grpc 1.34.0 → 1.42.0

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/tls13_enc.cc

@@ -33,24 +33,25 @@
 
 BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
 
-static bool init_key_schedule(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint16_t version,
-                              const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
-  if (!hs->transcript.InitHash(version, cipher)) {
+static bool init_key_schedule(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, SSLTranscript *transcript,
+                              uint16_t version, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher) {
+  if (!transcript->InitHash(version, cipher)) {
     return false;
   }
 
   // Initialize the secret to the zero key.
-  hs->ResizeSecrets(hs->transcript.DigestLen());
+  hs->ResizeSecrets(transcript->DigestLen());
   OPENSSL_memset(hs->secret().data(), 0, hs->secret().size());
 
   return true;
 }
 
-static bool hkdf_extract_to_secret(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, Span<const uint8_t> in) {
+static bool hkdf_extract_to_secret(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                   const SSLTranscript &transcript,
+                                   Span<const uint8_t> in) {
   size_t len;
-  if (!HKDF_extract(hs->secret().data(), &len, hs->transcript.Digest(),
-                    in.data(), in.size(), hs->secret().data(),
-                    hs->secret().size())) {
+  if (!HKDF_extract(hs->secret().data(), &len, transcript.Digest(), in.data(),
+                    in.size(), hs->secret().data(), hs->secret().size())) {
     return false;
   }
   assert(len == hs->secret().size());
@@ -58,7 +59,8 @@ static bool hkdf_extract_to_secret(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, Span<const uint8_t> in) {
 }
 
 bool tls13_init_key_schedule(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, Span<const uint8_t> psk) {
-  if (!init_key_schedule(hs, ssl_protocol_version(hs->ssl), hs->new_cipher)) {
+  if (!init_key_schedule(hs, &hs->transcript, ssl_protocol_version(hs->ssl),
+                         hs->new_cipher)) {
     return false;
   }
 
@@ -67,14 +69,22 @@ bool tls13_init_key_schedule(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, Span<const uint8_t> psk) {
   if (!hs->handback) {
     hs->transcript.FreeBuffer();
   }
-  return hkdf_extract_to_secret(hs, psk);
+  return hkdf_extract_to_secret(hs, hs->transcript, psk);
 }
 
-bool tls13_init_early_key_schedule(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, Span<const uint8_t> psk) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  return init_key_schedule(hs, ssl_session_protocol_version(ssl->session.get()),
-                           ssl->session->cipher) &&
-         hkdf_extract_to_secret(hs, psk);
+bool tls13_init_early_key_schedule(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                   const SSL_SESSION *session) {
+  assert(!hs->ssl->server);
+  // When offering ECH, early data is associated with ClientHelloInner, not
+  // ClientHelloOuter.
+  SSLTranscript *transcript =
+      hs->selected_ech_config ? &hs->inner_transcript : &hs->transcript;
+  return init_key_schedule(hs, transcript,
+                           ssl_session_protocol_version(session),
+                           session->cipher) &&
+         hkdf_extract_to_secret(
+             hs, *transcript,
+             MakeConstSpan(session->secret, session->secret_length));
 }
 
 static Span<const char> label_to_span(const char *label) {
@@ -118,25 +128,31 @@ bool tls13_advance_key_schedule(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, Span<const uint8_t> in) {
          hkdf_expand_label(hs->secret(), hs->transcript.Digest(), hs->secret(),
                            label_to_span(kTLS13LabelDerived),
                            MakeConstSpan(derive_context, derive_context_len)) &&
-         hkdf_extract_to_secret(hs, in);
+         hkdf_extract_to_secret(hs, hs->transcript, in);
 }
 
-// derive_secret derives a secret of length |out.size()| and writes the result
-// in |out| with the given label, the current base secret, and the most
-// recently-saved handshake context. It returns true on success and false on
-// error.
-static bool derive_secret(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, Span<uint8_t> out,
-                          Span<const char> label) {
+// derive_secret_with_transcript derives a secret of length |out.size()| and
+// writes the result in |out| with the given label, the current base secret, and
+// the state of |transcript|. It returns true on success and false on error.
+static bool derive_secret_with_transcript(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                          Span<uint8_t> out,
+                                          const SSLTranscript &transcript,
+                                          Span<const char> label) {
   uint8_t context_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
   size_t context_hash_len;
-  if (!hs->transcript.GetHash(context_hash, &context_hash_len)) {
+  if (!transcript.GetHash(context_hash, &context_hash_len)) {
     return false;
   }
 
-  return hkdf_expand_label(out, hs->transcript.Digest(), hs->secret(), label,
+  return hkdf_expand_label(out, transcript.Digest(), hs->secret(), label,
                            MakeConstSpan(context_hash, context_hash_len));
 }
 
+static bool derive_secret(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, Span<uint8_t> out,
+                          Span<const char> label) {
+  return derive_secret_with_transcript(hs, out, hs->transcript, label);
+}
+
 bool tls13_set_traffic_key(SSL *ssl, enum ssl_encryption_level_t level,
                            enum evp_aead_direction_t direction,
                            const SSL_SESSION *session,
@@ -228,8 +244,14 @@ static const char kTLS13LabelServerApplicationTraffic[] = "s ap traffic";
 
 bool tls13_derive_early_secret(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
   SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
-  if (!derive_secret(hs, hs->early_traffic_secret(),
-                     label_to_span(kTLS13LabelClientEarlyTraffic)) ||
+  // When offering ECH on the client, early data is associated with
+  // ClientHelloInner, not ClientHelloOuter.
+  const SSLTranscript &transcript = (!ssl->server && hs->selected_ech_config)
+                                        ? hs->inner_transcript
+                                        : hs->transcript;
+  if (!derive_secret_with_transcript(
+          hs, hs->early_traffic_secret(), transcript,
+          label_to_span(kTLS13LabelClientEarlyTraffic)) ||
       !ssl_log_secret(ssl, "CLIENT_EARLY_TRAFFIC_SECRET",
                       hs->early_traffic_secret())) {
     return false;
@@ -303,10 +325,9 @@ bool tls13_derive_resumption_secret(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
     return false;
   }
-  hs->new_session->master_key_length = hs->transcript.DigestLen();
+  hs->new_session->secret_length = hs->transcript.DigestLen();
   return derive_secret(
-      hs,
-      MakeSpan(hs->new_session->master_key, hs->new_session->master_key_length),
+      hs, MakeSpan(hs->new_session->secret, hs->new_session->secret_length),
       label_to_span(kTLS13LabelResumption));
 }
 
@@ -354,8 +375,8 @@ bool tls13_derive_session_psk(SSL_SESSION *session, Span<const uint8_t> nonce) {
   const EVP_MD *digest = ssl_session_get_digest(session);
   // The session initially stores the resumption_master_secret, which we
   // override with the PSK.
-  auto session_key = MakeSpan(session->master_key, session->master_key_length);
-  return hkdf_expand_label(session_key, digest, session_key,
+  auto session_secret = MakeSpan(session->secret, session->secret_length);
+  return hkdf_expand_label(session_secret, digest, session_secret,
                            label_to_span(kTLS13LabelResumptionPSK), nonce);
 }
 
@@ -396,100 +417,97 @@ bool tls13_export_keying_material(SSL *ssl, Span<uint8_t> out,
 
 static const char kTLS13LabelPSKBinder[] = "res binder";
 
-static bool tls13_psk_binder(uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, uint16_t version,
-                             const EVP_MD *digest, Span<const uint8_t> psk,
-                             Span<const uint8_t> context) {
+static bool tls13_psk_binder(uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
+                             const SSL_SESSION *session,
+                             const SSLTranscript &transcript,
+                             Span<const uint8_t> client_hello,
+                             size_t binders_len) {
+  const EVP_MD *digest = ssl_session_get_digest(session);
+
+  // Compute the binder key.
+  //
+  // TODO(davidben): Ideally we wouldn't recompute early secret and the binder
+  // key each time.
   uint8_t binder_context[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
   unsigned binder_context_len;
-  if (!EVP_Digest(NULL, 0, binder_context, &binder_context_len, digest, NULL)) {
-    return false;
-  }
-
   uint8_t early_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
   size_t early_secret_len;
-  if (!HKDF_extract(early_secret, &early_secret_len, digest, psk.data(),
-                    psk.size(), NULL, 0)) {
-    return false;
-  }
-
   uint8_t binder_key_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
   auto binder_key = MakeSpan(binder_key_buf, EVP_MD_size(digest));
-  if (!hkdf_expand_label(binder_key, digest,
+  if (!EVP_Digest(nullptr, 0, binder_context, &binder_context_len, digest,
+                  nullptr) ||
+      !HKDF_extract(early_secret, &early_secret_len, digest, session->secret,
+                    session->secret_length, nullptr, 0) ||
+      !hkdf_expand_label(binder_key, digest,
                          MakeConstSpan(early_secret, early_secret_len),
                          label_to_span(kTLS13LabelPSKBinder),
-                         MakeConstSpan(binder_context, binder_context_len)) ||
-      !tls13_verify_data(out, out_len, digest, version, binder_key, context)) {
+                         MakeConstSpan(binder_context, binder_context_len))) {
     return false;
   }
 
-  assert(*out_len == EVP_MD_size(digest));
-  return true;
-}
-
-static bool hash_transcript_and_truncated_client_hello(
-    SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, const EVP_MD *digest,
-    Span<const uint8_t> client_hello, size_t binders_len) {
-  // Truncate the ClientHello.
-  if (binders_len + 2 < binders_len || client_hello.size() < binders_len + 2) {
+  // Hash the transcript and truncated ClientHello.
+  if (client_hello.size() < binders_len) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
     return false;
   }
-  client_hello = client_hello.subspan(0, client_hello.size() - binders_len - 2);
-
+  auto truncated = client_hello.subspan(0, client_hello.size() - binders_len);
+  uint8_t context[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  unsigned context_len;
   ScopedEVP_MD_CTX ctx;
-  unsigned len;
-  if (!hs->transcript.CopyToHashContext(ctx.get(), digest) ||
-      !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx.get(), client_hello.data(), client_hello.size()) ||
-      !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx.get(), out, &len)) {
+  if (!transcript.CopyToHashContext(ctx.get(), digest) ||
+      !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx.get(), truncated.data(),
+                        truncated.size()) ||
+      !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx.get(), context, &context_len)) {
     return false;
   }
 
-  *out_len = len;
+  if (!tls13_verify_data(out, out_len, digest, session->ssl_version, binder_key,
+                         MakeConstSpan(context, context_len))) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  assert(*out_len == EVP_MD_size(digest));
   return true;
 }
 
-bool tls13_write_psk_binder(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, Span<uint8_t> msg) {
-  SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+bool tls13_write_psk_binder(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                            const SSLTranscript &transcript, Span<uint8_t> msg,
+                            size_t *out_binder_len) {
+  const SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
   const EVP_MD *digest = ssl_session_get_digest(ssl->session.get());
-  size_t hash_len = EVP_MD_size(digest);
-
-  ScopedEVP_MD_CTX ctx;
-  uint8_t context[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-  size_t context_len;
+  const size_t hash_len = EVP_MD_size(digest);
+  // We only offer one PSK, so the binders are a u16 and u8 length
+  // prefix, followed by the binder. The caller is assumed to have constructed
+  // |msg| with placeholder binders.
+  const size_t binders_len = 3 + hash_len;
   uint8_t verify_data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
   size_t verify_data_len;
-  if (!hash_transcript_and_truncated_client_hello(
-          hs, context, &context_len, digest, msg,
-          1 /* length prefix */ + hash_len) ||
-      !tls13_psk_binder(verify_data, &verify_data_len,
-                        ssl->session->ssl_version, digest,
-                        MakeConstSpan(ssl->session->master_key,
-                                      ssl->session->master_key_length),
-                        MakeConstSpan(context, context_len)) ||
+  if (!tls13_psk_binder(verify_data, &verify_data_len, ssl->session.get(),
+                        transcript, msg, binders_len) ||
       verify_data_len != hash_len) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
     return false;
   }
 
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(msg.data() + msg.size() - verify_data_len, verify_data,
-                 verify_data_len);
+  auto msg_binder = msg.last(verify_data_len);
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(msg_binder.data(), verify_data, verify_data_len);
+  if (out_binder_len != nullptr) {
+    *out_binder_len = verify_data_len;
+  }
   return true;
 }
 
-bool tls13_verify_psk_binder(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, SSL_SESSION *session,
-                             const SSLMessage &msg, CBS *binders) {
-  uint8_t context[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-  size_t context_len;
+bool tls13_verify_psk_binder(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                             const SSL_SESSION *session, const SSLMessage &msg,
+                             CBS *binders) {
   uint8_t verify_data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
   size_t verify_data_len;
   CBS binder;
-  if (!hash_transcript_and_truncated_client_hello(hs, context, &context_len,
-                                                  hs->transcript.Digest(),
-                                                  msg.raw, CBS_len(binders)) ||
-      !tls13_psk_binder(
-          verify_data, &verify_data_len, hs->ssl->version,
-          hs->transcript.Digest(),
-          MakeConstSpan(session->master_key, session->master_key_length),
-          MakeConstSpan(context, context_len)) ||
+  // The binders are computed over |msg| with |binders| and its u16 length
+  // prefix removed. The caller is assumed to have parsed |msg|, extracted
+  // |binders|, and verified the PSK extension is last.
+  if (!tls13_psk_binder(verify_data, &verify_data_len, session, hs->transcript,
+                        msg.raw, 2 + CBS_len(binders)) ||
       // We only consider the first PSK, so compare against the first binder.
       !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(binders, &binder)) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
@@ -510,4 +528,55 @@ bool tls13_verify_psk_binder(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, SSL_SESSION *session,
   return true;
 }
 
+size_t ssl_ech_confirmation_signal_hello_offset(const SSL *ssl) {
+  static_assert(ECH_CONFIRMATION_SIGNAL_LEN < SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+                "the confirmation signal is a suffix of the random");
+  const size_t header_len =
+      SSL_is_dtls(ssl) ? DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH : SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+  return header_len + 2 /* version */ + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
+         ECH_CONFIRMATION_SIGNAL_LEN;
+}
+
+bool ssl_ech_accept_confirmation(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, Span<uint8_t> out,
+                                 Span<const uint8_t> client_random,
+                                 const SSLTranscript &transcript, bool is_hrr,
+                                 Span<const uint8_t> msg, size_t offset) {
+  // See draft-ietf-tls-esni-13, sections 7.2 and 7.2.1.
+  static const uint8_t kZeros[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
+
+  // We hash |msg|, with bytes from |offset| zeroed.
+  if (msg.size() < offset + ECH_CONFIRMATION_SIGNAL_LEN) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  auto before_zeros = msg.subspan(0, offset);
+  auto after_zeros = msg.subspan(offset + ECH_CONFIRMATION_SIGNAL_LEN);
+  uint8_t context[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  unsigned context_len;
+  ScopedEVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+  if (!transcript.CopyToHashContext(ctx.get(), transcript.Digest()) ||
+      !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx.get(), before_zeros.data(), before_zeros.size()) ||
+      !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx.get(), kZeros, ECH_CONFIRMATION_SIGNAL_LEN) ||
+      !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx.get(), after_zeros.data(), after_zeros.size()) ||
+      !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx.get(), context, &context_len)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  size_t secret_len;
+  if (!HKDF_extract(secret, &secret_len, transcript.Digest(),
+                    client_random.data(), client_random.size(), kZeros,
+                    transcript.DigestLen())) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  assert(out.size() == ECH_CONFIRMATION_SIGNAL_LEN);
+  return hkdf_expand_label(out, transcript.Digest(),
+                           MakeConstSpan(secret, secret_len),
+                           is_hrr ? label_to_span("hrr ech accept confirmation")
+                                  : label_to_span("ech accept confirmation"),
+                           MakeConstSpan(context, context_len));
+}
+
 BSSL_NAMESPACE_END