grpc 1.69.0 → 1.70.1

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/dsa/{dsa.c → dsa.cc}

@@ -72,10 +72,10 @@
 #include <openssl/sha.h>
 #include <openssl/thread.h>
 
-#include "internal.h"
 #include "../fipsmodule/bn/internal.h"
 #include "../fipsmodule/dh/internal.h"
 #include "../internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
 
 
 // Primality test according to FIPS PUB 186[-1], Appendix 2.1: 50 rounds of
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(const DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **out_kinv,
 static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class = CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT;
 
 DSA *DSA_new(void) {
-  DSA *dsa = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(DSA));
+  DSA *dsa = reinterpret_cast<DSA *>(OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(DSA)));
   if (dsa == NULL) {
     return NULL;
   }
@@ -179,8 +179,7 @@ int DSA_set0_key(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key) {
 }
 
 int DSA_set0_pqg(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g) {
-  if ((dsa->p == NULL && p == NULL) ||
-      (dsa->q == NULL && q == NULL) ||
+  if ((dsa->p == NULL && p == NULL) || (dsa->q == NULL && q == NULL) ||
       (dsa->g == NULL && g == NULL)) {
     return 0;
   }
@@ -312,7 +311,8 @@ int DSA_generate_parameters_ex(DSA *dsa, unsigned bits, const uint8_t *seed_in,
       }
 
       // step 4
-      r = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(q, DSS_prime_checks, ctx, use_random_seed, cb);
+      r = BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex(q, DSS_prime_checks, ctx, use_random_seed,
+                                  cb);
       if (r > 0) {
         break;
       }
@@ -356,25 +356,20 @@ int DSA_generate_parameters_ex(DSA *dsa, unsigned bits, const uint8_t *seed_in,
         }
 
         // step 8
-        if (!BN_bin2bn(md, qsize, r0) ||
-            !BN_lshift(r0, r0, (qsize << 3) * k) ||
+        if (!BN_bin2bn(md, qsize, r0) || !BN_lshift(r0, r0, (qsize << 3) * k) ||
             !BN_add(W, W, r0)) {
           goto err;
         }
       }
 
       // more of step 8
-      if (!BN_mask_bits(W, bits - 1) ||
-          !BN_copy(X, W) ||
-          !BN_add(X, X, test)) {
+      if (!BN_mask_bits(W, bits - 1) || !BN_copy(X, W) || !BN_add(X, X, test)) {
         goto err;
       }
 
       // step 9
-      if (!BN_lshift1(r0, q) ||
-          !BN_mod(c, X, r0, ctx) ||
-          !BN_sub(r0, c, BN_value_one()) ||
-          !BN_sub(p, X, r0)) {
+      if (!BN_lshift1(r0, q) || !BN_mod(c, X, r0, ctx) ||
+          !BN_sub(r0, c, BN_value_one()) || !BN_sub(p, X, r0)) {
         goto err;
       }
 
@@ -407,14 +402,12 @@ end:
 
   // We now need to generate g
   // Set r0=(p-1)/q
-  if (!BN_sub(test, p, BN_value_one()) ||
-      !BN_div(r0, NULL, test, q, ctx)) {
+  if (!BN_sub(test, p, BN_value_one()) || !BN_div(r0, NULL, test, q, ctx)) {
     goto err;
   }
 
   mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new_for_modulus(p, ctx);
-  if (mont == NULL ||
-      !BN_set_word(test, h)) {
+  if (mont == NULL || !BN_set_word(test, h)) {
     goto err;
   }
 
@@ -541,7 +534,9 @@ err:
   return ok;
 }
 
-DSA_SIG *DSA_SIG_new(void) { return OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(DSA_SIG)); }
+DSA_SIG *DSA_SIG_new(void) {
+  return reinterpret_cast<DSA_SIG *>(OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(DSA_SIG)));
+}
 
 void DSA_SIG_free(DSA_SIG *sig) {
   if (!sig) {
@@ -583,8 +578,7 @@ static int mod_mul_consttime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
   BIGNUM *tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
   // |BN_mod_mul_montgomery| removes a factor of R, so we cancel it with a
   // single |BN_to_montgomery| which adds one factor of R.
-  int ok = tmp != NULL &&
-           BN_to_montgomery(tmp, a, mont, ctx) &&
+  int ok = tmp != NULL && BN_to_montgomery(tmp, a, mont, ctx) &&
            BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, tmp, b, mont, ctx);
   BN_CTX_end(ctx);
   return ok;
@@ -609,79 +603,80 @@ DSA_SIG *DSA_do_sign(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len, const DSA *dsa) {
   BN_init(&m);
   BN_init(&xr);
   s = BN_new();
-  if (s == NULL) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-  ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-  if (ctx == NULL) {
-    goto err;
-  }
+  {
+    if (s == NULL) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+      goto err;
+    }
 
-  // Cap iterations so that invalid parameters do not infinite loop. This does
-  // not impact valid parameters because the probability of requiring even one
-  // retry is negligible, let alone 32. Unfortunately, DSA was mis-specified, so
-  // invalid parameters are reachable from most callers handling untrusted
-  // private keys. (The |dsa_check_key| call above is not sufficient. Checking
-  // whether arbitrary paremeters form a valid DSA group is expensive.)
-  static const int kMaxIterations = 32;
-  int iters = 0;
-redo:
-  if (!dsa_sign_setup(dsa, ctx, &kinv, &r)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
+    // Cap iterations so that invalid parameters do not infinite loop. This does
+    // not impact valid parameters because the probability of requiring even one
+    // retry is negligible, let alone 32. Unfortunately, DSA was mis-specified,
+    // so invalid parameters are reachable from most callers handling untrusted
+    // private keys. (The |dsa_check_key| call above is not sufficient. Checking
+    // whether arbitrary paremeters form a valid DSA group is expensive.)
+    static const int kMaxIterations = 32;
+    int iters = 0;
+  redo:
+    if (!dsa_sign_setup(dsa, ctx, &kinv, &r)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
 
-  if (digest_len > BN_num_bytes(dsa->q)) {
-    // If the digest length is greater than the size of |dsa->q| use the
-    // BN_num_bits(dsa->q) leftmost bits of the digest, see FIPS 186-3, 4.2.
-    // Note the above check that |dsa->q| is a multiple of 8 bits.
-    digest_len = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q);
-  }
+    if (digest_len > BN_num_bytes(dsa->q)) {
+      // If the digest length is greater than the size of |dsa->q| use the
+      // BN_num_bits(dsa->q) leftmost bits of the digest, see FIPS 186-3, 4.2.
+      // Note the above check that |dsa->q| is a multiple of 8 bits.
+      digest_len = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q);
+    }
 
-  if (BN_bin2bn(digest, digest_len, &m) == NULL) {
-    goto err;
-  }
+    if (BN_bin2bn(digest, digest_len, &m) == NULL) {
+      goto err;
+    }
 
-  // |m| is bounded by 2^(num_bits(q)), which is slightly looser than q. This
-  // violates |bn_mod_add_consttime| and |mod_mul_consttime|'s preconditions.
-  // (The underlying algorithms could accept looser bounds, but we reduce for
-  // simplicity.)
-  size_t q_width = bn_minimal_width(dsa->q);
-  if (!bn_resize_words(&m, q_width) ||
-      !bn_resize_words(&xr, q_width)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-  bn_reduce_once_in_place(m.d, 0 /* no carry word */, dsa->q->d,
-                          xr.d /* scratch space */, q_width);
+    // |m| is bounded by 2^(num_bits(q)), which is slightly looser than q. This
+    // violates |bn_mod_add_consttime| and |mod_mul_consttime|'s preconditions.
+    // (The underlying algorithms could accept looser bounds, but we reduce for
+    // simplicity.)
+    size_t q_width = bn_minimal_width(dsa->q);
+    if (!bn_resize_words(&m, q_width) || !bn_resize_words(&xr, q_width)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    bn_reduce_once_in_place(m.d, 0 /* no carry word */, dsa->q->d,
+                            xr.d /* scratch space */, q_width);
+
+    // Compute s = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q. Note |dsa->method_mont_q| is
+    // initialized by |dsa_sign_setup|.
+    if (!mod_mul_consttime(&xr, dsa->priv_key, r, dsa->method_mont_q, ctx) ||
+        !bn_mod_add_consttime(s, &xr, &m, dsa->q, ctx) ||
+        !mod_mul_consttime(s, s, kinv, dsa->method_mont_q, ctx)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
 
-  // Compute s = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q. Note |dsa->method_mont_q| is
-  // initialized by |dsa_sign_setup|.
-  if (!mod_mul_consttime(&xr, dsa->priv_key, r, dsa->method_mont_q, ctx) ||
-      !bn_mod_add_consttime(s, &xr, &m, dsa->q, ctx) ||
-      !mod_mul_consttime(s, s, kinv, dsa->method_mont_q, ctx)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
+    // The signature is computed from the private key, but is public.
+    bn_declassify(r);
+    bn_declassify(s);
 
-  // The signature is computed from the private key, but is public.
-  bn_declassify(r);
-  bn_declassify(s);
-
-  // Redo if r or s is zero as required by FIPS 186-3: this is
-  // very unlikely.
-  if (BN_is_zero(r) || BN_is_zero(s)) {
-    iters++;
-    if (iters > kMaxIterations) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS);
-      goto err;
+    // Redo if r or s is zero as required by FIPS 186-3: this is
+    // very unlikely.
+    if (BN_is_zero(r) || BN_is_zero(s)) {
+      iters++;
+      if (iters > kMaxIterations) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DSA, DSA_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS);
+        goto err;
+      }
+      goto redo;
     }
-    goto redo;
-  }
 
-  ret = DSA_SIG_new();
-  if (ret == NULL) {
-    goto err;
+    ret = DSA_SIG_new();
+    if (ret == NULL) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    ret->r = r;
+    ret->s = s;
   }
-  ret->r = r;
-  ret->s = s;
 
 err:
   if (ret == NULL) {
@@ -725,71 +720,73 @@ int DSA_do_check_signature(int *out_valid, const uint8_t *digest,
   BN_init(&u2);
   BN_init(&t1);
   BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-  if (ctx == NULL) {
-    goto err;
-  }
+  {
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+      goto err;
+    }
 
-  if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || BN_is_negative(sig->r) ||
-      BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0) {
-    ret = 1;
-    goto err;
-  }
-  if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || BN_is_negative(sig->s) ||
-      BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0) {
-    ret = 1;
-    goto err;
-  }
+    if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || BN_is_negative(sig->r) ||
+        BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0) {
+      ret = 1;
+      goto err;
+    }
+    if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || BN_is_negative(sig->s) ||
+        BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0) {
+      ret = 1;
+      goto err;
+    }
 
-  // Calculate W = inv(S) mod Q
-  // save W in u2
-  if (BN_mod_inverse(&u2, sig->s, dsa->q, ctx) == NULL) {
-    goto err;
-  }
+    // Calculate W = inv(S) mod Q
+    // save W in u2
+    if (BN_mod_inverse(&u2, sig->s, dsa->q, ctx) == NULL) {
+      goto err;
+    }
 
-  // save M in u1
-  unsigned q_bits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q);
-  if (digest_len > (q_bits >> 3)) {
-    // if the digest length is greater than the size of q use the
-    // BN_num_bits(dsa->q) leftmost bits of the digest, see
-    // fips 186-3, 4.2
-    digest_len = (q_bits >> 3);
-  }
+    // save M in u1
+    unsigned q_bits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q);
+    if (digest_len > (q_bits >> 3)) {
+      // if the digest length is greater than the size of q use the
+      // BN_num_bits(dsa->q) leftmost bits of the digest, see
+      // fips 186-3, 4.2
+      digest_len = (q_bits >> 3);
+    }
 
-  if (BN_bin2bn(digest, digest_len, &u1) == NULL) {
-    goto err;
-  }
+    if (BN_bin2bn(digest, digest_len, &u1) == NULL) {
+      goto err;
+    }
 
-  // u1 = M * w mod q
-  if (!BN_mod_mul(&u1, &u1, &u2, dsa->q, ctx)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
+    // u1 = M * w mod q
+    if (!BN_mod_mul(&u1, &u1, &u2, dsa->q, ctx)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
 
-  // u2 = r * w mod q
-  if (!BN_mod_mul(&u2, sig->r, &u2, dsa->q, ctx)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
+    // u2 = r * w mod q
+    if (!BN_mod_mul(&u2, sig->r, &u2, dsa->q, ctx)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
 
-  if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked((BN_MONT_CTX **)&dsa->method_mont_p,
-                              (CRYPTO_MUTEX *)&dsa->method_mont_lock, dsa->p,
-                              ctx)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
+    if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked((BN_MONT_CTX **)&dsa->method_mont_p,
+                                (CRYPTO_MUTEX *)&dsa->method_mont_lock, dsa->p,
+                                ctx)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
 
-  if (!BN_mod_exp2_mont(&t1, dsa->g, &u1, dsa->pub_key, &u2, dsa->p, ctx,
-                        dsa->method_mont_p)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
+    if (!BN_mod_exp2_mont(&t1, dsa->g, &u1, dsa->pub_key, &u2, dsa->p, ctx,
+                          dsa->method_mont_p)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
 
-  // BN_copy(&u1,&t1);
-  // let u1 = u1 mod q
-  if (!BN_mod(&u1, &t1, dsa->q, ctx)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
+    // BN_copy(&u1,&t1);
+    // let u1 = u1 mod q
+    if (!BN_mod(&u1, &t1, dsa->q, ctx)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
 
-  // V is now in u1.  If the signature is correct, it will be
-  // equal to R.
-  *out_valid = BN_ucmp(&u1, sig->r) == 0;
-  ret = 1;
+    // V is now in u1.  If the signature is correct, it will be
+    // equal to R.
+    *out_valid = BN_ucmp(&u1, sig->r) == 0;
+    ret = 1;
+  }
 
 err:
   if (ret != 1) {
@@ -835,23 +832,25 @@ int DSA_check_signature(int *out_valid, const uint8_t *digest,
   uint8_t *der = NULL;
 
   s = DSA_SIG_new();
-  if (s == NULL) {
-    goto err;
-  }
+  {
+    if (s == NULL) {
+      goto err;
+    }
 
-  const uint8_t *sigp = sig;
-  if (d2i_DSA_SIG(&s, &sigp, sig_len) == NULL || sigp != sig + sig_len) {
-    goto err;
-  }
+    const uint8_t *sigp = sig;
+    if (d2i_DSA_SIG(&s, &sigp, sig_len) == NULL || sigp != sig + sig_len) {
+      goto err;
+    }
 
-  // Ensure that the signature uses DER and doesn't have trailing garbage.
-  int der_len = i2d_DSA_SIG(s, &der);
-  if (der_len < 0 || (size_t)der_len != sig_len ||
-      OPENSSL_memcmp(sig, der, sig_len)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
+    // Ensure that the signature uses DER and doesn't have trailing garbage.
+    int der_len = i2d_DSA_SIG(s, &der);
+    if (der_len < 0 || (size_t)der_len != sig_len ||
+        OPENSSL_memcmp(sig, der, sig_len)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
 
-  ret = DSA_do_check_signature(out_valid, digest, digest_len, s, dsa);
+    ret = DSA_do_check_signature(out_valid, digest, digest_len, s, dsa);
+  }
 
 err:
   OPENSSL_free(der);

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/dsa/{dsa_asn1.c → dsa_asn1.cc}

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
- * project 2000. */
+/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
+ * 2000. */
 /* ====================================================================
  * Copyright (c) 2000-2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/dsa/internal.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2020, Google Inc.
+/* Copyright 2020 The BoringSSL Authors
  *
  * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
  * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
@@ -42,8 +42,6 @@ struct dsa_st {
   CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
 };
 
-#define OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000
-
 // dsa_check_key performs cheap self-checks on |dsa|, and ensures it is within
 // DoS bounds. It returns one on success and zero on error.
 int dsa_check_key(const DSA *dsa);

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/ec_extra/{ec_asn1.c → ec_asn1.cc}

@@ -478,6 +478,41 @@ int i2d_ECPrivateKey(const EC_KEY *key, uint8_t **outp) {
   return CBB_finish_i2d(&cbb, outp);
 }
 
+EC_GROUP *d2i_ECPKParameters(EC_GROUP **out, const uint8_t **inp, long len) {
+  if (len < 0) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  CBS cbs;
+  CBS_init(&cbs, *inp, (size_t)len);
+  EC_GROUP *ret = EC_KEY_parse_parameters(&cbs);
+  if (ret == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  if (out != NULL) {
+    EC_GROUP_free(*out);
+    *out = ret;
+  }
+  *inp = CBS_data(&cbs);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int i2d_ECPKParameters(const EC_GROUP *group, uint8_t **outp) {
+  if (group == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  CBB cbb;
+  if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 0) ||  //
+      !EC_KEY_marshal_curve_name(&cbb, group)) {
+    CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+    return -1;
+  }
+  return CBB_finish_i2d(&cbb, outp);
+}
+
 EC_KEY *d2i_ECParameters(EC_KEY **out_key, const uint8_t **inp, long len) {
   if (len < 0) {
     return NULL;

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/ec_extra/{ec_derive.c → ec_derive.cc}

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2019, Google Inc.
+/* Copyright 2019 The BoringSSL Authors
  *
  * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
  * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/ec_extra/{hash_to_curve.c → hash_to_curve.cc}

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* Copyright (c) 2020, Google Inc.
+/* Copyright 2020 The BoringSSL Authors
  *
  * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
  * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
@@ -20,10 +20,10 @@
 
 #include <assert.h>
 
-#include "internal.h"
 #include "../fipsmodule/bn/internal.h"
 #include "../fipsmodule/ec/internal.h"
 #include "../internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
 
 
 // This file implements hash-to-curve, as described in RFC 9380.
@@ -63,72 +63,75 @@ static int expand_message_xmd(const EVP_MD *md, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len,
   EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
   EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
 
-  // Long DSTs are hashed down to size. See section 5.3.3.
-  static_assert(EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE < 256, "hashed DST still too large");
-  uint8_t dst_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-  if (dst_len >= 256) {
-    static const char kPrefix[] = "H2C-OVERSIZE-DST-";
+  {
+    // Long DSTs are hashed down to size. See section 5.3.3.
+    static_assert(EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE < 256, "hashed DST still too large");
+    uint8_t dst_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    if (dst_len >= 256) {
+      static const char kPrefix[] = "H2C-OVERSIZE-DST-";
+      if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, md, NULL) ||
+          !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, kPrefix, sizeof(kPrefix) - 1) ||
+          !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, dst, dst_len) ||
+          !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, dst_buf, NULL)) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+      dst = dst_buf;
+      dst_len = md_size;
+    }
+    uint8_t dst_len_u8 = (uint8_t)dst_len;
+
+    // Compute b_0.
+    static const uint8_t kZeros[EVP_MAX_MD_BLOCK_SIZE] = {0};
+    // If |out_len| exceeds 16 bits then |i| will wrap below causing an error to
+    // be returned. This depends on the static assert above.
+    uint8_t l_i_b_str_zero[3] = {static_cast<uint8_t>(out_len >> 8),
+                                 static_cast<uint8_t>(out_len), 0};
+    uint8_t b_0[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
     if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, md, NULL) ||
-        !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, kPrefix, sizeof(kPrefix) - 1) ||
+        !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, kZeros, block_size) ||
+        !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, msg, msg_len) ||
+        !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, l_i_b_str_zero, sizeof(l_i_b_str_zero)) ||
         !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, dst, dst_len) ||
-        !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, dst_buf, NULL)) {
+        !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &dst_len_u8, 1) ||
+        !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, b_0, NULL)) {
       goto err;
     }
-    dst = dst_buf;
-    dst_len = md_size;
-  }
-  uint8_t dst_len_u8 = (uint8_t)dst_len;
-
-  // Compute b_0.
-  static const uint8_t kZeros[EVP_MAX_MD_BLOCK_SIZE] = {0};
-  // If |out_len| exceeds 16 bits then |i| will wrap below causing an error to
-  // be returned. This depends on the static assert above.
-  uint8_t l_i_b_str_zero[3] = {out_len >> 8, out_len, 0};
-  uint8_t b_0[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-  if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, md, NULL) ||
-      !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, kZeros, block_size) ||
-      !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, msg, msg_len) ||
-      !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, l_i_b_str_zero, sizeof(l_i_b_str_zero)) ||
-      !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, dst, dst_len) ||
-      !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &dst_len_u8, 1) ||
-      !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, b_0, NULL)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
 
-  uint8_t b_i[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-  uint8_t i = 1;
-  while (out_len > 0) {
-    if (i == 0) {
-      // Input was too large.
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      goto err;
-    }
-    if (i > 1) {
-      for (size_t j = 0; j < md_size; j++) {
-        b_i[j] ^= b_0[j];
+    uint8_t b_i[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    uint8_t i = 1;
+    while (out_len > 0) {
+      if (i == 0) {
+        // Input was too large.
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        goto err;
+      }
+      if (i > 1) {
+        for (size_t j = 0; j < md_size; j++) {
+          b_i[j] ^= b_0[j];
+        }
+      } else {
+        OPENSSL_memcpy(b_i, b_0, md_size);
       }
-    } else {
-      OPENSSL_memcpy(b_i, b_0, md_size);
-    }
 
-    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, md, NULL) ||
-        !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, b_i, md_size) ||
-        !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &i, 1) ||
-        !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, dst, dst_len) ||
-        !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &dst_len_u8, 1) ||
-        !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, b_i, NULL)) {
-      goto err;
+      if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, md, NULL) ||
+          !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, b_i, md_size) ||
+          !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &i, 1) ||
+          !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, dst, dst_len) ||
+          !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, &dst_len_u8, 1) ||
+          !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, b_i, NULL)) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+
+      size_t todo = out_len >= md_size ? md_size : out_len;
+      OPENSSL_memcpy(out, b_i, todo);
+      out += todo;
+      out_len -= todo;
+      i++;
     }
 
-    size_t todo = out_len >= md_size ? md_size : out_len;
-    OPENSSL_memcpy(out, b_i, todo);
-    out += todo;
-    out_len -= todo;
-    i++;
+    ret = 1;
   }
 
-  ret = 1;
-
 err:
   EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
   return ret;
@@ -144,8 +147,7 @@ static int num_bytes_to_derive(size_t *out, const BIGNUM *modulus, unsigned k) {
   // |felem_reduce| and |ec_scalar_reduce|. All defined hash-to-curve suites
   // define |k| to be well under this bound. (|k| is usually around half of
   // |p_bits|.)
-  if (L * 8 >= 2 * bits - 2 ||
-      L > 2 * EC_MAX_BYTES) {
+  if (L * 8 >= 2 * bits - 2 || L > 2 * EC_MAX_BYTES) {
     assert(0);
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
     return 0;
@@ -462,9 +464,9 @@ int EC_hash_to_curve_p384_xmd_sha384_sswu(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *out,
                                                msg, msg_len);
 }
 
-int ec_hash_to_scalar_p384_xmd_sha384(
-    const EC_GROUP *group, EC_SCALAR *out, const uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len,
-    const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len) {
+int ec_hash_to_scalar_p384_xmd_sha384(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_SCALAR *out,
+                                      const uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len,
+                                      const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len) {
   if (EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group) != NID_secp384r1) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_GROUP_MISMATCH);
     return 0;
@@ -475,8 +477,8 @@ int ec_hash_to_scalar_p384_xmd_sha384(
 }
 
 int ec_hash_to_curve_p384_xmd_sha512_sswu_draft07(
-    const EC_GROUP *group, EC_JACOBIAN *out, const uint8_t *dst,
-    size_t dst_len, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len) {
+    const EC_GROUP *group, EC_JACOBIAN *out, const uint8_t *dst, size_t dst_len,
+    const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len) {
   // See section 8.3 of draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-07.
   if (EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group) != NID_secp384r1) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_GROUP_MISMATCH);