@adcp/sdk 12.0.0 → 12.0.2

package/dist/lib/signing/brand-jwks.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/signing/brand-jwks.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Receiver-side ergonomic: resolve a sender's JWKS by fetching their\n * `brand.json`, extracting the `jwks_uri` for the agent whose webhooks we're\n * verifying, and delegating to {@link HttpsJwksResolver}.\n *\n * Hand the resulting instance to `verifyWebhookSignature.jwks` (or\n * `verifyRequestSignature.jwks`) and the receiver never has to know where the\n * sender hosts their keys — brand.json is the single source of truth.\n *\n * Follows the two documented redirect variants of `brand.json`\n * (`authoritative_location` and `house`) up to a caller-configurable hop\n * depth. When the selected agent has no `jwks_uri`, falls back to\n * `/.well-known/jwks.json` on the origin of the agent's `url` — but only\n * when that origin matches the final brand.json origin. The spec's\n * well-known fallback exists so publishers hosting brand.json and their\n * agents on the same origin can skip the explicit `jwks_uri`; accepting a\n * cross-origin fallback would let an attacker pivot the trust anchor to a\n * controlled host with a permissive JWKS.\n *\n * Caching is stacked with the inner {@link HttpsJwksResolver}: brand.json\n * honors its own `Cache-Control`/`ETag` (bounded by `maxAgeSeconds`), and\n * unknown-kid refreshes cascade — first to the JWKS endpoint, then (if the\n * JWKS still doesn't have the kid and the brand.json cooldown has elapsed) to\n * brand.json itself, in case the sender rotated `jwks_uri`.\n */\nimport { ssrfSafeFetch } from '../net';\nimport type { JwksResolver } from './jwks';\nimport { HttpsJwksResolver, type HttpsJwksResolverOptions } from './jwks-https';\nimport type { AdcpJsonWebKey } from './types';\n\nexport type BrandAgentType =\n  | 'brand'\n  | 'rights'\n  | 'measurement'\n  | 'governance'\n  | 'creative'\n  | 'sales'\n  | 'buying'\n  | 'signals';\n\nexport type BrandJsonResolverErrorCode =\n  | 'invalid_url'\n  | 'invalid_house'\n  | 'redirect_loop'\n  | 'redirect_depth_exceeded'\n  | 'fetch_failed'\n  | 'invalid_body'\n  | 'schema_invalid'\n  | 'agent_not_found'\n  | 'agent_ambiguous'\n  | 'jwks_origin_mismatch';\n\n/**\n * Typed error surfaced by the resolver pipeline. Verifier callers can fold\n * these into `webhook_signature_key_unknown` (or treat ambiguous/schema\n * errors as config bugs) without parsing error message strings.\n */\nexport class BrandJsonResolverError extends Error {\n  readonly code: BrandJsonResolverErrorCode;\n  constructor(code: BrandJsonResolverErrorCode, message: string) {\n    super(message);\n    this.name = 'BrandJsonResolverError';\n    this.code = code;\n  }\n}\n\nexport interface BrandJsonJwksResolverOptions {\n  /** Functional role of the agent whose keys we want to resolve. */\n  agentType: BrandAgentType;\n  /**\n   * Agent id from `agents[].id`. Required when brand.json declares more than\n   * one agent of the requested type (otherwise the selector is ambiguous).\n   * Optional when the type is unique.\n   */\n  agentId?: string;\n  /**\n   * Brand id within a house portfolio (`brands[].id`). When omitted on a\n   * portfolio brand.json, the resolver looks at `house.agents[]`. When set,\n   * the resolver looks at `brands[brandId].agents[]` first and falls back to\n   * `house.agents[]` if no agent of the requested type is declared on the\n   * brand itself.\n   */\n  brandId?: string;\n  /**\n   * Minimum seconds between brand.json refetches. Mirrors the JWKS cooldown\n   * and protects counterparties from being hammered by unknown-kid refreshes.\n   * Default 30s (AdCP JWKS floor).\n   */\n  minCooldownSeconds?: number;\n  /**\n   * Absolute cap on how long a cached brand.json snapshot may be used before\n   * a refetch is attempted, even if the counterparty's Cache-Control would\n   * allow longer. Default 3600s (1 hour).\n   */\n  maxAgeSeconds?: number;\n  /**\n   * Maximum redirect hops to follow through `authoritative_location` /\n   * `house` variants. Default 3 — enough for `authoritative_location → house\n   * → portfolio` without inviting loops.\n   */\n  maxRedirects?: number;\n  /**\n   * Allow `http://` / private-IP brand.json and JWKS URLs (dev loops only).\n   * Default false. Forwarded to both the brand.json fetch and the inner\n   * HttpsJwksResolver so a single flag unlocks the whole chain.\n   */\n  allowPrivateIp?: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Forwarded to the inner {@link HttpsJwksResolver} constructor.\n   * `allowPrivateIp` and `now` are set from the outer options and should not\n   * be passed here.\n   */\n  jwksOptions?: Omit<HttpsJwksResolverOptions, 'allowPrivateIp' | 'now'>;\n  /** Clock override for deterministic tests. Returns epoch seconds. */\n  now?: () => number;\n}\n\ninterface BrandSnapshot {\n  /** The JWKS URL we resolved from the brand.json agent entry. */\n  jwksUri: string;\n  /** The agent's `url` — stable result attribution for verified webhooks. */\n  agentUrl: string;\n  etag?: string;\n  fetchedAt: number;\n  expiresAt: number;\n}\n\ninterface SelectedAgent {\n  url: string;\n  jwksUri: string;\n}\n\nconst DEFAULT_MIN_COOLDOWN_SECONDS = 30;\nconst DEFAULT_MAX_AGE_SECONDS = 3600;\nconst DEFAULT_MAX_REDIRECTS = 3;\n\n// Bare hostname pattern: lowercase labels separated by dots, no userinfo,\n// no path, no control characters. Matches the `house` domain regex used in\n// the brand.json schema (`^[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-]*[a-z0-9])?(\\.[a-z0-9]…)*$`).\nconst BARE_HOSTNAME = /^[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-]*[a-z0-9])?(\\.[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-]*[a-z0-9])?)*$/;\n\n/**\n * JWKS resolver backed by a sender's `brand.json`. Construct one per\n * counterparty (or keyed by `brand.json` URL + agent selector) and hand it to\n * the webhook/request verifier as the `jwks` dependency.\n */\nexport class BrandJsonJwksResolver implements JwksResolver {\n  private readonly url: string;\n  private readonly selector: {\n    agentType: BrandAgentType;\n    agentId?: string;\n    brandId?: string;\n  };\n  private readonly minCooldown: number;\n  private readonly maxAge: number;\n  private readonly maxRedirects: number;\n  private readonly allowPrivateIp: boolean;\n  private readonly jwksOptions: Omit<HttpsJwksResolverOptions, 'allowPrivateIp' | 'now'>;\n  private readonly now: () => number;\n  private snapshot: BrandSnapshot | undefined;\n  private inner: HttpsJwksResolver | undefined;\n  private inFlight: Promise<void> | undefined;\n\n  constructor(brandJsonUrl: string, options: BrandJsonJwksResolverOptions) {\n    this.url = brandJsonUrl;\n    this.selector = {\n      agentType: options.agentType,\n      ...(options.agentId !== undefined && { agentId: options.agentId }),\n      ...(options.brandId !== undefined && { brandId: options.brandId }),\n    };\n    this.minCooldown = options.minCooldownSeconds ?? DEFAULT_MIN_COOLDOWN_SECONDS;\n    this.maxAge = options.maxAgeSeconds ?? DEFAULT_MAX_AGE_SECONDS;\n    this.maxRedirects = options.maxRedirects ?? DEFAULT_MAX_REDIRECTS;\n    this.allowPrivateIp = options.allowPrivateIp ?? false;\n    this.jwksOptions = options.jwksOptions ?? {};\n    this.now = options.now ?? (() => Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Resolve a JWK by `kid`. On a cold cache, fetches brand.json first; on an\n   * expired brand.json snapshot, refreshes respecting the cooldown. Unknown\n   * kids cascade: first ask the inner HttpsJwksResolver (which will refetch\n   * its own URL if cooldown has elapsed); if still unknown, refresh\n   * brand.json in case `jwks_uri` rotated.\n   */\n  async resolve(keyid: string): Promise<AdcpJsonWebKey | null> {\n    if (!this.snapshot || !this.inner) {\n      await this.refresh();\n    } else if (this.now() > this.snapshot.expiresAt && this.now() - this.snapshot.fetchedAt >= this.minCooldown) {\n      await this.refresh().catch(() => {\n        /* keep stale on transient failure */\n      });\n    }\n    if (!this.inner) return null;\n\n    const hit = await this.inner.resolve(keyid);\n    if (hit) return hit;\n\n    if (this.snapshot && this.now() - this.snapshot.fetchedAt >= this.minCooldown) {\n      await this.refresh().catch(() => {\n        /* keep stale on transient failure */\n      });\n      return this.inner ? this.inner.resolve(keyid) : null;\n    }\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * The agent URL we resolved `jwks_uri` from. Populated after the first\n   * successful refresh; useful for verifier result attribution\n   * (`VerifyWebhookOptions.agentUrlForKeyid`).\n   */\n  get agentUrl(): string | undefined {\n    return this.snapshot?.agentUrl;\n  }\n\n  /** Force a refetch of both brand.json and the inner JWKS, bypassing the cooldown. */\n  async forceRefresh(): Promise<void> {\n    this.snapshot = undefined;\n    this.inner = undefined;\n    await this.refresh();\n  }\n\n  private async refresh(): Promise<void> {\n    if (this.inFlight) {\n      await this.inFlight;\n      return;\n    }\n    this.inFlight = this.doRefresh().finally(() => {\n      this.inFlight = undefined;\n    });\n    await this.inFlight;\n  }\n\n  private async doRefresh(): Promise<void> {\n    const fetched = await fetchBrandJson({\n      startUrl: this.url,\n      currentEtag: this.snapshot?.etag,\n      maxRedirects: this.maxRedirects,\n      allowPrivateIp: this.allowPrivateIp,\n    });\n\n    // 304 on the entry URL: extend the lifetime, keep the inner resolver.\n    if (fetched.status === 'not_modified' && this.snapshot) {\n      this.snapshot = {\n        ...this.snapshot,\n        ...(fetched.etag && { etag: fetched.etag }),\n        fetchedAt: this.now(),\n        expiresAt: this.now() + computeLifetime(fetched.cacheControl, this.maxAge),\n      };\n      return;\n    }\n\n    const agent = selectAgent(fetched.data, fetched.finalUrl, this.selector);\n\n    if (!this.inner || this.snapshot?.jwksUri !== agent.jwksUri) {\n      this.inner = new HttpsJwksResolver(agent.jwksUri, {\n        ...this.jwksOptions,\n        allowPrivateIp: this.allowPrivateIp,\n        now: this.now,\n      });\n    }\n    this.snapshot = {\n      jwksUri: agent.jwksUri,\n      agentUrl: agent.url,\n      ...(fetched.etag && { etag: fetched.etag }),\n      fetchedAt: this.now(),\n      expiresAt: this.now() + computeLifetime(fetched.cacheControl, this.maxAge),\n    };\n  }\n}\n\ninterface FetchedBrandJson {\n  status: 'ok' | 'not_modified';\n  finalUrl: string;\n  data: unknown;\n  etag?: string;\n  cacheControl?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Fetch brand.json from `startUrl`, following `authoritative_location` and\n * `house` string redirect variants up to `maxRedirects` hops. Each hop goes\n * through the SSRF-safe fetch primitive so an attacker-supplied chain can't\n * land on a private address or IMDS. Redirect targets are structurally\n * validated before dispatch — an attacker-controlled brand.json that emits\n * `{\"house\": \"evil.com\\\\@victim.com\"}` or `{\"authoritative_location\":\n * \"http://169.254.169.254/...\"}` is rejected at parse time rather than\n * relying on `ssrfSafeFetch` to catch every pathological shape.\n */\nasync function fetchBrandJson(args: {\n  startUrl: string;\n  currentEtag?: string;\n  maxRedirects: number;\n  allowPrivateIp: boolean;\n}): Promise<FetchedBrandJson> {\n  const seen = new Set<string>();\n  let url = canonicalizeUrl(args.startUrl, args.allowPrivateIp);\n\n  for (let hop = 0; hop <= args.maxRedirects; hop++) {\n    if (seen.has(url)) {\n      throw new BrandJsonResolverError('redirect_loop', `brand.json redirect loop detected`);\n    }\n    seen.add(url);\n\n    const headers: Record<string, string> = {\n      accept: 'application/json',\n    };\n    // Only attach If-None-Match on the entry URL: a 304 short-circuits the\n    // whole chain, so revalidating a deeper hop with a stale ETag would be\n    // a lie about the redirect target.\n    if (hop === 0 && args.currentEtag) headers['if-none-match'] = args.currentEtag;\n\n    const res = await ssrfSafeFetch(url, {\n      method: 'GET',\n      headers,\n      allowPrivateIp: args.allowPrivateIp,\n    });\n\n    if (hop === 0 && res.status === 304) {\n      return {\n        status: 'not_modified',\n        finalUrl: url,\n        data: null,\n        ...(res.headers['etag'] && { etag: res.headers['etag'] }),\n        ...(res.headers['cache-control'] && { cacheControl: res.headers['cache-control'] }),\n      };\n    }\n    if (res.status !== 200) {\n      throw new BrandJsonResolverError('fetch_failed', `brand.json fetch returned HTTP ${res.status}`);\n    }\n\n    const text = Buffer.from(res.body).toString('utf8');\n    let parsed: unknown;\n    try {\n      parsed = JSON.parse(text);\n    } catch {\n      throw new BrandJsonResolverError('invalid_body', `brand.json response is not valid JSON`);\n    }\n    if (!parsed || typeof parsed !== 'object') {\n      throw new BrandJsonResolverError('invalid_body', `brand.json response is not an object`);\n    }\n\n    const obj = parsed as Record<string, unknown>;\n    const authoritative = typeof obj.authoritative_location === 'string' ? obj.authoritative_location : undefined;\n    const house = typeof obj.house === 'string' ? obj.house : undefined;\n\n    if (authoritative !== undefined) {\n      if (hop === args.maxRedirects) {\n        throw new BrandJsonResolverError('redirect_depth_exceeded', `brand.json redirect depth exceeded`);\n      }\n      url = canonicalizeUrl(authoritative, args.allowPrivateIp);\n      continue;\n    }\n    if (house !== undefined) {\n      // The \"house string\" redirect variant: a bare domain pointing at the\n      // authoritative portfolio. Reject anything that isn't a bare hostname\n      // so an attacker can't inject userinfo, paths, or ports via the\n      // interpolation.\n      if (!BARE_HOSTNAME.test(house)) {\n        throw new BrandJsonResolverError('invalid_house', `brand.json \"house\" is not a bare hostname`);\n      }\n      if (hop === args.maxRedirects) {\n        throw new BrandJsonResolverError('redirect_depth_exceeded', `brand.json redirect depth exceeded`);\n      }\n      url = canonicalizeUrl(`https://${house}/.well-known/brand.json`, args.allowPrivateIp);\n      continue;\n    }\n\n    // Narrow shape validation on the terminal document. Full BrandJsonSchema\n    // validation is stricter than we need (it enforces `^https://` on URLs,\n    // which ssrfSafeFetch already polices) and fails too readily on trailing\n    // portfolio fields the resolver doesn't touch. What we MUST reject: a\n    // document whose shape would let an attacker smuggle a non-string url or\n    // jwks_uri past the selector.\n    assertBrandJsonShape(obj);\n\n    return {\n      status: 'ok',\n      finalUrl: url,\n      data: obj,\n      ...(res.headers['etag'] && { etag: res.headers['etag'] }),\n      ...(res.headers['cache-control'] && { cacheControl: res.headers['cache-control'] }),\n    };\n  }\n\n  throw new BrandJsonResolverError('redirect_depth_exceeded', `brand.json redirect depth exceeded`);\n}\n\n/**\n * Structurally validate a URL and return it in a canonical form for the\n * loop-detection `Set`. Rejects URLs that `ssrfSafeFetch` would later refuse\n * anyway — but catching them here gives a clearer error code and prevents\n * a malformed `authoritative_location` from silently bypassing the hop cap\n * because its string form differed from a prior seen URL.\n */\nfunction canonicalizeUrl(raw: string, allowPrivateIp: boolean): string {\n  let parsed: URL;\n  try {\n    parsed = new URL(raw);\n  } catch {\n    throw new BrandJsonResolverError('invalid_url', `brand.json URL is malformed`);\n  }\n  if (parsed.username || parsed.password) {\n    throw new BrandJsonResolverError('invalid_url', `brand.json URL must not include userinfo`);\n  }\n  if (parsed.protocol !== 'https:' && !(allowPrivateIp && parsed.protocol === 'http:')) {\n    throw new BrandJsonResolverError('invalid_url', `brand.json URL must use https://`);\n  }\n  // Fragments are not sent on the wire and must not smuggle loop-detection\n  // aliases — strip them before stashing in `seen`.\n  parsed.hash = '';\n  return parsed.toString();\n}\n\nfunction isPortfolioHouse(value: unknown): boolean {\n  return typeof value === 'object' && value !== null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Walk every `agents[]` array we might consult and reject entries where\n * `url` or `jwks_uri` are present but non-string. A permissive walk here\n * catches a malformed document that `pickAgent` would otherwise silently\n * skip (a non-string url gets filtered out, so an attacker who declares\n * two agents of a type — one well-formed and one with a poisoned shape —\n * couldn't change the selector outcome, but schema-invalid payloads are\n * still a strong signal of compromise).\n */\nfunction assertBrandJsonShape(obj: Record<string, unknown>): void {\n  const queues: unknown[] = [obj.agents];\n  if (isPortfolioHouse(obj.house)) {\n    const house = obj.house as Record<string, unknown>;\n    queues.push(house.agents);\n    if (Array.isArray(obj.brands)) {\n      for (const brand of obj.brands as Record<string, unknown>[]) {\n        if (brand) queues.push(brand.agents);\n      }\n    }\n  }\n  for (const q of queues) {\n    if (q === undefined) continue;\n    if (!Array.isArray(q)) {\n      throw new BrandJsonResolverError('schema_invalid', 'brand.json `agents` must be an array');\n    }\n    for (const entry of q) {\n      if (entry && typeof entry === 'object') {\n        const e = entry as AgentEntry;\n        if (e.url !== undefined && typeof e.url !== 'string') {\n          throw new BrandJsonResolverError('schema_invalid', 'brand.json agent.url must be a string');\n        }\n        if (e.jwks_uri !== undefined && typeof e.jwks_uri !== 'string') {\n          throw new BrandJsonResolverError('schema_invalid', 'brand.json agent.jwks_uri must be a string');\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/** An agent entry as declared in brand.json `agents[]`. */\ninterface AgentEntry {\n  type?: string;\n  url?: string;\n  id?: string;\n  jwks_uri?: string;\n}\n\nfunction selectAgent(\n  data: unknown,\n  finalBrandUrl: string,\n  selector: { agentType: BrandAgentType; agentId?: string; brandId?: string }\n): SelectedAgent {\n  if (!data || typeof data !== 'object') {\n    throw new BrandJsonResolverError(\n      'agent_not_found',\n      `brand.json has no agent matching ${describeSelector(selector)}`\n    );\n  }\n  const obj = data as Record<string, unknown>;\n\n  let picked: SelectedAgent | undefined;\n  if (isPortfolioHouse(obj.house)) {\n    const house = obj.house as Record<string, unknown>;\n    if (selector.brandId !== undefined) {\n      const brands = Array.isArray(obj.brands) ? (obj.brands as Record<string, unknown>[]) : [];\n      const brand = brands.find(b => b && b.id === selector.brandId);\n      if (brand) picked = pickAgent(brand.agents, finalBrandUrl, selector);\n    }\n    picked ??= pickAgent(house.agents, finalBrandUrl, selector);\n  } else {\n    picked = pickAgent(obj.agents, finalBrandUrl, selector);\n  }\n\n  if (!picked) {\n    throw new BrandJsonResolverError(\n      'agent_not_found',\n      `brand.json has no agent matching ${describeSelector(selector)}`\n    );\n  }\n  return picked;\n}\n\nfunction pickAgent(\n  agents: unknown,\n  finalBrandUrl: string,\n  selector: { agentType: BrandAgentType; agentId?: string }\n): SelectedAgent | undefined {\n  if (!Array.isArray(agents)) return undefined;\n  const matches = agents.filter((a): a is AgentEntry => {\n    if (!a || typeof a !== 'object') return false;\n    const e = a as AgentEntry;\n    if (e.type !== selector.agentType) return false;\n    if (selector.agentId !== undefined && e.id !== selector.agentId) return false;\n    return typeof e.url === 'string';\n  });\n  if (matches.length === 0) return undefined;\n  if (matches.length > 1 && selector.agentId === undefined) {\n    throw new BrandJsonResolverError(\n      'agent_ambiguous',\n      `brand.json declares ${matches.length} agents of type \"${selector.agentType}\"; ` +\n        `pass \\`agentId\\` to disambiguate (choices: ${matches.map(m => m.id ?? '<no-id>').join(', ')})`\n    );\n  }\n  const agent = matches[0]!;\n  const url = agent.url!;\n  const jwksUri = agent.jwks_uri ?? defaultJwksUri(url, finalBrandUrl);\n  return { url, jwksUri };\n}\n\n/**\n * Spec fallback: \"When absent, verifiers MUST default to /.well-known/jwks.json\n * on the origin of `url`.\" We strip any path/query/fragment from the agent\n * URL and replace it with the well-known path.\n *\n * Security: require the agent origin to match the final brand.json origin.\n * Without this check, an attacker-controlled brand.json could set\n * `agent.url: \"https://victim-internal.example/\"` and force the verifier to\n * treat that origin's JWKS as authoritative — a cross-origin trust pivot.\n * Publishers that genuinely host their agent on a different origin from\n * their brand.json MUST declare an explicit `jwks_uri` (and that URI is\n * validated at fetch time by the inner HttpsJwksResolver, not here).\n */\nfunction defaultJwksUri(agentUrl: string, finalBrandUrl: string): string {\n  let agent: URL;\n  try {\n    agent = new URL(agentUrl);\n  } catch {\n    throw new BrandJsonResolverError('invalid_url', `agent.url is not a valid URL`);\n  }\n  const brand = new URL(finalBrandUrl);\n  if (agent.origin !== brand.origin) {\n    throw new BrandJsonResolverError(\n      'jwks_origin_mismatch',\n      `agent.url origin (${agent.origin}) does not match brand.json origin (${brand.origin}); ` +\n        `publisher must declare an explicit jwks_uri for cross-origin agents`\n    );\n  }\n  return `${agent.origin}/.well-known/jwks.json`;\n}\n\nfunction describeSelector(selector: { agentType: BrandAgentType; agentId?: string; brandId?: string }): string {\n  const parts = [`type=${selector.agentType}`];\n  if (selector.agentId !== undefined) parts.push(`id=${selector.agentId}`);\n  if (selector.brandId !== undefined) parts.push(`brand=${selector.brandId}`);\n  return parts.join(' ');\n}\n\nfunction computeLifetime(cacheControl: string | undefined, maxAge: number): number {\n  if (!cacheControl) return maxAge;\n  const lower = cacheControl.toLowerCase();\n  if (/\\bno-store\\b|\\bno-cache\\b/.test(lower)) return 0;\n  const match = /max-age\\s*=\\s*(\\d+)/.exec(lower);\n  if (match) {\n    const serverMax = Number(match[1]);\n    if (Number.isFinite(serverMax)) return Math.min(serverMax, maxAge);\n  }\n  return 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When set,\n   * the resolver looks at `brands[brandId].agents[]` first and falls back to\n   * `house.agents[]` if no agent of the requested type is declared on the\n   * brand itself.\n   */\n  brandId?: string;\n  /**\n   * Minimum seconds between brand.json refetches. Mirrors the JWKS cooldown\n   * and protects counterparties from being hammered by unknown-kid refreshes.\n   * Default 30s (AdCP JWKS floor).\n   */\n  minCooldownSeconds?: number;\n  /**\n   * Absolute cap on how long a cached brand.json snapshot may be used before\n   * a refetch is attempted, even if the counterparty's Cache-Control would\n   * allow longer. Default 3600s (1 hour).\n   */\n  maxAgeSeconds?: number;\n  /**\n   * Maximum redirect hops to follow through `authoritative_location` /\n   * `house` variants. Default 3 — enough for `authoritative_location → house\n   * → portfolio` without inviting loops.\n   */\n  maxRedirects?: number;\n  /**\n   * Allow `http://` / private-IP brand.json and JWKS URLs (dev loops only).\n   * Default false. Forwarded to both the brand.json fetch and the inner\n   * HttpsJwksResolver so a single flag unlocks the whole chain.\n   */\n  allowPrivateIp?: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Forwarded to the inner {@link HttpsJwksResolver} constructor.\n   * `allowPrivateIp` and `now` are set from the outer options and should not\n   * be passed here.\n   */\n  jwksOptions?: Omit<HttpsJwksResolverOptions, 'allowPrivateIp' | 'now'>;\n  /** Clock override for deterministic tests. 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Construct one per\n * counterparty (or keyed by `brand.json` URL + agent selector) and hand it to\n * the webhook/request verifier as the `jwks` dependency.\n */\nexport class BrandJsonJwksResolver implements JwksResolver {\n  private readonly url: string;\n  private readonly selector: {\n    agentType: BrandAgentType;\n    agentId?: string;\n    brandId?: string;\n  };\n  private readonly minCooldown: number;\n  private readonly maxAge: number;\n  private readonly maxRedirects: number;\n  private readonly allowPrivateIp: boolean;\n  private readonly jwksOptions: Omit<HttpsJwksResolverOptions, 'allowPrivateIp' | 'now'>;\n  private readonly now: () => number;\n  private snapshot: BrandSnapshot | undefined;\n  private inner: HttpsJwksResolver | undefined;\n  private inFlight: Promise<void> | undefined;\n\n  constructor(brandJsonUrl: string, options: BrandJsonJwksResolverOptions) {\n    this.url = brandJsonUrl;\n    this.selector = {\n      agentType: options.agentType,\n      ...(options.agentId !== undefined && { agentId: options.agentId }),\n      ...(options.brandId !== undefined && { brandId: options.brandId }),\n    };\n    this.minCooldown = options.minCooldownSeconds ?? DEFAULT_MIN_COOLDOWN_SECONDS;\n    this.maxAge = options.maxAgeSeconds ?? DEFAULT_MAX_AGE_SECONDS;\n    this.maxRedirects = options.maxRedirects ?? DEFAULT_MAX_REDIRECTS;\n    this.allowPrivateIp = options.allowPrivateIp ?? false;\n    this.jwksOptions = options.jwksOptions ?? {};\n    this.now = options.now ?? (() => Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Resolve a JWK by `kid`. On a cold cache, fetches brand.json first; on an\n   * expired brand.json snapshot, refreshes respecting the cooldown. Unknown\n   * kids cascade: first ask the inner HttpsJwksResolver (which will refetch\n   * its own URL if cooldown has elapsed); if still unknown, refresh\n   * brand.json in case `jwks_uri` rotated.\n   */\n  async resolve(keyid: string): Promise<AdcpJsonWebKey | null> {\n    if (!this.snapshot || !this.inner) {\n      await this.refresh();\n    } else if (this.now() > this.snapshot.expiresAt && this.now() - this.snapshot.fetchedAt >= this.minCooldown) {\n      await this.refresh().catch(() => {\n        /* keep stale on transient failure */\n      });\n    }\n    if (!this.inner) return null;\n\n    const hit = await this.inner.resolve(keyid);\n    if (hit) return hit;\n\n    if (this.snapshot && this.now() - this.snapshot.fetchedAt >= this.minCooldown) {\n      await this.refresh().catch(() => {\n        /* keep stale on transient failure */\n      });\n      return this.inner ? this.inner.resolve(keyid) : null;\n    }\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * The agent URL we resolved `jwks_uri` from. Populated after the first\n   * successful refresh; useful for verifier result attribution\n   * (`VerifyWebhookOptions.agentUrlForKeyid`).\n   */\n  get agentUrl(): string | undefined {\n    return this.snapshot?.agentUrl;\n  }\n\n  /** Force a refetch of both brand.json and the inner JWKS, bypassing the cooldown. */\n  async forceRefresh(): Promise<void> {\n    this.snapshot = undefined;\n    this.inner = undefined;\n    await this.refresh();\n  }\n\n  private async refresh(): Promise<void> {\n    if (this.inFlight) {\n      await this.inFlight;\n      return;\n    }\n    this.inFlight = this.doRefresh().finally(() => {\n      this.inFlight = undefined;\n    });\n    await this.inFlight;\n  }\n\n  private async doRefresh(): Promise<void> {\n    const fetched = await fetchBrandJson({\n      startUrl: this.url,\n      currentEtag: this.snapshot?.etag,\n      maxRedirects: this.maxRedirects,\n      allowPrivateIp: this.allowPrivateIp,\n    });\n\n    // 304 on the entry URL: extend the lifetime, keep the inner resolver.\n    if (fetched.status === 'not_modified' && this.snapshot) {\n      this.snapshot = {\n        ...this.snapshot,\n        ...(fetched.etag && { etag: fetched.etag }),\n        fetchedAt: this.now(),\n        expiresAt: this.now() + computeLifetime(fetched.cacheControl, this.maxAge),\n      };\n      return;\n    }\n\n    const agent = selectAgent(fetched.data, fetched.finalUrl, this.selector);\n\n    if (!this.inner || this.snapshot?.jwksUri !== agent.jwksUri) {\n      this.inner = new HttpsJwksResolver(agent.jwksUri, {\n        ...this.jwksOptions,\n        allowPrivateIp: this.allowPrivateIp,\n        now: this.now,\n      });\n    }\n    this.snapshot = {\n      jwksUri: agent.jwksUri,\n      agentUrl: agent.url,\n      ...(fetched.etag && { etag: fetched.etag }),\n      fetchedAt: this.now(),\n      expiresAt: this.now() + computeLifetime(fetched.cacheControl, this.maxAge),\n    };\n  }\n}\n\ninterface FetchedBrandJson {\n  status: 'ok' | 'not_modified';\n  finalUrl: string;\n  data: unknown;\n  etag?: string;\n  cacheControl?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Fetch brand.json from `startUrl`, following `authoritative_location` and\n * `house` string redirect variants up to `maxRedirects` hops. Each hop goes\n * through the SSRF-safe fetch primitive so an attacker-supplied chain can't\n * land on a private address or IMDS. Redirect targets are structurally\n * validated before dispatch — an attacker-controlled brand.json that emits\n * `{\"house\": \"evil.com\\\\@victim.com\"}` or `{\"authoritative_location\":\n * \"http://169.254.169.254/...\"}` is rejected at parse time rather than\n * relying on `ssrfSafeFetch` to catch every pathological shape.\n */\nasync function fetchBrandJson(args: {\n  startUrl: string;\n  currentEtag?: string;\n  maxRedirects: number;\n  allowPrivateIp: boolean;\n}): Promise<FetchedBrandJson> {\n  const seen = new Set<string>();\n  let url = canonicalizeUrl(args.startUrl, args.allowPrivateIp);\n\n  for (let hop = 0; hop <= args.maxRedirects; hop++) {\n    if (seen.has(url)) {\n      throw new BrandJsonResolverError('redirect_loop', `brand.json redirect loop detected`);\n    }\n    seen.add(url);\n\n    const headers: Record<string, string> = {\n      accept: 'application/json',\n    };\n    // Only attach If-None-Match on the entry URL: a 304 short-circuits the\n    // whole chain, so revalidating a deeper hop with a stale ETag would be\n    // a lie about the redirect target.\n    if (hop === 0 && args.currentEtag) headers['if-none-match'] = args.currentEtag;\n\n    const res = await ssrfSafeFetch(url, {\n      method: 'GET',\n      headers,\n      allowPrivateIp: args.allowPrivateIp,\n    });\n\n    if (hop === 0 && res.status === 304) {\n      return {\n        status: 'not_modified',\n        finalUrl: url,\n        data: null,\n        ...(res.headers['etag'] && { etag: res.headers['etag'] }),\n        ...(res.headers['cache-control'] && { cacheControl: res.headers['cache-control'] }),\n      };\n    }\n    if (res.status !== 200) {\n      throw new BrandJsonResolverError('fetch_failed', `brand.json fetch returned HTTP ${res.status}`);\n    }\n\n    const text = Buffer.from(res.body).toString('utf8');\n    let parsed: unknown;\n    try {\n      parsed = JSON.parse(text);\n    } catch {\n      throw new BrandJsonResolverError('invalid_body', `brand.json response is not valid JSON`);\n    }\n    if (!parsed || typeof parsed !== 'object') {\n      throw new BrandJsonResolverError('invalid_body', `brand.json response is not an object`);\n    }\n\n    const obj = parsed as Record<string, unknown>;\n    const authoritative = typeof obj.authoritative_location === 'string' ? obj.authoritative_location : undefined;\n    const house = typeof obj.house === 'string' ? obj.house : undefined;\n\n    if (authoritative !== undefined) {\n      if (hop === args.maxRedirects) {\n        throw new BrandJsonResolverError('redirect_depth_exceeded', `brand.json redirect depth exceeded`);\n      }\n      url = canonicalizeUrl(authoritative, args.allowPrivateIp);\n      continue;\n    }\n    if (house !== undefined) {\n      // The \"house string\" redirect variant: a bare domain pointing at the\n      // authoritative portfolio. Reject anything that isn't a bare hostname\n      // so an attacker can't inject userinfo, paths, or ports via the\n      // interpolation.\n      if (!BARE_HOSTNAME.test(house)) {\n        throw new BrandJsonResolverError('invalid_house', `brand.json \"house\" is not a bare hostname`);\n      }\n      if (hop === args.maxRedirects) {\n        throw new BrandJsonResolverError('redirect_depth_exceeded', `brand.json redirect depth exceeded`);\n      }\n      url = canonicalizeUrl(`https://${house}/.well-known/brand.json`, args.allowPrivateIp);\n      continue;\n    }\n\n    // Narrow shape validation on the terminal document. Full BrandJsonSchema\n    // validation is stricter than we need (it enforces `^https://` on URLs,\n    // which ssrfSafeFetch already polices) and fails too readily on trailing\n    // portfolio fields the resolver doesn't touch. What we MUST reject: a\n    // document whose shape would let an attacker smuggle a non-string url or\n    // jwks_uri past the selector.\n    assertBrandJsonShape(obj);\n\n    return {\n      status: 'ok',\n      finalUrl: url,\n      data: obj,\n      ...(res.headers['etag'] && { etag: res.headers['etag'] }),\n      ...(res.headers['cache-control'] && { cacheControl: res.headers['cache-control'] }),\n    };\n  }\n\n  throw new BrandJsonResolverError('redirect_depth_exceeded', `brand.json redirect depth exceeded`);\n}\n\n/**\n * Structurally validate a URL and return it in a canonical form for the\n * loop-detection `Set`. Rejects URLs that `ssrfSafeFetch` would later refuse\n * anyway — but catching them here gives a clearer error code and prevents\n * a malformed `authoritative_location` from silently bypassing the hop cap\n * because its string form differed from a prior seen URL.\n */\nfunction canonicalizeUrl(raw: string, allowPrivateIp: boolean): string {\n  let parsed: URL;\n  try {\n    parsed = new URL(raw);\n  } catch {\n    throw new BrandJsonResolverError('invalid_url', `brand.json URL is malformed`);\n  }\n  if (parsed.username || parsed.password) {\n    throw new BrandJsonResolverError('invalid_url', `brand.json URL must not include userinfo`);\n  }\n  if (parsed.protocol !== 'https:' && !(allowPrivateIp && parsed.protocol === 'http:')) {\n    throw new BrandJsonResolverError('invalid_url', `brand.json URL must use https://`);\n  }\n  // Fragments are not sent on the wire and must not smuggle loop-detection\n  // aliases — strip them before stashing in `seen`.\n  parsed.hash = '';\n  return parsed.toString();\n}\n\nfunction isPortfolioHouse(value: unknown): boolean {\n  return typeof value === 'object' && value !== null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Walk every `agents[]` array we might consult and reject entries where\n * `url` or `jwks_uri` are present but non-string. A permissive walk here\n * catches a malformed document that `pickAgent` would otherwise silently\n * skip (a non-string url gets filtered out, so an attacker who declares\n * two agents of a type — one well-formed and one with a poisoned shape —\n * couldn't change the selector outcome, but schema-invalid payloads are\n * still a strong signal of compromise).\n */\nfunction assertBrandJsonShape(obj: Record<string, unknown>): void {\n  const queues: unknown[] = [obj.agents];\n  if (isPortfolioHouse(obj.house)) {\n    const house = obj.house as Record<string, unknown>;\n    queues.push(house.agents);\n    if (Array.isArray(obj.brands)) {\n      for (const brand of obj.brands as Record<string, unknown>[]) {\n        if (brand) queues.push(brand.agents);\n      }\n    }\n  }\n  for (const q of queues) {\n    if (q === undefined) continue;\n    if (!Array.isArray(q)) {\n      throw new BrandJsonResolverError('schema_invalid', 'brand.json `agents` must be an array');\n    }\n    for (const entry of q) {\n      if (entry && typeof entry === 'object') {\n        const e = entry as AgentEntry;\n        if (e.url !== undefined && typeof e.url !== 'string') {\n          throw new BrandJsonResolverError('schema_invalid', 'brand.json agent.url must be a string');\n        }\n        if (e.jwks_uri !== undefined && typeof e.jwks_uri !== 'string') {\n          throw new BrandJsonResolverError('schema_invalid', 'brand.json agent.jwks_uri must be a string');\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/** An agent entry as declared in brand.json `agents[]`. */\ninterface AgentEntry {\n  type?: string;\n  url?: string;\n  id?: string;\n  jwks_uri?: string;\n}\n\nfunction selectAgent(\n  data: unknown,\n  finalBrandUrl: string,\n  selector: { agentType: BrandAgentType; agentId?: string; brandId?: string }\n): SelectedAgent {\n  if (!data || typeof data !== 'object') {\n    throw new BrandJsonResolverError(\n      'agent_not_found',\n      `brand.json has no agent matching ${describeSelector(selector)}`\n    );\n  }\n  const obj = data as Record<string, unknown>;\n\n  let picked: SelectedAgent | undefined;\n  if (isPortfolioHouse(obj.house)) {\n    const house = obj.house as Record<string, unknown>;\n    if (selector.brandId !== undefined) {\n      const brands = Array.isArray(obj.brands) ? (obj.brands as Record<string, unknown>[]) : [];\n      const brand = brands.find(b => b && b.id === selector.brandId);\n      if (brand) picked = pickAgent(brand.agents, finalBrandUrl, selector);\n    }\n    picked ??= pickAgent(house.agents, finalBrandUrl, selector);\n  } else {\n    picked = pickAgent(obj.agents, finalBrandUrl, selector);\n  }\n\n  if (!picked) {\n    throw new BrandJsonResolverError(\n      'agent_not_found',\n      `brand.json has no agent matching ${describeSelector(selector)}`\n    );\n  }\n  return picked;\n}\n\nfunction pickAgent(\n  agents: unknown,\n  finalBrandUrl: string,\n  selector: { agentType: BrandAgentType; agentId?: string }\n): SelectedAgent | undefined {\n  if (!Array.isArray(agents)) return undefined;\n  const matches = agents.filter((a): a is AgentEntry => {\n    if (!a || typeof a !== 'object') return false;\n    const e = a as AgentEntry;\n    if (e.type !== selector.agentType) return false;\n    if (selector.agentId !== undefined && e.id !== selector.agentId) return false;\n    return typeof e.url === 'string';\n  });\n  if (matches.length === 0) return undefined;\n  if (matches.length > 1 && selector.agentId === undefined) {\n    throw new BrandJsonResolverError(\n      'agent_ambiguous',\n      `brand.json declares ${matches.length} agents of type \"${selector.agentType}\"; ` +\n        `pass \\`agentId\\` to disambiguate (choices: ${matches.map(m => m.id ?? '<no-id>').join(', ')})`\n    );\n  }\n  const agent = matches[0]!;\n  const url = agent.url!;\n  const jwksUri = agent.jwks_uri ?? defaultJwksUri(url, finalBrandUrl);\n  return { url, jwksUri };\n}\n\n/**\n * Spec fallback: \"When absent, verifiers MUST default to /.well-known/jwks.json\n * on the origin of `url`.\" We strip any path/query/fragment from the agent\n * URL and replace it with the well-known path.\n *\n * Security: require the agent origin to match the final brand.json origin.\n * Without this check, an attacker-controlled brand.json could set\n * `agent.url: \"https://victim-internal.example/\"` and force the verifier to\n * treat that origin's JWKS as authoritative — a cross-origin trust pivot.\n * Publishers that genuinely host their agent on a different origin from\n * their brand.json MUST declare an explicit `jwks_uri` (and that URI is\n * validated at fetch time by the inner HttpsJwksResolver, not here).\n */\nfunction defaultJwksUri(agentUrl: string, finalBrandUrl: string): string {\n  let agent: URL;\n  try {\n    agent = new URL(agentUrl);\n  } catch {\n    throw new BrandJsonResolverError('invalid_url', `agent.url is not a valid URL`);\n  }\n  const brand = new URL(finalBrandUrl);\n  if (agent.origin !== brand.origin) {\n    throw new BrandJsonResolverError(\n      'jwks_origin_mismatch',\n      `agent.url origin (${agent.origin}) does not match brand.json origin (${brand.origin}); ` +\n        `publisher must declare an explicit jwks_uri for cross-origin agents`\n    );\n  }\n  return `${agent.origin}/.well-known/jwks.json`;\n}\n\nfunction describeSelector(selector: { agentType: BrandAgentType; agentId?: string; brandId?: string }): string {\n  const parts = [`type=${selector.agentType}`];\n  if (selector.agentId !== undefined) parts.push(`id=${selector.agentId}`);\n  if (selector.brandId !== undefined) parts.push(`brand=${selector.brandId}`);\n  return parts.join(' ');\n}\n\nfunction computeLifetime(cacheControl: string | undefined, maxAge: number): number {\n  if (!cacheControl) return maxAge;\n  const lower = cacheControl.toLowerCase();\n  if (/\\bno-store\\b|\\bno-cache\\b/.test(lower)) return 0;\n  const match = /max-age\\s*=\\s*(\\d+)/.exec(lower);\n  if (match) {\n    const serverMax = Number(match[1]);\n    if (Number.isFinite(serverMax)) return Math.min(serverMax, maxAge);\n  }\n  return 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package/dist/lib/signing/canonicalize.mjs

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
-import { fileURLToPath as __adcpFileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { dirname as __adcpDirname } from 'node:path';
-import { createRequire as __adcpCreateRequire } from 'node:module';
-const __filename = __adcpFileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
-const __dirname = __adcpDirname(__filename);
-const require = __adcpCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
 import { RequestSignatureError } from "./errors.mjs";
 const DEFAULT_PARAM_ORDER = [
   "created",

package/dist/lib/signing/canonicalize.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/signing/canonicalize.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { RequestSignatureError } from './errors';\n\nexport interface RequestLike {\n  method: string;\n  url: string;\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>;\n  body?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * RFC 9421 response-signing context. Carries the response status and\n * headers/body, plus the originating request method + URL so derived\n * components that bind back to the request context (`@method`,\n * `@target-uri`, `@authority`) resolve correctly.\n */\nexport interface ResponseLike {\n  status: number;\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>;\n  body?: string;\n  /**\n   * Originating request context. `url` must be absolute because\n   * `@target-uri` and `@authority` are parsed with `new URL(...)`. 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package/dist/lib/signing/capability-cache.mjs

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
-import { fileURLToPath as __adcpFileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { dirname as __adcpDirname } from 'node:path';
-import { createRequire as __adcpCreateRequire } from 'node:module';
-const __filename = __adcpFileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
-const __dirname = __adcpDirname(__filename);
-const require = __adcpCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
 import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
 const DEFAULT_TTL_SECONDS = 300;
 class CapabilityCache {

package/dist/lib/signing/capability-cache.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/signing/capability-cache.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';\nimport type { VerifierCapability } from './types';\n\nexport interface CachedCapability {\n  /** RFC 9421 request-signing capability block as advertised by the agent. */\n  requestSigning: VerifierCapability | undefined;\n  /** AdCP major version associated with the capability response, when known. */\n  adcpVersion: number | undefined;\n  /** Epoch seconds when this entry was written. */\n  fetchedAt: number;\n  /**\n   * Optional explicit epoch-seconds deadline at which this entry becomes\n   * stale. Overrides the cache's default TTL — used to give negative\n   * (failed-discovery) entries a shorter refresh window than positive\n   * entries so a transient seller outage doesn't block signing decisions\n   * for the full 5-minute TTL.\n   */\n  staleAt?: number;\n}\n\nexport interface CapabilityCacheOptions {\n  /** Seconds before a cached capability is considered stale. Default 300. */\n  ttlSeconds?: number;\n  now?: () => number;\n}\n\nconst DEFAULT_TTL_SECONDS = 300;\n\n/**\n * Per-agent cache of the `request_signing` capability block returned by\n * `get_adcp_capabilities`. Keyed by a caller-supplied `cacheKey` (typically\n * `agent_uri + auth-token-hash`) so that different credentials or URLs get\n * independent entries.\n *\n * Staleness is TTL-based; callers may also invalidate explicitly — e.g. after\n * a seller rotates its advertisement mid-session — so the next outbound call\n * re-fetches before deciding whether to sign.\n */\nexport class CapabilityCache {\n  private readonly entries = new Map<string, CachedCapability>();\n  /**\n   * In-flight priming fetches keyed by `cacheKey`. Lives on the instance so\n   * two `CapabilityCache` objects — e.g., one per tenant in a multi-tenant\n   * embedding — don't share an `ensureCapabilityLoaded` promise map across\n   * instances and race each other's writes. The default process-global\n   * cache uses its own map via `defaultCapabilityCache`.\n   */\n  private readonly inFlight = new Map<string, Promise<CachedCapability>>();\n  private readonly ttlSeconds: number;\n  private readonly now: () => number;\n\n  constructor(options: CapabilityCacheOptions = {}) {\n    this.ttlSeconds = options.ttlSeconds ?? DEFAULT_TTL_SECONDS;\n    this.now = options.now ?? 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+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/signing/capability-cache.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';\nimport type { VerifierCapability } from './types';\n\nexport interface CachedCapability {\n  /** RFC 9421 request-signing capability block as advertised by the agent. */\n  requestSigning: VerifierCapability | undefined;\n  /** AdCP major version associated with the capability response, when known. */\n  adcpVersion: number | undefined;\n  /** Epoch seconds when this entry was written. */\n  fetchedAt: number;\n  /**\n   * Optional explicit epoch-seconds deadline at which this entry becomes\n   * stale. Overrides the cache's default TTL — used to give negative\n   * (failed-discovery) entries a shorter refresh window than positive\n   * entries so a transient seller outage doesn't block signing decisions\n   * for the full 5-minute TTL.\n   */\n  staleAt?: number;\n}\n\nexport interface CapabilityCacheOptions {\n  /** Seconds before a cached capability is considered stale. Default 300. */\n  ttlSeconds?: number;\n  now?: () => number;\n}\n\nconst DEFAULT_TTL_SECONDS = 300;\n\n/**\n * Per-agent cache of the `request_signing` capability block returned by\n * `get_adcp_capabilities`. Keyed by a caller-supplied `cacheKey` (typically\n * `agent_uri + auth-token-hash`) so that different credentials or URLs get\n * independent entries.\n *\n * Staleness is TTL-based; callers may also invalidate explicitly — e.g. after\n * a seller rotates its advertisement mid-session — so the next outbound call\n * re-fetches before deciding whether to sign.\n */\nexport class CapabilityCache {\n  private readonly entries = new Map<string, CachedCapability>();\n  /**\n   * In-flight priming fetches keyed by `cacheKey`. Lives on the instance so\n   * two `CapabilityCache` objects — e.g., one per tenant in a multi-tenant\n   * embedding — don't share an `ensureCapabilityLoaded` promise map across\n   * instances and race each other's writes. 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package/dist/lib/signing/capability-priming.mjs

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
-import { fileURLToPath as __adcpFileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { dirname as __adcpDirname } from 'node:path';
-import { createRequire as __adcpCreateRequire } from 'node:module';
-const __filename = __adcpFileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
-const __dirname = __adcpDirname(__filename);
-const require = __adcpCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
 import { unwrapProtocolResponse } from "./protocol-response.mjs";
 import { isAbortOrTimeoutError } from "../protocols/abort.mjs";
 const CAPABILITY_OP = "get_adcp_capabilities";

package/dist/lib/signing/capability-priming.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/signing/capability-priming.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type { AgentConfig } from '../types/adcp';\nimport type { AgentSigningContext } from './agent-context';\nimport type { CachedCapability } from './capability-cache';\nimport { unwrapProtocolResponse } from './protocol-response';\nimport type { VerifierCapability } from './types';\nimport { isAbortOrTimeoutError } from '../protocols/abort';\n\n/**\n * Op name used to fetch the seller's capability advertisement. 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(adcp!.major_versions as unknown[]) : undefined;\n  const adcpVersion =\n    versions && versions.length > 0 && typeof versions[0] === 'number' ? (versions[0] as number) : undefined;\n\n  return { requestSigning, adcpVersion };\n}\n\n/**\n * Refresh window applied to a negative-cache entry written after a failed\n * discovery call. 60s is short enough that a transient seller outage\n * self-heals on the next user action, long enough to avoid pile-ups if the\n * seller stays down.\n */\nconst NEGATIVE_CACHE_TTL_SECONDS = 60;\n\n/**\n * Populate the capability cache for an agent when the `request_signing` entry\n * is absent or stale. The injected `fetchRaw` callback is expected to make an\n * unsigned `get_adcp_capabilities` call against the counterparty — callers\n * wire it to `ProtocolClient.callTool` or the underlying transport helper so\n * that no new connection code lives here.\n *\n * Fails open: if discovery itself fails, we cache an empty entry with a short\n * `staleAt` window and return it rather than propagating the error. Signing\n * decisions then fall through:\n *   - Ops in the buyer's `always_sign` list are still signed (with default\n *     content-digest coverage), so explicit pilot opt-ins keep working.\n *   - Ops the seller might have listed in `required_for` go out unsigned and\n *     are rejected with `request_signature_required` at the wire — the user\n *     sees a clear error rather than an opaque priming wedge, and the next\n *     retry re-primes.\n */\nexport async function ensureCapabilityLoaded(\n  _agent: AgentConfig,\n  signingContext: AgentSigningContext,\n  fetchRaw: FetchRaw\n): Promise<CachedCapability> {\n  const { cache, capabilityCacheKey: key } = signingContext;\n  const existing = cache.get(key);\n  if (existing && !cache.isStale(existing)) return existing;\n\n  const pending = cache._getInFlight(key);\n  if (pending) return pending;\n\n  const promise = fetchRaw({})\n    .then(raw => {\n      const { requestSigning, adcpVersion } = extractCapability(raw);\n      const entry: CachedCapability = {\n        requestSigning,\n        adcpVersion,\n        fetchedAt: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),\n      };\n      cache.set(key, entry);\n      return entry;\n    })\n    .catch(error => {\n      if (isAbortOrTimeoutError(error)) {\n        throw error;\n      }\n      const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);\n      const entry: CachedCapability = {\n        requestSigning: undefined,\n        adcpVersion: undefined,\n        fetchedAt: now,\n        staleAt: now + NEGATIVE_CACHE_TTL_SECONDS,\n      };\n      cache.set(key, entry);\n      return entry;\n    })\n    .finally(() => {\n      cache._deleteInFlight(key);\n    });\n\n  cache._setInFlight(key, promise);\n  return promise;\n}\n"],"mappings":"AAGA,SAAS,8BAA8B;AAEvC,SAAS,6BAA6B;AAO/B,MAAM,gBAAgB;AAa7B,SAAS,kBAAkB,UAGzB;AACA,QAAM,UAAU,uBAAuB,QAAQ;AAC/C,MAAI,CAAC,WAAW,OAAO,YAAY,SAAU,QAAO,EAAE,gBAAgB,QAAW,aAAa,OAAU;AAExG,QAAM,OAAO;AACb,QAAM,iBAAiB,KAAK;AAC5B,QAAM,OAAO,KAAK;AAClB,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,cAAc,IAAK,KAAM,iBAA+B;AAC7F,QAAM,cACJ,YAAY,SAAS,SAAS,KAAK,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC,MAAM,WAAY,SAAS,CAAC,IAAe;AAEjG,SAAO,EAAE,gBAAgB,YAAY;AACvC;AAQA,MAAM,6BAA6B;AAmBnC,eAAsB,uBACpB,QACA,gBACA,UAC2B;AAC3B,QAAM,EAAE,OAAO,oBAAoB,IAAI,IAAI;AAC3C,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG;AAC9B,MAAI,YAAY,CAAC,MAAM,QAAQ,QAAQ,EAAG,QAAO;AAEjD,QAAM,UAAU,MAAM,aAAa,GAAG;AACtC,MAAI,QAAS,QAAO;AAEpB,QAAM,UAAU,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC,EACxB,KAAK,SAAO;AACX,UAAM,EAAE,gBAAgB,YAAY,IAAI,kBAAkB,GAAG;AAC7D,UAAM,QAA0B;AAAA,MAC9B;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,WAAW,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,GAAI;AAAA,IACzC;AACA,UAAM,IAAI,KAAK,KAAK;AACpB,WAAO;AAAA,EACT,CAAC,EACA,MAAM,WAAS;AACd,QAAI,sBAAsB,KAAK,GAAG;AAChC,YAAM;AAAA,IACR;AACA,UAAM,MAAM,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,GAAI;AACxC,UAAM,QAA0B;AAAA,MAC9B,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAChB,aAAa;AAAA,MACb,WAAW;AAAA,MACX,SAAS,MAAM;AAAA,IACjB;AACA,UAAM,IAAI,KAAK,KAAK;AACpB,WAAO;AAAA,EACT,CAAC,EACA,QAAQ,MAAM;AACb,UAAM,gBAAgB,GAAG;AAAA,EAC3B,CAAC;AAEH,QAAM,aAAa,KAAK,OAAO;AAC/B,SAAO;AACT;","names":[]}

package/dist/lib/signing/client.mjs

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
-import { fileURLToPath as __adcpFileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { dirname as __adcpDirname } from 'node:path';
-import { createRequire as __adcpCreateRequire } from 'node:module';
-const __filename = __adcpFileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
-const __dirname = __adcpDirname(__filename);
-const require = __adcpCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
 import {
   buildResponseSignatureBase,
   buildSignatureBase,

package/dist/lib/signing/client.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/signing/client.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Client-side signing surface: what a buyer needs to sign outbound AdCP\n * requests per RFC 9421 — signer, canonicalization helpers, fetch wrapper,\n * and the capability cache that gates auto-wiring.\n *\n * Paired with `@adcp/sdk/signing/server` (verifier / middleware / stores).\n * The aggregate `@adcp/sdk/signing` barrel re-exports both for back-compat.\n */\nexport {\n  buildResponseSignatureBase,\n  buildSignatureBase,\n  canonicalAuthority,\n  canonicalMethod,\n  canonicalTargetUri,\n  formatSignatureParams,\n  getHeaderValue,\n  type RequestLike,\n  type ResponseLike,\n  type SignatureParams,\n} from './canonicalize';\nexport { computeContentDigest, contentDigestMatches, parseContentDigest } from './content-digest';\nexport {\n  requestContextFromExpress,\n  requestContextFromFetch,\n  requestContextFromLambda,\n  type ExpressRequestLike,\n  type FetchRequestLike,\n  type LambdaRequestEvent,\n  type RequestContextFromExpressOptions,\n  type RequestContextFromLambdaOptions,\n} from './request-context';\nexport {\n  finalizeRequestSignature,\n  finalizeResponseSignature,\n  prepareRequestSignature,\n  prepareResponseSignature,\n  prepareWebhookSignature,\n  signRequest,\n  signResponse,\n  signWebhook,\n  type PreparedRequestSignature,\n  type PreparedResponseSignature,\n  type SignatureIdentity,\n  type SignedRequest,\n  type SignedResponse,\n  type SignerKey,\n  type SignRequestOptions,\n  type SignResponseOptions,\n  type SignWebhookOptions,\n} from './signer';\nexport { signRequestAsync, signResponseAsync, signWebhookAsync } from './signer-async';\nexport { derEcdsaToP1363 } from './ecdsa-encoding';\nexport { WEBHOOK_MANDATORY_COMPONENTS, WEBHOOK_SIGNING_TAG } from './webhook-verifier';\nexport { createSigningFetch, type CoverContentDigestPredicate, type SigningFetchOptions } from './fetch';\nexport { createSigningFetchAsync } from './fetch-async';\nexport type { SigningProvider } from './provider';\nexport {\n  RequestSignatureError,\n  type RequestSignatureErrorCode,\n  ResponseSignatureError,\n  type ResponseSignatureErrorCode,\n  SigningProviderAlgorithmMismatchError,\n  type SigningProviderErrorCode,\n  WebhookSignatureError,\n  type WebhookSignatureErrorCode,\n} from './errors';\nexport {\n  ALLOWED_ALGS,\n  CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS,\n  MANDATORY_COMPONENTS,\n  MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS,\n  REQUEST_SIGNING_TAG,\n  RESPONSE_MANDATORY_COMPONENTS,\n  RESPONSE_SIGNING_TAG,\n  type AdcpJsonWebKey,\n  type AdcpSignAlg,\n  type ContentDigestPolicy,\n  type VerifierCapability,\n} from './types';\nexport {\n  CapabilityCache,\n  buildCapabilityCacheKey,\n  defaultCapabilityCache,\n  type CachedCapability,\n  type CapabilityCacheOptions,\n} from './capability-cache';\nexport {\n  buildAgentSigningFetch,\n  createAgentSignedFetch,\n  extractAdcpOperation,\n  isInlineSigningConfig,\n  isProviderSigningConfig,\n  resolveCoverContentDigest,\n  shouldSignOperation,\n  toSignerKey,\n  type BuildAgentSigningFetchOptions,\n  type CreateAgentSignedFetchOptions,\n} from './agent-fetch';\nexport {\n  buildAgentSigningContext,\n  signingContextStorage,\n  type AgentSigningContext,\n  type AgentSigningIdentitySnapshot,\n} from './agent-context';\nexport { ensureCapabilityLoaded, CAPABILITY_OP } from './capability-priming';\nexport { pemToAdcpJwk, type AdcpUse, type PemToAdcpJwkOptions } from './jwks-helpers';\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;AAQA;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,OAIK;AACP,SAAS,sBAAsB,sBAAsB,0BAA0B;AAC/E;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,OAMK;AACP;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,OAUK;AACP,SAAS,kBAAkB,mBAAmB,wBAAwB;AACtE,SAAS,uBAAuB;AAChC,SAAS,8BAA8B,2BAA2B;AAClE,SAAS,0BAAsF;AAC/F,SAAS,+BAA+B;AAExC;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EAEA;AAAA,EAEA;AAAA,EAEA;AAAA,OAEK;AACP;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,OAKK;AACP;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,OAGK;AACP;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,OAGK;AACP;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,OAGK;AACP,SAAS,wBAAwB,qBAAqB;AACtD,SAAS,oBAA4D;","names":[]}
+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/signing/client.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Client-side signing surface: what a buyer needs to sign outbound AdCP\n * requests per RFC 9421 — signer, canonicalization helpers, fetch wrapper,\n * and the capability cache that gates auto-wiring.\n *\n * Paired with `@adcp/sdk/signing/server` (verifier / middleware / stores).\n * The aggregate `@adcp/sdk/signing` barrel re-exports both for back-compat.\n */\nexport {\n  buildResponseSignatureBase,\n  buildSignatureBase,\n  canonicalAuthority,\n  canonicalMethod,\n  canonicalTargetUri,\n  formatSignatureParams,\n  getHeaderValue,\n  type RequestLike,\n  type ResponseLike,\n  type SignatureParams,\n} from './canonicalize';\nexport { computeContentDigest, contentDigestMatches, parseContentDigest } from './content-digest';\nexport {\n  requestContextFromExpress,\n  requestContextFromFetch,\n  requestContextFromLambda,\n  type ExpressRequestLike,\n  type FetchRequestLike,\n  type LambdaRequestEvent,\n  type RequestContextFromExpressOptions,\n  type RequestContextFromLambdaOptions,\n} from './request-context';\nexport {\n  finalizeRequestSignature,\n  finalizeResponseSignature,\n  prepareRequestSignature,\n  prepareResponseSignature,\n  prepareWebhookSignature,\n  signRequest,\n  signResponse,\n  signWebhook,\n  type PreparedRequestSignature,\n  type PreparedResponseSignature,\n  type SignatureIdentity,\n  type SignedRequest,\n  type SignedResponse,\n  type SignerKey,\n  type SignRequestOptions,\n  type SignResponseOptions,\n  type SignWebhookOptions,\n} from './signer';\nexport { signRequestAsync, signResponseAsync, signWebhookAsync } from './signer-async';\nexport { derEcdsaToP1363 } from './ecdsa-encoding';\nexport { WEBHOOK_MANDATORY_COMPONENTS, WEBHOOK_SIGNING_TAG } from './webhook-verifier';\nexport { createSigningFetch, type CoverContentDigestPredicate, type SigningFetchOptions } from './fetch';\nexport { createSigningFetchAsync } from './fetch-async';\nexport type { SigningProvider } from './provider';\nexport {\n  RequestSignatureError,\n  type RequestSignatureErrorCode,\n  ResponseSignatureError,\n  type ResponseSignatureErrorCode,\n  SigningProviderAlgorithmMismatchError,\n  type SigningProviderErrorCode,\n  WebhookSignatureError,\n  type WebhookSignatureErrorCode,\n} from './errors';\nexport {\n  ALLOWED_ALGS,\n  CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS,\n  MANDATORY_COMPONENTS,\n  MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS,\n  REQUEST_SIGNING_TAG,\n  RESPONSE_MANDATORY_COMPONENTS,\n  RESPONSE_SIGNING_TAG,\n  type AdcpJsonWebKey,\n  type AdcpSignAlg,\n  type ContentDigestPolicy,\n  type VerifierCapability,\n} from './types';\nexport {\n  CapabilityCache,\n  buildCapabilityCacheKey,\n  defaultCapabilityCache,\n  type CachedCapability,\n  type CapabilityCacheOptions,\n} from './capability-cache';\nexport {\n  buildAgentSigningFetch,\n  createAgentSignedFetch,\n  extractAdcpOperation,\n  isInlineSigningConfig,\n  isProviderSigningConfig,\n  resolveCoverContentDigest,\n  shouldSignOperation,\n  toSignerKey,\n  type BuildAgentSigningFetchOptions,\n  type CreateAgentSignedFetchOptions,\n} from './agent-fetch';\nexport {\n  buildAgentSigningContext,\n  signingContextStorage,\n  type AgentSigningContext,\n  type AgentSigningIdentitySnapshot,\n} from './agent-context';\nexport { ensureCapabilityLoaded, CAPABILITY_OP } from './capability-priming';\nexport { pemToAdcpJwk, type AdcpUse, type PemToAdcpJwkOptions } from './jwks-helpers';\n"],"mappings":"AAQA;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,OAIK;AACP,SAAS,sBAAsB,sBAAsB,0BAA0B;AAC/E;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,OAMK;AACP;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,OAUK;AACP,SAAS,kBAAkB,mBAAmB,wBAAwB;AACtE,SAAS,uBAAuB;AAChC,SAAS,8BAA8B,2BAA2B;AAClE,SAAS,0BAAsF;AAC/F,SAAS,+BAA+B;AAExC;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EAEA;AAAA,EAEA;AAAA,EAEA;AAAA,OAEK;AACP;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,OAKK;AACP;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,OAGK;AACP;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,OAGK;AACP;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,OAGK;AACP,SAAS,wBAAwB,qBAAqB;AACtD,SAAS,oBAA4D;","names":[]}

package/dist/lib/signing/content-digest.mjs

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
-import { fileURLToPath as __adcpFileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { dirname as __adcpDirname } from 'node:path';
-import { createRequire as __adcpCreateRequire } from 'node:module';
-const __filename = __adcpFileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
-const __dirname = __adcpDirname(__filename);
-const require = __adcpCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
 import { createHash, timingSafeEqual } from "crypto";
 import { parseDictionary } from "structured-headers";
 const SHA256_MEMBER_RE = /(?:^|[,\s])sha-256=:([A-Za-z0-9+/_-]+={0,2}):/;

package/dist/lib/signing/content-digest.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/signing/content-digest.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { createHash, timingSafeEqual } from 'crypto';\nimport { parseDictionary } from 'structured-headers';\n\nconst SHA256_MEMBER_RE = /(?:^|[,\\s])sha-256=:([A-Za-z0-9+/_-]+={0,2}):/;\n\nexport function computeContentDigest(body: string | Uint8Array): string {\n  const buf = toBuffer(body);\n  const hash = createHash('sha256').update(buf).digest('base64');\n  return `sha-256=:${hash}:`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Extract the `sha-256` member from an RFC 9530 Content-Digest header. The\n * header is an RFC 8941 Dictionary and MAY list multiple algorithms; we look\n * up the `sha-256` member without requiring any particular position.\n */\nexport function parseContentDigest(header: string): Buffer | null {\n  try {\n    const dict = parseDictionary(header);\n    const entry = dict.get('sha-256');\n    if (entry && entry[0] instanceof ArrayBuffer) return Buffer.from(entry[0]);\n  } catch {\n    // Fall through: a malformed filler member (e.g. truncated sha-512) should\n    // not mask the sha-256 entry we actually verify against.\n  }\n  const m = header.match(SHA256_MEMBER_RE);\n  return m && m[1] ? Buffer.from(m[1], 'base64') : null;\n}\n\nexport function contentDigestMatches(header: string, body: string | Uint8Array): boolean {\n  const expected = parseContentDigest(header);\n  if (!expected) return false;\n  const buf = toBuffer(body);\n  const actual = createHash('sha256').update(buf).digest();\n  if (expected.length !== actual.length) return false;\n  return timingSafeEqual(expected, actual);\n}\n\nfunction toBuffer(body: string | Uint8Array): Buffer {\n  if (typeof body === 'string') return Buffer.from(body, 'utf8');\n  return Buffer.from(body.buffer, body.byteOffset, body.byteLength);\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;AAAA,SAAS,YAAY,uBAAuB;AAC5C,SAAS,uBAAuB;AAEhC,MAAM,mBAAmB;AAElB,SAAS,qBAAqB,MAAmC;AACtE,QAAM,MAAM,SAAS,IAAI;AACzB,QAAM,OAAO,WAAW,QAAQ,EAAE,OAAO,GAAG,EAAE,OAAO,QAAQ;AAC7D,SAAO,YAAY,IAAI;AACzB;AAOO,SAAS,mBAAmB,QAA+B;AAChE,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,OAAO,gBAAgB,MAAM;AACnC,UAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,IAAI,SAAS;AAChC,QAAI,SAAS,MAAM,CAAC,aAAa,YAAa,QAAO,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;AAAA,EAC3E,QAAQ;AAAA,EAGR;AACA,QAAM,IAAI,OAAO,MAAM,gBAAgB;AACvC,SAAO,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,IAAI,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,QAAQ,IAAI;AACnD;AAEO,SAAS,qBAAqB,QAAgB,MAAoC;AACvF,QAAM,WAAW,mBAAmB,MAAM;AAC1C,MAAI,CAAC,SAAU,QAAO;AACtB,QAAM,MAAM,SAAS,IAAI;AACzB,QAAM,SAAS,WAAW,QAAQ,EAAE,OAAO,GAAG,EAAE,OAAO;AACvD,MAAI,SAAS,WAAW,OAAO,OAAQ,QAAO;AAC9C,SAAO,gBAAgB,UAAU,MAAM;AACzC;AAEA,SAAS,SAAS,MAAmC;AACnD,MAAI,OAAO,SAAS,SAAU,QAAO,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,MAAM;AAC7D,SAAO,OAAO,KAAK,KAAK,QAAQ,KAAK,YAAY,KAAK,UAAU;AAClE;","names":[]}
+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/signing/content-digest.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { createHash, timingSafeEqual } from 'crypto';\nimport { parseDictionary } from 'structured-headers';\n\nconst SHA256_MEMBER_RE = /(?:^|[,\\s])sha-256=:([A-Za-z0-9+/_-]+={0,2}):/;\n\nexport function computeContentDigest(body: string | Uint8Array): string {\n  const buf = toBuffer(body);\n  const hash = createHash('sha256').update(buf).digest('base64');\n  return `sha-256=:${hash}:`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Extract the `sha-256` member from an RFC 9530 Content-Digest header. The\n * header is an RFC 8941 Dictionary and MAY list multiple algorithms; we look\n * up the `sha-256` member without requiring any particular position.\n */\nexport function parseContentDigest(header: string): Buffer | null {\n  try {\n    const dict = parseDictionary(header);\n    const entry = dict.get('sha-256');\n    if (entry && entry[0] instanceof ArrayBuffer) return Buffer.from(entry[0]);\n  } catch {\n    // Fall through: a malformed filler member (e.g. truncated sha-512) should\n    // not mask the sha-256 entry we actually verify against.\n  }\n  const m = header.match(SHA256_MEMBER_RE);\n  return m && m[1] ? Buffer.from(m[1], 'base64') : null;\n}\n\nexport function contentDigestMatches(header: string, body: string | Uint8Array): boolean {\n  const expected = parseContentDigest(header);\n  if (!expected) return false;\n  const buf = toBuffer(body);\n  const actual = createHash('sha256').update(buf).digest();\n  if (expected.length !== actual.length) return false;\n  return timingSafeEqual(expected, actual);\n}\n\nfunction toBuffer(body: string | Uint8Array): Buffer {\n  if (typeof body === 'string') return Buffer.from(body, 'utf8');\n  return Buffer.from(body.buffer, body.byteOffset, body.byteLength);\n}\n"],"mappings":"AAAA,SAAS,YAAY,uBAAuB;AAC5C,SAAS,uBAAuB;AAEhC,MAAM,mBAAmB;AAElB,SAAS,qBAAqB,MAAmC;AACtE,QAAM,MAAM,SAAS,IAAI;AACzB,QAAM,OAAO,WAAW,QAAQ,EAAE,OAAO,GAAG,EAAE,OAAO,QAAQ;AAC7D,SAAO,YAAY,IAAI;AACzB;AAOO,SAAS,mBAAmB,QAA+B;AAChE,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,OAAO,gBAAgB,MAAM;AACnC,UAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,IAAI,SAAS;AAChC,QAAI,SAAS,MAAM,CAAC,aAAa,YAAa,QAAO,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;AAAA,EAC3E,QAAQ;AAAA,EAGR;AACA,QAAM,IAAI,OAAO,MAAM,gBAAgB;AACvC,SAAO,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,IAAI,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,QAAQ,IAAI;AACnD;AAEO,SAAS,qBAAqB,QAAgB,MAAoC;AACvF,QAAM,WAAW,mBAAmB,MAAM;AAC1C,MAAI,CAAC,SAAU,QAAO;AACtB,QAAM,MAAM,SAAS,IAAI;AACzB,QAAM,SAAS,WAAW,QAAQ,EAAE,OAAO,GAAG,EAAE,OAAO;AACvD,MAAI,SAAS,WAAW,OAAO,OAAQ,QAAO;AAC9C,SAAO,gBAAgB,UAAU,MAAM;AACzC;AAEA,SAAS,SAAS,MAAmC;AACnD,MAAI,OAAO,SAAS,SAAU,QAAO,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,MAAM;AAC7D,SAAO,OAAO,KAAK,KAAK,QAAQ,KAAK,YAAY,KAAK,UAAU;AAClE;","names":[]}

package/dist/lib/signing/crypto.mjs

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
-import { fileURLToPath as __adcpFileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { dirname as __adcpDirname } from 'node:path';
-import { createRequire as __adcpCreateRequire } from 'node:module';
-const __filename = __adcpFileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
-const __dirname = __adcpDirname(__filename);
-const require = __adcpCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
 import { createPublicKey, verify as nodeVerify } from "crypto";
 import { RequestSignatureError } from "./errors.mjs";
 function jwkToPublicKey(jwk) {

package/dist/lib/signing/crypto.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/signing/crypto.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { createPublicKey, verify as nodeVerify, type JsonWebKey, type KeyObject } from 'crypto';\nimport { RequestSignatureError } from './errors';\nimport type { AdcpJsonWebKey } from './types';\n\nexport function jwkToPublicKey(jwk: AdcpJsonWebKey): KeyObject {\n  const publicJwk: Record<string, unknown> = { ...jwk };\n  delete publicJwk._private_d_for_test_only;\n  delete publicJwk.d;\n  try {\n    return createPublicKey({ key: publicJwk as JsonWebKey, format: 'jwk' });\n  } catch (err) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_key_unknown',\n      7,\n      `JWK for keyid \"${(jwk.kid as string) ?? '<unknown>'}\" is malformed`,\n      err\n    );\n  }\n}\n\nexport function verifySignature(alg: string, publicKey: KeyObject, data: Uint8Array, signature: Uint8Array): boolean {\n  try {\n    if (alg === 'ed25519') {\n      return nodeVerify(null, data, publicKey, signature);\n    }\n    if (alg === 'ecdsa-p256-sha256') {\n      return nodeVerify('sha256', data, { key: publicKey, dsaEncoding: 'ieee-p1363' }, signature);\n    }\n    return false;\n  } catch {\n    // Malformed signature bytes, mismatched key/alg, etc. — map to a caller-\n    // observable verify failure rather than letting an opaque crypto Error\n    // escape the 12-step pipeline.\n    return false;\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;AAAA,SAAS,iBAAiB,UAAU,kBAAmD;AACvF,SAAS,6BAA6B;AAG/B,SAAS,eAAe,KAAgC;AAC7D,QAAM,YAAqC,EAAE,GAAG,IAAI;AACpD,SAAO,UAAU;AACjB,SAAO,UAAU;AACjB,MAAI;AACF,WAAO,gBAAgB,EAAE,KAAK,WAAyB,QAAQ,MAAM,CAAC;AAAA,EACxE,SAAS,KAAK;AACZ,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,kBAAmB,IAAI,OAAkB,WAAW;AAAA,MACpD;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAEO,SAAS,gBAAgB,KAAa,WAAsB,MAAkB,WAAgC;AACnH,MAAI;AACF,QAAI,QAAQ,WAAW;AACrB,aAAO,WAAW,MAAM,MAAM,WAAW,SAAS;AAAA,IACpD;AACA,QAAI,QAAQ,qBAAqB;AAC/B,aAAO,WAAW,UAAU,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,WAAW,aAAa,aAAa,GAAG,SAAS;AAAA,IAC5F;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT,QAAQ;AAIN,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;","names":[]}
+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/signing/crypto.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { createPublicKey, verify as nodeVerify, type JsonWebKey, type KeyObject } from 'crypto';\nimport { RequestSignatureError } from './errors';\nimport type { AdcpJsonWebKey } from './types';\n\nexport function jwkToPublicKey(jwk: AdcpJsonWebKey): KeyObject {\n  const publicJwk: Record<string, unknown> = { ...jwk };\n  delete publicJwk._private_d_for_test_only;\n  delete publicJwk.d;\n  try {\n    return createPublicKey({ key: publicJwk as JsonWebKey, format: 'jwk' });\n  } catch (err) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_key_unknown',\n      7,\n      `JWK for keyid \"${(jwk.kid as string) ?? '<unknown>'}\" is malformed`,\n      err\n    );\n  }\n}\n\nexport function verifySignature(alg: string, publicKey: KeyObject, data: Uint8Array, signature: Uint8Array): boolean {\n  try {\n    if (alg === 'ed25519') {\n      return nodeVerify(null, data, publicKey, signature);\n    }\n    if (alg === 'ecdsa-p256-sha256') {\n      return nodeVerify('sha256', data, { key: publicKey, dsaEncoding: 'ieee-p1363' }, signature);\n    }\n    return false;\n  } catch {\n    // Malformed signature bytes, mismatched key/alg, etc. — map to a caller-\n    // observable verify failure rather than letting an opaque crypto Error\n    // escape the 12-step pipeline.\n    return false;\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":"AAAA,SAAS,iBAAiB,UAAU,kBAAmD;AACvF,SAAS,6BAA6B;AAG/B,SAAS,eAAe,KAAgC;AAC7D,QAAM,YAAqC,EAAE,GAAG,IAAI;AACpD,SAAO,UAAU;AACjB,SAAO,UAAU;AACjB,MAAI;AACF,WAAO,gBAAgB,EAAE,KAAK,WAAyB,QAAQ,MAAM,CAAC;AAAA,EACxE,SAAS,KAAK;AACZ,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,kBAAmB,IAAI,OAAkB,WAAW;AAAA,MACpD;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAEO,SAAS,gBAAgB,KAAa,WAAsB,MAAkB,WAAgC;AACnH,MAAI;AACF,QAAI,QAAQ,WAAW;AACrB,aAAO,WAAW,MAAM,MAAM,WAAW,SAAS;AAAA,IACpD;AACA,QAAI,QAAQ,qBAAqB;AAC/B,aAAO,WAAW,UAAU,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,WAAW,aAAa,aAAa,GAAG,SAAS;AAAA,IAC5F;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT,QAAQ;AAIN,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;","names":[]}

package/dist/lib/signing/ecdsa-encoding.mjs

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
-import { fileURLToPath as __adcpFileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { dirname as __adcpDirname } from 'node:path';
-import { createRequire as __adcpCreateRequire } from 'node:module';
-const __filename = __adcpFileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
-const __dirname = __adcpDirname(__filename);
-const require = __adcpCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
 function derEcdsaToP1363(der, componentLen) {
   const readByte = (offset) => {
     const v = der[offset];

package/dist/lib/signing/ecdsa-encoding.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/signing/ecdsa-encoding.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Convert a DER-encoded ECDSA signature into the IEEE P1363 (`r‖s`) wire\n * format AdCP and RFC 9421 §3.3.1 require.\n *\n * Most KMS providers (GCP KMS `asymmetricSign`, AWS KMS `Sign` for ECDSA,\n * Azure Key Vault) return DER-encoded ECDSA signatures. The Node `crypto`\n * signer used by the in-memory path produces P1363 directly via\n * `dsaEncoding: 'ieee-p1363'`. KMS adapters need this helper to normalize\n * to the wire format peers expect.\n *\n * `componentLen` is the curve's coordinate width in bytes — 32 for P-256.\n *\n * Each component is left-padded to `componentLen` bytes; DER's leading-zero\n * padding (which exists to keep ASN.1 INTEGER positive) is stripped.\n *\n * Throws if the DER structure is malformed or a component exceeds the\n * declared component length.\n */\nexport function derEcdsaToP1363(der: Uint8Array, componentLen: number): Uint8Array {\n  const readByte = (offset: number): number => {\n    const v = der[offset];\n    if (v === undefined) {\n      throw new Error(`Malformed DER ECDSA signature: unexpected end of input at offset ${offset}.`);\n    }\n    return v;\n  };\n\n  if (der.length < 8 || readByte(0) !== 0x30) {\n    throw new Error('Malformed DER ECDSA signature: missing SEQUENCE tag.');\n  }\n  let cursor = 2;\n  const lengthByte = readByte(1);\n  // SEQUENCE total-content length, used to validate the parsed contents\n  // don't claim more bytes than the buffer holds.\n  let sequenceContentLen: number;\n  // P-256 ECDSA signatures are always short-form length encoded (<= 72 bytes\n  // including header), so production callers never hit the long-form branch.\n  // We still parse long-form defensively but reject anything that would put\n  // cursor past the buffer.\n  if ((lengthByte & 0x80) !== 0) {\n    const skip = lengthByte & 0x7f;\n    if (skip === 0 || skip > 4) {\n      throw new Error('Malformed DER ECDSA signature: invalid long-form length.');\n    }\n    sequenceContentLen = 0;\n    for (let i = 0; i < skip; i++) {\n      sequenceContentLen = (sequenceContentLen << 8) | readByte(2 + i);\n    }\n    cursor = 2 + skip;\n    if (cursor >= der.length) {\n      throw new Error('Malformed DER ECDSA signature: long-form length runs past buffer.');\n    }\n  } else {\n    sequenceContentLen = lengthByte;\n  }\n  if (cursor + sequenceContentLen > der.length) {\n    throw new Error('Malformed DER ECDSA signature: SEQUENCE content runs past buffer.');\n  }\n  if (readByte(cursor) !== 0x02) {\n    throw new Error('Malformed DER ECDSA signature: missing INTEGER tag for r.');\n  }\n  const rLen = readByte(cursor + 1);\n  if (cursor + 2 + rLen > der.length) {\n    throw new Error('Malformed DER ECDSA signature: r INTEGER length runs past buffer.');\n  }\n  let r = der.subarray(cursor + 2, cursor + 2 + rLen);\n  cursor = cursor + 2 + rLen;\n  if (readByte(cursor) !== 0x02) {\n    throw new Error('Malformed DER ECDSA signature: missing INTEGER tag for s.');\n  }\n  const sLen = readByte(cursor + 1);\n  if (cursor + 2 + sLen > der.length) {\n    throw new Error('Malformed DER ECDSA signature: s INTEGER length runs past buffer.');\n  }\n  let s = der.subarray(cursor + 2, cursor + 2 + sLen);\n\n  if (r.length > componentLen && r[0] === 0x00) r = r.subarray(1);\n  if (s.length > componentLen && s[0] === 0x00) s = s.subarray(1);\n\n  if (r.length > componentLen || s.length > componentLen) {\n    throw new Error(`DER ECDSA component longer than expected ${componentLen}-byte wire format.`);\n  }\n  const out = new Uint8Array(componentLen * 2);\n  out.set(r, componentLen - r.length);\n  out.set(s, componentLen * 2 - s.length);\n  return out;\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;AAkBO,SAAS,gBAAgB,KAAiB,cAAkC;AACjF,QAAM,WAAW,CAAC,WAA2B;AAC3C,UAAM,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM;AACpB,QAAI,MAAM,QAAW;AACnB,YAAM,IAAI,MAAM,oEAAoE,MAAM,GAAG;AAAA,IAC/F;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAEA,MAAI,IAAI,SAAS,KAAK,SAAS,CAAC,MAAM,IAAM;AAC1C,UAAM,IAAI,MAAM,sDAAsD;AAAA,EACxE;AACA,MAAI,SAAS;AACb,QAAM,aAAa,SAAS,CAAC;AAG7B,MAAI;AAKJ,OAAK,aAAa,SAAU,GAAG;AAC7B,UAAM,OAAO,aAAa;AAC1B,QAAI,SAAS,KAAK,OAAO,GAAG;AAC1B,YAAM,IAAI,MAAM,0DAA0D;AAAA,IAC5E;AACA,yBAAqB;AACrB,aAAS,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK;AAC7B,2BAAsB,sBAAsB,IAAK,SAAS,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACjE;AACA,aAAS,IAAI;AACb,QAAI,UAAU,IAAI,QAAQ;AACxB,YAAM,IAAI,MAAM,mEAAmE;AAAA,IACrF;AAAA,EACF,OAAO;AACL,yBAAqB;AAAA,EACvB;AACA,MAAI,SAAS,qBAAqB,IAAI,QAAQ;AAC5C,UAAM,IAAI,MAAM,mEAAmE;AAAA,EACrF;AACA,MAAI,SAAS,MAAM,MAAM,GAAM;AAC7B,UAAM,IAAI,MAAM,2DAA2D;AAAA,EAC7E;AACA,QAAM,OAAO,SAAS,SAAS,CAAC;AAChC,MAAI,SAAS,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI,QAAQ;AAClC,UAAM,IAAI,MAAM,mEAAmE;AAAA,EACrF;AACA,MAAI,IAAI,IAAI,SAAS,SAAS,GAAG,SAAS,IAAI,IAAI;AAClD,WAAS,SAAS,IAAI;AACtB,MAAI,SAAS,MAAM,MAAM,GAAM;AAC7B,UAAM,IAAI,MAAM,2DAA2D;AAAA,EAC7E;AACA,QAAM,OAAO,SAAS,SAAS,CAAC;AAChC,MAAI,SAAS,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI,QAAQ;AAClC,UAAM,IAAI,MAAM,mEAAmE;AAAA,EACrF;AACA,MAAI,IAAI,IAAI,SAAS,SAAS,GAAG,SAAS,IAAI,IAAI;AAElD,MAAI,EAAE,SAAS,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,EAAM,KAAI,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC;AAC9D,MAAI,EAAE,SAAS,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,EAAM,KAAI,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC;AAE9D,MAAI,EAAE,SAAS,gBAAgB,EAAE,SAAS,cAAc;AACtD,UAAM,IAAI,MAAM,4CAA4C,YAAY,oBAAoB;AAAA,EAC9F;AACA,QAAM,MAAM,IAAI,WAAW,eAAe,CAAC;AAC3C,MAAI,IAAI,GAAG,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM;AAClC,MAAI,IAAI,GAAG,eAAe,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM;AACtC,SAAO;AACT;","names":[]}
+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/signing/ecdsa-encoding.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Convert a DER-encoded ECDSA signature into the IEEE P1363 (`r‖s`) wire\n * format AdCP and RFC 9421 §3.3.1 require.\n *\n * Most KMS providers (GCP KMS `asymmetricSign`, AWS KMS `Sign` for ECDSA,\n * Azure Key Vault) return DER-encoded ECDSA signatures. The Node `crypto`\n * signer used by the in-memory path produces P1363 directly via\n * `dsaEncoding: 'ieee-p1363'`. KMS adapters need this helper to normalize\n * to the wire format peers expect.\n *\n * `componentLen` is the curve's coordinate width in bytes — 32 for P-256.\n *\n * Each component is left-padded to `componentLen` bytes; DER's leading-zero\n * padding (which exists to keep ASN.1 INTEGER positive) is stripped.\n *\n * Throws if the DER structure is malformed or a component exceeds the\n * declared component length.\n */\nexport function derEcdsaToP1363(der: Uint8Array, componentLen: number): Uint8Array {\n  const readByte = (offset: number): number => {\n    const v = der[offset];\n    if (v === undefined) {\n      throw new Error(`Malformed DER ECDSA signature: unexpected end of input at offset ${offset}.`);\n    }\n    return v;\n  };\n\n  if (der.length < 8 || readByte(0) !== 0x30) {\n    throw new Error('Malformed DER ECDSA signature: missing SEQUENCE tag.');\n  }\n  let cursor = 2;\n  const lengthByte = readByte(1);\n  // SEQUENCE total-content length, used to validate the parsed contents\n  // don't claim more bytes than the buffer holds.\n  let sequenceContentLen: number;\n  // P-256 ECDSA signatures are always short-form length encoded (<= 72 bytes\n  // including header), so production callers never hit the long-form branch.\n  // We still parse long-form defensively but reject anything that would put\n  // cursor past the buffer.\n  if ((lengthByte & 0x80) !== 0) {\n    const skip = lengthByte & 0x7f;\n    if (skip === 0 || skip > 4) {\n      throw new Error('Malformed DER ECDSA signature: invalid long-form length.');\n    }\n    sequenceContentLen = 0;\n    for (let i = 0; i < skip; i++) {\n      sequenceContentLen = (sequenceContentLen << 8) | readByte(2 + i);\n    }\n    cursor = 2 + skip;\n    if (cursor >= der.length) {\n      throw new Error('Malformed DER ECDSA signature: long-form length runs past buffer.');\n    }\n  } else {\n    sequenceContentLen = lengthByte;\n  }\n  if (cursor + sequenceContentLen > der.length) {\n    throw new Error('Malformed DER ECDSA signature: SEQUENCE content runs past buffer.');\n  }\n  if (readByte(cursor) !== 0x02) {\n    throw new Error('Malformed DER ECDSA signature: missing INTEGER tag for r.');\n  }\n  const rLen = readByte(cursor + 1);\n  if (cursor + 2 + rLen > der.length) {\n    throw new Error('Malformed DER ECDSA signature: r INTEGER length runs past buffer.');\n  }\n  let r = der.subarray(cursor + 2, cursor + 2 + rLen);\n  cursor = cursor + 2 + rLen;\n  if (readByte(cursor) !== 0x02) {\n    throw new Error('Malformed DER ECDSA signature: missing INTEGER tag for s.');\n  }\n  const sLen = readByte(cursor + 1);\n  if (cursor + 2 + sLen > der.length) {\n    throw new Error('Malformed DER ECDSA signature: s INTEGER length runs past buffer.');\n  }\n  let s = der.subarray(cursor + 2, cursor + 2 + sLen);\n\n  if (r.length > componentLen && r[0] === 0x00) r = r.subarray(1);\n  if (s.length > componentLen && s[0] === 0x00) s = s.subarray(1);\n\n  if (r.length > componentLen || s.length > componentLen) {\n    throw new Error(`DER ECDSA component longer than expected ${componentLen}-byte wire format.`);\n  }\n  const out = new Uint8Array(componentLen * 2);\n  out.set(r, componentLen - r.length);\n  out.set(s, componentLen * 2 - s.length);\n  return out;\n}\n"],"mappings":"AAkBO,SAAS,gBAAgB,KAAiB,cAAkC;AACjF,QAAM,WAAW,CAAC,WAA2B;AAC3C,UAAM,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM;AACpB,QAAI,MAAM,QAAW;AACnB,YAAM,IAAI,MAAM,oEAAoE,MAAM,GAAG;AAAA,IAC/F;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAEA,MAAI,IAAI,SAAS,KAAK,SAAS,CAAC,MAAM,IAAM;AAC1C,UAAM,IAAI,MAAM,sDAAsD;AAAA,EACxE;AACA,MAAI,SAAS;AACb,QAAM,aAAa,SAAS,CAAC;AAG7B,MAAI;AAKJ,OAAK,aAAa,SAAU,GAAG;AAC7B,UAAM,OAAO,aAAa;AAC1B,QAAI,SAAS,KAAK,OAAO,GAAG;AAC1B,YAAM,IAAI,MAAM,0DAA0D;AAAA,IAC5E;AACA,yBAAqB;AACrB,aAAS,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK;AAC7B,2BAAsB,sBAAsB,IAAK,SAAS,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACjE;AACA,aAAS,IAAI;AACb,QAAI,UAAU,IAAI,QAAQ;AACxB,YAAM,IAAI,MAAM,mEAAmE;AAAA,IACrF;AAAA,EACF,OAAO;AACL,yBAAqB;AAAA,EACvB;AACA,MAAI,SAAS,qBAAqB,IAAI,QAAQ;AAC5C,UAAM,IAAI,MAAM,mEAAmE;AAAA,EACrF;AACA,MAAI,SAAS,MAAM,MAAM,GAAM;AAC7B,UAAM,IAAI,MAAM,2DAA2D;AAAA,EAC7E;AACA,QAAM,OAAO,SAAS,SAAS,CAAC;AAChC,MAAI,SAAS,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI,QAAQ;AAClC,UAAM,IAAI,MAAM,mEAAmE;AAAA,EACrF;AACA,MAAI,IAAI,IAAI,SAAS,SAAS,GAAG,SAAS,IAAI,IAAI;AAClD,WAAS,SAAS,IAAI;AACtB,MAAI,SAAS,MAAM,MAAM,GAAM;AAC7B,UAAM,IAAI,MAAM,2DAA2D;AAAA,EAC7E;AACA,QAAM,OAAO,SAAS,SAAS,CAAC;AAChC,MAAI,SAAS,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI,QAAQ;AAClC,UAAM,IAAI,MAAM,mEAAmE;AAAA,EACrF;AACA,MAAI,IAAI,IAAI,SAAS,SAAS,GAAG,SAAS,IAAI,IAAI;AAElD,MAAI,EAAE,SAAS,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,EAAM,KAAI,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC;AAC9D,MAAI,EAAE,SAAS,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,EAAM,KAAI,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC;AAE9D,MAAI,EAAE,SAAS,gBAAgB,EAAE,SAAS,cAAc;AACtD,UAAM,IAAI,MAAM,4CAA4C,YAAY,oBAAoB;AAAA,EAC9F;AACA,QAAM,MAAM,IAAI,WAAW,eAAe,CAAC;AAC3C,MAAI,IAAI,GAAG,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM;AAClC,MAAI,IAAI,GAAG,eAAe,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM;AACtC,SAAO;AACT;","names":[]}

package/dist/lib/signing/errors.mjs

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
-import { fileURLToPath as __adcpFileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { dirname as __adcpDirname } from 'node:path';
-import { createRequire as __adcpCreateRequire } from 'node:module';
-const __filename = __adcpFileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
-const __dirname = __adcpDirname(__filename);
-const require = __adcpCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
 import { ADCPError } from "../errors/index.mjs";
 class RequestSignatureError extends ADCPError {
   code;

package/dist/lib/signing/errors.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/signing/errors.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { ADCPError } from '../errors';\n\nexport type RequestSignatureErrorCode =\n  | 'request_signature_required'\n  | 'request_signature_header_malformed'\n  | 'request_signature_params_incomplete'\n  | 'request_signature_tag_invalid'\n  | 'request_signature_alg_not_allowed'\n  | 'request_signature_window_invalid'\n  | 'request_signature_components_incomplete'\n  | 'request_signature_components_unexpected'\n  | 'request_signature_key_unknown'\n  | 'request_signature_key_purpose_invalid'\n  | 'request_signature_key_revoked'\n  | 'request_signature_invalid'\n  | 'request_signature_digest_mismatch'\n  | 'request_signature_replayed'\n  | 'request_signature_rate_abuse'\n  | 'request_signature_revocation_stale';\n\nexport class RequestSignatureError extends ADCPError {\n  readonly code: RequestSignatureErrorCode;\n  readonly failedStep: number;\n\n  constructor(code: RequestSignatureErrorCode, failedStep: number, message: string, details?: unknown) {\n    super(message, details);\n    this.code = code;\n    this.failedStep = failedStep;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Error codes surfaced by the RFC 9421 webhook-signing verifier. Maps onto\n * the `webhook_signature_*` codes enumerated by the webhook-emission\n * storyboard (adcontextprotocol/adcp#2431) with matching semantics.\n */\n/**\n * Error taxonomy per the merged spec in `security.mdx#webhook-callbacks`\n * and the conformance vectors at `test-vectors/webhook-signing/`. The spec\n * folds every window failure (expired, negative window, over-long window,\n * created-in-future) into a single `webhook_signature_window_invalid` code —\n * no distinct `_expired`.\n */\nexport type WebhookSignatureErrorCode =\n  | 'webhook_signature_header_malformed'\n  | 'webhook_signature_params_incomplete'\n  | 'webhook_signature_tag_invalid'\n  | 'webhook_signature_alg_not_allowed'\n  | 'webhook_signature_window_invalid'\n  | 'webhook_signature_components_incomplete'\n  // `@target-uri` covered-component value failed syntactic validation (non-\n  // parseable URL, non-https scheme, userinfo present, fragment present).\n  // Distinct from `header_malformed`, which flags the `Signature` /\n  // `Signature-Input` headers themselves; this flags the covered URI.\n  | 'webhook_target_uri_malformed'\n  | 'webhook_signature_key_unknown'\n  // Every webhook key-purpose failure: absent `adcp_use`, a missing `verify`\n  // key_op, or an `adcp_use` outside the accepted set. Webhooks are signed\n  // with a `request-signing` key (the deprecated `webhook-signing` is also\n  // accepted for backward compatibility); any other purpose\n  // (`response-signing`, `governance-signing`) is rejected with this code.\n  | 'webhook_signature_key_purpose_invalid'\n  // The buyer's registered auth mode does not match the signing mode on the\n  // received webhook (HMAC-vs-9421 selector mismatch — see the spec's\n  // downgrade-resistance rules). This is NOT a key-purpose failure; reusing a\n  // request-signing key for webhooks is allowed and verifies cleanly.\n  | 'webhook_mode_mismatch'\n  | 'webhook_signature_key_revoked'\n  | 'webhook_signature_revocation_stale'\n  | 'webhook_signature_rate_abuse'\n  | 'webhook_signature_invalid'\n  | 'webhook_signature_digest_mismatch'\n  | 'webhook_signature_replayed';\n\nexport class WebhookSignatureError extends ADCPError {\n  readonly code: WebhookSignatureErrorCode;\n  readonly failedStep: number;\n\n  constructor(code: WebhookSignatureErrorCode, failedStep: number, message: string, details?: unknown) {\n    super(message, details);\n    this.code = code;\n    this.failedStep = failedStep;\n  }\n}\n\nexport type ResponseSignatureErrorCode = 'response_signature_key_purpose_invalid';\n\nexport class ResponseSignatureError extends ADCPError {\n  readonly code: ResponseSignatureErrorCode;\n  readonly failedStep: number;\n\n  constructor(code: ResponseSignatureErrorCode, failedStep: number, message: string, details?: unknown) {\n    super(message, details);\n    this.code = code;\n    this.failedStep = failedStep;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * SDK-side error codes for the `SigningProvider` integration path. 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+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/signing/errors.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { ADCPError } from '../errors';\n\nexport type RequestSignatureErrorCode =\n  | 'request_signature_required'\n  | 'request_signature_header_malformed'\n  | 'request_signature_params_incomplete'\n  | 'request_signature_tag_invalid'\n  | 'request_signature_alg_not_allowed'\n  | 'request_signature_window_invalid'\n  | 'request_signature_components_incomplete'\n  | 'request_signature_components_unexpected'\n  | 'request_signature_key_unknown'\n  | 'request_signature_key_purpose_invalid'\n  | 'request_signature_key_revoked'\n  | 'request_signature_invalid'\n  | 'request_signature_digest_mismatch'\n  | 'request_signature_replayed'\n  | 'request_signature_rate_abuse'\n  | 'request_signature_revocation_stale';\n\nexport class RequestSignatureError extends ADCPError {\n  readonly code: RequestSignatureErrorCode;\n  readonly failedStep: number;\n\n  constructor(code: RequestSignatureErrorCode, failedStep: number, message: string, details?: unknown) {\n    super(message, details);\n    this.code = code;\n    this.failedStep = failedStep;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Error codes surfaced by the RFC 9421 webhook-signing verifier. Maps onto\n * the `webhook_signature_*` codes enumerated by the webhook-emission\n * storyboard (adcontextprotocol/adcp#2431) with matching semantics.\n */\n/**\n * Error taxonomy per the merged spec in `security.mdx#webhook-callbacks`\n * and the conformance vectors at `test-vectors/webhook-signing/`. The spec\n * folds every window failure (expired, negative window, over-long window,\n * created-in-future) into a single `webhook_signature_window_invalid` code —\n * no distinct `_expired`.\n */\nexport type WebhookSignatureErrorCode =\n  | 'webhook_signature_header_malformed'\n  | 'webhook_signature_params_incomplete'\n  | 'webhook_signature_tag_invalid'\n  | 'webhook_signature_alg_not_allowed'\n  | 'webhook_signature_window_invalid'\n  | 'webhook_signature_components_incomplete'\n  // `@target-uri` covered-component value failed syntactic validation (non-\n  // parseable URL, non-https scheme, userinfo present, fragment present).\n  // Distinct from `header_malformed`, which flags the `Signature` /\n  // `Signature-Input` headers themselves; this flags the covered URI.\n  | 'webhook_target_uri_malformed'\n  | 'webhook_signature_key_unknown'\n  // Every webhook key-purpose failure: absent `adcp_use`, a missing `verify`\n  // key_op, or an `adcp_use` outside the accepted set. Webhooks are signed\n  // with a `request-signing` key (the deprecated `webhook-signing` is also\n  // accepted for backward compatibility); any other purpose\n  // (`response-signing`, `governance-signing`) is rejected with this code.\n  | 'webhook_signature_key_purpose_invalid'\n  // The buyer's registered auth mode does not match the signing mode on the\n  // received webhook (HMAC-vs-9421 selector mismatch — see the spec's\n  // downgrade-resistance rules). This is NOT a key-purpose failure; reusing a\n  // request-signing key for webhooks is allowed and verifies cleanly.\n  | 'webhook_mode_mismatch'\n  | 'webhook_signature_key_revoked'\n  | 'webhook_signature_revocation_stale'\n  | 'webhook_signature_rate_abuse'\n  | 'webhook_signature_invalid'\n  | 'webhook_signature_digest_mismatch'\n  | 'webhook_signature_replayed';\n\nexport class WebhookSignatureError extends ADCPError {\n  readonly code: WebhookSignatureErrorCode;\n  readonly failedStep: number;\n\n  constructor(code: WebhookSignatureErrorCode, failedStep: number, message: string, details?: unknown) {\n    super(message, details);\n    this.code = code;\n    this.failedStep = failedStep;\n  }\n}\n\nexport type ResponseSignatureErrorCode = 'response_signature_key_purpose_invalid';\n\nexport class ResponseSignatureError extends ADCPError {\n  readonly code: ResponseSignatureErrorCode;\n  readonly failedStep: number;\n\n  constructor(code: ResponseSignatureErrorCode, failedStep: number, message: string, details?: unknown) {\n    super(message, details);\n    this.code = code;\n    this.failedStep = failedStep;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * SDK-side error codes for the `SigningProvider` integration path. 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package/dist/lib/signing/fetch-async.mjs

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
-import { fileURLToPath as __adcpFileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { dirname as __adcpDirname } from 'node:path';
-import { createRequire as __adcpCreateRequire } from 'node:module';
-const __filename = __adcpFileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
-const __dirname = __adcpDirname(__filename);
-const require = __adcpCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
 import { signRequestAsync } from "./signer-async.mjs";
 const SIGNING_RESERVED_HEADERS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["signature", "signature-input", "content-digest"]);
 function createSigningFetchAsync(upstream, provider, options = {}) {

package/dist/lib/signing/fetch-async.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/signing/fetch-async.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type { CoverContentDigestPredicate, SigningFetchOptions } from './fetch';\nimport type { SigningProvider } from './provider';\nimport type { SignRequestOptions } from './signer';\nimport { signRequestAsync } from './signer-async';\n\ntype FetchLike = (input: string | URL | Request, init?: RequestInit) => Promise<Response>;\n\n// Mirrors `fetch.ts`'s SIGNING_RESERVED_HEADERS. `authorization` is intentionally\n// NOT in this set — AdCP's RFC 9421 profile does not cover Authorization, so\n// caller-supplied Bearer / RFC 7617 Basic headers pass through unmodified. See\n// `fetch.ts` for the full rationale and the RFC 9421 §7.5.7 caveat about\n// signing over long-lived credentials.\nconst SIGNING_RESERVED_HEADERS = new Set(['signature', 'signature-input', 'content-digest']);\n\n/**\n * Async-signing variant of `createSigningFetch`. 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package/dist/lib/signing/fetch.mjs

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
-import { fileURLToPath as __adcpFileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { dirname as __adcpDirname } from 'node:path';
-import { createRequire as __adcpCreateRequire } from 'node:module';
-const __filename = __adcpFileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
-const __dirname = __adcpDirname(__filename);
-const require = __adcpCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
 import { signRequest } from "./signer.mjs";
 const SIGNING_RESERVED_HEADERS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["signature", "signature-input", "content-digest"]);
 function createSigningFetch(upstream, key, options = {}) {