grpc 1.64.3 → 1.71.0

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c

@@ -1,1648 +0,0 @@
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
-
-#include <ctype.h>
-#include <limits.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <time.h>
-
-#include <openssl/asn1.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/mem.h>
-#include <openssl/obj.h>
-#include <openssl/thread.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-
-#include "../internal.h"
-#include "internal.h"
-
-static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class =
-    CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT_WITH_APP_DATA;
-
-// CRL score values
-
-// No unhandled critical extensions
-#define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
-
-// certificate is within CRL scope
-#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
-
-// CRL times valid
-#define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
-
-// Issuer name matches certificate
-#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
-
-// If this score or above CRL is probably valid
-#define CRL_SCORE_VALID \
-  (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL | CRL_SCORE_TIME | CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
-
-// CRL issuer is certificate issuer
-#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
-
-// CRL issuer is on certificate path
-#define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
-
-// CRL issuer matches CRL AKID
-#define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
-
-static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
-static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
-static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
-static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
-static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
-static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
-static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
-static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
-static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
-
-static X509 *get_trusted_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
-static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, X509_CRL *crl,
-                         X509 *x);
-static int get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509 *x);
-static int crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
-                          int *pcrl_score);
-static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score);
-static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
-
-static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
-
-static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) { return ok; }
-
-// cert_self_signed checks if |x| is self-signed. If |x| is valid, it returns
-// one and sets |*out_is_self_signed| to the result. If |x| is invalid, it
-// returns zero.
-static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x, int *out_is_self_signed) {
-  if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-  *out_is_self_signed = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) != 0;
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int call_verify_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
-  ok = ctx->verify_cb(ok, ctx);
-  // Historically, callbacks returning values like -1 would be treated as a mix
-  // of success or failure. Insert that callers check correctly.
-  //
-  // TODO(davidben): Also use this wrapper to constrain which errors may be
-  // suppressed, and ensure all |verify_cb| calls remember to fill in an error.
-  BSSL_CHECK(ok == 0 || ok == 1);
-  return ok;
-}
-
-// Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store
-static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) {
-  STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
-  X509 *xtmp = NULL;
-  size_t i;
-  // Lookup all certs with matching subject name
-  certs = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
-  if (certs == NULL) {
-    return NULL;
-  }
-  // Look for exact match
-  for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
-    xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
-    if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x)) {
-      break;
-    }
-  }
-  if (i < sk_X509_num(certs)) {
-    X509_up_ref(xtmp);
-  } else {
-    xtmp = NULL;
-  }
-  sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
-  return xtmp;
-}
-
-int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
-  X509 *chain_ss = NULL;
-  int bad_chain = 0;
-  X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
-  int i, ok = 0;
-  int j, retry, trust;
-  STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
-
-  if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
-    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
-    // This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
-    // cannot do another one.
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
-    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  if (ctx->param->flags &
-      (X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT | X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS)) {
-    // We do not support indirect or delta CRLs. The flags still exist for
-    // compatibility with bindings libraries, but to ensure we do not
-    // inadvertently skip a CRL check that the caller expects, fail closed.
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
-    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  // first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
-  // the first entry is in place
-  ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null();
-  if (ctx->chain == NULL || !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert)) {
-    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
-    goto end;
-  }
-  X509_up_ref(ctx->cert);
-  ctx->last_untrusted = 1;
-
-  // We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it.
-  if (ctx->untrusted != NULL && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
-    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
-    goto end;
-  }
-
-  int num = (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
-  X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
-  // |param->depth| does not include the leaf certificate or the trust anchor,
-  // so the maximum size is 2 more.
-  int max_chain = param->depth >= INT_MAX - 2 ? INT_MAX : param->depth + 2;
-
-  for (;;) {
-    if (num >= max_chain) {
-      // FIXME: If this happens, we should take note of it and, if appropriate,
-      // use the X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code later.
-      break;
-    }
-
-    int is_self_signed;
-    if (!cert_self_signed(x, &is_self_signed)) {
-      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
-      goto end;
-    }
-
-    // If we are self signed, we break
-    if (is_self_signed) {
-      break;
-    }
-    // If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first
-    if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) {
-      X509 *issuer = get_trusted_issuer(ctx, x);
-      if (issuer != NULL) {
-        // Free the certificate. It will be picked up again later.
-        X509_free(issuer);
-        break;
-      }
-    }
-
-    // If we were passed a cert chain, use it first
-    if (sktmp != NULL) {
-      X509 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
-      if (issuer != NULL) {
-        if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, issuer)) {
-          ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
-          goto end;
-        }
-        X509_up_ref(issuer);
-        (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, issuer);
-        ctx->last_untrusted++;
-        x = issuer;
-        num++;
-        // reparse the full chain for the next one
-        continue;
-      }
-    }
-    break;
-  }
-
-  // Remember how many untrusted certs we have
-  j = num;
-  // at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates.
-  // We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we
-  // complain.
-
-  do {
-    // Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed.
-    i = (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
-    x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1);
-
-    int is_self_signed;
-    if (!cert_self_signed(x, &is_self_signed)) {
-      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
-      goto end;
-    }
-
-    if (is_self_signed) {
-      // we have a self signed certificate
-      if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) {
-        // We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can
-        // find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid
-        // possible impersonation.
-        X509 *issuer = get_trusted_issuer(ctx, x);
-        if (issuer == NULL || X509_cmp(x, issuer) != 0) {
-          X509_free(issuer);
-          ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
-          ctx->current_cert = x;
-          ctx->error_depth = i - 1;
-          bad_chain = 1;
-          if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
-            goto end;
-          }
-        } else {
-          // We have a match: replace certificate with store
-          // version so we get any trust settings.
-          X509_free(x);
-          x = issuer;
-          (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
-          ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
-        }
-      } else {
-        // extract and save self signed certificate for later use
-        chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
-        ctx->last_untrusted--;
-        num--;
-        j--;
-        x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
-      }
-    }
-    // We now lookup certs from the certificate store
-    for (;;) {
-      if (num >= max_chain) {
-        // FIXME: If this happens, we should take note of it and, if
-        // appropriate, use the X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code later.
-        break;
-      }
-      if (!cert_self_signed(x, &is_self_signed)) {
-        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
-        goto end;
-      }
-      // If we are self signed, we break
-      if (is_self_signed) {
-        break;
-      }
-      X509 *issuer = get_trusted_issuer(ctx, x);
-      if (issuer == NULL) {
-        break;
-      }
-      x = issuer;
-      if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
-        X509_free(issuer);
-        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
-        goto end;
-      }
-      num++;
-    }
-
-    // we now have our chain, lets check it...
-    trust = check_trust(ctx);
-
-    // If explicitly rejected error
-    if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
-      goto end;
-    }
-    // If it's not explicitly trusted then check if there is an alternative
-    // chain that could be used. We only do this if we haven't already
-    // checked via TRUSTED_FIRST and the user hasn't switched off alternate
-    // chain checking
-    retry = 0;
-    if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED &&
-        !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) &&
-        !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) {
-      while (j-- > 1) {
-        X509 *issuer =
-            get_trusted_issuer(ctx, sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1));
-        // Check if we found an alternate chain
-        if (issuer != NULL) {
-          // Free up the found cert we'll add it again later
-          X509_free(issuer);
-
-          // Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an
-          // alternate chain
-          while (num > j) {
-            X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain));
-            num--;
-          }
-          ctx->last_untrusted = (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
-          retry = 1;
-          break;
-        }
-      }
-    }
-  } while (retry);
-
-  // If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single
-  // self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already
-  // and set bad_chain == 1
-  if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) {
-    if (chain_ss == NULL ||
-        !x509_check_issued_with_callback(ctx, x, chain_ss)) {
-      if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num) {
-        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
-      } else {
-        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
-      }
-      ctx->current_cert = x;
-    } else {
-      if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss)) {
-        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
-        goto end;
-      }
-      num++;
-      ctx->last_untrusted = num;
-      ctx->current_cert = chain_ss;
-      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
-      chain_ss = NULL;
-    }
-
-    ctx->error_depth = num - 1;
-    bad_chain = 1;
-    if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
-      goto end;
-    }
-  }
-
-  // We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose
-  if (!check_chain_extensions(ctx) ||  //
-      !check_id(ctx) ||
-      // We check revocation status after copying parameters because they may be
-      // needed for CRL signature verification.
-      !check_revocation(ctx) ||  //
-      !internal_verify(ctx) ||   //
-      !check_name_constraints(ctx) ||
-      // TODO(davidben): Does |check_policy| still need to be conditioned on
-      // |!bad_chain|? DoS concerns have been resolved.
-      (!bad_chain && !check_policy(ctx))) {
-    goto end;
-  }
-
-  ok = 1;
-
-end:
-  sk_X509_free(sktmp);
-  X509_free(chain_ss);
-
-  // Safety net, error returns must set ctx->error
-  if (!ok && ctx->error == X509_V_OK) {
-    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
-  }
-  return ok;
-}
-
-// Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
-
-static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) {
-  size_t i;
-  X509 *issuer;
-  for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
-    issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
-    if (x509_check_issued_with_callback(ctx, x, issuer)) {
-      return issuer;
-    }
-  }
-  return NULL;
-}
-
-// Given a possible certificate and issuer check them
-
-int x509_check_issued_with_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x,
-                                    X509 *issuer) {
-  int ret;
-  ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
-  if (ret == X509_V_OK) {
-    return 1;
-  }
-  // If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx
-  if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  ctx->error = ret;
-  ctx->current_cert = x;
-  return call_verify_cb(0, ctx);
-}
-
-static X509 *get_trusted_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) {
-  X509 *issuer;
-  if (ctx->trusted_stack != NULL) {
-    // Ignore the store and use the configured stack instead.
-    issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->trusted_stack, x);
-    if (issuer != NULL) {
-      X509_up_ref(issuer);
-    }
-    return issuer;
-  }
-
-  if (!X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer(&issuer, ctx, x)) {
-    return NULL;
-  }
-  return issuer;
-}
-
-// Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
-// purpose
-
-static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
-  int plen = 0;
-  int purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
-
-  // Check all untrusted certificates
-  for (int i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) {
-    X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
-    if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) &&
-        (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
-      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
-      ctx->error_depth = i;
-      ctx->current_cert = x;
-      if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
-        return 0;
-      }
-    }
-
-    int must_be_ca = i > 0;
-    if (must_be_ca && !X509_check_ca(x)) {
-      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
-      ctx->error_depth = i;
-      ctx->current_cert = x;
-      if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
-        return 0;
-      }
-    }
-    if (ctx->param->purpose > 0 &&
-        X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca) != 1) {
-      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
-      ctx->error_depth = i;
-      ctx->current_cert = x;
-      if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
-        return 0;
-      }
-    }
-    // Check pathlen if not self issued
-    if (i > 1 && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) && x->ex_pathlen != -1 &&
-        plen > x->ex_pathlen + 1) {
-      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
-      ctx->error_depth = i;
-      ctx->current_cert = x;
-      if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
-        return 0;
-      }
-    }
-    // Increment path length if not self issued
-    if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) {
-      plen++;
-    }
-  }
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int reject_dns_name_in_common_name(X509 *x509) {
-  const X509_NAME *name = X509_get_subject_name(x509);
-  int i = -1;
-  for (;;) {
-    i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, NID_commonName, i);
-    if (i == -1) {
-      return X509_V_OK;
-    }
-
-    const X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i);
-    const ASN1_STRING *common_name = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(entry);
-    unsigned char *idval;
-    int idlen = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&idval, common_name);
-    if (idlen < 0) {
-      return X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
-    }
-    // Only process attributes that look like host names. Note it is
-    // important that this check be mirrored in |X509_check_host|.
-    int looks_like_dns = x509v3_looks_like_dns_name(idval, (size_t)idlen);
-    OPENSSL_free(idval);
-    if (looks_like_dns) {
-      return X509_V_ERR_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_WITHOUT_SANS;
-    }
-  }
-}
-
-static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
-  int i, j, rv;
-  int has_name_constraints = 0;
-  // Check name constraints for all certificates
-  for (i = (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
-    X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
-    // Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain
-    if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) {
-      continue;
-    }
-    // Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
-    // including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
-    // but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
-    // to be obeyed.
-    for (j = (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
-      NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
-      if (nc) {
-        has_name_constraints = 1;
-        rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
-        switch (rv) {
-          case X509_V_OK:
-            continue;
-          case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
-            ctx->error = rv;
-            return 0;
-          default:
-            ctx->error = rv;
-            ctx->error_depth = i;
-            ctx->current_cert = x;
-            if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
-              return 0;
-            }
-            break;
-        }
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Name constraints do not match against the common name, but
-  // |X509_check_host| still implements the legacy behavior where, on
-  // certificates lacking a SAN list, DNS-like names in the common name are
-  // checked instead.
-  //
-  // While we could apply the name constraints to the common name, name
-  // constraints are rare enough that can hold such certificates to a higher
-  // standard. Note this does not make "DNS-like" heuristic failures any
-  // worse. A decorative common-name misidentified as a DNS name would fail
-  // the name constraint anyway.
-  X509 *leaf = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
-  if (has_name_constraints && leaf->altname == NULL) {
-    rv = reject_dns_name_in_common_name(leaf);
-    switch (rv) {
-      case X509_V_OK:
-        break;
-      case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
-        ctx->error = rv;
-        return 0;
-      default:
-        ctx->error = rv;
-        ctx->error_depth = i;
-        ctx->current_cert = leaf;
-        if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
-          return 0;
-        }
-        break;
-    }
-  }
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode) {
-  ctx->error = errcode;
-  ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
-  ctx->error_depth = 0;
-  return call_verify_cb(0, ctx);
-}
-
-static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) {
-  size_t i;
-  size_t n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(param->hosts);
-  char *name;
-
-  for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
-    name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(param->hosts, i);
-    if (X509_check_host(x, name, strlen(name), param->hostflags, NULL) > 0) {
-      return 1;
-    }
-  }
-  return n == 0;
-}
-
-static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
-  X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
-  X509 *x = ctx->cert;
-  if (vpm->poison) {
-    if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL)) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-  }
-  if (vpm->hosts && check_hosts(x, vpm) <= 0) {
-    if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH)) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-  }
-  if (vpm->email && X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
-    if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH)) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-  }
-  if (vpm->ip && X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
-    if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH)) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-  }
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
-  X509 *x = NULL;
-  // Check all trusted certificates in chain
-  for (size_t i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
-    x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
-    int trust = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
-    // If explicitly trusted return trusted
-    if (trust == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) {
-      return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
-    }
-    // If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not
-    // overridden.
-    if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
-      ctx->error_depth = (int)i;
-      ctx->current_cert = x;
-      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
-      if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
-        return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
-      }
-    }
-  }
-  // If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate
-  // return success.
-  if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
-    X509 *mx;
-    if (ctx->last_untrusted < (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain)) {
-      return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
-    }
-    x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
-    mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
-    if (mx) {
-      (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
-      X509_free(x);
-      ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
-      return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
-    }
-  }
-
-  // If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
-  // standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
-  return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
-}
-
-static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
-  if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)) {
-    return 1;
-  }
-  int last;
-  if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) {
-    last = (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
-  } else {
-    last = 0;
-  }
-  for (int i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
-    ctx->error_depth = i;
-    if (!check_cert(ctx)) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-  }
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
-  X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
-  int ok = 0, cnum = ctx->error_depth;
-  X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
-  ctx->current_cert = x;
-  ctx->current_crl_issuer = NULL;
-  ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
-
-  // Try to retrieve the relevant CRL. Note that |get_crl| sets
-  // |current_crl_issuer| and |current_crl_score|, which |check_crl| then reads.
-  //
-  // TODO(davidben): Remove these callbacks. gRPC currently sets them, but
-  // implements them incorrectly. It is not actually possible to implement
-  // |get_crl| from outside the library.
-  if (!ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x)) {
-    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
-    ok = call_verify_cb(0, ctx);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  ctx->current_crl = crl;
-  if (!ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl) ||  //
-      !cert_crl(ctx, crl, x)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  ok = 1;
-
-err:
-  X509_CRL_free(crl);
-  ctx->current_crl = NULL;
-  return ok;
-}
-
-// Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX
-static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify) {
-  if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME) {
-    return 1;
-  }
-
-  if (notify) {
-    ctx->current_crl = crl;
-  }
-  int64_t ptime;
-  if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) {
-    ptime = ctx->param->check_time;
-  } else {
-    ptime = time(NULL);
-  }
-
-  int i = X509_cmp_time_posix(X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
-  if (i == 0) {
-    if (!notify) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
-    if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (i > 0) {
-    if (!notify) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
-    if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl)) {
-    i = X509_cmp_time_posix(X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
-
-    if (i == 0) {
-      if (!notify) {
-        return 0;
-      }
-      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
-      if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
-        return 0;
-      }
-    }
-    if (i < 0) {
-      if (!notify) {
-        return 0;
-      }
-      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
-      if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
-        return 0;
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (notify) {
-    ctx->current_crl = NULL;
-  }
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509 **pissuer,
-                      int *pscore, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) {
-  int crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
-  X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
-  X509_CRL *best_crl = NULL;
-  X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
-
-  for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
-    X509_CRL *crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
-    crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, crl, x);
-    if (crl_score < best_score || crl_score == 0) {
-      continue;
-    }
-    // If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer
-    if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) {
-      int day, sec;
-      if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(best_crl),
-                         X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0) {
-        continue;
-      }
-      // ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day|
-      // and |sec|.
-      if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0) {
-        continue;
-      }
-    }
-    best_crl = crl;
-    best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
-    best_score = crl_score;
-  }
-
-  if (best_crl) {
-    if (*pcrl) {
-      X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
-    }
-    *pcrl = best_crl;
-    *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
-    *pscore = best_score;
-    X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl);
-  }
-
-  if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID) {
-    return 1;
-  }
-
-  return 0;
-}
-
-// For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
-// 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
-// the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer.
-static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, X509_CRL *crl,
-                         X509 *x) {
-  int crl_score = 0;
-
-  // First see if we can reject CRL straight away
-
-  // Invalid IDP cannot be processed
-  if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-  // Reason codes and indirect CRLs are not supported.
-  if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-  // We do not support indirect CRLs, so the issuer names must match.
-  if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-  crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
-
-  if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
-    crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
-  }
-
-  // Check expiry
-  if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0)) {
-    crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
-  }
-
-  // Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer
-  if (!crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score)) {
-    // If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  // Check cert for matching CRL distribution points
-  if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score)) {
-    crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
-  }
-
-  return crl_score;
-}
-
-static int crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
-                          int *pcrl_score) {
-  X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
-  X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
-  int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
-
-  if ((size_t)cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1) {
-    cidx++;
-  }
-
-  crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
-
-  if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
-    *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
-    *pissuer = crl_issuer;
-    return 1;
-  }
-
-  for (cidx++; cidx < (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
-    crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
-    if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) {
-      continue;
-    }
-    if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
-      *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
-      *pissuer = crl_issuer;
-      return 1;
-    }
-  }
-
-  return 0;
-}
-
-// Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. 1.
-// Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. 2. One full, one
-// relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. 3. Both are full names and
-// compare two GENERAL_NAMES. 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
-static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b) {
-  X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
-  GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
-  GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
-  size_t i, j;
-  if (!a || !b) {
-    return 1;
-  }
-  if (a->type == 1) {
-    if (!a->dpname) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-    // Case 1: two X509_NAME
-    if (b->type == 1) {
-      if (!b->dpname) {
-        return 0;
-      }
-      if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname)) {
-        return 1;
-      } else {
-        return 0;
-      }
-    }
-    // Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately
-    nm = a->dpname;
-    gens = b->name.fullname;
-  } else if (b->type == 1) {
-    if (!b->dpname) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-    // Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately
-    gens = a->name.fullname;
-    nm = b->dpname;
-  }
-
-  // Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME
-  if (nm) {
-    for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
-      gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
-      if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME) {
-        continue;
-      }
-      if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName)) {
-        return 1;
-      }
-    }
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  // Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES
-
-  for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
-    gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
-    for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
-      genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
-      if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb)) {
-        return 1;
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  return 0;
-}
-
-// Check CRLDP and IDP
-static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score) {
-  if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-  if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
-    if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-  } else {
-    if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-  }
-  for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
-    DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
-    // Skip distribution points with a reasons field or a CRL issuer:
-    //
-    // We do not support CRLs partitioned by reason code. RFC 5280 requires CAs
-    // include at least one DistributionPoint that covers all reasons.
-    //
-    // We also do not support indirect CRLs, and a CRL issuer can only match
-    // indirect CRLs (RFC 5280, section 6.3.3, step b.1).
-    // support.
-    if (dp->reasons != NULL && dp->CRLissuer != NULL &&
-        (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint))) {
-      return 1;
-    }
-  }
-
-  // If the CRL does not specify an issuing distribution point, allow it to
-  // match anything.
-  //
-  // TODO(davidben): Does this match RFC 5280? It's hard to follow because RFC
-  // 5280 starts from distribution points, while this starts from CRLs.
-  return !crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint;
-}
-
-// Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate.
-static int get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509 *x) {
-  X509 *issuer = NULL;
-  int crl_score = 0;
-  X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
-  if (get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &issuer, &crl_score, ctx->crls)) {
-    goto done;
-  }
-
-  // Lookup CRLs from store
-  STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl =
-      X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls(ctx, X509_get_issuer_name(x));
-
-  // If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that
-  if (!skcrl && crl) {
-    goto done;
-  }
-
-  get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &issuer, &crl_score, skcrl);
-
-  sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
-
-done:
-
-  // If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success
-  if (crl) {
-    ctx->current_crl_issuer = issuer;
-    ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
-    *pcrl = crl;
-    return 1;
-  }
-
-  return 0;
-}
-
-// Check CRL validity
-static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) {
-  X509 *issuer = NULL;
-  int cnum = ctx->error_depth;
-  int chnum = (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
-  // If we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that. Otherwise, it is the
-  // issuer of the current certificate.
-  if (ctx->current_crl_issuer) {
-    issuer = ctx->current_crl_issuer;
-  } else if (cnum < chnum) {
-    issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
-  } else {
-    issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
-    // If not self signed, can't check signature
-    if (!x509_check_issued_with_callback(ctx, issuer, issuer)) {
-      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
-      if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
-        return 0;
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (issuer) {
-    // Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present
-    if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
-        !(issuer->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_CRL_SIGN)) {
-      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
-      if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
-        return 0;
-      }
-    }
-
-    if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) {
-      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
-      if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
-        return 0;
-      }
-    }
-
-    if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) {
-      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
-      if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
-        return 0;
-      }
-    }
-
-    if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) {
-      if (!check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1)) {
-        return 0;
-      }
-    }
-
-    // Attempt to get issuer certificate public key
-    EVP_PKEY *ikey = X509_get0_pubkey(issuer);
-    if (!ikey) {
-      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
-      if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
-        return 0;
-      }
-    } else {
-      // Verify CRL signature
-      if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) {
-        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
-        if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
-          return 0;
-        }
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-// Check certificate against CRL
-static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) {
-  // The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
-  // critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
-  // was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can
-  // change the meaning of CRL entries.
-  if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) &&
-      (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
-    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
-    if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-  }
-  // Look for serial number of certificate in CRL.
-  X509_REVOKED *rev;
-  if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
-    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
-    if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-  }
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
-  X509 *current_cert = NULL;
-  int ret = X509_policy_check(ctx->chain, ctx->param->policies,
-                              ctx->param->flags, &current_cert);
-  if (ret != X509_V_OK) {
-    ctx->current_cert = current_cert;
-    ctx->error = ret;
-    if (ret == X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-    return call_verify_cb(0, ctx);
-  }
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) {
-  if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME) {
-    return 1;
-  }
-
-  int64_t ptime;
-  if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) {
-    ptime = ctx->param->check_time;
-  } else {
-    ptime = time(NULL);
-  }
-
-  int i = X509_cmp_time_posix(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
-  if (i == 0) {
-    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
-    ctx->current_cert = x;
-    if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (i > 0) {
-    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
-    ctx->current_cert = x;
-    if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-  }
-
-  i = X509_cmp_time_posix(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
-  if (i == 0) {
-    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
-    ctx->current_cert = x;
-    if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (i < 0) {
-    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
-    ctx->current_cert = x;
-    if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-  }
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
-  // TODO(davidben): This logic is incredibly confusing. Rewrite this:
-  //
-  // First, don't allow the verify callback to suppress
-  // X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY, which will simplify the
-  // signature check. Then replace jumping into the middle of the loop. It's
-  // trying to ensure that all certificates see |check_cert_time|, then checking
-  // the root's self signature when requested, but not breaking partial chains
-  // in the process.
-  int n = (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
-  ctx->error_depth = n - 1;
-  n--;
-  X509 *xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
-  X509 *xs;
-  if (x509_check_issued_with_callback(ctx, xi, xi)) {
-    xs = xi;
-  } else {
-    if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
-      xs = xi;
-      goto check_cert;
-    }
-    if (n <= 0) {
-      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
-      ctx->current_cert = xi;
-      return call_verify_cb(0, ctx);
-    }
-    n--;
-    ctx->error_depth = n;
-    xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
-  }
-
-  //      ctx->error=0;  not needed
-  while (n >= 0) {
-    ctx->error_depth = n;
-
-    // Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
-    // explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
-    // time.
-    if (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)) {
-      EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(xi);
-      if (pkey == NULL) {
-        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
-        ctx->current_cert = xi;
-        if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
-          return 0;
-        }
-      } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
-        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
-        ctx->current_cert = xs;
-        if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
-          return 0;
-        }
-      }
-    }
-
-  check_cert:
-    if (!check_cert_time(ctx, xs)) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-
-    // The last error (if any) is still in the error value
-    ctx->current_cert = xs;
-    if (!call_verify_cb(1, ctx)) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-
-    n--;
-    if (n >= 0) {
-      xi = xs;
-      xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
-    }
-  }
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm) {
-  return X509_cmp_time_posix(ctm, time(NULL));
-}
-
-int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, const time_t *cmp_time) {
-  int64_t compare_time = (cmp_time == NULL) ? time(NULL) : *cmp_time;
-  return X509_cmp_time_posix(ctm, compare_time);
-}
-
-int X509_cmp_time_posix(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, int64_t cmp_time) {
-  int64_t ctm_time;
-  if (!ASN1_TIME_to_posix(ctm, &ctm_time)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-  // The return value 0 is reserved for errors.
-  return (ctm_time - cmp_time <= 0) ? -1 : 1;
-}
-
-ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec) {
-  return X509_time_adj(s, offset_sec, NULL);
-}
-
-ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, const time_t *in_tm) {
-  return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
-}
-
-ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s, int offset_day, long offset_sec,
-                            const time_t *in_tm) {
-  int64_t t = 0;
-
-  if (in_tm) {
-    t = *in_tm;
-  } else {
-    t = time(NULL);
-  }
-
-  return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
-}
-
-int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
-                                    CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused,
-                                    CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused,
-                                    CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
-  return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index_ex(&g_ex_data_class, argl, argp, free_func);
-}
-
-int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) {
-  return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
-}
-
-void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) {
-  return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
-}
-
-int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->error; }
-
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) {
-  ctx->error = err;
-}
-
-int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
-  return ctx->error_depth;
-}
-
-X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
-  return ctx->current_cert;
-}
-
-STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
-  return ctx->chain;
-}
-
-STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
-  return ctx->chain;
-}
-
-STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
-  if (!ctx->chain) {
-    return NULL;
-  }
-  return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
-}
-
-X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
-  return ctx->current_crl;
-}
-
-X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
-  // In OpenSSL, an |X509_STORE_CTX| sometimes has a parent context during CRL
-  // path validation for indirect CRLs. We require the CRL to be issued
-  // somewhere along the certificate path, so this is always NULL.
-  return NULL;
-}
-
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) {
-  ctx->untrusted = sk;
-}
-
-STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
-  return ctx->untrusted;
-}
-
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk) {
-  ctx->crls = sk;
-}
-
-int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) {
-  // If |purpose| is zero, this function historically silently did nothing.
-  if (purpose == 0) {
-    return 1;
-  }
-
-  const X509_PURPOSE *pobj = X509_PURPOSE_get0(purpose);
-  if (pobj == NULL) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  int trust = X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(pobj);
-  if (!X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(ctx, trust)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  if (ctx->param->purpose == 0) {
-    ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
-  }
-  return 1;
-}
-
-int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) {
-  // If |trust| is zero, this function historically silently did nothing.
-  if (trust == 0) {
-    return 1;
-  }
-
-  if (!X509_is_valid_trust_id(trust)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  if (ctx->param->trust == 0) {
-    ctx->param->trust = trust;
-  }
-  return 1;
-}
-
-X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) {
-  return OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
-}
-
-void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
-  if (ctx == NULL) {
-    return;
-  }
-  X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
-  OPENSSL_free(ctx);
-}
-
-int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
-                        STACK_OF(X509) *chain) {
-  X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
-
-  ctx->ctx = store;
-  ctx->cert = x509;
-  ctx->untrusted = chain;
-
-  CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data);
-
-  if (store == NULL) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
-  if (!ctx->param) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  // Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE.
-
-  ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
-
-  if (!X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param) ||
-      !X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
-                                 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"))) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  if (store->verify_cb) {
-    ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
-  } else {
-    ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
-  }
-
-  if (store->get_crl) {
-    ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
-  } else {
-    ctx->get_crl = get_crl;
-  }
-
-  if (store->check_crl) {
-    ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
-  } else {
-    ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
-  }
-
-  return 1;
-
-err:
-  CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &ctx->ex_data);
-  if (ctx->param != NULL) {
-    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
-  }
-
-  OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
-  return 0;
-}
-
-// Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
-// avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
-
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
-                                       STACK_OF(X509) *sk) {
-  ctx->trusted_stack = sk;
-}
-
-void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) {
-  X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(ctx, sk);
-}
-
-void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
-  CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
-  X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
-  sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
-  OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
-}
-
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) {
-  X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
-}
-
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) {
-  X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
-}
-
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time_posix(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
-                                   int64_t t) {
-  X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time_posix(ctx->param, t);
-}
-
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
-                             time_t t) {
-  X509_STORE_CTX_set_time_posix(ctx, flags, t);
-}
-
-X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->cert; }
-
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
-                                  int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) {
-  ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
-}
-
-int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name) {
-  const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
-  if (!param) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-  return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
-}
-
-X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
-  return ctx->param;
-}
-
-void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) {
-  if (ctx->param) {
-    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
-  }
-  ctx->param = param;
-}