grpc 1.28.0 → 1.37.0

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/fipsmodule/cipher/e_aes.c

@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@
 OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(push))
 OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(disable: 4702))  // Unreachable code.
 
+#define AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH 12
+
 #if defined(BSAES)
 static void vpaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks_with_bsaes(const uint8_t *in,
                                                   uint8_t *out, size_t blocks,
@@ -630,7 +632,7 @@ DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_128_gcm_generic) {
   out->nid = NID_aes_128_gcm;
   out->block_size = 1;
   out->key_len = 16;
-  out->iv_len = 12;
+  out->iv_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
   out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX) + EVP_AES_GCM_CTX_PADDING;
   out->flags = EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY |
                EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT |
@@ -698,7 +700,7 @@ DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_192_gcm_generic) {
   out->nid = NID_aes_192_gcm;
   out->block_size = 1;
   out->key_len = 24;
-  out->iv_len = 12;
+  out->iv_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
   out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX) + EVP_AES_GCM_CTX_PADDING;
   out->flags = EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY |
                EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT |
@@ -766,7 +768,7 @@ DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(EVP_CIPHER, aes_256_gcm_generic) {
   out->nid = NID_aes_256_gcm;
   out->block_size = 1;
   out->key_len = 32;
-  out->iv_len = 12;
+  out->iv_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
   out->ctx_size = sizeof(EVP_AES_GCM_CTX) + EVP_AES_GCM_CTX_PADDING;
   out->flags = EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY |
                EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT |
@@ -931,21 +933,19 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
 
 static void aead_aes_gcm_cleanup(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx) {}
 
-static int aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
-                                     uint8_t *out_tag, size_t *out_tag_len,
-                                     size_t max_out_tag_len,
-                                     const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
-                                     const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
-                                     const uint8_t *extra_in,
-                                     size_t extra_in_len,
-                                     const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
-  struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx = (struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *) &ctx->state;
-
-  if (extra_in_len + ctx->tag_len < ctx->tag_len) {
+static int aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter_impl(
+    const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx,
+    uint8_t *out, uint8_t *out_tag, size_t *out_tag_len, size_t max_out_tag_len,
+    const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
+    const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
+    const uint8_t *extra_in, size_t extra_in_len,
+    const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len,
+    size_t tag_len) {
+  if (extra_in_len + tag_len < tag_len) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_TOO_LARGE);
     return 0;
   }
-  if (max_out_tag_len < extra_in_len + ctx->tag_len) {
+  if (max_out_tag_len < extra_in_len + tag_len) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
     return 0;
   }
@@ -989,18 +989,35 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
     }
   }
 
-  CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gcm, out_tag + extra_in_len, ctx->tag_len);
-  *out_tag_len = ctx->tag_len + extra_in_len;
+  CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gcm, out_tag + extra_in_len, tag_len);
+  *out_tag_len = tag_len + extra_in_len;
 
   return 1;
 }
 
-static int aead_aes_gcm_open_gather(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
-                                    const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
-                                    const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
-                                    const uint8_t *in_tag, size_t in_tag_len,
-                                    const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
-  struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx = (struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *) &ctx->state;
+static int aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
+                                     uint8_t *out_tag, size_t *out_tag_len,
+                                     size_t max_out_tag_len,
+                                     const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
+                                     const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
+                                     const uint8_t *extra_in,
+                                     size_t extra_in_len,
+                                     const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
+  const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx =
+      (const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *)&ctx->state;
+  return aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter_impl(
+      gcm_ctx, out, out_tag, out_tag_len, max_out_tag_len, nonce, nonce_len, in,
+      in_len, extra_in, extra_in_len, ad, ad_len, ctx->tag_len);
+}
+
+static int aead_aes_gcm_open_gather_impl(const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx,
+                                         uint8_t *out,
+                                         const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
+                                         const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
+                                         const uint8_t *in_tag,
+                                         size_t in_tag_len,
+                                         const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len,
+                                         size_t tag_len) {
   uint8_t tag[EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN];
 
   if (nonce_len == 0) {
@@ -1008,7 +1025,7 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_open_gather(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
     return 0;
   }
 
-  if (in_tag_len != ctx->tag_len) {
+  if (in_tag_len != tag_len) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
     return 0;
   }
@@ -1035,8 +1052,8 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_open_gather(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
     }
   }
 
-  CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gcm, tag, ctx->tag_len);
-  if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, in_tag, ctx->tag_len) != 0) {
+  CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gcm, tag, tag_len);
+  if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tag, in_tag, tag_len) != 0) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
     return 0;
   }
@@ -1044,11 +1061,22 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_open_gather(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
   return 1;
 }
 
+static int aead_aes_gcm_open_gather(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
+                                    const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
+                                    const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
+                                    const uint8_t *in_tag, size_t in_tag_len,
+                                    const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
+  struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx = (struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *)&ctx->state;
+  return aead_aes_gcm_open_gather_impl(gcm_ctx, out, nonce, nonce_len, in,
+                                       in_len, in_tag, in_tag_len, ad, ad_len,
+                                       ctx->tag_len);
+}
+
 DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm) {
   memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
 
   out->key_len = 16;
-  out->nonce_len = 12;
+  out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
   out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
   out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
   out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
@@ -1063,7 +1091,7 @@ DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_192_gcm) {
   memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
 
   out->key_len = 24;
-  out->nonce_len = 12;
+  out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
   out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
   out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
   out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
@@ -1078,7 +1106,7 @@ DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm) {
   memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
 
   out->key_len = 32;
-  out->nonce_len = 12;
+  out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
   out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
   out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
   out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
@@ -1089,6 +1117,116 @@ DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm) {
   out->open_gather = aead_aes_gcm_open_gather;
 }
 
+static int aead_aes_gcm_init_randnonce(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key,
+                                       size_t key_len,
+                                       size_t requested_tag_len) {
+  if (requested_tag_len != EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH) {
+    if (requested_tag_len < AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+      return 0;
+    }
+    requested_tag_len -= AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
+  }
+
+  if (!aead_aes_gcm_init(ctx, key, key_len, requested_tag_len)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  ctx->tag_len += AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter_randnonce(
+    const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx,
+    uint8_t *out, uint8_t *out_tag, size_t *out_tag_len, size_t max_out_tag_len,
+    const uint8_t *external_nonce, size_t external_nonce_len,
+    const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
+    const uint8_t *extra_in, size_t extra_in_len,
+    const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
+  if (external_nonce_len != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t nonce[AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH];
+  if (max_out_tag_len < sizeof(nonce)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  RAND_bytes(nonce, sizeof(nonce));
+  const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx =
+      (const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *)&ctx->state;
+  if (!aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter_impl(gcm_ctx, out, out_tag, out_tag_len,
+                                      max_out_tag_len - AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH,
+                                      nonce, sizeof(nonce), in, in_len,
+                                      extra_in, extra_in_len, ad, ad_len,
+                                      ctx->tag_len - AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  assert(*out_tag_len + sizeof(nonce) <= max_out_tag_len);
+  memcpy(out_tag + *out_tag_len, nonce, sizeof(nonce));
+  *out_tag_len += sizeof(nonce);
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int aead_aes_gcm_open_gather_randnonce(
+    const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out,
+    const uint8_t *external_nonce, size_t external_nonce_len,
+    const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
+    const uint8_t *in_tag, size_t in_tag_len,
+    const uint8_t *ad, size_t ad_len) {
+  if (external_nonce_len != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_INVALID_NONCE_SIZE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (in_tag_len < AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  const uint8_t *nonce = in_tag + in_tag_len - AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
+
+  const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *gcm_ctx =
+      (const struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx *)&ctx->state;
+  return aead_aes_gcm_open_gather_impl(
+      gcm_ctx, out, nonce, AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH, in, in_len, in_tag,
+      in_tag_len - AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH, ad, ad_len,
+      ctx->tag_len - AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH);
+}
+
+DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm_randnonce) {
+  memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
+
+  out->key_len = 16;
+  out->nonce_len = 0;
+  out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN + AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
+  out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN + AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
+  out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
+
+  out->init = aead_aes_gcm_init_randnonce;
+  out->cleanup = aead_aes_gcm_cleanup;
+  out->seal_scatter = aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter_randnonce;
+  out->open_gather = aead_aes_gcm_open_gather_randnonce;
+}
+
+DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm_randnonce) {
+  memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
+
+  out->key_len = 32;
+  out->nonce_len = 0;
+  out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN + AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
+  out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN + AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
+  out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
+
+  out->init = aead_aes_gcm_init_randnonce;
+  out->cleanup = aead_aes_gcm_cleanup;
+  out->seal_scatter = aead_aes_gcm_seal_scatter_randnonce;
+  out->open_gather = aead_aes_gcm_open_gather_randnonce;
+}
+
 struct aead_aes_gcm_tls12_ctx {
   struct aead_aes_gcm_ctx gcm_ctx;
   uint64_t min_next_nonce;
@@ -1128,7 +1266,7 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_tls12_seal_scatter(
   struct aead_aes_gcm_tls12_ctx *gcm_ctx =
       (struct aead_aes_gcm_tls12_ctx *) &ctx->state;
 
-  if (nonce_len != 12) {
+  if (nonce_len != AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_NONCE_SIZE);
     return 0;
   }
@@ -1155,7 +1293,7 @@ DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm_tls12) {
   memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
 
   out->key_len = 16;
-  out->nonce_len = 12;
+  out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
   out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
   out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
   out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
@@ -1170,7 +1308,7 @@ DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm_tls12) {
   memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
 
   out->key_len = 32;
-  out->nonce_len = 12;
+  out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
   out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
   out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
   out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
@@ -1223,7 +1361,7 @@ static int aead_aes_gcm_tls13_seal_scatter(
   struct aead_aes_gcm_tls13_ctx *gcm_ctx =
       (struct aead_aes_gcm_tls13_ctx *) &ctx->state;
 
-  if (nonce_len != 12) {
+  if (nonce_len != AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(CIPHER, CIPHER_R_UNSUPPORTED_NONCE_SIZE);
     return 0;
   }
@@ -1261,7 +1399,7 @@ DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm_tls13) {
   memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
 
   out->key_len = 16;
-  out->nonce_len = 12;
+  out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
   out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
   out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
   out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;
@@ -1276,7 +1414,7 @@ DEFINE_METHOD_FUNCTION(EVP_AEAD, EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm_tls13) {
   memset(out, 0, sizeof(EVP_AEAD));
 
   out->key_len = 32;
-  out->nonce_len = 12;
+  out->nonce_len = AES_GCM_NONCE_LENGTH;
   out->overhead = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
   out->max_tag_len = EVP_AEAD_AES_GCM_TAG_LEN;
   out->seal_scatter_supports_extra_in = 1;

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/{dh → fipsmodule/dh}/dh.c

@@ -60,17 +60,16 @@
 
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/ex_data.h>
+#include <openssl/digest.h>
 #include <openssl/mem.h>
 #include <openssl/thread.h>
 
-#include "../internal.h"
+#include "../../internal.h"
+#include "../bn/internal.h"
 
 
 #define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000
 
-static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class = CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT;
-
 DH *DH_new(void) {
   DH *dh = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DH));
   if (dh == NULL) {
@@ -83,7 +82,6 @@ DH *DH_new(void) {
   CRYPTO_MUTEX_init(&dh->method_mont_p_lock);
 
   dh->references = 1;
-  CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&dh->ex_data);
 
   return dh;
 }
@@ -97,8 +95,6 @@ void DH_free(DH *dh) {
     return;
   }
 
-  CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, dh, &dh->ex_data);
-
   BN_MONT_CTX_free(dh->method_mont_p);
   BN_clear_free(dh->p);
   BN_clear_free(dh->g);
@@ -113,6 +109,16 @@ void DH_free(DH *dh) {
   OPENSSL_free(dh);
 }
 
+const BIGNUM *DH_get0_pub_key(const DH *dh) { return dh->pub_key; }
+
+const BIGNUM *DH_get0_priv_key(const DH *dh) { return dh->priv_key; }
+
+const BIGNUM *DH_get0_p(const DH *dh) { return dh->p; }
+
+const BIGNUM *DH_get0_q(const DH *dh) { return dh->q; }
+
+const BIGNUM *DH_get0_g(const DH *dh) { return dh->g; }
+
 void DH_get0_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **out_pub_key,
                  const BIGNUM **out_priv_key) {
   if (out_pub_key != NULL) {
@@ -174,118 +180,9 @@ int DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g) {
   return 1;
 }
 
-int DH_generate_parameters_ex(DH *dh, int prime_bits, int generator, BN_GENCB *cb) {
-  // We generate DH parameters as follows
-  // find a prime q which is prime_bits/2 bits long.
-  // p=(2*q)+1 or (p-1)/2 = q
-  // For this case, g is a generator if
-  // g^((p-1)/q) mod p != 1 for values of q which are the factors of p-1.
-  // Since the factors of p-1 are q and 2, we just need to check
-  // g^2 mod p != 1 and g^q mod p != 1.
-  //
-  // Having said all that,
-  // there is another special case method for the generators 2, 3 and 5.
-  // for 2, p mod 24 == 11
-  // for 3, p mod 12 == 5  <<<<< does not work for safe primes.
-  // for 5, p mod 10 == 3 or 7
-  //
-  // Thanks to Phil Karn <karn@qualcomm.com> for the pointers about the
-  // special generators and for answering some of my questions.
-  //
-  // I've implemented the second simple method :-).
-  // Since DH should be using a safe prime (both p and q are prime),
-  // this generator function can take a very very long time to run.
-
-  // Actually there is no reason to insist that 'generator' be a generator.
-  // It's just as OK (and in some sense better) to use a generator of the
-  // order-q subgroup.
-
-  BIGNUM *t1, *t2;
-  int g, ok = 0;
-  BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-
-  ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-  if (ctx == NULL) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-  t1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  t2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  if (t1 == NULL || t2 == NULL) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  // Make sure |dh| has the necessary elements
-  if (dh->p == NULL) {
-    dh->p = BN_new();
-    if (dh->p == NULL) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-  }
-  if (dh->g == NULL) {
-    dh->g = BN_new();
-    if (dh->g == NULL) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (generator <= 1) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_BAD_GENERATOR);
-    goto err;
-  }
-  if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_2) {
-    if (!BN_set_word(t1, 24)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-    if (!BN_set_word(t2, 11)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-    g = 2;
-  } else if (generator == DH_GENERATOR_5) {
-    if (!BN_set_word(t1, 10)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-    if (!BN_set_word(t2, 3)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-    // BN_set_word(t3,7); just have to miss
-    // out on these ones :-(
-    g = 5;
-  } else {
-    // in the general case, don't worry if 'generator' is a
-    // generator or not: since we are using safe primes,
-    // it will generate either an order-q or an order-2q group,
-    // which both is OK
-    if (!BN_set_word(t1, 2)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-    if (!BN_set_word(t2, 1)) {
-      goto err;
-    }
-    g = generator;
-  }
-
-  if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(dh->p, prime_bits, 1, t1, t2, cb)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-  if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-  if (!BN_set_word(dh->g, g)) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-  ok = 1;
-
-err:
-  if (!ok) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-  }
-
-  if (ctx != NULL) {
-    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-  }
-  return ok;
+int DH_set_length(DH *dh, unsigned priv_length) {
+  dh->priv_length = priv_length;
+  return 1;
 }
 
 int DH_generate_key(DH *dh) {
@@ -375,144 +272,185 @@ err:
   return ok;
 }
 
-int DH_compute_key(unsigned char *out, const BIGNUM *peers_key, DH *dh) {
-  BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-  BIGNUM *shared_key;
-  int ret = -1;
-  int check_result;
-
+static int dh_compute_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *out_shared_key,
+                          const BIGNUM *peers_key, BN_CTX *ctx) {
   if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-  if (ctx == NULL) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-  shared_key = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  if (shared_key == NULL) {
-    goto err;
+    return 0;
   }
 
   if (dh->priv_key == NULL) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dh->method_mont_p, &dh->method_mont_p_lock,
-                              dh->p, ctx)) {
-    goto err;
+    return 0;
   }
 
+  int check_result;
   if (!DH_check_pub_key(dh, peers_key, &check_result) || check_result) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_INVALID_PUBKEY);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  int ret = 0;
+  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+  BIGNUM *p_minus_1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+
+  if (!p_minus_1 ||
+      !BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dh->method_mont_p, &dh->method_mont_p_lock,
+                              dh->p, ctx)) {
     goto err;
   }
 
-  if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(shared_key, peers_key, dh->priv_key, dh->p,
-                                 ctx, dh->method_mont_p)) {
+  if (!BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(out_shared_key, peers_key, dh->priv_key, dh->p,
+                                 ctx, dh->method_mont_p) ||
+      !BN_copy(p_minus_1, dh->p) ||
+      !BN_sub_word(p_minus_1, 1)) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
     goto err;
   }
 
-  ret = BN_bn2bin(shared_key, out);
-
-err:
-  if (ctx != NULL) {
-    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+  // This performs the check required by SP 800-56Ar3 section 5.7.1.1 step two.
+  if (BN_cmp_word(out_shared_key, 1) <= 0 ||
+      BN_cmp(out_shared_key, p_minus_1) == 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(DH, DH_R_INVALID_PUBKEY);
+    goto err;
   }
 
+  ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
   return ret;
 }
 
-int DH_size(const DH *dh) { return BN_num_bytes(dh->p); }
+int DH_compute_key_padded(unsigned char *out, const BIGNUM *peers_key, DH *dh) {
+  BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+  if (ctx == NULL) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
 
-unsigned DH_num_bits(const DH *dh) { return BN_num_bits(dh->p); }
+  int dh_size = DH_size(dh);
+  int ret = -1;
+  BIGNUM *shared_key = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  if (shared_key &&
+      dh_compute_key(dh, shared_key, peers_key, ctx) &&
+      BN_bn2bin_padded(out, dh_size, shared_key)) {
+    ret = dh_size;
+  }
 
-int DH_up_ref(DH *dh) {
-  CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&dh->references);
-  return 1;
+  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+  BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+  return ret;
 }
 
-static int int_dh_bn_cpy(BIGNUM **dst, const BIGNUM *src) {
-  BIGNUM *a = NULL;
+int DH_compute_key(unsigned char *out, const BIGNUM *peers_key, DH *dh) {
+  BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+  if (ctx == NULL) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
 
-  if (src) {
-    a = BN_dup(src);
-    if (!a) {
-      return 0;
-    }
+  int ret = -1;
+  BIGNUM *shared_key = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  if (shared_key && dh_compute_key(dh, shared_key, peers_key, ctx)) {
+    ret = BN_bn2bin(shared_key, out);
   }
 
-  BN_free(*dst);
-  *dst = a;
-  return 1;
+  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+  BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+  return ret;
 }
 
-static int int_dh_param_copy(DH *to, const DH *from, int is_x942) {
-  if (is_x942 == -1) {
-    is_x942 = !!from->q;
-  }
-  if (!int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->p, from->p) ||
-      !int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->g, from->g)) {
+int DH_compute_key_hashed(DH *dh, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
+                          size_t max_out_len, const BIGNUM *peers_key,
+                          const EVP_MD *digest) {
+  *out_len = (size_t)-1;
+
+  const size_t digest_len = EVP_MD_size(digest);
+  if (digest_len > max_out_len) {
     return 0;
   }
 
-  if (!is_x942) {
-    return 1;
+  int ret = 0;
+  const size_t dh_len = DH_size(dh);
+  uint8_t *shared_bytes = OPENSSL_malloc(dh_len);
+  unsigned out_len_unsigned;
+  if (!shared_bytes ||
+      // SP 800-56A is ambiguous about whether the output should be padded prior
+      // to revision three. But revision three, section C.1, awkwardly specifies
+      // padding to the length of p.
+      //
+      // Also, padded output avoids side-channels, so is always strongly
+      // advisable.
+      DH_compute_key_padded(shared_bytes, peers_key, dh) != (int)dh_len ||
+      !EVP_Digest(shared_bytes, dh_len, out, &out_len_unsigned, digest, NULL) ||
+      out_len_unsigned != digest_len) {
+    goto err;
   }
 
-  if (!int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->q, from->q) ||
-      !int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->j, from->j)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
+  *out_len = digest_len;
+  ret = 1;
 
-  OPENSSL_free(to->seed);
-  to->seed = NULL;
-  to->seedlen = 0;
+ err:
+  OPENSSL_free(shared_bytes);
+  return ret;
+}
 
-  if (from->seed) {
-    to->seed = OPENSSL_memdup(from->seed, from->seedlen);
-    if (!to->seed) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-    to->seedlen = from->seedlen;
-  }
+int DH_size(const DH *dh) { return BN_num_bytes(dh->p); }
 
+unsigned DH_num_bits(const DH *dh) { return BN_num_bits(dh->p); }
+
+int DH_up_ref(DH *dh) {
+  CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&dh->references);
   return 1;
 }
 
-DH *DHparams_dup(const DH *dh) {
-  DH *ret = DH_new();
-  if (!ret) {
-    return NULL;
+DH *DH_get_rfc7919_2048(void) {
+  // This is the prime from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7919#appendix-A.1,
+  // which is specifically approved for FIPS in appendix D of SP 800-56Ar3.
+  static const BN_ULONG kFFDHE2048Data[] = {
+      TOBN(0xffffffff, 0xffffffff), TOBN(0x886b4238, 0x61285c97),
+      TOBN(0xc6f34a26, 0xc1b2effa), TOBN(0xc58ef183, 0x7d1683b2),
+      TOBN(0x3bb5fcbc, 0x2ec22005), TOBN(0xc3fe3b1b, 0x4c6fad73),
+      TOBN(0x8e4f1232, 0xeef28183), TOBN(0x9172fe9c, 0xe98583ff),
+      TOBN(0xc03404cd, 0x28342f61), TOBN(0x9e02fce1, 0xcdf7e2ec),
+      TOBN(0x0b07a7c8, 0xee0a6d70), TOBN(0xae56ede7, 0x6372bb19),
+      TOBN(0x1d4f42a3, 0xde394df4), TOBN(0xb96adab7, 0x60d7f468),
+      TOBN(0xd108a94b, 0xb2c8e3fb), TOBN(0xbc0ab182, 0xb324fb61),
+      TOBN(0x30acca4f, 0x483a797a), TOBN(0x1df158a1, 0x36ade735),
+      TOBN(0xe2a689da, 0xf3efe872), TOBN(0x984f0c70, 0xe0e68b77),
+      TOBN(0xb557135e, 0x7f57c935), TOBN(0x85636555, 0x3ded1af3),
+      TOBN(0x2433f51f, 0x5f066ed0), TOBN(0xd3df1ed5, 0xd5fd6561),
+      TOBN(0xf681b202, 0xaec4617a), TOBN(0x7d2fe363, 0x630c75d8),
+      TOBN(0xcc939dce, 0x249b3ef9), TOBN(0xa9e13641, 0x146433fb),
+      TOBN(0xd8b9c583, 0xce2d3695), TOBN(0xafdc5620, 0x273d3cf1),
+      TOBN(0xadf85458, 0xa2bb4a9a), TOBN(0xffffffff, 0xffffffff),
+  };
+
+  BIGNUM *const ffdhe2048_p = BN_new();
+  BIGNUM *const ffdhe2048_q = BN_new();
+  BIGNUM *const ffdhe2048_g = BN_new();
+  DH *const dh = DH_new();
+
+  if (!ffdhe2048_p || !ffdhe2048_q || !ffdhe2048_g || !dh) {
+    goto err;
   }
 
-  if (!int_dh_param_copy(ret, dh, -1)) {
-    DH_free(ret);
-    return NULL;
-  }
+  bn_set_static_words(ffdhe2048_p, kFFDHE2048Data,
+                      OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kFFDHE2048Data));
 
-  return ret;
-}
-
-int DH_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused,
-                        CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
-  int index;
-  if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp,
-                               free_func)) {
-    return -1;
+  if (!BN_rshift1(ffdhe2048_q, ffdhe2048_p) ||
+      !BN_set_word(ffdhe2048_g, 2) ||
+      !DH_set0_pqg(dh, ffdhe2048_p, ffdhe2048_q, ffdhe2048_g)) {
+    goto err;
   }
-  return index;
-}
 
-int DH_set_ex_data(DH *d, int idx, void *arg) {
-  return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx, arg);
-}
+  return dh;
 
-void *DH_get_ex_data(DH *d, int idx) {
-  return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx);
+ err:
+    BN_free(ffdhe2048_p);
+    BN_free(ffdhe2048_q);
+    BN_free(ffdhe2048_g);
+    DH_free(dh);
+    return NULL;
 }