grpc 1.40.0 → 1.43.1

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/handshake_client.cc

@@ -333,8 +333,7 @@ bool ssl_add_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
       !ssl_write_client_hello_without_extensions(hs, &body, type,
                                                  /*empty_session_id*/ false) ||
       !ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(hs, &body, /*out_encoded=*/nullptr,
-                                  &needs_psk_binder, type, CBB_len(&body),
-                                  /*omit_ech_len=*/0) ||
+                                  &needs_psk_binder, type, CBB_len(&body)) ||
       !ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &msg)) {
     return false;
   }
@@ -354,42 +353,31 @@ bool ssl_add_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
   return ssl->method->add_message(ssl, std::move(msg));
 }
 
-static bool parse_supported_versions(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint16_t *version,
-                                     const CBS *in) {
-  // If the outer version is not TLS 1.2, or there is no extensions block, use
-  // the outer version.
-  if (*version != TLS1_2_VERSION || CBS_len(in) == 0) {
+static bool parse_server_version(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint16_t *out_version,
+                                 uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                 const ParsedServerHello &server_hello) {
+  // If the outer version is not TLS 1.2, use it.
+  // TODO(davidben): This function doesn't quite match the RFC8446 formulation.
+  if (server_hello.legacy_version != TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+    *out_version = server_hello.legacy_version;
     return true;
   }
 
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  CBS copy = *in, extensions;
-  if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&copy, &extensions) ||
-      CBS_len(&copy) != 0) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+  SSLExtension supported_versions(TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions);
+  CBS extensions = server_hello.extensions;
+  if (!ssl_parse_extensions(&extensions, out_alert, {&supported_versions},
+                            /*ignore_unknown=*/true)) {
     return false;
   }
 
-  bool have_supported_versions;
-  CBS supported_versions;
-  const SSL_EXTENSION_TYPE ext_types[] = {
-    {TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions, &have_supported_versions,
-     &supported_versions},
-  };
-
-  uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-  if (!ssl_parse_extensions(&extensions, &alert, ext_types,
-                            /*ignore_unknown=*/true)) {
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
-    return false;
+  if (!supported_versions.present) {
+    *out_version = server_hello.legacy_version;
+    return true;
   }
 
-  // Override the outer version with the extension, if present.
-  if (have_supported_versions &&
-      (!CBS_get_u16(&supported_versions, version) ||
-       CBS_len(&supported_versions) != 0)) {
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+  if (!CBS_get_u16(&supported_versions.data, out_version) ||
+       CBS_len(&supported_versions.data) != 0) {
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
     return false;
   }
 
@@ -445,7 +433,7 @@ static ssl_early_data_reason_t should_offer_early_data(
 }
 
 void ssl_done_writing_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  hs->ech_client_bytes.Reset();
+  hs->ech_client_outer.Reset();
   hs->cookie.Reset();
   hs->key_share_bytes.Reset();
 }
@@ -657,6 +645,38 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_hello_verify_request(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
   return ssl_hs_flush;
 }
 
+bool ssl_parse_server_hello(ParsedServerHello *out, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                            const SSLMessage &msg) {
+  if (msg.type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+    return false;
+  }
+  out->raw = msg.raw;
+  CBS body = msg.body;
+  if (!CBS_get_u16(&body, &out->legacy_version) ||
+      !CBS_get_bytes(&body, &out->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
+      !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &out->session_id) ||
+      CBS_len(&out->session_id) > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE ||
+      !CBS_get_u16(&body, &out->cipher_suite) ||
+      !CBS_get_u8(&body, &out->compression_method)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    return false;
+  }
+  // In TLS 1.2 and below, empty extensions blocks may be omitted. In TLS 1.3,
+  // ServerHellos always have extensions, so this can be applied generically.
+  CBS_init(&out->extensions, nullptr, 0);
+  if ((CBS_len(&body) != 0 &&
+       !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &out->extensions)) ||
+      CBS_len(&body) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+    *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+    return false;
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
 static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
   SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
   SSLMessage msg;
@@ -664,26 +684,12 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
     return ssl_hs_read_server_hello;
   }
 
-  if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO)) {
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  CBS server_hello = msg.body, server_random, session_id;
-  uint16_t server_version, cipher_suite;
-  uint8_t compression_method;
-  if (!CBS_get_u16(&server_hello, &server_version) ||
-      !CBS_get_bytes(&server_hello, &server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ||
-      !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&server_hello, &session_id) ||
-      CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE ||
-      !CBS_get_u16(&server_hello, &cipher_suite) ||
-      !CBS_get_u8(&server_hello, &compression_method)) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
-  // Use the supported_versions extension if applicable.
-  if (!parse_supported_versions(hs, &server_version, &server_hello)) {
+  ParsedServerHello server_hello;
+  uint16_t server_version;
+  uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+  if (!ssl_parse_server_hello(&server_hello, &alert, msg) ||
+      !parse_server_version(hs, &server_version, &alert, server_hello)) {
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
     return ssl_hs_error;
   }
 
@@ -731,17 +737,13 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
     return ssl_hs_error;
   }
 
-  // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/275): If the server negotiates TLS 1.2 and
-  // we offer ECH, we handshake with ClientHelloOuter instead of
-  // ClientHelloInner. That path is not yet implemented. For now, terminate the
-  // handshake with a distinguishable error for testing.
+  // TLS 1.2 handshakes cannot accept ECH.
   if (hs->selected_ech_config) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CONNECTION_REJECTED);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
+    ssl->s3->ech_status = ssl_ech_rejected;
   }
 
   // Copy over the server random.
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->server_random, CBS_data(&server_random),
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(ssl->s3->server_random, CBS_data(&server_hello.random),
                  SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
 
   // Enforce the TLS 1.3 anti-downgrade feature.
@@ -764,64 +766,44 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
     }
   }
 
-  if (hs->session_id_len != 0 &&
-      CBS_mem_equal(&session_id, hs->session_id, hs->session_id_len)) {
-    // Echoing the ClientHello session ID in TLS 1.2, whether from the session
-    // or a synthetic one, indicates resumption. If there was no session, this
-    // was the TLS 1.3 compatibility mode session ID. As we know this is not a
-    // session the server knows about, any server resuming it is in error.
-    // Reject the first connection deterministicly, rather than installing an
-    // invalid session into the session cache. https://crbug.com/796910
-    if (ssl->session == nullptr) {
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SERVER_ECHOED_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-    // We never offer sessions on renegotiation.
-    assert(!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete);
-    ssl->s3->session_reused = true;
-    // Note |ssl->session| may be a TLS 1.3 session, offered in a separate
-    // extension altogether. In that case, the version check below will fail the
-    // connection.
-  } else {
-    // The session wasn't resumed. Create a fresh SSL_SESSION to fill out.
-    ssl_set_session(ssl, NULL);
-    if (!ssl_get_new_session(hs)) {
-      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-      return ssl_hs_error;
-    }
-    // Note: session_id could be empty.
-    hs->new_session->session_id_length = CBS_len(&session_id);
-    OPENSSL_memcpy(hs->new_session->session_id, CBS_data(&session_id),
-                   CBS_len(&session_id));
-  }
-
-  const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite);
-  if (cipher == NULL) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
   // The cipher must be allowed in the selected version and enabled.
+  const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(server_hello.cipher_suite);
   uint32_t mask_a, mask_k;
   ssl_get_client_disabled(hs, &mask_a, &mask_k);
-  if ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & mask_k) || (cipher->algorithm_auth & mask_a) ||
+  if (cipher == nullptr ||
+      (cipher->algorithm_mkey & mask_k) ||
+      (cipher->algorithm_auth & mask_a) ||
       SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(cipher) > ssl_protocol_version(ssl) ||
       SSL_CIPHER_get_max_version(cipher) < ssl_protocol_version(ssl) ||
-      !sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(ssl), NULL, cipher)) {
+      !sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(ssl), nullptr, cipher)) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
     ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
     return ssl_hs_error;
   }
 
-  if (ssl->session != NULL) {
+  hs->new_cipher = cipher;
+
+  if (hs->session_id_len != 0 &&
+      CBS_mem_equal(&server_hello.session_id, hs->session_id,
+                    hs->session_id_len)) {
+    // Echoing the ClientHello session ID in TLS 1.2, whether from the session
+    // or a synthetic one, indicates resumption. If there was no session (or if
+    // the session was only offered in ECH ClientHelloInner), this was the
+    // TLS 1.3 compatibility mode session ID. As we know this is not a session
+    // the server knows about, any server resuming it is in error. Reject the
+    // first connection deterministicly, rather than installing an invalid
+    // session into the session cache. https://crbug.com/796910
+    if (ssl->session == nullptr || ssl->s3->ech_status == ssl_ech_rejected) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SERVER_ECHOED_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
     if (ssl->session->ssl_version != ssl->version) {
       OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_VERSION_NOT_RETURNED);
       ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
       return ssl_hs_error;
     }
-    if (ssl->session->cipher != cipher) {
+    if (ssl->session->cipher != hs->new_cipher) {
       OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
       ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
       return ssl_hs_error;
@@ -833,10 +815,23 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
       ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
       return ssl_hs_error;
     }
+    // We never offer sessions on renegotiation.
+    assert(!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete);
+    ssl->s3->session_reused = true;
   } else {
-    hs->new_session->cipher = cipher;
+    // The session wasn't resumed. Create a fresh SSL_SESSION to fill out.
+    ssl_set_session(ssl, NULL);
+    if (!ssl_get_new_session(hs)) {
+      ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+      return ssl_hs_error;
+    }
+    // Note: session_id could be empty.
+    hs->new_session->session_id_length = CBS_len(&server_hello.session_id);
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(hs->new_session->session_id,
+                   CBS_data(&server_hello.session_id),
+                   CBS_len(&server_hello.session_id));
+    hs->new_session->cipher = hs->new_cipher;
   }
-  hs->new_cipher = cipher;
 
   // Now that the cipher is known, initialize the handshake hash and hash the
   // ServerHello.
@@ -855,26 +850,17 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
   }
 
   // Only the NULL compression algorithm is supported.
-  if (compression_method != 0) {
+  if (server_hello.compression_method != 0) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
     ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
     return ssl_hs_error;
   }
 
-  // TLS extensions
-  if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(hs, &server_hello)) {
+  if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(hs, &server_hello.extensions)) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
     return ssl_hs_error;
   }
 
-  // There should be nothing left over in the record.
-  if (CBS_len(&server_hello) != 0) {
-    // wrong packet length
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
-    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
-    return ssl_hs_error;
-  }
-
   if (ssl->session != NULL &&
       hs->extended_master_secret != ssl->session->extended_master_secret) {
     if (ssl->session->extended_master_secret) {
@@ -1334,8 +1320,12 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_client_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
     return ssl_hs_ok;
   }
 
-  // Call cert_cb to update the certificate.
-  if (hs->config->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
+  if (ssl->s3->ech_status == ssl_ech_rejected) {
+    // Do not send client certificates on ECH reject. We have not authenticated
+    // the server for the name that can learn the certificate.
+    SSL_certs_clear(ssl);
+  } else if (hs->config->cert->cert_cb != nullptr) {
+    // Call cert_cb to update the certificate.
     int rv = hs->config->cert->cert_cb(ssl, hs->config->cert->cert_cb_arg);
     if (rv == 0) {
       ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
@@ -1642,7 +1632,7 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_client_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
 }
 
 static bool can_false_start(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  const SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
 
   // False Start bypasses the Finished check's downgrade protection. This can
   // enable attacks where we send data under weaker settings than supported
@@ -1660,6 +1650,13 @@ static bool can_false_start(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
     return false;
   }
 
+  // If ECH was rejected, disable False Start. We run the handshake to
+  // completion, including the Finished downgrade check, to authenticate the
+  // recovery flow.
+  if (ssl->s3->ech_status == ssl_ech_rejected) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
   // Additionally require ALPN or NPN by default.
   //
   // TODO(davidben): Can this constraint be relaxed globally now that cipher
@@ -1739,39 +1736,30 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_session_ticket(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
     return ssl_hs_read_change_cipher_spec;
   }
 
-  SSL_SESSION *session = hs->new_session.get();
-  UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> renewed_session;
-  if (ssl->session != NULL) {
+  if (ssl->session != nullptr) {
     // The server is sending a new ticket for an existing session. Sessions are
     // immutable once established, so duplicate all but the ticket of the
     // existing session.
-    renewed_session =
+    assert(!hs->new_session);
+    hs->new_session =
         SSL_SESSION_dup(ssl->session.get(), SSL_SESSION_INCLUDE_NONAUTH);
-    if (!renewed_session) {
-      // This should never happen.
-      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    if (!hs->new_session) {
       return ssl_hs_error;
     }
-    session = renewed_session.get();
   }
 
   // |ticket_lifetime_hint| is measured from when the ticket was issued.
-  ssl_session_rebase_time(ssl, session);
+  ssl_session_rebase_time(ssl, hs->new_session.get());
 
-  if (!session->ticket.CopyFrom(ticket)) {
+  if (!hs->new_session->ticket.CopyFrom(ticket)) {
     return ssl_hs_error;
   }
-  session->ticket_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
+  hs->new_session->ticket_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
 
   // Historically, OpenSSL filled in fake session IDs for ticket-based sessions.
   // TODO(davidben): Are external callers relying on this? Try removing this.
-  SHA256(CBS_data(&ticket), CBS_len(&ticket), session->session_id);
-  session->session_id_length = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
-
-  if (renewed_session) {
-    session->not_resumable = false;
-    ssl->session = std::move(renewed_session);
-  }
+  SHA256(CBS_data(&ticket), CBS_len(&ticket), hs->new_session->session_id);
+  hs->new_session->session_id_length = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
 
   ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
   hs->state = state_process_change_cipher_spec;
@@ -1805,15 +1793,25 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_server_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
 
 static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_finish_client_handshake(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
   SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+  if (ssl->s3->ech_status == ssl_ech_rejected) {
+    // Release the retry configs.
+    hs->ech_authenticated_reject = true;
+    ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ECH_REQUIRED);
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ECH_REJECTED);
+    return ssl_hs_error;
+  }
 
   ssl->method->on_handshake_complete(ssl);
 
-  if (ssl->session != NULL) {
-    ssl->s3->established_session = UpRef(ssl->session);
-  } else {
-    // We make a copy of the session in order to maintain the immutability
-    // of the new established_session due to False Start. The caller may
-    // have taken a reference to the temporary session.
+  // Note TLS 1.2 resumptions with ticket renewal have both |ssl->session| (the
+  // resumed session) and |hs->new_session| (the session with the new ticket).
+  bool has_new_session = hs->new_session != nullptr;
+  if (has_new_session) {
+    // When False Start is enabled, the handshake reports completion early. The
+    // caller may then have passed the (then unresuable) |hs->new_session| to
+    // another thread via |SSL_get0_session| for resumption. To avoid potential
+    // race conditions in such callers, we duplicate the session before
+    // clearing |not_resumable|.
     ssl->s3->established_session =
         SSL_SESSION_dup(hs->new_session.get(), SSL_SESSION_DUP_ALL);
     if (!ssl->s3->established_session) {
@@ -1825,11 +1823,16 @@ static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_finish_client_handshake(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
     }
 
     hs->new_session.reset();
+  } else {
+    assert(ssl->session != nullptr);
+    ssl->s3->established_session = UpRef(ssl->session);
   }
 
   hs->handshake_finalized = true;
   ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete = true;
-  ssl_update_cache(hs, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
+  if (has_new_session) {
+    ssl_update_cache(ssl);
+  }
 
   hs->state = state_done;
   return ssl_hs_ok;