rhodes 3.3.5 → 3.4.2

data/lib/extensions/openssl.so/ext/sources/ssl/s3_meth.c

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+/* ssl/s3_meth.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ * 
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ * 
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ * 
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * 
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * 
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+
+static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_method(int ver);
+static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_method(int ver)
+	{
+	if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
+		return(SSLv3_method());
+	else 
+		return(NULL);
+	}
+
+IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_method,
+			 ssl3_accept,
+			 ssl3_connect,
+			 ssl3_get_method)
+
+

data/lib/extensions/openssl.so/ext/sources/ssl/s3_pkt.c

@@ -0,0 +1,1518 @@
+/* ssl/s3_pkt.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ * 
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ * 
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ * 
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * 
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * 
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#define USE_SOCKETS
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
+			 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
+static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
+
+int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
+	{
+	/* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
+	 * packet by another n bytes.
+	 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
+	 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
+	 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
+	 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
+	 */
+	int i,len,left;
+	long align=0;
+	unsigned char *pkt;
+	SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
+
+	if (n <= 0) return n;
+
+	rb    = &(s->s3->rbuf);
+	if (rb->buf == NULL)
+		if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
+			return -1;
+
+	left  = rb->left;
+#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
+	align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+	align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
+#endif
+
+	if (!extend)
+		{
+		/* start with empty packet ... */
+		if (left == 0)
+			rb->offset = align;
+		else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
+			{
+			/* check if next packet length is large
+			 * enough to justify payload alignment... */
+			pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
+			if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
+			    && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128)
+				{
+				/* Note that even if packet is corrupted
+				 * and its length field is insane, we can
+				 * only be led to wrong decision about
+				 * whether memmove will occur or not.
+				 * Header values has no effect on memmove
+				 * arguments and therefore no buffer
+				 * overrun can be triggered. */
+				memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left);
+				rb->offset = align;
+				}
+			}
+		s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
+		s->packet_length = 0;
+		/* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
+		}
+
+	/* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
+	 * because the read operation returns the whole packet
+	 * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
+	if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+		{
+		if (left > 0 && n > left)
+			n = left;
+		}
+
+	/* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
+	if (left >= n)
+		{
+		s->packet_length+=n;
+		rb->left=left-n;
+		rb->offset+=n;
+		return(n);
+		}
+
+	/* else we need to read more data */
+
+	len = s->packet_length;
+	pkt = rb->buf+align;
+	/* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
+	 * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
+	 * 'left' extra ones at the end */
+	if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */
+		{
+		memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left);
+		s->packet = pkt;
+		rb->offset = len + align;
+		}
+
+	if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+		return -1;
+		}
+
+	if (!s->read_ahead)
+		/* ignore max parameter */
+		max = n;
+	else
+		{
+		if (max < n)
+			max = n;
+		if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
+			max = rb->len - rb->offset;
+		}
+
+	while (left < n)
+		{
+		/* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
+		 * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
+		 * len+max if possible) */
+
+		clear_sys_error();
+		if (s->rbio != NULL)
+			{
+			s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+			i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left);
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
+			i = -1;
+			}
+
+		if (i <= 0)
+			{
+			rb->left = left;
+			if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
+			    SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+				if (len+left == 0)
+					ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
+			return(i);
+			}
+		left+=i;
+		/* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
+		 * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed
+		 * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */
+		if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+			{
+			if (n > left)
+				n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
+			}
+		}
+
+	/* done reading, now the book-keeping */
+	rb->offset += n;
+	rb->left = left - n;
+	s->packet_length += n;
+	s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+	return(n);
+	}
+
+/* Call this to get a new input record.
+ * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
+ * or non-blocking IO.
+ * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.type    - is the type of record
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.data, 	 - data
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
+ */
+/* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
+static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
+	{
+	int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
+	int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
+	SSL3_RECORD *rr;
+	SSL_SESSION *sess;
+	unsigned char *p;
+	unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+	short version;
+	int mac_size;
+	int clear=0;
+	size_t extra;
+	int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
+	unsigned char *mac = NULL;
+
+	rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
+	sess=s->session;
+
+	if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
+		extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
+	else
+		extra=0;
+	if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra)
+		{
+		/* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
+		 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+		return -1;
+		}
+
+again:
+	/* check if we have the header */
+	if (	(s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
+		(s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) 
+		{
+		n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
+		if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
+		s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
+
+		p=s->packet;
+
+		/* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
+		rr->type= *(p++);
+		ssl_major= *(p++);
+		ssl_minor= *(p++);
+		version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
+		n2s(p,rr->length);
+#if 0
+fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
+#endif
+
+		/* Lets check version */
+		if (!s->first_packet)
+			{
+			if (version != s->version)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+                                if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00))
+                                	/* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
+					s->version = (unsigned short)version;
+				al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+				goto f_err;
+				}
+			}
+
+		if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+
+		/* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
+		}
+
+	/* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
+
+	if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
+		{
+		/* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
+		i=rr->length;
+		n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
+		if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
+		/* now n == rr->length,
+		 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
+		}
+
+	s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
+
+	/* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
+	 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
+	 */
+	rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+
+	/* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
+	 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
+	 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
+	 * the decryption or by the decompression
+	 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
+	 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */ 
+
+	/* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
+	 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
+
+	/* check is not needed I believe */
+	if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
+		{
+		al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+		goto f_err;
+		}
+
+	/* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
+	rr->data=rr->input;
+
+	enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
+	if (enc_err <= 0)
+		{
+		if (enc_err == 0)
+			/* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
+			goto err;
+
+		/* Otherwise enc_err == -1, which indicates bad padding
+		 * (rec->length has not been changed in this case).
+		 * To minimize information leaked via timing, we will perform
+		 * the MAC computation anyway. */
+		decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
+		}
+
+#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
+printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
+{ unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
+printf("\n");
+#endif
+
+	/* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
+	if (	(sess == NULL) ||
+		(s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
+		(EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) == NULL))
+		clear=1;
+
+	if (!clear)
+		{
+		/* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
+		mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+		OPENSSL_assert(mac_size >= 0);
+
+		if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
+			{
+#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
+			al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+			goto f_err;
+#else
+			decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
+#endif			
+			}
+		/* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
+		if (rr->length >= (unsigned int)mac_size)
+			{
+			rr->length -= mac_size;
+			mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			/* record (minus padding) is too short to contain a MAC */
+#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
+			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+			goto f_err;
+#else
+			decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
+			rr->length = 0;
+#endif
+			}
+		i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
+		if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
+			{
+			decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
+		{
+		/* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
+		 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'.  But unless a decryption
+		 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
+		 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
+		 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
+		al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+		goto f_err;
+		}
+
+	/* r->length is now just compressed */
+	if (s->expand != NULL)
+		{
+		if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		}
+
+	if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
+		{
+		al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+		goto f_err;
+		}
+
+	rr->off=0;
+	/* So at this point the following is true
+	 * ssl->s3->rrec.type 	is the type of record
+	 * ssl->s3->rrec.length	== number of bytes in record
+	 * ssl->s3->rrec.off	== offset to first valid byte
+	 * ssl->s3->rrec.data	== where to take bytes from, increment
+	 *			   after use :-).
+	 */
+
+	/* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
+	s->packet_length=0;
+
+	/* just read a 0 length packet */
+	if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
+
+#if 0
+fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
+#endif
+
+	return(1);
+
+f_err:
+	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+err:
+	return(ret);
+	}
+
+int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
+	{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+	int i;
+	SSL3_RECORD *rr;
+
+	rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
+	i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
+		SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
+	if (i < 0)
+		return(0);
+	else
+		rr->length=i;
+	rr->data=rr->comp;
+#endif
+	return(1);
+	}
+
+int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
+	{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+	int i;
+	SSL3_RECORD *wr;
+
+	wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
+	i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
+		SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
+		wr->input,(int)wr->length);
+	if (i < 0)
+		return(0);
+	else
+		wr->length=i;
+
+	wr->input=wr->data;
+#endif
+	return(1);
+	}
+
+/* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
+ * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
+ */
+int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
+	{
+	const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
+	unsigned int tot,n,nw;
+	int i;
+
+	s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+	tot=s->s3->wnum;
+	s->s3->wnum=0;
+
+	if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
+		{
+		i=s->handshake_func(s);
+		if (i < 0) return(i);
+		if (i == 0)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+			return -1;
+			}
+		}
+
+	n=(len-tot);
+	for (;;)
+		{
+		if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
+			nw=s->max_send_fragment;
+		else
+			nw=n;
+
+		i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
+		if (i <= 0)
+			{
+			s->s3->wnum=tot;
+			return i;
+			}
+
+		if ((i == (int)n) ||
+			(type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
+			 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
+			{
+			/* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
+			 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
+			s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
+			
+			return tot+i;
+			}
+
+		n-=i;
+		tot+=i;
+		}
+	}
+
+static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
+			 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
+	{
+	unsigned char *p,*plen;
+	int i,mac_size,clear=0;
+	int prefix_len=0;
+	int eivlen;
+	long align=0;
+	SSL3_RECORD *wr;
+	SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
+	SSL_SESSION *sess;
+
+ 	if (wb->buf == NULL)
+		if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
+			return -1;
+
+	/* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
+	 * out.  This will happen with non blocking IO */
+	if (wb->left != 0)
+		return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
+
+	/* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
+	if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
+		{
+		i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
+		if (i <= 0)
+			return(i);
+		/* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
+		}
+
+	if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
+		return 0;
+
+	wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
+	sess=s->session;
+
+	if (	(sess == NULL) ||
+		(s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
+		(EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
+		{
+#if 1
+		clear=s->enc_write_ctx?0:1;	/* must be AEAD cipher */
+#else
+		clear=1;
+#endif
+		mac_size=0;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+		if (mac_size < 0)
+			goto err;
+		}
+
+	/* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
+	if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
+		{
+		/* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
+		 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
+
+		if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
+			{
+			/* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
+			 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
+			 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
+			 * together with the actual payload) */
+			prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
+			if (prefix_len <= 0)
+				goto err;
+
+			if (prefix_len >
+		(SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
+				{
+				/* insufficient space */
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			}
+		
+		s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
+		}
+
+	if (create_empty_fragment)
+		{
+#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
+		/* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
+		 * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
+		 * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
+		 * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
+		align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+		align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
+#endif
+		p = wb->buf + align;
+		wb->offset  = align;
+		}
+	else if (prefix_len)
+		{
+		p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
+		align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+		align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
+#endif
+		p = wb->buf + align;
+		wb->offset  = align;
+		}
+
+	/* write the header */
+
+	*(p++)=type&0xff;
+	wr->type=type;
+
+	*(p++)=(s->version>>8);
+	/* Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256
+	 * bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0
+	 */
+	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
+				&& TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
+		*(p++) = 0x1;
+	else
+		*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
+
+	/* field where we are to write out packet length */
+	plen=p; 
+	p+=2;
+	/* Explicit IV length, block ciphers and TLS version 1.1 or later */
+	if (s->enc_write_ctx && s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION)
+		{
+		int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
+		if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+			{
+			eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
+			if (eivlen <= 1)
+				eivlen = 0;
+			}
+		/* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
+		else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
+			eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+		else
+			eivlen = 0;
+		}
+	else 
+		eivlen = 0;
+
+	/* lets setup the record stuff. */
+	wr->data=p + eivlen;
+	wr->length=(int)len;
+	wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
+
+	/* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
+	 * wr->data */
+
+	/* first we compress */
+	if (s->compress != NULL)
+		{
+		if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
+		wr->input=wr->data;
+		}
+
+	/* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
+	 * from wr->input.  Length should be wr->length.
+	 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
+
+	if (mac_size != 0)
+		{
+		if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + eivlen]),1) < 0)
+			goto err;
+		wr->length+=mac_size;
+		}
+
+	wr->input=p;
+	wr->data=p;
+
+	if (eivlen)
+		{
+	/*	if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0)
+			goto err; */
+		wr->length += eivlen;
+		}
+
+	/* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
+	s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
+
+	/* record length after mac and block padding */
+	s2n(wr->length,plen);
+
+	/* we should now have
+	 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
+	 * wr->length long */
+	wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
+	wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+	if (create_empty_fragment)
+		{
+		/* we are in a recursive call;
+		 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
+		 */
+		return wr->length;
+		}
+
+	/* now let's set up wb */
+	wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
+
+	/* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
+	s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
+	s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
+	s->s3->wpend_type=type;
+	s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
+
+	/* we now just need to write the buffer */
+	return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
+err:
+	return -1;
+	}
+
+/* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
+int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
+	unsigned int len)
+	{
+	int i;
+	SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
+
+/* XXXX */
+	if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
+		|| ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
+			!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
+		|| (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
+		return(-1);
+		}
+
+	for (;;)
+		{
+		clear_sys_error();
+		if (s->wbio != NULL)
+			{
+			s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
+			i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
+				(char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
+				(unsigned int)wb->left);
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
+			i= -1;
+			}
+		if (i == wb->left)
+			{
+			wb->left=0;
+			wb->offset+=i;
+			if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
+			    SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+				ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
+			s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+			return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
+			}
+		else if (i <= 0) {
+			if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
+			    s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+				/* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
+				   point in using a datagram service */
+				wb->left = 0;
+			}
+			return(i);
+		}
+		wb->offset+=i;
+		wb->left-=i;
+		}
+	}
+
+/* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
+ * 'type' is one of the following:
+ *
+ *   -  SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
+ *   -  SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
+ *   -  0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
+ *
+ * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
+ * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
+ *
+ * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
+ * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
+ * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
+ * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
+ * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
+ * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
+ *     Change cipher spec protocol
+ *             just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
+ *     Alert protocol
+ *             2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
+ *     Handshake protocol
+ *             4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
+ *             to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
+ *             here, anything else is handled by higher layers
+ *     Application data protocol
+ *             none of our business
+ */
+int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
+	{
+	int al,i,j,ret;
+	unsigned int n;
+	SSL3_RECORD *rr;
+	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
+
+	if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
+		if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
+			return(-1);
+
+	if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
+	    (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+		return -1;
+		}
+
+	if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
+		/* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
+		{
+		unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
+		unsigned char *dst = buf;
+		unsigned int k;
+
+		/* peek == 0 */
+		n = 0;
+		while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
+			{
+			*dst++ = *src++;
+			len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
+			n++;
+			}
+		/* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
+		for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
+			s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
+		return n;
+	}
+
+	/* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
+
+	if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
+		{
+		/* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
+		i=s->handshake_func(s);
+		if (i < 0) return(i);
+		if (i == 0)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+			return(-1);
+			}
+		}
+start:
+	s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+
+	/* s->s3->rrec.type	    - is the type of record
+	 * s->s3->rrec.data,    - data
+	 * s->s3->rrec.off,     - offset into 'data' for next read
+	 * s->s3->rrec.length,  - number of bytes. */
+	rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
+
+	/* get new packet if necessary */
+	if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
+		{
+		ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
+		if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
+		}
+
+	/* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
+
+	if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
+	                               * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
+		&& (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
+		{
+		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
+		goto f_err;
+		}
+
+	/* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
+	 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
+	if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
+		{
+		rr->length=0;
+		s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+		return(0);
+		}
+
+
+	if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
+		{
+		/* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
+		 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
+		if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
+			(s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+
+		if (len <= 0) return(len);
+
+		if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
+			n = rr->length;
+		else
+			n = (unsigned int)len;
+
+		memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
+		if (!peek)
+			{
+			rr->length-=n;
+			rr->off+=n;
+			if (rr->length == 0)
+				{
+				s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
+				rr->off=0;
+				if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
+					ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
+				}
+			}
+		return(n);
+		}
+
+
+	/* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
+	 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
+
+	/* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
+	 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
+	 */
+		{
+		unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
+		unsigned char *dest = NULL;
+		unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
+
+		if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
+			{
+			dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
+			dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
+			dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
+			}
+		else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
+			{
+			dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
+			dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
+			dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
+			}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+		else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT)
+			{
+			tls1_process_heartbeat(s);
+
+			/* Exit and notify application to read again */
+			rr->length = 0;
+			s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+			BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+			BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+			return(-1);
+			}
+#endif
+
+		if (dest_maxlen > 0)
+			{
+			n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
+			if (rr->length < n)
+				n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
+
+			/* now move 'n' bytes: */
+			while (n-- > 0)
+				{
+				dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
+				rr->length--;
+				}
+
+			if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
+				goto start; /* fragment was too small */
+			}
+		}
+
+	/* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4  iff  rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
+	 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2      iff  rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
+	 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
+
+	/* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
+	if ((!s->server) &&
+		(s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
+		(s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
+		(s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
+		{
+		s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
+
+		if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
+			(s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
+			(s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+
+		if (s->msg_callback)
+			s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+		if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
+			!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
+			!s->s3->renegotiate)
+			{
+			ssl3_renegotiate(s);
+			if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
+				{
+				i=s->handshake_func(s);
+				if (i < 0) return(i);
+				if (i == 0)
+					{
+					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+					return(-1);
+					}
+
+				if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
+					{
+					if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
+						{
+						BIO *bio;
+						/* In the case where we try to read application data,
+						 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
+						 * the retry option set.  Otherwise renegotiation may
+						 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
+						s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+						bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
+						BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
+						BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
+						return(-1);
+						}
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		/* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
+		 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
+		goto start;
+		}
+	/* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
+	 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
+	 * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
+	 */
+	if (s->server &&
+		SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
+    		!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
+		(s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
+		(s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
+		(s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
+		(s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
+		!(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
+		
+		{
+		/*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
+		rr->length = 0;
+		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+		goto start;
+		}
+	if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
+		{
+		int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
+		int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
+
+		s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
+
+		if (s->msg_callback)
+			s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+		if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+			cb=s->info_callback;
+		else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+			cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+		if (cb != NULL)
+			{
+			j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
+			cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
+			}
+
+		if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
+			{
+			s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
+			if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
+				{
+				s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
+				return(0);
+				}
+			/* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
+			 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
+			 * a fatal alert because if application tried to
+			 * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
+			 * expects it to succeed.
+			 *
+			 * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
+			 * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
+			 */
+			else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION)
+				{
+				al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+				goto f_err;
+				}
+#ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
+			if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
+				return(0);
+#endif
+			}
+		else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
+			{
+			char tmp[16];
+
+			s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+			s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
+			BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
+			ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
+			s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
+			SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
+			return(0);
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+
+		goto start;
+		}
+
+	if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
+		{
+		s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+		rr->length=0;
+		return(0);
+		}
+
+	if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
+		{
+		/* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
+		 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
+		if (	(rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
+			(rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+
+		/* Check we have a cipher to change to */
+		if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+
+		rr->length=0;
+
+		if (s->msg_callback)
+			s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+		s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
+		if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
+			goto err;
+		else
+			goto start;
+		}
+
+	/* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
+	if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&	!s->in_handshake)
+		{
+		if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
+			!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
+			{
+#if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
+       * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
+       * protocol violations): */
+			s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
+				?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
+				:SSL_ST_CONNECT;
+#else
+			s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
+#endif
+			s->renegotiate=1;
+			s->new_session=1;
+			}
+		i=s->handshake_func(s);
+		if (i < 0) return(i);
+		if (i == 0)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+			return(-1);
+			}
+
+		if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
+			{
+			if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
+				{
+				BIO *bio;
+				/* In the case where we try to read application data,
+				 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
+				 * the retry option set.  Otherwise renegotiation may
+				 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
+				s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+				bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
+				BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
+				BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
+				return(-1);
+				}
+			}
+		goto start;
+		}
+
+	switch (rr->type)
+		{
+	default:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
+		/* TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types:
+		 * TLS v1.2 give an unexpected message alert.
+		 */
+		if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION)
+			{
+			rr->length = 0;
+			goto start;
+			}
+#endif
+		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+		goto f_err;
+	case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
+	case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
+	case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
+		/* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
+		 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
+		 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
+		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+		goto f_err;
+	case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
+		/* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
+		 * but have application data.  If the library was
+		 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
+		 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
+		 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
+		 * we will indulge it.
+		 */
+		if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
+			(s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
+			((
+				(s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
+				(s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
+				(s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
+				) || (
+					(s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
+					(s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
+					(s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
+					)
+				))
+			{
+			s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
+			return(-1);
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+		}
+	/* not reached */
+
+f_err:
+	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+err:
+	return(-1);
+	}
+
+int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
+	{
+	int i;
+	const char *sender;
+	int slen;
+
+	if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+		i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
+	else
+		i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
+
+	if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
+		{
+		if (s->session == NULL) 
+			{
+			/* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+			return (0);
+			}
+
+		s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
+		if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
+		}
+
+	if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
+		return(0);
+
+	/* we have to record the message digest at
+	 * this point so we can get it before we read
+	 * the finished message */
+	if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+		{
+		sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
+		slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
+		slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
+		}
+
+	s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
+		sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
+
+	return(1);
+	}
+
+int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
+	{
+	/* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
+	desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
+	if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
+		desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
+	if (desc < 0) return -1;
+	/* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
+	if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
+		SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
+
+	s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
+	s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
+	s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
+	if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
+		return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
+	/* else data is still being written out, we will get written
+	 * some time in the future */
+	return -1;
+	}
+
+int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
+	{
+	int i,j;
+	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
+
+	s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
+	i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
+	if (i <= 0)
+		{
+		s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		/* Alert sent to BIO.  If it is important, flush it now.
+		 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
+		 * we will not worry too much. */
+		if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
+			(void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
+
+		if (s->msg_callback)
+			s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+		if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+			cb=s->info_callback;
+		else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+			cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+		if (cb != NULL)
+			{
+			j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
+			cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
+			}
+		}
+	return(i);
+	}