grpc 1.69.0 → 1.70.1

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/d1_lib.cc

@@ -70,45 +70,40 @@
 
 BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
 
-// DTLS1_MTU_TIMEOUTS is the maximum number of timeouts to expire
-// before starting to decrease the MTU.
-#define DTLS1_MTU_TIMEOUTS                     2
-
-// DTLS1_MAX_TIMEOUTS is the maximum number of timeouts to expire
-// before failing the DTLS handshake.
-#define DTLS1_MAX_TIMEOUTS                     12
-
 DTLS1_STATE::DTLS1_STATE()
     : has_change_cipher_spec(false),
       outgoing_messages_complete(false),
-      flight_has_reply(false) {}
+      flight_has_reply(false),
+      handshake_write_overflow(false),
+      handshake_read_overflow(false),
+      sending_flight(false),
+      sending_ack(false),
+      queued_key_update(QueuedKeyUpdate::kNone) {}
 
 DTLS1_STATE::~DTLS1_STATE() {}
 
+bool DTLS1_STATE::Init() {
+  // Set up the initial epochs.
+  read_epoch.aead = SSLAEADContext::CreateNullCipher();
+  write_epoch.aead = SSLAEADContext::CreateNullCipher();
+  if (read_epoch.aead == nullptr || write_epoch.aead == nullptr) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
 bool dtls1_new(SSL *ssl) {
   if (!tls_new(ssl)) {
     return false;
   }
   UniquePtr<DTLS1_STATE> d1 = MakeUnique<DTLS1_STATE>();
-  if (!d1) {
-    tls_free(ssl);
-    return false;
-  }
-
-  d1->initial_aead_write_ctx = SSLAEADContext::CreateNullCipher(true);
-  if (!d1->initial_aead_write_ctx) {
+  if (!d1 || !d1->Init()) {
     tls_free(ssl);
     return false;
   }
 
   ssl->d1 = d1.release();
-
-  // Set the version to the highest supported version.
-  //
-  // TODO(davidben): Move this field into |s3|, have it store the normalized
-  // protocol version, and implement this pre-negotiation quirk in |SSL_version|
-  // at the API boundary rather than in internal state.
-  ssl->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
   return true;
 }
 
@@ -123,81 +118,81 @@ void dtls1_free(SSL *ssl) {
   ssl->d1 = NULL;
 }
 
-void dtls1_start_timer(SSL *ssl) {
-  // If timer is not set, initialize duration (by default, 1 second)
-  if (ssl->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == 0 && ssl->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec == 0) {
-    ssl->d1->timeout_duration_ms = ssl->initial_timeout_duration_ms;
-  }
+void DTLSTimer::StartMicroseconds(OPENSSL_timeval now, uint64_t microseconds) {
+  uint64_t seconds = microseconds / 1000000;
+  microseconds %= 1000000;
 
-  // Set timeout to current time
-  ssl_get_current_time(ssl, &ssl->d1->next_timeout);
+  now.tv_usec += microseconds;
+  if (now.tv_usec >= 1000000) {
+    now.tv_usec -= 1000000;
+    seconds++;
+  }
 
-  // Add duration to current time
-  ssl->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec += ssl->d1->timeout_duration_ms / 1000;
-  ssl->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec += (ssl->d1->timeout_duration_ms % 1000) * 1000;
-  if (ssl->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec >= 1000000) {
-    ssl->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec++;
-    ssl->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec -= 1000000;
+  if (now.tv_sec > UINT64_MAX - seconds) {
+    Stop();
+    return;
   }
+  now.tv_sec += seconds;
+  expire_time_ = now;
 }
 
-bool dtls1_is_timer_expired(SSL *ssl) {
-  struct timeval timeleft;
-
-  // Get time left until timeout, return false if no timer running
-  if (!DTLSv1_get_timeout(ssl, &timeleft)) {
-    return false;
-  }
+void DTLSTimer::Stop() { expire_time_ = {0, 0}; }
 
-  // Return false if timer is not expired yet
-  if (timeleft.tv_sec > 0 || timeleft.tv_usec > 0) {
-    return false;
-  }
+bool DTLSTimer::IsExpired(OPENSSL_timeval now) const {
+  return MicrosecondsRemaining(now) == 0;
+}
 
-  // Timer expired, so return true
-  return true;
+bool DTLSTimer::IsSet() const {
+  return expire_time_.tv_sec != 0 || expire_time_.tv_usec != 0;
 }
 
-static void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *ssl) {
-  ssl->d1->timeout_duration_ms *= 2;
-  if (ssl->d1->timeout_duration_ms > 60000) {
-    ssl->d1->timeout_duration_ms = 60000;
+uint64_t DTLSTimer::MicrosecondsRemaining(OPENSSL_timeval now) const {
+  if (!IsSet()) {
+    return kNever;
   }
-}
 
-void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *ssl) {
-  ssl->d1->num_timeouts = 0;
-  OPENSSL_memset(&ssl->d1->next_timeout, 0, sizeof(ssl->d1->next_timeout));
-  ssl->d1->timeout_duration_ms = ssl->initial_timeout_duration_ms;
-}
+  if (now.tv_sec > expire_time_.tv_sec ||
+      (now.tv_sec == expire_time_.tv_sec &&
+       now.tv_usec >= expire_time_.tv_usec)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
 
-bool dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *ssl) {
-  ssl->d1->num_timeouts++;
+  uint64_t sec = expire_time_.tv_sec - now.tv_sec;
+  uint32_t usec;
+  if (expire_time_.tv_usec >= now.tv_usec) {
+    usec = expire_time_.tv_usec - now.tv_usec;
+  } else {
+    sec--;
+    usec = expire_time_.tv_usec + 1000000 - now.tv_usec;
+  }
 
-  // Reduce MTU after 2 unsuccessful retransmissions
-  if (ssl->d1->num_timeouts > DTLS1_MTU_TIMEOUTS &&
-      !(SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
-    long mtu =
-        BIO_ctrl(ssl->wbio.get(), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU, 0, nullptr);
-    if (mtu >= 0 && mtu <= (1 << 30) && (unsigned)mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu()) {
-      ssl->d1->mtu = (unsigned)mtu;
-    }
+  // If remaining time is less than 15 ms, return 0 to prevent issues because of
+  // small divergences with socket timeouts.
+  if (sec == 0 && usec < 15000) {
+    return 0;
   }
 
-  if (ssl->d1->num_timeouts > DTLS1_MAX_TIMEOUTS) {
-    // fail the connection, enough alerts have been sent
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED);
-    return false;
+  if (sec > UINT64_MAX / 1000000) {
+    return kNever;
+  }
+  sec *= 1000000;
+  if (sec > UINT64_MAX - usec) {
+    return kNever;
   }
+  return sec + usec;
+}
 
-  return true;
+void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *ssl) {
+  ssl->d1->num_timeouts = 0;
+  ssl->d1->retransmit_timer.Stop();
+  ssl->d1->timeout_duration_ms = ssl->initial_timeout_duration_ms;
 }
 
 BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
 
 using namespace bssl;
 
-void DTLSv1_set_initial_timeout_duration(SSL *ssl, unsigned int duration_ms) {
+void DTLSv1_set_initial_timeout_duration(SSL *ssl, uint32_t duration_ms) {
   ssl->initial_timeout_duration_ms = duration_ms;
 }
 
@@ -206,48 +201,27 @@ int DTLSv1_get_timeout(const SSL *ssl, struct timeval *out) {
     return 0;
   }
 
-  // If no timeout is set, just return 0.
-  if (ssl->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == 0 && ssl->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec == 0) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  struct OPENSSL_timeval timenow;
-  ssl_get_current_time(ssl, &timenow);
-
-  // If timer already expired, set remaining time to 0.
-  if (ssl->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec < timenow.tv_sec ||
-      (ssl->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == timenow.tv_sec &&
-       ssl->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec <= timenow.tv_usec)) {
-    OPENSSL_memset(out, 0, sizeof(*out));
-    return 1;
+  OPENSSL_timeval now = ssl_ctx_get_current_time(ssl->ctx.get());
+  uint64_t remaining_usec =
+      ssl->d1->retransmit_timer.MicrosecondsRemaining(now);
+  remaining_usec =
+      std::min(remaining_usec, ssl->d1->ack_timer.MicrosecondsRemaining(now));
+  if (remaining_usec == DTLSTimer::kNever) {
+    return 0;  // No timeout is set.
   }
 
-  // Calculate time left until timer expires.
-  struct OPENSSL_timeval ret;
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(&ret, &ssl->d1->next_timeout, sizeof(ret));
-  ret.tv_sec -= timenow.tv_sec;
-  if (ret.tv_usec >= timenow.tv_usec) {
-    ret.tv_usec -= timenow.tv_usec;
-  } else {
-    ret.tv_usec = 1000000 + ret.tv_usec - timenow.tv_usec;
-    ret.tv_sec--;
-  }
+  uint64_t remaining_sec = remaining_usec / 1000000;
+  remaining_usec %= 1000000;
 
-  // If remaining time is less than 15 ms, set it to 0 to prevent issues
-  // because of small divergences with socket timeouts.
-  if (ret.tv_sec == 0 && ret.tv_usec < 15000) {
-    OPENSSL_memset(&ret, 0, sizeof(ret));
-  }
-
-  // Clamp the result in case of overflow.
-  if (ret.tv_sec > INT_MAX) {
-    assert(0);
-    out->tv_sec = INT_MAX;
+  // |timeval| uses |time_t|, which may be 32-bit.
+  const auto kTvSecMax = std::numeric_limits<decltype(out->tv_sec)>::max();
+  if (remaining_sec > static_cast<uint64_t>(kTvSecMax)) {
+    out->tv_sec = kTvSecMax;  // Saturate the output.
+    out->tv_usec = 999999;
   } else {
-    out->tv_sec = ret.tv_sec;
+    out->tv_sec = static_cast<decltype(out->tv_sec)>(remaining_sec);
   }
-
-  out->tv_usec = ret.tv_usec;
+  out->tv_usec = remaining_usec;
   return 1;
 }
 
@@ -259,16 +233,39 @@ int DTLSv1_handle_timeout(SSL *ssl) {
     return -1;
   }
 
-  // If no timer is expired, don't do anything.
-  if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(ssl)) {
+  if (!ssl->d1->ack_timer.IsSet() && !ssl->d1->retransmit_timer.IsSet()) {
+    // No timers are running. Don't bother querying the clock.
     return 0;
   }
 
-  if (!dtls1_check_timeout_num(ssl)) {
-    return -1;
+  OPENSSL_timeval now = ssl_ctx_get_current_time(ssl->ctx.get());
+  bool any_timer_expired = false;
+  if (ssl->d1->ack_timer.IsExpired(now)) {
+    any_timer_expired = true;
+    ssl->d1->sending_ack = true;
+    ssl->d1->ack_timer.Stop();
+  }
+
+  if (ssl->d1->retransmit_timer.IsExpired(now)) {
+    any_timer_expired = true;
+    ssl->d1->sending_flight = true;
+    ssl->d1->retransmit_timer.Stop();
+
+    ssl->d1->num_timeouts++;
+    // Reduce MTU after 2 unsuccessful retransmissions.
+    if (ssl->d1->num_timeouts > DTLS1_MTU_TIMEOUTS &&
+        !(SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
+      long mtu = BIO_ctrl(ssl->wbio.get(), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU, 0,
+                          nullptr);
+      if (mtu >= 0 && mtu <= (1 << 30) && (unsigned)mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu()) {
+        ssl->d1->mtu = (unsigned)mtu;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!any_timer_expired) {
+    return 0;
   }
 
-  dtls1_double_timeout(ssl);
-  dtls1_start_timer(ssl);
-  return dtls1_retransmit_outgoing_messages(ssl);
+  return dtls1_flush(ssl);
 }

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/d1_pkt.cc

@@ -114,11 +114,13 @@
 #include <assert.h>
 #include <string.h>
 
+#include <algorithm>
+
 #include <openssl/bio.h>
 #include <openssl/bytestring.h>
-#include <openssl/mem.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 
 #include "../crypto/internal.h"
@@ -127,22 +129,162 @@
 
 BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
 
+ssl_open_record_t dtls1_process_ack(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                    DTLSRecordNumber ack_record_number,
+                                    Span<const uint8_t> data) {
+  // As a DTLS-1.3-capable client, it is possible to receive an ACK before we
+  // receive ServerHello and learned the server picked DTLS 1.3. Thus, tolerate
+  // but ignore ACKs before the version is set.
+  if (!ssl_has_final_version(ssl)) {
+    return ssl_open_record_discard;
+  }
+
+  // ACKs are only allowed in DTLS 1.3. Reject them if we've negotiated a
+  // version and it's not 1.3.
+  if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+    return ssl_open_record_error;
+  }
+
+  CBS cbs = data, record_numbers;
+  if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &record_numbers) ||
+      CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    return ssl_open_record_error;
+  }
+
+  while (CBS_len(&record_numbers) != 0) {
+    uint64_t epoch, seq;
+    if (!CBS_get_u64(&record_numbers, &epoch) ||
+        !CBS_get_u64(&record_numbers, &seq)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+      return ssl_open_record_error;
+    }
+
+    // During the handshake, records must be ACKed at the same or higher epoch.
+    // See https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid8108. Additionally, if the
+    // record does not fit in DTLSRecordNumber, it is definitely not a record
+    // number that we sent.
+    if ((ack_record_number.epoch() < ssl_encryption_application &&
+         epoch > ack_record_number.epoch()) ||
+        epoch > UINT16_MAX || seq > DTLSRecordNumber::kMaxSequence) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+      *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+      return ssl_open_record_error;
+    }
+
+    // Find the sent record that matches this ACK.
+    DTLSRecordNumber number(static_cast<uint16_t>(epoch), seq);
+    DTLSSentRecord *sent_record = nullptr;
+    if (ssl->d1->sent_records != nullptr) {
+      for (size_t i = 0; i < ssl->d1->sent_records->size(); i++) {
+        if ((*ssl->d1->sent_records)[i].number == number) {
+          sent_record = &(*ssl->d1->sent_records)[i];
+          break;
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    if (sent_record == nullptr) {
+      // We may have sent this record and forgotten it, so this is not an error.
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    // Mark each message as ACKed.
+    if (sent_record->first_msg == sent_record->last_msg) {
+      ssl->d1->outgoing_messages[sent_record->first_msg].acked.MarkRange(
+          sent_record->first_msg_start, sent_record->last_msg_end);
+    } else {
+      ssl->d1->outgoing_messages[sent_record->first_msg].acked.MarkRange(
+          sent_record->first_msg_start, SIZE_MAX);
+      for (size_t i = size_t{sent_record->first_msg} + 1;
+           i < sent_record->last_msg; i++) {
+        ssl->d1->outgoing_messages[i].acked.MarkRange(0, SIZE_MAX);
+      }
+      if (sent_record->last_msg_end != 0) {
+        ssl->d1->outgoing_messages[sent_record->last_msg].acked.MarkRange(
+            0, sent_record->last_msg_end);
+      }
+    }
+
+    // Clear the state so we don't bother re-marking the messages next time.
+    sent_record->first_msg = 0;
+    sent_record->first_msg_start = 0;
+    sent_record->last_msg = 0;
+    sent_record->last_msg_end = 0;
+  }
+
+  // If the outgoing flight is now fully ACKed, we are done retransmitting.
+  if (std::all_of(ssl->d1->outgoing_messages.begin(),
+                  ssl->d1->outgoing_messages.end(),
+                  [](const auto &msg) { return msg.IsFullyAcked(); })) {
+    dtls1_stop_timer(ssl);
+    dtls_clear_outgoing_messages(ssl);
+
+    // DTLS 1.3 defers the key update to when the message is ACKed.
+    if (ssl->s3->key_update_pending) {
+      if (!tls13_rotate_traffic_key(ssl, evp_aead_seal)) {
+        return ssl_open_record_error;
+      }
+      ssl->s3->key_update_pending = false;
+    }
+
+    // Check for deferred messages.
+    if (ssl->d1->queued_key_update != QueuedKeyUpdate::kNone) {
+      int request_type =
+          ssl->d1->queued_key_update == QueuedKeyUpdate::kUpdateRequested
+              ? SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED
+              : SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED;
+      ssl->d1->queued_key_update = QueuedKeyUpdate::kNone;
+      if (!tls13_add_key_update(ssl, request_type)) {
+        return ssl_open_record_error;
+      }
+    }
+  } else {
+    // We may still be able to drop unused write epochs.
+    dtls_clear_unused_write_epochs(ssl);
+
+    // TODO(crbug.com/42290594): Schedule a retransmit. The peer will have
+    // waited before sending the ACK, so a partial ACK suggests packet loss.
+  }
+
+  ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, /*is_write=*/0, SSL3_RT_ACK, data);
+  return ssl_open_record_discard;
+}
+
 ssl_open_record_t dtls1_open_app_data(SSL *ssl, Span<uint8_t> *out,
                                       size_t *out_consumed, uint8_t *out_alert,
                                       Span<uint8_t> in) {
   assert(!SSL_in_init(ssl));
 
   uint8_t type;
+  DTLSRecordNumber record_number;
   Span<uint8_t> record;
-  auto ret = dtls_open_record(ssl, &type, &record, out_consumed, out_alert, in);
+  auto ret = dtls_open_record(ssl, &type, &record_number, &record, out_consumed,
+                              out_alert, in);
   if (ret != ssl_open_record_success) {
     return ret;
   }
 
   if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
+    // Process handshake fragments for DTLS 1.3 post-handshake messages.
+    if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+      if (!dtls1_process_handshake_fragments(ssl, out_alert, record_number,
+                                             record)) {
+        return ssl_open_record_error;
+      }
+      return ssl_open_record_discard;
+    }
+
     // Parse the first fragment header to determine if this is a pre-CCS or
     // post-CCS handshake record. DTLS resets handshake message numbers on each
     // handshake, so renegotiations and retransmissions are ambiguous.
+    //
+    // TODO(crbug.com/42290594): Move this logic into
+    // |dtls1_process_handshake_fragments| and integrate it into DTLS 1.3
+    // retransmit conditions.
     CBS cbs, body;
     struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
     CBS_init(&cbs, record.data(), record.size());
@@ -154,16 +296,15 @@ ssl_open_record_t dtls1_open_app_data(SSL *ssl, Span<uint8_t> *out,
 
     if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED &&
         msg_hdr.seq == ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq - 1) {
-      if (msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) {
+      if (!ssl->d1->sending_flight && msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) {
         // Retransmit our last flight of messages. If the peer sends the second
         // Finished, they may not have received ours. Only do this for the
         // first fragment, in case the Finished was fragmented.
-        if (!dtls1_check_timeout_num(ssl)) {
-          *out_alert = 0;  // TODO(davidben): Send an alert?
-          return ssl_open_record_error;
-        }
-
-        dtls1_retransmit_outgoing_messages(ssl);
+        //
+        // This is not really a timeout, but increment the timeout count so we
+        // eventually give up.
+        ssl->d1->num_timeouts++;
+        ssl->d1->sending_flight = true;
       }
       return ssl_open_record_discard;
     }
@@ -172,6 +313,10 @@ ssl_open_record_t dtls1_open_app_data(SSL *ssl, Span<uint8_t> *out,
     // renegotiation attempt. Fall through to the error path.
   }
 
+  if (type == SSL3_RT_ACK) {
+    return dtls1_process_ack(ssl, out_alert, record_number, record);
+  }
+
   if (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
     *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
@@ -207,8 +352,9 @@ int dtls1_write_app_data(SSL *ssl, bool *out_needs_handshake,
     return 1;
   }
 
+  // TODO(crbug.com/381113363): Use the 0-RTT epoch if writing 0-RTT.
   int ret = dtls1_write_record(ssl, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, in,
-                               ssl->d1->w_epoch);
+                               ssl->d1->write_epoch.epoch());
   if (ret <= 0) {
     return ret;
   }
@@ -216,11 +362,6 @@ int dtls1_write_app_data(SSL *ssl, bool *out_needs_handshake,
   return 1;
 }
 
-static size_t dtls_seal_align_prefix_len(const SSL *ssl, uint16_t epoch) {
-  return dtls_record_header_write_len(ssl, epoch) +
-         ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->ExplicitNonceLen();
-}
-
 int dtls1_write_record(SSL *ssl, int type, Span<const uint8_t> in,
                        uint16_t epoch) {
   SSLBuffer *buf = &ssl->s3->write_buffer;
@@ -235,12 +376,13 @@ int dtls1_write_record(SSL *ssl, int type, Span<const uint8_t> in,
     return -1;
   }
 
+  DTLSRecordNumber record_number;
   size_t ciphertext_len;
-  if (!buf->EnsureCap(dtls_seal_align_prefix_len(ssl, epoch),
+  if (!buf->EnsureCap(dtls_seal_prefix_len(ssl, epoch),
                       in.size() + SSL_max_seal_overhead(ssl)) ||
-      !dtls_seal_record(ssl, buf->remaining().data(), &ciphertext_len,
-                        buf->remaining().size(), type, in.data(), in.size(),
-                        epoch)) {
+      !dtls_seal_record(ssl, &record_number, buf->remaining().data(),
+                        &ciphertext_len, buf->remaining().size(), type,
+                        in.data(), in.size(), epoch)) {
     buf->Clear();
     return -1;
   }
@@ -255,7 +397,7 @@ int dtls1_write_record(SSL *ssl, int type, Span<const uint8_t> in,
 
 int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *ssl) {
   int ret = dtls1_write_record(ssl, SSL3_RT_ALERT, ssl->s3->send_alert,
-                               ssl->d1->w_epoch);
+                               ssl->d1->write_epoch.epoch());
   if (ret <= 0) {
     return ret;
   }

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/d1_srtp.cc

@@ -127,18 +127,10 @@
 using namespace bssl;
 
 static const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE kSRTPProfiles[] = {
-    {
-        "SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_80", SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_80,
-    },
-    {
-        "SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_32", SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_32,
-    },
-    {
-        "SRTP_AEAD_AES_128_GCM", SRTP_AEAD_AES_128_GCM,
-    },
-    {
-        "SRTP_AEAD_AES_256_GCM", SRTP_AEAD_AES_256_GCM,
-    },
+    {"SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_80", SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_80},
+    {"SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_32", SRTP_AES128_CM_SHA1_32},
+    {"SRTP_AEAD_AES_128_GCM", SRTP_AEAD_AES_128_GCM},
+    {"SRTP_AEAD_AES_256_GCM", SRTP_AEAD_AES_256_GCM},
     {0, 0},
 };