grpc 1.31.1 → 1.35.0.pre1

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/fipsmodule/digest/digest.c

@@ -122,6 +122,8 @@ int EVP_DigestFinalXOF(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, size_t len) {
 
 uint32_t EVP_MD_meth_get_flags(const EVP_MD *md) { return EVP_MD_flags(md); }
 
+void EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int flags) {}
+
 int EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *out, const EVP_MD_CTX *in) {
   // |in->digest| may be NULL if this is a signing |EVP_MD_CTX| for, e.g.,
   // Ed25519 which does not hash with |EVP_MD_CTX|.

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/fipsmodule/rsa/internal.h

@@ -108,6 +108,10 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
 int RSA_padding_add_none(uint8_t *to, size_t to_len, const uint8_t *from,
                          size_t from_len);
 
+// rsa_check_public_key checks that |rsa|'s public modulus and exponent are
+// within DoS bounds.
+int rsa_check_public_key(const RSA *rsa);
+
 // RSA_private_transform calls either the method-specific |private_transform|
 // function (if given) or the generic one. See the comment for
 // |private_transform| in |rsa_meth_st|.

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/fipsmodule/rsa/rsa.c

@@ -661,6 +661,9 @@ static int check_mod_inverse(int *out_ok, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *ainv,
     return 1;
   }
 
+  // Note |bn_mul_consttime| and |bn_div_consttime| do not scale linearly, but
+  // checking |ainv| is in range bounds the running time, assuming |m|'s bounds
+  // were checked by the caller.
   BN_CTX_start(ctx);
   BIGNUM *tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
   int ret = tmp != NULL &&
@@ -674,22 +677,35 @@ static int check_mod_inverse(int *out_ok, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *ainv,
 }
 
 int RSA_check_key(const RSA *key) {
+  // TODO(davidben): RSA key initialization is spread across
+  // |rsa_check_public_key|, |RSA_check_key|, |freeze_private_key|, and
+  // |BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked| as a result of API issues. See
+  // https://crbug.com/boringssl/316. As a result, we inconsistently check RSA
+  // invariants. We should fix this and integrate that logic.
+
   if (RSA_is_opaque(key)) {
     // Opaque keys can't be checked.
     return 1;
   }
 
+  if (!rsa_check_public_key(key)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
   if ((key->p != NULL) != (key->q != NULL)) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_ONLY_ONE_OF_P_Q_GIVEN);
     return 0;
   }
 
-  if (!key->n || !key->e) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
+  // |key->d| must be bounded by |key->n|. This ensures bounds on |RSA_bits|
+  // translate to bounds on the running time of private key operations.
+  if (key->d != NULL &&
+      (BN_is_negative(key->d) || BN_cmp(key->d, key->n) >= 0)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_D_OUT_OF_RANGE);
     return 0;
   }
 
-  if (!key->d || !key->p) {
+  if (key->d == NULL || key->p == NULL) {
     // For a public key, or without p and q, there's nothing that can be
     // checked.
     return 1;
@@ -709,24 +725,28 @@ int RSA_check_key(const RSA *key) {
   BN_init(&qm1);
   BN_init(&dmp1);
   BN_init(&dmq1);
+
+  // Check that p * q == n. Before we multiply, we check that p and q are in
+  // bounds, to avoid a DoS vector in |bn_mul_consttime| below. Note that
+  // n was bound by |rsa_check_public_key|.
+  if (BN_is_negative(key->p) || BN_cmp(key->p, key->n) >= 0 ||
+      BN_is_negative(key->q) || BN_cmp(key->q, key->n) >= 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_N_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q);
+    goto out;
+  }
   if (!bn_mul_consttime(&tmp, key->p, key->q, ctx)) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_LIB_BN);
     goto out;
   }
-
   if (BN_cmp(&tmp, key->n) != 0) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_N_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q);
     goto out;
   }
 
-  if (BN_is_negative(key->d) || BN_cmp(key->d, key->n) >= 0) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_D_OUT_OF_RANGE);
-    goto out;
-  }
-
   // d must be an inverse of e mod the Carmichael totient, lcm(p-1, q-1), but it
   // may be unreduced because other implementations use the Euler totient. We
-  // simply check that d * e is one mod p-1 and mod q-1.
+  // simply check that d * e is one mod p-1 and mod q-1. Note d and e were bound
+  // by earlier checks in this function.
   if (!bn_usub_consttime(&pm1, key->p, BN_value_one()) ||
       !bn_usub_consttime(&qm1, key->q, BN_value_one()) ||
       !bn_mul_consttime(&de, key->d, key->e, ctx) ||

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/fipsmodule/rsa/rsa_impl.c

@@ -73,7 +73,12 @@
 #include "../rand/fork_detect.h"
 
 
-static int check_modulus_and_exponent_sizes(const RSA *rsa) {
+int rsa_check_public_key(const RSA *rsa) {
+  if (rsa->n == NULL || rsa->e == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
   unsigned rsa_bits = BN_num_bits(rsa->n);
 
   if (rsa_bits > 16 * 1024) {
@@ -253,8 +258,7 @@ size_t rsa_default_size(const RSA *rsa) {
 
 int RSA_encrypt(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
                 const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) {
-  if (rsa->n == NULL || rsa->e == NULL) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
+  if (!rsa_check_public_key(rsa)) {
     return 0;
   }
 
@@ -269,10 +273,6 @@ int RSA_encrypt(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
     return 0;
   }
 
-  if (!check_modulus_and_exponent_sizes(rsa)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
   ctx = BN_CTX_new();
   if (ctx == NULL) {
     goto err;
@@ -592,8 +592,7 @@ static int mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
 
 int RSA_verify_raw(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
                    const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) {
-  if (rsa->n == NULL || rsa->e == NULL) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
+  if (!rsa_check_public_key(rsa)) {
     return 0;
   }
 
@@ -610,10 +609,6 @@ int RSA_verify_raw(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
     return 0;
   }
 
-  if (!check_modulus_and_exponent_sizes(rsa)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
   BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
   if (ctx == NULL) {
     return 0;
@@ -938,20 +933,57 @@ static int ensure_bignum(BIGNUM **out) {
   return *out != NULL;
 }
 
-// kBoringSSLRSASqrtTwo is the BIGNUM representation of ⌊2¹⁵³⁵×√2⌋. This is
-// chosen to give enough precision for 3072-bit RSA, the largest key size FIPS
+// kBoringSSLRSASqrtTwo is the BIGNUM representation of ⌊2²⁰⁴⁷×√2⌋. This is
+// chosen to give enough precision for 4096-bit RSA, the largest key size FIPS
 // specifies. Key sizes beyond this will round up.
 //
-// To verify this number, check that n² < 2³⁰⁷¹ < (n+1)², where n is value
+// To calculate, use the following Haskell code:
+//
+// import Text.Printf (printf)
+// import Data.List (intercalate)
+//
+// pow2 = 4095
+// target = 2^pow2
+//
+// f x = x*x - (toRational target)
+//
+// fprime x = 2*x
+//
+// newtonIteration x = x - (f x) / (fprime x)
+//
+// converge x =
+//   let n = floor x in
+//   if n*n - target < 0 && (n+1)*(n+1) - target > 0
+//     then n
+//     else converge (newtonIteration x)
+//
+// divrem bits x = (x `div` (2^bits), x `rem` (2^bits))
+//
+// bnWords :: Integer -> [Integer]
+// bnWords x =
+//   if x == 0
+//     then []
+//     else let (high, low) = divrem 64 x in low : bnWords high
+//
+// showWord x = let (high, low) = divrem 32 x in printf "TOBN(0x%08x, 0x%08x)" high low
+//
+// output :: String
+// output = intercalate ", " $ map showWord $ bnWords $ converge (2 ^ (pow2 `div` 2))
+//
+// To verify this number, check that n² < 2⁴⁰⁹⁵ < (n+1)², where n is value
 // represented here. Note the components are listed in little-endian order. Here
 // is some sample Python code to check:
 //
 //   >>> TOBN = lambda a, b: a << 32 | b
 //   >>> l = [ <paste the contents of kSqrtTwo> ]
 //   >>> n = sum(a * 2**(64*i) for i, a in enumerate(l))
-//   >>> n**2 < 2**3071 < (n+1)**2
+//   >>> n**2 < 2**4095 < (n+1)**2
 //   True
 const BN_ULONG kBoringSSLRSASqrtTwo[] = {
+    TOBN(0x4d7c60a5, 0xe633e3e1), TOBN(0x5fcf8f7b, 0xca3ea33b),
+    TOBN(0xc246785e, 0x92957023), TOBN(0xf9acce41, 0x797f2805),
+    TOBN(0xfdfe170f, 0xd3b1f780), TOBN(0xd24f4a76, 0x3facb882),
+    TOBN(0x18838a2e, 0xaff5f3b2), TOBN(0xc1fcbdde, 0xa2f7dc33),
     TOBN(0xdea06241, 0xf7aa81c2), TOBN(0xf6a1be3f, 0xca221307),
     TOBN(0x332a5e9f, 0x7bda1ebf), TOBN(0x0104dc01, 0xfe32352f),
     TOBN(0xb8cf341b, 0x6f8236c7), TOBN(0x4264dabc, 0xd528b651),
@@ -1121,8 +1153,8 @@ static int rsa_generate_key_impl(RSA *rsa, int bits, const BIGNUM *e_value,
 
   // Reject excessively large public exponents. Windows CryptoAPI and Go don't
   // support values larger than 32 bits, so match their limits for generating
-  // keys. (|check_modulus_and_exponent_sizes| uses a slightly more conservative
-  // value, but we don't need to support generating such keys.)
+  // keys. (|rsa_check_public_key| uses a slightly more conservative value, but
+  // we don't need to support generating such keys.)
   // https://github.com/golang/go/issues/3161
   // https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa387685(VS.85).aspx
   if (BN_num_bits(e_value) > 32) {
@@ -1172,13 +1204,13 @@ static int rsa_generate_key_impl(RSA *rsa, int bits, const BIGNUM *e_value,
   int sqrt2_bits = kBoringSSLRSASqrtTwoLen * BN_BITS2;
   assert(sqrt2_bits == (int)BN_num_bits(sqrt2));
   if (sqrt2_bits > prime_bits) {
-    // For key sizes up to 3072 (prime_bits = 1536), this is exactly
+    // For key sizes up to 4096 (prime_bits = 2048), this is exactly
     // ⌊2^(prime_bits-1)×√2⌋.
     if (!BN_rshift(sqrt2, sqrt2, sqrt2_bits - prime_bits)) {
       goto bn_err;
     }
   } else if (prime_bits > sqrt2_bits) {
-    // For key sizes beyond 3072, this is approximate. We err towards retrying
+    // For key sizes beyond 4096, this is approximate. We err towards retrying
     // to ensure our key is the right size and round up.
     if (!BN_add_word(sqrt2, 1) ||
         !BN_lshift(sqrt2, sqrt2, prime_bits - sqrt2_bits)) {
@@ -1335,7 +1367,9 @@ int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, const BIGNUM *e_value,
 int RSA_generate_key_fips(RSA *rsa, int bits, BN_GENCB *cb) {
   // FIPS 186-4 allows 2048-bit and 3072-bit RSA keys (1024-bit and 1536-bit
   // primes, respectively) with the prime generation method we use.
-  if (bits != 2048 && bits != 3072) {
+  // Subsequently, IG A.14 stated that larger modulus sizes can be used and ACVP
+  // testing supports 4096 bits.
+  if (bits != 2048 && bits != 3072 && bits != 4096) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_RSA_PARAMETERS);
     return 0;
   }

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/fipsmodule/self_check/self_check.c

@@ -611,7 +611,7 @@ int boringssl_fips_self_test(
     goto err;
   }
 
-  // ECDSA Sign/Verify PWCT
+  // ECDSA Sign/Verify KAT
 
   // The 'k' value for ECDSA is fixed to avoid an entropy draw.
   ec_key->fixed_k = BN_new();
@@ -632,7 +632,13 @@ int boringssl_fips_self_test(
       !BN_bn2bin(sig->s, ecdsa_s_bytes) ||
       !check_test(kECDSASigR, ecdsa_r_bytes, sizeof(kECDSASigR), "ECDSA R") ||
       !check_test(kECDSASigS, ecdsa_s_bytes, sizeof(kECDSASigS), "ECDSA S")) {
-    fprintf(stderr, "ECDSA KAT failed.\n");
+    fprintf(stderr, "ECDSA signature KAT failed.\n");
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  if (!ECDSA_do_verify(kPlaintextSHA256, sizeof(kPlaintextSHA256), sig,
+                       ec_key)) {
+    fprintf(stderr, "ECDSA verification KAT failed.\n");
     goto err;
   }
 

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/hpke/hpke.c

@@ -0,0 +1,543 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2020, Google Inc.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
+ * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/aead.h>
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/digest.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/hkdf.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+
+#include "../internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+// This file implements draft-irtf-cfrg-hpke-05.
+
+#define KEM_CONTEXT_LEN (2 * X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN)
+
+// HPKE KEM scheme IDs.
+#define HPKE_DHKEM_X25519_HKDF_SHA256 0x0020
+
+// This is strlen("HPKE") + 3 * sizeof(uint16_t).
+#define HPKE_SUITE_ID_LEN 10
+
+#define HPKE_MODE_BASE 0
+#define HPKE_MODE_PSK 1
+
+static const char kHpkeRfcId[] = "HPKE-05 ";
+
+static int add_label_string(CBB *cbb, const char *label) {
+  return CBB_add_bytes(cbb, (const uint8_t *)label, strlen(label));
+}
+
+// The suite_id for the KEM is defined as concat("KEM", I2OSP(kem_id, 2)). Note
+// that the suite_id used outside of the KEM also includes the kdf_id and
+// aead_id.
+static const uint8_t kX25519SuiteID[] = {
+    'K', 'E', 'M', HPKE_DHKEM_X25519_HKDF_SHA256 >> 8,
+    HPKE_DHKEM_X25519_HKDF_SHA256 & 0x00ff};
+
+// The suite_id for non-KEM pieces of HPKE is defined as concat("HPKE",
+// I2OSP(kem_id, 2), I2OSP(kdf_id, 2), I2OSP(aead_id, 2)).
+static int hpke_build_suite_id(uint8_t out[HPKE_SUITE_ID_LEN], uint16_t kdf_id,
+                               uint16_t aead_id) {
+  CBB cbb;
+  int ret = CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, out, HPKE_SUITE_ID_LEN) &&
+            add_label_string(&cbb, "HPKE") &&
+            CBB_add_u16(&cbb, HPKE_DHKEM_X25519_HKDF_SHA256) &&
+            CBB_add_u16(&cbb, kdf_id) &&
+            CBB_add_u16(&cbb, aead_id);
+  CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static int hpke_labeled_extract(const EVP_MD *hkdf_md, uint8_t *out_key,
+                                size_t *out_len, const uint8_t *salt,
+                                size_t salt_len, const uint8_t *suite_id,
+                                size_t suite_id_len, const char *label,
+                                const uint8_t *ikm, size_t ikm_len) {
+  // labeledIKM = concat("RFCXXXX ", suite_id, label, IKM)
+  CBB labeled_ikm;
+  int ok = CBB_init(&labeled_ikm, 0) &&
+           add_label_string(&labeled_ikm, kHpkeRfcId) &&
+           CBB_add_bytes(&labeled_ikm, suite_id, suite_id_len) &&
+           add_label_string(&labeled_ikm, label) &&
+           CBB_add_bytes(&labeled_ikm, ikm, ikm_len) &&
+           HKDF_extract(out_key, out_len, hkdf_md, CBB_data(&labeled_ikm),
+                        CBB_len(&labeled_ikm), salt, salt_len);
+  CBB_cleanup(&labeled_ikm);
+  return ok;
+}
+
+static int hpke_labeled_expand(const EVP_MD *hkdf_md, uint8_t *out_key,
+                               size_t out_len, const uint8_t *prk,
+                               size_t prk_len, const uint8_t *suite_id,
+                               size_t suite_id_len, const char *label,
+                               const uint8_t *info, size_t info_len) {
+  // labeledInfo = concat(I2OSP(L, 2), "RFCXXXX ", suite_id, label, info)
+  CBB labeled_info;
+  int ok = CBB_init(&labeled_info, 0) &&
+           CBB_add_u16(&labeled_info, out_len) &&
+           add_label_string(&labeled_info, kHpkeRfcId) &&
+           CBB_add_bytes(&labeled_info, suite_id, suite_id_len) &&
+           add_label_string(&labeled_info, label) &&
+           CBB_add_bytes(&labeled_info, info, info_len) &&
+           HKDF_expand(out_key, out_len, hkdf_md, prk, prk_len,
+                       CBB_data(&labeled_info), CBB_len(&labeled_info));
+  CBB_cleanup(&labeled_info);
+  return ok;
+}
+
+static int hpke_extract_and_expand(const EVP_MD *hkdf_md, uint8_t *out_key,
+                                   size_t out_len,
+                                   const uint8_t dh[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
+                                   const uint8_t kem_context[KEM_CONTEXT_LEN]) {
+  uint8_t prk[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  size_t prk_len;
+  static const char kEaePrkLabel[] = "eae_prk";
+  if (!hpke_labeled_extract(hkdf_md, prk, &prk_len, NULL, 0, kX25519SuiteID,
+                            sizeof(kX25519SuiteID), kEaePrkLabel, dh,
+                            X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  static const char kPRKExpandLabel[] = "shared_secret";
+  if (!hpke_labeled_expand(hkdf_md, out_key, out_len, prk, prk_len,
+                           kX25519SuiteID, sizeof(kX25519SuiteID),
+                           kPRKExpandLabel, kem_context, KEM_CONTEXT_LEN)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static const EVP_AEAD *hpke_get_aead(uint16_t aead_id) {
+  switch (aead_id) {
+    case EVP_HPKE_AEAD_AES_GCM_128:
+      return EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm();
+    case EVP_HPKE_AEAD_AES_GCM_256:
+      return EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm();
+    case EVP_HPKE_AEAD_CHACHA20POLY1305:
+      return EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305();
+  }
+  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+static const EVP_MD *hpke_get_kdf(uint16_t kdf_id) {
+  switch (kdf_id) {
+    case EVP_HPKE_HKDF_SHA256:
+      return EVP_sha256();
+    case EVP_HPKE_HKDF_SHA384:
+      return EVP_sha384();
+    case EVP_HPKE_HKDF_SHA512:
+      return EVP_sha512();
+  }
+  OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+static int hpke_key_schedule(EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint8_t mode,
+                             const uint8_t *shared_secret,
+                             size_t shared_secret_len, const uint8_t *info,
+                             size_t info_len, const uint8_t *psk,
+                             size_t psk_len, const uint8_t *psk_id,
+                             size_t psk_id_len) {
+  // Verify the PSK inputs.
+  switch (mode) {
+    case HPKE_MODE_BASE:
+      // This is an internal error, unreachable from the caller.
+      assert(psk_len == 0 && psk_id_len == 0);
+      break;
+    case HPKE_MODE_PSK:
+      if (psk_len == 0 || psk_id_len == 0) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_EMPTY_PSK);
+        return 0;
+      }
+      break;
+    default:
+      return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Attempt to get an EVP_AEAD*.
+  const EVP_AEAD *aead = hpke_get_aead(hpke->aead_id);
+  if (aead == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t suite_id[HPKE_SUITE_ID_LEN];
+  if (!hpke_build_suite_id(suite_id, hpke->kdf_id, hpke->aead_id)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // psk_id_hash = LabeledExtract("", "psk_id_hash", psk_id)
+  static const char kPskIdHashLabel[] = "psk_id_hash";
+  uint8_t psk_id_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  size_t psk_id_hash_len;
+  if (!hpke_labeled_extract(hpke->hkdf_md, psk_id_hash, &psk_id_hash_len, NULL,
+                            0, suite_id, sizeof(suite_id), kPskIdHashLabel,
+                            psk_id, psk_id_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // info_hash = LabeledExtract("", "info_hash", info)
+  static const char kInfoHashLabel[] = "info_hash";
+  uint8_t info_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  size_t info_hash_len;
+  if (!hpke_labeled_extract(hpke->hkdf_md, info_hash, &info_hash_len, NULL, 0,
+                            suite_id, sizeof(suite_id), kInfoHashLabel, info,
+                            info_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // key_schedule_context = concat(mode, psk_id_hash, info_hash)
+  uint8_t context[sizeof(uint8_t) + 2 * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  size_t context_len;
+  CBB context_cbb;
+  if (!CBB_init_fixed(&context_cbb, context, sizeof(context)) ||
+      !CBB_add_u8(&context_cbb, mode) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&context_cbb, psk_id_hash, psk_id_hash_len) ||
+      !CBB_add_bytes(&context_cbb, info_hash, info_hash_len) ||
+      !CBB_finish(&context_cbb, NULL, &context_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // psk_hash = LabeledExtract("", "psk_hash", psk)
+  static const char kPskHashLabel[] = "psk_hash";
+  uint8_t psk_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  size_t psk_hash_len;
+  if (!hpke_labeled_extract(hpke->hkdf_md, psk_hash, &psk_hash_len, NULL, 0,
+                            suite_id, sizeof(suite_id), kPskHashLabel, psk,
+                            psk_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // secret = LabeledExtract(psk_hash, "secret", shared_secret)
+  static const char kSecretExtractLabel[] = "secret";
+  uint8_t secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  size_t secret_len;
+  if (!hpke_labeled_extract(hpke->hkdf_md, secret, &secret_len, psk_hash,
+                            psk_hash_len, suite_id, sizeof(suite_id),
+                            kSecretExtractLabel, shared_secret,
+                            shared_secret_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // key = LabeledExpand(secret, "key", key_schedule_context, Nk)
+  static const char kKeyExpandLabel[] = "key";
+  uint8_t key[EVP_AEAD_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
+  const size_t kKeyLen = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead);
+  if (!hpke_labeled_expand(hpke->hkdf_md, key, kKeyLen, secret, secret_len,
+                           suite_id, sizeof(suite_id), kKeyExpandLabel, context,
+                           context_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // Initialize the HPKE context's AEAD context, storing a copy of |key|.
+  if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(&hpke->aead_ctx, aead, key, kKeyLen, 0, NULL)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // nonce = LabeledExpand(secret, "nonce", key_schedule_context, Nn)
+  static const char kNonceExpandLabel[] = "nonce";
+  if (!hpke_labeled_expand(hpke->hkdf_md, hpke->nonce,
+                           EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead), secret, secret_len,
+                           suite_id, sizeof(suite_id), kNonceExpandLabel,
+                           context, context_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // exporter_secret = LabeledExpand(secret, "exp", key_schedule_context, Nh)
+  static const char kExporterSecretExpandLabel[] = "exp";
+  if (!hpke_labeled_expand(hpke->hkdf_md, hpke->exporter_secret,
+                           EVP_MD_size(hpke->hkdf_md), secret, secret_len,
+                           suite_id, sizeof(suite_id),
+                           kExporterSecretExpandLabel, context, context_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+// The number of bytes written to |out_shared_secret| is the size of the KEM's
+// KDF (currently we only support SHA256).
+static int hpke_encap(EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke,
+                      uint8_t out_shared_secret[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH],
+                      const uint8_t public_key_r[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
+                      const uint8_t ephemeral_private[X25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN],
+                      const uint8_t ephemeral_public[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN]) {
+  uint8_t dh[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN];
+  if (!X25519(dh, ephemeral_private, public_key_r)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_PEER_KEY);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t kem_context[KEM_CONTEXT_LEN];
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(kem_context, ephemeral_public, X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN);
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(kem_context + X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN, public_key_r,
+                 X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN);
+  if (!hpke_extract_and_expand(EVP_sha256(), out_shared_secret,
+                               SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, dh, kem_context)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int hpke_decap(const EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke,
+                      uint8_t out_shared_secret[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH],
+                      const uint8_t enc[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
+                      const uint8_t public_key_r[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
+                      const uint8_t secret_key_r[X25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN]) {
+  uint8_t dh[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN];
+  if (!X25519(dh, secret_key_r, enc)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_PEER_KEY);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  uint8_t kem_context[KEM_CONTEXT_LEN];
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(kem_context, enc, X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN);
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(kem_context + X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN, public_key_r,
+                 X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN);
+  if (!hpke_extract_and_expand(EVP_sha256(), out_shared_secret,
+                               SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, dh, kem_context)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+void EVP_HPKE_CTX_init(EVP_HPKE_CTX *ctx) {
+  OPENSSL_memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(EVP_HPKE_CTX));
+  EVP_AEAD_CTX_zero(&ctx->aead_ctx);
+}
+
+void EVP_HPKE_CTX_cleanup(EVP_HPKE_CTX *ctx) {
+  EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->aead_ctx);
+}
+
+int EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_base_s_x25519(
+    EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint8_t out_enc[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
+    uint16_t kdf_id, uint16_t aead_id,
+    const uint8_t peer_public_value[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
+    const uint8_t *info, size_t info_len) {
+  // The GenerateKeyPair() step technically belongs in the KEM's Encap()
+  // function, but we've moved it up a layer to make it easier for tests to
+  // inject an ephemeral keypair.
+  uint8_t ephemeral_private[X25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN];
+  X25519_keypair(out_enc, ephemeral_private);
+  return EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_base_s_x25519_for_test(
+      hpke, kdf_id, aead_id, peer_public_value, info, info_len,
+      ephemeral_private, out_enc);
+}
+
+int EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_base_s_x25519_for_test(
+    EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint16_t kdf_id, uint16_t aead_id,
+    const uint8_t peer_public_value[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
+    const uint8_t *info, size_t info_len,
+    const uint8_t ephemeral_private[X25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN],
+    const uint8_t ephemeral_public[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN]) {
+  hpke->is_sender = 1;
+  hpke->kdf_id = kdf_id;
+  hpke->aead_id = aead_id;
+  hpke->hkdf_md = hpke_get_kdf(kdf_id);
+  if (hpke->hkdf_md == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  uint8_t shared_secret[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+  if (!hpke_encap(hpke, shared_secret, peer_public_value, ephemeral_private,
+                  ephemeral_public) ||
+      !hpke_key_schedule(hpke, HPKE_MODE_BASE, shared_secret,
+                         sizeof(shared_secret), info, info_len, NULL, 0, NULL,
+                         0)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_base_r_x25519(
+    EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint16_t kdf_id, uint16_t aead_id,
+    const uint8_t enc[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
+    const uint8_t public_key[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
+    const uint8_t private_key[X25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN], const uint8_t *info,
+    size_t info_len) {
+  hpke->is_sender = 0;
+  hpke->kdf_id = kdf_id;
+  hpke->aead_id = aead_id;
+  hpke->hkdf_md = hpke_get_kdf(kdf_id);
+  if (hpke->hkdf_md == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  uint8_t shared_secret[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+  if (!hpke_decap(hpke, shared_secret, enc, public_key, private_key) ||
+      !hpke_key_schedule(hpke, HPKE_MODE_BASE, shared_secret,
+                         sizeof(shared_secret), info, info_len, NULL, 0, NULL,
+                         0)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_psk_s_x25519(
+    EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint8_t out_enc[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
+    uint16_t kdf_id, uint16_t aead_id,
+    const uint8_t peer_public_value[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
+    const uint8_t *info, size_t info_len, const uint8_t *psk, size_t psk_len,
+    const uint8_t *psk_id, size_t psk_id_len) {
+  // The GenerateKeyPair() step technically belongs in the KEM's Encap()
+  // function, but we've moved it up a layer to make it easier for tests to
+  // inject an ephemeral keypair.
+  uint8_t ephemeral_private[X25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN];
+  X25519_keypair(out_enc, ephemeral_private);
+  return EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_psk_s_x25519_for_test(
+      hpke, kdf_id, aead_id, peer_public_value, info, info_len, psk, psk_len,
+      psk_id, psk_id_len, ephemeral_private, out_enc);
+}
+
+int EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_psk_s_x25519_for_test(
+    EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint16_t kdf_id, uint16_t aead_id,
+    const uint8_t peer_public_value[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
+    const uint8_t *info, size_t info_len, const uint8_t *psk, size_t psk_len,
+    const uint8_t *psk_id, size_t psk_id_len,
+    const uint8_t ephemeral_private[X25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN],
+    const uint8_t ephemeral_public[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN]) {
+  hpke->is_sender = 1;
+  hpke->kdf_id = kdf_id;
+  hpke->aead_id = aead_id;
+  hpke->hkdf_md = hpke_get_kdf(kdf_id);
+  if (hpke->hkdf_md == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  uint8_t shared_secret[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+  if (!hpke_encap(hpke, shared_secret, peer_public_value, ephemeral_private,
+                  ephemeral_public) ||
+      !hpke_key_schedule(hpke, HPKE_MODE_PSK, shared_secret,
+                         sizeof(shared_secret), info, info_len, psk, psk_len,
+                         psk_id, psk_id_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_HPKE_CTX_setup_psk_r_x25519(
+    EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint16_t kdf_id, uint16_t aead_id,
+    const uint8_t enc[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
+    const uint8_t public_key[X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN],
+    const uint8_t private_key[X25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN], const uint8_t *info,
+    size_t info_len, const uint8_t *psk, size_t psk_len, const uint8_t *psk_id,
+    size_t psk_id_len) {
+  hpke->is_sender = 0;
+  hpke->kdf_id = kdf_id;
+  hpke->aead_id = aead_id;
+  hpke->hkdf_md = hpke_get_kdf(kdf_id);
+  if (hpke->hkdf_md == NULL) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  uint8_t shared_secret[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+  if (!hpke_decap(hpke, shared_secret, enc, public_key, private_key) ||
+      !hpke_key_schedule(hpke, HPKE_MODE_PSK, shared_secret,
+                         sizeof(shared_secret), info, info_len, psk, psk_len,
+                         psk_id, psk_id_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static void hpke_nonce(const EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint8_t *out_nonce,
+                       size_t nonce_len) {
+  assert(nonce_len >= 8);
+
+  // Write padded big-endian bytes of |hpke->seq| to |out_nonce|.
+  OPENSSL_memset(out_nonce, 0, nonce_len);
+  uint64_t seq_copy = hpke->seq;
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+    out_nonce[nonce_len - i - 1] = seq_copy & 0xff;
+    seq_copy >>= 8;
+  }
+
+  // XOR the encoded sequence with the |hpke->nonce|.
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < nonce_len; i++) {
+    out_nonce[i] ^= hpke->nonce[i];
+  }
+}
+
+size_t EVP_HPKE_CTX_max_overhead(const EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke) {
+  assert(hpke->is_sender);
+  return EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(hpke->aead_ctx.aead);
+}
+
+int EVP_HPKE_CTX_open(EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
+                      size_t max_out_len, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
+                      const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
+  if (hpke->is_sender) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (hpke->seq == UINT64_MAX) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t nonce[EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH];
+  const size_t nonce_len = EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(hpke->aead_ctx.aead);
+  hpke_nonce(hpke, nonce, nonce_len);
+
+  if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(&hpke->aead_ctx, out, out_len, max_out_len, nonce,
+                         nonce_len, in, in_len, ad, ad_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  hpke->seq++;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_HPKE_CTX_seal(EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
+                      size_t max_out_len, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
+                      const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
+  if (!hpke->is_sender) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (hpke->seq == UINT64_MAX) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t nonce[EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH];
+  const size_t nonce_len = EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(hpke->aead_ctx.aead);
+  hpke_nonce(hpke, nonce, nonce_len);
+
+  if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(&hpke->aead_ctx, out, out_len, max_out_len, nonce,
+                         nonce_len, in, in_len, ad, ad_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  hpke->seq++;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int EVP_HPKE_CTX_export(const EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke, uint8_t *out,
+                        size_t secret_len, const uint8_t *context,
+                        size_t context_len) {
+  uint8_t suite_id[HPKE_SUITE_ID_LEN];
+  if (!hpke_build_suite_id(suite_id, hpke->kdf_id, hpke->aead_id)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  static const char kExportExpandLabel[] = "sec";
+  if (!hpke_labeled_expand(hpke->hkdf_md, out, secret_len,
+                           hpke->exporter_secret, EVP_MD_size(hpke->hkdf_md),
+                           suite_id, sizeof(suite_id), kExportExpandLabel,
+                           context, context_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return 1;
+}