grpc 1.10.0.pre1 → 1.10.0.pre2

data/third_party/boringssl/crypto/fipsmodule/ecdsa/ecdsa.c

@@ -0,0 +1,444 @@
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
+
+#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+
+#include "../bn/internal.h"
+#include "../ec/internal.h"
+#include "../../internal.h"
+
+
+// digest_to_bn interprets |digest_len| bytes from |digest| as a big-endian
+// number and sets |out| to that value. It then truncates |out| so that it's,
+// at most, as long as |order|. It returns one on success and zero otherwise.
+static int digest_to_bn(BIGNUM *out, const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
+                        const BIGNUM *order) {
+  size_t num_bits;
+
+  num_bits = BN_num_bits(order);
+  // Need to truncate digest if it is too long: first truncate whole
+  // bytes.
+  if (8 * digest_len > num_bits) {
+    digest_len = (num_bits + 7) / 8;
+  }
+  if (!BN_bin2bn(digest, digest_len, out)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // If still too long truncate remaining bits with a shift
+  if ((8 * digest_len > num_bits) &&
+      !BN_rshift(out, out, 8 - (num_bits & 0x7))) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_SIG_new(void) {
+  ECDSA_SIG *sig = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(ECDSA_SIG));
+  if (sig == NULL) {
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  sig->r = BN_new();
+  sig->s = BN_new();
+  if (sig->r == NULL || sig->s == NULL) {
+    ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  return sig;
+}
+
+void ECDSA_SIG_free(ECDSA_SIG *sig) {
+  if (sig == NULL) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  BN_free(sig->r);
+  BN_free(sig->s);
+  OPENSSL_free(sig);
+}
+
+ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_do_sign(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
+                         const EC_KEY *key) {
+  return ECDSA_do_sign_ex(digest, digest_len, NULL, NULL, key);
+}
+
+int ECDSA_do_verify(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
+                    const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const EC_KEY *eckey) {
+  int ret = 0;
+  BN_CTX *ctx;
+  BIGNUM *u1, *u2, *m, *X;
+  EC_POINT *point = NULL;
+  const EC_GROUP *group;
+  const EC_POINT *pub_key;
+
+  // check input values
+  if ((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) == NULL ||
+      (pub_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(eckey)) == NULL ||
+      sig == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+  if (!ctx) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+  u1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  u2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  m = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  X = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+  if (u1 == NULL || u2 == NULL || m == NULL || X == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  const BIGNUM *order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group);
+  if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || BN_is_negative(sig->r) ||
+      BN_ucmp(sig->r, order) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(sig->s) ||
+      BN_is_negative(sig->s) || BN_ucmp(sig->s, order) >= 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+    goto err;
+  }
+  // calculate tmp1 = inv(S) mod order
+  int no_inverse;
+  if (!BN_mod_inverse_odd(u2, &no_inverse, sig->s, order, ctx)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+    goto err;
+  }
+  if (!digest_to_bn(m, digest, digest_len, order)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  // u1 = m * tmp mod order
+  if (!BN_mod_mul(u1, m, u2, order, ctx)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+    goto err;
+  }
+  // u2 = r * w mod q
+  if (!BN_mod_mul(u2, sig->r, u2, order, ctx)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  point = EC_POINT_new(group);
+  if (point == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    goto err;
+  }
+  if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, point, u1, pub_key, u2, ctx)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+    goto err;
+  }
+  if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, X, NULL, ctx)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+    goto err;
+  }
+  if (!BN_nnmod(u1, X, order, ctx)) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+    goto err;
+  }
+  // if the signature is correct u1 is equal to sig->r
+  if (BN_ucmp(u1, sig->r) != 0) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+  BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+  EC_POINT_free(point);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static int ecdsa_sign_setup(const EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
+                            BIGNUM **rp, const uint8_t *digest,
+                            size_t digest_len) {
+  BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+  BIGNUM *k = NULL, *kinv = NULL, *r = NULL, *tmp = NULL;
+  EC_POINT *tmp_point = NULL;
+  const EC_GROUP *group;
+  int ret = 0;
+
+  if (eckey == NULL || (group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (ctx_in == NULL) {
+    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      return 0;
+    }
+  } else {
+    ctx = ctx_in;
+  }
+
+  k = BN_new();
+  kinv = BN_new();  // this value is later returned in *kinvp
+  r = BN_new();  // this value is later returned in *rp
+  tmp = BN_new();
+  if (k == NULL || kinv == NULL || r == NULL || tmp == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    goto err;
+  }
+  tmp_point = EC_POINT_new(group);
+  if (tmp_point == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  const BIGNUM *order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group);
+
+  // Check that the size of the group order is FIPS compliant (FIPS 186-4
+  // B.5.2).
+  if (BN_num_bits(order) < 160) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  do {
+    // If possible, we'll include the private key and message digest in the k
+    // generation. The |digest| argument is only empty if |ECDSA_sign_setup| is
+    // being used.
+    if (eckey->fixed_k != NULL) {
+      if (!BN_copy(k, eckey->fixed_k)) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+    } else if (digest_len > 0) {
+      do {
+        if (!BN_generate_dsa_nonce(k, order, EC_KEY_get0_private_key(eckey),
+                                   digest, digest_len, ctx)) {
+          OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_R_RANDOM_NUMBER_GENERATION_FAILED);
+          goto err;
+        }
+      } while (BN_is_zero(k));
+    } else if (!BN_rand_range_ex(k, 1, order)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_R_RANDOM_NUMBER_GENERATION_FAILED);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    // Compute the inverse of k. The order is a prime, so use Fermat's Little
+    // Theorem. Note |ec_group_get_order_mont| may return NULL but
+    // |bn_mod_inverse_prime| allows this.
+    if (!bn_mod_inverse_prime(kinv, k, order, ctx,
+                              ec_group_get_order_mont(group))) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    // We do not want timing information to leak the length of k,
+    // so we compute G*k using an equivalent scalar of fixed
+    // bit-length.
+
+    if (!BN_add(k, k, order)) {
+      goto err;
+    }
+    if (BN_num_bits(k) <= BN_num_bits(order)) {
+      if (!BN_add(k, k, order)) {
+        goto err;
+      }
+    }
+
+    // compute r the x-coordinate of generator * k
+    if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, tmp_point, k, NULL, NULL, ctx)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+      goto err;
+    }
+    if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, tmp_point, tmp, NULL,
+                                             ctx)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+      goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!BN_nnmod(r, tmp, order, ctx)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+      goto err;
+    }
+  } while (BN_is_zero(r));
+
+  // clear old values if necessary
+  BN_clear_free(*rp);
+  BN_clear_free(*kinvp);
+
+  // save the pre-computed values
+  *rp = r;
+  *kinvp = kinv;
+  ret = 1;
+
+err:
+  BN_clear_free(k);
+  if (!ret) {
+    BN_clear_free(kinv);
+    BN_clear_free(r);
+  }
+  if (ctx_in == NULL) {
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+  }
+  EC_POINT_free(tmp_point);
+  BN_clear_free(tmp);
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int ECDSA_sign_setup(const EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM **kinv,
+                     BIGNUM **rp) {
+  return ecdsa_sign_setup(eckey, ctx, kinv, rp, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_do_sign_ex(const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
+                            const BIGNUM *in_kinv, const BIGNUM *in_r,
+                            const EC_KEY *eckey) {
+  int ok = 0;
+  BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *s, *m = NULL, *tmp = NULL;
+  const BIGNUM *ckinv;
+  BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+  const EC_GROUP *group;
+  ECDSA_SIG *ret;
+  const BIGNUM *priv_key;
+
+  if (eckey->ecdsa_meth && eckey->ecdsa_meth->sign) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_R_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey);
+  priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(eckey);
+
+  if (group == NULL || priv_key == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+
+  ret = ECDSA_SIG_new();
+  if (!ret) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return NULL;
+  }
+  s = ret->s;
+
+  if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL ||
+      (tmp = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+      (m = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  const BIGNUM *order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group);
+
+  if (!digest_to_bn(m, digest, digest_len, order)) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  for (;;) {
+    if (in_kinv == NULL || in_r == NULL) {
+      if (!ecdsa_sign_setup(eckey, ctx, &kinv, &ret->r, digest, digest_len)) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
+        goto err;
+      }
+      ckinv = kinv;
+    } else {
+      ckinv = in_kinv;
+      if (BN_copy(ret->r, in_r) == NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, priv_key, ret->r, order, ctx)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+      goto err;
+    }
+    if (!BN_mod_add_quick(s, tmp, m, order)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+      goto err;
+    }
+    if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, ckinv, order, ctx)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+      goto err;
+    }
+    if (BN_is_zero(s)) {
+      // if kinv and r have been supplied by the caller
+      // don't to generate new kinv and r values
+      if (in_kinv != NULL && in_r != NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES);
+        goto err;
+      }
+    } else {
+      // s != 0 => we have a valid signature
+      break;
+    }
+  }
+
+  ok = 1;
+
+err:
+  if (!ok) {
+    ECDSA_SIG_free(ret);
+    ret = NULL;
+  }
+  BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+  BN_clear_free(m);
+  BN_clear_free(tmp);
+  BN_clear_free(kinv);
+  return ret;
+}

data/third_party/boringssl/crypto/fipsmodule/hmac/hmac.c

@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
+
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/digest.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+
+#include "../../internal.h"
+
+
+uint8_t *HMAC(const EVP_MD *evp_md, const void *key, size_t key_len,
+              const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len, uint8_t *out,
+              unsigned int *out_len) {
+  HMAC_CTX ctx;
+  HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
+  if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, key, key_len, evp_md, NULL) ||
+      !HMAC_Update(&ctx, data, data_len) ||
+      !HMAC_Final(&ctx, out, out_len)) {
+    out = NULL;
+  }
+
+  HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+  return out;
+}
+
+void HMAC_CTX_init(HMAC_CTX *ctx) {
+  ctx->md = NULL;
+  EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx->i_ctx);
+  EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx->o_ctx);
+  EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx->md_ctx);
+}
+
+HMAC_CTX *HMAC_CTX_new(void) {
+  HMAC_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(HMAC_CTX));
+  if (ctx != NULL) {
+    HMAC_CTX_init(ctx);
+  }
+  return ctx;
+}
+
+void HMAC_CTX_cleanup(HMAC_CTX *ctx) {
+  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->i_ctx);
+  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->o_ctx);
+  EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->md_ctx);
+  OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx, sizeof(HMAC_CTX));
+}
+
+void HMAC_CTX_free(HMAC_CTX *ctx) {
+  if (ctx == NULL) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  HMAC_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+  OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+}
+
+int HMAC_Init_ex(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, size_t key_len,
+                 const EVP_MD *md, ENGINE *impl) {
+  if (md == NULL) {
+    md = ctx->md;
+  }
+
+  // If either |key| is non-NULL or |md| has changed, initialize with a new key
+  // rather than rewinding the previous one.
+  //
+  // TODO(davidben,eroman): Passing the previous |md| with a NULL |key| is
+  // ambiguous between using the empty key and reusing the previous key. There
+  // exist callers which intend the latter, but the former is an awkward edge
+  // case. Fix to API to avoid this.
+  if (md != ctx->md || key != NULL) {
+    uint8_t pad[EVP_MAX_MD_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    uint8_t key_block[EVP_MAX_MD_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    unsigned key_block_len;
+
+    size_t block_size = EVP_MD_block_size(md);
+    assert(block_size <= sizeof(key_block));
+    if (block_size < key_len) {
+      // Long keys are hashed.
+      if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx->md_ctx, md, impl) ||
+          !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->md_ctx, key, key_len) ||
+          !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx->md_ctx, key_block, &key_block_len)) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+    } else {
+      assert(key_len <= sizeof(key_block));
+      OPENSSL_memcpy(key_block, key, key_len);
+      key_block_len = (unsigned)key_len;
+    }
+    // Keys are then padded with zeros.
+    if (key_block_len != EVP_MAX_MD_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+      OPENSSL_memset(&key_block[key_block_len], 0, sizeof(key_block) - key_block_len);
+    }
+
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < EVP_MAX_MD_BLOCK_SIZE; i++) {
+      pad[i] = 0x36 ^ key_block[i];
+    }
+    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx->i_ctx, md, impl) ||
+        !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->i_ctx, pad, EVP_MD_block_size(md))) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < EVP_MAX_MD_BLOCK_SIZE; i++) {
+      pad[i] = 0x5c ^ key_block[i];
+    }
+    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx->o_ctx, md, impl) ||
+        !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->o_ctx, pad, EVP_MD_block_size(md))) {
+      return 0;
+    }
+
+    ctx->md = md;
+  }
+
+  if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx->md_ctx, &ctx->i_ctx)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+int HMAC_Update(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len) {
+  return EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->md_ctx, data, data_len);
+}
+
+int HMAC_Final(HMAC_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, unsigned int *out_len) {
+  unsigned int i;
+  uint8_t buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+
+  // TODO(davidben): The only thing that can officially fail here is
+  // |EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex|, but even that should be impossible in this case.
+  if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx->md_ctx, buf, &i) ||
+      !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx->md_ctx, &ctx->o_ctx) ||
+      !EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->md_ctx, buf, i) ||
+      !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx->md_ctx, out, out_len)) {
+    *out_len = 0;
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+size_t HMAC_size(const HMAC_CTX *ctx) {
+  return EVP_MD_size(ctx->md);
+}
+
+int HMAC_CTX_copy_ex(HMAC_CTX *dest, const HMAC_CTX *src) {
+  if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&dest->i_ctx, &src->i_ctx) ||
+      !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&dest->o_ctx, &src->o_ctx) ||
+      !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&dest->md_ctx, &src->md_ctx)) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  dest->md = src->md;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+void HMAC_CTX_reset(HMAC_CTX *ctx) {
+  HMAC_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+  HMAC_CTX_init(ctx);
+}
+
+int HMAC_Init(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, int key_len, const EVP_MD *md) {
+  if (key && md) {
+    HMAC_CTX_init(ctx);
+  }
+  return HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, key, key_len, md, NULL);
+}
+
+int HMAC_CTX_copy(HMAC_CTX *dest, const HMAC_CTX *src) {
+  HMAC_CTX_init(dest);
+  return HMAC_CTX_copy_ex(dest, src);
+}