grpc 1.69.0 → 1.70.1

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/s3_both.cc

@@ -122,8 +122,8 @@
 #include <openssl/bytestring.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/mem.h>
 #include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
 #include <openssl/nid.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 #include <openssl/sha.h>
@@ -170,8 +170,8 @@ static bool add_record_to_flight(SSL *ssl, uint8_t type,
 
 bool tls_init_message(const SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb, CBB *body, uint8_t type) {
   // Pick a modest size hint to save most of the |realloc| calls.
-  if (!CBB_init(cbb, 64) ||
-      !CBB_add_u8(cbb, type) ||
+  if (!CBB_init(cbb, 64) ||      //
+      !CBB_add_u8(cbb, type) ||  //
       !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(cbb, body)) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
     CBB_cleanup(cbb);
@@ -192,10 +192,9 @@ bool tls_add_message(SSL *ssl, Array<uint8_t> msg) {
   // cipher. The benefit is smaller and there is a risk of breaking buggy
   // implementations.
   //
-  // TODO(davidben): See if we can do this uniformly.
+  // TODO(crbug.com/374991962): See if we can do this uniformly.
   Span<const uint8_t> rest = msg;
-  if (ssl->quic_method == nullptr &&
-      ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->is_null_cipher()) {
+  if (!SSL_is_quic(ssl) && ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->is_null_cipher()) {
     while (!rest.empty()) {
       Span<const uint8_t> chunk = rest.subspan(0, ssl->max_send_fragment);
       rest = rest.subspan(chunk.size());
@@ -234,7 +233,7 @@ bool tls_add_message(SSL *ssl, Array<uint8_t> msg) {
   ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, msg);
   // TODO(svaldez): Move this up a layer to fix abstraction for SSLTranscript on
   // hs.
-  if (ssl->s3->hs != NULL &&
+  if (ssl->s3->hs != NULL &&  //
       !ssl->s3->hs->transcript.Update(msg)) {
     return false;
   }
@@ -250,9 +249,9 @@ bool tls_flush_pending_hs_data(SSL *ssl) {
   auto data =
       MakeConstSpan(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(pending_hs_data->data),
                     pending_hs_data->length);
-  if (ssl->quic_method) {
+  if (SSL_is_quic(ssl)) {
     if ((ssl->s3->hs == nullptr || !ssl->s3->hs->hints_requested) &&
-        !ssl->quic_method->add_handshake_data(ssl, ssl->s3->write_level,
+        !ssl->quic_method->add_handshake_data(ssl, ssl->s3->quic_write_level,
                                               data.data(), data.size())) {
       OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_QUIC_INTERNAL_ERROR);
       return false;
@@ -264,13 +263,12 @@ bool tls_flush_pending_hs_data(SSL *ssl) {
 }
 
 bool tls_add_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl) {
-  static const uint8_t kChangeCipherSpec[1] = {SSL3_MT_CCS};
-
-  if (!tls_flush_pending_hs_data(ssl)) {
-    return false;
+  if (SSL_is_quic(ssl)) {
+    return true;
   }
 
-  if (!ssl->quic_method &&
+  static const uint8_t kChangeCipherSpec[1] = {SSL3_MT_CCS};
+  if (!tls_flush_pending_hs_data(ssl) ||
       !add_record_to_flight(ssl, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
                             kChangeCipherSpec)) {
     return false;
@@ -281,12 +279,12 @@ bool tls_add_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl) {
   return true;
 }
 
-int tls_flush_flight(SSL *ssl) {
+int tls_flush(SSL *ssl) {
   if (!tls_flush_pending_hs_data(ssl)) {
     return -1;
   }
 
-  if (ssl->quic_method) {
+  if (SSL_is_quic(ssl)) {
     if (ssl->s3->write_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_none) {
       OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
       return -1;
@@ -376,7 +374,7 @@ static ssl_open_record_t read_v2_client_hello(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_consumed,
     return ssl_open_record_partial;
   }
 
-  CBS v2_client_hello = CBS(ssl->s3->read_buffer.span().subspan(2, msg_length));
+  CBS v2_client_hello = CBS(in.subspan(2, msg_length));
   // The V2ClientHello without the length is incorporated into the handshake
   // hash. This is only ever called at the start of the handshake, so hs is
   // guaranteed to be non-NULL.
@@ -461,8 +459,8 @@ static ssl_open_record_t read_v2_client_hello(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_consumed,
   }
 
   // Add the null compression scheme and finish.
-  if (!CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 1) ||
-      !CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) ||
+  if (!CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 1) ||  //
+      !CBB_add_u8(&hello_body, 0) ||  //
       !CBB_finish(client_hello.get(), NULL, &ssl->s3->hs_buf->length)) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
     return ssl_open_record_error;
@@ -484,7 +482,7 @@ static bool parse_message(const SSL *ssl, SSLMessage *out,
   uint32_t len;
   CBS_init(&cbs, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(ssl->s3->hs_buf->data),
            ssl->s3->hs_buf->length);
-  if (!CBS_get_u8(&cbs, &out->type) ||
+  if (!CBS_get_u8(&cbs, &out->type) ||  //
       !CBS_get_u24(&cbs, &len)) {
     *out_bytes_needed = 4;
     return false;
@@ -573,10 +571,10 @@ ssl_open_record_t tls_open_handshake(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_consumed,
     // Some dedicated error codes for protocol mixups should the application
     // wish to interpret them differently. (These do not overlap with
     // ClientHello or V2ClientHello.)
-    const char *str = reinterpret_cast<const char*>(in.data());
-    if (strncmp("GET ", str, 4) == 0 ||
-        strncmp("POST ", str, 5) == 0 ||
-        strncmp("HEAD ", str, 5) == 0 ||
+    const char *str = reinterpret_cast<const char *>(in.data());
+    if (strncmp("GET ", str, 4) == 0 ||   //
+        strncmp("POST ", str, 5) == 0 ||  //
+        strncmp("HEAD ", str, 5) == 0 ||  //
         strncmp("PUT ", str, 4) == 0) {
       OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST);
       *out_alert = 0;
@@ -610,17 +608,6 @@ ssl_open_record_t tls_open_handshake(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_consumed,
     return ret;
   }
 
-  // WatchGuard's TLS 1.3 interference bug is very distinctive: they drop the
-  // ServerHello and send the remaining encrypted application data records
-  // as-is. This manifests as an application data record when we expect
-  // handshake. Report a dedicated error code for this case.
-  if (!ssl->server && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
-      ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->is_null_cipher()) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_APPLICATION_DATA_INSTEAD_OF_HANDSHAKE);
-    *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-    return ssl_open_record_error;
-  }
-
   if (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
     *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
@@ -638,8 +625,8 @@ ssl_open_record_t tls_open_handshake(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_consumed,
 
 void tls_next_message(SSL *ssl) {
   SSLMessage msg;
-  if (!tls_get_message(ssl, &msg) ||
-      !ssl->s3->hs_buf ||
+  if (!tls_get_message(ssl, &msg) ||  //
+      !ssl->s3->hs_buf ||             //
       ssl->s3->hs_buf->length < CBS_len(&msg.raw)) {
     assert(0);
     return;
@@ -706,7 +693,7 @@ class CNsaCipherScorer : public CipherScorer {
   }
 };
 
-}
+}  // namespace
 
 bool ssl_tls13_cipher_meets_policy(uint16_t cipher_id,
                                    enum ssl_compliance_policy_t policy) {
@@ -754,9 +741,10 @@ const SSL_CIPHER *ssl_choose_tls13_cipher(CBS cipher_suites, bool has_aes_hw,
   const SSL_CIPHER *best = nullptr;
   AesHwCipherScorer aes_hw_scorer(has_aes_hw);
   CNsaCipherScorer cnsa_scorer;
-  CipherScorer *const scorer = (policy == ssl_compliance_policy_cnsa_202407)
-                                   ? static_cast<CipherScorer*>(&cnsa_scorer)
-                                   : static_cast<CipherScorer*>(&aes_hw_scorer);
+  CipherScorer *const scorer =
+      (policy == ssl_compliance_policy_cnsa_202407)
+          ? static_cast<CipherScorer *>(&cnsa_scorer)
+          : static_cast<CipherScorer *>(&aes_hw_scorer);
   CipherScorer::Score best_score = CipherScorer::kMinScore;
 
   while (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) > 0) {

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/s3_lib.cc

@@ -165,7 +165,6 @@ BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
 
 SSL3_STATE::SSL3_STATE()
     : skip_early_data(false),
-      have_version(false),
       v2_hello_done(false),
       is_v2_hello(false),
       has_message(false),
@@ -188,21 +187,24 @@ bool tls_new(SSL *ssl) {
     return false;
   }
 
-  s3->aead_read_ctx = SSLAEADContext::CreateNullCipher(SSL_is_dtls(ssl));
-  s3->aead_write_ctx = SSLAEADContext::CreateNullCipher(SSL_is_dtls(ssl));
+  // TODO(crbug.com/368805255): Fields that aren't used in DTLS should not be
+  // allocated at all.
+  // TODO(crbug.com/371998381): Don't create these in QUIC either, once the
+  // placeholder QUIC ones for subsequent epochs are removed.
+  if (!SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) {
+    s3->aead_read_ctx = SSLAEADContext::CreateNullCipher();
+    s3->aead_write_ctx = SSLAEADContext::CreateNullCipher();
+    if (!s3->aead_read_ctx || !s3->aead_write_ctx) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
   s3->hs = ssl_handshake_new(ssl);
-  if (!s3->aead_read_ctx || !s3->aead_write_ctx || !s3->hs) {
+  if (!s3->hs) {
     return false;
   }
 
   ssl->s3 = s3.release();
-
-  // Set the version to the highest supported version.
-  //
-  // TODO(davidben): Move this field into |s3|, have it store the normalized
-  // protocol version, and implement this pre-negotiation quirk in |SSL_version|
-  // at the API boundary rather than in internal state.
-  ssl->version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
   return true;
 }
 

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/s3_pkt.cc

@@ -455,8 +455,8 @@ int ssl_send_alert_impl(SSL *ssl, int level, int desc) {
 }
 
 int tls_dispatch_alert(SSL *ssl) {
-  if (ssl->quic_method) {
-    if (!ssl->quic_method->send_alert(ssl, ssl->s3->write_level,
+  if (SSL_is_quic(ssl)) {
+    if (!ssl->quic_method->send_alert(ssl, ssl->s3->quic_write_level,
                                       ssl->s3->send_alert[1])) {
       OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_QUIC_INTERNAL_ERROR);
       return 0;

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/ssl_aead_ctx.cc

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2015, Google Inc.
+/* Copyright 2015 The BoringSSL Authors
  *
  * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
  * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@
 #include <string.h>
 
 #include <openssl/aead.h>
-#include <openssl/chacha.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 
@@ -34,29 +33,22 @@
 
 BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
 
-SSLAEADContext::SSLAEADContext(uint16_t version_arg, bool is_dtls_arg,
-                               const SSL_CIPHER *cipher_arg)
+SSLAEADContext::SSLAEADContext(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher_arg)
     : cipher_(cipher_arg),
-      version_(version_arg),
-      is_dtls_(is_dtls_arg),
       variable_nonce_included_in_record_(false),
       random_variable_nonce_(false),
       xor_fixed_nonce_(false),
       omit_length_in_ad_(false),
-      ad_is_header_(false) {
-  OPENSSL_memset(fixed_nonce_, 0, sizeof(fixed_nonce_));
-  CreateRecordNumberEncrypter();
-}
+      ad_is_header_(false) {}
 
 SSLAEADContext::~SSLAEADContext() {}
 
-UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> SSLAEADContext::CreateNullCipher(bool is_dtls) {
-  return MakeUnique<SSLAEADContext>(0 /* version */, is_dtls,
-                                    nullptr /* cipher */);
+UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> SSLAEADContext::CreateNullCipher() {
+  return MakeUnique<SSLAEADContext>(/*cipher=*/nullptr);
 }
 
 UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> SSLAEADContext::Create(
-    enum evp_aead_direction_t direction, uint16_t version, bool is_dtls,
+    enum evp_aead_direction_t direction, uint16_t version,
     const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, Span<const uint8_t> enc_key,
     Span<const uint8_t> mac_key, Span<const uint8_t> fixed_iv) {
   const EVP_AEAD *aead;
@@ -64,8 +56,8 @@ UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> SSLAEADContext::Create(
   size_t expected_mac_key_len, expected_fixed_iv_len;
   if (!ssl_protocol_version_from_wire(&protocol_version, version) ||
       !ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(&aead, &expected_mac_key_len,
-                               &expected_fixed_iv_len, cipher, protocol_version,
-                               is_dtls) ||
+                               &expected_fixed_iv_len, cipher,
+                               protocol_version) ||
       // Ensure the caller returned correct key sizes.
       expected_fixed_iv_len != fixed_iv.size() ||
       expected_mac_key_len != mac_key.size()) {
@@ -73,128 +65,72 @@ UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> SSLAEADContext::Create(
     return nullptr;
   }
 
-  uint8_t merged_key[EVP_AEAD_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
-  if (!mac_key.empty()) {
-    // This is a "stateful" AEAD (for compatibility with pre-AEAD cipher
-    // suites).
-    if (mac_key.size() + enc_key.size() + fixed_iv.size() >
-        sizeof(merged_key)) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      return nullptr;
-    }
-    OPENSSL_memcpy(merged_key, mac_key.data(), mac_key.size());
-    OPENSSL_memcpy(merged_key + mac_key.size(), enc_key.data(), enc_key.size());
-    OPENSSL_memcpy(merged_key + mac_key.size() + enc_key.size(),
-                   fixed_iv.data(), fixed_iv.size());
-    enc_key = MakeConstSpan(merged_key,
-                            enc_key.size() + mac_key.size() + fixed_iv.size());
-  }
-
-  UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> aead_ctx =
-      MakeUnique<SSLAEADContext>(version, is_dtls, cipher);
+  UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> aead_ctx = MakeUnique<SSLAEADContext>(cipher);
   if (!aead_ctx) {
     return nullptr;
   }
 
-  assert(aead_ctx->ProtocolVersion() == protocol_version);
-
-  if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(
-          aead_ctx->ctx_.get(), aead, enc_key.data(), enc_key.size(),
-          EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH, direction)) {
-    return nullptr;
-  }
-
+  uint8_t merged_key[EVP_AEAD_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
   assert(EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead) <= EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH);
   static_assert(EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH < 256,
                 "variable_nonce_len doesn't fit in uint8_t");
   aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len_ = (uint8_t)EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead);
   if (mac_key.empty()) {
-    assert(fixed_iv.size() <= sizeof(aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_));
-    OPENSSL_memcpy(aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_, fixed_iv.data(), fixed_iv.size());
-    aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len_ = fixed_iv.size();
+    // This is an actual AEAD.
+    aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_.CopyFrom(fixed_iv);
 
-    if (cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305) {
-      // The fixed nonce into the actual nonce (the sequence number).
+    if (protocol_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION ||
+        cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305) {
+      // TLS 1.3, and TLS 1.2 ChaCha20-Poly1305, XOR the fixed IV with the
+      // sequence number to form the nonce.
       aead_ctx->xor_fixed_nonce_ = true;
       aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len_ = 8;
+      assert(fixed_iv.size() >= aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len_);
     } else {
-      // The fixed IV is prepended to the nonce.
+      // TLS 1.2 AES-GCM prepends the fixed IV to an explicit nonce.
       assert(fixed_iv.size() <= aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len_);
+      assert(cipher->algorithm_enc & (SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES256GCM));
       aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len_ -= fixed_iv.size();
-    }
-
-    // AES-GCM uses an explicit nonce.
-    if (cipher->algorithm_enc & (SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES256GCM)) {
       aead_ctx->variable_nonce_included_in_record_ = true;
     }
 
-    // The TLS 1.3 construction XORs the fixed nonce into the sequence number
-    // and omits the additional data.
+    // Starting TLS 1.3, the AAD is the whole record header.
     if (protocol_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
-      aead_ctx->xor_fixed_nonce_ = true;
-      aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len_ = 8;
-      aead_ctx->variable_nonce_included_in_record_ = false;
       aead_ctx->ad_is_header_ = true;
-      assert(fixed_iv.size() >= aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len_);
     }
   } else {
+    // This is a CBC cipher suite that implements the |EVP_AEAD| interface. The
+    // |EVP_AEAD| takes the MAC key, encryption key, and fixed IV concatenated
+    // as its input key.
     assert(protocol_version < TLS1_3_VERSION);
+    BSSL_CHECK(mac_key.size() + enc_key.size() + fixed_iv.size() <=
+               sizeof(merged_key));
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(merged_key, mac_key.data(), mac_key.size());
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(merged_key + mac_key.size(), enc_key.data(), enc_key.size());
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(merged_key + mac_key.size() + enc_key.size(),
+                   fixed_iv.data(), fixed_iv.size());
+    enc_key = MakeConstSpan(merged_key,
+                            enc_key.size() + mac_key.size() + fixed_iv.size());
+
+    // The |EVP_AEAD|'s per-encryption nonce, if any, is actually the CBC IV. It
+    // must be generated randomly and prepended to the record.
     aead_ctx->variable_nonce_included_in_record_ = true;
     aead_ctx->random_variable_nonce_ = true;
     aead_ctx->omit_length_in_ad_ = true;
   }
 
-  return aead_ctx;
-}
-
-void SSLAEADContext::CreateRecordNumberEncrypter() {
-  if (!cipher_) {
-    return;
-  }
-#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
-  rn_encrypter_ = MakeUnique<NullRecordNumberEncrypter>();
-#else
-  if (cipher_->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128GCM) {
-    rn_encrypter_ = MakeUnique<AES128RecordNumberEncrypter>();
-  } else if (cipher_->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256GCM) {
-    rn_encrypter_ = MakeUnique<AES256RecordNumberEncrypter>();
-  } else if (cipher_->algorithm_enc == SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305) {
-    rn_encrypter_ = MakeUnique<ChaChaRecordNumberEncrypter>();
-  }
-#endif  // BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE
-}
-
-UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> SSLAEADContext::CreatePlaceholderForQUIC(
-    uint16_t version, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
-  return MakeUnique<SSLAEADContext>(version, false, cipher);
-}
-
-void SSLAEADContext::SetVersionIfNullCipher(uint16_t version) {
-  if (is_null_cipher()) {
-    version_ = version;
+  if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_init_with_direction(
+          aead_ctx->ctx_.get(), aead, enc_key.data(), enc_key.size(),
+          EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH, direction)) {
+    return nullptr;
   }
-}
 
-uint16_t SSLAEADContext::ProtocolVersion() const {
-  uint16_t protocol_version;
-  if(!ssl_protocol_version_from_wire(&protocol_version, version_)) {
-    assert(false);
-    return 0;
-  }
-  return protocol_version;
+  return aead_ctx;
 }
 
-uint16_t SSLAEADContext::RecordVersion() const {
-  if (version_ == 0) {
-    assert(is_null_cipher());
-    return is_dtls_ ? DTLS1_VERSION : TLS1_VERSION;
-  }
-
-  if (ProtocolVersion() <= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
-    return version_;
-  }
-
-  return is_dtls_ ? DTLS1_2_VERSION : TLS1_2_VERSION;
+UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> SSLAEADContext::CreatePlaceholderForQUIC(
+    const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  return MakeUnique<SSLAEADContext>(cipher);
 }
 
 size_t SSLAEADContext::ExplicitNonceLen() const {
@@ -237,6 +173,43 @@ size_t SSLAEADContext::MaxOverhead() const {
               : EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(EVP_AEAD_CTX_aead(ctx_.get())));
 }
 
+size_t SSLAEADContext::MaxSealInputLen(size_t max_out) const {
+  size_t explicit_nonce_len = ExplicitNonceLen();
+  if (max_out <= explicit_nonce_len) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  max_out -= explicit_nonce_len;
+  if (is_null_cipher() || FUZZER_MODE) {
+    return max_out;
+  }
+  // TODO(crbug.com/42290602): This should be part of |EVP_AEAD_CTX|.
+  size_t overhead = EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(EVP_AEAD_CTX_aead(ctx_.get()));
+  if (SSL_CIPHER_is_block_cipher(cipher())) {
+    size_t block_size;
+    switch (cipher()->algorithm_enc) {
+      case SSL_AES128:
+      case SSL_AES256:
+        block_size = 16;
+        break;
+      case SSL_3DES:
+        block_size = 8;
+        break;
+      default:
+        abort();
+    }
+
+    // The output for a CBC cipher is always a whole number of blocks. Round the
+    // remaining capacity down.
+    max_out &= ~(block_size - 1);
+    // The maximum overhead is a full block of padding and the MAC, but the
+    // minimum overhead is one byte of padding, once we know the output is
+    // rounded down.
+    assert(overhead > block_size);
+    overhead -= block_size - 1;
+  }
+  return max_out <= overhead ? 0 : max_out - overhead;
+}
+
 Span<const uint8_t> SSLAEADContext::GetAdditionalData(
     uint8_t storage[13], uint8_t type, uint16_t record_version, uint64_t seqnum,
     size_t plaintext_len, Span<const uint8_t> header) {
@@ -288,11 +261,11 @@ bool SSLAEADContext::Open(Span<uint8_t> *out, uint8_t type,
 
   // Prepend the fixed nonce, or left-pad with zeros if XORing.
   if (xor_fixed_nonce_) {
-    nonce_len = fixed_nonce_len_ - variable_nonce_len_;
+    nonce_len = fixed_nonce_.size() - variable_nonce_len_;
     OPENSSL_memset(nonce, 0, nonce_len);
   } else {
-    OPENSSL_memcpy(nonce, fixed_nonce_, fixed_nonce_len_);
-    nonce_len += fixed_nonce_len_;
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(nonce, fixed_nonce_.data(), fixed_nonce_.size());
+    nonce_len += fixed_nonce_.size();
   }
 
   // Add the variable nonce.
@@ -312,8 +285,8 @@ bool SSLAEADContext::Open(Span<uint8_t> *out, uint8_t type,
 
   // XOR the fixed nonce, if necessary.
   if (xor_fixed_nonce_) {
-    assert(nonce_len == fixed_nonce_len_);
-    for (size_t i = 0; i < fixed_nonce_len_; i++) {
+    assert(nonce_len == fixed_nonce_.size());
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < fixed_nonce_.size(); i++) {
       nonce[i] ^= fixed_nonce_[i];
     }
   }
@@ -365,11 +338,11 @@ bool SSLAEADContext::SealScatter(uint8_t *out_prefix, uint8_t *out,
 
   // Prepend the fixed nonce, or left-pad with zeros if XORing.
   if (xor_fixed_nonce_) {
-    nonce_len = fixed_nonce_len_ - variable_nonce_len_;
+    nonce_len = fixed_nonce_.size() - variable_nonce_len_;
     OPENSSL_memset(nonce, 0, nonce_len);
   } else {
-    OPENSSL_memcpy(nonce, fixed_nonce_, fixed_nonce_len_);
-    nonce_len += fixed_nonce_len_;
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(nonce, fixed_nonce_.data(), fixed_nonce_.size());
+    nonce_len += fixed_nonce_.size();
   }
 
   // Select the variable nonce.
@@ -393,14 +366,14 @@ bool SSLAEADContext::SealScatter(uint8_t *out_prefix, uint8_t *out,
       OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OUTPUT_ALIASES_INPUT);
       return false;
     }
-    OPENSSL_memcpy(out_prefix, nonce + fixed_nonce_len_,
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(out_prefix, nonce + fixed_nonce_.size(),
                    variable_nonce_len_);
   }
 
   // XOR the fixed nonce, if necessary.
   if (xor_fixed_nonce_) {
-    assert(nonce_len == fixed_nonce_len_);
-    for (size_t i = 0; i < fixed_nonce_len_; i++) {
+    assert(nonce_len == fixed_nonce_.size());
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < fixed_nonce_.size(); i++) {
       nonce[i] ^= fixed_nonce_[i];
     }
   }
@@ -446,70 +419,4 @@ bool SSLAEADContext::GetIV(const uint8_t **out_iv, size_t *out_iv_len) const {
          EVP_AEAD_CTX_get_iv(ctx_.get(), out_iv, out_iv_len);
 }
 
-bool SSLAEADContext::GenerateRecordNumberMask(Span<uint8_t> out,
-                                              Span<const uint8_t> sample) {
-  if (!rn_encrypter_) {
-    return false;
-  }
-  return rn_encrypter_->GenerateMask(out, sample);
-}
-
-size_t AES128RecordNumberEncrypter::KeySize() { return 16; }
-
-size_t AES256RecordNumberEncrypter::KeySize() { return 32; }
-
-bool AESRecordNumberEncrypter::SetKey(Span<const uint8_t> key) {
-  return AES_set_encrypt_key(key.data(), key.size() * 8, &key_) == 0;
-}
-
-bool AESRecordNumberEncrypter::GenerateMask(Span<uint8_t> out,
-                                            Span<const uint8_t> sample) {
-  if (sample.size() < AES_BLOCK_SIZE || out.size() != AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
-    return false;
-  }
-  AES_encrypt(sample.data(), out.data(), &key_);
-  return true;
-}
-
-size_t ChaChaRecordNumberEncrypter::KeySize() { return kKeySize; }
-
-bool ChaChaRecordNumberEncrypter::SetKey(Span<const uint8_t> key) {
-  if (key.size() != kKeySize) {
-    return false;
-  }
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(key_, key.data(), key.size());
-  return true;
-}
-
-bool ChaChaRecordNumberEncrypter::GenerateMask(Span<uint8_t> out,
-                                               Span<const uint8_t> sample) {
-  Array<uint8_t> zeroes;
-  if (!zeroes.Init(out.size())) {
-    return false;
-  }
-  OPENSSL_memset(zeroes.data(), 0, zeroes.size());
-  // RFC 9147 section 4.2.3 uses the first 4 bytes of the sample as the counter
-  // and the next 12 bytes as the nonce. If we have less than 4+12=16 bytes in
-  // the sample, then we'll read past the end of the |sample| buffer.
-  if (sample.size() < 16) {
-    return false;
-  }
-  uint32_t counter = CRYPTO_load_u32_be(sample.data());
-  Span<const uint8_t> nonce = sample.subspan(4);
-  CRYPTO_chacha_20(out.data(), zeroes.data(), zeroes.size(), key_, nonce.data(),
-                   counter);
-  return true;
-}
-
-#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
-size_t NullRecordNumberEncrypter::KeySize() { return 0; }
-bool NullRecordNumberEncrypter::SetKey(Span<const uint8_t> key) { return true; }
-
-bool NullRecordNumberEncrypter::GenerateMask(Span<uint8_t> out,
-                                             Span<const uint8_t> sample) {
-  OPENSSL_memset(out.data(), 0, out.size());
-  return true;
-}
-#endif  // BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE
-
 BSSL_NAMESPACE_END