grpc 1.64.3 → 1.71.0

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.cc

@@ -0,0 +1,1600 @@
+// Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/obj.h>
+#include <openssl/thread.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#include "../internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class =
+    CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT_WITH_APP_DATA;
+
+// CRL score values
+
+// No unhandled critical extensions
+#define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
+
+// certificate is within CRL scope
+#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
+
+// CRL times valid
+#define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
+
+// Issuer name matches certificate
+#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
+
+// If this score or above CRL is probably valid
+#define CRL_SCORE_VALID \
+  (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL | CRL_SCORE_TIME | CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
+
+// CRL issuer is certificate issuer
+#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
+
+// CRL issuer is on certificate path
+#define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
+
+// CRL issuer matches CRL AKID
+#define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
+
+static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
+static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
+static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+
+static X509 *get_trusted_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
+static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, X509_CRL *crl,
+                         X509 *x);
+static int get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509 *x);
+static int crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
+                          int *pcrl_score);
+static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score);
+static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl);
+static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
+
+static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+
+static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) { return ok; }
+
+// cert_self_signed checks if |x| is self-signed. If |x| is valid, it returns
+// one and sets |*out_is_self_signed| to the result. If |x| is invalid, it
+// returns zero.
+static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x, int *out_is_self_signed) {
+  if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  *out_is_self_signed = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) != 0;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int call_verify_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  ok = ctx->verify_cb(ok, ctx);
+  // Historically, callbacks returning values like -1 would be treated as a mix
+  // of success or failure. Insert that callers check correctly.
+  //
+  // TODO(davidben): Also use this wrapper to constrain which errors may be
+  // suppressed, and ensure all |verify_cb| calls remember to fill in an error.
+  BSSL_CHECK(ok == 0 || ok == 1);
+  return ok;
+}
+
+// Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store
+static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) {
+  STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
+  X509 *xtmp = NULL;
+  size_t i;
+  // Lookup all certs with matching subject name
+  certs = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
+  if (certs == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  // Look for exact match
+  for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
+    xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+    if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x)) {
+      break;
+    }
+  }
+  if (i < sk_X509_num(certs)) {
+    X509_up_ref(xtmp);
+  } else {
+    xtmp = NULL;
+  }
+  sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
+  return xtmp;
+}
+
+int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  X509 *chain_ss = NULL;
+  int bad_chain = 0;
+  X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
+  int i, ok = 0;
+  int j, retry, trust;
+  STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
+
+  {
+    if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
+      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
+      // This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
+      // cannot do another one.
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (ctx->param->flags &
+        (X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT | X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS)) {
+      // We do not support indirect or delta CRLs. The flags still exist for
+      // compatibility with bindings libraries, but to ensure we do not
+      // inadvertently skip a CRL check that the caller expects, fail closed.
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    // first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
+    // the first entry is in place
+    ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null();
+    if (ctx->chain == NULL || !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert)) {
+      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+      goto end;
+    }
+    X509_up_ref(ctx->cert);
+    ctx->last_untrusted = 1;
+
+    // We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it.
+    if (ctx->untrusted != NULL &&
+        (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
+      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+      goto end;
+    }
+
+    int num = (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+    X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
+    // |param->depth| does not include the leaf certificate or the trust anchor,
+    // so the maximum size is 2 more.
+    int max_chain = param->depth >= INT_MAX - 2 ? INT_MAX : param->depth + 2;
+
+    for (;;) {
+      if (num >= max_chain) {
+        // FIXME: If this happens, we should take note of it and, if
+        // appropriate, use the X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code later.
+        break;
+      }
+
+      int is_self_signed;
+      if (!cert_self_signed(x, &is_self_signed)) {
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
+        goto end;
+      }
+
+      // If we are self signed, we break
+      if (is_self_signed) {
+        break;
+      }
+      // If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first
+      if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) {
+        X509 *issuer = get_trusted_issuer(ctx, x);
+        if (issuer != NULL) {
+          // Free the certificate. It will be picked up again later.
+          X509_free(issuer);
+          break;
+        }
+      }
+
+      // If we were passed a cert chain, use it first
+      if (sktmp != NULL) {
+        X509 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
+        if (issuer != NULL) {
+          if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, issuer)) {
+            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+            goto end;
+          }
+          X509_up_ref(issuer);
+          (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, issuer);
+          ctx->last_untrusted++;
+          x = issuer;
+          num++;
+          // reparse the full chain for the next one
+          continue;
+        }
+      }
+      break;
+    }
+
+    // Remember how many untrusted certs we have
+    j = num;
+    // at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates.
+    // We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we
+    // complain.
+
+    do {
+      // Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed.
+      i = (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+      x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1);
+
+      int is_self_signed;
+      if (!cert_self_signed(x, &is_self_signed)) {
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
+        goto end;
+      }
+
+      if (is_self_signed) {
+        // we have a self signed certificate
+        if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) {
+          // We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can
+          // find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid
+          // possible impersonation.
+          X509 *issuer = get_trusted_issuer(ctx, x);
+          if (issuer == NULL || X509_cmp(x, issuer) != 0) {
+            X509_free(issuer);
+            ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
+            ctx->current_cert = x;
+            ctx->error_depth = i - 1;
+            bad_chain = 1;
+            if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
+              goto end;
+            }
+          } else {
+            // We have a match: replace certificate with store
+            // version so we get any trust settings.
+            X509_free(x);
+            x = issuer;
+            (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
+            ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
+          }
+        } else {
+          // extract and save self signed certificate for later use
+          chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
+          ctx->last_untrusted--;
+          num--;
+          j--;
+          x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
+        }
+      }
+      // We now lookup certs from the certificate store
+      for (;;) {
+        if (num >= max_chain) {
+          // FIXME: If this happens, we should take note of it and, if
+          // appropriate, use the X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code
+          // later.
+          break;
+        }
+        if (!cert_self_signed(x, &is_self_signed)) {
+          ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
+          goto end;
+        }
+        // If we are self signed, we break
+        if (is_self_signed) {
+          break;
+        }
+        X509 *issuer = get_trusted_issuer(ctx, x);
+        if (issuer == NULL) {
+          break;
+        }
+        x = issuer;
+        if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
+          X509_free(issuer);
+          ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+          goto end;
+        }
+        num++;
+      }
+
+      // we now have our chain, lets check it...
+      trust = check_trust(ctx);
+
+      // If explicitly rejected error
+      if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
+        goto end;
+      }
+      // If it's not explicitly trusted then check if there is an alternative
+      // chain that could be used. We only do this if we haven't already
+      // checked via TRUSTED_FIRST and the user hasn't switched off alternate
+      // chain checking
+      retry = 0;
+      if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED &&
+          !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) &&
+          !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) {
+        while (j-- > 1) {
+          X509 *issuer =
+              get_trusted_issuer(ctx, sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1));
+          // Check if we found an alternate chain
+          if (issuer != NULL) {
+            // Free up the found cert we'll add it again later
+            X509_free(issuer);
+
+            // Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an
+            // alternate chain
+            while (num > j) {
+              X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain));
+              num--;
+            }
+            ctx->last_untrusted = (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+            retry = 1;
+            break;
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    } while (retry);
+
+    // If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single
+    // self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already
+    // and set bad_chain == 1
+    if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) {
+      if (chain_ss == NULL ||
+          !x509_check_issued_with_callback(ctx, x, chain_ss)) {
+        if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num) {
+          ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
+        } else {
+          ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
+        }
+        ctx->current_cert = x;
+      } else {
+        if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss)) {
+          ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+          goto end;
+        }
+        num++;
+        ctx->last_untrusted = num;
+        ctx->current_cert = chain_ss;
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
+        chain_ss = NULL;
+      }
+
+      ctx->error_depth = num - 1;
+      bad_chain = 1;
+      if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
+        goto end;
+      }
+    }
+
+    // We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose
+    if (!check_chain_extensions(ctx) ||  //
+        !check_id(ctx) ||
+        // We check revocation status after copying parameters because they may
+        // be needed for CRL signature verification.
+        !check_revocation(ctx) ||  //
+        !internal_verify(ctx) ||   //
+        !check_name_constraints(ctx) ||
+        // TODO(davidben): Does |check_policy| still need to be conditioned on
+        // |!bad_chain|? DoS concerns have been resolved.
+        (!bad_chain && !check_policy(ctx))) {
+      goto end;
+    }
+
+    ok = 1;
+  }
+
+end:
+  sk_X509_free(sktmp);
+  X509_free(chain_ss);
+
+  // Safety net, error returns must set ctx->error
+  if (!ok && ctx->error == X509_V_OK) {
+    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
+  }
+  return ok;
+}
+
+// Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
+
+static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) {
+  size_t i;
+  X509 *issuer;
+  for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
+    issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
+    if (x509_check_issued_with_callback(ctx, x, issuer)) {
+      return issuer;
+    }
+  }
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+// Given a possible certificate and issuer check them
+
+int x509_check_issued_with_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x,
+                                    X509 *issuer) {
+  int ret;
+  ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
+  if (ret == X509_V_OK) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+  // If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx
+  if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  ctx->error = ret;
+  ctx->current_cert = x;
+  return call_verify_cb(0, ctx);
+}
+
+static X509 *get_trusted_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) {
+  X509 *issuer;
+  if (ctx->trusted_stack != NULL) {
+    // Ignore the store and use the configured stack instead.
+    issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->trusted_stack, x);
+    if (issuer != NULL) {
+      X509_up_ref(issuer);
+    }
+    return issuer;
+  }
+
+  if (!X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer(&issuer, ctx, x)) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  return issuer;
+}
+
+// Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
+// purpose
+
+static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  int plen = 0;
+  int purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
+
+  // Check all untrusted certificates
+  for (int i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) {
+    X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+    if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) &&
+        (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
+      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
+      ctx->error_depth = i;
+      ctx->current_cert = x;
+      if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+    }
+
+    int must_be_ca = i > 0;
+    if (must_be_ca && !X509_check_ca(x)) {
+      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
+      ctx->error_depth = i;
+      ctx->current_cert = x;
+      if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+    }
+    if (ctx->param->purpose > 0 &&
+        X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca) != 1) {
+      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
+      ctx->error_depth = i;
+      ctx->current_cert = x;
+      if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+    }
+    // Check pathlen if not self issued
+    if (i > 1 && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) && x->ex_pathlen != -1 &&
+        plen > x->ex_pathlen + 1) {
+      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
+      ctx->error_depth = i;
+      ctx->current_cert = x;
+      if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+    }
+    // Increment path length if not self issued
+    if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) {
+      plen++;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int reject_dns_name_in_common_name(X509 *x509) {
+  const X509_NAME *name = X509_get_subject_name(x509);
+  int i = -1;
+  for (;;) {
+    i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, NID_commonName, i);
+    if (i == -1) {
+      return X509_V_OK;
+    }
+
+    const X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i);
+    const ASN1_STRING *common_name = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(entry);
+    unsigned char *idval;
+    int idlen = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&idval, common_name);
+    if (idlen < 0) {
+      return X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
+    }
+    // Only process attributes that look like host names. Note it is
+    // important that this check be mirrored in |X509_check_host|.
+    int looks_like_dns = x509v3_looks_like_dns_name(idval, (size_t)idlen);
+    OPENSSL_free(idval);
+    if (looks_like_dns) {
+      return X509_V_ERR_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_WITHOUT_SANS;
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  int i, j, rv;
+  int has_name_constraints = 0;
+  // Check name constraints for all certificates
+  for (i = (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+    X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+    // Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain
+    if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    // Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
+    // including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
+    // but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
+    // to be obeyed.
+    for (j = (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
+      NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
+      if (nc) {
+        has_name_constraints = 1;
+        rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
+        switch (rv) {
+          case X509_V_OK:
+            continue;
+          case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
+            ctx->error = rv;
+            return 0;
+          default:
+            ctx->error = rv;
+            ctx->error_depth = i;
+            ctx->current_cert = x;
+            if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
+              return 0;
+            }
+            break;
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Name constraints do not match against the common name, but
+  // |X509_check_host| still implements the legacy behavior where, on
+  // certificates lacking a SAN list, DNS-like names in the common name are
+  // checked instead.
+  //
+  // While we could apply the name constraints to the common name, name
+  // constraints are rare enough that can hold such certificates to a higher
+  // standard. Note this does not make "DNS-like" heuristic failures any
+  // worse. A decorative common-name misidentified as a DNS name would fail
+  // the name constraint anyway.
+  X509 *leaf = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
+  if (has_name_constraints && leaf->altname == NULL) {
+    rv = reject_dns_name_in_common_name(leaf);
+    switch (rv) {
+      case X509_V_OK:
+        break;
+      case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
+        ctx->error = rv;
+        return 0;
+      default:
+        ctx->error = rv;
+        ctx->error_depth = i;
+        ctx->current_cert = leaf;
+        if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
+          return 0;
+        }
+        break;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode) {
+  ctx->error = errcode;
+  ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
+  ctx->error_depth = 0;
+  return call_verify_cb(0, ctx);
+}
+
+static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) {
+  size_t i;
+  size_t n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(param->hosts);
+  char *name;
+
+  for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
+    name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(param->hosts, i);
+    if (X509_check_host(x, name, strlen(name), param->hostflags, NULL) > 0) {
+      return 1;
+    }
+  }
+  return n == 0;
+}
+
+static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
+  X509 *x = ctx->cert;
+  if (vpm->poison) {
+    if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+  if (vpm->hosts && check_hosts(x, vpm) <= 0) {
+    if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+  if (vpm->email && X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
+    if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+  if (vpm->ip && X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
+    if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  X509 *x = NULL;
+  // Check all trusted certificates in chain
+  for (size_t i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
+    x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+    int trust = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
+    // If explicitly trusted return trusted
+    if (trust == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) {
+      return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+    }
+    // If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not
+    // overridden.
+    if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
+      ctx->error_depth = (int)i;
+      ctx->current_cert = x;
+      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
+      if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
+        return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  // If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate
+  // return success.
+  if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
+    X509 *mx;
+    if (ctx->last_untrusted < (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain)) {
+      return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+    }
+    x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
+    mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
+    if (mx) {
+      (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
+      X509_free(x);
+      ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
+      return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
+  // standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
+  return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
+}
+
+static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+  int last;
+  if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) {
+    last = (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
+  } else {
+    last = 0;
+  }
+  for (int i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
+    ctx->error_depth = i;
+    if (!check_cert(ctx)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
+  int ok = 0, cnum = ctx->error_depth;
+  X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
+  ctx->current_cert = x;
+  ctx->current_crl_issuer = NULL;
+  ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
+
+  // Try to retrieve the relevant CRL. Note that |get_crl| sets
+  // |current_crl_issuer| and |current_crl_score|, which |check_crl| then reads.
+  //
+  // TODO(davidben): The awkward internal calling convention is a historical
+  // artifact of when these functions were user-overridable callbacks, even
+  // though there was no way to set them correctly. These callbacks have since
+  // been removed, so we can pass input and output parameters more directly.
+  if (!get_crl(ctx, &crl, x)) {
+    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
+    ok = call_verify_cb(0, ctx);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ctx->current_crl = crl;
+  if (!check_crl(ctx, crl) ||  //
+      !cert_crl(ctx, crl, x)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ok = 1;
+
+err:
+  X509_CRL_free(crl);
+  ctx->current_crl = NULL;
+  return ok;
+}
+
+// Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX
+static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify) {
+  if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  if (notify) {
+    ctx->current_crl = crl;
+  }
+  int64_t ptime;
+  if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) {
+    ptime = ctx->param->check_time;
+  } else {
+    ptime = time(NULL);
+  }
+
+  int i = X509_cmp_time_posix(X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
+  if (i == 0) {
+    if (!notify) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
+    if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (i > 0) {
+    if (!notify) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
+    if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl)) {
+    i = X509_cmp_time_posix(X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
+
+    if (i == 0) {
+      if (!notify) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
+      if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+    }
+    if (i < 0) {
+      if (!notify) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
+      if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (notify) {
+    ctx->current_crl = NULL;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509 **pissuer,
+                      int *pscore, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) {
+  int crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
+  X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
+  X509_CRL *best_crl = NULL;
+  X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
+
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
+    X509_CRL *crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
+    crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, crl, x);
+    if (crl_score < best_score || crl_score == 0) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    // If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer
+    if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) {
+      int day, sec;
+      if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(best_crl),
+                         X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      // ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day|
+      // and |sec|.
+      if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0) {
+        continue;
+      }
+    }
+    best_crl = crl;
+    best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
+    best_score = crl_score;
+  }
+
+  if (best_crl) {
+    if (*pcrl) {
+      X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
+    }
+    *pcrl = best_crl;
+    *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
+    *pscore = best_score;
+    X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl);
+  }
+
+  if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+// For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
+// 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
+// the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer.
+static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, X509_CRL *crl,
+                         X509 *x) {
+  int crl_score = 0;
+
+  // First see if we can reject CRL straight away
+
+  // Invalid IDP cannot be processed
+  if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  // Reason codes and indirect CRLs are not supported.
+  if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  // We do not support indirect CRLs, so the issuer names must match.
+  if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
+
+  if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
+    crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
+  }
+
+  // Check expiry
+  if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0)) {
+    crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
+  }
+
+  // Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer
+  if (!crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score)) {
+    // If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Check cert for matching CRL distribution points
+  if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score)) {
+    crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
+  }
+
+  return crl_score;
+}
+
+static int crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
+                          int *pcrl_score) {
+  X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
+  X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
+  int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
+
+  if ((size_t)cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1) {
+    cidx++;
+  }
+
+  crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
+
+  if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
+    *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
+    *pissuer = crl_issuer;
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  for (cidx++; cidx < (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
+    crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
+    if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
+      *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
+      *pissuer = crl_issuer;
+      return 1;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+// Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. 1.
+// Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. 2. One full, one
+// relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. 3. Both are full names and
+// compare two GENERAL_NAMES. 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
+static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b) {
+  X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
+  GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
+  GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
+  size_t i, j;
+  if (!a || !b) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+  if (a->type == 1) {
+    if (!a->dpname) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    // Case 1: two X509_NAME
+    if (b->type == 1) {
+      if (!b->dpname) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+      if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname)) {
+        return 1;
+      } else {
+        return 0;
+      }
+    }
+    // Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately
+    nm = a->dpname;
+    gens = b->name.fullname;
+  } else if (b->type == 1) {
+    if (!b->dpname) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    // Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately
+    gens = a->name.fullname;
+    nm = b->dpname;
+  }
+
+  // Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME
+  if (nm) {
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
+      gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
+      if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName)) {
+        return 1;
+      }
+    }
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES
+
+  for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
+    gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
+    for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
+      genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
+      if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb)) {
+        return 1;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+// Check CRLDP and IDP
+static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score) {
+  if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
+    if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  } else {
+    if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
+    DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
+    // Skip distribution points with a reasons field or a CRL issuer:
+    //
+    // We do not support CRLs partitioned by reason code. RFC 5280 requires CAs
+    // include at least one DistributionPoint that covers all reasons.
+    //
+    // We also do not support indirect CRLs, and a CRL issuer can only match
+    // indirect CRLs (RFC 5280, section 6.3.3, step b.1).
+    // support.
+    if (dp->reasons != NULL && dp->CRLissuer != NULL &&
+        (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint))) {
+      return 1;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // If the CRL does not specify an issuing distribution point, allow it to
+  // match anything.
+  //
+  // TODO(davidben): Does this match RFC 5280? It's hard to follow because RFC
+  // 5280 starts from distribution points, while this starts from CRLs.
+  return !crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint;
+}
+
+// Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate.
+static int get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509 *x) {
+  X509 *issuer = NULL;
+  int crl_score = 0;
+  X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
+  STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl = NULL;
+  if (get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &issuer, &crl_score, ctx->crls)) {
+    goto done;
+  }
+
+  // Lookup CRLs from store
+  skcrl = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls(ctx, X509_get_issuer_name(x));
+
+  // If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that
+  if (!skcrl && crl) {
+    goto done;
+  }
+
+  get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &issuer, &crl_score, skcrl);
+
+  sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
+
+done:
+  // If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success
+  if (crl) {
+    ctx->current_crl_issuer = issuer;
+    ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
+    *pcrl = crl;
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+// Check CRL validity
+static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) {
+  X509 *issuer = NULL;
+  int cnum = ctx->error_depth;
+  int chnum = (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
+  // If we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that. Otherwise, it is the
+  // issuer of the current certificate.
+  if (ctx->current_crl_issuer) {
+    issuer = ctx->current_crl_issuer;
+  } else if (cnum < chnum) {
+    issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
+  } else {
+    issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
+    // If not self signed, can't check signature
+    if (!x509_check_issued_with_callback(ctx, issuer, issuer)) {
+      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
+      if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (issuer) {
+    // Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present
+    if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
+        !(issuer->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_CRL_SIGN)) {
+      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
+      if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) {
+      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
+      if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) {
+      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
+      if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) {
+      if (!check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1)) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+    }
+
+    // Attempt to get issuer certificate public key
+    EVP_PKEY *ikey = X509_get0_pubkey(issuer);
+    if (!ikey) {
+      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
+      if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+    } else {
+      // Verify CRL signature
+      if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) {
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
+        if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
+          return 0;
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+// Check certificate against CRL
+static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) {
+  // The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
+  // critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
+  // was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can
+  // change the meaning of CRL entries.
+  if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) &&
+      (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
+    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
+    if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+  // Look for serial number of certificate in CRL.
+  X509_REVOKED *rev;
+  if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
+    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
+    if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  X509 *current_cert = NULL;
+  int ret = X509_policy_check(ctx->chain, ctx->param->policies,
+                              ctx->param->flags, &current_cert);
+  if (ret != X509_V_OK) {
+    ctx->current_cert = current_cert;
+    ctx->error = ret;
+    if (ret == X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+    return call_verify_cb(0, ctx);
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) {
+  if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  int64_t ptime;
+  if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) {
+    ptime = ctx->param->check_time;
+  } else {
+    ptime = time(NULL);
+  }
+
+  int i = X509_cmp_time_posix(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
+  if (i == 0) {
+    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
+    ctx->current_cert = x;
+    if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (i > 0) {
+    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
+    ctx->current_cert = x;
+    if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  i = X509_cmp_time_posix(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
+  if (i == 0) {
+    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
+    ctx->current_cert = x;
+    if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (i < 0) {
+    ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
+    ctx->current_cert = x;
+    if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  // TODO(davidben): This logic is incredibly confusing. Rewrite this:
+  //
+  // First, don't allow the verify callback to suppress
+  // X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY, which will simplify the
+  // signature check. Then replace jumping into the middle of the loop. It's
+  // trying to ensure that all certificates see |check_cert_time|, then checking
+  // the root's self signature when requested, but not breaking partial chains
+  // in the process.
+  int n = (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+  ctx->error_depth = n - 1;
+  n--;
+  X509 *xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
+  X509 *xs;
+  if (x509_check_issued_with_callback(ctx, xi, xi)) {
+    xs = xi;
+  } else {
+    if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
+      xs = xi;
+      goto check_cert;
+    }
+    if (n <= 0) {
+      ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
+      ctx->current_cert = xi;
+      return call_verify_cb(0, ctx);
+    }
+    n--;
+    ctx->error_depth = n;
+    xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
+  }
+
+  //      ctx->error=0;  not needed
+  while (n >= 0) {
+    ctx->error_depth = n;
+
+    // Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
+    // explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
+    // time.
+    if (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)) {
+      EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(xi);
+      if (pkey == NULL) {
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
+        ctx->current_cert = xi;
+        if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
+          return 0;
+        }
+      } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
+        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
+        ctx->current_cert = xs;
+        if (!call_verify_cb(0, ctx)) {
+          return 0;
+        }
+      }
+    }
+
+  check_cert:
+    if (!check_cert_time(ctx, xs)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    // The last error (if any) is still in the error value
+    ctx->current_cert = xs;
+    if (!call_verify_cb(1, ctx)) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    n--;
+    if (n >= 0) {
+      xi = xs;
+      xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
+    }
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm) {
+  return X509_cmp_time_posix(ctm, time(NULL));
+}
+
+int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, const time_t *cmp_time) {
+  int64_t compare_time = (cmp_time == NULL) ? time(NULL) : *cmp_time;
+  return X509_cmp_time_posix(ctm, compare_time);
+}
+
+int X509_cmp_time_posix(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, int64_t cmp_time) {
+  int64_t ctm_time;
+  if (!ASN1_TIME_to_posix(ctm, &ctm_time)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  // The return value 0 is reserved for errors.
+  return (ctm_time - cmp_time <= 0) ? -1 : 1;
+}
+
+ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec) {
+  return X509_time_adj(s, offset_sec, NULL);
+}
+
+ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, const time_t *in_tm) {
+  return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
+}
+
+ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s, int offset_day, long offset_sec,
+                            const time_t *in_tm) {
+  int64_t t = 0;
+
+  if (in_tm) {
+    t = *in_tm;
+  } else {
+    t = time(NULL);
+  }
+
+  return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
+                                    CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused,
+                                    CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused,
+                                    CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
+  return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index_ex(&g_ex_data_class, argl, argp, free_func);
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) {
+  return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
+}
+
+void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) {
+  return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->error; }
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) {
+  ctx->error = err;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  return ctx->error_depth;
+}
+
+X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  return ctx->current_cert;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  return ctx->chain;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  return ctx->chain;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  if (!ctx->chain) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
+}
+
+X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  return ctx->current_crl;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  // In OpenSSL, an |X509_STORE_CTX| sometimes has a parent context during CRL
+  // path validation for indirect CRLs. We require the CRL to be issued
+  // somewhere along the certificate path, so this is always NULL.
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) {
+  ctx->untrusted = sk;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  return ctx->untrusted;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk) {
+  ctx->crls = sk;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) {
+  // If |purpose| is zero, this function historically silently did nothing.
+  if (purpose == 0) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  const X509_PURPOSE *pobj = X509_PURPOSE_get0(purpose);
+  if (pobj == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  int trust = X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(pobj);
+  if (!X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(ctx, trust)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (ctx->param->purpose == 0) {
+    ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) {
+  // If |trust| is zero, this function historically silently did nothing.
+  if (trust == 0) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  if (!X509_is_valid_trust_id(trust)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (ctx->param->trust == 0) {
+    ctx->param->trust = trust;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) {
+  return reinterpret_cast<X509_STORE_CTX *>(
+      OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)));
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  if (ctx == NULL) {
+    return;
+  }
+  X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+  OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
+                        STACK_OF(X509) *chain) {
+  X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+
+  ctx->ctx = store;
+  ctx->cert = x509;
+  ctx->untrusted = chain;
+
+  CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data);
+
+  if (store == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
+  if (!ctx->param) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  // Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE.
+
+  ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
+
+  if (!X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param) ||
+      !X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
+                                 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"))) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (store->verify_cb) {
+    ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
+  } else {
+    ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+
+err:
+  CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &ctx->ex_data);
+  if (ctx->param != NULL) {
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
+  }
+
+  OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
+  return 0;
+}
+
+// Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
+// avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+                                       STACK_OF(X509) *sk) {
+  ctx->trusted_stack = sk;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) {
+  X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(ctx, sk);
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
+  X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
+  sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
+  OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) {
+  X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) {
+  X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time_posix(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
+                                   int64_t t) {
+  X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time_posix(ctx->param, t);
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
+                             time_t t) {
+  X509_STORE_CTX_set_time_posix(ctx, flags, t);
+}
+
+X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->cert; }
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+                                  int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) {
+  ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
+}
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name) {
+  const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
+  if (!param) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
+}
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) {
+  return ctx->param;
+}
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) {
+  if (ctx->param) {
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
+  }
+  ctx->param = param;
+}