latency per call.\n *\n * Callers that hold a private JWK in process should keep using the sync\n * `signRequest` for lower per-call cost; this entry point is for production\n * deployments that store private keys in a managed key store.\n */\nexport async function signRequestAsync(\n  request: RequestLike,\n  provider: SigningProvider,\n  options: SignRequestOptions = {}\n): Promise<SignedRequest> {\n  assertProviderPurpose(provider, 'request-signing');\n  const prepared = prepareRequestSignature(request, { keyid: provider.keyid, alg: provider.algorithm }, options);\n  const signature = await provider.sign(Buffer.from(prepared.base, 'utf8'));\n  return finalizeRequestSignature(prepared, signature);\n}\n\n/**\n * Async variant of `signWebhook`. Reuses {@link prepareWebhookSignature}\n * and {@link finalizeRequestSignature} from the sync path so the five\n * mandatory components, `adcp/webhook-signing/v1` tag, and unconditional\n * `Content-Digest` header stay in lockstep.\n */\nexport async function signWebhookAsync(\n  request: RequestLike,\n  provider: SigningProvider,\n  options: SignWebhookOptions = {}\n): Promise<SignedRequest> {\n  assertWebhookProviderPurpose(provider);\n  const prepared = prepareWebhookSignature(request, { keyid: provider.keyid, alg: provider.algorithm }, options);\n  const signature = await provider.sign(Buffer.from(prepared.base, 'utf8'));\n  return finalizeRequestSignature(prepared, signature);\n}\n\n/**\n * Async variant of `signResponse`. Reuses the sync canonicalization path;\n * `provider.sign(payload)` is the only difference.\n */\nexport async function signResponseAsync(\n  response: ResponseLike,\n  provider: SigningProvider,\n  options: SignResponseOptions = {}\n): Promise<SignedResponse> {\n  assertProviderPurpose(provider, 'response-signing', { requirePurpose: true });\n  const prepared = prepareResponseSignature(response, { keyid: provider.keyid, alg: provider.algorithm }, options);\n  const signature = await provider.sign(Buffer.from(prepared.base, 'utf8'));\n  return finalizeResponseSignature(prepared, signature);\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;AASA;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,OACK;AAcP,eAAsB,iBACpB,SACA,UACA,UAA8B,CAAC,GACP;AACxB,wBAAsB,UAAU,iBAAiB;AACjD,QAAM,WAAW,wBAAwB,SAAS,EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,OAAO,KAAK,SAAS,UAAU,GAAG,OAAO;AAC7G,QAAM,YAAY,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK,OAAO,KAAK,SAAS,MAAM,MAAM,CAAC;AACxE,SAAO,yBAAyB,UAAU,SAAS;AACrD;AAQA,eAAsB,iBACpB,SACA,UACA,UAA8B,CAAC,GACP;AACxB,+BAA6B,QAAQ;AACrC,QAAM,WAAW,wBAAwB,SAAS,EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,OAAO,KAAK,SAAS,UAAU,GAAG,OAAO;AAC7G,QAAM,YAAY,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK,OAAO,KAAK,SAAS,MAAM,MAAM,CAAC;AACxE,SAAO,yBAAyB,UAAU,SAAS;AACrD;AAMA,eAAsB,kBACpB,UACA,UACA,UAA+B,CAAC,GACP;AACzB,wBAAsB,UAAU,oBAAoB,EAAE,gBAAgB,KAAK,CAAC;AAC5E,QAAM,WAAW,yBAAyB,UAAU,EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,OAAO,KAAK,SAAS,UAAU,GAAG,OAAO;AAC/G,QAAM,YAAY,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK,OAAO,KAAK,SAAS,MAAM,MAAM,CAAC;AACxE,SAAO,0BAA0B,UAAU,SAAS;AACtD;","names":[]}
+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/signing/signer-async.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type { RequestLike, ResponseLike } from './canonicalize';\nimport type { SigningProvider } from './provider';\nimport type {\n  SignedRequest,\n  SignedResponse,\n  SignRequestOptions,\n  SignResponseOptions,\n  SignWebhookOptions,\n} from './signer';\nimport {\n  assertProviderPurpose,\n  assertWebhookProviderPurpose,\n  finalizeRequestSignature,\n  finalizeResponseSignature,\n  prepareRequestSignature,\n  prepareResponseSignature,\n  prepareWebhookSignature,\n} from './signer';\n\n/**\n * Async variant of `signRequest` that delegates the actual signature\n * production to a {@link SigningProvider}. Reuses\n * {@link prepareRequestSignature} and {@link finalizeRequestSignature} from\n * the sync path so canonicalization cannot drift between the two —\n * `provider.sign(payload)` is the only difference, and it may dispatch to\n * KMS / HSM / Vault and add 10–50 ms of network latency per call.\n *\n * Callers that hold a private JWK in process should keep using the sync\n * `signRequest` for lower per-call cost; this entry point is for production\n * deployments that store private keys in a managed key store.\n */\nexport async function signRequestAsync(\n  request: RequestLike,\n  provider: SigningProvider,\n  options: SignRequestOptions = {}\n): Promise<SignedRequest> {\n  assertProviderPurpose(provider, 'request-signing');\n  const prepared = prepareRequestSignature(request, { keyid: provider.keyid, alg: provider.algorithm }, options);\n  const signature = await provider.sign(Buffer.from(prepared.base, 'utf8'));\n  return finalizeRequestSignature(prepared, signature);\n}\n\n/**\n * Async variant of `signWebhook`. Reuses {@link prepareWebhookSignature}\n * and {@link finalizeRequestSignature} from the sync path so the five\n * mandatory components, `adcp/webhook-signing/v1` tag, and unconditional\n * `Content-Digest` header stay in lockstep.\n */\nexport async function signWebhookAsync(\n  request: RequestLike,\n  provider: SigningProvider,\n  options: SignWebhookOptions = {}\n): Promise<SignedRequest> {\n  assertWebhookProviderPurpose(provider);\n  const prepared = prepareWebhookSignature(request, { keyid: provider.keyid, alg: provider.algorithm }, options);\n  const signature = await provider.sign(Buffer.from(prepared.base, 'utf8'));\n  return finalizeRequestSignature(prepared, signature);\n}\n\n/**\n * Async variant of `signResponse`. Reuses the sync canonicalization path;\n * `provider.sign(payload)` is the only difference.\n */\nexport async function signResponseAsync(\n  response: ResponseLike,\n  provider: SigningProvider,\n  options: SignResponseOptions = {}\n): Promise<SignedResponse> {\n  assertProviderPurpose(provider, 'response-signing', { requirePurpose: true });\n  const prepared = prepareResponseSignature(response, { keyid: provider.keyid, alg: provider.algorithm }, options);\n  const signature = await provider.sign(Buffer.from(prepared.base, 'utf8'));\n  return finalizeResponseSignature(prepared, signature);\n}\n"],"mappings":"AASA;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,OACK;AAcP,eAAsB,iBACpB,SACA,UACA,UAA8B,CAAC,GACP;AACxB,wBAAsB,UAAU,iBAAiB;AACjD,QAAM,WAAW,wBAAwB,SAAS,EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,OAAO,KAAK,SAAS,UAAU,GAAG,OAAO;AAC7G,QAAM,YAAY,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK,OAAO,KAAK,SAAS,MAAM,MAAM,CAAC;AACxE,SAAO,yBAAyB,UAAU,SAAS;AACrD;AAQA,eAAsB,iBACpB,SACA,UACA,UAA8B,CAAC,GACP;AACxB,+BAA6B,QAAQ;AACrC,QAAM,WAAW,wBAAwB,SAAS,EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,OAAO,KAAK,SAAS,UAAU,GAAG,OAAO;AAC7G,QAAM,YAAY,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK,OAAO,KAAK,SAAS,MAAM,MAAM,CAAC;AACxE,SAAO,yBAAyB,UAAU,SAAS;AACrD;AAMA,eAAsB,kBACpB,UACA,UACA,UAA+B,CAAC,GACP;AACzB,wBAAsB,UAAU,oBAAoB,EAAE,gBAAgB,KAAK,CAAC;AAC5E,QAAM,WAAW,yBAAyB,UAAU,EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,OAAO,KAAK,SAAS,UAAU,GAAG,OAAO;AAC/G,QAAM,YAAY,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK,OAAO,KAAK,SAAS,MAAM,MAAM,CAAC;AACxE,SAAO,0BAA0B,UAAU,SAAS;AACtD;","names":[]}

package/dist/lib/signing/signer.mjs

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
-import { fileURLToPath as __adcpFileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { dirname as __adcpDirname } from 'node:path';
-import { createRequire as __adcpCreateRequire } from 'node:module';
-const __filename = __adcpFileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
-const __dirname = __adcpDirname(__filename);
-const require = __adcpCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
 import { createPrivateKey, randomBytes, sign as nodeSign } from "crypto";
 import {
   buildResponseSignatureBase,

package/dist/lib/signing/signer.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/signing/signer.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { createPrivateKey, randomBytes, sign as nodeSign, type JsonWebKey } from 'crypto';\nimport {\n  buildResponseSignatureBase,\n  buildSignatureBase,\n  formatSignatureParams,\n  type RequestLike,\n  type ResponseLike,\n  type SignatureParams,\n} from './canonicalize';\nimport { computeContentDigest } from './content-digest';\nimport { RequestSignatureError, ResponseSignatureError, WebhookSignatureError } from './errors';\nimport type { AdcpUse } from './jwks-helpers';\nimport {\n  MANDATORY_COMPONENTS,\n  MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS,\n  REQUEST_SIGNING_TAG,\n  RESPONSE_MANDATORY_COMPONENTS,\n  RESPONSE_SIGNING_TAG,\n  type AdcpJsonWebKey,\n  type AdcpSignAlg,\n} from './types';\nimport { WEBHOOK_MANDATORY_COMPONENTS, WEBHOOK_SIGNING_TAG } from './webhook-verifier';\n\nexport interface SignerKey {\n  keyid: string;\n  alg: 'ed25519' | 'ecdsa-p256-sha256';\n  /**\n   * Private JWK. MUST carry `adcp_use` matching the helper being called:\n   * - `signRequest` requires `adcp_use: 'request-signing'`\n   * - `signWebhook` requires `adcp_use: 'request-signing'` (the deprecated\n   *   `'webhook-signing'` is still accepted — adcontextprotocol/adcp#5555)\n   * - `signResponse` requires `adcp_use: 'response-signing'`\n   *\n   * Mismatched or missing `adcp_use` throws at the signer with the same\n   * error code the verifier raises at step 8 — failure surfaces at\n   * configuration time rather than at the receiver, where the message is\n   * far from its cause. Mint keys with `pemToAdcpJwk({ adcp_use: ... })`\n   * to get the binding right by construction.\n   */\n  privateKey: AdcpJsonWebKey;\n}\n\n/**\n * Step-8-equivalent purpose-binding gate on the signer side. The verifier\n * already enforces `jwk.adcp_use === expected` at step 8 (see verifier.ts\n * for request signing; webhook-verifier.ts for webhooks). Replicating the\n * check on the signer side prevents the more common operator footgun:\n * passing a wrong-purpose key into the helper, producing a wire-conformant\n * signature that the downstream verifier then rejects, surfacing the\n * misconfiguration at the wrong end of the connection.\n *\n * Errors emit the same code the verifier uses for that direction so log\n * scrapers across signer / verifier see consistent vocabulary.\n */\n/**\n * Subset of {@link AdcpUse} that the RFC 9421 helpers in this module emit\n * as `expected`. Governance signing is JWS-based and lives on a different\n * code path; narrowing the parameter here lets the exhaustiveness branch\n * stay tight without a `case 'governance-signing':` arm that throws an\n * untyped error. A future JWS helper would mint its own typed error class\n * rather than route through `throwIfPurposeMismatch`.\n */\ntype Rfc9421AdcpUse = Exclude<AdcpUse, 'governance-signing'>;\n\nfunction assertKeyPurpose(key: SignerKey, expected: Rfc9421AdcpUse): void {\n  throwIfPurposeMismatch(key.keyid, key.privateKey.adcp_use, expected);\n}\n\n/**\n * Async-path equivalent. Mirrors {@link assertKeyPurpose} but reads\n * `adcpUse` from a {@link SigningProvider} rather than a `SignerKey`.\n *\n * **Optional binding.** When `provider.adcpUse` is `undefined`, the gate\n * is skipped — preserves backward compat with adapters that pre-date the\n * `SigningProvider.adcpUse` field. Adapter authors who want signer-side\n * defense-in-depth set `adcpUse` on their provider; the async helpers\n * (`signRequestAsync` / `signWebhookAsync`) then enforce the binding\n * parallel to the sync path.\n */\nfunction assertProviderPurpose(\n  provider: { readonly keyid: string; readonly adcpUse?: string },\n  expected: Rfc9421AdcpUse,\n  options: { requirePurpose?: boolean } = {}\n): void {\n  if (provider.adcpUse === undefined && !options.requirePurpose) return;\n  throwIfPurposeMismatch(provider.keyid, provider.adcpUse, expected);\n}\n\nfunction throwIfPurposeMismatch(keyid: string, actual: string | undefined, expected: Rfc9421AdcpUse): void {\n  if (actual === expected) return;\n  const message =\n    `Signing key '${keyid}' has adcp_use=${actual === undefined ? '<missing>' : `'${actual}'`} ` +\n    `but the helper requires '${expected}'. Mint a key scoped for '${expected}' via ` +\n    `pemToAdcpJwk({ adcp_use: '${expected}' }) — sharing keys across purposes is intentionally refused.`;\n  switch (expected) {\n    case 'request-signing':\n      throw new RequestSignatureError('request_signature_key_purpose_invalid', 8, message);\n    case 'webhook-signing':\n      throw new WebhookSignatureError('webhook_signature_key_purpose_invalid', 8, message);\n    case 'response-signing':\n      throw new ResponseSignatureError('response_signature_key_purpose_invalid', 8, message);\n    default: {\n      // Compile-time exhaustiveness: a future widening of `Rfc9421AdcpUse`\n      // (typically because `AdcpUse` grew an RFC-9421 member) must add a\n      // case arm here. Trips `tsc --noEmit` if the union grows without an\n      // explicit gate decision for the new member.\n      const _exhaustive: never = expected;\n      throw new Error(`unreachable: unhandled Rfc9421AdcpUse '${_exhaustive}'`);\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Purpose gate for the webhook signing helpers. Webhooks are signed with a\n * `adcp_use: \"request-signing\"` key — there is no dedicated webhook key\n * purpose. See webhook-verifier.ts step 8 for the rationale: the signature\n * `tag` (`adcp/webhook-signing/v1`) plus mandatory `content-digest` coverage\n * carry domain separation, so the key purpose need not be webhook-specific.\n * The deprecated `adcp_use: \"webhook-signing\"` value is still accepted for\n * backward compatibility (pending removal — adcontextprotocol/adcp#5555). Any other purpose\n * (`response-signing`, `governance-signing`, unknown) is refused with the same\n * `webhook_signature_key_purpose_invalid` code the verifier emits.\n */\nconst WEBHOOK_SIGNING_PURPOSES: readonly string[] = ['request-signing', 'webhook-signing'];\n\nfunction throwIfWebhookPurposeMismatch(keyid: string, actual: string | undefined): void {\n  if (actual !== undefined && WEBHOOK_SIGNING_PURPOSES.includes(actual)) return;\n  throw new WebhookSignatureError(\n    'webhook_signature_key_purpose_invalid',\n    8,\n    `Signing key '${keyid}' has adcp_use=${actual === undefined ? '<missing>' : `'${actual}'`} ` +\n      `but webhook signing requires 'request-signing' (the deprecated 'webhook-signing' is also accepted).`\n  );\n}\n\nfunction assertWebhookKeyPurpose(key: SignerKey): void {\n  throwIfWebhookPurposeMismatch(key.keyid, key.privateKey.adcp_use);\n}\n\nfunction assertWebhookProviderPurpose(\n  provider: { readonly keyid: string; readonly adcpUse?: string },\n  options: { requirePurpose?: boolean } = {}\n): void {\n  if (provider.adcpUse === undefined && !options.requirePurpose) return;\n  throwIfWebhookPurposeMismatch(provider.keyid, provider.adcpUse);\n}\n\nexport { assertProviderPurpose, assertWebhookProviderPurpose };\n\nexport interface SignRequestOptions {\n  coverContentDigest?: boolean;\n  label?: string;\n  windowSeconds?: number;\n  now?: () => number;\n  nonce?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface SignedRequest {\n  headers: Record<string, string>;\n  signatureBase: string;\n  params: SignatureParams;\n}\n\n/**\n * Identity fields needed to populate `Signature-Input` parameters. The sync\n * `signRequest` path takes these from a {@link SignerKey}; the async path\n * takes them from a `SigningProvider`. Centralizing the shape keeps both\n * canonicalizations identical.\n */\nexport interface SignatureIdentity {\n  keyid: string;\n  alg: AdcpSignAlg;\n}\n\n/**\n * Result of canonicalizing a request for signing — everything `signRequest`\n * and `signRequestAsync` produce up to (but not including) the call into\n * the signer/provider.\n */\nexport interface PreparedRequestSignature {\n  components: string[];\n  params: SignatureParams;\n  /**\n   * Outbound headers including `Content-Digest` when covered, but not yet\n   * including `Signature-Input` / `Signature` — those are appended by\n   * {@link finalizeRequestSignature}.\n   */\n  headers: Record<string, string>;\n  /** Canonical signature base bytes (UTF-8). Pass to the signer/provider. */\n  base: string;\n  label: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Canonicalize a request for RFC 9421 request-signing. Pure (no I/O); the\n * sync and async paths share this so canonicalization can't drift between\n * them.\n *\n * **No purpose-binding gate.** This function takes a `SignatureIdentity`\n * (just `keyid` + `alg`), not a full `SignerKey`, so it deliberately\n * cannot enforce `adcp_use`. Callers composing `prepare* + own-signer`\n * are responsible for purpose binding themselves — the convenience\n * helper `signRequest` runs `assertKeyPurpose` before calling this and\n * is what most adopters want. Test-vector authors who need to sign with\n * wrong-purpose keys (e.g. AdCP negative-vector 009 cross-purpose\n * rejection) use this prepare/finalize composition deliberately.\n */\nexport function prepareRequestSignature(\n  request: RequestLike,\n  identity: SignatureIdentity,\n  options: SignRequestOptions = {}\n): PreparedRequestSignature {\n  const now = options.now ? options.now() : Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);\n  const windowSeconds = Math.min(options.windowSeconds ?? 300, MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS);\n  const nonce = options.nonce ?? base64UrlRandom(16);\n  const label = options.label ?? 'sig1';\n  const hasBody = (request.body ?? '').length > 0;\n\n  const coverDigest = options.coverContentDigest === true && hasBody;\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = { ...flattenHeaders(request.headers) };\n  if (coverDigest) {\n    headers['Content-Digest'] = computeContentDigest(request.body ?? '');\n  }\n\n  const components = [...MANDATORY_COMPONENTS];\n  if (hasBody) components.push('content-type');\n  if (coverDigest) components.push('content-digest');\n\n  const params: SignatureParams = {\n    created: now,\n    expires: now + windowSeconds,\n    nonce,\n    keyid: identity.keyid,\n    alg: identity.alg,\n    tag: REQUEST_SIGNING_TAG,\n  };\n\n  const normalizedRequest: RequestLike = { ...request, headers };\n  const base = buildSignatureBase(components, normalizedRequest, params);\n\n  return { components, params, headers, base, label };\n}\n\n/**\n * Attach `Signature` / `Signature-Input` headers given the bytes returned\n * by the signer/provider. Shared between the sync and async paths so the\n * base64url emission stays canonical.\n *\n * Emits base64url without padding to match the AdCP conformance-vector\n * format (and deterministic Ed25519 sigs are then byte-identical across\n * SDKs). Verifiers accept either variant since Node's base64 decoder\n * treats `+`/`-` and `/`/`_` interchangeably.\n */\nexport function finalizeRequestSignature(prepared: PreparedRequestSignature, signature: Uint8Array): SignedRequest {\n  const headers = { ...prepared.headers };\n  const sigB64 = Buffer.from(signature).toString('base64url');\n  headers['Signature-Input'] = `${prepared.label}=${formatSignatureParams(prepared.components, prepared.params)}`;\n  headers['Signature'] = `${prepared.label}=:${sigB64}:`;\n  return { headers, signatureBase: prepared.base, params: prepared.params };\n}\n\nexport function signRequest(request: RequestLike, key: SignerKey, options: SignRequestOptions = {}): SignedRequest {\n  assertKeyPurpose(key, 'request-signing');\n  const prepared = prepareRequestSignature(request, { keyid: key.keyid, alg: key.alg }, options);\n  const signature = produceSignature(key, Buffer.from(prepared.base, 'utf8'));\n  return finalizeRequestSignature(prepared, signature);\n}\n\nexport interface SignWebhookOptions {\n  label?: string;\n  windowSeconds?: number;\n  now?: () => number;\n  nonce?: string;\n  /**\n   * Override the signature tag. Defaults to `adcp/webhook-signing/v1`.\n   * Exposed so test suites can pin a wrong tag to exercise receiver\n   * rejection paths without mutating the signed headers post-hoc.\n   */\n  tag?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Canonicalize an outbound webhook request under the RFC 9421 webhook\n * profile. Pure (no I/O); shared between sync `signWebhook` and async\n * `signWebhookAsync` paths. Covers the five mandatory components —\n * `@method`, `@target-uri`, `@authority`, `content-type`, `content-digest` —\n * and sets `Content-Digest` on the outgoing headers.\n *\n * **No purpose-binding gate** — same caveat as\n * {@link prepareRequestSignature}. The convenience helper `signWebhook`\n * runs `assertKeyPurpose` before calling this.\n */\nexport function prepareWebhookSignature(\n  request: RequestLike,\n  identity: SignatureIdentity,\n  options: SignWebhookOptions = {}\n): PreparedRequestSignature {\n  const now = options.now ? options.now() : Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);\n  const windowSeconds = Math.min(options.windowSeconds ?? 300, MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS);\n  const nonce = options.nonce ?? base64UrlRandom(16);\n  const label = options.label ?? 'sig1';\n\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = { ...flattenHeaders(request.headers) };\n  headers['Content-Digest'] = computeContentDigest(request.body ?? '');\n\n  const components = [...WEBHOOK_MANDATORY_COMPONENTS];\n  const params: SignatureParams = {\n    created: now,\n    expires: now + windowSeconds,\n    nonce,\n    keyid: identity.keyid,\n    alg: identity.alg,\n    tag: options.tag ?? WEBHOOK_SIGNING_TAG,\n  };\n\n  const normalizedRequest: RequestLike = { ...request, headers };\n  const base = buildSignatureBase(components, normalizedRequest, params);\n\n  return { components, params, headers, base, label };\n}\n\n/**\n * Sign an outbound webhook request under the RFC 9421 webhook profile\n * (`tag=adcp/webhook-signing/v1`). Covers the five mandatory components —\n * `@method`, `@target-uri`, `@authority`, `content-type`, `content-digest` —\n * and sets `Content-Digest` on the outgoing headers. Publishers emitting\n * conformant webhooks should use this instead of hand-rolling signatures.\n */\nexport function signWebhook(request: RequestLike, key: SignerKey, options: SignWebhookOptions = {}): SignedRequest {\n  assertWebhookKeyPurpose(key);\n  const prepared = prepareWebhookSignature(request, { keyid: key.keyid, alg: key.alg }, options);\n  const signature = produceSignature(key, Buffer.from(prepared.base, 'utf8'));\n  return finalizeRequestSignature(prepared, signature);\n}\n\nexport interface SignResponseOptions {\n  /**\n   * Cover a `Content-Digest` of the response body. Defaults to `true` when\n   * the response has a body.\n   */\n  coverContentDigest?: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Additional derived/header components to cover beyond\n   * {@link RESPONSE_MANDATORY_COMPONENTS}. The defaults include `@status`,\n   * `@method;req`, `@authority;req`, and `@target-uri;req`. Only the\n   * RFC 9421 `;req` component parameter is supported; other component\n   * parameters are rejected rather than silently round-tripped.\n   */\n  additionalComponents?: ReadonlyArray<string>;\n  label?: string;\n  windowSeconds?: number;\n  now?: () => number;\n  nonce?: string;\n  /**\n   * Override the signature tag. Defaults to `adcp/response-signing/v1`.\n   */\n  tag?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface SignedResponse {\n  status: number;\n  headers: Record<string, string>;\n  signatureBase: string;\n  params: SignatureParams;\n}\n\nexport interface PreparedResponseSignature {\n  status: number;\n  components: string[];\n  params: SignatureParams;\n  /**\n   * Outbound response headers including `Content-Digest` when covered, but\n   * not yet including `Signature-Input` / `Signature`.\n   */\n  headers: Record<string, string>;\n  /** Canonical signature base bytes (UTF-8). Pass to the signer/provider. */\n  base: string;\n  label: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Canonicalize a response for RFC 9421 response signing. This compatibility\n * helper is signing-only; it does not imply a generic AdCP response-verifier\n * protocol surface.\n */\nexport function prepareResponseSignature(\n  response: ResponseLike,\n  identity: SignatureIdentity,\n  options: SignResponseOptions = {}\n): PreparedResponseSignature {\n  const now = options.now ? options.now() : Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);\n  const windowSeconds = Math.min(options.windowSeconds ?? 300, MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS);\n  const nonce = options.nonce ?? base64UrlRandom(16);\n  const label = options.label ?? 'sig1';\n  const hasBody = (response.body ?? '').length > 0;\n  const coverDigest = (options.coverContentDigest ?? true) && hasBody;\n\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = { ...flattenHeaders(response.headers) };\n  if (coverDigest) {\n    headers['Content-Digest'] = computeContentDigest(response.body ?? '');\n  }\n\n  const components = [...RESPONSE_MANDATORY_COMPONENTS];\n  if (hasBody) components.push('content-type');\n  if (coverDigest) components.push('content-digest');\n  if (options.additionalComponents) {\n    for (const component of options.additionalComponents) {\n      if (!components.includes(component)) components.push(component);\n    }\n  }\n\n  const params: SignatureParams = {\n    created: now,\n    expires: now + windowSeconds,\n    nonce,\n    keyid: identity.keyid,\n    alg: identity.alg,\n    tag: options.tag ?? RESPONSE_SIGNING_TAG,\n  };\n\n  const normalizedResponse: ResponseLike = { ...response, headers };\n  const base = buildResponseSignatureBase(components, normalizedResponse, params);\n\n  return { status: response.status, components, params, headers, base, label };\n}\n\nexport function finalizeResponseSignature(prepared: PreparedResponseSignature, signature: Uint8Array): SignedResponse {\n  const headers = { ...prepared.headers };\n  const sigB64 = Buffer.from(signature).toString('base64url');\n  headers['Signature-Input'] = `${prepared.label}=${formatSignatureParams(prepared.components, prepared.params)}`;\n  headers['Signature'] = `${prepared.label}=:${sigB64}:`;\n  return { status: prepared.status, headers, signatureBase: prepared.base, params: prepared.params };\n}\n\nexport function signResponse(\n  response: ResponseLike,\n  key: SignerKey,\n  options: SignResponseOptions = {}\n): SignedResponse {\n  assertKeyPurpose(key, 'response-signing');\n  const prepared = prepareResponseSignature(response, { keyid: key.keyid, alg: key.alg }, options);\n  const signature = produceSignature(key, Buffer.from(prepared.base, 'utf8'));\n  return finalizeResponseSignature(prepared, signature);\n}\n\nfunction produceSignature(key: SignerKey, data: Buffer): Uint8Array {\n  const privateKey = createPrivateKey({\n    key: key.privateKey as JsonWebKey,\n    format: 'jwk',\n  });\n  if (key.alg === 'ed25519') {\n    return new Uint8Array(nodeSign(null, data, privateKey));\n  }\n  return new Uint8Array(nodeSign('sha256', data, { key: privateKey, dsaEncoding: 'ieee-p1363' }));\n}\n\nfunction flattenHeaders(headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>): Record<string, string> {\n  const out: Record<string, string> = {};\n  for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(headers)) {\n    if (v === undefined) continue;\n    // Trim each entry and use \", \" as the joiner so the signer and verifier\n    // produce the same canonical value when a header was originally multi-line.\n    out[k] = Array.isArray(v) ? v.map(entry => entry.trim()).join(', ') : v.trim();\n  }\n  return out;\n}\n\nfunction base64UrlRandom(byteLength: number): string {\n  return randomBytes(byteLength).toString('base64').replace(/\\+/g, '-').replace(/\\//g, '_').replace(/=+$/g, 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+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/signing/signer.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { createPrivateKey, randomBytes, sign as nodeSign, type JsonWebKey } from 'crypto';\nimport {\n  buildResponseSignatureBase,\n  buildSignatureBase,\n  formatSignatureParams,\n  type RequestLike,\n  type ResponseLike,\n  type SignatureParams,\n} from './canonicalize';\nimport { computeContentDigest } from './content-digest';\nimport { RequestSignatureError, ResponseSignatureError, WebhookSignatureError } from './errors';\nimport type { AdcpUse } from './jwks-helpers';\nimport {\n  MANDATORY_COMPONENTS,\n  MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS,\n  REQUEST_SIGNING_TAG,\n  RESPONSE_MANDATORY_COMPONENTS,\n  RESPONSE_SIGNING_TAG,\n  type AdcpJsonWebKey,\n  type AdcpSignAlg,\n} from './types';\nimport { WEBHOOK_MANDATORY_COMPONENTS, WEBHOOK_SIGNING_TAG } from './webhook-verifier';\n\nexport interface SignerKey {\n  keyid: string;\n  alg: 'ed25519' | 'ecdsa-p256-sha256';\n  /**\n   * Private JWK. MUST carry `adcp_use` matching the helper being called:\n   * - `signRequest` requires `adcp_use: 'request-signing'`\n   * - `signWebhook` requires `adcp_use: 'request-signing'` (the deprecated\n   *   `'webhook-signing'` is still accepted — adcontextprotocol/adcp#5555)\n   * - `signResponse` requires `adcp_use: 'response-signing'`\n   *\n   * Mismatched or missing `adcp_use` throws at the signer with the same\n   * error code the verifier raises at step 8 — failure surfaces at\n   * configuration time rather than at the receiver, where the message is\n   * far from its cause. Mint keys with `pemToAdcpJwk({ adcp_use: ... })`\n   * to get the binding right by construction.\n   */\n  privateKey: AdcpJsonWebKey;\n}\n\n/**\n * Step-8-equivalent purpose-binding gate on the signer side. The verifier\n * already enforces `jwk.adcp_use === expected` at step 8 (see verifier.ts\n * for request signing; webhook-verifier.ts for webhooks). Replicating the\n * check on the signer side prevents the more common operator footgun:\n * passing a wrong-purpose key into the helper, producing a wire-conformant\n * signature that the downstream verifier then rejects, surfacing the\n * misconfiguration at the wrong end of the connection.\n *\n * Errors emit the same code the verifier uses for that direction so log\n * scrapers across signer / verifier see consistent vocabulary.\n */\n/**\n * Subset of {@link AdcpUse} that the RFC 9421 helpers in this module emit\n * as `expected`. Governance signing is JWS-based and lives on a different\n * code path; narrowing the parameter here lets the exhaustiveness branch\n * stay tight without a `case 'governance-signing':` arm that throws an\n * untyped error. A future JWS helper would mint its own typed error class\n * rather than route through `throwIfPurposeMismatch`.\n */\ntype Rfc9421AdcpUse = Exclude<AdcpUse, 'governance-signing'>;\n\nfunction assertKeyPurpose(key: SignerKey, expected: Rfc9421AdcpUse): void {\n  throwIfPurposeMismatch(key.keyid, key.privateKey.adcp_use, expected);\n}\n\n/**\n * Async-path equivalent. Mirrors {@link assertKeyPurpose} but reads\n * `adcpUse` from a {@link SigningProvider} rather than a `SignerKey`.\n *\n * **Optional binding.** When `provider.adcpUse` is `undefined`, the gate\n * is skipped — preserves backward compat with adapters that pre-date the\n * `SigningProvider.adcpUse` field. Adapter authors who want signer-side\n * defense-in-depth set `adcpUse` on their provider; the async helpers\n * (`signRequestAsync` / `signWebhookAsync`) then enforce the binding\n * parallel to the sync path.\n */\nfunction assertProviderPurpose(\n  provider: { readonly keyid: string; readonly adcpUse?: string },\n  expected: Rfc9421AdcpUse,\n  options: { requirePurpose?: boolean } = {}\n): void {\n  if (provider.adcpUse === undefined && !options.requirePurpose) return;\n  throwIfPurposeMismatch(provider.keyid, provider.adcpUse, expected);\n}\n\nfunction throwIfPurposeMismatch(keyid: string, actual: string | undefined, expected: Rfc9421AdcpUse): void {\n  if (actual === expected) return;\n  const message =\n    `Signing key '${keyid}' has adcp_use=${actual === undefined ? '<missing>' : `'${actual}'`} ` +\n    `but the helper requires '${expected}'. Mint a key scoped for '${expected}' via ` +\n    `pemToAdcpJwk({ adcp_use: '${expected}' }) — sharing keys across purposes is intentionally refused.`;\n  switch (expected) {\n    case 'request-signing':\n      throw new RequestSignatureError('request_signature_key_purpose_invalid', 8, message);\n    case 'webhook-signing':\n      throw new WebhookSignatureError('webhook_signature_key_purpose_invalid', 8, message);\n    case 'response-signing':\n      throw new ResponseSignatureError('response_signature_key_purpose_invalid', 8, message);\n    default: {\n      // Compile-time exhaustiveness: a future widening of `Rfc9421AdcpUse`\n      // (typically because `AdcpUse` grew an RFC-9421 member) must add a\n      // case arm here. Trips `tsc --noEmit` if the union grows without an\n      // explicit gate decision for the new member.\n      const _exhaustive: never = expected;\n      throw new Error(`unreachable: unhandled Rfc9421AdcpUse '${_exhaustive}'`);\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Purpose gate for the webhook signing helpers. Webhooks are signed with a\n * `adcp_use: \"request-signing\"` key — there is no dedicated webhook key\n * purpose. See webhook-verifier.ts step 8 for the rationale: the signature\n * `tag` (`adcp/webhook-signing/v1`) plus mandatory `content-digest` coverage\n * carry domain separation, so the key purpose need not be webhook-specific.\n * The deprecated `adcp_use: \"webhook-signing\"` value is still accepted for\n * backward compatibility (pending removal — adcontextprotocol/adcp#5555). Any other purpose\n * (`response-signing`, `governance-signing`, unknown) is refused with the same\n * `webhook_signature_key_purpose_invalid` code the verifier emits.\n */\nconst WEBHOOK_SIGNING_PURPOSES: readonly string[] = ['request-signing', 'webhook-signing'];\n\nfunction throwIfWebhookPurposeMismatch(keyid: string, actual: string | undefined): void {\n  if (actual !== undefined && WEBHOOK_SIGNING_PURPOSES.includes(actual)) return;\n  throw new WebhookSignatureError(\n    'webhook_signature_key_purpose_invalid',\n    8,\n    `Signing key '${keyid}' has adcp_use=${actual === undefined ? '<missing>' : `'${actual}'`} ` +\n      `but webhook signing requires 'request-signing' (the deprecated 'webhook-signing' is also accepted).`\n  );\n}\n\nfunction assertWebhookKeyPurpose(key: SignerKey): void {\n  throwIfWebhookPurposeMismatch(key.keyid, key.privateKey.adcp_use);\n}\n\nfunction assertWebhookProviderPurpose(\n  provider: { readonly keyid: string; readonly adcpUse?: string },\n  options: { requirePurpose?: boolean } = {}\n): void {\n  if (provider.adcpUse === undefined && !options.requirePurpose) return;\n  throwIfWebhookPurposeMismatch(provider.keyid, provider.adcpUse);\n}\n\nexport { assertProviderPurpose, assertWebhookProviderPurpose };\n\nexport interface SignRequestOptions {\n  coverContentDigest?: boolean;\n  label?: string;\n  windowSeconds?: number;\n  now?: () => number;\n  nonce?: string;\n}\n\nexport interface SignedRequest {\n  headers: Record<string, string>;\n  signatureBase: string;\n  params: SignatureParams;\n}\n\n/**\n * Identity fields needed to populate `Signature-Input` parameters. The sync\n * `signRequest` path takes these from a {@link SignerKey}; the async path\n * takes them from a `SigningProvider`. Centralizing the shape keeps both\n * canonicalizations identical.\n */\nexport interface SignatureIdentity {\n  keyid: string;\n  alg: AdcpSignAlg;\n}\n\n/**\n * Result of canonicalizing a request for signing — everything `signRequest`\n * and `signRequestAsync` produce up to (but not including) the call into\n * the signer/provider.\n */\nexport interface PreparedRequestSignature {\n  components: string[];\n  params: SignatureParams;\n  /**\n   * Outbound headers including `Content-Digest` when covered, but not yet\n   * including `Signature-Input` / `Signature` — those are appended by\n   * {@link finalizeRequestSignature}.\n   */\n  headers: Record<string, string>;\n  /** Canonical signature base bytes (UTF-8). Pass to the signer/provider. */\n  base: string;\n  label: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Canonicalize a request for RFC 9421 request-signing. Pure (no I/O); the\n * sync and async paths share this so canonicalization can't drift between\n * them.\n *\n * **No purpose-binding gate.** This function takes a `SignatureIdentity`\n * (just `keyid` + `alg`), not a full `SignerKey`, so it deliberately\n * cannot enforce `adcp_use`. Callers composing `prepare* + own-signer`\n * are responsible for purpose binding themselves — the convenience\n * helper `signRequest` runs `assertKeyPurpose` before calling this and\n * is what most adopters want. Test-vector authors who need to sign with\n * wrong-purpose keys (e.g. AdCP negative-vector 009 cross-purpose\n * rejection) use this prepare/finalize composition deliberately.\n */\nexport function prepareRequestSignature(\n  request: RequestLike,\n  identity: SignatureIdentity,\n  options: SignRequestOptions = {}\n): PreparedRequestSignature {\n  const now = options.now ? options.now() : Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);\n  const windowSeconds = Math.min(options.windowSeconds ?? 300, MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS);\n  const nonce = options.nonce ?? base64UrlRandom(16);\n  const label = options.label ?? 'sig1';\n  const hasBody = (request.body ?? '').length > 0;\n\n  const coverDigest = options.coverContentDigest === true && hasBody;\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = { ...flattenHeaders(request.headers) };\n  if (coverDigest) {\n    headers['Content-Digest'] = computeContentDigest(request.body ?? 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Verifiers accept either variant since Node's base64 decoder\n * treats `+`/`-` and `/`/`_` interchangeably.\n */\nexport function finalizeRequestSignature(prepared: PreparedRequestSignature, signature: Uint8Array): SignedRequest {\n  const headers = { ...prepared.headers };\n  const sigB64 = Buffer.from(signature).toString('base64url');\n  headers['Signature-Input'] = `${prepared.label}=${formatSignatureParams(prepared.components, prepared.params)}`;\n  headers['Signature'] = `${prepared.label}=:${sigB64}:`;\n  return { headers, signatureBase: prepared.base, params: prepared.params };\n}\n\nexport function signRequest(request: RequestLike, key: SignerKey, options: SignRequestOptions = {}): SignedRequest {\n  assertKeyPurpose(key, 'request-signing');\n  const prepared = prepareRequestSignature(request, { keyid: key.keyid, alg: key.alg }, options);\n  const signature = produceSignature(key, Buffer.from(prepared.base, 'utf8'));\n  return finalizeRequestSignature(prepared, signature);\n}\n\nexport interface SignWebhookOptions {\n  label?: string;\n  windowSeconds?: number;\n  now?: () => number;\n  nonce?: string;\n  /**\n   * Override the signature tag. 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WEBHOOK_SIGNING_TAG,\n  };\n\n  const normalizedRequest: RequestLike = { ...request, headers };\n  const base = buildSignatureBase(components, normalizedRequest, params);\n\n  return { components, params, headers, base, label };\n}\n\n/**\n * Sign an outbound webhook request under the RFC 9421 webhook profile\n * (`tag=adcp/webhook-signing/v1`). Covers the five mandatory components —\n * `@method`, `@target-uri`, `@authority`, `content-type`, `content-digest` —\n * and sets `Content-Digest` on the outgoing headers. Publishers emitting\n * conformant webhooks should use this instead of hand-rolling signatures.\n */\nexport function signWebhook(request: RequestLike, key: SignerKey, options: SignWebhookOptions = {}): SignedRequest {\n  assertWebhookKeyPurpose(key);\n  const prepared = prepareWebhookSignature(request, { keyid: key.keyid, alg: key.alg }, options);\n  const signature = produceSignature(key, Buffer.from(prepared.base, 'utf8'));\n  return finalizeRequestSignature(prepared, signature);\n}\n\nexport interface SignResponseOptions {\n  /**\n   * Cover a `Content-Digest` of the response body. Defaults to `true` when\n   * the response has a body.\n   */\n  coverContentDigest?: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Additional derived/header components to cover beyond\n   * {@link RESPONSE_MANDATORY_COMPONENTS}. The defaults include `@status`,\n   * `@method;req`, `@authority;req`, and `@target-uri;req`. 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'').length > 0;\n  const coverDigest = (options.coverContentDigest ?? true) && hasBody;\n\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = { ...flattenHeaders(response.headers) };\n  if (coverDigest) {\n    headers['Content-Digest'] = computeContentDigest(response.body ?? '');\n  }\n\n  const components = [...RESPONSE_MANDATORY_COMPONENTS];\n  if (hasBody) components.push('content-type');\n  if (coverDigest) components.push('content-digest');\n  if (options.additionalComponents) {\n    for (const component of options.additionalComponents) {\n      if (!components.includes(component)) components.push(component);\n    }\n  }\n\n  const params: SignatureParams = {\n    created: now,\n    expires: now + windowSeconds,\n    nonce,\n    keyid: identity.keyid,\n    alg: identity.alg,\n    tag: options.tag ?? RESPONSE_SIGNING_TAG,\n  };\n\n  const normalizedResponse: ResponseLike = { ...response, headers };\n  const base = buildResponseSignatureBase(components, normalizedResponse, params);\n\n  return { status: response.status, components, params, headers, base, label };\n}\n\nexport function finalizeResponseSignature(prepared: PreparedResponseSignature, signature: Uint8Array): SignedResponse {\n  const headers = { ...prepared.headers };\n  const sigB64 = Buffer.from(signature).toString('base64url');\n  headers['Signature-Input'] = `${prepared.label}=${formatSignatureParams(prepared.components, prepared.params)}`;\n  headers['Signature'] = `${prepared.label}=:${sigB64}:`;\n  return { status: prepared.status, headers, signatureBase: prepared.base, params: prepared.params };\n}\n\nexport function signResponse(\n  response: ResponseLike,\n  key: SignerKey,\n  options: SignResponseOptions = {}\n): SignedResponse {\n  assertKeyPurpose(key, 'response-signing');\n  const prepared = prepareResponseSignature(response, { keyid: key.keyid, alg: key.alg }, options);\n  const signature = produceSignature(key, Buffer.from(prepared.base, 'utf8'));\n  return finalizeResponseSignature(prepared, signature);\n}\n\nfunction produceSignature(key: SignerKey, data: Buffer): Uint8Array {\n  const privateKey = createPrivateKey({\n    key: key.privateKey as JsonWebKey,\n    format: 'jwk',\n  });\n  if (key.alg === 'ed25519') {\n    return new Uint8Array(nodeSign(null, data, privateKey));\n  }\n  return new Uint8Array(nodeSign('sha256', data, { key: privateKey, dsaEncoding: 'ieee-p1363' }));\n}\n\nfunction flattenHeaders(headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>): Record<string, string> {\n  const out: Record<string, string> = {};\n  for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(headers)) {\n    if (v === undefined) continue;\n    // Trim each entry and use \", \" as the joiner so the signer and verifier\n    // produce the same canonical value when a header was originally multi-line.\n    out[k] = Array.isArray(v) ? v.map(entry => entry.trim()).join(', ') : v.trim();\n  }\n  return out;\n}\n\nfunction base64UrlRandom(byteLength: number): string {\n  return randomBytes(byteLength).toString('base64').replace(/\\+/g, '-').replace(/\\//g, '_').replace(/=+$/g, 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package/dist/lib/signing/testing.mjs

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
-import { fileURLToPath as __adcpFileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { dirname as __adcpDirname } from 'node:path';
-import { createRequire as __adcpCreateRequire } from 'node:module';
-const __filename = __adcpFileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
-const __dirname = __adcpDirname(__filename);
-const require = __adcpCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
 import { createHash, createPrivateKey, randomUUID, sign as nodeSign } from "node:crypto";
 import { assertAdcpUse } from "./jwks-helpers.mjs";
 const ALLOW_IN_MEMORY_SIGNER_ENV = "ADCP_ALLOW_IN_MEMORY_SIGNER";

package/dist/lib/signing/testing.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/signing/testing.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { createHash, createPrivateKey, randomUUID, sign as nodeSign, type JsonWebKey } from 'node:crypto';\nimport type { SigningProvider } from './provider';\nimport type { SignerKey } from './signer';\nimport { assertAdcpUse, type AdcpUse } from './jwks-helpers';\nimport type { AdcpJsonWebKey, AdcpSignAlg } from './types';\n\n/**\n * Environment variable that lets operators acknowledge an in-memory signer\n * is intentional in a `NODE_ENV=production` deployment (CI runs with\n * production builds, ephemeral test envs, etc.). Set to `1` to bypass the\n * production-time guard.\n */\nexport const ALLOW_IN_MEMORY_SIGNER_ENV = 'ADCP_ALLOW_IN_MEMORY_SIGNER';\n\nexport interface InMemorySigningProviderOptions {\n  /** `kid` published in `Signature-Input`. */\n  keyid: string;\n  /** Wire-format algorithm identifier — must match the JWK material. */\n  algorithm: AdcpSignAlg;\n  /** Private JWK including the `d` scalar. */\n  privateKey: AdcpJsonWebKey;\n  /**\n   * Optional purpose binding. When supplied, the async signing helpers\n   * (`signRequestAsync` / `signWebhookAsync`) refuse to sign with a\n   * mismatched purpose — same defense-in-depth gate the sync path's\n   * `SignerKey.privateKey.adcp_use` provides. Defaults to the value carried\n   * on `privateKey.adcp_use` when present, so adapters minted via\n   * `pemToAdcpJwk({ adcp_use: ... })` get the binding for free.\n   */\n  adcpUse?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Reference {@link SigningProvider} that holds the private JWK in process\n * memory. Useful for unit tests, conformance vectors, and local development.\n *\n * **Production deployments should use a KMS-backed provider** (see\n * `examples/gcp-kms-signing-provider.ts`). To prevent accidental shipping of\n * an in-memory signer to prod, the constructor refuses to instantiate when\n * `NODE_ENV === 'production'` unless the operator sets\n * `ADCP_ALLOW_IN_MEMORY_SIGNER=1` to acknowledge the choice — keeping the\n * in-memory path grep-able in deploy manifests.\n */\nexport class InMemorySigningProvider implements SigningProvider {\n  readonly keyid: string;\n  readonly algorithm: AdcpSignAlg;\n  readonly fingerprint: string;\n  readonly adcpUse?: string;\n  private readonly privateKey: AdcpJsonWebKey;\n\n  constructor(options: InMemorySigningProviderOptions) {\n    // The env is read once at construction. Module-init paths that\n    // instantiate `InMemorySigningProvider` before the runtime sets\n    // `NODE_ENV` will bypass the gate; orchestrators conventionally set\n    // `NODE_ENV` before the app process spawns, so this is rare in practice.\n    // Compare case-insensitively so `Production` / `PRODUCTION` don't slip\n    // through.\n    const isProduction = process.env.NODE_ENV?.toLowerCase() === 'production';\n    if (isProduction && !process.env[ALLOW_IN_MEMORY_SIGNER_ENV]) {\n      throw new Error(\n        `InMemorySigningProvider blocked in production. Set ${ALLOW_IN_MEMORY_SIGNER_ENV}=1 to acknowledge, ` +\n          `or use a KMS-backed SigningProvider (see examples/gcp-kms-signing-provider.ts).`\n      );\n    }\n    if (!options.privateKey.d) {\n      throw new TypeError('InMemorySigningProvider requires a JWK with a `d` (private scalar) field.');\n    }\n    this.keyid = options.keyid;\n    this.algorithm = options.algorithm;\n    this.privateKey = options.privateKey;\n    // Prefer explicit `adcpUse` option; fall back to raw JWK metadata so\n    // retired/unknown purposes still fail closed at the async signer gate.\n    const jwkUse = options.privateKey.adcp_use;\n    this.adcpUse = options.adcpUse ?? (typeof jwkUse === 'string' ? jwkUse : undefined);\n    // Mirrors the historical `privateKeyFingerprint` derivation — same input,\n    // same 64-bit cache disambiguator, so behavior carries over for callers\n    // who switch from the inline `request_signing` shape to a provider while\n    // holding the same key material.\n    this.fingerprint = createHash('sha256')\n      .update(options.keyid)\n      .update('\\0')\n      .update(options.privateKey.d as string)\n      .digest('hex')\n      .slice(0, 16);\n  }\n\n  async sign(payload: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n    const privateKey = createPrivateKey({ key: this.privateKey as JsonWebKey, format: 'jwk' });\n    const data = Buffer.from(payload);\n    if (this.algorithm === 'ed25519') {\n      return new Uint8Array(nodeSign(null, data, privateKey));\n    }\n    return new Uint8Array(nodeSign('sha256', data, { key: privateKey, dsaEncoding: 'ieee-p1363' }));\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Adapter from a legacy {@link SignerKey} to a {@link SigningProvider}.\n * Lets callers (and the conformance runner) reuse private JWK material\n * loaded for the sync-signing path against the new async-provider pipeline\n * without rewriting key-load logic.\n */\nexport function signerKeyToProvider(key: SignerKey): SigningProvider {\n  return new InMemorySigningProvider({\n    keyid: key.keyid,\n    algorithm: key.alg,\n    privateKey: key.privateKey,\n  });\n}\n\nexport interface EphemeralEd25519Key {\n  /** The `kid` embedded in both JWKs. */\n  kid: string;\n  /**\n   * AdCP wire-format algorithm identifier — pass directly to\n   * `InMemorySigningProvider({ algorithm })`. Always `'ed25519'` today;\n   * typed as `AdcpSignAlg` so callers don't hardcode a string literal.\n   */\n  algorithm: AdcpSignAlg;\n  /** Public JWK — publish at `/.well-known/jwks.json` or pass to JWKS discovery. */\n  publicKey: AdcpJsonWebKey;\n  /**\n   * Private JWK with `d` scalar. Pass to\n   * `new InMemorySigningProvider({ keyid, algorithm, privateKey })`.\n   * Never publish this value.\n   */\n  privateKey: AdcpJsonWebKey;\n}\n\nexport interface MintEphemeralEd25519KeyOptions {\n  /**\n   * Stable key ID embedded in both JWKs. Defaults to a random UUID so each\n   * call produces a unique kid. Pass a stable value for deterministic IDs\n   * across test restarts — the `keyid` passed to `InMemorySigningProvider`\n   * must match the `kid` in the published public JWK.\n   */\n  kid?: string;\n  /**\n   * AdCP purpose binding tagged on both JWKs. Accepts every member of\n   * {@link AdcpUse} — see that type for the canonical list.\n   * Defaults to `'webhook-signing'`.\n   *\n   * For production request-signing keys use `pemToAdcpJwk()` or a KMS-backed\n   * `SigningProvider` instead.\n   */\n  adcp_use?: AdcpUse;\n}\n\n/**\n * Mint an ephemeral Ed25519 keypair as `AdcpJsonWebKey` pairs, ready for\n * dev/test signing.\n *\n * Handles the Node `KeyObject.export({ format: 'jwk' })` → `AdcpJsonWebKey`\n * reshape: Node's `JsonWebKey` has `kty?: string` (optional), while\n * `AdcpJsonWebKey` requires `kty: string`. Without this helper, callers must\n * write a manual spread + non-null assertion on every key-generation site —\n * easy to typo on the most critical JWK field.\n *\n * Both JWKs are tagged with the correct AdCP fields:\n * - `alg: 'EdDSA'` — JOSE algorithm name required by AdCP verifiers (step 8).\n * - `use: 'sig'` — RFC 7517 §4.2 intent hint.\n * - `adcp_use` — AdCP purpose binding; enforced at step 8. Defaults to\n *   `'webhook-signing'`; pass `'request-signing'` for buyer-to-seller keys.\n * - `key_ops`: `['verify']` on `publicKey`, `['sign']` on `privateKey`.\n *\n * Usage with {@link InMemorySigningProvider}:\n * ```ts\n * import { mintEphemeralEd25519Key, InMemorySigningProvider } from '@adcp/sdk/signing/testing';\n *\n * const { kid, algorithm, privateKey, publicKey } = await mintEphemeralEd25519Key();\n * const provider = new InMemorySigningProvider({ keyid: kid, algorithm, privateKey });\n * // Publish publicKey in your /.well-known/jwks.json `keys` array.\n * ```\n */\nexport async function mintEphemeralEd25519Key(opts?: MintEphemeralEd25519KeyOptions): Promise<EphemeralEd25519Key> {\n  const resolvedKid = opts?.kid ?? randomUUID();\n  const adcpUse: AdcpUse = opts?.adcp_use ?? 'webhook-signing';\n  assertAdcpUse(adcpUse, 'mintEphemeralEd25519Key');\n  const { generateKeyPair, exportJWK } = await import('jose');\n  const { publicKey: pubKeyObj, privateKey: privKeyObj } = await generateKeyPair('EdDSA', {\n    crv: 'Ed25519',\n    extractable: true,\n  });\n  const [pubJwk, privJwk] = await Promise.all([exportJWK(pubKeyObj), exportJWK(privKeyObj)]);\n\n  if (!pubJwk.kty) throw new Error('mintEphemeralEd25519Key: jose exportJWK returned publicKey without kty');\n  if (!privJwk.kty) throw new Error('mintEphemeralEd25519Key: jose exportJWK returned privateKey without kty');\n\n  const publicKey: AdcpJsonWebKey = {\n    ...(pubJwk as Record<string, unknown>),\n    kid: resolvedKid,\n    kty: pubJwk.kty,\n    alg: 'EdDSA',\n    use: 'sig',\n    adcp_use: adcpUse,\n    key_ops: ['verify'],\n  };\n\n  const privateKey: AdcpJsonWebKey = {\n    ...(privJwk as Record<string, unknown>),\n    kid: resolvedKid,\n    kty: privJwk.kty,\n    alg: 'EdDSA',\n    use: 'sig',\n    adcp_use: adcpUse,\n    // RFC 7517 §4.3: private JWK states signing intent. Node's createPrivateKey\n    // ignores key_ops at runtime; the field is present for JWK consumers that honour it.\n    key_ops: ['sign'],\n  };\n\n  return { kid: resolvedKid, algorithm: 'ed25519', publicKey, privateKey };\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;AAAA,SAAS,YAAY,kBAAkB,YAAY,QAAQ,gBAAiC;AAG5F,SAAS,qBAAmC;AASrC,MAAM,6BAA6B;AA+BnC,MAAM,wBAAmD;AAAA,EACrD;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACQ;AAAA,EAEjB,YAAY,SAAyC;AAOnD,UAAM,eAAe,QAAQ,IAAI,UAAU,YAAY,MAAM;AAC7D,QAAI,gBAAgB,CAAC,QAAQ,IAAI,0BAA0B,GAAG;AAC5D,YAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QACR,sDAAsD,0BAA0B;AAAA,MAElF;AAAA,IACF;AACA,QAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,WAAW,GAAG;AACzB,YAAM,IAAI,UAAU,2EAA2E;AAAA,IACjG;AACA,SAAK,QAAQ,QAAQ;AACrB,SAAK,YAAY,QAAQ;AACzB,SAAK,aAAa,QAAQ;AAG1B,UAAM,SAAS,QAAQ,WAAW;AAClC,SAAK,UAAU,QAAQ,YAAY,OAAO,WAAW,WAAW,SAAS;AAKzE,SAAK,cAAc,WAAW,QAAQ,EACnC,OAAO,QAAQ,KAAK,EACpB,OAAO,IAAI,EACX,OAAO,QAAQ,WAAW,CAAW,EACrC,OAAO,KAAK,EACZ,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE;AAAA,EAChB;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,KAAK,SAA0C;AACnD,UAAM,aAAa,iBAAiB,EAAE,KAAK,KAAK,YAA0B,QAAQ,MAAM,CAAC;AACzF,UAAM,OAAO,OAAO,KAAK,OAAO;AAChC,QAAI,KAAK,cAAc,WAAW;AAChC,aAAO,IAAI,WAAW,SAAS,MAAM,MAAM,UAAU,CAAC;AAAA,IACxD;AACA,WAAO,IAAI,WAAW,SAAS,UAAU,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,YAAY,aAAa,aAAa,CAAC,CAAC;AAAA,EAChG;AACF;AAQO,SAAS,oBAAoB,KAAiC;AACnE,SAAO,IAAI,wBAAwB;AAAA,IACjC,OAAO,IAAI;AAAA,IACX,WAAW,IAAI;AAAA,IACf,YAAY,IAAI;AAAA,EAClB,CAAC;AACH;AAkEA,eAAsB,wBAAwB,MAAqE;AACjH,QAAM,cAAc,MAAM,OAAO,WAAW;AAC5C,QAAM,UAAmB,MAAM,YAAY;AAC3C,gBAAc,SAAS,yBAAyB;AAChD,QAAM,EAAE,iBAAiB,UAAU,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,MAAM;AAC1D,QAAM,EAAE,WAAW,WAAW,YAAY,WAAW,IAAI,MAAM,gBAAgB,SAAS;AAAA,IACtF,KAAK;AAAA,IACL,aAAa;AAAA,EACf,CAAC;AACD,QAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,OAAO,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,SAAS,GAAG,UAAU,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC;AAEzF,MAAI,CAAC,OAAO,IAAK,OAAM,IAAI,MAAM,wEAAwE;AACzG,MAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,IAAK,OAAM,IAAI,MAAM,yEAAyE;AAE3G,QAAM,YAA4B;AAAA,IAChC,GAAI;AAAA,IACJ,KAAK;AAAA,IACL,KAAK,OAAO;AAAA,IACZ,KAAK;AAAA,IACL,KAAK;AAAA,IACL,UAAU;AAAA,IACV,SAAS,CAAC,QAAQ;AAAA,EACpB;AAEA,QAAM,aAA6B;AAAA,IACjC,GAAI;AAAA,IACJ,KAAK;AAAA,IACL,KAAK,QAAQ;AAAA,IACb,KAAK;AAAA,IACL,KAAK;AAAA,IACL,UAAU;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,IAGV,SAAS,CAAC,MAAM;AAAA,EAClB;AAEA,SAAO,EAAE,KAAK,aAAa,WAAW,WAAW,WAAW,WAAW;AACzE;","names":[]}
+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/signing/testing.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { createHash, createPrivateKey, randomUUID, sign as nodeSign, type JsonWebKey } from 'node:crypto';\nimport type { SigningProvider } from './provider';\nimport type { SignerKey } from './signer';\nimport { assertAdcpUse, type AdcpUse } from './jwks-helpers';\nimport type { AdcpJsonWebKey, AdcpSignAlg } from './types';\n\n/**\n * Environment variable that lets operators acknowledge an in-memory signer\n * is intentional in a `NODE_ENV=production` deployment (CI runs with\n * production builds, ephemeral test envs, etc.). Set to `1` to bypass the\n * production-time guard.\n */\nexport const ALLOW_IN_MEMORY_SIGNER_ENV = 'ADCP_ALLOW_IN_MEMORY_SIGNER';\n\nexport interface InMemorySigningProviderOptions {\n  /** `kid` published in `Signature-Input`. */\n  keyid: string;\n  /** Wire-format algorithm identifier — must match the JWK material. */\n  algorithm: AdcpSignAlg;\n  /** Private JWK including the `d` scalar. */\n  privateKey: AdcpJsonWebKey;\n  /**\n   * Optional purpose binding. When supplied, the async signing helpers\n   * (`signRequestAsync` / `signWebhookAsync`) refuse to sign with a\n   * mismatched purpose — same defense-in-depth gate the sync path's\n   * `SignerKey.privateKey.adcp_use` provides. Defaults to the value carried\n   * on `privateKey.adcp_use` when present, so adapters minted via\n   * `pemToAdcpJwk({ adcp_use: ... })` get the binding for free.\n   */\n  adcpUse?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Reference {@link SigningProvider} that holds the private JWK in process\n * memory. Useful for unit tests, conformance vectors, and local development.\n *\n * **Production deployments should use a KMS-backed provider** (see\n * `examples/gcp-kms-signing-provider.ts`). To prevent accidental shipping of\n * an in-memory signer to prod, the constructor refuses to instantiate when\n * `NODE_ENV === 'production'` unless the operator sets\n * `ADCP_ALLOW_IN_MEMORY_SIGNER=1` to acknowledge the choice — keeping the\n * in-memory path grep-able in deploy manifests.\n */\nexport class InMemorySigningProvider implements SigningProvider {\n  readonly keyid: string;\n  readonly algorithm: AdcpSignAlg;\n  readonly fingerprint: string;\n  readonly adcpUse?: string;\n  private readonly privateKey: AdcpJsonWebKey;\n\n  constructor(options: InMemorySigningProviderOptions) {\n    // The env is read once at construction. Module-init paths that\n    // instantiate `InMemorySigningProvider` before the runtime sets\n    // `NODE_ENV` will bypass the gate; orchestrators conventionally set\n    // `NODE_ENV` before the app process spawns, so this is rare in practice.\n    // Compare case-insensitively so `Production` / `PRODUCTION` don't slip\n    // through.\n    const isProduction = process.env.NODE_ENV?.toLowerCase() === 'production';\n    if (isProduction && !process.env[ALLOW_IN_MEMORY_SIGNER_ENV]) {\n      throw new Error(\n        `InMemorySigningProvider blocked in production. Set ${ALLOW_IN_MEMORY_SIGNER_ENV}=1 to acknowledge, ` +\n          `or use a KMS-backed SigningProvider (see examples/gcp-kms-signing-provider.ts).`\n      );\n    }\n    if (!options.privateKey.d) {\n      throw new TypeError('InMemorySigningProvider requires a JWK with a `d` (private scalar) field.');\n    }\n    this.keyid = options.keyid;\n    this.algorithm = options.algorithm;\n    this.privateKey = options.privateKey;\n    // Prefer explicit `adcpUse` option; fall back to raw JWK metadata so\n    // retired/unknown purposes still fail closed at the async signer gate.\n    const jwkUse = options.privateKey.adcp_use;\n    this.adcpUse = options.adcpUse ?? (typeof jwkUse === 'string' ? jwkUse : undefined);\n    // Mirrors the historical `privateKeyFingerprint` derivation — same input,\n    // same 64-bit cache disambiguator, so behavior carries over for callers\n    // who switch from the inline `request_signing` shape to a provider while\n    // holding the same key material.\n    this.fingerprint = createHash('sha256')\n      .update(options.keyid)\n      .update('\\0')\n      .update(options.privateKey.d as string)\n      .digest('hex')\n      .slice(0, 16);\n  }\n\n  async sign(payload: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n    const privateKey = createPrivateKey({ key: this.privateKey as JsonWebKey, format: 'jwk' });\n    const data = Buffer.from(payload);\n    if (this.algorithm === 'ed25519') {\n      return new Uint8Array(nodeSign(null, data, privateKey));\n    }\n    return new Uint8Array(nodeSign('sha256', data, { key: privateKey, dsaEncoding: 'ieee-p1363' }));\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Adapter from a legacy {@link SignerKey} to a {@link SigningProvider}.\n * Lets callers (and the conformance runner) reuse private JWK material\n * loaded for the sync-signing path against the new async-provider pipeline\n * without rewriting key-load logic.\n */\nexport function signerKeyToProvider(key: SignerKey): SigningProvider {\n  return new InMemorySigningProvider({\n    keyid: key.keyid,\n    algorithm: key.alg,\n    privateKey: key.privateKey,\n  });\n}\n\nexport interface EphemeralEd25519Key {\n  /** The `kid` embedded in both JWKs. */\n  kid: string;\n  /**\n   * AdCP wire-format algorithm identifier — pass directly to\n   * `InMemorySigningProvider({ algorithm })`. Always `'ed25519'` today;\n   * typed as `AdcpSignAlg` so callers don't hardcode a string literal.\n   */\n  algorithm: AdcpSignAlg;\n  /** Public JWK — publish at `/.well-known/jwks.json` or pass to JWKS discovery. */\n  publicKey: AdcpJsonWebKey;\n  /**\n   * Private JWK with `d` scalar. Pass to\n   * `new InMemorySigningProvider({ keyid, algorithm, privateKey })`.\n   * Never publish this value.\n   */\n  privateKey: AdcpJsonWebKey;\n}\n\nexport interface MintEphemeralEd25519KeyOptions {\n  /**\n   * Stable key ID embedded in both JWKs. Defaults to a random UUID so each\n   * call produces a unique kid. Pass a stable value for deterministic IDs\n   * across test restarts — the `keyid` passed to `InMemorySigningProvider`\n   * must match the `kid` in the published public JWK.\n   */\n  kid?: string;\n  /**\n   * AdCP purpose binding tagged on both JWKs. Accepts every member of\n   * {@link AdcpUse} — see that type for the canonical list.\n   * Defaults to `'webhook-signing'`.\n   *\n   * For production request-signing keys use `pemToAdcpJwk()` or a KMS-backed\n   * `SigningProvider` instead.\n   */\n  adcp_use?: AdcpUse;\n}\n\n/**\n * Mint an ephemeral Ed25519 keypair as `AdcpJsonWebKey` pairs, ready for\n * dev/test signing.\n *\n * Handles the Node `KeyObject.export({ format: 'jwk' })` → `AdcpJsonWebKey`\n * reshape: Node's `JsonWebKey` has `kty?: string` (optional), while\n * `AdcpJsonWebKey` requires `kty: string`. Without this helper, callers must\n * write a manual spread + non-null assertion on every key-generation site —\n * easy to typo on the most critical JWK field.\n *\n * Both JWKs are tagged with the correct AdCP fields:\n * - `alg: 'EdDSA'` — JOSE algorithm name required by AdCP verifiers (step 8).\n * - `use: 'sig'` — RFC 7517 §4.2 intent hint.\n * - `adcp_use` — AdCP purpose binding; enforced at step 8. Defaults to\n *   `'webhook-signing'`; pass `'request-signing'` for buyer-to-seller keys.\n * - `key_ops`: `['verify']` on `publicKey`, `['sign']` on `privateKey`.\n *\n * Usage with {@link InMemorySigningProvider}:\n * ```ts\n * import { mintEphemeralEd25519Key, InMemorySigningProvider } from '@adcp/sdk/signing/testing';\n *\n * const { kid, algorithm, privateKey, publicKey } = await mintEphemeralEd25519Key();\n * const provider = new InMemorySigningProvider({ keyid: kid, algorithm, privateKey });\n * // Publish publicKey in your /.well-known/jwks.json `keys` array.\n * ```\n */\nexport async function mintEphemeralEd25519Key(opts?: MintEphemeralEd25519KeyOptions): Promise<EphemeralEd25519Key> {\n  const resolvedKid = opts?.kid ?? randomUUID();\n  const adcpUse: AdcpUse = opts?.adcp_use ?? 'webhook-signing';\n  assertAdcpUse(adcpUse, 'mintEphemeralEd25519Key');\n  const { generateKeyPair, exportJWK } = await import('jose');\n  const { publicKey: pubKeyObj, privateKey: privKeyObj } = await generateKeyPair('EdDSA', {\n    crv: 'Ed25519',\n    extractable: true,\n  });\n  const [pubJwk, privJwk] = await Promise.all([exportJWK(pubKeyObj), exportJWK(privKeyObj)]);\n\n  if (!pubJwk.kty) throw new Error('mintEphemeralEd25519Key: jose exportJWK returned publicKey without kty');\n  if (!privJwk.kty) throw new Error('mintEphemeralEd25519Key: jose exportJWK returned privateKey without kty');\n\n  const publicKey: AdcpJsonWebKey = {\n    ...(pubJwk as Record<string, unknown>),\n    kid: resolvedKid,\n    kty: pubJwk.kty,\n    alg: 'EdDSA',\n    use: 'sig',\n    adcp_use: adcpUse,\n    key_ops: ['verify'],\n  };\n\n  const privateKey: AdcpJsonWebKey = {\n    ...(privJwk as Record<string, unknown>),\n    kid: resolvedKid,\n    kty: privJwk.kty,\n    alg: 'EdDSA',\n    use: 'sig',\n    adcp_use: adcpUse,\n    // RFC 7517 §4.3: private JWK states signing intent. 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package/dist/lib/signing/types.mjs

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
-import { fileURLToPath as __adcpFileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { dirname as __adcpDirname } from 'node:path';
-import { createRequire as __adcpCreateRequire } from 'node:module';
-const __filename = __adcpFileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
-const __dirname = __adcpDirname(__filename);
-const require = __adcpCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
 const REQUEST_SIGNING_TAG = "adcp/request-signing/v1";
 const RESPONSE_SIGNING_TAG = "adcp/response-signing/v1";
 const ALLOWED_ALGS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["ed25519", "ecdsa-p256-sha256"]);

package/dist/lib/signing/types.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/signing/types.ts"],"sourcesContent":["export type ContentDigestPolicy = 'required' | 'forbidden' | 'either';\n\nexport interface VerifierCapability {\n  supported: boolean;\n  covers_content_digest: ContentDigestPolicy;\n  required_for: string[];\n  /**\n   * Shadow-mode bridge between `supported_for` and `required_for`: the seller\n   * verifies signatures when present and logs failures but does NOT reject\n   * unsigned requests. Counterparties SHOULD sign ops in this list so sellers\n   * can surface failure rates before flipping to `required_for`. Precedence:\n   * `required_for` > `warn_for` > `supported_for`.\n   */\n  warn_for?: string[];\n  supported_for?: string[];\n  /**\n   * JSON-RPC protocol methods (for example `tasks/cancel`) that require\n   * request signatures. Kept separate from `required_for`, whose namespace is\n   * AdCP tool names such as `create_media_buy`.\n   */\n  protocol_methods_required_for?: string[];\n}\n\nexport interface AdcpJsonWebKey {\n  kid: string;\n  kty: string;\n  crv?: string;\n  alg?: string;\n  use?: string;\n  key_ops?: string[];\n  adcp_use?: string;\n  /** Public-key X coordinate (Ed25519) or x-coordinate (EC P-256). */\n  x?: string;\n  /** Public-key Y coordinate (EC P-256 only). */\n  y?: string;\n  /**\n   * Private scalar (RFC 7518 §6.2.2.1 / §6.1.2). Present only when the JWK\n   * represents a private key — never published at `jwks_uri`. Test vectors\n   * ship this under `_private_d_for_test_only` in their `keys.json`; runtime\n   * signers load it into `d`.\n   */\n  d?: string;\n  [extra: string]: unknown;\n}\n\nexport interface RevocationSnapshot {\n  issuer: string;\n  updated: string;\n  next_update: string;\n  revoked_kids: string[];\n  revoked_jtis: string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * Narrow \"successfully verified\" shape. Middleware sets `req.verifiedSigner`\n * to a value of this type only after a real signature was validated — the\n * absence of `req.verifiedSigner` is the signal that the request went through\n * the verifier as unsigned (and the operation didn't require signing).\n *\n * `keyid` is always non-empty. Pre-3.x releases returned a `keyid: ''`\n * sentinel on the unsigned path; consumers MUST now branch on\n * `req.verifiedSigner === undefined` instead.\n */\nexport interface VerifiedSigner {\n  keyid: string;\n  agent_url?: string;\n  verified_at: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Discriminated union returned by `verifyRequestSignature`.\n *\n * - `{ status: 'verified', ... }` — a signature was present and passed all\n *   pipeline steps. Shape extends {@link VerifiedSigner}.\n * - `{ status: 'unsigned' }` — no signature headers were present, and the\n *   operation was not in `capability.required_for` (or no operation was\n *   supplied). The request may still be accepted by the server's own auth\n *   path; the verifier just has no signer to attest to.\n *\n * A caller that needs to distinguish \"unsigned but acceptable\" from\n * \"verified\" should branch on `.status`. Most middleware consumers should\n * instead rely on `req.verifiedSigner` being populated — that reads cleanly\n * as \"did a real signature check succeed.\"\n */\nexport type VerifyResult = ({ status: 'verified' } & VerifiedSigner) | { status: 'unsigned'; verified_at: number };\n\nexport const REQUEST_SIGNING_TAG = 'adcp/request-signing/v1';\nexport const RESPONSE_SIGNING_TAG = 'adcp/response-signing/v1';\nexport const ALLOWED_ALGS = new Set(['ed25519', 'ecdsa-p256-sha256']);\n/**\n * Wire-format algorithm identifier — the string that appears in\n * `Signature-Input`'s `alg` parameter. Same vocabulary as `ALLOWED_ALGS`.\n */\nexport type AdcpSignAlg = 'ed25519' | 'ecdsa-p256-sha256';\nexport const MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS = 300;\nexport const CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS = 60;\nexport const MANDATORY_COMPONENTS: ReadonlyArray<string> = ['@method', '@target-uri', '@authority'];\nexport const RESPONSE_MANDATORY_COMPONENTS: ReadonlyArray<string> = [\n  '@status',\n  '@method;req',\n  '@authority;req',\n  '@target-uri;req',\n];\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;AAsFO,MAAM,sBAAsB;AAC5B,MAAM,uBAAuB;AAC7B,MAAM,eAAe,oBAAI,IAAI,CAAC,WAAW,mBAAmB,CAAC;AAM7D,MAAM,+BAA+B;AACrC,MAAM,+BAA+B;AACrC,MAAM,uBAA8C,CAAC,WAAW,eAAe,YAAY;AAC3F,MAAM,gCAAuD;AAAA,EAClE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AACF;","names":[]}
+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/signing/types.ts"],"sourcesContent":["export type ContentDigestPolicy = 'required' | 'forbidden' | 'either';\n\nexport interface VerifierCapability {\n  supported: boolean;\n  covers_content_digest: ContentDigestPolicy;\n  required_for: string[];\n  /**\n   * Shadow-mode bridge between `supported_for` and `required_for`: the seller\n   * verifies signatures when present and logs failures but does NOT reject\n   * unsigned requests. Counterparties SHOULD sign ops in this list so sellers\n   * can surface failure rates before flipping to `required_for`. Precedence:\n   * `required_for` > `warn_for` > `supported_for`.\n   */\n  warn_for?: string[];\n  supported_for?: string[];\n  /**\n   * JSON-RPC protocol methods (for example `tasks/cancel`) that require\n   * request signatures. Kept separate from `required_for`, whose namespace is\n   * AdCP tool names such as `create_media_buy`.\n   */\n  protocol_methods_required_for?: string[];\n}\n\nexport interface AdcpJsonWebKey {\n  kid: string;\n  kty: string;\n  crv?: string;\n  alg?: string;\n  use?: string;\n  key_ops?: string[];\n  adcp_use?: string;\n  /** Public-key X coordinate (Ed25519) or x-coordinate (EC P-256). */\n  x?: string;\n  /** Public-key Y coordinate (EC P-256 only). */\n  y?: string;\n  /**\n   * Private scalar (RFC 7518 §6.2.2.1 / §6.1.2). Present only when the JWK\n   * represents a private key — never published at `jwks_uri`. Test vectors\n   * ship this under `_private_d_for_test_only` in their `keys.json`; runtime\n   * signers load it into `d`.\n   */\n  d?: string;\n  [extra: string]: unknown;\n}\n\nexport interface RevocationSnapshot {\n  issuer: string;\n  updated: string;\n  next_update: string;\n  revoked_kids: string[];\n  revoked_jtis: string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * Narrow \"successfully verified\" shape. Middleware sets `req.verifiedSigner`\n * to a value of this type only after a real signature was validated — the\n * absence of `req.verifiedSigner` is the signal that the request went through\n * the verifier as unsigned (and the operation didn't require signing).\n *\n * `keyid` is always non-empty. Pre-3.x releases returned a `keyid: ''`\n * sentinel on the unsigned path; consumers MUST now branch on\n * `req.verifiedSigner === undefined` instead.\n */\nexport interface VerifiedSigner {\n  keyid: string;\n  agent_url?: string;\n  verified_at: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Discriminated union returned by `verifyRequestSignature`.\n *\n * - `{ status: 'verified', ... }` — a signature was present and passed all\n *   pipeline steps. Shape extends {@link VerifiedSigner}.\n * - `{ status: 'unsigned' }` — no signature headers were present, and the\n *   operation was not in `capability.required_for` (or no operation was\n *   supplied). The request may still be accepted by the server's own auth\n *   path; the verifier just has no signer to attest to.\n *\n * A caller that needs to distinguish \"unsigned but acceptable\" from\n * \"verified\" should branch on `.status`. Most middleware consumers should\n * instead rely on `req.verifiedSigner` being populated — that reads cleanly\n * as \"did a real signature check succeed.\"\n */\nexport type VerifyResult = ({ status: 'verified' } & VerifiedSigner) | { status: 'unsigned'; verified_at: number };\n\nexport const REQUEST_SIGNING_TAG = 'adcp/request-signing/v1';\nexport const RESPONSE_SIGNING_TAG = 'adcp/response-signing/v1';\nexport const ALLOWED_ALGS = new Set(['ed25519', 'ecdsa-p256-sha256']);\n/**\n * Wire-format algorithm identifier — the string that appears in\n * `Signature-Input`'s `alg` parameter. Same vocabulary as `ALLOWED_ALGS`.\n */\nexport type AdcpSignAlg = 'ed25519' | 'ecdsa-p256-sha256';\nexport const MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS = 300;\nexport const CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS = 60;\nexport const MANDATORY_COMPONENTS: ReadonlyArray<string> = ['@method', '@target-uri', '@authority'];\nexport const RESPONSE_MANDATORY_COMPONENTS: ReadonlyArray<string> = [\n  '@status',\n  '@method;req',\n  '@authority;req',\n  '@target-uri;req',\n];\n"],"mappings":"AAsFO,MAAM,sBAAsB;AAC5B,MAAM,uBAAuB;AAC7B,MAAM,eAAe,oBAAI,IAAI,CAAC,WAAW,mBAAmB,CAAC;AAM7D,MAAM,+BAA+B;AACrC,MAAM,+BAA+B;AACrC,MAAM,uBAA8C,CAAC,WAAW,eAAe,YAAY;AAC3F,MAAM,gCAAuD;AAAA,EAClE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AACF;","names":[]}

package/dist/lib/signing/verifier.mjs

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
-import { fileURLToPath as __adcpFileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { dirname as __adcpDirname } from 'node:path';
-import { createRequire as __adcpCreateRequire } from 'node:module';
-const __filename = __adcpFileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
-const __dirname = __adcpDirname(__filename);
-const require = __adcpCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
 import { parseDictionary } from "structured-headers";
 import {
   buildSignatureBase,