@adcp/sdk 12.0.0 → 12.0.2

package/dist/lib/server/a2a-adapter.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/server/a2a-adapter.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * A2A transport adapter for `AdcpServer`.\n *\n * Peer of `serve()` / `createExpressAdapter()`: same `AdcpServer` handle,\n * different wire transport. MCP and A2A share the dispatcher, idempotency\n * store, state store, resolveAccount, and governance — everything the\n * framework pipeline owns is transport-agnostic.\n *\n * **Scope (v0)**: `message/send`, `tasks/get`, `tasks/cancel`, and\n * `GET /.well-known/agent-card.json`. Streaming (`message/stream`),\n * push notifications, and mid-flight `input-required` interrupts are\n * explicit \"not yet\" — see `docs/guides/BUILD-AN-AGENT.md`.\n *\n * **Handler-return → A2A `Task.state` mapping:**\n *\n * | Handler returned…                   | A2A `Task.state`  | Artifact payload                                 |\n * |-------------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------------------------------------|\n * | Success arm                         | `completed`       | DataPart with the typed AdCP response            |\n * | Submitted arm (`status:'submitted'`)| `completed` [^1]  | DataPart with AdCP response + `metadata.adcp_task_id` |\n * | Error arm (`errors:[]`)             | `failed`          | DataPart with the AdCP Error arm payload         |\n * | `adcpError()` envelope              | `failed`          | DataPart with `adcp_error`                       |\n *\n * [^1]: A2A `submitted` is the INITIAL lifecycle state (before\n * `working`); A2A `completed` marks the transport call as done.\n * When the AdCP handler returns a Submitted arm the HTTP call itself\n * has completed — the AdCP-level async work is queued and buyers\n * resume it via `adcp_task_id` on `artifact.metadata`. The DataPart's\n * `data` still carries `status: 'submitted'` from the AdCP response,\n * so a buyer reading the artifact payload sees the ad-tech state\n * directly; the A2A Task.state only mirrors whether the transport\n * call itself terminated.\n *\n * **Message shape.** A client addresses a tool by sending a `Message`\n * with a single `DataPart`: `{ kind: 'data', data: { skill, input } }`.\n * `skill` must match a registered AdCP tool name (e.g. `get_products`);\n * `input` becomes the tool arguments before AdCP schema validation\n * runs. The older client convention `{ skill, parameters }` (used by\n * `src/lib/protocols/a2a.ts`) is also accepted — `data.parameters` is\n * treated as an alias for `data.input`; new callers should prefer\n * `input` since A2A `DataPart.data` is free-form and `input` matches\n * the AdCP tool's typed request shape.\n *\n * **Two lifecycles, one response.** A2A's `Task.state` tracks the\n * TRANSPORT call (did the HTTP request complete?). AdCP's `status`\n * inside the artifact tracks the WORK (submitted / completed /\n * failed). Don't conflate them: a `completed` A2A task can carry a\n * `submitted` AdCP response, meaning the call returned successfully\n * but the ad-tech operation itself is still queued. Buyers resume the\n * AdCP work via the `adcp_task_id` on the artifact's `metadata`, not\n * by re-polling the A2A Task.\n *\n * @preview v0 surface — field semantics may shift while the ecosystem\n * converges on AdCP-over-A2A conventions. Pinning a minor version is\n * recommended.\n */\n\nimport {\n  type AgentExecutor,\n  type ExecutionEventBus,\n  type RequestContext,\n  type TaskStore,\n  type User,\n  type UnauthenticatedUser,\n  DefaultRequestHandler,\n  InMemoryTaskStore as SdkInMemoryTaskStore,\n  DefaultExecutionEventBusManager,\n} from '@a2a-js/sdk/server';\nimport { jsonRpcHandler, agentCardHandler } from '@a2a-js/sdk/server/express';\nimport type {\n  AgentCard,\n  AgentCapabilities,\n  AgentProvider,\n  AgentSkill,\n  Artifact,\n  DataPart,\n  Message,\n  SecurityScheme,\n  Task,\n  TaskArtifactUpdateEvent,\n  TaskStatusUpdateEvent,\n} from '@a2a-js/sdk';\nimport type { Request, RequestHandler } from 'express';\nimport { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';\nimport { getSdkServer, listRegisteredToolNames, type AdcpAuthInfo, type AdcpServer } from './adcp-server';\nimport type { McpToolResponse } from './responses';\nimport type { AdcpLogger } from './create-adcp-server';\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Public types\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Agent-card identity fields the adapter can't derive automatically.\n * Auto-seeded fields (`capabilities`, `skills`, `defaultInputModes`,\n * `defaultOutputModes`, `protocolVersion`, `additionalInterfaces`) may\n * be overridden by passing them here; the merged card is validated\n * against A2A's required-field set at boot.\n */\nexport interface A2AAgentCardOverrides {\n  /** Human-readable agent name (required). */\n  name: string;\n  /** Human-readable description (required). */\n  description: string;\n  /** Agent URL — the endpoint A2A clients connect to (required). */\n  url: string;\n  /** Agent version (required). */\n  version: string;\n\n  provider?: AgentProvider;\n  documentationUrl?: string;\n  iconUrl?: string;\n  securitySchemes?: { [k: string]: SecurityScheme };\n  security?: { [k: string]: string[] }[];\n  preferredTransport?: string;\n\n  /**\n   * Override the auto-generated capabilities. The adapter sets\n   * `streaming: false` and `pushNotifications: false` by default (v0\n   * ships neither). Set `streaming: true` if you wire a downstream\n   * extension; the adapter still won't emit `TaskStatusUpdateEvent`s\n   * on the stream path in v0.\n   */\n  capabilities?: AgentCapabilities;\n\n  /**\n   * Override the auto-generated skills list. When omitted the adapter\n   * derives one `AgentSkill` per registered AdCP tool from the server's\n   * capability object. Supply this to add descriptions, examples, tags,\n   * or per-skill input/output modes the SDK can't infer. Framework-private\n   * tools such as `comply_test_controller` are still filtered from the public\n   * A2A agent card.\n   */\n  skills?: AgentSkill[];\n\n  defaultInputModes?: string[];\n  defaultOutputModes?: string[];\n  protocolVersion?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Options for {@link createA2AAdapter}.\n *\n * **Auth posture.** `authenticate(req)` runs BEFORE the tool handler\n * sees the request. Return an `AdcpAuthInfo` to let the pipeline\n * proceed with that principal; return `null` (or throw) to reject.\n * A rejection currently surfaces as a generic JSON-RPC `-32000`\n * server error — the `@a2a-js/sdk` doesn't yet expose a typed\n * authentication-failed code for the `UserBuilder` path. Production\n * deployments SHOULD wire upstream middleware (e.g. `express-jwt`) to\n * reject with a proper HTTP 401 / WWW-Authenticate challenge before\n * the request reaches `jsonRpcHandler`. The `authenticate` option\n * here is a last-line-of-defense guard, not the primary auth surface.\n *\n * **Agent-card `securitySchemes`.** The `agentCard.securitySchemes`\n * you provide is served verbatim at `/.well-known/agent-card.json` —\n * only put non-secret discovery data there (token endpoint, scopes,\n * OIDC issuer URL). Never paste client secrets, private JWKS, or\n * internal URLs into the card. The SDK doesn't schema-validate\n * `securitySchemes` at boot (v0 check is required-field presence\n * only), so a hand-crafted malformed entry will ship as-written.\n *\n * Omitting `authenticate` makes the adapter anonymous — handlers see\n * `ctx.authInfo === undefined`, matching `serve({ authenticate: undefined })`.\n */\nexport interface A2AAdapterOptions {\n  /** AdCP server whose registered tools this adapter exposes over A2A. */\n  server: AdcpServer;\n\n  /**\n   * Authenticate an inbound A2A request. Transport-level auth runs\n   * before `AdcpServer.invoke()` so the framework pipeline sees a\n   * verified `authInfo`. Return `null` (or throw) to reject.\n   */\n  authenticate?: (req: Request) => Promise<AdcpAuthInfo | null>;\n\n  /** Seller-supplied agent-card identity fields. Required. */\n  agentCard: A2AAgentCardOverrides;\n\n  /**\n   * A2A task store. Defaults to the SDK's `InMemoryTaskStore`.\n   * Persistent deployments should supply a durable implementation\n   * (e.g. a Postgres-backed `TaskStore`).\n   */\n  taskStore?: TaskStore;\n\n  /** Optional logger. Falls back to `console`. */\n  logger?: AdcpLogger;\n}\n\n/** Minimal Express app surface the adapter's `mount()` helper needs. */\nexport interface ExpressAppLike {\n  use(path: string, ...handlers: RequestHandler[]): unknown;\n}\n\n/** Options for {@link A2AAdapter.mount}. */\nexport interface A2AMountOptions {\n  /**\n   * URL-path prefix for the JSON-RPC endpoint. Defaults to the pathname\n   * of the agent card's `url` field (so `url: 'https://host/a2a'` mounts\n   * JSON-RPC at `/a2a`). Override to mount under a different path.\n   */\n  basePath?: string;\n  /**\n   * When true (default), also mounts the agent card at the origin root\n   * (`/.well-known/agent-card.json`) so simple discovery probes targeting\n   * the host itself find the card. Some deployments disable this when an\n   * upstream proxy owns origin-root routes — set `false` to mount only\n   * at `{basePath}/.well-known/agent-card.json`.\n   */\n  wellKnownAtRoot?: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Value returned by {@link createA2AAdapter}.\n *\n * For almost every seller, `adapter.mount(app)` is the right entry\n * point — it wires all four routes (JSON-RPC at the agent-card's\n * path, the agent card at both `{basePath}/.well-known/agent-card.json`\n * for A2A discovery and `/.well-known/agent-card.json` for origin-root\n * probes) with one call.\n *\n * The `jsonRpcHandler` and `agentCardHandler` fields stay exposed for\n * deployments that need finer control (mounting behind a custom auth\n * layer, serving the card from a CDN, testing).\n */\nexport interface A2AAdapter {\n  /** The A2A JSON-RPC middleware (`message/send`, `tasks/get`, `tasks/cancel`). */\n  jsonRpcHandler: RequestHandler;\n  /** The agent-card discovery GET middleware. */\n  agentCardHandler: RequestHandler;\n  /** Returns the merged, validated agent card. */\n  getAgentCard(): Promise<AgentCard>;\n  /**\n   * Wire all A2A routes onto an Express-compatible app in one call.\n   * Eliminates the \"card mounted at only one location\" footgun: the\n   * A2A SDK derives `${agentCard.url}/.well-known/agent-card.json` for\n   * discovery, while many clients also probe origin root — this helper\n   * satisfies both. See {@link A2AMountOptions} to override paths.\n   */\n  mount(app: ExpressAppLike, options?: A2AMountOptions): void;\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Internals\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Our `User` carries the full AdCP auth payload, not just the two\n * getters A2A's minimal `User` requires. The executor reads this back\n * out of `RequestContext.context.user`.\n */\ninterface A2AAdcpUser extends User {\n  readonly adcpAuthInfo?: AdcpAuthInfo;\n}\n\nfunction buildAuthenticatedUser(authInfo: AdcpAuthInfo): A2AAdcpUser {\n  const clientId = authInfo.clientId;\n  return {\n    get isAuthenticated() {\n      return true;\n    },\n    get userName() {\n      return clientId;\n    },\n    adcpAuthInfo: authInfo,\n  };\n}\n\nfunction buildAnonymousUser(): UnauthenticatedUser {\n  return {\n    get isAuthenticated() {\n      return false as const;\n    },\n    get userName() {\n      return 'anonymous';\n    },\n  };\n}\n\nfunction getAdcpAuthInfo(context: RequestContext['context']): AdcpAuthInfo | undefined {\n  const user = context?.user as A2AAdcpUser | undefined;\n  return user?.adcpAuthInfo;\n}\n\n/**\n * Extract the `{ skill, input }` pair from the inbound Message's parts.\n *\n * Convention: the client sends a single DataPart with\n * `{ skill: '<tool_name>', input: { ...args } }`. Reject anything else\n * — text-only payloads, files, multiple data parts — so buyers get a\n * deterministic error instead of silently-wrong routing.\n */\ninterface ExtractedInvocation {\n  skill: string;\n  input: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\nfunction extractInvocation(message: Message): ExtractedInvocation {\n  if (!Array.isArray(message.parts) || message.parts.length === 0) {\n    throw new A2AInvocationError('Message must carry at least one part with a `data` kind.');\n  }\n  const dataParts = message.parts.filter((p): p is DataPart => p?.kind === 'data');\n  if (dataParts.length === 0) {\n    throw new A2AInvocationError(\n      \"Message must include a DataPart with { skill, input } — text-only messages aren't routable to AdCP tools.\"\n    );\n  }\n  if (dataParts.length > 1) {\n    throw new A2AInvocationError(\n      'Message must include exactly one DataPart — multi-part invocations are not supported in v0.'\n    );\n  }\n  const firstDataPart = dataParts[0]!;\n  const rawData = firstDataPart.data;\n  // Guard before destructuring — a client sending `{ kind: 'data', data: null }`\n  // or `data: \"string\"` would otherwise TypeError on payload.skill and surface\n  // as a generic HANDLER_THREW instead of INVALID_INVOCATION.\n  if (rawData == null || typeof rawData !== 'object' || Array.isArray(rawData)) {\n    throw new A2AInvocationError('DataPart `data` must be an object containing { skill, input }.');\n  }\n  const payload = rawData as Record<string, unknown>;\n  const skill = payload.skill;\n  // Accept `parameters` as an alias for `input` — the in-tree A2A\n  // client (`src/lib/protocols/a2a.ts`) shipped first and uses\n  // `parameters`, so downstream agents already emit that key. Going\n  // forward prefer `input`: A2A `DataPart.data` is free-form JSON and\n  // `input` matches the AdCP tool's typed request shape. The alias\n  // stays for ecosystem compatibility; no deprecation timer in v0.\n  const input = payload.input ?? payload.parameters;\n  if (typeof skill !== 'string' || skill.length === 0) {\n    throw new A2AInvocationError('DataPart must include a non-empty string `skill` field naming the AdCP tool.');\n  }\n  if (input != null && (typeof input !== 'object' || Array.isArray(input))) {\n    throw new A2AInvocationError('DataPart `input` (or legacy `parameters`) must be an object (or omitted).');\n  }\n  return { skill, input: (input as Record<string, unknown>) ?? {} };\n}\n\n/** Thrown when an incoming Message doesn't match the AdCP-over-A2A convention. */\nexport class A2AInvocationError extends Error {\n  constructor(message: string) {\n    super(message);\n    this.name = 'A2AInvocationError';\n  }\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Executor — translates A2A execute() into adcpServer.invoke() + events\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Classify a framework-produced `McpToolResponse` so the executor knows\n * what A2A `Task.state` to publish.\n */\ntype ClassifiedResult =\n  | { kind: 'success'; data: Record<string, unknown> }\n  | { kind: 'submitted'; adcpTaskId: string; data: Record<string, unknown> }\n  | { kind: 'error_arm'; data: Record<string, unknown> }\n  | { kind: 'adcp_error'; data: Record<string, unknown> };\n\nfunction classifyResponse(res: McpToolResponse): ClassifiedResult {\n  const structured = (res.structuredContent ?? {}) as Record<string, unknown>;\n  if (res.isError === true) {\n    if (structured.adcp_error && typeof structured.adcp_error === 'object') {\n      return { kind: 'adcp_error', data: structured };\n    }\n    return { kind: 'error_arm', data: structured };\n  }\n  if (structured.status === 'submitted' && typeof structured.task_id === 'string') {\n    return { kind: 'submitted', adcpTaskId: structured.task_id, data: structured };\n  }\n  return { kind: 'success', data: structured };\n}\n\nclass AdcpA2AAgentExecutor implements AgentExecutor {\n  // Cooperative-cancel flag. `DefaultRequestHandler.cancelTask` only\n  // calls our executor's `cancelTask` while an execute() is in-flight\n  // (eventBus still open); post-completion cancels are handled by the\n  // SDK directly against the task store. So this set only holds\n  // taskIds that currently have a pending `cancelTask`, and execute()\n  // always clears its entry at the end — no unbounded growth.\n  private readonly canceled = new Set<string>();\n\n  // A2A `Task.id` → original `contextId`. Populated when execute()\n  // starts so `cancelTask` can emit a well-formed status-update event\n  // against the same contextId instead of guessing an empty string.\n  // Cleared alongside the canceled flag in execute()'s finally block.\n  private readonly taskContextIds = new Map<string, string>();\n\n  constructor(\n    private readonly server: AdcpServer,\n    private readonly logger: AdcpLogger\n  ) {}\n\n  async execute(requestContext: RequestContext, eventBus: ExecutionEventBus): Promise<void> {\n    const { taskId, contextId, userMessage } = requestContext;\n    const authInfo = getAdcpAuthInfo(requestContext.context);\n\n    this.taskContextIds.set(taskId, contextId);\n    try {\n      // Register the task with the ResultManager by publishing a Task\n      // event first — subsequent status-update / artifact-update events\n      // only resolve if the manager has seen the task. `working` is the\n      // initial state; we replace it with completed / submitted / failed\n      // once the handler returns.\n      this.publishInitialTask(eventBus, taskId, contextId, userMessage);\n\n      let invocation: ExtractedInvocation;\n      try {\n        invocation = extractInvocation(userMessage);\n      } catch (err) {\n        const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Invalid A2A invocation';\n        this.emitFailure(eventBus, taskId, contextId, {\n          reason: 'INVALID_INVOCATION',\n          message,\n        });\n        return;\n      }\n\n      let response: McpToolResponse | undefined;\n      const toolNames = a2aSkillToServerToolNames(invocation.skill);\n      let invokedToolName: string | undefined;\n      try {\n        for (const toolName of toolNames) {\n          try {\n            invokedToolName = toolName;\n            response = await this.server.invoke({\n              // Platform servers register `tasks_get`; older/custom A2A\n              // fixtures may still register the slash name directly.\n              toolName,\n              args: invocation.input,\n              ...(authInfo && { authInfo }),\n            });\n            break;\n          } catch (err) {\n            if (toolName === 'tasks_get' && invocation.skill === 'tasks/get' && isToolNotRegistered(err, toolName)) {\n              continue;\n            }\n            throw err;\n          }\n        }\n      } catch (err) {\n        const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);\n        this.logger.error('A2A adapter: handler invocation threw', {\n          toolName: invokedToolName ?? invocation.skill,\n          requestedToolName: invocation.skill,\n          error: message,\n        });\n        this.emitFailure(eventBus, taskId, contextId, {\n          reason: 'HANDLER_THREW',\n          message,\n        });\n        return;\n      }\n      if (response === undefined) {\n        this.emitFailure(eventBus, taskId, contextId, {\n          reason: 'HANDLER_THREW',\n          message: `No handler registered for ${invocation.skill}`,\n        });\n        return;\n      }\n\n      if (this.canceled.has(taskId)) {\n        this.publishStatus(eventBus, taskId, contextId, 'canceled', true);\n        return;\n      }\n\n      const classified = classifyResponse(response);\n      this.publishArtifact(eventBus, taskId, contextId, classified);\n      // A2A Task.state maps the TRANSPORT call lifecycle, not the AdCP\n      // work. A `submitted` AdCP arm means the HTTP call itself\n      // completed — the ad-tech work is queued, resumed via\n      // `adcp_task_id` on the artifact metadata. Emitting A2A\n      // `state: 'submitted'` with `final: true` would be a\n      // non-conformant transition per A2A 0.3.0 (`submitted` is the\n      // INITIAL state before `working`, never terminal). Buyers read\n      // the AdCP-level status from the artifact's `data.status` field.\n      this.publishStatus(\n        eventBus,\n        taskId,\n        contextId,\n        classified.kind === 'success' || classified.kind === 'submitted' ? 'completed' : 'failed',\n        true\n      );\n    } finally {\n      // Clean up per-task state regardless of path — the executor is\n      // long-lived (one per adapter instance), so any leak compounds.\n      this.canceled.delete(taskId);\n      this.taskContextIds.delete(taskId);\n      eventBus.finished();\n    }\n  }\n\n  async cancelTask(taskId: string, eventBus: ExecutionEventBus): Promise<void> {\n    this.canceled.add(taskId);\n    // `DefaultRequestHandler.cancelTask` only reaches us when execute()\n    // is still in-flight (eventBus still open). Publish the canceled\n    // status so the SDK's secondary `_processEvents` loop terminates;\n    // execute() will ALSO see the flag and short-circuit before\n    // publishing a success/failure status. The A2A event bus is\n    // idempotent on duplicate status publishes — whichever lands first\n    // wins the taskStore write.\n    const contextId = this.taskContextIds.get(taskId) ?? '';\n    this.publishStatus(eventBus, taskId, contextId, 'canceled', true);\n    // Do NOT call eventBus.finished() here — execute()'s finally block\n    // owns the finished() signal, and calling it twice risks closing\n    // the queue mid-event-flush on the primary processEvents loop.\n  }\n\n  private publishInitialTask(\n    eventBus: ExecutionEventBus,\n    taskId: string,\n    contextId: string,\n    userMessage: Message\n  ): void {\n    const task: Task = {\n      kind: 'task',\n      id: taskId,\n      contextId,\n      status: {\n        state: 'working',\n        timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),\n      },\n      history: [userMessage],\n    };\n    eventBus.publish(task);\n  }\n\n  private publishStatus(\n    eventBus: ExecutionEventBus,\n    taskId: string,\n    contextId: string,\n    state: TaskStatusUpdateEvent['status']['state'],\n    final: boolean\n  ): void {\n    const event: TaskStatusUpdateEvent = {\n      kind: 'status-update',\n      taskId,\n      contextId,\n      status: {\n        state,\n        timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),\n      },\n      final,\n    };\n    eventBus.publish(event);\n  }\n\n  private publishArtifact(\n    eventBus: ExecutionEventBus,\n    taskId: string,\n    contextId: string,\n    classified: ClassifiedResult\n  ): void {\n    const artifactName =\n      classified.kind === 'success' ? 'result' : classified.kind === 'submitted' ? 'submitted' : 'error';\n    // DataPart `data` is the AdCP tool's typed response — no\n    // transport-level fields injected here so the payload still\n    // validates against the tool's AdCP response schema. AdCP\n    // transport metadata (`adcp_task_id` pointing at the async handle)\n    // rides on `artifact.metadata` per A2A 0.3.0's extension\n    // convention.\n    const artifact: Artifact = {\n      artifactId: randomUUID(),\n      name: artifactName,\n      parts: [{ kind: 'data', data: classified.data }],\n      ...(classified.kind === 'submitted' && {\n        metadata: { adcp_task_id: classified.adcpTaskId },\n      }),\n    };\n    const event: TaskArtifactUpdateEvent = {\n      kind: 'artifact-update',\n      taskId,\n      contextId,\n      artifact,\n      append: false,\n      lastChunk: true,\n    };\n    eventBus.publish(event);\n  }\n\n  private emitFailure(\n    eventBus: ExecutionEventBus,\n    taskId: string,\n    contextId: string,\n    payload: { reason: string; message: string }\n  ): void {\n    const artifact: Artifact = {\n      artifactId: randomUUID(),\n      name: 'error',\n      parts: [{ kind: 'data', data: payload }],\n    };\n    eventBus.publish({\n      kind: 'artifact-update',\n      taskId,\n      contextId,\n      artifact,\n      append: false,\n      lastChunk: true,\n    } satisfies TaskArtifactUpdateEvent);\n    this.publishStatus(eventBus, taskId, contextId, 'failed', true);\n  }\n}\n\nfunction isToolNotRegistered(err: unknown, toolName: string): boolean {\n  return err instanceof Error && err.message.includes(`tool \"${toolName}\" is not registered`);\n}\n\nfunction a2aSkillToServerToolNames(skill: string): string[] {\n  return skill === 'tasks/get' ? ['tasks_get', 'tasks/get'] : [skill];\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Agent card\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nconst DEFAULT_MODES = ['application/json'] as const;\nconst DEFAULT_PROTOCOL_VERSION = '0.3.0';\nconst PUBLIC_AGENT_CARD_EXCLUDED_SKILLS = new Set(['get_adcp_capabilities', 'comply_test_controller']);\n\n/**\n * Derive one `AgentSkill` per registered AdCP tool. Skills without\n * seller-supplied descriptions get a generic one pointing at the\n * AdCP tool name — enough to pass A2A registry validation; sellers\n * are expected to enrich via `agentCard.skills` in production.\n */\nfunction deriveSkills(toolNames: string[]): AgentSkill[] {\n  const publicNames = new Set(toolNames.map(toA2ASkillName));\n  return [...publicNames].map(name => ({\n    id: name,\n    name,\n    description: `AdCP tool: ${name}. Send { skill: \"${name}\", input: { ... } } as a DataPart.`,\n    tags: ['adcp'],\n  }));\n}\n\nfunction toA2ASkillName(toolName: string): string {\n  return toolName === 'tasks_get' ? 'tasks/get' : toolName;\n}\n\nfunction listRegisteredTools(server: AdcpServer): string[] {\n  const sdk = getSdkServer(server);\n  if (!sdk) return [];\n  return listRegisteredToolNames(sdk).filter(name => !PUBLIC_AGENT_CARD_EXCLUDED_SKILLS.has(name));\n}\n\nfunction filterPublicAgentCardSkills(skills: AgentSkill[]): AgentSkill[] {\n  return skills.filter(skill => {\n    const id = typeof skill.id === 'string' ? skill.id : undefined;\n    const name = typeof skill.name === 'string' ? skill.name : undefined;\n    return !(\n      (id != null && PUBLIC_AGENT_CARD_EXCLUDED_SKILLS.has(id)) ||\n      (name != null && PUBLIC_AGENT_CARD_EXCLUDED_SKILLS.has(name))\n    );\n  });\n}\n\nfunction buildAgentCard(server: AdcpServer, overrides: A2AAgentCardOverrides): AgentCard {\n  const tools = listRegisteredTools(server);\n  const skills = filterPublicAgentCardSkills(overrides.skills ?? deriveSkills(tools));\n\n  const card: AgentCard = {\n    name: overrides.name,\n    description: overrides.description,\n    url: overrides.url,\n    version: overrides.version,\n    protocolVersion: overrides.protocolVersion ?? DEFAULT_PROTOCOL_VERSION,\n    defaultInputModes: overrides.defaultInputModes ?? [...DEFAULT_MODES],\n    defaultOutputModes: overrides.defaultOutputModes ?? [...DEFAULT_MODES],\n    capabilities: overrides.capabilities ?? {\n      streaming: false,\n      pushNotifications: false,\n    },\n    skills,\n    ...(overrides.provider && { provider: overrides.provider }),\n    ...(overrides.documentationUrl && { documentationUrl: overrides.documentationUrl }),\n    ...(overrides.iconUrl && { iconUrl: overrides.iconUrl }),\n    ...(overrides.securitySchemes && { securitySchemes: overrides.securitySchemes }),\n    ...(overrides.security && { security: overrides.security }),\n    ...(overrides.preferredTransport && { preferredTransport: overrides.preferredTransport }),\n  };\n\n  validateAgentCard(card);\n  return card;\n}\n\n/**\n * Fail loud at adapter construction when the merged card misses\n * A2A-required fields. The SDK would reject the discovery response\n * at runtime anyway — better to catch it at boot so the agent never\n * binds a port with an unserviceable card.\n */\nfunction validateAgentCard(card: AgentCard): void {\n  const missing: string[] = [];\n  if (!card.name) missing.push('name');\n  if (!card.description) missing.push('description');\n  if (!card.url) missing.push('url');\n  if (!card.version) missing.push('version');\n  if (!card.protocolVersion) missing.push('protocolVersion');\n  if (!card.capabilities) missing.push('capabilities');\n  if (!Array.isArray(card.defaultInputModes) || card.defaultInputModes.length === 0) {\n    missing.push('defaultInputModes');\n  }\n  if (!Array.isArray(card.defaultOutputModes) || card.defaultOutputModes.length === 0) {\n    missing.push('defaultOutputModes');\n  }\n  if (!Array.isArray(card.skills)) missing.push('skills');\n  if (missing.length > 0) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `createA2AAdapter: agent card is missing required fields — ${missing.join(', ')}. ` +\n        `Supply them via options.agentCard so A2A discovery doesn't fail at runtime.`\n    );\n  }\n  if (Array.isArray(card.skills) && card.skills.length === 0) {\n    throw new Error(\n      'createA2AAdapter: agent card has no skills — register AdCP handlers on the server (or supply options.agentCard.skills) before creating the adapter.'\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Public entry point\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nconst DEFAULT_LOGGER: AdcpLogger = {\n  debug: (m, d) => console.debug(m, d ?? ''),\n  info: (m, d) => console.info(m, d ?? ''),\n  warn: (m, d) => console.warn(m, d ?? ''),\n  error: (m, d) => console.error(m, d ?? ''),\n};\n\n/**\n * Create an A2A transport adapter around an `AdcpServer`.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * const adcp = createAdcpServer({ mediaBuy: { getProducts: async () => ({ products: [] }) } });\n * const a2a = createA2AAdapter({\n *   server: adcp,\n *   agentCard: {\n *     name: 'Acme SSP',\n *     description: 'Guaranteed + non-guaranteed display inventory',\n *     url: 'https://ssp.acme.com/a2a',\n *     version: '1.0.0',\n *     provider: { organization: 'Acme', url: 'https://acme.com' },\n *     securitySchemes: { bearer: { type: 'http', scheme: 'bearer' } },\n *   },\n *   async authenticate(req) {\n *     const token = extractBearer(req);\n *     return token ? { token, clientId: 'buyer_123', scopes: [] } : null;\n *   },\n * });\n *\n * app.use('/a2a', a2a.jsonRpcHandler);\n * app.use('/.well-known/agent-card.json', a2a.agentCardHandler);\n * ```\n *\n * @preview — see the module docstring.\n */\nexport function createA2AAdapter(options: A2AAdapterOptions): A2AAdapter {\n  const logger = options.logger ?? DEFAULT_LOGGER;\n  const card = buildAgentCard(options.server, options.agentCard);\n  const taskStore = options.taskStore ?? new SdkInMemoryTaskStore();\n  const executor = new AdcpA2AAgentExecutor(options.server, logger);\n  const eventBusManager = new DefaultExecutionEventBusManager();\n  const requestHandler = new DefaultRequestHandler(card, taskStore, executor, eventBusManager);\n\n  const userBuilder = async (req: Request): Promise<User> => {\n    if (!options.authenticate) return buildAnonymousUser();\n    const authInfo = await options.authenticate(req);\n    if (authInfo == null) {\n      // Throwing an A2AError with an authentication code would give the\n      // SDK's JSON-RPC envelope the right shape, but the SDK keeps\n      // `A2AError` internal — surfacing as a thrown Error yields a\n      // generic -32000 server error, which is still closer to the\n      // right signal than silently continuing anonymously. Most\n      // deployments should reject before the UserBuilder via upstream\n      // middleware (e.g. `express-jwt`); auth via the UserBuilder is\n      // the fallback path.\n      throw new Error('A2A authentication failed');\n    }\n    return buildAuthenticatedUser(authInfo);\n  };\n\n  const jsonRpc = jsonRpcHandler({ requestHandler, userBuilder });\n  const agentCardMiddleware = agentCardHandler({ agentCardProvider: requestHandler });\n\n  // Derive the default basePath from the agent-card URL's pathname so\n  // `mount(app)` \"just works\" for the common case where the URL the\n  // seller advertised and the URL their app serves are aligned.\n  // Falls back to `/a2a` when the URL has no path (empty or `/`).\n  const defaultBasePath = (() => {\n    try {\n      const parsed = new URL(card.url);\n      const pathname = parsed.pathname.replace(/\\/+$/, '');\n      return pathname.length > 0 ? pathname : '/a2a';\n    } catch {\n      // `agentCard.url` might be a relative path or otherwise unparseable\n      // — fall back to the conventional A2A mount point.\n      return '/a2a';\n    }\n  })();\n\n  const mount = (app: ExpressAppLike, mountOptions: A2AMountOptions = {}): void => {\n    const basePath = mountOptions.basePath ?? defaultBasePath;\n    const wellKnownAtRoot = mountOptions.wellKnownAtRoot ?? true;\n    // A2A SDK clients derive `${agentCard.url}/.well-known/agent-card.json`\n    // for discovery, so mount there first.\n    app.use(`${basePath}/.well-known/agent-card.json`, agentCardMiddleware);\n    if (wellKnownAtRoot) {\n      // Origin-root is where simple \"what agent lives at this host?\"\n      // probes look. 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Streaming (`message/stream`),\n * push notifications, and mid-flight `input-required` interrupts are\n * explicit \"not yet\" — see `docs/guides/BUILD-AN-AGENT.md`.\n *\n * **Handler-return → A2A `Task.state` mapping:**\n *\n * | Handler returned…                   | A2A `Task.state`  | Artifact payload                                 |\n * |-------------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------------------------------------|\n * | Success arm                         | `completed`       | DataPart with the typed AdCP response            |\n * | Submitted arm (`status:'submitted'`)| `completed` [^1]  | DataPart with AdCP response + `metadata.adcp_task_id` |\n * | Error arm (`errors:[]`)             | `failed`          | DataPart with the AdCP Error arm payload         |\n * | `adcpError()` envelope              | `failed`          | DataPart with `adcp_error`                       |\n *\n * [^1]: A2A `submitted` is the INITIAL lifecycle state (before\n * `working`); A2A `completed` marks the transport call as done.\n * When the AdCP handler returns a Submitted arm the HTTP call itself\n * has completed — the AdCP-level async work is queued and buyers\n * resume it via `adcp_task_id` on `artifact.metadata`. The DataPart's\n * `data` still carries `status: 'submitted'` from the AdCP response,\n * so a buyer reading the artifact payload sees the ad-tech state\n * directly; the A2A Task.state only mirrors whether the transport\n * call itself terminated.\n *\n * **Message shape.** A client addresses a tool by sending a `Message`\n * with a single `DataPart`: `{ kind: 'data', data: { skill, input } }`.\n * `skill` must match a registered AdCP tool name (e.g. `get_products`);\n * `input` becomes the tool arguments before AdCP schema validation\n * runs. The older client convention `{ skill, parameters }` (used by\n * `src/lib/protocols/a2a.ts`) is also accepted — `data.parameters` is\n * treated as an alias for `data.input`; new callers should prefer\n * `input` since A2A `DataPart.data` is free-form and `input` matches\n * the AdCP tool's typed request shape.\n *\n * **Two lifecycles, one response.** A2A's `Task.state` tracks the\n * TRANSPORT call (did the HTTP request complete?). AdCP's `status`\n * inside the artifact tracks the WORK (submitted / completed /\n * failed). Don't conflate them: a `completed` A2A task can carry a\n * `submitted` AdCP response, meaning the call returned successfully\n * but the ad-tech operation itself is still queued. Buyers resume the\n * AdCP work via the `adcp_task_id` on the artifact's `metadata`, not\n * by re-polling the A2A Task.\n *\n * @preview v0 surface — field semantics may shift while the ecosystem\n * converges on AdCP-over-A2A conventions. Pinning a minor version is\n * recommended.\n */\n\nimport {\n  type AgentExecutor,\n  type ExecutionEventBus,\n  type RequestContext,\n  type TaskStore,\n  type User,\n  type UnauthenticatedUser,\n  DefaultRequestHandler,\n  InMemoryTaskStore as SdkInMemoryTaskStore,\n  DefaultExecutionEventBusManager,\n} from '@a2a-js/sdk/server';\nimport { jsonRpcHandler, agentCardHandler } from '@a2a-js/sdk/server/express';\nimport type {\n  AgentCard,\n  AgentCapabilities,\n  AgentProvider,\n  AgentSkill,\n  Artifact,\n  DataPart,\n  Message,\n  SecurityScheme,\n  Task,\n  TaskArtifactUpdateEvent,\n  TaskStatusUpdateEvent,\n} from '@a2a-js/sdk';\nimport type { Request, RequestHandler } from 'express';\nimport { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';\nimport { getSdkServer, listRegisteredToolNames, type AdcpAuthInfo, type AdcpServer } from './adcp-server';\nimport type { McpToolResponse } from './responses';\nimport type { AdcpLogger } from './create-adcp-server';\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Public types\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Agent-card identity fields the adapter can't derive automatically.\n * Auto-seeded fields (`capabilities`, `skills`, `defaultInputModes`,\n * `defaultOutputModes`, `protocolVersion`, `additionalInterfaces`) may\n * be overridden by passing them here; the merged card is validated\n * against A2A's required-field set at boot.\n */\nexport interface A2AAgentCardOverrides {\n  /** Human-readable agent name (required). */\n  name: string;\n  /** Human-readable description (required). */\n  description: string;\n  /** Agent URL — the endpoint A2A clients connect to (required). */\n  url: string;\n  /** Agent version (required). */\n  version: string;\n\n  provider?: AgentProvider;\n  documentationUrl?: string;\n  iconUrl?: string;\n  securitySchemes?: { [k: string]: SecurityScheme };\n  security?: { [k: string]: string[] }[];\n  preferredTransport?: string;\n\n  /**\n   * Override the auto-generated capabilities. The adapter sets\n   * `streaming: false` and `pushNotifications: false` by default (v0\n   * ships neither). Set `streaming: true` if you wire a downstream\n   * extension; the adapter still won't emit `TaskStatusUpdateEvent`s\n   * on the stream path in v0.\n   */\n  capabilities?: AgentCapabilities;\n\n  /**\n   * Override the auto-generated skills list. When omitted the adapter\n   * derives one `AgentSkill` per registered AdCP tool from the server's\n   * capability object. Supply this to add descriptions, examples, tags,\n   * or per-skill input/output modes the SDK can't infer. Framework-private\n   * tools such as `comply_test_controller` are still filtered from the public\n   * A2A agent card.\n   */\n  skills?: AgentSkill[];\n\n  defaultInputModes?: string[];\n  defaultOutputModes?: string[];\n  protocolVersion?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Options for {@link createA2AAdapter}.\n *\n * **Auth posture.** `authenticate(req)` runs BEFORE the tool handler\n * sees the request. Return an `AdcpAuthInfo` to let the pipeline\n * proceed with that principal; return `null` (or throw) to reject.\n * A rejection currently surfaces as a generic JSON-RPC `-32000`\n * server error — the `@a2a-js/sdk` doesn't yet expose a typed\n * authentication-failed code for the `UserBuilder` path. Production\n * deployments SHOULD wire upstream middleware (e.g. `express-jwt`) to\n * reject with a proper HTTP 401 / WWW-Authenticate challenge before\n * the request reaches `jsonRpcHandler`. The `authenticate` option\n * here is a last-line-of-defense guard, not the primary auth surface.\n *\n * **Agent-card `securitySchemes`.** The `agentCard.securitySchemes`\n * you provide is served verbatim at `/.well-known/agent-card.json` —\n * only put non-secret discovery data there (token endpoint, scopes,\n * OIDC issuer URL). Never paste client secrets, private JWKS, or\n * internal URLs into the card. The SDK doesn't schema-validate\n * `securitySchemes` at boot (v0 check is required-field presence\n * only), so a hand-crafted malformed entry will ship as-written.\n *\n * Omitting `authenticate` makes the adapter anonymous — handlers see\n * `ctx.authInfo === undefined`, matching `serve({ authenticate: undefined })`.\n */\nexport interface A2AAdapterOptions {\n  /** AdCP server whose registered tools this adapter exposes over A2A. */\n  server: AdcpServer;\n\n  /**\n   * Authenticate an inbound A2A request. Transport-level auth runs\n   * before `AdcpServer.invoke()` so the framework pipeline sees a\n   * verified `authInfo`. Return `null` (or throw) to reject.\n   */\n  authenticate?: (req: Request) => Promise<AdcpAuthInfo | null>;\n\n  /** Seller-supplied agent-card identity fields. Required. */\n  agentCard: A2AAgentCardOverrides;\n\n  /**\n   * A2A task store. Defaults to the SDK's `InMemoryTaskStore`.\n   * Persistent deployments should supply a durable implementation\n   * (e.g. a Postgres-backed `TaskStore`).\n   */\n  taskStore?: TaskStore;\n\n  /** Optional logger. Falls back to `console`. */\n  logger?: AdcpLogger;\n}\n\n/** Minimal Express app surface the adapter's `mount()` helper needs. */\nexport interface ExpressAppLike {\n  use(path: string, ...handlers: RequestHandler[]): unknown;\n}\n\n/** Options for {@link A2AAdapter.mount}. */\nexport interface A2AMountOptions {\n  /**\n   * URL-path prefix for the JSON-RPC endpoint. Defaults to the pathname\n   * of the agent card's `url` field (so `url: 'https://host/a2a'` mounts\n   * JSON-RPC at `/a2a`). Override to mount under a different path.\n   */\n  basePath?: string;\n  /**\n   * When true (default), also mounts the agent card at the origin root\n   * (`/.well-known/agent-card.json`) so simple discovery probes targeting\n   * the host itself find the card. Some deployments disable this when an\n   * upstream proxy owns origin-root routes — set `false` to mount only\n   * at `{basePath}/.well-known/agent-card.json`.\n   */\n  wellKnownAtRoot?: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Value returned by {@link createA2AAdapter}.\n *\n * For almost every seller, `adapter.mount(app)` is the right entry\n * point — it wires all four routes (JSON-RPC at the agent-card's\n * path, the agent card at both `{basePath}/.well-known/agent-card.json`\n * for A2A discovery and `/.well-known/agent-card.json` for origin-root\n * probes) with one call.\n *\n * The `jsonRpcHandler` and `agentCardHandler` fields stay exposed for\n * deployments that need finer control (mounting behind a custom auth\n * layer, serving the card from a CDN, testing).\n */\nexport interface A2AAdapter {\n  /** The A2A JSON-RPC middleware (`message/send`, `tasks/get`, `tasks/cancel`). */\n  jsonRpcHandler: RequestHandler;\n  /** The agent-card discovery GET middleware. */\n  agentCardHandler: RequestHandler;\n  /** Returns the merged, validated agent card. */\n  getAgentCard(): Promise<AgentCard>;\n  /**\n   * Wire all A2A routes onto an Express-compatible app in one call.\n   * Eliminates the \"card mounted at only one location\" footgun: the\n   * A2A SDK derives `${agentCard.url}/.well-known/agent-card.json` for\n   * discovery, while many clients also probe origin root — this helper\n   * satisfies both. See {@link A2AMountOptions} to override paths.\n   */\n  mount(app: ExpressAppLike, options?: A2AMountOptions): void;\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Internals\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Our `User` carries the full AdCP auth payload, not just the two\n * getters A2A's minimal `User` requires. The executor reads this back\n * out of `RequestContext.context.user`.\n */\ninterface A2AAdcpUser extends User {\n  readonly adcpAuthInfo?: AdcpAuthInfo;\n}\n\nfunction buildAuthenticatedUser(authInfo: AdcpAuthInfo): A2AAdcpUser {\n  const clientId = authInfo.clientId;\n  return {\n    get isAuthenticated() {\n      return true;\n    },\n    get userName() {\n      return clientId;\n    },\n    adcpAuthInfo: authInfo,\n  };\n}\n\nfunction buildAnonymousUser(): UnauthenticatedUser {\n  return {\n    get isAuthenticated() {\n      return false as const;\n    },\n    get userName() {\n      return 'anonymous';\n    },\n  };\n}\n\nfunction getAdcpAuthInfo(context: RequestContext['context']): AdcpAuthInfo | undefined {\n  const user = context?.user as A2AAdcpUser | undefined;\n  return user?.adcpAuthInfo;\n}\n\n/**\n * Extract the `{ skill, input }` pair from the inbound Message's parts.\n *\n * Convention: the client sends a single DataPart with\n * `{ skill: '<tool_name>', input: { ...args } }`. Reject anything else\n * — text-only payloads, files, multiple data parts — so buyers get a\n * deterministic error instead of silently-wrong routing.\n */\ninterface ExtractedInvocation {\n  skill: string;\n  input: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\nfunction extractInvocation(message: Message): ExtractedInvocation {\n  if (!Array.isArray(message.parts) || message.parts.length === 0) {\n    throw new A2AInvocationError('Message must carry at least one part with a `data` kind.');\n  }\n  const dataParts = message.parts.filter((p): p is DataPart => p?.kind === 'data');\n  if (dataParts.length === 0) {\n    throw new A2AInvocationError(\n      \"Message must include a DataPart with { skill, input } — text-only messages aren't routable to AdCP tools.\"\n    );\n  }\n  if (dataParts.length > 1) {\n    throw new A2AInvocationError(\n      'Message must include exactly one DataPart — multi-part invocations are not supported in v0.'\n    );\n  }\n  const firstDataPart = dataParts[0]!;\n  const rawData = firstDataPart.data;\n  // Guard before destructuring — a client sending `{ kind: 'data', data: null }`\n  // or `data: \"string\"` would otherwise TypeError on payload.skill and surface\n  // as a generic HANDLER_THREW instead of INVALID_INVOCATION.\n  if (rawData == null || typeof rawData !== 'object' || Array.isArray(rawData)) {\n    throw new A2AInvocationError('DataPart `data` must be an object containing { skill, input }.');\n  }\n  const payload = rawData as Record<string, unknown>;\n  const skill = payload.skill;\n  // Accept `parameters` as an alias for `input` — the in-tree A2A\n  // client (`src/lib/protocols/a2a.ts`) shipped first and uses\n  // `parameters`, so downstream agents already emit that key. Going\n  // forward prefer `input`: A2A `DataPart.data` is free-form JSON and\n  // `input` matches the AdCP tool's typed request shape. The alias\n  // stays for ecosystem compatibility; no deprecation timer in v0.\n  const input = payload.input ?? payload.parameters;\n  if (typeof skill !== 'string' || skill.length === 0) {\n    throw new A2AInvocationError('DataPart must include a non-empty string `skill` field naming the AdCP tool.');\n  }\n  if (input != null && (typeof input !== 'object' || Array.isArray(input))) {\n    throw new A2AInvocationError('DataPart `input` (or legacy `parameters`) must be an object (or omitted).');\n  }\n  return { skill, input: (input as Record<string, unknown>) ?? {} };\n}\n\n/** Thrown when an incoming Message doesn't match the AdCP-over-A2A convention. */\nexport class A2AInvocationError extends Error {\n  constructor(message: string) {\n    super(message);\n    this.name = 'A2AInvocationError';\n  }\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Executor — translates A2A execute() into adcpServer.invoke() + events\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Classify a framework-produced `McpToolResponse` so the executor knows\n * what A2A `Task.state` to publish.\n */\ntype ClassifiedResult =\n  | { kind: 'success'; data: Record<string, unknown> }\n  | { kind: 'submitted'; adcpTaskId: string; data: Record<string, unknown> }\n  | { kind: 'error_arm'; data: Record<string, unknown> }\n  | { kind: 'adcp_error'; data: Record<string, unknown> };\n\nfunction classifyResponse(res: McpToolResponse): ClassifiedResult {\n  const structured = (res.structuredContent ?? {}) as Record<string, unknown>;\n  if (res.isError === true) {\n    if (structured.adcp_error && typeof structured.adcp_error === 'object') {\n      return { kind: 'adcp_error', data: structured };\n    }\n    return { kind: 'error_arm', data: structured };\n  }\n  if (structured.status === 'submitted' && typeof structured.task_id === 'string') {\n    return { kind: 'submitted', adcpTaskId: structured.task_id, data: structured };\n  }\n  return { kind: 'success', data: structured };\n}\n\nclass AdcpA2AAgentExecutor implements AgentExecutor {\n  // Cooperative-cancel flag. `DefaultRequestHandler.cancelTask` only\n  // calls our executor's `cancelTask` while an execute() is in-flight\n  // (eventBus still open); post-completion cancels are handled by the\n  // SDK directly against the task store. So this set only holds\n  // taskIds that currently have a pending `cancelTask`, and execute()\n  // always clears its entry at the end — no unbounded growth.\n  private readonly canceled = new Set<string>();\n\n  // A2A `Task.id` → original `contextId`. Populated when execute()\n  // starts so `cancelTask` can emit a well-formed status-update event\n  // against the same contextId instead of guessing an empty string.\n  // Cleared alongside the canceled flag in execute()'s finally block.\n  private readonly taskContextIds = new Map<string, string>();\n\n  constructor(\n    private readonly server: AdcpServer,\n    private readonly logger: AdcpLogger\n  ) {}\n\n  async execute(requestContext: RequestContext, eventBus: ExecutionEventBus): Promise<void> {\n    const { taskId, contextId, userMessage } = requestContext;\n    const authInfo = getAdcpAuthInfo(requestContext.context);\n\n    this.taskContextIds.set(taskId, contextId);\n    try {\n      // Register the task with the ResultManager by publishing a Task\n      // event first — subsequent status-update / artifact-update events\n      // only resolve if the manager has seen the task. `working` is the\n      // initial state; we replace it with completed / submitted / failed\n      // once the handler returns.\n      this.publishInitialTask(eventBus, taskId, contextId, userMessage);\n\n      let invocation: ExtractedInvocation;\n      try {\n        invocation = extractInvocation(userMessage);\n      } catch (err) {\n        const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Invalid A2A invocation';\n        this.emitFailure(eventBus, taskId, contextId, {\n          reason: 'INVALID_INVOCATION',\n          message,\n        });\n        return;\n      }\n\n      let response: McpToolResponse | undefined;\n      const toolNames = a2aSkillToServerToolNames(invocation.skill);\n      let invokedToolName: string | undefined;\n      try {\n        for (const toolName of toolNames) {\n          try {\n            invokedToolName = toolName;\n            response = await this.server.invoke({\n              // Platform servers register `tasks_get`; older/custom A2A\n              // fixtures may still register the slash name directly.\n              toolName,\n              args: invocation.input,\n              ...(authInfo && { authInfo }),\n            });\n            break;\n          } catch (err) {\n            if (toolName === 'tasks_get' && invocation.skill === 'tasks/get' && isToolNotRegistered(err, toolName)) {\n              continue;\n            }\n            throw err;\n          }\n        }\n      } catch (err) {\n        const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);\n        this.logger.error('A2A adapter: handler invocation threw', {\n          toolName: invokedToolName ?? invocation.skill,\n          requestedToolName: invocation.skill,\n          error: message,\n        });\n        this.emitFailure(eventBus, taskId, contextId, {\n          reason: 'HANDLER_THREW',\n          message,\n        });\n        return;\n      }\n      if (response === undefined) {\n        this.emitFailure(eventBus, taskId, contextId, {\n          reason: 'HANDLER_THREW',\n          message: `No handler registered for ${invocation.skill}`,\n        });\n        return;\n      }\n\n      if (this.canceled.has(taskId)) {\n        this.publishStatus(eventBus, taskId, contextId, 'canceled', true);\n        return;\n      }\n\n      const classified = classifyResponse(response);\n      this.publishArtifact(eventBus, taskId, contextId, classified);\n      // A2A Task.state maps the TRANSPORT call lifecycle, not the AdCP\n      // work. A `submitted` AdCP arm means the HTTP call itself\n      // completed — the ad-tech work is queued, resumed via\n      // `adcp_task_id` on the artifact metadata. Emitting A2A\n      // `state: 'submitted'` with `final: true` would be a\n      // non-conformant transition per A2A 0.3.0 (`submitted` is the\n      // INITIAL state before `working`, never terminal). Buyers read\n      // the AdCP-level status from the artifact's `data.status` field.\n      this.publishStatus(\n        eventBus,\n        taskId,\n        contextId,\n        classified.kind === 'success' || classified.kind === 'submitted' ? 'completed' : 'failed',\n        true\n      );\n    } finally {\n      // Clean up per-task state regardless of path — the executor is\n      // long-lived (one per adapter instance), so any leak compounds.\n      this.canceled.delete(taskId);\n      this.taskContextIds.delete(taskId);\n      eventBus.finished();\n    }\n  }\n\n  async cancelTask(taskId: string, eventBus: ExecutionEventBus): Promise<void> {\n    this.canceled.add(taskId);\n    // `DefaultRequestHandler.cancelTask` only reaches us when execute()\n    // is still in-flight (eventBus still open). Publish the canceled\n    // status so the SDK's secondary `_processEvents` loop terminates;\n    // execute() will ALSO see the flag and short-circuit before\n    // publishing a success/failure status. The A2A event bus is\n    // idempotent on duplicate status publishes — whichever lands first\n    // wins the taskStore write.\n    const contextId = this.taskContextIds.get(taskId) ?? '';\n    this.publishStatus(eventBus, taskId, contextId, 'canceled', true);\n    // Do NOT call eventBus.finished() here — execute()'s finally block\n    // owns the finished() signal, and calling it twice risks closing\n    // the queue mid-event-flush on the primary processEvents loop.\n  }\n\n  private publishInitialTask(\n    eventBus: ExecutionEventBus,\n    taskId: string,\n    contextId: string,\n    userMessage: Message\n  ): void {\n    const task: Task = {\n      kind: 'task',\n      id: taskId,\n      contextId,\n      status: {\n        state: 'working',\n        timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),\n      },\n      history: [userMessage],\n    };\n    eventBus.publish(task);\n  }\n\n  private publishStatus(\n    eventBus: ExecutionEventBus,\n    taskId: string,\n    contextId: string,\n    state: TaskStatusUpdateEvent['status']['state'],\n    final: boolean\n  ): void {\n    const event: TaskStatusUpdateEvent = {\n      kind: 'status-update',\n      taskId,\n      contextId,\n      status: {\n        state,\n        timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),\n      },\n      final,\n    };\n    eventBus.publish(event);\n  }\n\n  private publishArtifact(\n    eventBus: ExecutionEventBus,\n    taskId: string,\n    contextId: string,\n    classified: ClassifiedResult\n  ): void {\n    const artifactName =\n      classified.kind === 'success' ? 'result' : classified.kind === 'submitted' ? 'submitted' : 'error';\n    // DataPart `data` is the AdCP tool's typed response — no\n    // transport-level fields injected here so the payload still\n    // validates against the tool's AdCP response schema. AdCP\n    // transport metadata (`adcp_task_id` pointing at the async handle)\n    // rides on `artifact.metadata` per A2A 0.3.0's extension\n    // convention.\n    const artifact: Artifact = {\n      artifactId: randomUUID(),\n      name: artifactName,\n      parts: [{ kind: 'data', data: classified.data }],\n      ...(classified.kind === 'submitted' && {\n        metadata: { adcp_task_id: classified.adcpTaskId },\n      }),\n    };\n    const event: TaskArtifactUpdateEvent = {\n      kind: 'artifact-update',\n      taskId,\n      contextId,\n      artifact,\n      append: false,\n      lastChunk: true,\n    };\n    eventBus.publish(event);\n  }\n\n  private emitFailure(\n    eventBus: ExecutionEventBus,\n    taskId: string,\n    contextId: string,\n    payload: { reason: string; message: string }\n  ): void {\n    const artifact: Artifact = {\n      artifactId: randomUUID(),\n      name: 'error',\n      parts: [{ kind: 'data', data: payload }],\n    };\n    eventBus.publish({\n      kind: 'artifact-update',\n      taskId,\n      contextId,\n      artifact,\n      append: false,\n      lastChunk: true,\n    } satisfies TaskArtifactUpdateEvent);\n    this.publishStatus(eventBus, taskId, contextId, 'failed', true);\n  }\n}\n\nfunction isToolNotRegistered(err: unknown, toolName: string): boolean {\n  return err instanceof Error && err.message.includes(`tool \"${toolName}\" is not registered`);\n}\n\nfunction a2aSkillToServerToolNames(skill: string): string[] {\n  return skill === 'tasks/get' ? ['tasks_get', 'tasks/get'] : [skill];\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Agent card\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nconst DEFAULT_MODES = ['application/json'] as const;\nconst DEFAULT_PROTOCOL_VERSION = '0.3.0';\nconst PUBLIC_AGENT_CARD_EXCLUDED_SKILLS = new Set(['get_adcp_capabilities', 'comply_test_controller']);\n\n/**\n * Derive one `AgentSkill` per registered AdCP tool. Skills without\n * seller-supplied descriptions get a generic one pointing at the\n * AdCP tool name — enough to pass A2A registry validation; sellers\n * are expected to enrich via `agentCard.skills` in production.\n */\nfunction deriveSkills(toolNames: string[]): AgentSkill[] {\n  const publicNames = new Set(toolNames.map(toA2ASkillName));\n  return [...publicNames].map(name => ({\n    id: name,\n    name,\n    description: `AdCP tool: ${name}. Send { skill: \"${name}\", input: { ... } } as a DataPart.`,\n    tags: ['adcp'],\n  }));\n}\n\nfunction toA2ASkillName(toolName: string): string {\n  return toolName === 'tasks_get' ? 'tasks/get' : toolName;\n}\n\nfunction listRegisteredTools(server: AdcpServer): string[] {\n  const sdk = getSdkServer(server);\n  if (!sdk) return [];\n  return listRegisteredToolNames(sdk).filter(name => !PUBLIC_AGENT_CARD_EXCLUDED_SKILLS.has(name));\n}\n\nfunction filterPublicAgentCardSkills(skills: AgentSkill[]): AgentSkill[] {\n  return skills.filter(skill => {\n    const id = typeof skill.id === 'string' ? skill.id : undefined;\n    const name = typeof skill.name === 'string' ? skill.name : undefined;\n    return !(\n      (id != null && PUBLIC_AGENT_CARD_EXCLUDED_SKILLS.has(id)) ||\n      (name != null && PUBLIC_AGENT_CARD_EXCLUDED_SKILLS.has(name))\n    );\n  });\n}\n\nfunction buildAgentCard(server: AdcpServer, overrides: A2AAgentCardOverrides): AgentCard {\n  const tools = listRegisteredTools(server);\n  const skills = filterPublicAgentCardSkills(overrides.skills ?? deriveSkills(tools));\n\n  const card: AgentCard = {\n    name: overrides.name,\n    description: overrides.description,\n    url: overrides.url,\n    version: overrides.version,\n    protocolVersion: overrides.protocolVersion ?? DEFAULT_PROTOCOL_VERSION,\n    defaultInputModes: overrides.defaultInputModes ?? [...DEFAULT_MODES],\n    defaultOutputModes: overrides.defaultOutputModes ?? [...DEFAULT_MODES],\n    capabilities: overrides.capabilities ?? {\n      streaming: false,\n      pushNotifications: false,\n    },\n    skills,\n    ...(overrides.provider && { provider: overrides.provider }),\n    ...(overrides.documentationUrl && { documentationUrl: overrides.documentationUrl }),\n    ...(overrides.iconUrl && { iconUrl: overrides.iconUrl }),\n    ...(overrides.securitySchemes && { securitySchemes: overrides.securitySchemes }),\n    ...(overrides.security && { security: overrides.security }),\n    ...(overrides.preferredTransport && { preferredTransport: overrides.preferredTransport }),\n  };\n\n  validateAgentCard(card);\n  return card;\n}\n\n/**\n * Fail loud at adapter construction when the merged card misses\n * A2A-required fields. The SDK would reject the discovery response\n * at runtime anyway — better to catch it at boot so the agent never\n * binds a port with an unserviceable card.\n */\nfunction validateAgentCard(card: AgentCard): void {\n  const missing: string[] = [];\n  if (!card.name) missing.push('name');\n  if (!card.description) missing.push('description');\n  if (!card.url) missing.push('url');\n  if (!card.version) missing.push('version');\n  if (!card.protocolVersion) missing.push('protocolVersion');\n  if (!card.capabilities) missing.push('capabilities');\n  if (!Array.isArray(card.defaultInputModes) || card.defaultInputModes.length === 0) {\n    missing.push('defaultInputModes');\n  }\n  if (!Array.isArray(card.defaultOutputModes) || card.defaultOutputModes.length === 0) {\n    missing.push('defaultOutputModes');\n  }\n  if (!Array.isArray(card.skills)) missing.push('skills');\n  if (missing.length > 0) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `createA2AAdapter: agent card is missing required fields — ${missing.join(', ')}. ` +\n        `Supply them via options.agentCard so A2A discovery doesn't fail at runtime.`\n    );\n  }\n  if (Array.isArray(card.skills) && card.skills.length === 0) {\n    throw new Error(\n      'createA2AAdapter: agent card has no skills — register AdCP handlers on the server (or supply options.agentCard.skills) before creating the adapter.'\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Public entry point\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nconst DEFAULT_LOGGER: AdcpLogger = {\n  debug: (m, d) => console.debug(m, d ?? ''),\n  info: (m, d) => console.info(m, d ?? ''),\n  warn: (m, d) => console.warn(m, d ?? ''),\n  error: (m, d) => console.error(m, d ?? ''),\n};\n\n/**\n * Create an A2A transport adapter around an `AdcpServer`.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * const adcp = createAdcpServer({ mediaBuy: { getProducts: async () => ({ products: [] }) } });\n * const a2a = createA2AAdapter({\n *   server: adcp,\n *   agentCard: {\n *     name: 'Acme SSP',\n *     description: 'Guaranteed + non-guaranteed display inventory',\n *     url: 'https://ssp.acme.com/a2a',\n *     version: '1.0.0',\n *     provider: { organization: 'Acme', url: 'https://acme.com' },\n *     securitySchemes: { bearer: { type: 'http', scheme: 'bearer' } },\n *   },\n *   async authenticate(req) {\n *     const token = extractBearer(req);\n *     return token ? { token, clientId: 'buyer_123', scopes: [] } : null;\n *   },\n * });\n *\n * app.use('/a2a', a2a.jsonRpcHandler);\n * app.use('/.well-known/agent-card.json', a2a.agentCardHandler);\n * ```\n *\n * @preview — see the module docstring.\n */\nexport function createA2AAdapter(options: A2AAdapterOptions): A2AAdapter {\n  const logger = options.logger ?? DEFAULT_LOGGER;\n  const card = buildAgentCard(options.server, options.agentCard);\n  const taskStore = options.taskStore ?? new SdkInMemoryTaskStore();\n  const executor = new AdcpA2AAgentExecutor(options.server, logger);\n  const eventBusManager = new DefaultExecutionEventBusManager();\n  const requestHandler = new DefaultRequestHandler(card, taskStore, executor, eventBusManager);\n\n  const userBuilder = async (req: Request): Promise<User> => {\n    if (!options.authenticate) return buildAnonymousUser();\n    const authInfo = await options.authenticate(req);\n    if (authInfo == null) {\n      // Throwing an A2AError with an authentication code would give the\n      // SDK's JSON-RPC envelope the right shape, but the SDK keeps\n      // `A2AError` internal — surfacing as a thrown Error yields a\n      // generic -32000 server error, which is still closer to the\n      // right signal than silently continuing anonymously. 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package/dist/lib/server/account-mode.mjs

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
-import { fileURLToPath as __adcpFileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { dirname as __adcpDirname } from 'node:path';
-import { createRequire as __adcpCreateRequire } from 'node:module';
-const __filename = __adcpFileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
-const __dirname = __adcpDirname(__filename);
-const require = __adcpCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
 import { AdcpError } from "./decisioning/async-outcome.mjs";
 function getAccountMode(account) {
   if (account == null || typeof account !== "object") return "live";

package/dist/lib/server/account-mode.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/server/account-mode.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Account-mode primitives for sandbox-authority enforcement of\n * `comply_test_controller` and other test-only surfaces.\n *\n * The hard rule: under no circumstances should the comply test\n * controller (or any test-only surface) operate on a `live`-mode\n * account. The flag must live on the resolved account, not on a\n * process-level env var — env vars are operator-error-prone proxies\n * for what is fundamentally an authority decision per principal.\n *\n * This module ships the type + helpers; auto-wiring into\n * `createAdcpServerFromPlatform`'s `complyTest` path lands in a\n * follow-up alongside mock-mode routing (#1435 Phase 2).\n *\n * @public\n */\n\nimport { AdcpError } from './decisioning/async-outcome';\n\n/**\n * Three operationally distinct account modes:\n *\n *   - `live`: production traffic. Adopter's upstream is truth. Test-only\n *     surfaces (comply controller, force_*, simulate_*) are denied.\n *   - `sandbox`: adopter's own test account. Their code path runs against\n *     their test infrastructure. Test-only surfaces are allowed.\n *   - `mock`: SDK-routed-to-mock-server. Adopter's code is bypassed; the\n *     SDK forwards to the mock upstream backend. Test-only surfaces are\n *     allowed.\n *\n * Default when unspecified: `live`. A missing or unknown `mode` reads\n * as production, fail-closed for any test-only dispatch.\n *\n * See `docs/proposals/lifecycle-state-and-sandbox-authority.md` for the\n * full three-mode design and Phase 1/2/3 rollout.\n */\nexport type AccountMode = 'live' | 'sandbox' | 'mock';\n\n/**\n * Reads `mode` off any account-shaped value, with back-compat for\n * the legacy `sandbox: boolean` field. Returns the explicit mode if\n * present; otherwise infers `'sandbox'` from `sandbox === true`;\n * otherwise `'live'`.\n *\n * Adopters that have not yet migrated to the `mode` field continue to\n * work — `account.sandbox === true` reads as sandbox mode through this\n * helper. New code should prefer `mode` directly.\n *\n * Prototype-pollution defense: both `mode` and `sandbox` are read via\n * `Object.hasOwn` rather than bare property access. Bare access traverses\n * the prototype chain, so an attacker who reaches a `__proto__`-via-merge\n * sink upstream (reachable in MCP envelope handling and similar deep-merge\n * sites) could stamp `Object.prototype.mode = 'sandbox'` and silently\n * downgrade every account's gate to a no-op. The own-property check makes\n * the gate immune to that class of attack regardless of upstream hardening.\n */\nexport function getAccountMode(account: unknown): AccountMode {\n  if (account == null || typeof account !== 'object') return 'live';\n  if (Object.hasOwn(account, 'mode')) {\n    const mode = (account as { mode?: unknown }).mode;\n    if (mode === 'live' || mode === 'sandbox' || mode === 'mock') return mode;\n  }\n  // Back-compat: legacy `sandbox: true` flag reads as `sandbox` mode.\n  if (Object.hasOwn(account, 'sandbox') && (account as { sandbox?: unknown }).sandbox === true) {\n    return 'sandbox';\n  }\n  return 'live';\n}\n\n/**\n * Predicate: is the account in a non-production mode that admits\n * test-only surfaces (comply controller, force_*, simulate_*)?\n *\n * Returns `true` for `mode === 'sandbox' | 'mock'` (or legacy\n * `sandbox: true`); `false` for `mode === 'live'` or any account\n * shape that doesn't carry the field.\n */\nexport function isSandboxOrMockAccount(account: unknown): boolean {\n  const mode = getAccountMode(account);\n  return mode === 'sandbox' || mode === 'mock';\n}\n\n/**\n * Throws an `AdcpError('PERMISSION_DENIED')` if the account is not in\n * a non-production mode. Use to gate dispatch of test-only surfaces.\n *\n * Fail-closed semantics:\n *   - `account === undefined` (no resolved account): throws.\n *   - `account.mode === 'live'` or unspecified + no `sandbox: true`:\n *     throws.\n *   - `account.mode === 'sandbox' | 'mock'` (or legacy `sandbox: true`):\n *     no-op, dispatch proceeds.\n *\n * The `details` payload carries `{ scope: 'sandbox-gate', tool? }` so\n * dashboards can distinguish gate-rejections from other permission\n * denials.\n *\n * **Resolver discipline.** The strength of this gate depends entirely on\n * how the adopter's `AccountStore.resolve` constructs its return value.\n * Resolvers MUST NOT spread untrusted input (request body, headers,\n * `ctx_metadata`, query params) into the resolved account — doing so lets\n * a buyer self-promote to `mode: 'sandbox'` and unlock test-only surfaces\n * on a live principal. Source `mode` (and `sandbox`) from a trusted store\n * keyed by the authenticated principal; never from request data.\n *\n * **opts.message must be a static string literal.** The message is echoed\n * on the wire inside the error envelope. Interpolating user-controlled\n * values into it creates a reflection sink (PII leakage, log injection,\n * downstream HTML rendering). Pick from a fixed set of messages keyed by\n * `tool` if you need variants.\n *\n * @param account The resolved account (typically `ctx.account` inside\n *   a tool dispatch). 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+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/server/account-mode.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Account-mode primitives for sandbox-authority enforcement of\n * `comply_test_controller` and other test-only surfaces.\n *\n * The hard rule: under no circumstances should the comply test\n * controller (or any test-only surface) operate on a `live`-mode\n * account. The flag must live on the resolved account, not on a\n * process-level env var — env vars are operator-error-prone proxies\n * for what is fundamentally an authority decision per principal.\n *\n * This module ships the type + helpers; auto-wiring into\n * `createAdcpServerFromPlatform`'s `complyTest` path lands in a\n * follow-up alongside mock-mode routing (#1435 Phase 2).\n *\n * @public\n */\n\nimport { AdcpError } from './decisioning/async-outcome';\n\n/**\n * Three operationally distinct account modes:\n *\n *   - `live`: production traffic. Adopter's upstream is truth. Test-only\n *     surfaces (comply controller, force_*, simulate_*) are denied.\n *   - `sandbox`: adopter's own test account. Their code path runs against\n *     their test infrastructure. Test-only surfaces are allowed.\n *   - `mock`: SDK-routed-to-mock-server. Adopter's code is bypassed; the\n *     SDK forwards to the mock upstream backend. Test-only surfaces are\n *     allowed.\n *\n * Default when unspecified: `live`. A missing or unknown `mode` reads\n * as production, fail-closed for any test-only dispatch.\n *\n * See `docs/proposals/lifecycle-state-and-sandbox-authority.md` for the\n * full three-mode design and Phase 1/2/3 rollout.\n */\nexport type AccountMode = 'live' | 'sandbox' | 'mock';\n\n/**\n * Reads `mode` off any account-shaped value, with back-compat for\n * the legacy `sandbox: boolean` field. Returns the explicit mode if\n * present; otherwise infers `'sandbox'` from `sandbox === true`;\n * otherwise `'live'`.\n *\n * Adopters that have not yet migrated to the `mode` field continue to\n * work — `account.sandbox === true` reads as sandbox mode through this\n * helper. New code should prefer `mode` directly.\n *\n * Prototype-pollution defense: both `mode` and `sandbox` are read via\n * `Object.hasOwn` rather than bare property access. Bare access traverses\n * the prototype chain, so an attacker who reaches a `__proto__`-via-merge\n * sink upstream (reachable in MCP envelope handling and similar deep-merge\n * sites) could stamp `Object.prototype.mode = 'sandbox'` and silently\n * downgrade every account's gate to a no-op. The own-property check makes\n * the gate immune to that class of attack regardless of upstream hardening.\n */\nexport function getAccountMode(account: unknown): AccountMode {\n  if (account == null || typeof account !== 'object') return 'live';\n  if (Object.hasOwn(account, 'mode')) {\n    const mode = (account as { mode?: unknown }).mode;\n    if (mode === 'live' || mode === 'sandbox' || mode === 'mock') return mode;\n  }\n  // Back-compat: legacy `sandbox: true` flag reads as `sandbox` mode.\n  if (Object.hasOwn(account, 'sandbox') && (account as { sandbox?: unknown }).sandbox === true) {\n    return 'sandbox';\n  }\n  return 'live';\n}\n\n/**\n * Predicate: is the account in a non-production mode that admits\n * test-only surfaces (comply controller, force_*, simulate_*)?\n *\n * Returns `true` for `mode === 'sandbox' | 'mock'` (or legacy\n * `sandbox: true`); `false` for `mode === 'live'` or any account\n * shape that doesn't carry the field.\n */\nexport function isSandboxOrMockAccount(account: unknown): boolean {\n  const mode = getAccountMode(account);\n  return mode === 'sandbox' || mode === 'mock';\n}\n\n/**\n * Throws an `AdcpError('PERMISSION_DENIED')` if the account is not in\n * a non-production mode. Use to gate dispatch of test-only surfaces.\n *\n * Fail-closed semantics:\n *   - `account === undefined` (no resolved account): throws.\n *   - `account.mode === 'live'` or unspecified + no `sandbox: true`:\n *     throws.\n *   - `account.mode === 'sandbox' | 'mock'` (or legacy `sandbox: true`):\n *     no-op, dispatch proceeds.\n *\n * The `details` payload carries `{ scope: 'sandbox-gate', tool? }` so\n * dashboards can distinguish gate-rejections from other permission\n * denials.\n *\n * **Resolver discipline.** The strength of this gate depends entirely on\n * how the adopter's `AccountStore.resolve` constructs its return value.\n * Resolvers MUST NOT spread untrusted input (request body, headers,\n * `ctx_metadata`, query params) into the resolved account — doing so lets\n * a buyer self-promote to `mode: 'sandbox'` and unlock test-only surfaces\n * on a live principal. Source `mode` (and `sandbox`) from a trusted store\n * keyed by the authenticated principal; never from request data.\n *\n * **opts.message must be a static string literal.** The message is echoed\n * on the wire inside the error envelope. Interpolating user-controlled\n * values into it creates a reflection sink (PII leakage, log injection,\n * downstream HTML rendering). Pick from a fixed set of messages keyed by\n * `tool` if you need variants.\n *\n * @param account The resolved account (typically `ctx.account` inside\n *   a tool dispatch). 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package/dist/lib/server/adcp-server.mjs

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
-import { fileURLToPath as __adcpFileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { dirname as __adcpDirname } from 'node:path';
-import { createRequire as __adcpCreateRequire } from 'node:module';
-const __filename = __adcpFileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
-const __dirname = __adcpDirname(__filename);
-const require = __adcpCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
 import { ADCP_VERSION } from "../version.mjs";
 const ADCP_SERVER_BRAND = /* @__PURE__ */ Symbol("ADCP_SERVER_BRAND");
 const ADCP_SDK_SERVER = /* @__PURE__ */ Symbol.for("@adcp/client.sdkServer");

package/dist/lib/server/adcp-server.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/server/adcp-server.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Opaque AdCP server handle.\n *\n * `createAdcpServer()` returns a value typed as `AdcpServer` rather than the\n * underlying `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk` `McpServer`. Two reasons:\n *\n *   1. **Dual-package hazard.** Re-exporting the SDK's `McpServer` type from\n *      our public API forces downstream consumers through a specific SDK\n *      resolution path (ESM or CJS). When a TypeScript ESM consumer\n *      imports `@adcp/sdk` (CJS) and separately imports the SDK (ESM),\n *      the two `McpServer` types are structurally identical but distinct\n *      — the SDK's private `_serverInfo` field breaks assignment\n *      compatibility between them. Owning the type on our side\n *      eliminates the hazard: `AdcpServer` resolves the same way for\n *      every consumer because it comes from a single package.\n *\n *   2. **Test ergonomics.** Downstream test harnesses have been reaching\n *      into `(server as any)._requestHandlers` and\n *      `server.server._requestHandlers` to dispatch tool calls in-process.\n *      `dispatchTestRequest()` moves that private-field access into a\n *      single encapsulated helper so consumers don't have to repeat it.\n *\n * To register additional tools or resources, configure them through\n * `createAdcpServer()`'s domain-grouped handler config. The opaque\n * surface intentionally doesn't expose `registerTool()` — keeping it off the\n * public API lets the framework own tool registration conventions\n * (idempotency, governance, validation, response shape).\n */\n\nimport type { McpServer } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/mcp.js';\nimport type { CallToolResult } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/types.js';\nimport type { McpToolResponse } from './responses';\nimport { ADCP_VERSION } from '../version';\n\n/**\n * Structural shape of an MCP transport the server can connect to.\n *\n * Matches `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/shared/transport.js` Transport without\n * importing it — keeping the SDK type off our public API surface.\n * `StreamableHTTPServerTransport`, `StdioServerTransport`, and\n * `InMemoryTransport` from the SDK all satisfy this shape.\n *\n * `message` / callback parameters are typed with `any` (not `unknown`) so\n * SDK-specific transports with narrower message types (JSONRPCMessage) are\n * assignable bi-directionally without forcing downstream consumers to\n * widen their own transport types.\n */\n// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\nexport interface AdcpServerTransport {\n  start(): Promise<void>;\n  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n  send(message: any, options?: any): Promise<void>;\n  close(): Promise<void>;\n  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n  onmessage?: (message: any, extra?: any) => void;\n  onclose?: () => void;\n  onerror?: (error: Error) => void;\n  sessionId?: string;\n  setProtocolVersion?: (version: string) => void;\n}\n\n/**\n * Request envelope accepted by `AdcpServer.dispatchTestRequest()`.\n *\n * Mirrors the JSON-RPC method/params shape so tests can target the same\n * methods the transport would — `tools/call`, `tools/list`, etc.\n */\nexport interface AdcpTestRequest {\n  method: string;\n  params?: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Typed variant of {@link AdcpTestRequest} for `tools/call`. Used by the\n * `dispatchTestRequest` overload that returns a typed `CallToolResult`.\n */\nexport interface AdcpTestToolsCallRequest {\n  method: 'tools/call';\n  params: { name: string; arguments?: Record<string, unknown> };\n}\n\n/**\n * Response returned by `AdcpServer.dispatchTestRequest()`.\n *\n * The shape depends on the `method` — for `tools/call` this is the\n * `CallToolResult` (content + structuredContent + optional isError);\n * for other methods it's the method-specific result. Left as `unknown`\n * so callers narrow with type guards or schema validation relevant to\n * the specific method they're dispatching.\n */\nexport type AdcpTestResponse = unknown;\n\n/**\n * Auth principal visible to handlers and `resolveAccount`. Mirrors the\n * shape `serve()` produces from its `authenticate` hook, and what the\n * A2A adapter's `authenticate` callback should return.\n */\nexport interface AdcpAuthInfo {\n  token: string;\n  clientId: string;\n  scopes: string[];\n  expiresAt?: number;\n  extra?: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Optional per-call overrides for `dispatchTestRequest()`. Lets tests\n * simulate transport-level state — most importantly the `authInfo` that\n * `serve()` populates from its `authenticate` hook — without spinning up\n * a real HTTP transport.\n */\nexport interface AdcpTestRequestExtras {\n  authInfo?: AdcpAuthInfo;\n  sessionId?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Arguments accepted by `AdcpServer.invoke()`. A transport adapter (MCP\n * `serve()`, `createA2AAdapter()`, etc.) authenticates the incoming\n * request, maps it to one of the registered AdCP tool names, then calls\n * this surface to run the framework pipeline (idempotency, account\n * resolution, validation, governance, response-union narrowing).\n */\nexport interface AdcpInvokeOptions {\n  /** AdCP tool name (`get_products`, `create_media_buy`, ...). */\n  toolName: string;\n  /** Tool arguments as received from the transport, pre-schema-validation. */\n  args: Record<string, unknown>;\n  /**\n   * Auth principal the transport produced from its `authenticate` hook.\n   * Handlers and `resolveAccount` see it as `ctx.authInfo`. Transports\n   * MUST verify the principal before calling `invoke()` — `invoke()`\n   * does NOT re-check the token.\n   */\n  authInfo?: AdcpAuthInfo;\n  /** Abort signal for cancellation; defaults to a fresh controller. */\n  signal?: AbortSignal;\n}\n\n/**\n * Test-harness hooks attached to every `AdcpServer`. Namespaced under\n * `compliance` so production code paths don't accidentally reach for\n * them — `reset()` drops cached state and is intended for storyboard\n * runners that exercise many scenarios in one process.\n */\nexport interface AdcpServerComplianceApi {\n  /**\n   * Drop session state and the idempotency cache so subsequent\n   * storyboards don't inherit plans, media buys, or cached replies from\n   * earlier runs. Conformance storyboards share brand domains across\n   * test kits — without this hook, a $10K governance plan seeded by\n   * `media_buy_seller/governance_denied` would intercept a $50K buy in\n   * `sales_guaranteed`.\n   *\n   * Refuses to run by default unless BOTH guardrails hold:\n   *   - `NODE_ENV !== 'production'` (opt out with `allowProduction: true`)\n   *   - The configured stores are the in-memory SDK defaults\n   *     (`InMemoryStateStore` + memory idempotency backend). Opt out\n   *     with `force: true` when you've wired a disposable test\n   *     Postgres cluster and know the flush is safe.\n   *\n   * The two flags are independent on purpose: `force` lets you flush\n   * a non-memory store you've verified is a test DB, WITHOUT also\n   * opening the door to running against a production `NODE_ENV`.\n   * Same the other way: `allowProduction` lets you run in a prod-\n   * labeled CI environment against memory stores, without bypassing\n   * the store-shape safety check.\n   */\n  reset(options?: { force?: boolean; allowProduction?: boolean }): Promise<void>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Phantom brand for {@link AdcpServer}. Makes the type nominal — a plain\n * object that has the same methods structurally cannot be assigned to\n * `AdcpServer` because it lacks this symbol-keyed property. Closes the\n * door on `(plainObject as AdcpServer).registerTool(...)` patterns that\n * tried to reach for an MCP-SDK method the framework intentionally\n * doesn't expose.\n *\n * The brand is `never`-typed and never set on the runtime object, so\n * `Object.getOwnPropertySymbols(server)` won't expose it — only the\n * wrapper produced by `createAdcpServer()` carries the type-level\n * signature, via the `as AdcpServerInternal` cast in `wrapMcpServer()`.\n *\n * Must be a real (non-`declare`) const so the d.ts emit retains it. An\n * `export declare const X: unique symbol` in a `.ts` source file does\n * not survive emit — the binding gets dropped from the published d.ts\n * while consumers (the public `AdcpServer` interface) keep referencing\n * it, which produces `TS2304: Cannot find name 'ADCP_SERVER_BRAND'` on\n * any adopter `tsc --noEmit` against `@adcp/sdk/server` (issue #1236).\n */\nexport const ADCP_SERVER_BRAND: unique symbol = Symbol('ADCP_SERVER_BRAND');\n\n/**\n * Opaque handle returned by `createAdcpServer()`.\n *\n * Pass to `serve()` to mount on an HTTP transport, or use\n * `dispatchTestRequest()` from a test harness to exercise handlers\n * in-process without opening a socket.\n */\nexport interface AdcpServer {\n  /**\n   * Phantom brand — type-level only, never present at runtime. See\n   * {@link ADCP_SERVER_BRAND}. Tagged `never` so `(x as AdcpServer)`\n   * casts from structurally-similar objects fail; a real `AdcpServer`\n   * is only obtainable via `createAdcpServer()`.\n   */\n  readonly [ADCP_SERVER_BRAND]?: never;\n\n  /**\n   * Connect the server to an MCP transport.\n   *\n   * Takes ownership of the transport — any callbacks previously\n   * registered on it are replaced. Matches the semantics of the SDK's\n   * `McpServer.connect()`.\n   */\n  connect(transport: AdcpServerTransport): Promise<void>;\n\n  /** Close the server and release resources. */\n  close(): Promise<void>;\n\n  /**\n   * Test-harness hooks — see {@link AdcpServerComplianceApi}. Not\n   * intended for production call sites; production code paths should\n   * use `close()` to release resources.\n   */\n  readonly compliance: AdcpServerComplianceApi;\n\n  /**\n   * Invoke a registered handler in-process and return its response.\n   *\n   * Bypasses the transport layer — no sockets, no JSON-RPC framing.\n   * Intended for test harnesses only; production callers should go\n   * through a transport so protocol invariants (request ID linking,\n   * task progress, notifications) are enforced.\n   *\n   * Throws when no handler is registered for the requested method,\n   * or when a `tools/call` request targets an unknown tool. Arguments\n   * default to `{}` when `params.arguments` is omitted — a validation\n   * error from the tool's input schema (not from dispatch) is the\n   * expected failure mode for a missing required field.\n   *\n   * **Never mount this behind an HTTP route.** `extras.authInfo` is\n   * written directly onto the MCP handler's `extra` without any check\n   * against `serve({ authenticate })` — exposing it externally lets a\n   * caller impersonate any principal. This API is for in-process test\n   * harnesses and storyboard runners only.\n   *\n   * @example\n   * ```typescript\n   * const result = await server.dispatchTestRequest({\n   *   method: 'tools/call',\n   *   params: {\n   *     name: 'get_products',\n   *     arguments: { brief: 'premium sports inventory' },\n   *   },\n   * });\n   * ```\n   */\n  dispatchTestRequest(request: AdcpTestToolsCallRequest, extras?: AdcpTestRequestExtras): Promise<CallToolResult>;\n  dispatchTestRequest(request: AdcpTestRequest, extras?: AdcpTestRequestExtras): Promise<AdcpTestResponse>;\n\n  /**\n   * Production-safe tool invocation surface for transport adapters.\n   *\n   * Runs the full framework pipeline against a registered tool:\n   * request schema validation → account resolution → idempotency →\n   * handler dispatch → response narrowing → response validation.\n   * Returns the same `McpToolResponse` envelope the MCP transport\n   * observes — a transport adapter layers its own protocol framing on\n   * top (JSON-RPC result for MCP, A2A `Task` artifact for A2A, etc.).\n   *\n   * **Auth is the caller's responsibility.** `invoke()` forwards the\n   * provided `authInfo` verbatim to handlers and `resolveAccount`\n   * without re-verifying. Mount it only behind a transport that has\n   * already authenticated the principal (e.g. `serve({ authenticate })`\n   * for MCP, `createA2AAdapter({ authenticate })` for A2A). Do not call\n   * it directly from an HTTP handler — that path skips auth.\n   *\n   * For in-process tests that want to synthesize an `authInfo` without\n   * running a transport, reach for {@link dispatchTestRequest} instead\n   * — it takes the same principal shape but is explicitly marked\n   * test-only in its docstring.\n   *\n   * Throws when `toolName` is not registered; schema errors round-trip\n   * as structured `VALIDATION_ERROR` envelopes inside the return value.\n   */\n  invoke(options: AdcpInvokeOptions): Promise<McpToolResponse>;\n\n  /**\n   * Returns the AdCP protocol version this server is configured to speak.\n   *\n   * Defaults to {@link ADCP_VERSION} (the GA version the SDK ships against)\n   * unless overridden via `createAdcpServer({ adcpVersion })`. This is the\n   * protocol version, **not** the publisher's app version (`config.version`).\n   *\n   * Plumbing surface — Stage 2 of the multi-version refactor exposes the\n   * configured value but does not yet vary validator/schema selection by\n   * version. Wire-shape adapters key off this getter in subsequent stages.\n   */\n  getAdcpVersion(): string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Symbol-keyed accessor for the underlying SDK `McpServer`. Used by\n * `serve()` to reach through the opaque wrapper when SDK-specific\n * operations are needed. Not part of the public API — typed on a\n * separate internal interface so downstream consumers can't discover\n * it through the `AdcpServer` type.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport const ADCP_SDK_SERVER: unique symbol = Symbol.for('@adcp/client.sdkServer');\n\n/**\n * Symbol-keyed accessor for the state store backing an `AdcpServer`.\n * Test harnesses and helpers like\n * `@adcp/sdk/compliance-fixtures`'s `seedComplianceFixtures` need\n * to reach the store without widening the public `AdcpServer`\n * interface (handlers already get `ctx.store`; production code paths\n * don't need a second accessor).\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport const ADCP_STATE_STORE: unique symbol = Symbol.for('@adcp/client.stateStore');\n\n/**\n * Symbol-keyed accessor for the capabilities object `createAdcpServer`\n * assembles and the auto-wired `get_adcp_capabilities` handler reads from.\n * Mutating this object mutates what subsequent capability-discovery calls\n * return — `registerTestController` uses this to add a\n * `compliance_testing` capability block after registration so the server\n * advertises its controller scenarios even though `registerTestController`\n * runs after `createAdcpServer`.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport const ADCP_CAPABILITIES: unique symbol = Symbol.for('@adcp/client.capabilities');\n\n/** Per-request tool visibility policy consumed by transport adapters. @internal */\nexport const ADCP_TOOL_VISIBILITY: unique symbol = Symbol.for('@adcp/client.toolVisibility');\n\n/** @internal */\nexport type AdcpToolVisibilityResolver = (options: {\n  toolName: string;\n  authInfo?: AdcpAuthInfo;\n  input?: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;\n}) => boolean | Promise<boolean>;\n\n/** @internal */\nexport interface AdcpServerInternal extends AdcpServer {\n  readonly [ADCP_SDK_SERVER]: McpServer;\n  [ADCP_TOOL_VISIBILITY]?: AdcpToolVisibilityResolver;\n}\n\n/**\n * Return the underlying `McpServer` for a wrapped `AdcpServer`, or\n * `undefined` if the value is not an `AdcpServer` produced by\n * `createAdcpServer()`.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport function getSdkServer(server: AdcpServer | McpServer): McpServer | undefined {\n  const candidate = (server as unknown as Partial<AdcpServerInternal>)[ADCP_SDK_SERVER];\n  return candidate;\n}\n\n/** Attach a transport-independent per-request tool visibility policy. @internal */\nexport function setToolVisibilityResolver(server: AdcpServer, resolver: AdcpToolVisibilityResolver): void {\n  (server as AdcpServerInternal)[ADCP_TOOL_VISIBILITY] = resolver;\n}\n\n/** Resolve whether a registered tool may be exposed to this request. @internal */\nexport async function isRegisteredToolVisible(\n  server: AdcpServer,\n  options: Parameters<AdcpToolVisibilityResolver>[0]\n): Promise<boolean> {\n  const resolver = (server as AdcpServerInternal)[ADCP_TOOL_VISIBILITY];\n  return resolver ? resolver(options) : true;\n}\n\n/**\n * True when `value` is an `AdcpServer` produced by `createAdcpServer()`.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport function isAdcpServer(value: unknown): value is AdcpServerInternal {\n  return (\n    value != null &&\n    typeof value === 'object' &&\n    ADCP_SDK_SERVER in (value as Record<PropertyKey, unknown>) &&\n    typeof (value as AdcpServer).dispatchTestRequest === 'function'\n  );\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Private-field access — centralized\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n//\n// The MCP SDK marks `_requestHandlers` and `_registeredTools` as private.\n// Dispatching a request in-process from a test needs them. Doing it once\n// here means downstream harnesses don't each repeat the (server as any)\n// dance, which is the whole point of exposing `dispatchTestRequest()`.\n//\n// If/when the SDK ships a public in-process dispatch API, swap these two\n// helpers for that API. The AdcpServer surface stays the same.\n\ninterface RegisteredTool {\n  title?: string;\n  description?: string;\n  inputSchema?: unknown;\n  outputSchema?: unknown;\n  annotations?: unknown;\n  _meta?: Record<string, unknown>;\n  enabled?: boolean;\n  handler: (args: unknown, extra: unknown) => unknown | Promise<unknown>;\n}\n\ninterface McpServerPrivates {\n  _registeredTools?: Record<string, RegisteredTool | undefined>;\n  server?: {\n    _requestHandlers?: Map<\n      string,\n      (request: { method: string; params?: unknown }, extra: unknown) => unknown | Promise<unknown>\n    >;\n    _serverInfo?: { name: string; version: string; [key: string]: unknown };\n    _instructions?: string;\n  };\n}\n\n/** Tool metadata needed to mirror the registered AdCP surface into another official MCP transport. @internal */\nexport interface RegisteredToolDefinition {\n  name: string;\n  title?: string;\n  description?: string;\n  inputSchema?: unknown;\n  outputSchema?: unknown;\n  annotations?: unknown;\n  _meta?: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\n/** @internal */\ntype McpRequestHandler = (request: { method: string; params?: unknown }, extra: unknown) => unknown | Promise<unknown>;\n\n/**\n * Write the instructions string onto the low-level SDK server backing\n * `mcpServer`. Called by the async-function-form instructions hook to\n * inject the resolved string just before the MCP `initialize` response.\n *\n * @internal\n * @remarks Pokes an SDK private field — see the \"Private-field access\" note above.\n */\nexport function setSdkServerInstructions(mcpServer: McpServer, value: string | undefined): void {\n  const priv = mcpServer as unknown as McpServerPrivates;\n  if (priv.server) {\n    priv.server._instructions = value;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Wrap the `initialize` request handler on `mcpServer` so that `wrapper`\n * runs (and can await async work) before the original handler responds.\n * The wrapper receives the original handler as its first argument and must\n * call it to complete the handshake.\n *\n * The wrapper is invoked once per MCP `initialize` call on this server\n * instance. Under `serve({ reuseAgent: false })` the server is created\n * fresh per request, so the wrapper fires once per session. Under\n * `reuseAgent: true` the `ADCP_INSTRUCTIONS_FN` check in `serve.ts`\n * blocks the combination before the wrapper can be called a second time.\n *\n * @internal\n * @remarks Pokes an SDK private field — see the \"Private-field access\" note above.\n */\nexport function wrapInitializeHandler(\n  mcpServer: McpServer,\n  wrapper: (\n    origHandler: McpRequestHandler,\n    req: { method: string; params?: unknown },\n    extra: unknown\n  ) => unknown | Promise<unknown>\n): void {\n  const priv = mcpServer as unknown as McpServerPrivates;\n  const handlers = priv.server?._requestHandlers;\n  if (!handlers) return;\n  const orig = handlers.get('initialize');\n  if (!orig) return;\n  handlers.set('initialize', (req, extra) => wrapper(orig, req, extra));\n}\n\nfunction getRegisteredTool(server: McpServer, name: string): RegisteredTool | undefined {\n  return (server as unknown as McpServerPrivates)._registeredTools?.[name];\n}\n\n/**\n * Wrap a registered MCP tool handler without changing the tool definition\n * advertised by the SDK server.\n *\n * @internal\n * @remarks Pokes an SDK private field — see the \"Private-field access\" note above.\n */\nexport function wrapRegisteredToolHandler(\n  server: McpServer,\n  name: string,\n  wrapper: (orig: RegisteredTool['handler'], args: unknown, extra: unknown) => unknown | Promise<unknown>\n): boolean {\n  const tool = getRegisteredTool(server, name);\n  if (!tool) return false;\n  const orig = tool.handler;\n  tool.handler = (args, extra) => wrapper(orig, args, extra);\n  return true;\n}\n\n/**\n * Enumerate the tool names registered on the underlying SDK server.\n * Used by transport adapters that need to derive discovery metadata\n * (agent cards, capability listings) from the registered surface\n * without reaching into private SDK fields at every call site.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport function listRegisteredToolNames(server: McpServer): string[] {\n  const registered = (server as unknown as McpServerPrivates)._registeredTools ?? {};\n  return Object.keys(registered);\n}\n\n/**\n * Return enabled registered-tool metadata for the modern MCP server adapter.\n * Handler functions stay private; the adapter dispatches through\n * {@link AdcpServer.invoke} so the framework pipeline remains authoritative.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport function listRegisteredToolDefinitions(server: McpServer): RegisteredToolDefinition[] {\n  const registered = (server as unknown as McpServerPrivates)._registeredTools ?? {};\n  return Object.entries(registered).flatMap(([name, tool]) => {\n    if (!tool || tool.enabled === false) return [];\n    return [\n      {\n        name,\n        ...(tool.title !== undefined && { title: tool.title }),\n        ...(tool.description !== undefined && { description: tool.description }),\n        ...(tool.inputSchema !== undefined && { inputSchema: tool.inputSchema }),\n        ...(tool.outputSchema !== undefined && { outputSchema: tool.outputSchema }),\n        ...(tool.annotations !== undefined && { annotations: tool.annotations }),\n        ...(tool._meta !== undefined && { _meta: tool._meta }),\n      },\n    ];\n  });\n}\n\n/** Return the SDK server identity advertised during MCP discovery. @internal */\nexport function getSdkServerInfo(server: McpServer): { name: string; version: string; [key: string]: unknown } {\n  return (\n    (server as unknown as McpServerPrivates).server?._serverInfo ?? {\n      name: 'AdCP Server',\n      version: 'unknown',\n    }\n  );\n}\n\n/** Return static or already-resolved server instructions. @internal */\nexport function getSdkServerInstructions(server: McpServer): string | undefined {\n  return (server as unknown as McpServerPrivates).server?._instructions;\n}\n\nfunction getRequestHandler(\n  server: McpServer,\n  method: string\n): ((request: { method: string; params?: unknown }, extra: unknown) => unknown | Promise<unknown>) | undefined {\n  return (server as unknown as McpServerPrivates).server?._requestHandlers?.get(method);\n}\n\n/**\n * Wrap an SDK request handler such as `tools/list` while preserving the\n * original handler's request/extra contract.\n *\n * @internal\n * @remarks Pokes an SDK private field — see the \"Private-field access\" note above.\n */\nexport function wrapSdkRequestHandler(\n  server: McpServer,\n  method: string,\n  wrapper: (\n    orig: McpRequestHandler,\n    req: { method: string; params?: unknown },\n    extra: unknown\n  ) => unknown | Promise<unknown>\n): boolean {\n  const handlers = (server as unknown as McpServerPrivates).server?._requestHandlers;\n  const orig = handlers?.get(method);\n  if (!handlers || !orig) return false;\n  handlers.set(method, (req, extra) => wrapper(orig, req, extra));\n  return true;\n}\n\n/**\n * Wrap an SDK `McpServer` into the opaque `AdcpServer` handle returned by\n * `createAdcpServer()`. Consumers should prefer `createAdcpServer()` and\n * treat this as an internal utility; it's exported for framework code\n * that needs to produce an `AdcpServer` around a hand-built server.\n *\n * Idempotent — passing an already-wrapped `AdcpServer` returns it\n * unchanged rather than nesting wrappers (which would leave\n * `ADCP_SDK_SERVER` pointing at the outer wrapper instead of the SDK\n * handle and break `getSdkServer()` round-trips).\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport function wrapMcpServer(\n  inner: McpServer | AdcpServerInternal,\n  compliance?: AdcpServerComplianceApi,\n  adcpVersion: string = ADCP_VERSION\n): AdcpServerInternal {\n  if (isAdcpServer(inner)) return inner;\n  const mcp = inner as McpServer;\n  const resolvedCompliance: AdcpServerComplianceApi = compliance ?? {\n    async reset() {\n      throw new Error(\n        'AdcpServer.compliance.reset: no-op handle returned by `wrapMcpServer` without a compliance implementation. ' +\n          'Use `createAdcpServer()` to get a server whose `compliance.reset()` flushes the state and idempotency stores.'\n      );\n    },\n  };\n  const dispatch = async (request: AdcpTestRequest, extras?: AdcpTestRequestExtras): Promise<AdcpTestResponse> => {\n    const extra: { signal: AbortSignal; authInfo?: AdcpTestRequestExtras['authInfo']; sessionId?: string } = {\n      signal: new AbortController().signal,\n    };\n    if (extras?.authInfo) extra.authInfo = extras.authInfo;\n    if (extras?.sessionId) extra.sessionId = extras.sessionId;\n\n    if (request.method === 'tools/call') {\n      const params = (request.params ?? {}) as { name?: string; arguments?: Record<string, unknown> };\n      if (typeof params.name !== 'string') {\n        throw new Error(\"dispatchTestRequest: 'tools/call' requires params.name (string)\");\n      }\n      const tool = getRegisteredTool(mcp, params.name);\n      if (!tool) {\n        throw new Error(`dispatchTestRequest: tool \"${params.name}\" is not registered`);\n      }\n      return tool.handler(params.arguments ?? {}, extra);\n    }\n\n    const handler = getRequestHandler(mcp, request.method);\n    if (!handler) {\n      throw new Error(`dispatchTestRequest: no handler registered for method \"${request.method}\"`);\n    }\n    return handler({ method: request.method, params: request.params ?? {} }, extra);\n  };\n  const invoke = async (options: AdcpInvokeOptions): Promise<McpToolResponse> => {\n    const tool = getRegisteredTool(mcp, options.toolName);\n    if (!tool) {\n      throw new Error(`AdcpServer.invoke: tool \"${options.toolName}\" is not registered`);\n    }\n    const extra: { signal: AbortSignal; 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+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/server/adcp-server.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Opaque AdCP server handle.\n *\n * `createAdcpServer()` returns a value typed as `AdcpServer` rather than the\n * underlying `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk` `McpServer`. Two reasons:\n *\n *   1. **Dual-package hazard.** Re-exporting the SDK's `McpServer` type from\n *      our public API forces downstream consumers through a specific SDK\n *      resolution path (ESM or CJS). When a TypeScript ESM consumer\n *      imports `@adcp/sdk` (CJS) and separately imports the SDK (ESM),\n *      the two `McpServer` types are structurally identical but distinct\n *      — the SDK's private `_serverInfo` field breaks assignment\n *      compatibility between them. Owning the type on our side\n *      eliminates the hazard: `AdcpServer` resolves the same way for\n *      every consumer because it comes from a single package.\n *\n *   2. **Test ergonomics.** Downstream test harnesses have been reaching\n *      into `(server as any)._requestHandlers` and\n *      `server.server._requestHandlers` to dispatch tool calls in-process.\n *      `dispatchTestRequest()` moves that private-field access into a\n *      single encapsulated helper so consumers don't have to repeat it.\n *\n * To register additional tools or resources, configure them through\n * `createAdcpServer()`'s domain-grouped handler config. The opaque\n * surface intentionally doesn't expose `registerTool()` — keeping it off the\n * public API lets the framework own tool registration conventions\n * (idempotency, governance, validation, response shape).\n */\n\nimport type { McpServer } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/mcp.js';\nimport type { CallToolResult } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/types.js';\nimport type { McpToolResponse } from './responses';\nimport { ADCP_VERSION } from '../version';\n\n/**\n * Structural shape of an MCP transport the server can connect to.\n *\n * Matches `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/shared/transport.js` Transport without\n * importing it — keeping the SDK type off our public API surface.\n * `StreamableHTTPServerTransport`, `StdioServerTransport`, and\n * `InMemoryTransport` from the SDK all satisfy this shape.\n *\n * `message` / callback parameters are typed with `any` (not `unknown`) so\n * SDK-specific transports with narrower message types (JSONRPCMessage) are\n * assignable bi-directionally without forcing downstream consumers to\n * widen their own transport types.\n */\n// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\nexport interface AdcpServerTransport {\n  start(): Promise<void>;\n  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n  send(message: any, options?: any): Promise<void>;\n  close(): Promise<void>;\n  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n  onmessage?: (message: any, extra?: any) => void;\n  onclose?: () => void;\n  onerror?: (error: Error) => void;\n  sessionId?: string;\n  setProtocolVersion?: (version: string) => void;\n}\n\n/**\n * Request envelope accepted by `AdcpServer.dispatchTestRequest()`.\n *\n * Mirrors the JSON-RPC method/params shape so tests can target the same\n * methods the transport would — `tools/call`, `tools/list`, etc.\n */\nexport interface AdcpTestRequest {\n  method: string;\n  params?: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Typed variant of {@link AdcpTestRequest} for `tools/call`. Used by the\n * `dispatchTestRequest` overload that returns a typed `CallToolResult`.\n */\nexport interface AdcpTestToolsCallRequest {\n  method: 'tools/call';\n  params: { name: string; arguments?: Record<string, unknown> };\n}\n\n/**\n * Response returned by `AdcpServer.dispatchTestRequest()`.\n *\n * The shape depends on the `method` — for `tools/call` this is the\n * `CallToolResult` (content + structuredContent + optional isError);\n * for other methods it's the method-specific result. Left as `unknown`\n * so callers narrow with type guards or schema validation relevant to\n * the specific method they're dispatching.\n */\nexport type AdcpTestResponse = unknown;\n\n/**\n * Auth principal visible to handlers and `resolveAccount`. Mirrors the\n * shape `serve()` produces from its `authenticate` hook, and what the\n * A2A adapter's `authenticate` callback should return.\n */\nexport interface AdcpAuthInfo {\n  token: string;\n  clientId: string;\n  scopes: string[];\n  expiresAt?: number;\n  extra?: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Optional per-call overrides for `dispatchTestRequest()`. Lets tests\n * simulate transport-level state — most importantly the `authInfo` that\n * `serve()` populates from its `authenticate` hook — without spinning up\n * a real HTTP transport.\n */\nexport interface AdcpTestRequestExtras {\n  authInfo?: AdcpAuthInfo;\n  sessionId?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Arguments accepted by `AdcpServer.invoke()`. A transport adapter (MCP\n * `serve()`, `createA2AAdapter()`, etc.) authenticates the incoming\n * request, maps it to one of the registered AdCP tool names, then calls\n * this surface to run the framework pipeline (idempotency, account\n * resolution, validation, governance, response-union narrowing).\n */\nexport interface AdcpInvokeOptions {\n  /** AdCP tool name (`get_products`, `create_media_buy`, ...). */\n  toolName: string;\n  /** Tool arguments as received from the transport, pre-schema-validation. */\n  args: Record<string, unknown>;\n  /**\n   * Auth principal the transport produced from its `authenticate` hook.\n   * Handlers and `resolveAccount` see it as `ctx.authInfo`. Transports\n   * MUST verify the principal before calling `invoke()` — `invoke()`\n   * does NOT re-check the token.\n   */\n  authInfo?: AdcpAuthInfo;\n  /** Abort signal for cancellation; defaults to a fresh controller. */\n  signal?: AbortSignal;\n}\n\n/**\n * Test-harness hooks attached to every `AdcpServer`. Namespaced under\n * `compliance` so production code paths don't accidentally reach for\n * them — `reset()` drops cached state and is intended for storyboard\n * runners that exercise many scenarios in one process.\n */\nexport interface AdcpServerComplianceApi {\n  /**\n   * Drop session state and the idempotency cache so subsequent\n   * storyboards don't inherit plans, media buys, or cached replies from\n   * earlier runs. Conformance storyboards share brand domains across\n   * test kits — without this hook, a $10K governance plan seeded by\n   * `media_buy_seller/governance_denied` would intercept a $50K buy in\n   * `sales_guaranteed`.\n   *\n   * Refuses to run by default unless BOTH guardrails hold:\n   *   - `NODE_ENV !== 'production'` (opt out with `allowProduction: true`)\n   *   - The configured stores are the in-memory SDK defaults\n   *     (`InMemoryStateStore` + memory idempotency backend). Opt out\n   *     with `force: true` when you've wired a disposable test\n   *     Postgres cluster and know the flush is safe.\n   *\n   * The two flags are independent on purpose: `force` lets you flush\n   * a non-memory store you've verified is a test DB, WITHOUT also\n   * opening the door to running against a production `NODE_ENV`.\n   * Same the other way: `allowProduction` lets you run in a prod-\n   * labeled CI environment against memory stores, without bypassing\n   * the store-shape safety check.\n   */\n  reset(options?: { force?: boolean; allowProduction?: boolean }): Promise<void>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Phantom brand for {@link AdcpServer}. Makes the type nominal — a plain\n * object that has the same methods structurally cannot be assigned to\n * `AdcpServer` because it lacks this symbol-keyed property. Closes the\n * door on `(plainObject as AdcpServer).registerTool(...)` patterns that\n * tried to reach for an MCP-SDK method the framework intentionally\n * doesn't expose.\n *\n * The brand is `never`-typed and never set on the runtime object, so\n * `Object.getOwnPropertySymbols(server)` won't expose it — only the\n * wrapper produced by `createAdcpServer()` carries the type-level\n * signature, via the `as AdcpServerInternal` cast in `wrapMcpServer()`.\n *\n * Must be a real (non-`declare`) const so the d.ts emit retains it. An\n * `export declare const X: unique symbol` in a `.ts` source file does\n * not survive emit — the binding gets dropped from the published d.ts\n * while consumers (the public `AdcpServer` interface) keep referencing\n * it, which produces `TS2304: Cannot find name 'ADCP_SERVER_BRAND'` on\n * any adopter `tsc --noEmit` against `@adcp/sdk/server` (issue #1236).\n */\nexport const ADCP_SERVER_BRAND: unique symbol = Symbol('ADCP_SERVER_BRAND');\n\n/**\n * Opaque handle returned by `createAdcpServer()`.\n *\n * Pass to `serve()` to mount on an HTTP transport, or use\n * `dispatchTestRequest()` from a test harness to exercise handlers\n * in-process without opening a socket.\n */\nexport interface AdcpServer {\n  /**\n   * Phantom brand — type-level only, never present at runtime. See\n   * {@link ADCP_SERVER_BRAND}. Tagged `never` so `(x as AdcpServer)`\n   * casts from structurally-similar objects fail; a real `AdcpServer`\n   * is only obtainable via `createAdcpServer()`.\n   */\n  readonly [ADCP_SERVER_BRAND]?: never;\n\n  /**\n   * Connect the server to an MCP transport.\n   *\n   * Takes ownership of the transport — any callbacks previously\n   * registered on it are replaced. Matches the semantics of the SDK's\n   * `McpServer.connect()`.\n   */\n  connect(transport: AdcpServerTransport): Promise<void>;\n\n  /** Close the server and release resources. */\n  close(): Promise<void>;\n\n  /**\n   * Test-harness hooks — see {@link AdcpServerComplianceApi}. Not\n   * intended for production call sites; production code paths should\n   * use `close()` to release resources.\n   */\n  readonly compliance: AdcpServerComplianceApi;\n\n  /**\n   * Invoke a registered handler in-process and return its response.\n   *\n   * Bypasses the transport layer — no sockets, no JSON-RPC framing.\n   * Intended for test harnesses only; production callers should go\n   * through a transport so protocol invariants (request ID linking,\n   * task progress, notifications) are enforced.\n   *\n   * Throws when no handler is registered for the requested method,\n   * or when a `tools/call` request targets an unknown tool. Arguments\n   * default to `{}` when `params.arguments` is omitted — a validation\n   * error from the tool's input schema (not from dispatch) is the\n   * expected failure mode for a missing required field.\n   *\n   * **Never mount this behind an HTTP route.** `extras.authInfo` is\n   * written directly onto the MCP handler's `extra` without any check\n   * against `serve({ authenticate })` — exposing it externally lets a\n   * caller impersonate any principal. This API is for in-process test\n   * harnesses and storyboard runners only.\n   *\n   * @example\n   * ```typescript\n   * const result = await server.dispatchTestRequest({\n   *   method: 'tools/call',\n   *   params: {\n   *     name: 'get_products',\n   *     arguments: { brief: 'premium sports inventory' },\n   *   },\n   * });\n   * ```\n   */\n  dispatchTestRequest(request: AdcpTestToolsCallRequest, extras?: AdcpTestRequestExtras): Promise<CallToolResult>;\n  dispatchTestRequest(request: AdcpTestRequest, extras?: AdcpTestRequestExtras): Promise<AdcpTestResponse>;\n\n  /**\n   * Production-safe tool invocation surface for transport adapters.\n   *\n   * Runs the full framework pipeline against a registered tool:\n   * request schema validation → account resolution → idempotency →\n   * handler dispatch → response narrowing → response validation.\n   * Returns the same `McpToolResponse` envelope the MCP transport\n   * observes — a transport adapter layers its own protocol framing on\n   * top (JSON-RPC result for MCP, A2A `Task` artifact for A2A, etc.).\n   *\n   * **Auth is the caller's responsibility.** `invoke()` forwards the\n   * provided `authInfo` verbatim to handlers and `resolveAccount`\n   * without re-verifying. Mount it only behind a transport that has\n   * already authenticated the principal (e.g. `serve({ authenticate })`\n   * for MCP, `createA2AAdapter({ authenticate })` for A2A). Do not call\n   * it directly from an HTTP handler — that path skips auth.\n   *\n   * For in-process tests that want to synthesize an `authInfo` without\n   * running a transport, reach for {@link dispatchTestRequest} instead\n   * — it takes the same principal shape but is explicitly marked\n   * test-only in its docstring.\n   *\n   * Throws when `toolName` is not registered; schema errors round-trip\n   * as structured `VALIDATION_ERROR` envelopes inside the return value.\n   */\n  invoke(options: AdcpInvokeOptions): Promise<McpToolResponse>;\n\n  /**\n   * Returns the AdCP protocol version this server is configured to speak.\n   *\n   * Defaults to {@link ADCP_VERSION} (the GA version the SDK ships against)\n   * unless overridden via `createAdcpServer({ adcpVersion })`. This is the\n   * protocol version, **not** the publisher's app version (`config.version`).\n   *\n   * Plumbing surface — Stage 2 of the multi-version refactor exposes the\n   * configured value but does not yet vary validator/schema selection by\n   * version. Wire-shape adapters key off this getter in subsequent stages.\n   */\n  getAdcpVersion(): string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Symbol-keyed accessor for the underlying SDK `McpServer`. Used by\n * `serve()` to reach through the opaque wrapper when SDK-specific\n * operations are needed. Not part of the public API — typed on a\n * separate internal interface so downstream consumers can't discover\n * it through the `AdcpServer` type.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport const ADCP_SDK_SERVER: unique symbol = Symbol.for('@adcp/client.sdkServer');\n\n/**\n * Symbol-keyed accessor for the state store backing an `AdcpServer`.\n * Test harnesses and helpers like\n * `@adcp/sdk/compliance-fixtures`'s `seedComplianceFixtures` need\n * to reach the store without widening the public `AdcpServer`\n * interface (handlers already get `ctx.store`; production code paths\n * don't need a second accessor).\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport const ADCP_STATE_STORE: unique symbol = Symbol.for('@adcp/client.stateStore');\n\n/**\n * Symbol-keyed accessor for the capabilities object `createAdcpServer`\n * assembles and the auto-wired `get_adcp_capabilities` handler reads from.\n * Mutating this object mutates what subsequent capability-discovery calls\n * return — `registerTestController` uses this to add a\n * `compliance_testing` capability block after registration so the server\n * advertises its controller scenarios even though `registerTestController`\n * runs after `createAdcpServer`.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport const ADCP_CAPABILITIES: unique symbol = Symbol.for('@adcp/client.capabilities');\n\n/** Per-request tool visibility policy consumed by transport adapters. @internal */\nexport const ADCP_TOOL_VISIBILITY: unique symbol = Symbol.for('@adcp/client.toolVisibility');\n\n/** @internal */\nexport type AdcpToolVisibilityResolver = (options: {\n  toolName: string;\n  authInfo?: AdcpAuthInfo;\n  input?: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;\n}) => boolean | Promise<boolean>;\n\n/** @internal */\nexport interface AdcpServerInternal extends AdcpServer {\n  readonly [ADCP_SDK_SERVER]: McpServer;\n  [ADCP_TOOL_VISIBILITY]?: AdcpToolVisibilityResolver;\n}\n\n/**\n * Return the underlying `McpServer` for a wrapped `AdcpServer`, or\n * `undefined` if the value is not an `AdcpServer` produced by\n * `createAdcpServer()`.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport function getSdkServer(server: AdcpServer | McpServer): McpServer | undefined {\n  const candidate = (server as unknown as Partial<AdcpServerInternal>)[ADCP_SDK_SERVER];\n  return candidate;\n}\n\n/** Attach a transport-independent per-request tool visibility policy. @internal */\nexport function setToolVisibilityResolver(server: AdcpServer, resolver: AdcpToolVisibilityResolver): void {\n  (server as AdcpServerInternal)[ADCP_TOOL_VISIBILITY] = resolver;\n}\n\n/** Resolve whether a registered tool may be exposed to this request. @internal */\nexport async function isRegisteredToolVisible(\n  server: AdcpServer,\n  options: Parameters<AdcpToolVisibilityResolver>[0]\n): Promise<boolean> {\n  const resolver = (server as AdcpServerInternal)[ADCP_TOOL_VISIBILITY];\n  return resolver ? resolver(options) : true;\n}\n\n/**\n * True when `value` is an `AdcpServer` produced by `createAdcpServer()`.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport function isAdcpServer(value: unknown): value is AdcpServerInternal {\n  return (\n    value != null &&\n    typeof value === 'object' &&\n    ADCP_SDK_SERVER in (value as Record<PropertyKey, unknown>) &&\n    typeof (value as AdcpServer).dispatchTestRequest === 'function'\n  );\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Private-field access — centralized\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n//\n// The MCP SDK marks `_requestHandlers` and `_registeredTools` as private.\n// Dispatching a request in-process from a test needs them. Doing it once\n// here means downstream harnesses don't each repeat the (server as any)\n// dance, which is the whole point of exposing `dispatchTestRequest()`.\n//\n// If/when the SDK ships a public in-process dispatch API, swap these two\n// helpers for that API. The AdcpServer surface stays the same.\n\ninterface RegisteredTool {\n  title?: string;\n  description?: string;\n  inputSchema?: unknown;\n  outputSchema?: unknown;\n  annotations?: unknown;\n  _meta?: Record<string, unknown>;\n  enabled?: boolean;\n  handler: (args: unknown, extra: unknown) => unknown | Promise<unknown>;\n}\n\ninterface McpServerPrivates {\n  _registeredTools?: Record<string, RegisteredTool | undefined>;\n  server?: {\n    _requestHandlers?: Map<\n      string,\n      (request: { method: string; params?: unknown }, extra: unknown) => unknown | Promise<unknown>\n    >;\n    _serverInfo?: { name: string; version: string; [key: string]: unknown };\n    _instructions?: string;\n  };\n}\n\n/** Tool metadata needed to mirror the registered AdCP surface into another official MCP transport. @internal */\nexport interface RegisteredToolDefinition {\n  name: string;\n  title?: string;\n  description?: string;\n  inputSchema?: unknown;\n  outputSchema?: unknown;\n  annotations?: unknown;\n  _meta?: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\n/** @internal */\ntype McpRequestHandler = (request: { method: string; params?: unknown }, extra: unknown) => unknown | Promise<unknown>;\n\n/**\n * Write the instructions string onto the low-level SDK server backing\n * `mcpServer`. Called by the async-function-form instructions hook to\n * inject the resolved string just before the MCP `initialize` response.\n *\n * @internal\n * @remarks Pokes an SDK private field — see the \"Private-field access\" note above.\n */\nexport function setSdkServerInstructions(mcpServer: McpServer, value: string | undefined): void {\n  const priv = mcpServer as unknown as McpServerPrivates;\n  if (priv.server) {\n    priv.server._instructions = value;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Wrap the `initialize` request handler on `mcpServer` so that `wrapper`\n * runs (and can await async work) before the original handler responds.\n * The wrapper receives the original handler as its first argument and must\n * call it to complete the handshake.\n *\n * The wrapper is invoked once per MCP `initialize` call on this server\n * instance. Under `serve({ reuseAgent: false })` the server is created\n * fresh per request, so the wrapper fires once per session. Under\n * `reuseAgent: true` the `ADCP_INSTRUCTIONS_FN` check in `serve.ts`\n * blocks the combination before the wrapper can be called a second time.\n *\n * @internal\n * @remarks Pokes an SDK private field — see the \"Private-field access\" note above.\n */\nexport function wrapInitializeHandler(\n  mcpServer: McpServer,\n  wrapper: (\n    origHandler: McpRequestHandler,\n    req: { method: string; params?: unknown },\n    extra: unknown\n  ) => unknown | Promise<unknown>\n): void {\n  const priv = mcpServer as unknown as McpServerPrivates;\n  const handlers = priv.server?._requestHandlers;\n  if (!handlers) return;\n  const orig = handlers.get('initialize');\n  if (!orig) return;\n  handlers.set('initialize', (req, extra) => wrapper(orig, req, extra));\n}\n\nfunction getRegisteredTool(server: McpServer, name: string): RegisteredTool | undefined {\n  return (server as unknown as McpServerPrivates)._registeredTools?.[name];\n}\n\n/**\n * Wrap a registered MCP tool handler without changing the tool definition\n * advertised by the SDK server.\n *\n * @internal\n * @remarks Pokes an SDK private field — see the \"Private-field access\" note above.\n */\nexport function wrapRegisteredToolHandler(\n  server: McpServer,\n  name: string,\n  wrapper: (orig: RegisteredTool['handler'], args: unknown, extra: unknown) => unknown | Promise<unknown>\n): boolean {\n  const tool = getRegisteredTool(server, name);\n  if (!tool) return false;\n  const orig = tool.handler;\n  tool.handler = (args, extra) => wrapper(orig, args, extra);\n  return true;\n}\n\n/**\n * Enumerate the tool names registered on the underlying SDK server.\n * Used by transport adapters that need to derive discovery metadata\n * (agent cards, capability listings) from the registered surface\n * without reaching into private SDK fields at every call site.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport function listRegisteredToolNames(server: McpServer): string[] {\n  const registered = (server as unknown as McpServerPrivates)._registeredTools ?? {};\n  return Object.keys(registered);\n}\n\n/**\n * Return enabled registered-tool metadata for the modern MCP server adapter.\n * Handler functions stay private; the adapter dispatches through\n * {@link AdcpServer.invoke} so the framework pipeline remains authoritative.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport function listRegisteredToolDefinitions(server: McpServer): RegisteredToolDefinition[] {\n  const registered = (server as unknown as McpServerPrivates)._registeredTools ?? {};\n  return Object.entries(registered).flatMap(([name, tool]) => {\n    if (!tool || tool.enabled === false) return [];\n    return [\n      {\n        name,\n        ...(tool.title !== undefined && { title: tool.title }),\n        ...(tool.description !== undefined && { description: tool.description }),\n        ...(tool.inputSchema !== undefined && { inputSchema: tool.inputSchema }),\n        ...(tool.outputSchema !== undefined && { outputSchema: tool.outputSchema }),\n        ...(tool.annotations !== undefined && { annotations: tool.annotations }),\n        ...(tool._meta !== undefined && { _meta: tool._meta }),\n      },\n    ];\n  });\n}\n\n/** Return the SDK server identity advertised during MCP discovery. @internal */\nexport function getSdkServerInfo(server: McpServer): { name: string; version: string; [key: string]: unknown } {\n  return (\n    (server as unknown as McpServerPrivates).server?._serverInfo ?? {\n      name: 'AdCP Server',\n      version: 'unknown',\n    }\n  );\n}\n\n/** Return static or already-resolved server instructions. @internal */\nexport function getSdkServerInstructions(server: McpServer): string | undefined {\n  return (server as unknown as McpServerPrivates).server?._instructions;\n}\n\nfunction getRequestHandler(\n  server: McpServer,\n  method: string\n): ((request: { method: string; params?: unknown }, extra: unknown) => unknown | Promise<unknown>) | undefined {\n  return (server as unknown as McpServerPrivates).server?._requestHandlers?.get(method);\n}\n\n/**\n * Wrap an SDK request handler such as `tools/list` while preserving the\n * original handler's request/extra contract.\n *\n * @internal\n * @remarks Pokes an SDK private field — see the \"Private-field access\" note above.\n */\nexport function wrapSdkRequestHandler(\n  server: McpServer,\n  method: string,\n  wrapper: (\n    orig: McpRequestHandler,\n    req: { method: string; params?: unknown },\n    extra: unknown\n  ) => unknown | Promise<unknown>\n): boolean {\n  const handlers = (server as unknown as McpServerPrivates).server?._requestHandlers;\n  const orig = handlers?.get(method);\n  if (!handlers || !orig) return false;\n  handlers.set(method, (req, extra) => wrapper(orig, req, extra));\n  return true;\n}\n\n/**\n * Wrap an SDK `McpServer` into the opaque `AdcpServer` handle returned by\n * `createAdcpServer()`. Consumers should prefer `createAdcpServer()` and\n * treat this as an internal utility; it's exported for framework code\n * that needs to produce an `AdcpServer` around a hand-built server.\n *\n * Idempotent — passing an already-wrapped `AdcpServer` returns it\n * unchanged rather than nesting wrappers (which would leave\n * `ADCP_SDK_SERVER` pointing at the outer wrapper instead of the SDK\n * handle and break `getSdkServer()` round-trips).\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport function wrapMcpServer(\n  inner: McpServer | AdcpServerInternal,\n  compliance?: AdcpServerComplianceApi,\n  adcpVersion: string = ADCP_VERSION\n): AdcpServerInternal {\n  if (isAdcpServer(inner)) return inner;\n  const mcp = inner as McpServer;\n  const resolvedCompliance: AdcpServerComplianceApi = compliance ?? {\n    async reset() {\n      throw new Error(\n        'AdcpServer.compliance.reset: no-op handle returned by `wrapMcpServer` without a compliance implementation. ' +\n          'Use `createAdcpServer()` to get a server whose `compliance.reset()` flushes the state and idempotency stores.'\n      );\n    },\n  };\n  const dispatch = async (request: AdcpTestRequest, extras?: AdcpTestRequestExtras): Promise<AdcpTestResponse> => {\n    const extra: { signal: AbortSignal; authInfo?: AdcpTestRequestExtras['authInfo']; sessionId?: string } = {\n      signal: new AbortController().signal,\n    };\n    if (extras?.authInfo) extra.authInfo = extras.authInfo;\n    if (extras?.sessionId) extra.sessionId = extras.sessionId;\n\n    if (request.method === 'tools/call') {\n      const params = (request.params ?? {}) as { name?: string; arguments?: Record<string, unknown> };\n      if (typeof params.name !== 'string') {\n        throw new Error(\"dispatchTestRequest: 'tools/call' requires params.name (string)\");\n      }\n      const tool = getRegisteredTool(mcp, params.name);\n      if (!tool) {\n        throw new Error(`dispatchTestRequest: tool \"${params.name}\" is not registered`);\n      }\n      return tool.handler(params.arguments ?? {}, extra);\n    }\n\n    const handler = getRequestHandler(mcp, request.method);\n    if (!handler) {\n      throw new Error(`dispatchTestRequest: no handler registered for method \"${request.method}\"`);\n    }\n    return handler({ method: request.method, params: request.params ?? {} }, extra);\n  };\n  const invoke = async (options: AdcpInvokeOptions): Promise<McpToolResponse> => {\n    const tool = getRegisteredTool(mcp, options.toolName);\n    if (!tool) {\n      throw new Error(`AdcpServer.invoke: tool \"${options.toolName}\" is not registered`);\n    }\n    const extra: { signal: AbortSignal; 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package/dist/lib/server/auth-introspection.mjs

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
-import { fileURLToPath as __adcpFileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { dirname as __adcpDirname } from 'node:path';
-import { createRequire as __adcpCreateRequire } from 'node:module';
-const __filename = __adcpFileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
-const __dirname = __adcpDirname(__filename);
-const require = __adcpCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
 import { createHash } from "crypto";
 import { AuthError, extractBearerToken } from "./auth.mjs";
 function verifyIntrospection(options) {

package/dist/lib/server/auth-introspection.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/server/auth-introspection.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * RFC 7662 OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection authenticator.\n *\n * Use case: the agent is NOT the identity issuer. Instead it proxies an\n * upstream OAuth provider (Snap, Meta, TikTok, Google, …) — the Bearer\n * token a buyer presents is the upstream platform's access token, not a\n * JWT the adapter minted. {@link verifyBearer} doesn't apply there; the\n * only way to validate the token is to ask the upstream: POST the token\n * to its RFC 7662 introspection endpoint and check `active: true`.\n *\n * Matches the {@link Authenticator} contract of {@link verifyBearer}:\n * returns `null` when no bearer header is present (so {@link anyOf} can\n * fall through), throws {@link AuthError} when a token was presented\n * and rejected. Public error messages are sanitized — the upstream\n * response body never crosses the wire, only a generic \"Token\n * validation failed.\" / \"Insufficient scope.\" message on 401.\n *\n * **Positive-response caching is opt-in.** Introspection endpoints are\n * often rate-limited and always round-trip at least one TLS handshake\n * worth of latency — a small in-process LRU keyed on the token's\n * SHA-256 hash amortizes the cost across closely-spaced requests from\n * the same buyer. Negative responses are NOT cached by default; a\n * stolen-then-revoked token must be able to fail the next request. Set\n * `cache.negativeTtlSeconds` to cache `active: false` too (mitigates\n * introspection-amplification DoS, trades against revocation latency).\n */\nimport { createHash } from 'crypto';\nimport type { IncomingMessage } from 'http';\nimport { AuthError, extractBearerToken, type AuthPrincipal, type AuthResult, type Authenticator } from './auth';\n\n/** RFC 7662 §2.2 introspection response. Fields are all optional except `active`. */\nexport interface IntrospectionResponse {\n  active: boolean;\n  scope?: string;\n  client_id?: string;\n  username?: string;\n  token_type?: string;\n  exp?: number;\n  iat?: number;\n  nbf?: number;\n  sub?: string;\n  aud?: string | string[];\n  iss?: string;\n  jti?: string;\n  [extension: string]: unknown;\n}\n\nexport interface IntrospectionCacheOptions {\n  /** Max cached entries (positive + negative combined). Default 1024. */\n  max?: number;\n  /**\n   * Seconds to cache `active: true` responses. Default 60. Must be <=\n   * the token's remaining lifetime — the helper caps the effective\n   * TTL at `exp - now` so the cache can't extend a token past its\n   * issued expiry.\n   */\n  ttlSeconds?: number;\n  /**\n   * Seconds to cache `active: false` responses. Default 0 (disabled).\n   * Caching negatives mitigates introspection-amplification DoS from an\n   * attacker replaying a stolen-then-revoked token, but delays propagation\n   * of a fresh revocation by up to this many seconds. Keep short (≤5s).\n   */\n  negativeTtlSeconds?: number;\n}\n\nexport interface VerifyIntrospectionOptions {\n  /** Absolute URL of the upstream introspection endpoint (RFC 7662 §2). */\n  introspectionUrl: string;\n  /**\n   * Client credentials for the introspection call. Introspection endpoints\n   * ALWAYS require client authentication — without credentials the endpoint\n   * would be an open oracle for \"is this token valid.\" Basic auth is the\n   * default (RFC 7662 §2.1); `clientAuth: 'body'` sends `client_id` +\n   * `client_secret` as form params instead (some IdPs require this).\n   */\n  clientId: string;\n  clientSecret: string;\n  clientAuth?: 'basic' | 'body';\n  /**\n   * Required scopes — the introspection response's `scope` claim (space\n   * delimited per RFC 7662) must contain ALL of these. Useful when the\n   * agent grants a subset of what the upstream IdP issues.\n   */\n  requiredScopes?: string[];\n  /**\n   * Optional constraint on the introspection response's `aud` claim.\n   * When set, the helper rejects a token whose `aud` doesn't contain\n   * this value. Note: many upstream platforms (Snap, Meta) don't set\n   * `aud` on access tokens — their tokens are bound to the client_id,\n   * not the resource URL. Leave undefined in that case.\n   */\n  audience?: string;\n  /**\n   * Optional cache. Disabled by default (every request round-trips to\n   * the introspection endpoint). Enable for hot paths.\n   */\n  cache?: IntrospectionCacheOptions;\n  /**\n   * Timeout for the introspection request in milliseconds. Default\n   * 2000ms. On timeout the authenticator throws an {@link AuthError}\n   * (fail-closed — a slow upstream can't bypass authentication).\n   */\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n  /**\n   * `token_type_hint` sent with the introspection request (RFC 7662 §2.1).\n   * Default `'access_token'`. Most IdPs ignore the hint but setting it\n   * correctly is the spec-conformant move.\n   */\n  tokenTypeHint?: 'access_token' | 'refresh_token';\n}\n\ninterface CacheEntry {\n  principal: AuthResult;\n  expiresAt: number; // ms since epoch\n}\n\n/** Build a token-introspection authenticator. See {@link VerifyIntrospectionOptions}. */\nexport function verifyIntrospection(options: VerifyIntrospectionOptions): Authenticator {\n  // Resolved defaults + sanity-checks at construction so misconfig fails loud at boot.\n  let introspectionUrl: URL;\n  try {\n    introspectionUrl = new URL(options.introspectionUrl);\n  } catch {\n    throw new Error(`verifyIntrospection: \\`introspectionUrl\\` is not a valid URL: ${options.introspectionUrl}`);\n  }\n  if (introspectionUrl.protocol !== 'https:' && !isLoopbackHost(introspectionUrl.hostname)) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `verifyIntrospection: \\`introspectionUrl\\` must use https:// (got ${introspectionUrl.protocol}). ` +\n        'Sending bearer tokens over plain HTTP to remote hosts is a credential-exposure bug.'\n    );\n  }\n  if (!options.clientId || !options.clientSecret) {\n    throw new Error('verifyIntrospection: `clientId` and `clientSecret` are required (RFC 7662 mandates client auth).');\n  }\n  const clientAuth = options.clientAuth ?? 'basic';\n  const timeoutMs = options.timeoutMs ?? 2000;\n  const tokenTypeHint = options.tokenTypeHint ?? 'access_token';\n  const requiredScopes = options.requiredScopes ?? [];\n\n  const cache = options.cache ? createIntrospectionCache(options.cache) : undefined;\n\n  // RFC 6749 §2.3.1 mandates application/x-www-form-urlencoded on the\n  // clientId and clientSecret BEFORE base64'ing for Basic auth. That's\n  // what `formUrlEncode` does (encodeURIComponent + `!*'()` escapes).\n  // Some legacy ASes compare the decoded Basic-auth password directly\n  // against the stored secret without percent-decoding — if that's\n  // biting you, set `clientAuth: 'body'` to send creds in the form body\n  // instead, which sidesteps the encoding negotiation entirely.\n  const basicAuthHeader =\n    clientAuth === 'basic'\n      ? `Basic ${Buffer.from(`${formUrlEncode(options.clientId)}:${formUrlEncode(options.clientSecret)}`).toString('base64')}`\n      : undefined;\n\n  return async (req: IncomingMessage): Promise<AuthResult> => {\n    const token = extractBearerToken(req);\n    if (!token) return null;\n\n    // Cache lookup keyed on SHA-256(token) so the cache never stores\n    // the raw bearer in process memory.\n    const cacheKey = cache ? sha256(token) : undefined;\n    if (cache && cacheKey) {\n      const hit = cache.get(cacheKey);\n      if (hit) {\n        if (hit.principal === null) {\n          throw new AuthError('Token validation failed.');\n        }\n        return { ...hit.principal, token };\n      }\n    }\n\n    let response: IntrospectionResponse;\n    try {\n      response = await introspect({\n        introspectionUrl,\n        token,\n        tokenTypeHint,\n        clientAuth,\n        basicAuthHeader,\n        clientId: options.clientId,\n        clientSecret: options.clientSecret,\n        timeoutMs,\n      });\n    } catch (err) {\n      // Network / HTTP errors — fail closed but DON'T cache. The next\n      // request retries. Public message is generic; cause is logged.\n      throw new AuthError('Token validation failed.', { cause: err });\n    }\n\n    // Inactive token. Cache the negative result if enabled — mitigates\n    // replay-amplification of a revoked token. Cause message is generic.\n    if (!response.active) {\n      if (cache && cacheKey && cache.negativeTtlMs > 0) {\n        cache.set(cacheKey, { principal: null, expiresAt: Date.now() + cache.negativeTtlMs });\n      }\n      throw new AuthError('Token validation failed.');\n    }\n\n    // Audience check — only when the caller specified a required audience.\n    // Many upstream IdPs don't populate `aud` on access tokens, so the\n    // default \"no audience required\" is correct for the adapter case.\n    if (options.audience !== undefined) {\n      const aud = response.aud;\n      const audList = typeof aud === 'string' ? [aud] : Array.isArray(aud) ? aud : [];\n      if (!audList.includes(options.audience)) {\n        throw new AuthError('Token validation failed.');\n      }\n    }\n\n    const scopes = parseScope(response.scope);\n    if (requiredScopes.length > 0) {\n      const missing = requiredScopes.filter(s => !scopes.includes(s));\n      if (missing.length > 0) {\n        throw new AuthError('Insufficient scope.');\n      }\n    }\n\n    const principal: AuthPrincipal = {\n      principal:\n        typeof response.sub === 'string'\n          ? response.sub\n          : typeof response.client_id === 'string'\n            ? response.client_id\n            : 'unknown',\n      token,\n      scopes,\n      claims: response,\n    };\n    if (typeof response.exp === 'number') principal.expiresAt = response.exp;\n\n    if (cache && cacheKey) {\n      // Cap the positive TTL at the token's own remaining lifetime —\n      // never let the cache extend a token past its issued `exp`. When\n      // the IdP omits `exp`, fall back to the configured TTL.\n      const nowSec = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);\n      const configuredTtlMs = cache.positiveTtlMs;\n      const effectiveTtlMs =\n        typeof response.exp === 'number'\n          ? Math.min(configuredTtlMs, Math.max(0, (response.exp - nowSec) * 1000))\n          : configuredTtlMs;\n      if (effectiveTtlMs > 0) {\n        // Deep-clone the principal for the cache entry so callers that\n        // mutate the returned principal can't poison the cached copy.\n        // `claims` is cloned with structuredClone — a shallow spread would\n        // leave nested objects aliased, and a malicious or buggy caller\n        // that set `returned.claims.scope = 'admin'` would upgrade every\n        // subsequent cached lookup.\n        const cachedPrincipal: AuthPrincipal = {\n          principal: principal.principal,\n          scopes: [...scopes],\n          claims: principal.claims ? structuredClone(principal.claims) : undefined,\n        };\n        if (principal.expiresAt !== undefined) cachedPrincipal.expiresAt = principal.expiresAt;\n        cache.set(cacheKey, {\n          principal: cachedPrincipal,\n          expiresAt: Date.now() + effectiveTtlMs,\n        });\n      }\n    }\n\n    // Return a fresh object to callers — the cached copy is sealed behind\n    // the `cachedPrincipal` closure. If the caller mutates the returned\n    // `scopes` array or `claims` object, the cache entry stays clean\n    // because it was cloned at `set` time (see block above).\n    return principal;\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Check whether a hostname is a loopback address. Exact-match for the\n * three literal forms (`localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, `[::1]`) so attacker\n * tricks like `localhost.evil.com` don't slip past — URL parser sets\n * `.hostname` to the whole string, not the left-most label.\n */\nfunction isLoopbackHost(hostname: string): boolean {\n  // URL parses IPv6 `[::1]` as hostname `::1` (brackets stripped). The\n  // 127.0.0.0/8 range is loopback per RFC 6890 — accept anything in\n  // that range since Node's own fetch routes it to lo0.\n  if (hostname === 'localhost' || hostname === '::1') return true;\n  const m = /^127\\.(\\d{1,3})\\.(\\d{1,3})\\.(\\d{1,3})$/.exec(hostname);\n  if (!m) return false;\n  return m.slice(1).every(octet => {\n    const n = Number(octet);\n    return n >= 0 && n <= 255;\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * application/x-www-form-urlencoded encoding per RFC 6749 §2.3.1 and\n * Appendix B. Differs from `encodeURIComponent` in that `!*'()` MUST be\n * percent-encoded (those are reserved in the form-urlencoded grammar).\n * Rare in real-world client credentials but spec-correct and avoids\n * per-IdP quirks when a secret happens to include one of those chars.\n */\nfunction formUrlEncode(s: string): string {\n  return encodeURIComponent(s).replace(/[!*'()]/g, c => '%' + c.charCodeAt(0).toString(16).toUpperCase());\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Introspection transport\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nasync function introspect(args: {\n  introspectionUrl: URL;\n  token: string;\n  tokenTypeHint: 'access_token' | 'refresh_token';\n  clientAuth: 'basic' | 'body';\n  basicAuthHeader: string | undefined;\n  clientId: string;\n  clientSecret: string;\n  timeoutMs: number;\n}): Promise<IntrospectionResponse> {\n  const body = new URLSearchParams();\n  body.set('token', args.token);\n  body.set('token_type_hint', args.tokenTypeHint);\n  if (args.clientAuth === 'body') {\n    body.set('client_id', args.clientId);\n    body.set('client_secret', args.clientSecret);\n  }\n\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = {\n    'content-type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded',\n    accept: 'application/json',\n  };\n  if (args.basicAuthHeader) headers.authorization = args.basicAuthHeader;\n\n  const controller = new AbortController();\n  const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), args.timeoutMs);\n  try {\n    const res = await fetch(args.introspectionUrl, {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers,\n      body,\n      signal: controller.signal,\n    });\n    if (!res.ok) {\n      // 4xx/5xx — don't treat as `active: false`; that would mask a\n      // misconfigured client credential as a revoked token.\n      const statusText = res.statusText || 'no status text';\n      throw new Error(`introspection endpoint returned HTTP ${res.status} (${statusText})`);\n    }\n    const ct = res.headers.get('content-type') || '';\n    if (!ct.includes('application/json')) {\n      throw new Error(`introspection endpoint returned non-JSON content-type: ${ct}`);\n    }\n    const json = (await res.json()) as IntrospectionResponse;\n    if (typeof json?.active !== 'boolean') {\n      throw new Error('introspection response missing required `active` field');\n    }\n    return json;\n  } finally {\n    clearTimeout(timer);\n  }\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Helpers\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nfunction sha256(input: string): string {\n  return createHash('sha256').update(input).digest('hex');\n}\n\nfunction parseScope(scope: unknown): string[] {\n  if (typeof scope !== 'string' || scope.length === 0) return [];\n  return scope.split(/\\s+/).filter(Boolean);\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Cache\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\ninterface IntrospectionCacheHandle {\n  get(key: string): CacheEntry | undefined;\n  set(key: string, entry: CacheEntry): void;\n  readonly positiveTtlMs: number;\n  readonly negativeTtlMs: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Small insertion-ordered LRU. 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+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/server/auth-introspection.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * RFC 7662 OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection authenticator.\n *\n * Use case: the agent is NOT the identity issuer. Instead it proxies an\n * upstream OAuth provider (Snap, Meta, TikTok, Google, …) — the Bearer\n * token a buyer presents is the upstream platform's access token, not a\n * JWT the adapter minted. {@link verifyBearer} doesn't apply there; the\n * only way to validate the token is to ask the upstream: POST the token\n * to its RFC 7662 introspection endpoint and check `active: true`.\n *\n * Matches the {@link Authenticator} contract of {@link verifyBearer}:\n * returns `null` when no bearer header is present (so {@link anyOf} can\n * fall through), throws {@link AuthError} when a token was presented\n * and rejected. Public error messages are sanitized — the upstream\n * response body never crosses the wire, only a generic \"Token\n * validation failed.\" / \"Insufficient scope.\" message on 401.\n *\n * **Positive-response caching is opt-in.** Introspection endpoints are\n * often rate-limited and always round-trip at least one TLS handshake\n * worth of latency — a small in-process LRU keyed on the token's\n * SHA-256 hash amortizes the cost across closely-spaced requests from\n * the same buyer. Negative responses are NOT cached by default; a\n * stolen-then-revoked token must be able to fail the next request. Set\n * `cache.negativeTtlSeconds` to cache `active: false` too (mitigates\n * introspection-amplification DoS, trades against revocation latency).\n */\nimport { createHash } from 'crypto';\nimport type { IncomingMessage } from 'http';\nimport { AuthError, extractBearerToken, type AuthPrincipal, type AuthResult, type Authenticator } from './auth';\n\n/** RFC 7662 §2.2 introspection response. Fields are all optional except `active`. */\nexport interface IntrospectionResponse {\n  active: boolean;\n  scope?: string;\n  client_id?: string;\n  username?: string;\n  token_type?: string;\n  exp?: number;\n  iat?: number;\n  nbf?: number;\n  sub?: string;\n  aud?: string | string[];\n  iss?: string;\n  jti?: string;\n  [extension: string]: unknown;\n}\n\nexport interface IntrospectionCacheOptions {\n  /** Max cached entries (positive + negative combined). Default 1024. */\n  max?: number;\n  /**\n   * Seconds to cache `active: true` responses. Default 60. Must be <=\n   * the token's remaining lifetime — the helper caps the effective\n   * TTL at `exp - now` so the cache can't extend a token past its\n   * issued expiry.\n   */\n  ttlSeconds?: number;\n  /**\n   * Seconds to cache `active: false` responses. Default 0 (disabled).\n   * Caching negatives mitigates introspection-amplification DoS from an\n   * attacker replaying a stolen-then-revoked token, but delays propagation\n   * of a fresh revocation by up to this many seconds. Keep short (≤5s).\n   */\n  negativeTtlSeconds?: number;\n}\n\nexport interface VerifyIntrospectionOptions {\n  /** Absolute URL of the upstream introspection endpoint (RFC 7662 §2). */\n  introspectionUrl: string;\n  /**\n   * Client credentials for the introspection call. Introspection endpoints\n   * ALWAYS require client authentication — without credentials the endpoint\n   * would be an open oracle for \"is this token valid.\" Basic auth is the\n   * default (RFC 7662 §2.1); `clientAuth: 'body'` sends `client_id` +\n   * `client_secret` as form params instead (some IdPs require this).\n   */\n  clientId: string;\n  clientSecret: string;\n  clientAuth?: 'basic' | 'body';\n  /**\n   * Required scopes — the introspection response's `scope` claim (space\n   * delimited per RFC 7662) must contain ALL of these. Useful when the\n   * agent grants a subset of what the upstream IdP issues.\n   */\n  requiredScopes?: string[];\n  /**\n   * Optional constraint on the introspection response's `aud` claim.\n   * When set, the helper rejects a token whose `aud` doesn't contain\n   * this value. Note: many upstream platforms (Snap, Meta) don't set\n   * `aud` on access tokens — their tokens are bound to the client_id,\n   * not the resource URL. Leave undefined in that case.\n   */\n  audience?: string;\n  /**\n   * Optional cache. Disabled by default (every request round-trips to\n   * the introspection endpoint). Enable for hot paths.\n   */\n  cache?: IntrospectionCacheOptions;\n  /**\n   * Timeout for the introspection request in milliseconds. Default\n   * 2000ms. On timeout the authenticator throws an {@link AuthError}\n   * (fail-closed — a slow upstream can't bypass authentication).\n   */\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n  /**\n   * `token_type_hint` sent with the introspection request (RFC 7662 §2.1).\n   * Default `'access_token'`. Most IdPs ignore the hint but setting it\n   * correctly is the spec-conformant move.\n   */\n  tokenTypeHint?: 'access_token' | 'refresh_token';\n}\n\ninterface CacheEntry {\n  principal: AuthResult;\n  expiresAt: number; // ms since epoch\n}\n\n/** Build a token-introspection authenticator. See {@link VerifyIntrospectionOptions}. */\nexport function verifyIntrospection(options: VerifyIntrospectionOptions): Authenticator {\n  // Resolved defaults + sanity-checks at construction so misconfig fails loud at boot.\n  let introspectionUrl: URL;\n  try {\n    introspectionUrl = new URL(options.introspectionUrl);\n  } catch {\n    throw new Error(`verifyIntrospection: \\`introspectionUrl\\` is not a valid URL: ${options.introspectionUrl}`);\n  }\n  if (introspectionUrl.protocol !== 'https:' && !isLoopbackHost(introspectionUrl.hostname)) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `verifyIntrospection: \\`introspectionUrl\\` must use https:// (got ${introspectionUrl.protocol}). ` +\n        'Sending bearer tokens over plain HTTP to remote hosts is a credential-exposure bug.'\n    );\n  }\n  if (!options.clientId || !options.clientSecret) {\n    throw new Error('verifyIntrospection: `clientId` and `clientSecret` are required (RFC 7662 mandates client auth).');\n  }\n  const clientAuth = options.clientAuth ?? 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That's\n  // what `formUrlEncode` does (encodeURIComponent + `!*'()` escapes).\n  // Some legacy ASes compare the decoded Basic-auth password directly\n  // against the stored secret without percent-decoding — if that's\n  // biting you, set `clientAuth: 'body'` to send creds in the form body\n  // instead, which sidesteps the encoding negotiation entirely.\n  const basicAuthHeader =\n    clientAuth === 'basic'\n      ? `Basic ${Buffer.from(`${formUrlEncode(options.clientId)}:${formUrlEncode(options.clientSecret)}`).toString('base64')}`\n      : undefined;\n\n  return async (req: IncomingMessage): Promise<AuthResult> => {\n    const token = extractBearerToken(req);\n    if (!token) return null;\n\n    // Cache lookup keyed on SHA-256(token) so the cache never stores\n    // the raw bearer in process memory.\n    const cacheKey = cache ? sha256(token) : undefined;\n    if (cache && cacheKey) {\n      const hit = cache.get(cacheKey);\n      if (hit) {\n        if (hit.principal === null) {\n          throw new AuthError('Token validation failed.');\n        }\n        return { ...hit.principal, token };\n      }\n    }\n\n    let response: IntrospectionResponse;\n    try {\n      response = await introspect({\n        introspectionUrl,\n        token,\n        tokenTypeHint,\n        clientAuth,\n        basicAuthHeader,\n        clientId: options.clientId,\n        clientSecret: options.clientSecret,\n        timeoutMs,\n      });\n    } catch (err) {\n      // Network / HTTP errors — fail closed but DON'T cache. The next\n      // request retries. Public message is generic; cause is logged.\n      throw new AuthError('Token validation failed.', { cause: err });\n    }\n\n    // Inactive token. Cache the negative result if enabled — mitigates\n    // replay-amplification of a revoked token. Cause message is generic.\n    if (!response.active) {\n      if (cache && cacheKey && cache.negativeTtlMs > 0) {\n        cache.set(cacheKey, { principal: null, expiresAt: Date.now() + cache.negativeTtlMs });\n      }\n      throw new AuthError('Token validation failed.');\n    }\n\n    // Audience check — only when the caller specified a required audience.\n    // Many upstream IdPs don't populate `aud` on access tokens, so the\n    // default \"no audience required\" is correct for the adapter case.\n    if (options.audience !== undefined) {\n      const aud = response.aud;\n      const audList = typeof aud === 'string' ? [aud] : Array.isArray(aud) ? aud : [];\n      if (!audList.includes(options.audience)) {\n        throw new AuthError('Token validation failed.');\n      }\n    }\n\n    const scopes = parseScope(response.scope);\n    if (requiredScopes.length > 0) {\n      const missing = requiredScopes.filter(s => !scopes.includes(s));\n      if (missing.length > 0) {\n        throw new AuthError('Insufficient scope.');\n      }\n    }\n\n    const principal: AuthPrincipal = {\n      principal:\n        typeof response.sub === 'string'\n          ? response.sub\n          : typeof response.client_id === 'string'\n            ? response.client_id\n            : 'unknown',\n      token,\n      scopes,\n      claims: response,\n    };\n    if (typeof response.exp === 'number') principal.expiresAt = response.exp;\n\n    if (cache && cacheKey) {\n      // Cap the positive TTL at the token's own remaining lifetime —\n      // never let the cache extend a token past its issued `exp`. When\n      // the IdP omits `exp`, fall back to the configured TTL.\n      const nowSec = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);\n      const configuredTtlMs = cache.positiveTtlMs;\n      const effectiveTtlMs =\n        typeof response.exp === 'number'\n          ? Math.min(configuredTtlMs, Math.max(0, (response.exp - nowSec) * 1000))\n          : configuredTtlMs;\n      if (effectiveTtlMs > 0) {\n        // Deep-clone the principal for the cache entry so callers that\n        // mutate the returned principal can't poison the cached copy.\n        // `claims` is cloned with structuredClone — a shallow spread would\n        // leave nested objects aliased, and a malicious or buggy caller\n        // that set `returned.claims.scope = 'admin'` would upgrade every\n        // subsequent cached lookup.\n        const cachedPrincipal: AuthPrincipal = {\n          principal: principal.principal,\n          scopes: [...scopes],\n          claims: principal.claims ? structuredClone(principal.claims) : undefined,\n        };\n        if (principal.expiresAt !== undefined) cachedPrincipal.expiresAt = principal.expiresAt;\n        cache.set(cacheKey, {\n          principal: cachedPrincipal,\n          expiresAt: Date.now() + effectiveTtlMs,\n        });\n      }\n    }\n\n    // Return a fresh object to callers — the cached copy is sealed behind\n    // the `cachedPrincipal` closure. If the caller mutates the returned\n    // `scopes` array or `claims` object, the cache entry stays clean\n    // because it was cloned at `set` time (see block above).\n    return principal;\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Check whether a hostname is a loopback address. Exact-match for the\n * three literal forms (`localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, `[::1]`) so attacker\n * tricks like `localhost.evil.com` don't slip past — URL parser sets\n * `.hostname` to the whole string, not the left-most label.\n */\nfunction isLoopbackHost(hostname: string): boolean {\n  // URL parses IPv6 `[::1]` as hostname `::1` (brackets stripped). The\n  // 127.0.0.0/8 range is loopback per RFC 6890 — accept anything in\n  // that range since Node's own fetch routes it to lo0.\n  if (hostname === 'localhost' || hostname === '::1') return true;\n  const m = /^127\\.(\\d{1,3})\\.(\\d{1,3})\\.(\\d{1,3})$/.exec(hostname);\n  if (!m) return false;\n  return m.slice(1).every(octet => {\n    const n = Number(octet);\n    return n >= 0 && n <= 255;\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * application/x-www-form-urlencoded encoding per RFC 6749 §2.3.1 and\n * Appendix B. Differs from `encodeURIComponent` in that `!*'()` MUST be\n * percent-encoded (those are reserved in the form-urlencoded grammar).\n * Rare in real-world client credentials but spec-correct and avoids\n * per-IdP quirks when a secret happens to include one of those chars.\n */\nfunction formUrlEncode(s: string): string {\n  return encodeURIComponent(s).replace(/[!*'()]/g, c => '%' + c.charCodeAt(0).toString(16).toUpperCase());\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Introspection transport\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nasync function introspect(args: {\n  introspectionUrl: URL;\n  token: string;\n  tokenTypeHint: 'access_token' | 'refresh_token';\n  clientAuth: 'basic' | 'body';\n  basicAuthHeader: string | undefined;\n  clientId: string;\n  clientSecret: string;\n  timeoutMs: number;\n}): Promise<IntrospectionResponse> {\n  const body = new URLSearchParams();\n  body.set('token', args.token);\n  body.set('token_type_hint', args.tokenTypeHint);\n  if (args.clientAuth === 'body') {\n    body.set('client_id', args.clientId);\n    body.set('client_secret', args.clientSecret);\n  }\n\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = {\n    'content-type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded',\n    accept: 'application/json',\n  };\n  if (args.basicAuthHeader) headers.authorization = args.basicAuthHeader;\n\n  const controller = new AbortController();\n  const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), args.timeoutMs);\n  try {\n    const res = await fetch(args.introspectionUrl, {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers,\n      body,\n      signal: controller.signal,\n    });\n    if (!res.ok) {\n      // 4xx/5xx — don't treat as `active: false`; that would mask a\n      // misconfigured client credential as a revoked token.\n      const statusText = res.statusText || 'no status text';\n      throw new Error(`introspection endpoint returned HTTP ${res.status} (${statusText})`);\n    }\n    const ct = res.headers.get('content-type') || '';\n    if (!ct.includes('application/json')) {\n      throw new Error(`introspection endpoint returned non-JSON content-type: ${ct}`);\n    }\n    const json = (await res.json()) as IntrospectionResponse;\n    if (typeof json?.active !== 'boolean') {\n      throw new Error('introspection response missing required `active` field');\n    }\n    return json;\n  } finally {\n    clearTimeout(timer);\n  }\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Helpers\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nfunction sha256(input: string): string {\n  return createHash('sha256').update(input).digest('hex');\n}\n\nfunction parseScope(scope: unknown): string[] {\n  if (typeof scope !== 'string' || scope.length === 0) return [];\n  return scope.split(/\\s+/).filter(Boolean);\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Cache\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\ninterface IntrospectionCacheHandle {\n  get(key: string): CacheEntry | undefined;\n  set(key: string, entry: CacheEntry): void;\n  readonly positiveTtlMs: number;\n  readonly negativeTtlMs: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Small insertion-ordered LRU. Map iteration order is insertion order; to\n * bump an entry on access, delete + re-set. Keeps the implementation\n * dependency-free.\n */\nfunction createIntrospectionCache(options: IntrospectionCacheOptions): IntrospectionCacheHandle {\n  const max = options.max ?? 1024;\n  const positiveTtlMs = (options.ttlSeconds ?? 60) * 1000;\n  const negativeTtlMs = (options.negativeTtlSeconds ?? 0) * 1000;\n  const store = new Map<string, CacheEntry>();\n\n  return {\n    positiveTtlMs,\n    negativeTtlMs,\n    get(key) {\n      const entry = store.get(key);\n      if (!entry) return undefined;\n      if (entry.expiresAt <= Date.now()) {\n        store.delete(key);\n        return undefined;\n      }\n      // Bump LRU: re-insert at the tail.\n      store.delete(key);\n      store.set(key, entry);\n      return entry;\n    },\n    set(key, entry) {\n      if (store.has(key)) store.delete(key);\n      store.set(key, entry);\n      while (store.size > max) {\n        const oldest = store.keys().next().value;\n        if (oldest === undefined) break;\n        store.delete(oldest);\n  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package/dist/lib/server/auth-signature.mjs

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
-import { fileURLToPath as __adcpFileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { dirname as __adcpDirname } from 'node:path';
-import { createRequire as __adcpCreateRequire } from 'node:module';
-const __filename = __adcpFileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
-const __dirname = __adcpDirname(__filename);
-const require = __adcpCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
 import { RequestSignatureError } from "../signing/errors.mjs";
 import { InMemoryReplayStore } from "../signing/replay.mjs";
 import { InMemoryRevocationStore } from "../signing/revocation.mjs";