grpc 1.40.0 → 1.43.1

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/include/openssl/span.h

@@ -94,18 +94,6 @@ class SpanBase {
 template <typename T>
 class Span : private internal::SpanBase<const T> {
  private:
-  // Heuristically test whether C is a container type that can be converted into
-  // a Span by checking for data() and size() member functions.
-  //
-  // TODO(davidben): Switch everything to std::enable_if_t when we remove
-  // support for MSVC 2015. Although we could write our own enable_if_t and MSVC
-  // 2015 has std::enable_if_t anyway, MSVC 2015's SFINAE implementation is
-  // problematic and does not work below unless we write the ::type at use.
-  template <typename C>
-  using EnableIfContainer = std::enable_if<
-      std::is_convertible<decltype(std::declval<C>().data()), T *>::value &&
-      std::is_integral<decltype(std::declval<C>().size())>::value>;
-
   static const size_t npos = static_cast<size_t>(-1);
 
  public:
@@ -116,12 +104,27 @@ class Span : private internal::SpanBase<const T> {
   constexpr Span(T (&array)[N]) : Span(array, N) {}
 
   template <
-      typename C, typename = typename EnableIfContainer<C>::type,
+      typename C,
+      // TODO(davidben): Switch everything to std::enable_if_t when we remove
+      // support for MSVC 2015. Although we could write our own enable_if_t and
+      // MSVC 2015 has std::enable_if_t anyway, MSVC 2015's SFINAE
+      // implementation is problematic and does not work below unless we write
+      // the ::type at use.
+      //
+      // TODO(davidben): Move this and the identical copy below into an
+      // EnableIfContainer alias when we drop MSVC 2015 support. MSVC 2015's
+      // SFINAE support cannot handle type aliases.
+      typename = typename std::enable_if<
+          std::is_convertible<decltype(std::declval<C>().data()), T *>::value &&
+          std::is_integral<decltype(std::declval<C>().size())>::value>::type,
       typename = typename std::enable_if<std::is_const<T>::value, C>::type>
   Span(const C &container) : data_(container.data()), size_(container.size()) {}
 
   template <
-      typename C, typename = typename EnableIfContainer<C>::type,
+      typename C,
+      typename = typename std::enable_if<
+          std::is_convertible<decltype(std::declval<C>().data()), T *>::value &&
+          std::is_integral<decltype(std::declval<C>().size())>::value>::type,
       typename = typename std::enable_if<!std::is_const<T>::value, C>::type>
   explicit Span(C &container)
       : data_(container.data()), size_(container.size()) {}
@@ -158,11 +161,30 @@ class Span : private internal::SpanBase<const T> {
 
   Span subspan(size_t pos = 0, size_t len = npos) const {
     if (pos > size_) {
-      abort();  // absl::Span throws an exception here.
+      // absl::Span throws an exception here. Note std::span and Chromium
+      // base::span additionally forbid pos + len being out of range, with a
+      // special case at npos/dynamic_extent, while absl::Span::subspan clips
+      // the span. For now, we align with absl::Span in case we switch to it in
+      // the future.
+      abort();
     }
     return Span(data_ + pos, std::min(size_ - pos, len));
   }
 
+  Span first(size_t len) {
+    if (len > size_) {
+      abort();
+    }
+    return Span(data_, len);
+  }
+
+  Span last(size_t len) {
+    if (len > size_) {
+      abort();
+    }
+    return Span(data_ + size_ - len, len);
+  }
+
  private:
   T *data_;
   size_t size_;

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/include/openssl/ssl.h

@@ -1219,6 +1219,11 @@ enum ssl_private_key_result_t BORINGSSL_ENUM_INT {
 // key hooks. This is used to off-load signing operations to a custom,
 // potentially asynchronous, backend. Metadata about the key such as the type
 // and size are parsed out of the certificate.
+//
+// Callers that use this structure should additionally call
+// |SSL_set_signing_algorithm_prefs| or |SSL_CTX_set_signing_algorithm_prefs|
+// with the private key's capabilities. This ensures BoringSSL will select a
+// suitable signature algorithm for the private key.
 struct ssl_private_key_method_st {
   // sign signs the message |in| in using the specified signature algorithm. On
   // success, it returns |ssl_private_key_success| and writes at most |max_out|
@@ -1644,6 +1649,11 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_export_keying_material(
 // abbreviated handshake. It is reference-counted and immutable. Once
 // established, an |SSL_SESSION| may be shared by multiple |SSL| objects on
 // different threads and must not be modified.
+//
+// Note the TLS notion of "session" is not suitable for application-level
+// session state. It is an optional caching mechanism for the handshake. Not all
+// connections within an application-level session will reuse TLS sessions. TLS
+// sessions may be dropped by the client or ignored by the server at any time.
 
 DECLARE_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION)
 
@@ -1698,6 +1708,19 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(SSL_SESSION *session,
 
 // SSL_SESSION_get_id returns a pointer to a buffer containing |session|'s
 // session ID and sets |*out_len| to its length.
+//
+// This function should only be used for implementing a TLS session cache. TLS
+// sessions are not suitable for application-level session state, and a session
+// ID is an implementation detail of the TLS resumption handshake mechanism. Not
+// all resumption flows use session IDs, and not all connections within an
+// application-level session will reuse TLS sessions.
+//
+// To determine if resumption occurred, use |SSL_session_reused| instead.
+// Comparing session IDs will not give the right result in all cases.
+//
+// As a workaround for some broken applications, BoringSSL sometimes synthesizes
+// arbitrary session IDs for non-ID-based sessions. This behavior may be
+// removed in the future.
 OPENSSL_EXPORT const uint8_t *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *session,
                                                  unsigned *out_len);
 
@@ -3557,9 +3580,14 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT const char *SSL_early_data_reason_string(
 // This can prevent observers from seeing cleartext information about the
 // connection, such as the server_name extension.
 //
+// By default, BoringSSL will treat the server name, session ticket, and client
+// certificate as secret, but most other parameters, such as the ALPN protocol
+// list will be treated as public and sent in the cleartext ClientHello. Other
+// APIs may be added for applications with different secrecy requirements.
+//
 // ECH support in BoringSSL is still experimental and under development.
 //
-// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-esni-10.
+// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-esni-13.
 
 // SSL_set_enable_ech_grease configures whether the client will send a GREASE
 // ECH extension when no supported ECHConfig is available.
@@ -3573,16 +3601,57 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_enable_ech_grease(SSL *ssl, int enable);
 // valid but none of the ECHConfigs implement supported parameters, it will
 // return success and proceed without ECH.
 //
-// WARNING: Client ECH support is still incomplete and does not yet implement
-// the recovery flow. It currently treats ECH rejection as a fatal error. Do not
-// use this API yet.
-//
-// TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/275): When the recovery flow is implemented,
-// fill in the remaining docs.
+// If a supported ECHConfig is found, |ssl| will encrypt the true ClientHello
+// parameters. If the server cannot decrypt it, e.g. due to a key mismatch, ECH
+// has a recovery flow. |ssl| will handshake using the cleartext parameters,
+// including a public name in the ECHConfig. If using
+// |SSL_CTX_set_custom_verify|, callers should use |SSL_get0_ech_name_override|
+// to verify the certificate with the public name. If using the built-in
+// verifier, the |X509_STORE_CTX| will be configured automatically.
+//
+// If no other errors are found in this handshake, it will fail with
+// |SSL_R_ECH_REJECTED|. Since it didn't use the true parameters, the connection
+// cannot be used for application data. Instead, callers should handle this
+// error by calling |SSL_get0_ech_retry_configs| and retrying the connection
+// with updated ECH parameters. If the retry also fails with
+// |SSL_R_ECH_REJECTED|, the caller should report a connection failure.
 OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set1_ech_config_list(SSL *ssl,
                                             const uint8_t *ech_config_list,
                                             size_t ech_config_list_len);
 
+// SSL_get0_ech_name_override, if |ssl| is a client and the server rejected ECH,
+// sets |*out_name| and |*out_name_len| to point to a buffer containing the ECH
+// public name. Otherwise, the buffer will be empty.
+//
+// When offering ECH as a client, this function should be called during the
+// certificate verification callback (see |SSL_CTX_set_custom_verify|). If
+// |*out_name_len| is non-zero, the caller should verify the certificate against
+// the result, interpreted as a DNS name, rather than the true server name. In
+// this case, the handshake will never succeed and is only used to authenticate
+// retry configs. See also |SSL_get0_ech_retry_configs|.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_get0_ech_name_override(const SSL *ssl,
+                                               const char **out_name,
+                                               size_t *out_name_len);
+
+// SSL_get0_ech_retry_configs sets |*out_retry_configs| and
+// |*out_retry_configs_len| to a buffer containing a serialized ECHConfigList.
+// If the server did not provide an ECHConfigList, |*out_retry_configs_len| will
+// be zero.
+//
+// When handling an |SSL_R_ECH_REJECTED| error code as a client, callers should
+// use this function to recover from potential key mismatches. If the result is
+// non-empty, the caller should retry the connection, passing this buffer to
+// |SSL_set1_ech_config_list|. If the result is empty, the server has rolled
+// back ECH support, and the caller should retry without ECH.
+//
+// This function must only be called in response to an |SSL_R_ECH_REJECTED|
+// error code. Calling this function on |ssl|s that have not authenticated the
+// rejection handshake will assert in debug builds and otherwise return an
+// unparsable list.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_get0_ech_retry_configs(
+    const SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out_retry_configs,
+    size_t *out_retry_configs_len);
+
 // SSL_marshal_ech_config constructs a new serialized ECHConfig. On success, it
 // sets |*out| to a newly-allocated buffer containing the result and |*out_len|
 // to the size of the buffer. The caller must call |OPENSSL_free| on |*out| to
@@ -3818,6 +3887,10 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT uint64_t SSL_get_read_sequence(const SSL *ssl);
 // two most significant bytes.
 OPENSSL_EXPORT uint64_t SSL_get_write_sequence(const SSL *ssl);
 
+// SSL_CTX_set_record_protocol_version returns whether |version| is zero.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_set_record_protocol_version(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                                       int version);
+
 
 // Handshake hints.
 //
@@ -4089,7 +4162,7 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_max_send_fragment(SSL *ssl,
 // callbacks that are called very early on during the server handshake. At this
 // point, much of the SSL* hasn't been filled out and only the ClientHello can
 // be depended on.
-typedef struct ssl_early_callback_ctx {
+struct ssl_early_callback_ctx {
   SSL *ssl;
   const uint8_t *client_hello;
   size_t client_hello_len;
@@ -4104,7 +4177,7 @@ typedef struct ssl_early_callback_ctx {
   size_t compression_methods_len;
   const uint8_t *extensions;
   size_t extensions_len;
-} SSL_CLIENT_HELLO;
+} /* SSL_CLIENT_HELLO */;
 
 // ssl_select_cert_result_t enumerates the possible results from selecting a
 // certificate with |select_certificate_cb|.
@@ -4506,20 +4579,13 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *ssl, int idx, int *psign,
 // SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH is the same as SSL_MODE_ENABLE_FALSE_START.
 #define SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH SSL_MODE_ENABLE_FALSE_START
 
-// i2d_SSL_SESSION serializes |in| to the bytes pointed to by |*pp|. On success,
-// it returns the number of bytes written and advances |*pp| by that many bytes.
-// On failure, it returns -1. If |pp| is NULL, no bytes are written and only the
-// length is returned.
+// i2d_SSL_SESSION serializes |in|, as described in |i2d_SAMPLE|.
 //
 // Use |SSL_SESSION_to_bytes| instead.
 OPENSSL_EXPORT int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, uint8_t **pp);
 
 // d2i_SSL_SESSION parses a serialized session from the |length| bytes pointed
-// to by |*pp|. It returns the new |SSL_SESSION| and advances |*pp| by the
-// number of bytes consumed on success and NULL on failure. The caller takes
-// ownership of the new session and must call |SSL_SESSION_free| when done.
-//
-// If |a| is non-NULL, |*a| is released and set the new |SSL_SESSION|.
+// to by |*pp|, as described in |d2i_SAMPLE|.
 //
 // Use |SSL_SESSION_from_bytes| instead.
 OPENSSL_EXPORT SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const uint8_t **pp,
@@ -4843,12 +4909,6 @@ OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_set_tmp_ecdh(SSL *ssl, const EC_KEY *ec_key);
 OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *out,
                                                       const char *dir);
 
-// SSL_set_verify_result calls |abort| unless |result| is |X509_V_OK|.
-//
-// TODO(davidben): Remove this function once it has been removed from
-// netty-tcnative.
-OPENSSL_EXPORT void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl, long result);
-
 // SSL_CTX_enable_tls_channel_id calls |SSL_CTX_set_tls_channel_id_enabled|.
 OPENSSL_EXPORT int SSL_CTX_enable_tls_channel_id(SSL_CTX *ctx);
 
@@ -5502,6 +5562,9 @@ BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
 #define SSL_R_COULD_NOT_PARSE_HINTS 316
 #define SSL_R_INVALID_ECH_PUBLIC_NAME 317
 #define SSL_R_INVALID_ECH_CONFIG_LIST 318
+#define SSL_R_ECH_REJECTED 319
+#define SSL_R_OUTER_EXTENSION_NOT_FOUND 320
+#define SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_ECH_NEGOTIATION 321
 #define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CLOSE_NOTIFY 1000
 #define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE 1010
 #define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_RECORD_MAC 1020

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/include/openssl/tls1.h

@@ -179,28 +179,28 @@ extern "C" {
 #define TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY 115
 #define TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED 116
 #define TLS1_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL 120
-#define TLS1_AD_ECH_REQUIRED 121  // draft-ietf-tls-esni-10
+#define TLS1_AD_ECH_REQUIRED 121  // draft-ietf-tls-esni-13
 
-// ExtensionType values from RFC6066
+// ExtensionType values from RFC 6066
 #define TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name 0
 #define TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request 5
 
-// ExtensionType values from RFC4492
+// ExtensionType values from RFC 4492
 #define TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats 11
 
-// ExtensionType values from RFC5246
+// ExtensionType values from RFC 5246
 #define TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms 13
 
-// ExtensionType value from RFC5764
+// ExtensionType value from RFC 5764
 #define TLSEXT_TYPE_srtp 14
 
-// ExtensionType value from RFC7301
+// ExtensionType value from RFC 7301
 #define TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation 16
 
-// ExtensionType value from RFC7685
+// ExtensionType value from RFC 7685
 #define TLSEXT_TYPE_padding 21
 
-// ExtensionType value from RFC7627
+// ExtensionType value from RFC 7627
 #define TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret 23
 
 // ExtensionType value from draft-ietf-quic-tls. Drafts 00 through 32 use
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ extern "C" {
 // use the value 57 which was officially registered with IANA.
 #define TLSEXT_TYPE_quic_transport_parameters_legacy 0xffa5
 
-// ExtensionType value from RFC9000
+// ExtensionType value from RFC 9000
 #define TLSEXT_TYPE_quic_transport_parameters 57
 
 // TLSEXT_TYPE_quic_transport_parameters_standard is an alias for
@@ -219,13 +219,13 @@ extern "C" {
 #define TLSEXT_TYPE_quic_transport_parameters_standard \
   TLSEXT_TYPE_quic_transport_parameters
 
-// ExtensionType value from RFC8879
+// ExtensionType value from RFC 8879
 #define TLSEXT_TYPE_cert_compression 27
 
-// ExtensionType value from RFC4507
+// ExtensionType value from RFC 4507
 #define TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket 35
 
-// ExtensionType values from RFC8446
+// ExtensionType values from RFC 8446
 #define TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups 10
 #define TLSEXT_TYPE_pre_shared_key 41
 #define TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data 42
@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #define TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms_cert 50
 #define TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share 51
 
-// ExtensionType value from RFC5746
+// ExtensionType value from RFC 5746
 #define TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate 0xff01
 
 // ExtensionType value from draft-ietf-tls-subcerts.
@@ -246,13 +246,12 @@ extern "C" {
 // extension number.
 #define TLSEXT_TYPE_application_settings 17513
 
-// ExtensionType values from draft-ietf-tls-esni-10. This is not an IANA defined
+// ExtensionType values from draft-ietf-tls-esni-13. This is not an IANA defined
 // extension number.
-#define TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypted_client_hello 0xfe0a
-#define TLSEXT_TYPE_ech_is_inner 0xda09
+#define TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypted_client_hello 0xfe0d
 #define TLSEXT_TYPE_ech_outer_extensions 0xfd00
 
-// ExtensionType value from RFC6962
+// ExtensionType value from RFC 6962
 #define TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp 18
 
 // This is not an IANA defined extension number
@@ -313,7 +312,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA 0x03000065
 #define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x03000066
 
-// AES ciphersuites from RFC3268
+// AES ciphersuites from RFC 3268
 
 #define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA 0x0300002F
 #define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA 0x03000030
@@ -337,7 +336,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 0x0300003F
 #define TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 0x03000040
 
-// Camellia ciphersuites from RFC4132
+// Camellia ciphersuites from RFC 4132
 #define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA 0x03000041
 #define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA 0x03000042
 #define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA 0x03000043
@@ -354,7 +353,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 0x0300006C
 #define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 0x0300006D
 
-// Camellia ciphersuites from RFC4132
+// Camellia ciphersuites from RFC 4132
 #define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x03000084
 #define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x03000085
 #define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x03000086
@@ -362,7 +361,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x03000088
 #define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x03000089
 
-// SEED ciphersuites from RFC4162
+// SEED ciphersuites from RFC 4162
 #define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA 0x03000096
 #define TLS1_CK_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA 0x03000097
 #define TLS1_CK_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA 0x03000098
@@ -370,7 +369,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA 0x0300009A
 #define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_SEED_SHA 0x0300009B
 
-// TLS v1.2 GCM ciphersuites from RFC5288
+// TLS v1.2 GCM ciphersuites from RFC 5288
 #define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x0300009C
 #define TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x0300009D
 #define TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x0300009E
@@ -384,7 +383,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x030000A6
 #define TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x030000A7
 
-// ECC ciphersuites from RFC4492
+// ECC ciphersuites from RFC 4492
 #define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x0300C001
 #define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x0300C002
 #define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA 0x0300C003
@@ -426,7 +425,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0300C021
 #define TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0300C022
 
-// ECDH HMAC based ciphersuites from RFC5289
+// ECDH HMAC based ciphersuites from RFC 5289
 
 #define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 0x0300C023
 #define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384 0x0300C024
@@ -437,7 +436,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 0x0300C029
 #define TLS1_CK_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384 0x0300C02A
 
-// ECDH GCM based ciphersuites from RFC5289
+// ECDH GCM based ciphersuites from RFC 5289
 #define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x0300C02B
 #define TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x0300C02C
 #define TLS1_CK_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x0300C02D
@@ -473,7 +472,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_EXPORT1024_WITH_RC4_56_SHA "EXP1024-DHE-DSS-RC4-SHA"
 #define TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA "DHE-DSS-RC4-SHA"
 
-// AES ciphersuites from RFC3268
+// AES ciphersuites from RFC 3268
 #define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA "AES128-SHA"
 #define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA "DH-DSS-AES128-SHA"
 #define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA "DH-RSA-AES128-SHA"
@@ -488,7 +487,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA "DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA"
 #define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA "ADH-AES256-SHA"
 
-// ECC ciphersuites from RFC4492
+// ECC ciphersuites from RFC 4492
 #define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA "ECDH-ECDSA-NULL-SHA"
 #define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA "ECDH-ECDSA-RC4-SHA"
 #define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA "ECDH-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA"
@@ -540,7 +539,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA "SRP-RSA-AES-256-CBC-SHA"
 #define TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA "SRP-DSS-AES-256-CBC-SHA"
 
-// Camellia ciphersuites from RFC4132
+// Camellia ciphersuites from RFC 4132
 #define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA "CAMELLIA128-SHA"
 #define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA "DH-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA"
 #define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA "DH-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA"
@@ -555,7 +554,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA "DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA"
 #define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA "ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA"
 
-// SEED ciphersuites from RFC4162
+// SEED ciphersuites from RFC 4162
 #define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA "SEED-SHA"
 #define TLS1_TXT_DH_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA "DH-DSS-SEED-SHA"
 #define TLS1_TXT_DH_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA "DH-RSA-SEED-SHA"
@@ -578,7 +577,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 "ADH-AES128-SHA256"
 #define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 "ADH-AES256-SHA256"
 
-// TLS v1.2 GCM ciphersuites from RFC5288
+// TLS v1.2 GCM ciphersuites from RFC 5288
 #define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 "AES128-GCM-SHA256"
 #define TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 "AES256-GCM-SHA384"
 #define TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 "DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
@@ -592,7 +591,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 "ADH-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
 #define TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 "ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384"
 
-// ECDH HMAC based ciphersuites from RFC5289
+// ECDH HMAC based ciphersuites from RFC 5289
 
 #define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256"
 #define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384 "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384"
@@ -603,7 +602,7 @@ extern "C" {
 #define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 "ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA256"
 #define TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384 "ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA384"
 
-// ECDH GCM based ciphersuites from RFC5289
+// ECDH GCM based ciphersuites from RFC 5289
 #define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 \
   "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"
 #define TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 \