grpc 1.28.0 → 1.37.0

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/poly1305/poly1305.c

@@ -46,10 +46,14 @@ struct poly1305_state_st {
   uint32_t s1, s2, s3, s4;
   uint32_t h0, h1, h2, h3, h4;
   uint8_t buf[16];
-  unsigned int buf_used;
+  size_t buf_used;
   uint8_t key[16];
 };
 
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(
+    sizeof(struct poly1305_state_st) + 63 <= sizeof(poly1305_state),
+    "poly1305_state isn't large enough to hold aligned poly1305_state_st");
+
 static inline struct poly1305_state_st *poly1305_aligned_state(
     poly1305_state *state) {
   return (struct poly1305_state_st *)(((uintptr_t)state + 63) & ~63);
@@ -200,7 +204,6 @@ void CRYPTO_poly1305_init(poly1305_state *statep, const uint8_t key[32]) {
 
 void CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305_state *statep, const uint8_t *in,
                             size_t in_len) {
-  unsigned int i;
   struct poly1305_state_st *state = poly1305_aligned_state(statep);
 
 #if defined(OPENSSL_POLY1305_NEON)
@@ -211,11 +214,11 @@ void CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305_state *statep, const uint8_t *in,
 #endif
 
   if (state->buf_used) {
-    unsigned todo = 16 - state->buf_used;
+    size_t todo = 16 - state->buf_used;
     if (todo > in_len) {
-      todo = (unsigned)in_len;
+      todo = in_len;
     }
-    for (i = 0; i < todo; i++) {
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < todo; i++) {
       state->buf[state->buf_used + i] = in[i];
     }
     state->buf_used += todo;
@@ -236,10 +239,10 @@ void CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305_state *statep, const uint8_t *in,
   }
 
   if (in_len) {
-    for (i = 0; i < in_len; i++) {
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < in_len; i++) {
       state->buf[i] = in[i];
     }
-    state->buf_used = (unsigned)in_len;
+    state->buf_used = in_len;
   }
 }
 

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/poly1305/poly1305_arm.c

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ extern void addmulmod(fe1305x2 *r, const fe1305x2 *x, const fe1305x2 *y,
                       const fe1305x2 *c);
 
 extern int blocks(fe1305x2 *h, const fe1305x2 *precomp, const uint8_t *in,
-                  unsigned int inlen);
+                  size_t inlen);
 
 static void freeze(fe1305x2 *r) {
   int i;
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ static void fe1305x2_tobytearray(uint8_t r[16], fe1305x2 *x) {
 }
 
 static void fe1305x2_frombytearray(fe1305x2 *r, const uint8_t *x, size_t xlen) {
-  unsigned i;
+  size_t i;
   uint8_t t[17];
 
   for (i = 0; (i < 16) && (i < xlen); i++) {
@@ -179,17 +179,20 @@ static const alignas(16) fe1305x2 zero;
 struct poly1305_state_st {
   uint8_t data[sizeof(fe1305x2[5]) + 128];
   uint8_t buf[32];
-  unsigned int buf_used;
+  size_t buf_used;
   uint8_t key[16];
 };
 
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(
+    sizeof(struct poly1305_state_st) + 63 <= sizeof(poly1305_state),
+    "poly1305_state isn't large enough to hold aligned poly1305_state_st.");
+
 void CRYPTO_poly1305_init_neon(poly1305_state *state, const uint8_t key[32]) {
   struct poly1305_state_st *st = (struct poly1305_state_st *)(state);
   fe1305x2 *const r = (fe1305x2 *)(st->data + (15 & (-(int)st->data)));
   fe1305x2 *const h = r + 1;
   fe1305x2 *const c = h + 1;
   fe1305x2 *const precomp = c + 1;
-  unsigned int j;
 
   r->v[1] = r->v[0] = 0x3ffffff & load32(key);
   r->v[3] = r->v[2] = 0x3ffff03 & (load32(key + 3) >> 2);
@@ -197,7 +200,7 @@ void CRYPTO_poly1305_init_neon(poly1305_state *state, const uint8_t key[32]) {
   r->v[7] = r->v[6] = 0x3f03fff & (load32(key + 9) >> 6);
   r->v[9] = r->v[8] = 0x00fffff & (load32(key + 12) >> 8);
 
-  for (j = 0; j < 10; j++) {
+  for (size_t j = 0; j < 10; j++) {
     h->v[j] = 0;  // XXX: should fast-forward a bit
   }
 
@@ -215,14 +218,13 @@ void CRYPTO_poly1305_update_neon(poly1305_state *state, const uint8_t *in,
   fe1305x2 *const h = r + 1;
   fe1305x2 *const c = h + 1;
   fe1305x2 *const precomp = c + 1;
-  unsigned int i;
 
   if (st->buf_used) {
-    unsigned int todo = 32 - st->buf_used;
+    size_t todo = 32 - st->buf_used;
     if (todo > in_len) {
       todo = in_len;
     }
-    for (i = 0; i < todo; i++) {
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < todo; i++) {
       st->buf[st->buf_used + i] = in[i];
     }
     st->buf_used += todo;
@@ -232,7 +234,7 @@ void CRYPTO_poly1305_update_neon(poly1305_state *state, const uint8_t *in,
     if (st->buf_used == sizeof(st->buf) && in_len) {
       addmulmod(h, h, precomp, &zero);
       fe1305x2_frombytearray(c, st->buf, sizeof(st->buf));
-      for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
+      for (size_t i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
         h->v[i] += c->v[i];
       }
       st->buf_used = 0;
@@ -240,7 +242,7 @@ void CRYPTO_poly1305_update_neon(poly1305_state *state, const uint8_t *in,
   }
 
   while (in_len > 32) {
-    unsigned int tlen = 1048576;
+    size_t tlen = 1048576;
     if (in_len < tlen) {
       tlen = in_len;
     }
@@ -250,7 +252,7 @@ void CRYPTO_poly1305_update_neon(poly1305_state *state, const uint8_t *in,
   }
 
   if (in_len) {
-    for (i = 0; i < in_len; i++) {
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < in_len; i++) {
       st->buf[i] = in[i];
     }
     st->buf_used = in_len;

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/poly1305/poly1305_vec.c

@@ -92,6 +92,10 @@ typedef struct poly1305_state_internal_t {
 } poly1305_state_internal; /* 448 bytes total + 63 bytes for
                               alignment = 511 bytes raw */
 
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(
+    sizeof(struct poly1305_state_internal_t) + 63 <= sizeof(poly1305_state),
+    "poly1305_state isn't large enough to hold aligned poly1305_state_internal_t");
+
 static inline poly1305_state_internal *poly1305_aligned_state(
     poly1305_state *state) {
   return (poly1305_state_internal *)(((uint64_t)state + 63) & ~63);

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/rand_extra/deterministic.c

@@ -30,27 +30,23 @@
 // multi-threaded program, replace this with a thread-local. (A mutex would not
 // be deterministic.)
 static uint64_t g_num_calls = 0;
+static struct CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX g_num_calls_lock = CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_INIT;
 
 void RAND_reset_for_fuzzing(void) { g_num_calls = 0; }
 
 void CRYPTO_sysrand(uint8_t *out, size_t requested) {
   static const uint8_t kZeroKey[32];
 
+  CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_lock_write(&g_num_calls_lock);
+  uint64_t num_calls = g_num_calls++;
+  CRYPTO_STATIC_MUTEX_unlock_write(&g_num_calls_lock);
+
   uint8_t nonce[12];
   OPENSSL_memset(nonce, 0, sizeof(nonce));
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(nonce, &g_num_calls, sizeof(g_num_calls));
+  OPENSSL_memcpy(nonce, &num_calls, sizeof(num_calls));
 
   OPENSSL_memset(out, 0, requested);
   CRYPTO_chacha_20(out, out, requested, kZeroKey, nonce, 0);
-  g_num_calls++;
-}
-
-void CRYPTO_sysrand_for_seed(uint8_t *out, size_t requested) {
-  CRYPTO_sysrand(out, requested);
-}
-
-void CRYPTO_sysrand_if_available(uint8_t *out, size_t requested) {
-  CRYPTO_sysrand(out, requested);
 }
 
 #endif  // BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_DETERMINISTIC_MODE

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/rand_extra/passive.c

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2020, Google Inc.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
+ * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
+
+#include <openssl/base.h>
+#include "../fipsmodule/rand/internal.h"
+
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS_PASSIVE_ENTROPY)
+
+// RAND_need_entropy is called by the FIPS module when it has blocked because of
+// a lack of entropy. This signal is used as an indication to feed it more.
+void RAND_need_entropy(size_t bytes_needed) {
+  uint8_t buf[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN * BORINGSSL_FIPS_OVERREAD];
+  size_t todo = sizeof(buf);
+  if (todo > bytes_needed) {
+    todo = bytes_needed;
+  }
+
+  int used_cpu;
+  CRYPTO_get_seed_entropy(buf, todo, &used_cpu);
+  RAND_load_entropy(buf, todo, used_cpu);
+}
+
+#endif  // BORINGSSL_FIPS_PASSIVE_ENTROPY

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/rand_extra/rand_extra.c

@@ -63,6 +63,10 @@ RAND_METHOD *RAND_SSLeay(void) {
   return (RAND_METHOD*) &kSSLeayMethod;
 }
 
+RAND_METHOD *RAND_OpenSSL(void) {
+  return RAND_SSLeay();
+}
+
 const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void) { return RAND_SSLeay(); }
 
 void RAND_set_rand_method(const RAND_METHOD *method) {}

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/rand_extra/windows.c

@@ -23,12 +23,18 @@ OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(push, 3))
 
 #include <windows.h>
 
+#if WINAPI_FAMILY_PARTITION(WINAPI_PARTITION_APP) && \
+    !WINAPI_FAMILY_PARTITION(WINAPI_PARTITION_DESKTOP)
+#include <bcrypt.h>
+OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(comment(lib, "bcrypt.lib"))
+#else
 // #define needed to link in RtlGenRandom(), a.k.a. SystemFunction036.  See the
 // "Community Additions" comment on MSDN here:
 // http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa387694.aspx
 #define SystemFunction036 NTAPI SystemFunction036
 #include <ntsecapi.h>
 #undef SystemFunction036
+#endif  // WINAPI_PARTITION_APP && !WINAPI_PARTITION_DESKTOP
 
 OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(pop))
 
@@ -41,7 +47,17 @@ void CRYPTO_sysrand(uint8_t *out, size_t requested) {
     if (requested < output_bytes_this_pass) {
       output_bytes_this_pass = (ULONG)requested;
     }
+    // On non-UWP configurations, use RtlGenRandom instead of BCryptGenRandom
+    // to avoid accessing resources that may be unavailable inside the
+    // Chromium sandbox. See https://crbug.com/boringssl/307
+#if WINAPI_FAMILY_PARTITION(WINAPI_PARTITION_APP) && \
+    !WINAPI_FAMILY_PARTITION(WINAPI_PARTITION_DESKTOP)
+    if (!BCRYPT_SUCCESS(BCryptGenRandom(
+            /*hAlgorithm=*/NULL, out, output_bytes_this_pass,
+            BCRYPT_USE_SYSTEM_PREFERRED_RNG))) {
+#else
     if (RtlGenRandom(out, output_bytes_this_pass) == FALSE) {
+#endif  // WINAPI_PARTITION_APP && !WINAPI_PARTITION_DESKTOP
       abort();
     }
     requested -= output_bytes_this_pass;

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/stack/stack.c

@@ -57,7 +57,6 @@
 #include <openssl/stack.h>
 
 #include <assert.h>
-#include <string.h>
 
 #include <openssl/mem.h>
 
@@ -69,11 +68,9 @@
 static const size_t kMinSize = 4;
 
 _STACK *sk_new(stack_cmp_func comp) {
-  _STACK *ret;
-
-  ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(_STACK));
+  _STACK *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(_STACK));
   if (ret == NULL) {
-    goto err;
+    return NULL;
   }
   OPENSSL_memset(ret, 0, sizeof(_STACK));
 
@@ -331,23 +328,20 @@ void *sk_pop(_STACK *sk) {
 }
 
 _STACK *sk_dup(const _STACK *sk) {
-  _STACK *ret;
-  void **s;
-
   if (sk == NULL) {
     return NULL;
   }
 
-  ret = sk_new(sk->comp);
+  _STACK *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(_STACK));
   if (ret == NULL) {
-    goto err;
+    return NULL;
   }
+  OPENSSL_memset(ret, 0, sizeof(_STACK));
 
-  s = (void **)OPENSSL_realloc(ret->data, sizeof(void *) * sk->num_alloc);
-  if (s == NULL) {
+  ret->data = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(void *) * sk->num_alloc);
+  if (ret->data == NULL) {
     goto err;
   }
-  ret->data = s;
 
   ret->num = sk->num;
   OPENSSL_memcpy(ret->data, sk->data, sizeof(void *) * sk->num);

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/thread_pthread.c

@@ -26,6 +26,10 @@
 
 OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(CRYPTO_MUTEX) >= sizeof(pthread_rwlock_t),
                       "CRYPTO_MUTEX is too small");
+#if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(alignof(CRYPTO_MUTEX) >= alignof(pthread_rwlock_t),
+                      "CRYPTO_MUTEX has insufficient alignment");
+#endif
 
 void CRYPTO_MUTEX_init(CRYPTO_MUTEX *lock) {
   if (pthread_rwlock_init((pthread_rwlock_t *) lock, NULL) != 0) {

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/thread_win.c

@@ -29,6 +29,10 @@ OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(pop))
 
 OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(CRYPTO_MUTEX) >= sizeof(SRWLOCK),
                       "CRYPTO_MUTEX is too small");
+#if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)
+OPENSSL_STATIC_ASSERT(alignof(CRYPTO_MUTEX) >= alignof(SRWLOCK),
+                      "CRYPTO_MUTEX has insufficient alignment");
+#endif
 
 static BOOL CALLBACK call_once_init(INIT_ONCE *once, void *arg, void **out) {
   void (**init)(void) = (void (**)(void))arg;

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/trust_token/internal.h

@@ -0,0 +1,318 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2019, Google Inc.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
+ * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_TRUST_TOKEN_INTERNAL_H
+#define OPENSSL_HEADER_TRUST_TOKEN_INTERNAL_H
+
+#include <openssl/base.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/ec_key.h>
+#include <openssl/nid.h>
+
+#include "../fipsmodule/ec/internal.h"
+
+#include <openssl/trust_token.h>
+
+
+#if defined(__cplusplus)
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+
+// For the following cryptographic schemes, we use P-384 instead of our usual
+// choice of P-256. See Appendix I of
+// https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/072/20200324:214215 which describes two attacks
+// which may affect smaller curves. In particular, p-1 for P-256 is smooth,
+// giving a low complexity for the p-1 attack. P-384's p-1 has a 281-bit prime
+// factor,
+// 3055465788140352002733946906144561090641249606160407884365391979704929268480326390471.
+// This lower-bounds the p-1 attack at O(2^140). The p+1 attack is lower-bounded
+// by O(p^(1/3)) or O(2^128), so we do not need to check the smoothness of p+1.
+
+
+// TRUST_TOKEN_NONCE_SIZE is the size of nonces used as part of the Trust_Token
+// protocol.
+#define TRUST_TOKEN_NONCE_SIZE 64
+
+typedef struct {
+  // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/334): These should store |EC_PRECOMP| so
+  // that |TRUST_TOKEN_finish_issuance| can use |ec_point_mul_scalar_precomp|.
+  EC_AFFINE pub0;
+  EC_AFFINE pub1;
+  EC_AFFINE pubs;
+} TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_KEY;
+
+typedef struct {
+  EC_SCALAR x0;
+  EC_SCALAR y0;
+  EC_SCALAR x1;
+  EC_SCALAR y1;
+  EC_SCALAR xs;
+  EC_SCALAR ys;
+  EC_AFFINE pub0;
+  EC_PRECOMP pub0_precomp;
+  EC_AFFINE pub1;
+  EC_PRECOMP pub1_precomp;
+  EC_AFFINE pubs;
+  EC_PRECOMP pubs_precomp;
+} TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY;
+
+// TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN represents the intermediate state a client keeps during
+// a Trust_Token issuance operation.
+typedef struct pmb_pretoken_st {
+  uint8_t t[TRUST_TOKEN_NONCE_SIZE];
+  EC_SCALAR r;
+  EC_AFFINE Tp;
+} TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN;
+
+// TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN_free releases the memory associated with |token|.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT void TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN_free(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN *token);
+
+DEFINE_STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN)
+
+
+// PMBTokens.
+//
+// PMBTokens is described in https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/072/20200324:214215
+// and provides anonymous tokens with private metadata. We implement the
+// construction with validity verification, described in appendix H,
+// construction 6.
+
+// The following functions implement the corresponding |TRUST_TOKENS_METHOD|
+// functions for |TRUST_TOKENS_experiment_v1|'s PMBTokens construction which
+// uses P-384.
+int pmbtoken_exp1_generate_key(CBB *out_private, CBB *out_public);
+int pmbtoken_exp1_client_key_from_bytes(TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
+                                        const uint8_t *in, size_t len);
+int pmbtoken_exp1_issuer_key_from_bytes(TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
+                                        const uint8_t *in, size_t len);
+STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN) * pmbtoken_exp1_blind(CBB *cbb, size_t count);
+int pmbtoken_exp1_sign(const TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key, CBB *cbb, CBS *cbs,
+                       size_t num_requested, size_t num_to_issue,
+                       uint8_t private_metadata);
+STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN) *
+    pmbtoken_exp1_unblind(const TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
+                          const STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN) * pretokens,
+                          CBS *cbs, size_t count, uint32_t key_id);
+int pmbtoken_exp1_read(const TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
+                       uint8_t out_nonce[TRUST_TOKEN_NONCE_SIZE],
+                       uint8_t *out_private_metadata, const uint8_t *token,
+                       size_t token_len);
+
+// pmbtoken_exp1_get_h_for_testing returns H in uncompressed coordinates. This
+// function is used to confirm H was computed as expected.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int pmbtoken_exp1_get_h_for_testing(uint8_t out[97]);
+
+// The following functions implement the corresponding |TRUST_TOKENS_METHOD|
+// functions for |TRUST_TOKENS_experiment_v2|'s PMBTokens construction which
+// uses P-384.
+int pmbtoken_exp2_generate_key(CBB *out_private, CBB *out_public);
+int pmbtoken_exp2_client_key_from_bytes(TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
+                                        const uint8_t *in, size_t len);
+int pmbtoken_exp2_issuer_key_from_bytes(TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
+                                        const uint8_t *in, size_t len);
+STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN) * pmbtoken_exp2_blind(CBB *cbb, size_t count);
+int pmbtoken_exp2_sign(const TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key, CBB *cbb, CBS *cbs,
+                       size_t num_requested, size_t num_to_issue,
+                       uint8_t private_metadata);
+STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN) *
+    pmbtoken_exp2_unblind(const TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
+                          const STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN) * pretokens,
+                          CBS *cbs, size_t count, uint32_t key_id);
+int pmbtoken_exp2_read(const TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
+                       uint8_t out_nonce[TRUST_TOKEN_NONCE_SIZE],
+                       uint8_t *out_private_metadata, const uint8_t *token,
+                       size_t token_len);
+
+// pmbtoken_exp2_get_h_for_testing returns H in uncompressed coordinates. This
+// function is used to confirm H was computed as expected.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int pmbtoken_exp2_get_h_for_testing(uint8_t out[97]);
+
+
+// VOPRF.
+//
+// VOPRFs are described in https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-voprf-04
+// and provide anonymous tokens. This implementation uses TrustToken DSTs and
+// the DLEQ batching primitive from
+// https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/072/20200324:214215.
+// VOPRF only uses the |pub|' field of the TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_KEY and
+// |xs|/|pubs| fields of the TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY.
+
+// The following functions implement the corresponding |TRUST_TOKENS_METHOD|
+// functions for |TRUST_TOKENS_experiment_v2|'s VOPRF construction which uses
+// P-384.
+int voprf_exp2_generate_key(CBB *out_private, CBB *out_public);
+int voprf_exp2_client_key_from_bytes(TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
+                                     const uint8_t *in, size_t len);
+int voprf_exp2_issuer_key_from_bytes(TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
+                                     const uint8_t *in, size_t len);
+STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN) * voprf_exp2_blind(CBB *cbb, size_t count);
+int voprf_exp2_sign(const TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key, CBB *cbb, CBS *cbs,
+                    size_t num_requested, size_t num_to_issue,
+                    uint8_t private_metadata);
+STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN) *
+    voprf_exp2_unblind(const TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
+                       const STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN) * pretokens,
+                       CBS *cbs, size_t count, uint32_t key_id);
+int voprf_exp2_read(const TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
+                    uint8_t out_nonce[TRUST_TOKEN_NONCE_SIZE],
+                    uint8_t *out_private_metadata, const uint8_t *token,
+                    size_t token_len);
+
+
+// Trust Tokens internals.
+
+struct trust_token_method_st {
+  // generate_key generates a fresh keypair and writes their serialized
+  // forms into |out_private| and |out_public|. It returns one on success and
+  // zero on failure.
+  int (*generate_key)(CBB *out_private, CBB *out_public);
+
+  // client_key_from_bytes decodes a client key from |in| and sets |key|
+  // to the resulting key. It returns one on success and zero
+  // on failure.
+  int (*client_key_from_bytes)(TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key, const uint8_t *in,
+                               size_t len);
+
+  // issuer_key_from_bytes decodes a issuer key from |in| and sets |key|
+  // to the resulting key. It returns one on success and zero
+  // on failure.
+  int (*issuer_key_from_bytes)(TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key, const uint8_t *in,
+                               size_t len);
+
+  // blind generates a new issuance request for |count| tokens. On
+  // success, it returns a newly-allocated |STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN)| and
+  // writes a request to the issuer to |cbb|. On failure, it returns NULL. The
+  // |STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN)|s should be passed to |pmbtoken_unblind| when
+  // the server responds.
+  //
+  // This function implements the AT.Usr0 operation.
+  STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN) * (*blind)(CBB *cbb, size_t count);
+
+  // sign parses a request for |num_requested| tokens from |cbs| and
+  // issues |num_to_issue| tokens with |key| and a private metadata value of
+  // |private_metadata|. It then writes the response to |cbb|. It returns one on
+  // success and zero on failure.
+  //
+  // This function implements the AT.Sig operation.
+  int (*sign)(const TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key, CBB *cbb, CBS *cbs,
+              size_t num_requested, size_t num_to_issue,
+              uint8_t private_metadata);
+
+  // unblind processes an issuance response for |count| tokens from |cbs|
+  // and unblinds the signed tokens. |pretokens| are the pre-tokens returned
+  // from the corresponding |blind| call. On success, the function returns a
+  // newly-allocated |STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN)| containing the resulting tokens.
+  // Each token's serialization will have |key_id| prepended. Otherwise, it
+  // returns NULL.
+  //
+  // This function implements the AT.Usr1 operation.
+  STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN) *
+      (*unblind)(const TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_KEY *key,
+                 const STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN) * pretokens, CBS *cbs,
+                 size_t count, uint32_t key_id);
+
+  // read parses a PMBToken from |token| and verifies it using |key|. On
+  // success, it returns one and stores the nonce and private metadata bit in
+  // |out_nonce| and |*out_private_metadata|. Otherwise, it returns zero. Note
+  // that, unlike the output of |unblind|, |token| does not have a
+  // four-byte key ID prepended.
+  int (*read)(const TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY *key,
+              uint8_t out_nonce[TRUST_TOKEN_NONCE_SIZE],
+              uint8_t *out_private_metadata, const uint8_t *token,
+              size_t token_len);
+
+  // whether the construction supports private metadata.
+  int has_private_metadata;
+
+  // max keys that can be configured.
+  size_t max_keys;
+
+  // whether the SRR is part of the protocol.
+  int has_srr;
+};
+
+// Structure representing a single Trust Token public key with the specified ID.
+struct trust_token_client_key_st {
+  uint32_t id;
+  TRUST_TOKEN_CLIENT_KEY key;
+};
+
+// Structure representing a single Trust Token private key with the specified
+// ID.
+struct trust_token_issuer_key_st {
+  uint32_t id;
+  TRUST_TOKEN_ISSUER_KEY key;
+};
+
+struct trust_token_client_st {
+  const TRUST_TOKEN_METHOD *method;
+
+  // max_batchsize is the maximum supported batchsize.
+  uint16_t max_batchsize;
+
+  // keys is the set of public keys that are supported by the client for
+  // issuance/redemptions.
+  struct trust_token_client_key_st keys[6];
+
+  // num_keys is the number of keys currently configured.
+  size_t num_keys;
+
+  // pretokens is the intermediate state during an active issuance.
+  STACK_OF(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN)* pretokens;
+
+  // srr_key is the public key used to verify the signature of the SRR.
+  EVP_PKEY *srr_key;
+};
+
+
+struct trust_token_issuer_st {
+  const TRUST_TOKEN_METHOD *method;
+
+  // max_batchsize is the maximum supported batchsize.
+  uint16_t max_batchsize;
+
+  // keys is the set of private keys that are supported by the issuer for
+  // issuance/redemptions. The public metadata is an index into this list of
+  // keys.
+  struct trust_token_issuer_key_st keys[6];
+
+  // num_keys is the number of keys currently configured.
+  size_t num_keys;
+
+  // srr_key is the private key used to sign the SRR.
+  EVP_PKEY *srr_key;
+
+  // metadata_key is the secret material used to encode the private metadata bit
+  // in the SRR.
+  uint8_t *metadata_key;
+  size_t metadata_key_len;
+};
+
+
+#if defined(__cplusplus)
+}  // extern C
+
+extern "C++" {
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
+
+BORINGSSL_MAKE_DELETER(TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN, TRUST_TOKEN_PRETOKEN_free)
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
+
+}  // extern C++
+#endif
+
+#endif  // OPENSSL_HEADER_TRUST_TOKEN_INTERNAL_H