gitlab-grpc 1.42.1.gitlab

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/ssl/internal.h

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+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_SSL_INTERNAL_H
+#define OPENSSL_HEADER_SSL_INTERNAL_H
+
+#include <openssl/base.h>
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include <initializer_list>
+#include <limits>
+#include <new>
+#include <type_traits>
+#include <utility>
+
+#include <openssl/aead.h>
+#include <openssl/curve25519.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/hpke.h>
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/span.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/stack.h>
+
+#include "../crypto/err/internal.h"
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+#include "../crypto/lhash/internal.h"
+
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS)
+// Windows defines struct timeval in winsock2.h.
+OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(push, 3))
+#include <winsock2.h>
+OPENSSL_MSVC_PRAGMA(warning(pop))
+#else
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
+
+struct SSL_CONFIG;
+struct SSL_HANDSHAKE;
+struct SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD;
+struct SSL_X509_METHOD;
+
+// C++ utilities.
+
+// New behaves like |new| but uses |OPENSSL_malloc| for memory allocation. It
+// returns nullptr on allocation error. It only implements single-object
+// allocation and not new T[n].
+//
+// Note: unlike |new|, this does not support non-public constructors.
+template <typename T, typename... Args>
+T *New(Args &&... args) {
+  void *t = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(T));
+  if (t == nullptr) {
+    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  return new (t) T(std::forward<Args>(args)...);
+}
+
+// Delete behaves like |delete| but uses |OPENSSL_free| to release memory.
+//
+// Note: unlike |delete| this does not support non-public destructors.
+template <typename T>
+void Delete(T *t) {
+  if (t != nullptr) {
+    t->~T();
+    OPENSSL_free(t);
+  }
+}
+
+// All types with kAllowUniquePtr set may be used with UniquePtr. Other types
+// may be C structs which require a |BORINGSSL_MAKE_DELETER| registration.
+namespace internal {
+template <typename T>
+struct DeleterImpl<T, typename std::enable_if<T::kAllowUniquePtr>::type> {
+  static void Free(T *t) { Delete(t); }
+};
+}  // namespace internal
+
+// MakeUnique behaves like |std::make_unique| but returns nullptr on allocation
+// error.
+template <typename T, typename... Args>
+UniquePtr<T> MakeUnique(Args &&... args) {
+  return UniquePtr<T>(New<T>(std::forward<Args>(args)...));
+}
+
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_ALLOW_CXX_RUNTIME)
+#define HAS_VIRTUAL_DESTRUCTOR
+#define PURE_VIRTUAL = 0
+#else
+// HAS_VIRTUAL_DESTRUCTOR should be declared in any base class which defines a
+// virtual destructor. This avoids a dependency on |_ZdlPv| and prevents the
+// class from being used with |delete|.
+#define HAS_VIRTUAL_DESTRUCTOR \
+  void operator delete(void *) { abort(); }
+
+// PURE_VIRTUAL should be used instead of = 0 when defining pure-virtual
+// functions. This avoids a dependency on |__cxa_pure_virtual| but loses
+// compile-time checking.
+#define PURE_VIRTUAL \
+  { abort(); }
+#endif
+
+// CONSTEXPR_ARRAY works around a VS 2015 bug where ranged for loops don't work
+// on constexpr arrays.
+#if defined(_MSC_VER) && !defined(__clang__) && _MSC_VER < 1910
+#define CONSTEXPR_ARRAY const
+#else
+#define CONSTEXPR_ARRAY constexpr
+#endif
+
+// Array<T> is an owning array of elements of |T|.
+template <typename T>
+class Array {
+ public:
+  // Array's default constructor creates an empty array.
+  Array() {}
+  Array(const Array &) = delete;
+  Array(Array &&other) { *this = std::move(other); }
+
+  ~Array() { Reset(); }
+
+  Array &operator=(const Array &) = delete;
+  Array &operator=(Array &&other) {
+    Reset();
+    other.Release(&data_, &size_);
+    return *this;
+  }
+
+  const T *data() const { return data_; }
+  T *data() { return data_; }
+  size_t size() const { return size_; }
+  bool empty() const { return size_ == 0; }
+
+  const T &operator[](size_t i) const { return data_[i]; }
+  T &operator[](size_t i) { return data_[i]; }
+
+  T *begin() { return data_; }
+  const T *begin() const { return data_; }
+  T *end() { return data_ + size_; }
+  const T *end() const { return data_ + size_; }
+
+  void Reset() { Reset(nullptr, 0); }
+
+  // Reset releases the current contents of the array and takes ownership of the
+  // raw pointer supplied by the caller.
+  void Reset(T *new_data, size_t new_size) {
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < size_; i++) {
+      data_[i].~T();
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(data_);
+    data_ = new_data;
+    size_ = new_size;
+  }
+
+  // Release releases ownership of the array to a raw pointer supplied by the
+  // caller.
+  void Release(T **out, size_t *out_size) {
+    *out = data_;
+    *out_size = size_;
+    data_ = nullptr;
+    size_ = 0;
+  }
+
+  // Init replaces the array with a newly-allocated array of |new_size|
+  // default-constructed copies of |T|. It returns true on success and false on
+  // error.
+  //
+  // Note that if |T| is a primitive type like |uint8_t|, it is uninitialized.
+  bool Init(size_t new_size) {
+    Reset();
+    if (new_size == 0) {
+      return true;
+    }
+
+    if (new_size > std::numeric_limits<size_t>::max() / sizeof(T)) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+      return false;
+    }
+    data_ = reinterpret_cast<T *>(OPENSSL_malloc(new_size * sizeof(T)));
+    if (data_ == nullptr) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      return false;
+    }
+    size_ = new_size;
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < size_; i++) {
+      new (&data_[i]) T;
+    }
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // CopyFrom replaces the array with a newly-allocated copy of |in|. It returns
+  // true on success and false on error.
+  bool CopyFrom(Span<const T> in) {
+    if (!Init(in.size())) {
+      return false;
+    }
+    OPENSSL_memcpy(data_, in.data(), sizeof(T) * in.size());
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // Shrink shrinks the stored size of the array to |new_size|. It crashes if
+  // the new size is larger. Note this does not shrink the allocation itself.
+  void Shrink(size_t new_size) {
+    if (new_size > size_) {
+      abort();
+    }
+    for (size_t i = new_size; i < size_; i++) {
+      data_[i].~T();
+    }
+    size_ = new_size;
+  }
+
+ private:
+  T *data_ = nullptr;
+  size_t size_ = 0;
+};
+
+// GrowableArray<T> is an array that owns elements of |T|, backed by an
+// Array<T>. When necessary, pushing will automatically trigger a resize.
+//
+// Note, for simplicity, this class currently differs from |std::vector| in that
+// |T| must be efficiently default-constructible. Allocated elements beyond the
+// end of the array are constructed and destructed.
+template <typename T>
+class GrowableArray {
+ public:
+  GrowableArray() = default;
+  GrowableArray(const GrowableArray &) = delete;
+  GrowableArray(GrowableArray &&other) { *this = std::move(other); }
+  ~GrowableArray() {}
+
+  GrowableArray &operator=(const GrowableArray &) = delete;
+  GrowableArray &operator=(GrowableArray &&other) {
+    size_ = other.size_;
+    other.size_ = 0;
+    array_ = std::move(other.array_);
+    return *this;
+  }
+
+  const T *data() const { return array_.data(); }
+  T *data() { return array_.data(); }
+  size_t size() const { return size_; }
+  bool empty() const { return size_ == 0; }
+
+  const T &operator[](size_t i) const { return array_[i]; }
+  T &operator[](size_t i) { return array_[i]; }
+
+  T *begin() { return array_.data(); }
+  const T *begin() const { return array_.data(); }
+  T *end() { return array_.data() + size_; }
+  const T *end() const { return array_.data() + size_; }
+
+  void clear() {
+    size_ = 0;
+    array_.Reset();
+  }
+
+  // Push adds |elem| at the end of the internal array, growing if necessary. It
+  // returns false when allocation fails.
+  bool Push(T elem) {
+    if (!MaybeGrow()) {
+      return false;
+    }
+    array_[size_] = std::move(elem);
+    size_++;
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // CopyFrom replaces the contents of the array with a copy of |in|. It returns
+  // true on success and false on allocation error.
+  bool CopyFrom(Span<const T> in) {
+    if (!array_.CopyFrom(in)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+    size_ = in.size();
+    return true;
+  }
+
+ private:
+  // If there is no room for one more element, creates a new backing array with
+  // double the size of the old one and copies elements over.
+  bool MaybeGrow() {
+    if (array_.size() == 0) {
+      return array_.Init(kDefaultSize);
+    }
+    // No need to grow if we have room for one more T.
+    if (size_ < array_.size()) {
+      return true;
+    }
+    // Double the array's size if it's safe to do so.
+    if (array_.size() > std::numeric_limits<size_t>::max() / 2) {
+      OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
+      return false;
+    }
+    Array<T> new_array;
+    if (!new_array.Init(array_.size() * 2)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < array_.size(); i++) {
+      new_array[i] = std::move(array_[i]);
+    }
+    array_ = std::move(new_array);
+
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // |size_| is the number of elements stored in this GrowableArray.
+  size_t size_ = 0;
+  // |array_| is the backing array. Note that |array_.size()| is this
+  // GrowableArray's current capacity and that |size_ <= array_.size()|.
+  Array<T> array_;
+  // |kDefaultSize| is the default initial size of the backing array.
+  static constexpr size_t kDefaultSize = 16;
+};
+
+// CBBFinishArray behaves like |CBB_finish| but stores the result in an Array.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bool CBBFinishArray(CBB *cbb, Array<uint8_t> *out);
+
+
+// Protocol versions.
+//
+// Due to DTLS's historical wire version differences, we maintain two notions of
+// version.
+//
+// The "version" or "wire version" is the actual 16-bit value that appears on
+// the wire. It uniquely identifies a version and is also used at API
+// boundaries. The set of supported versions differs between TLS and DTLS. Wire
+// versions are opaque values and may not be compared numerically.
+//
+// The "protocol version" identifies the high-level handshake variant being
+// used. DTLS versions map to the corresponding TLS versions. Protocol versions
+// are sequential and may be compared numerically.
+
+// ssl_protocol_version_from_wire sets |*out| to the protocol version
+// corresponding to wire version |version| and returns true. If |version| is not
+// a valid TLS or DTLS version, it returns false.
+//
+// Note this simultaneously handles both DTLS and TLS. Use one of the
+// higher-level functions below for most operations.
+bool ssl_protocol_version_from_wire(uint16_t *out, uint16_t version);
+
+// ssl_get_version_range sets |*out_min_version| and |*out_max_version| to the
+// minimum and maximum enabled protocol versions, respectively.
+bool ssl_get_version_range(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint16_t *out_min_version,
+                           uint16_t *out_max_version);
+
+// ssl_supports_version returns whether |hs| supports |version|.
+bool ssl_supports_version(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint16_t version);
+
+// ssl_method_supports_version returns whether |method| supports |version|.
+bool ssl_method_supports_version(const SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD *method,
+                                 uint16_t version);
+
+// ssl_add_supported_versions writes the supported versions of |hs| to |cbb|, in
+// decreasing preference order. The version list is filtered to those whose
+// protocol version is at least |extra_min_version|.
+bool ssl_add_supported_versions(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *cbb,
+                                uint16_t extra_min_version);
+
+// ssl_negotiate_version negotiates a common version based on |hs|'s preferences
+// and the peer preference list in |peer_versions|. On success, it returns true
+// and sets |*out_version| to the selected version. Otherwise, it returns false
+// and sets |*out_alert| to an alert to send.
+bool ssl_negotiate_version(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                           uint16_t *out_version, const CBS *peer_versions);
+
+// ssl_protocol_version returns |ssl|'s protocol version. It is an error to
+// call this function before the version is determined.
+uint16_t ssl_protocol_version(const SSL *ssl);
+
+// Cipher suites.
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
+
+struct ssl_cipher_st {
+  // name is the OpenSSL name for the cipher.
+  const char *name;
+  // standard_name is the IETF name for the cipher.
+  const char *standard_name;
+  // id is the cipher suite value bitwise OR-d with 0x03000000.
+  uint32_t id;
+
+  // algorithm_* determine the cipher suite. See constants below for the values.
+  uint32_t algorithm_mkey;
+  uint32_t algorithm_auth;
+  uint32_t algorithm_enc;
+  uint32_t algorithm_mac;
+  uint32_t algorithm_prf;
+};
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
+
+// Bits for |algorithm_mkey| (key exchange algorithm).
+#define SSL_kRSA 0x00000001u
+#define SSL_kECDHE 0x00000002u
+// SSL_kPSK is only set for plain PSK, not ECDHE_PSK.
+#define SSL_kPSK 0x00000004u
+#define SSL_kGENERIC 0x00000008u
+
+// Bits for |algorithm_auth| (server authentication).
+#define SSL_aRSA 0x00000001u
+#define SSL_aECDSA 0x00000002u
+// SSL_aPSK is set for both PSK and ECDHE_PSK.
+#define SSL_aPSK 0x00000004u
+#define SSL_aGENERIC 0x00000008u
+
+#define SSL_aCERT (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aECDSA)
+
+// Bits for |algorithm_enc| (symmetric encryption).
+#define SSL_3DES 0x00000001u
+#define SSL_AES128 0x00000002u
+#define SSL_AES256 0x00000004u
+#define SSL_AES128GCM 0x00000008u
+#define SSL_AES256GCM 0x00000010u
+#define SSL_eNULL 0x00000020u
+#define SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305 0x00000040u
+
+#define SSL_AES (SSL_AES128 | SSL_AES256 | SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES256GCM)
+
+// Bits for |algorithm_mac| (symmetric authentication).
+#define SSL_SHA1 0x00000001u
+// SSL_AEAD is set for all AEADs.
+#define SSL_AEAD 0x00000002u
+
+// Bits for |algorithm_prf| (handshake digest).
+#define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT 0x1
+#define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 0x2
+#define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 0x4
+
+// SSL_MAX_MD_SIZE is size of the largest hash function used in TLS, SHA-384.
+#define SSL_MAX_MD_SIZE 48
+
+// An SSLCipherPreferenceList contains a list of SSL_CIPHERs with equal-
+// preference groups. For TLS clients, the groups are moot because the server
+// picks the cipher and groups cannot be expressed on the wire. However, for
+// servers, the equal-preference groups allow the client's preferences to be
+// partially respected. (This only has an effect with
+// SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE).
+//
+// The equal-preference groups are expressed by grouping SSL_CIPHERs together.
+// All elements of a group have the same priority: no ordering is expressed
+// within a group.
+//
+// The values in |ciphers| are in one-to-one correspondence with
+// |in_group_flags|. (That is, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) is the number of
+// bytes in |in_group_flags|.) The bytes in |in_group_flags| are either 1, to
+// indicate that the corresponding SSL_CIPHER is not the last element of a
+// group, or 0 to indicate that it is.
+//
+// For example, if |in_group_flags| contains all zeros then that indicates a
+// traditional, fully-ordered preference. Every SSL_CIPHER is the last element
+// of the group (i.e. they are all in a one-element group).
+//
+// For a more complex example, consider:
+//   ciphers:        A  B  C  D  E  F
+//   in_group_flags: 1  1  0  0  1  0
+//
+// That would express the following, order:
+//
+//    A         E
+//    B -> D -> F
+//    C
+struct SSLCipherPreferenceList {
+  static constexpr bool kAllowUniquePtr = true;
+
+  SSLCipherPreferenceList() = default;
+  ~SSLCipherPreferenceList();
+
+  bool Init(UniquePtr<STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)> ciphers,
+            Span<const bool> in_group_flags);
+  bool Init(const SSLCipherPreferenceList &);
+
+  void Remove(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher);
+
+  UniquePtr<STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)> ciphers;
+  bool *in_group_flags = nullptr;
+};
+
+// AllCiphers returns an array of all supported ciphers, sorted by id.
+Span<const SSL_CIPHER> AllCiphers();
+
+// ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead sets |*out_aead| to point to the correct EVP_AEAD
+// object for |cipher| protocol version |version|. It sets |*out_mac_secret_len|
+// and |*out_fixed_iv_len| to the MAC key length and fixed IV length,
+// respectively. The MAC key length is zero except for legacy block and stream
+// ciphers. It returns true on success and false on error.
+bool ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(const EVP_AEAD **out_aead,
+                             size_t *out_mac_secret_len,
+                             size_t *out_fixed_iv_len, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher,
+                             uint16_t version, bool is_dtls);
+
+// ssl_get_handshake_digest returns the |EVP_MD| corresponding to |version| and
+// |cipher|.
+const EVP_MD *ssl_get_handshake_digest(uint16_t version,
+                                       const SSL_CIPHER *cipher);
+
+// ssl_create_cipher_list evaluates |rule_str|. It sets |*out_cipher_list| to a
+// newly-allocated |SSLCipherPreferenceList| containing the result. It returns
+// true on success and false on failure. If |strict| is true, nonsense will be
+// rejected. If false, nonsense will be silently ignored. An empty result is
+// considered an error regardless of |strict|.
+bool ssl_create_cipher_list(UniquePtr<SSLCipherPreferenceList> *out_cipher_list,
+                            const char *rule_str, bool strict);
+
+// ssl_cipher_auth_mask_for_key returns the mask of cipher |algorithm_auth|
+// values suitable for use with |key| in TLS 1.2 and below.
+uint32_t ssl_cipher_auth_mask_for_key(const EVP_PKEY *key);
+
+// ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth returns whether |cipher| authenticates the
+// server and, optionally, the client with a certificate.
+bool ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher);
+
+// ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange returns whether |cipher| requires a
+// ServerKeyExchange message.
+//
+// This function may return false while still allowing |cipher| an optional
+// ServerKeyExchange. This is the case for plain PSK ciphers.
+bool ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher);
+
+// ssl_cipher_get_record_split_len, for TLS 1.0 CBC mode ciphers, returns the
+// length of an encrypted 1-byte record, for use in record-splitting. Otherwise
+// it returns zero.
+size_t ssl_cipher_get_record_split_len(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher);
+
+// ssl_choose_tls13_cipher returns an |SSL_CIPHER| corresponding with the best
+// available from |cipher_suites| compatible with |version| and |group_id|. It
+// returns NULL if there isn't a compatible cipher.
+const SSL_CIPHER *ssl_choose_tls13_cipher(CBS cipher_suites, uint16_t version,
+                                          uint16_t group_id);
+
+
+// Transcript layer.
+
+// SSLTranscript maintains the handshake transcript as a combination of a
+// buffer and running hash.
+class SSLTranscript {
+ public:
+  SSLTranscript();
+  ~SSLTranscript();
+
+  SSLTranscript(SSLTranscript &&other) = default;
+  SSLTranscript &operator=(SSLTranscript &&other) = default;
+
+  // Init initializes the handshake transcript. If called on an existing
+  // transcript, it resets the transcript and hash. It returns true on success
+  // and false on failure.
+  bool Init();
+
+  // InitHash initializes the handshake hash based on the PRF and contents of
+  // the handshake transcript. Subsequent calls to |Update| will update the
+  // rolling hash. It returns one on success and zero on failure. It is an error
+  // to call this function after the handshake buffer is released. This may be
+  // called multiple times to change the hash function.
+  bool InitHash(uint16_t version, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher);
+
+  // UpdateForHelloRetryRequest resets the rolling hash with the
+  // HelloRetryRequest construction. It returns true on success and false on
+  // failure. It is an error to call this function before the handshake buffer
+  // is released.
+  bool UpdateForHelloRetryRequest();
+
+  // CopyToHashContext initializes |ctx| with |digest| and the data thus far in
+  // the transcript. It returns true on success and false on failure. If the
+  // handshake buffer is still present, |digest| may be any supported digest.
+  // Otherwise, |digest| must match the transcript hash.
+  bool CopyToHashContext(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *digest) const;
+
+  Span<const uint8_t> buffer() const {
+    return MakeConstSpan(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(buffer_->data),
+                         buffer_->length);
+  }
+
+  // FreeBuffer releases the handshake buffer. Subsequent calls to
+  // |Update| will not update the handshake buffer.
+  void FreeBuffer();
+
+  // DigestLen returns the length of the PRF hash.
+  size_t DigestLen() const;
+
+  // Digest returns the PRF hash. For TLS 1.1 and below, this is
+  // |EVP_md5_sha1|.
+  const EVP_MD *Digest() const;
+
+  // Update adds |in| to the handshake buffer and handshake hash, whichever is
+  // enabled. It returns true on success and false on failure.
+  bool Update(Span<const uint8_t> in);
+
+  // GetHash writes the handshake hash to |out| which must have room for at
+  // least |DigestLen| bytes. On success, it returns true and sets |*out_len| to
+  // the number of bytes written. Otherwise, it returns false.
+  bool GetHash(uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len) const;
+
+  // GetFinishedMAC computes the MAC for the Finished message into the bytes
+  // pointed by |out| and writes the number of bytes to |*out_len|. |out| must
+  // have room for |EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE| bytes. It returns true on success and false
+  // on failure.
+  bool GetFinishedMAC(uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, const SSL_SESSION *session,
+                      bool from_server) const;
+
+ private:
+  // buffer_, if non-null, contains the handshake transcript.
+  UniquePtr<BUF_MEM> buffer_;
+  // hash, if initialized with an |EVP_MD|, maintains the handshake hash.
+  ScopedEVP_MD_CTX hash_;
+};
+
+// tls1_prf computes the PRF function for |ssl|. It fills |out|, using |secret|
+// as the secret and |label| as the label. |seed1| and |seed2| are concatenated
+// to form the seed parameter. It returns true on success and false on failure.
+bool tls1_prf(const EVP_MD *digest, Span<uint8_t> out,
+              Span<const uint8_t> secret, Span<const char> label,
+              Span<const uint8_t> seed1, Span<const uint8_t> seed2);
+
+
+// Encryption layer.
+
+// SSLAEADContext contains information about an AEAD that is being used to
+// encrypt an SSL connection.
+class SSLAEADContext {
+ public:
+  SSLAEADContext(uint16_t version, bool is_dtls, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher);
+  ~SSLAEADContext();
+  static constexpr bool kAllowUniquePtr = true;
+
+  SSLAEADContext(const SSLAEADContext &&) = delete;
+  SSLAEADContext &operator=(const SSLAEADContext &&) = delete;
+
+  // CreateNullCipher creates an |SSLAEADContext| for the null cipher.
+  static UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> CreateNullCipher(bool is_dtls);
+
+  // Create creates an |SSLAEADContext| using the supplied key material. It
+  // returns nullptr on error. Only one of |Open| or |Seal| may be used with the
+  // resulting object, depending on |direction|. |version| is the normalized
+  // protocol version, so DTLS 1.0 is represented as 0x0301, not 0xffef.
+  static UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> Create(enum evp_aead_direction_t direction,
+                                          uint16_t version, bool is_dtls,
+                                          const SSL_CIPHER *cipher,
+                                          Span<const uint8_t> enc_key,
+                                          Span<const uint8_t> mac_key,
+                                          Span<const uint8_t> fixed_iv);
+
+  // CreatePlaceholderForQUIC creates a placeholder |SSLAEADContext| for the
+  // given cipher and version. The resulting object can be queried for various
+  // properties but cannot encrypt or decrypt data.
+  static UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> CreatePlaceholderForQUIC(
+      uint16_t version, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher);
+
+  // SetVersionIfNullCipher sets the version the SSLAEADContext for the null
+  // cipher, to make version-specific determinations in the record layer prior
+  // to a cipher being selected.
+  void SetVersionIfNullCipher(uint16_t version);
+
+  // ProtocolVersion returns the protocol version associated with this
+  // SSLAEADContext. It can only be called once |version_| has been set to a
+  // valid value.
+  uint16_t ProtocolVersion() const;
+
+  // RecordVersion returns the record version that should be used with this
+  // SSLAEADContext for record construction and crypto.
+  uint16_t RecordVersion() const;
+
+  const SSL_CIPHER *cipher() const { return cipher_; }
+
+  // is_null_cipher returns true if this is the null cipher.
+  bool is_null_cipher() const { return !cipher_; }
+
+  // ExplicitNonceLen returns the length of the explicit nonce.
+  size_t ExplicitNonceLen() const;
+
+  // MaxOverhead returns the maximum overhead of calling |Seal|.
+  size_t MaxOverhead() const;
+
+  // SuffixLen calculates the suffix length written by |SealScatter| and writes
+  // it to |*out_suffix_len|. It returns true on success and false on error.
+  // |in_len| and |extra_in_len| should equal the argument of the same names
+  // passed to |SealScatter|.
+  bool SuffixLen(size_t *out_suffix_len, size_t in_len,
+                 size_t extra_in_len) const;
+
+  // CiphertextLen calculates the total ciphertext length written by
+  // |SealScatter| and writes it to |*out_len|. It returns true on success and
+  // false on error. |in_len| and |extra_in_len| should equal the argument of
+  // the same names passed to |SealScatter|.
+  bool CiphertextLen(size_t *out_len, size_t in_len, size_t extra_in_len) const;
+
+  // Open authenticates and decrypts |in| in-place. On success, it sets |*out|
+  // to the plaintext in |in| and returns true.  Otherwise, it returns
+  // false. The output will always be |ExplicitNonceLen| bytes ahead of |in|.
+  bool Open(Span<uint8_t> *out, uint8_t type, uint16_t record_version,
+            const uint8_t seqnum[8], Span<const uint8_t> header,
+            Span<uint8_t> in);
+
+  // Seal encrypts and authenticates |in_len| bytes from |in| and writes the
+  // result to |out|. It returns true on success and false on error.
+  //
+  // If |in| and |out| alias then |out| + |ExplicitNonceLen| must be == |in|.
+  bool Seal(uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, size_t max_out, uint8_t type,
+            uint16_t record_version, const uint8_t seqnum[8],
+            Span<const uint8_t> header, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len);
+
+  // SealScatter encrypts and authenticates |in_len| bytes from |in| and splits
+  // the result between |out_prefix|, |out| and |out_suffix|. It returns one on
+  // success and zero on error.
+  //
+  // On successful return, exactly |ExplicitNonceLen| bytes are written to
+  // |out_prefix|, |in_len| bytes to |out|, and |SuffixLen| bytes to
+  // |out_suffix|.
+  //
+  // |extra_in| may point to an additional plaintext buffer. If present,
+  // |extra_in_len| additional bytes are encrypted and authenticated, and the
+  // ciphertext is written to the beginning of |out_suffix|. |SuffixLen| should
+  // be used to size |out_suffix| accordingly.
+  //
+  // If |in| and |out| alias then |out| must be == |in|. Other arguments may not
+  // alias anything.
+  bool SealScatter(uint8_t *out_prefix, uint8_t *out, uint8_t *out_suffix,
+                   uint8_t type, uint16_t record_version,
+                   const uint8_t seqnum[8], Span<const uint8_t> header,
+                   const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, const uint8_t *extra_in,
+                   size_t extra_in_len);
+
+  bool GetIV(const uint8_t **out_iv, size_t *out_iv_len) const;
+
+ private:
+  // GetAdditionalData returns the additional data, writing into |storage| if
+  // necessary.
+  Span<const uint8_t> GetAdditionalData(uint8_t storage[13], uint8_t type,
+                                        uint16_t record_version,
+                                        const uint8_t seqnum[8],
+                                        size_t plaintext_len,
+                                        Span<const uint8_t> header);
+
+  const SSL_CIPHER *cipher_;
+  ScopedEVP_AEAD_CTX ctx_;
+  // fixed_nonce_ contains any bytes of the nonce that are fixed for all
+  // records.
+  uint8_t fixed_nonce_[12];
+  uint8_t fixed_nonce_len_ = 0, variable_nonce_len_ = 0;
+  // version_ is the wire version that should be used with this AEAD.
+  uint16_t version_;
+  // is_dtls_ is whether DTLS is being used with this AEAD.
+  bool is_dtls_;
+  // variable_nonce_included_in_record_ is true if the variable nonce
+  // for a record is included as a prefix before the ciphertext.
+  bool variable_nonce_included_in_record_ : 1;
+  // random_variable_nonce_ is true if the variable nonce is
+  // randomly generated, rather than derived from the sequence
+  // number.
+  bool random_variable_nonce_ : 1;
+  // xor_fixed_nonce_ is true if the fixed nonce should be XOR'd into the
+  // variable nonce rather than prepended.
+  bool xor_fixed_nonce_ : 1;
+  // omit_length_in_ad_ is true if the length should be omitted in the
+  // AEAD's ad parameter.
+  bool omit_length_in_ad_ : 1;
+  // ad_is_header_ is true if the AEAD's ad parameter is the record header.
+  bool ad_is_header_ : 1;
+};
+
+
+// DTLS replay bitmap.
+
+// DTLS1_BITMAP maintains a sliding window of 64 sequence numbers to detect
+// replayed packets. It should be initialized by zeroing every field.
+struct DTLS1_BITMAP {
+  // map is a bit mask of the last 64 sequence numbers. Bit
+  // |1<<i| corresponds to |max_seq_num - i|.
+  uint64_t map = 0;
+  // max_seq_num is the largest sequence number seen so far as a 64-bit
+  // integer.
+  uint64_t max_seq_num = 0;
+};
+
+
+// Record layer.
+
+// ssl_record_sequence_update increments the sequence number in |seq|. It
+// returns true on success and false on wraparound.
+bool ssl_record_sequence_update(uint8_t *seq, size_t seq_len);
+
+// ssl_record_prefix_len returns the length of the prefix before the ciphertext
+// of a record for |ssl|.
+//
+// TODO(davidben): Expose this as part of public API once the high-level
+// buffer-free APIs are available.
+size_t ssl_record_prefix_len(const SSL *ssl);
+
+enum ssl_open_record_t {
+  ssl_open_record_success,
+  ssl_open_record_discard,
+  ssl_open_record_partial,
+  ssl_open_record_close_notify,
+  ssl_open_record_error,
+};
+
+// tls_open_record decrypts a record from |in| in-place.
+//
+// If the input did not contain a complete record, it returns
+// |ssl_open_record_partial|. It sets |*out_consumed| to the total number of
+// bytes necessary. It is guaranteed that a successful call to |tls_open_record|
+// will consume at least that many bytes.
+//
+// Otherwise, it sets |*out_consumed| to the number of bytes of input
+// consumed. Note that input may be consumed on all return codes if a record was
+// decrypted.
+//
+// On success, it returns |ssl_open_record_success|. It sets |*out_type| to the
+// record type and |*out| to the record body in |in|. Note that |*out| may be
+// empty.
+//
+// If a record was successfully processed but should be discarded, it returns
+// |ssl_open_record_discard|.
+//
+// If a record was successfully processed but is a close_notify, it returns
+// |ssl_open_record_close_notify|.
+//
+// On failure or fatal alert, it returns |ssl_open_record_error| and sets
+// |*out_alert| to an alert to emit, or zero if no alert should be emitted.
+enum ssl_open_record_t tls_open_record(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_type,
+                                       Span<uint8_t> *out, size_t *out_consumed,
+                                       uint8_t *out_alert, Span<uint8_t> in);
+
+// dtls_open_record implements |tls_open_record| for DTLS. It only returns
+// |ssl_open_record_partial| if |in| was empty and sets |*out_consumed| to
+// zero. The caller should read one packet and try again.
+enum ssl_open_record_t dtls_open_record(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_type,
+                                        Span<uint8_t> *out,
+                                        size_t *out_consumed,
+                                        uint8_t *out_alert, Span<uint8_t> in);
+
+// ssl_seal_align_prefix_len returns the length of the prefix before the start
+// of the bulk of the ciphertext when sealing a record with |ssl|. Callers may
+// use this to align buffers.
+//
+// Note when TLS 1.0 CBC record-splitting is enabled, this includes the one byte
+// record and is the offset into second record's ciphertext. Thus sealing a
+// small record may result in a smaller output than this value.
+//
+// TODO(davidben): Is this alignment valuable? Record-splitting makes this a
+// mess.
+size_t ssl_seal_align_prefix_len(const SSL *ssl);
+
+// tls_seal_record seals a new record of type |type| and body |in| and writes it
+// to |out|. At most |max_out| bytes will be written. It returns true on success
+// and false on error. If enabled, |tls_seal_record| implements TLS 1.0 CBC
+// 1/n-1 record splitting and may write two records concatenated.
+//
+// For a large record, the bulk of the ciphertext will begin
+// |ssl_seal_align_prefix_len| bytes into out. Aligning |out| appropriately may
+// improve performance. It writes at most |in_len| + |SSL_max_seal_overhead|
+// bytes to |out|.
+//
+// |in| and |out| may not alias.
+bool tls_seal_record(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, size_t max_out,
+                     uint8_t type, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len);
+
+enum dtls1_use_epoch_t {
+  dtls1_use_previous_epoch,
+  dtls1_use_current_epoch,
+};
+
+// dtls_max_seal_overhead returns the maximum overhead, in bytes, of sealing a
+// record.
+size_t dtls_max_seal_overhead(const SSL *ssl, enum dtls1_use_epoch_t use_epoch);
+
+// dtls_seal_prefix_len returns the number of bytes of prefix to reserve in
+// front of the plaintext when sealing a record in-place.
+size_t dtls_seal_prefix_len(const SSL *ssl, enum dtls1_use_epoch_t use_epoch);
+
+// dtls_seal_record implements |tls_seal_record| for DTLS. |use_epoch| selects
+// which epoch's cipher state to use. Unlike |tls_seal_record|, |in| and |out|
+// may alias but, if they do, |in| must be exactly |dtls_seal_prefix_len| bytes
+// ahead of |out|.
+bool dtls_seal_record(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, size_t max_out,
+                      uint8_t type, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
+                      enum dtls1_use_epoch_t use_epoch);
+
+// ssl_process_alert processes |in| as an alert and updates |ssl|'s shutdown
+// state. It returns one of |ssl_open_record_discard|, |ssl_open_record_error|,
+// |ssl_open_record_close_notify|, or |ssl_open_record_fatal_alert| as
+// appropriate.
+enum ssl_open_record_t ssl_process_alert(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                         Span<const uint8_t> in);
+
+
+// Private key operations.
+
+// ssl_has_private_key returns whether |hs| has a private key configured.
+bool ssl_has_private_key(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+// ssl_private_key_* perform the corresponding operation on
+// |SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD|. If there is a custom private key configured, they
+// call the corresponding function or |complete| depending on whether there is a
+// pending operation. Otherwise, they implement the operation with
+// |EVP_PKEY|.
+
+enum ssl_private_key_result_t ssl_private_key_sign(
+    SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, size_t max_out,
+    uint16_t sigalg, Span<const uint8_t> in);
+
+enum ssl_private_key_result_t ssl_private_key_decrypt(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                                      uint8_t *out,
+                                                      size_t *out_len,
+                                                      size_t max_out,
+                                                      Span<const uint8_t> in);
+
+// ssl_private_key_supports_signature_algorithm returns whether |hs|'s private
+// key supports |sigalg|.
+bool ssl_private_key_supports_signature_algorithm(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                                  uint16_t sigalg);
+
+// ssl_public_key_verify verifies that the |signature| is valid for the public
+// key |pkey| and input |in|, using the signature algorithm |sigalg|.
+bool ssl_public_key_verify(SSL *ssl, Span<const uint8_t> signature,
+                           uint16_t sigalg, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                           Span<const uint8_t> in);
+
+
+// Key shares.
+
+// SSLKeyShare abstracts over Diffie-Hellman-like key exchanges.
+class SSLKeyShare {
+ public:
+  virtual ~SSLKeyShare() {}
+  static constexpr bool kAllowUniquePtr = true;
+  HAS_VIRTUAL_DESTRUCTOR
+
+  // Create returns a SSLKeyShare instance for use with group |group_id| or
+  // nullptr on error.
+  static UniquePtr<SSLKeyShare> Create(uint16_t group_id);
+
+  // Create deserializes an SSLKeyShare instance previously serialized by
+  // |Serialize|.
+  static UniquePtr<SSLKeyShare> Create(CBS *in);
+
+  // Serializes writes the group ID and private key, in a format that can be
+  // read by |Create|.
+  bool Serialize(CBB *out);
+
+  // GroupID returns the group ID.
+  virtual uint16_t GroupID() const PURE_VIRTUAL;
+
+  // Offer generates a keypair and writes the public value to
+  // |out_public_key|. It returns true on success and false on error.
+  virtual bool Offer(CBB *out_public_key) PURE_VIRTUAL;
+
+  // Accept performs a key exchange against the |peer_key| generated by |Offer|.
+  // On success, it returns true, writes the public value to |out_public_key|,
+  // and sets |*out_secret| to the shared secret. On failure, it returns false
+  // and sets |*out_alert| to an alert to send to the peer.
+  //
+  // The default implementation calls |Offer| and then |Finish|, assuming a key
+  // exchange protocol where the peers are symmetric.
+  virtual bool Accept(CBB *out_public_key, Array<uint8_t> *out_secret,
+                      uint8_t *out_alert, Span<const uint8_t> peer_key);
+
+  // Finish performs a key exchange against the |peer_key| generated by
+  // |Accept|. On success, it returns true and sets |*out_secret| to the shared
+  // secret. On failure, it returns false and sets |*out_alert| to an alert to
+  // send to the peer.
+  virtual bool Finish(Array<uint8_t> *out_secret, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                      Span<const uint8_t> peer_key) PURE_VIRTUAL;
+
+  // SerializePrivateKey writes the private key to |out|, returning true if
+  // successful and false otherwise. It should be called after |Offer|.
+  virtual bool SerializePrivateKey(CBB *out) { return false; }
+
+  // DeserializePrivateKey initializes the state of the key exchange from |in|,
+  // returning true if successful and false otherwise.
+  virtual bool DeserializePrivateKey(CBS *in) { return false; }
+};
+
+struct NamedGroup {
+  int nid;
+  uint16_t group_id;
+  const char name[8], alias[11];
+};
+
+// NamedGroups returns all supported groups.
+Span<const NamedGroup> NamedGroups();
+
+// ssl_nid_to_group_id looks up the group corresponding to |nid|. On success, it
+// sets |*out_group_id| to the group ID and returns true. Otherwise, it returns
+// false.
+bool ssl_nid_to_group_id(uint16_t *out_group_id, int nid);
+
+// ssl_name_to_group_id looks up the group corresponding to the |name| string of
+// length |len|. On success, it sets |*out_group_id| to the group ID and returns
+// true. Otherwise, it returns false.
+bool ssl_name_to_group_id(uint16_t *out_group_id, const char *name, size_t len);
+
+
+// Handshake messages.
+
+struct SSLMessage {
+  bool is_v2_hello;
+  uint8_t type;
+  CBS body;
+  // raw is the entire serialized handshake message, including the TLS or DTLS
+  // message header.
+  CBS raw;
+};
+
+// SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT is the number of messages, including
+// ChangeCipherSpec, in the longest handshake flight. Currently this is the
+// client's second leg in a full handshake when client certificates, NPN, and
+// Channel ID, are all enabled.
+#define SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT 7
+
+extern const uint8_t kHelloRetryRequest[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
+extern const uint8_t kTLS12DowngradeRandom[8];
+extern const uint8_t kTLS13DowngradeRandom[8];
+extern const uint8_t kJDK11DowngradeRandom[8];
+
+// ssl_max_handshake_message_len returns the maximum number of bytes permitted
+// in a handshake message for |ssl|.
+size_t ssl_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *ssl);
+
+// tls_can_accept_handshake_data returns whether |ssl| is able to accept more
+// data into handshake buffer.
+bool tls_can_accept_handshake_data(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert);
+
+// tls_has_unprocessed_handshake_data returns whether there is buffered
+// handshake data that has not been consumed by |get_message|.
+bool tls_has_unprocessed_handshake_data(const SSL *ssl);
+
+// tls_append_handshake_data appends |data| to the handshake buffer. It returns
+// true on success and false on allocation failure.
+bool tls_append_handshake_data(SSL *ssl, Span<const uint8_t> data);
+
+// dtls_has_unprocessed_handshake_data behaves like
+// |tls_has_unprocessed_handshake_data| for DTLS.
+bool dtls_has_unprocessed_handshake_data(const SSL *ssl);
+
+// tls_flush_pending_hs_data flushes any handshake plaintext data.
+bool tls_flush_pending_hs_data(SSL *ssl);
+
+struct DTLS_OUTGOING_MESSAGE {
+  DTLS_OUTGOING_MESSAGE() {}
+  DTLS_OUTGOING_MESSAGE(const DTLS_OUTGOING_MESSAGE &) = delete;
+  DTLS_OUTGOING_MESSAGE &operator=(const DTLS_OUTGOING_MESSAGE &) = delete;
+  ~DTLS_OUTGOING_MESSAGE() { Clear(); }
+
+  void Clear();
+
+  uint8_t *data = nullptr;
+  uint32_t len = 0;
+  uint16_t epoch = 0;
+  bool is_ccs = false;
+};
+
+// dtls_clear_outgoing_messages releases all buffered outgoing messages.
+void dtls_clear_outgoing_messages(SSL *ssl);
+
+
+// Callbacks.
+
+// ssl_do_info_callback calls |ssl|'s info callback, if set.
+void ssl_do_info_callback(const SSL *ssl, int type, int value);
+
+// ssl_do_msg_callback calls |ssl|'s message callback, if set.
+void ssl_do_msg_callback(const SSL *ssl, int is_write, int content_type,
+                         Span<const uint8_t> in);
+
+
+// Transport buffers.
+
+class SSLBuffer {
+ public:
+  SSLBuffer() {}
+  ~SSLBuffer() { Clear(); }
+
+  SSLBuffer(const SSLBuffer &) = delete;
+  SSLBuffer &operator=(const SSLBuffer &) = delete;
+
+  uint8_t *data() { return buf_ + offset_; }
+  size_t size() const { return size_; }
+  bool empty() const { return size_ == 0; }
+  size_t cap() const { return cap_; }
+
+  Span<uint8_t> span() { return MakeSpan(data(), size()); }
+
+  Span<uint8_t> remaining() {
+    return MakeSpan(data() + size(), cap() - size());
+  }
+
+  // Clear releases the buffer.
+  void Clear();
+
+  // EnsureCap ensures the buffer has capacity at least |new_cap|, aligned such
+  // that data written after |header_len| is aligned to a
+  // |SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD|-byte boundary. It returns true on success and false
+  // on error.
+  bool EnsureCap(size_t header_len, size_t new_cap);
+
+  // DidWrite extends the buffer by |len|. The caller must have filled in to
+  // this point.
+  void DidWrite(size_t len);
+
+  // Consume consumes |len| bytes from the front of the buffer.  The memory
+  // consumed will remain valid until the next call to |DiscardConsumed| or
+  // |Clear|.
+  void Consume(size_t len);
+
+  // DiscardConsumed discards the consumed bytes from the buffer. If the buffer
+  // is now empty, it releases memory used by it.
+  void DiscardConsumed();
+
+ private:
+  // buf_ is the memory allocated for this buffer.
+  uint8_t *buf_ = nullptr;
+  // offset_ is the offset into |buf_| which the buffer contents start at.
+  uint16_t offset_ = 0;
+  // size_ is the size of the buffer contents from |buf_| + |offset_|.
+  uint16_t size_ = 0;
+  // cap_ is how much memory beyond |buf_| + |offset_| is available.
+  uint16_t cap_ = 0;
+  // inline_buf_ is a static buffer for short reads.
+  uint8_t inline_buf_[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH];
+  // buf_allocated_ is true if |buf_| points to allocated data and must be freed
+  // or false if it points into |inline_buf_|.
+  bool buf_allocated_ = false;
+};
+
+// ssl_read_buffer_extend_to extends the read buffer to the desired length. For
+// TLS, it reads to the end of the buffer until the buffer is |len| bytes
+// long. For DTLS, it reads a new packet and ignores |len|. It returns one on
+// success, zero on EOF, and a negative number on error.
+//
+// It is an error to call |ssl_read_buffer_extend_to| in DTLS when the buffer is
+// non-empty.
+int ssl_read_buffer_extend_to(SSL *ssl, size_t len);
+
+// ssl_handle_open_record handles the result of passing |ssl->s3->read_buffer|
+// to a record-processing function. If |ret| is a success or if the caller
+// should retry, it returns one and sets |*out_retry|. Otherwise, it returns <=
+// 0.
+int ssl_handle_open_record(SSL *ssl, bool *out_retry, ssl_open_record_t ret,
+                           size_t consumed, uint8_t alert);
+
+// ssl_write_buffer_flush flushes the write buffer to the transport. It returns
+// one on success and <= 0 on error. For DTLS, whether or not the write
+// succeeds, the write buffer will be cleared.
+int ssl_write_buffer_flush(SSL *ssl);
+
+
+// Certificate functions.
+
+// ssl_has_certificate returns whether a certificate and private key are
+// configured.
+bool ssl_has_certificate(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+// ssl_parse_cert_chain parses a certificate list from |cbs| in the format used
+// by a TLS Certificate message. On success, it advances |cbs| and returns
+// true. Otherwise, it returns false and sets |*out_alert| to an alert to send
+// to the peer.
+//
+// If the list is non-empty then |*out_chain| and |*out_pubkey| will be set to
+// the certificate chain and the leaf certificate's public key
+// respectively. Otherwise, both will be set to nullptr.
+//
+// If the list is non-empty and |out_leaf_sha256| is non-NULL, it writes the
+// SHA-256 hash of the leaf to |out_leaf_sha256|.
+bool ssl_parse_cert_chain(uint8_t *out_alert,
+                          UniquePtr<STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER)> *out_chain,
+                          UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> *out_pubkey,
+                          uint8_t *out_leaf_sha256, CBS *cbs,
+                          CRYPTO_BUFFER_POOL *pool);
+
+// ssl_add_cert_chain adds |hs->ssl|'s certificate chain to |cbb| in the format
+// used by a TLS Certificate message. If there is no certificate chain, it emits
+// an empty certificate list. It returns true on success and false on error.
+bool ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *cbb);
+
+enum ssl_key_usage_t {
+  key_usage_digital_signature = 0,
+  key_usage_encipherment = 2,
+};
+
+// ssl_cert_check_key_usage parses the DER-encoded, X.509 certificate in |in|
+// and returns true if doesn't specify a key usage or, if it does, if it
+// includes |bit|. Otherwise it pushes to the error queue and returns false.
+bool ssl_cert_check_key_usage(const CBS *in, enum ssl_key_usage_t bit);
+
+// ssl_cert_parse_pubkey extracts the public key from the DER-encoded, X.509
+// certificate in |in|. It returns an allocated |EVP_PKEY| or else returns
+// nullptr and pushes to the error queue.
+UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> ssl_cert_parse_pubkey(const CBS *in);
+
+// ssl_parse_client_CA_list parses a CA list from |cbs| in the format used by a
+// TLS CertificateRequest message. On success, it returns a newly-allocated
+// |CRYPTO_BUFFER| list and advances |cbs|. Otherwise, it returns nullptr and
+// sets |*out_alert| to an alert to send to the peer.
+UniquePtr<STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER)> ssl_parse_client_CA_list(SSL *ssl,
+                                                            uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                                            CBS *cbs);
+
+// ssl_has_client_CAs returns there are configured CAs.
+bool ssl_has_client_CAs(const SSL_CONFIG *cfg);
+
+// ssl_add_client_CA_list adds the configured CA list to |cbb| in the format
+// used by a TLS CertificateRequest message. It returns true on success and
+// false on error.
+bool ssl_add_client_CA_list(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *cbb);
+
+// ssl_check_leaf_certificate returns one if |pkey| and |leaf| are suitable as
+// a server's leaf certificate for |hs|. Otherwise, it returns zero and pushes
+// an error on the error queue.
+bool ssl_check_leaf_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+                               const CRYPTO_BUFFER *leaf);
+
+// ssl_on_certificate_selected is called once the certificate has been selected.
+// It finalizes the certificate and initializes |hs->local_pubkey|. It returns
+// true on success and false on error.
+bool ssl_on_certificate_selected(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+
+// TLS 1.3 key derivation.
+
+// tls13_init_key_schedule initializes the handshake hash and key derivation
+// state, and incorporates the PSK. The cipher suite and PRF hash must have been
+// selected at this point. It returns true on success and false on error.
+bool tls13_init_key_schedule(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, Span<const uint8_t> psk);
+
+// tls13_init_early_key_schedule initializes the handshake hash and key
+// derivation state from |session| for use with 0-RTT. It returns one on success
+// and zero on error.
+bool tls13_init_early_key_schedule(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                   const SSL_SESSION *session);
+
+// tls13_advance_key_schedule incorporates |in| into the key schedule with
+// HKDF-Extract. It returns true on success and false on error.
+bool tls13_advance_key_schedule(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, Span<const uint8_t> in);
+
+// tls13_set_traffic_key sets the read or write traffic keys to
+// |traffic_secret|. The version and cipher suite are determined from |session|.
+// It returns true on success and false on error.
+bool tls13_set_traffic_key(SSL *ssl, enum ssl_encryption_level_t level,
+                           enum evp_aead_direction_t direction,
+                           const SSL_SESSION *session,
+                           Span<const uint8_t> traffic_secret);
+
+// tls13_derive_early_secret derives the early traffic secret. It returns true
+// on success and false on error.
+bool tls13_derive_early_secret(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+// tls13_derive_handshake_secrets derives the handshake traffic secret. It
+// returns true on success and false on error.
+bool tls13_derive_handshake_secrets(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+// tls13_rotate_traffic_key derives the next read or write traffic secret. It
+// returns true on success and false on error.
+bool tls13_rotate_traffic_key(SSL *ssl, enum evp_aead_direction_t direction);
+
+// tls13_derive_application_secrets derives the initial application data traffic
+// and exporter secrets based on the handshake transcripts and |master_secret|.
+// It returns true on success and false on error.
+bool tls13_derive_application_secrets(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+// tls13_derive_resumption_secret derives the |resumption_secret|.
+bool tls13_derive_resumption_secret(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+// tls13_export_keying_material provides an exporter interface to use the
+// |exporter_secret|.
+bool tls13_export_keying_material(SSL *ssl, Span<uint8_t> out,
+                                  Span<const uint8_t> secret,
+                                  Span<const char> label,
+                                  Span<const uint8_t> context);
+
+// tls13_finished_mac calculates the MAC of the handshake transcript to verify
+// the integrity of the Finished message, and stores the result in |out| and
+// length in |out_len|. |is_server| is true if this is for the Server Finished
+// and false for the Client Finished.
+bool tls13_finished_mac(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len,
+                        bool is_server);
+
+// tls13_derive_session_psk calculates the PSK for this session based on the
+// resumption master secret and |nonce|. It returns true on success, and false
+// on failure.
+bool tls13_derive_session_psk(SSL_SESSION *session, Span<const uint8_t> nonce);
+
+// tls13_write_psk_binder calculates the PSK binder value over |transcript| and
+// |msg|, and replaces the last bytes of |msg| with the resulting value. It
+// returns true on success, and false on failure. If |out_binder_len| is
+// non-NULL, it sets |*out_binder_len| to the length of the value computed.
+bool tls13_write_psk_binder(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                            const SSLTranscript &transcript, Span<uint8_t> msg,
+                            size_t *out_binder_len);
+
+// tls13_verify_psk_binder verifies that the handshake transcript, truncated up
+// to the binders has a valid signature using the value of |session|'s
+// resumption secret. It returns true on success, and false on failure.
+bool tls13_verify_psk_binder(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                             const SSL_SESSION *session, const SSLMessage &msg,
+                             CBS *binders);
+
+
+// Encrypted ClientHello.
+
+struct ECHConfig {
+  static constexpr bool kAllowUniquePtr = true;
+  // raw contains the serialized ECHConfig.
+  Array<uint8_t> raw;
+  // The following fields alias into |raw|.
+  Span<const uint8_t> public_key;
+  Span<const uint8_t> public_name;
+  Span<const uint8_t> cipher_suites;
+  uint16_t kem_id = 0;
+  uint8_t maximum_name_length = 0;
+  uint8_t config_id = 0;
+};
+
+class ECHServerConfig {
+ public:
+  static constexpr bool kAllowUniquePtr = true;
+  ECHServerConfig() = default;
+  ECHServerConfig(const ECHServerConfig &other) = delete;
+  ECHServerConfig &operator=(ECHServerConfig &&) = delete;
+
+  // Init parses |ech_config| as an ECHConfig and saves a copy of |key|.
+  // It returns true on success and false on error.
+  bool Init(Span<const uint8_t> ech_config, const EVP_HPKE_KEY *key,
+            bool is_retry_config);
+
+  // SetupContext sets up |ctx| for a new connection, given the specified
+  // HPKE ciphersuite and encapsulated KEM key. It returns true on success and
+  // false on error. This function may only be called on an initialized object.
+  bool SetupContext(EVP_HPKE_CTX *ctx, uint16_t kdf_id, uint16_t aead_id,
+                    Span<const uint8_t> enc) const;
+
+  const ECHConfig &ech_config() const { return ech_config_; }
+  bool is_retry_config() const { return is_retry_config_; }
+
+ private:
+  ECHConfig ech_config_;
+  ScopedEVP_HPKE_KEY key_;
+  bool is_retry_config_ = false;
+};
+
+enum ssl_client_hello_type_t {
+  ssl_client_hello_unencrypted,
+  ssl_client_hello_inner,
+  ssl_client_hello_outer,
+};
+
+// ECH_CLIENT_* are types for the ClientHello encrypted_client_hello extension.
+#define ECH_CLIENT_OUTER 0
+#define ECH_CLIENT_INNER 1
+
+// ssl_decode_client_hello_inner recovers the full ClientHelloInner from the
+// EncodedClientHelloInner |encoded_client_hello_inner| by replacing its
+// outer_extensions extension with the referenced extensions from the
+// ClientHelloOuter |client_hello_outer|. If successful, it writes the recovered
+// ClientHelloInner to |out_client_hello_inner|. It returns true on success and
+// false on failure.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bool ssl_decode_client_hello_inner(
+    SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, Array<uint8_t> *out_client_hello_inner,
+    Span<const uint8_t> encoded_client_hello_inner,
+    const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello_outer);
+
+// ssl_client_hello_decrypt attempts to decrypt the |payload| and writes the
+// result to |*out|. |payload| must point into |client_hello_outer|. It returns
+// true on success and false on error. On error, it sets |*out_is_decrypt_error|
+// to whether the failure was due to a bad ciphertext.
+bool ssl_client_hello_decrypt(EVP_HPKE_CTX *hpke_ctx, Array<uint8_t> *out,
+                              bool *out_is_decrypt_error,
+                              const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello_outer,
+                              Span<const uint8_t> payload);
+
+#define ECH_CONFIRMATION_SIGNAL_LEN 8
+
+// ssl_ech_confirmation_signal_hello_offset returns the offset of the ECH
+// confirmation signal in a ServerHello message, including the handshake header.
+size_t ssl_ech_confirmation_signal_hello_offset(const SSL *ssl);
+
+// ssl_ech_accept_confirmation computes the server's ECH acceptance signal,
+// writing it to |out|. The transcript portion is the concatenation of
+// |transcript| with |msg|. The |ECH_CONFIRMATION_SIGNAL_LEN| bytes from
+// |offset| in |msg| are replaced with zeros before hashing. This function
+// returns true on success, and false on failure.
+bool ssl_ech_accept_confirmation(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, Span<uint8_t> out,
+                                 Span<const uint8_t> client_random,
+                                 const SSLTranscript &transcript, bool is_hrr,
+                                 Span<const uint8_t> msg, size_t offset);
+
+// ssl_is_valid_ech_public_name returns true if |public_name| is a valid ECH
+// public name and false otherwise. It is exported for testing.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bool ssl_is_valid_ech_public_name(
+    Span<const uint8_t> public_name);
+
+// ssl_is_valid_ech_config_list returns true if |ech_config_list| is a valid
+// ECHConfigList structure and false otherwise.
+bool ssl_is_valid_ech_config_list(Span<const uint8_t> ech_config_list);
+
+// ssl_select_ech_config selects an ECHConfig and associated parameters to offer
+// on the client and updates |hs|. It returns true on success, whether an
+// ECHConfig was found or not, and false on internal error. On success, the
+// encapsulated key is written to |out_enc| and |*out_enc_len| is set to the
+// number of bytes written. If the function did not select an ECHConfig, the
+// encapsulated key is the empty string.
+bool ssl_select_ech_config(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, Span<uint8_t> out_enc,
+                           size_t *out_enc_len);
+
+// ssl_ech_extension_body_length returns the length of the body of a ClientHello
+// ECH extension that encrypts |in_len| bytes with |aead| and an 'enc' value of
+// length |enc_len|. The result does not include the four-byte extension header.
+size_t ssl_ech_extension_body_length(const EVP_HPKE_AEAD *aead, size_t enc_len,
+                                     size_t in_len);
+
+// ssl_encrypt_client_hello constructs a new ClientHelloInner, adds it to the
+// inner transcript, and encrypts for inclusion in the ClientHelloOuter. |enc|
+// is the encapsulated key to include in the extension. It returns true on
+// success and false on error. If not offering ECH, |enc| is ignored and the
+// function will compute a GREASE ECH extension if necessary, and otherwise
+// return success while doing nothing.
+//
+// Encrypting the ClientHelloInner incorporates all extensions in the
+// ClientHelloOuter, so all other state necessary for |ssl_add_client_hello|
+// must already be computed.
+bool ssl_encrypt_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, Span<const uint8_t> enc);
+
+
+// Delegated credentials.
+
+// This structure stores a delegated credential (DC) as defined by
+// draft-ietf-tls-subcerts-03.
+struct DC {
+  static constexpr bool kAllowUniquePtr = true;
+  ~DC();
+
+  // Dup returns a copy of this DC and takes references to |raw| and |pkey|.
+  UniquePtr<DC> Dup();
+
+  // Parse parses the delegated credential stored in |in|. If successful it
+  // returns the parsed structure, otherwise it returns |nullptr| and sets
+  // |*out_alert|.
+  static UniquePtr<DC> Parse(CRYPTO_BUFFER *in, uint8_t *out_alert);
+
+  // raw is the delegated credential encoded as specified in draft-ietf-tls-
+  // subcerts-03.
+  UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> raw;
+
+  // expected_cert_verify_algorithm is the signature scheme of the DC public
+  // key.
+  uint16_t expected_cert_verify_algorithm = 0;
+
+  // pkey is the public key parsed from |public_key|.
+  UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey;
+
+ private:
+  friend DC* New<DC>();
+  DC();
+};
+
+// ssl_signing_with_dc returns true if the peer has indicated support for
+// delegated credentials and this host has sent a delegated credential in
+// response. If this is true then we've committed to using the DC in the
+// handshake.
+bool ssl_signing_with_dc(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+
+// Handshake functions.
+
+enum ssl_hs_wait_t {
+  ssl_hs_error,
+  ssl_hs_ok,
+  ssl_hs_read_server_hello,
+  ssl_hs_read_message,
+  ssl_hs_flush,
+  ssl_hs_certificate_selection_pending,
+  ssl_hs_handoff,
+  ssl_hs_handback,
+  ssl_hs_x509_lookup,
+  ssl_hs_private_key_operation,
+  ssl_hs_pending_session,
+  ssl_hs_pending_ticket,
+  ssl_hs_early_return,
+  ssl_hs_early_data_rejected,
+  ssl_hs_read_end_of_early_data,
+  ssl_hs_read_change_cipher_spec,
+  ssl_hs_certificate_verify,
+  ssl_hs_hints_ready,
+};
+
+enum ssl_grease_index_t {
+  ssl_grease_cipher = 0,
+  ssl_grease_group,
+  ssl_grease_extension1,
+  ssl_grease_extension2,
+  ssl_grease_version,
+  ssl_grease_ticket_extension,
+  ssl_grease_ech_config_id,
+  ssl_grease_last_index = ssl_grease_ech_config_id,
+};
+
+enum tls12_server_hs_state_t {
+  state12_start_accept = 0,
+  state12_read_client_hello,
+  state12_read_client_hello_after_ech,
+  state12_select_certificate,
+  state12_tls13,
+  state12_select_parameters,
+  state12_send_server_hello,
+  state12_send_server_certificate,
+  state12_send_server_key_exchange,
+  state12_send_server_hello_done,
+  state12_read_client_certificate,
+  state12_verify_client_certificate,
+  state12_read_client_key_exchange,
+  state12_read_client_certificate_verify,
+  state12_read_change_cipher_spec,
+  state12_process_change_cipher_spec,
+  state12_read_next_proto,
+  state12_read_channel_id,
+  state12_read_client_finished,
+  state12_send_server_finished,
+  state12_finish_server_handshake,
+  state12_done,
+};
+
+enum tls13_server_hs_state_t {
+  state13_select_parameters = 0,
+  state13_select_session,
+  state13_send_hello_retry_request,
+  state13_read_second_client_hello,
+  state13_send_server_hello,
+  state13_send_server_certificate_verify,
+  state13_send_server_finished,
+  state13_send_half_rtt_ticket,
+  state13_read_second_client_flight,
+  state13_process_end_of_early_data,
+  state13_read_client_encrypted_extensions,
+  state13_read_client_certificate,
+  state13_read_client_certificate_verify,
+  state13_read_channel_id,
+  state13_read_client_finished,
+  state13_send_new_session_ticket,
+  state13_done,
+};
+
+// handback_t lists the points in the state machine where a handback can occur.
+// These are the different points at which key material is no longer needed.
+enum handback_t {
+  handback_after_session_resumption = 0,
+  handback_after_ecdhe = 1,
+  handback_after_handshake = 2,
+  handback_tls13 = 3,
+  handback_max_value = handback_tls13,
+};
+
+// SSL_HANDSHAKE_HINTS contains handshake hints for a connection. See
+// |SSL_request_handshake_hints| and related functions.
+struct SSL_HANDSHAKE_HINTS {
+  static constexpr bool kAllowUniquePtr = true;
+
+  Array<uint8_t> server_random;
+
+  uint16_t key_share_group_id = 0;
+  Array<uint8_t> key_share_public_key;
+  Array<uint8_t> key_share_secret;
+
+  uint16_t signature_algorithm = 0;
+  Array<uint8_t> signature_input;
+  Array<uint8_t> signature_spki;
+  Array<uint8_t> signature;
+
+  Array<uint8_t> decrypted_psk;
+  bool ignore_psk = false;
+
+  uint16_t cert_compression_alg_id = 0;
+  Array<uint8_t> cert_compression_input;
+  Array<uint8_t> cert_compression_output;
+};
+
+struct SSL_HANDSHAKE {
+  explicit SSL_HANDSHAKE(SSL *ssl);
+  ~SSL_HANDSHAKE();
+  static constexpr bool kAllowUniquePtr = true;
+
+  // ssl is a non-owning pointer to the parent |SSL| object.
+  SSL *ssl;
+
+  // config is a non-owning pointer to the handshake configuration.
+  SSL_CONFIG *config;
+
+  // wait contains the operation the handshake is currently blocking on or
+  // |ssl_hs_ok| if none.
+  enum ssl_hs_wait_t wait = ssl_hs_ok;
+
+  // state is the internal state for the TLS 1.2 and below handshake. Its
+  // values depend on |do_handshake| but the starting state is always zero.
+  int state = 0;
+
+  // tls13_state is the internal state for the TLS 1.3 handshake. Its values
+  // depend on |do_handshake| but the starting state is always zero.
+  int tls13_state = 0;
+
+  // min_version is the minimum accepted protocol version, taking account both
+  // |SSL_OP_NO_*| and |SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version| APIs.
+  uint16_t min_version = 0;
+
+  // max_version is the maximum accepted protocol version, taking account both
+  // |SSL_OP_NO_*| and |SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version| APIs.
+  uint16_t max_version = 0;
+
+ private:
+  size_t hash_len_ = 0;
+  uint8_t secret_[SSL_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
+  uint8_t early_traffic_secret_[SSL_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
+  uint8_t client_handshake_secret_[SSL_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
+  uint8_t server_handshake_secret_[SSL_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
+  uint8_t client_traffic_secret_0_[SSL_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
+  uint8_t server_traffic_secret_0_[SSL_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
+  uint8_t expected_client_finished_[SSL_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
+
+ public:
+  void ResizeSecrets(size_t hash_len);
+
+  // GetClientHello, on the server, returns either the normal ClientHello
+  // message or the ClientHelloInner if it has been serialized to
+  // |ech_client_hello_buf|. This function should only be called when the
+  // current message is a ClientHello. It returns true on success and false on
+  // error.
+  //
+  // Note that fields of the returned |out_msg| and |out_client_hello| point
+  // into a handshake-owned buffer, so their lifetimes should not exceed this
+  // SSL_HANDSHAKE.
+  bool GetClientHello(SSLMessage *out_msg, SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *out_client_hello);
+
+  Span<uint8_t> secret() { return MakeSpan(secret_, hash_len_); }
+  Span<const uint8_t> secret() const {
+    return MakeConstSpan(secret_, hash_len_);
+  }
+  Span<uint8_t> early_traffic_secret() {
+    return MakeSpan(early_traffic_secret_, hash_len_);
+  }
+  Span<uint8_t> client_handshake_secret() {
+    return MakeSpan(client_handshake_secret_, hash_len_);
+  }
+  Span<uint8_t> server_handshake_secret() {
+    return MakeSpan(server_handshake_secret_, hash_len_);
+  }
+  Span<uint8_t> client_traffic_secret_0() {
+    return MakeSpan(client_traffic_secret_0_, hash_len_);
+  }
+  Span<uint8_t> server_traffic_secret_0() {
+    return MakeSpan(server_traffic_secret_0_, hash_len_);
+  }
+  Span<uint8_t> expected_client_finished() {
+    return MakeSpan(expected_client_finished_, hash_len_);
+  }
+
+  union {
+    // sent is a bitset where the bits correspond to elements of kExtensions
+    // in extensions.cc. Each bit is set if that extension was sent in a
+    // ClientHello. It's not used by servers.
+    uint32_t sent = 0;
+    // received is a bitset, like |sent|, but is used by servers to record
+    // which extensions were received from a client.
+    uint32_t received;
+  } extensions;
+
+  // inner_extensions_sent, on clients that offer ECH, is |extensions.sent| for
+  // the ClientHelloInner.
+  uint32_t inner_extensions_sent = 0;
+
+  // error, if |wait| is |ssl_hs_error|, is the error the handshake failed on.
+  UniquePtr<ERR_SAVE_STATE> error;
+
+  // key_shares are the current key exchange instances. The second is only used
+  // as a client if we believe that we should offer two key shares in a
+  // ClientHello.
+  UniquePtr<SSLKeyShare> key_shares[2];
+
+  // transcript is the current handshake transcript.
+  SSLTranscript transcript;
+
+  // inner_transcript, on the client, is the handshake transcript for the
+  // ClientHelloInner handshake. It is moved to |transcript| if the server
+  // accepts ECH.
+  SSLTranscript inner_transcript;
+
+  // inner_client_random is the ClientHello random value used with
+  // ClientHelloInner.
+  uint8_t inner_client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE] = {0};
+
+  // cookie is the value of the cookie received from the server, if any.
+  Array<uint8_t> cookie;
+
+  // ech_client_outer contains the outer ECH extension to send in the
+  // ClientHello, excluding the header and type byte.
+  Array<uint8_t> ech_client_outer;
+
+  // ech_retry_configs, on the client, contains the retry configs from the
+  // server as a serialized ECHConfigList.
+  Array<uint8_t> ech_retry_configs;
+
+  // ech_client_hello_buf, on the server, contains the bytes of the
+  // reconstructed ClientHelloInner message.
+  Array<uint8_t> ech_client_hello_buf;
+
+  // key_share_bytes is the key_share extension that the client should send.
+  Array<uint8_t> key_share_bytes;
+
+  // ecdh_public_key, for servers, is the key share to be sent to the client in
+  // TLS 1.3.
+  Array<uint8_t> ecdh_public_key;
+
+  // peer_sigalgs are the signature algorithms that the peer supports. These are
+  // taken from the contents of the signature algorithms extension for a server
+  // or from the CertificateRequest for a client.
+  Array<uint16_t> peer_sigalgs;
+
+  // peer_supported_group_list contains the supported group IDs advertised by
+  // the peer. This is only set on the server's end. The server does not
+  // advertise this extension to the client.
+  Array<uint16_t> peer_supported_group_list;
+
+  // peer_delegated_credential_sigalgs are the signature algorithms the peer
+  // supports with delegated credentials.
+  Array<uint16_t> peer_delegated_credential_sigalgs;
+
+  // peer_key is the peer's ECDH key for a TLS 1.2 client.
+  Array<uint8_t> peer_key;
+
+  // extension_permutation is the permutation to apply to ClientHello
+  // extensions. It maps indices into the |kExtensions| table into other
+  // indices.
+  Array<uint8_t> extension_permutation;
+
+  // cert_compression_alg_id, for a server, contains the negotiated certificate
+  // compression algorithm for this client. It is only valid if
+  // |cert_compression_negotiated| is true.
+  uint16_t cert_compression_alg_id;
+
+  // ech_hpke_ctx is the HPKE context used in ECH. On the server, it is
+  // initialized if |ech_status| is |ssl_ech_accepted|. On the client, it is
+  // initialized if |selected_ech_config| is not nullptr.
+  ScopedEVP_HPKE_CTX ech_hpke_ctx;
+
+  // server_params, in a TLS 1.2 server, stores the ServerKeyExchange
+  // parameters. It has client and server randoms prepended for signing
+  // convenience.
+  Array<uint8_t> server_params;
+
+  // peer_psk_identity_hint, on the client, is the psk_identity_hint sent by the
+  // server when using a TLS 1.2 PSK key exchange.
+  UniquePtr<char> peer_psk_identity_hint;
+
+  // ca_names, on the client, contains the list of CAs received in a
+  // CertificateRequest message.
+  UniquePtr<STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER)> ca_names;
+
+  // cached_x509_ca_names contains a cache of parsed versions of the elements of
+  // |ca_names|. This pointer is left non-owning so only
+  // |ssl_crypto_x509_method| needs to link against crypto/x509.
+  STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *cached_x509_ca_names = nullptr;
+
+  // certificate_types, on the client, contains the set of certificate types
+  // received in a CertificateRequest message.
+  Array<uint8_t> certificate_types;
+
+  // local_pubkey is the public key we are authenticating as.
+  UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> local_pubkey;
+
+  // peer_pubkey is the public key parsed from the peer's leaf certificate.
+  UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> peer_pubkey;
+
+  // new_session is the new mutable session being established by the current
+  // handshake. It should not be cached.
+  UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> new_session;
+
+  // early_session is the session corresponding to the current 0-RTT state on
+  // the client if |in_early_data| is true.
+  UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> early_session;
+
+  // ssl_ech_keys, for servers, is the set of ECH keys to use with this
+  // handshake. This is copied from |SSL_CTX| to ensure consistent behavior as
+  // |SSL_CTX| rotates keys.
+  UniquePtr<SSL_ECH_KEYS> ech_keys;
+
+  // selected_ech_config, for clients, is the ECHConfig the client uses to offer
+  // ECH, or nullptr if ECH is not being offered. If non-NULL, |ech_hpke_ctx|
+  // will be initialized.
+  UniquePtr<ECHConfig> selected_ech_config;
+
+  // new_cipher is the cipher being negotiated in this handshake.
+  const SSL_CIPHER *new_cipher = nullptr;
+
+  // key_block is the record-layer key block for TLS 1.2 and earlier.
+  Array<uint8_t> key_block;
+
+  // hints contains the handshake hints for this connection. If
+  // |hints_requested| is true, this field is non-null and contains the pending
+  // hints to filled as the predicted handshake progresses. Otherwise, this
+  // field, if non-null, contains hints configured by the caller and will
+  // influence the handshake on match.
+  UniquePtr<SSL_HANDSHAKE_HINTS> hints;
+
+  // ech_is_inner, on the server, indicates whether the ClientHello contained an
+  // inner ECH extension.
+  bool ech_is_inner : 1;
+
+  // ech_authenticated_reject, on the client, indicates whether an ECH rejection
+  // handshake has been authenticated.
+  bool ech_authenticated_reject : 1;
+
+  // scts_requested is true if the SCT extension is in the ClientHello.
+  bool scts_requested : 1;
+
+  // handshake_finalized is true once the handshake has completed, at which
+  // point accessors should use the established state.
+  bool handshake_finalized : 1;
+
+  // accept_psk_mode stores whether the client's PSK mode is compatible with our
+  // preferences.
+  bool accept_psk_mode : 1;
+
+  // cert_request is true if a client certificate was requested.
+  bool cert_request : 1;
+
+  // certificate_status_expected is true if OCSP stapling was negotiated and the
+  // server is expected to send a CertificateStatus message. (This is used on
+  // both the client and server sides.)
+  bool certificate_status_expected : 1;
+
+  // ocsp_stapling_requested is true if a client requested OCSP stapling.
+  bool ocsp_stapling_requested : 1;
+
+  // delegated_credential_requested is true if the peer indicated support for
+  // the delegated credential extension.
+  bool delegated_credential_requested : 1;
+
+  // should_ack_sni is used by a server and indicates that the SNI extension
+  // should be echoed in the ServerHello.
+  bool should_ack_sni : 1;
+
+  // in_false_start is true if there is a pending client handshake in False
+  // Start. The client may write data at this point.
+  bool in_false_start : 1;
+
+  // in_early_data is true if there is a pending handshake that has progressed
+  // enough to send and receive early data.
+  bool in_early_data : 1;
+
+  // early_data_offered is true if the client sent the early_data extension.
+  bool early_data_offered : 1;
+
+  // can_early_read is true if application data may be read at this point in the
+  // handshake.
+  bool can_early_read : 1;
+
+  // can_early_write is true if application data may be written at this point in
+  // the handshake.
+  bool can_early_write : 1;
+
+  // next_proto_neg_seen is one of NPN was negotiated.
+  bool next_proto_neg_seen : 1;
+
+  // ticket_expected is true if a TLS 1.2 NewSessionTicket message is to be sent
+  // or received.
+  bool ticket_expected : 1;
+
+  // extended_master_secret is true if the extended master secret extension is
+  // negotiated in this handshake.
+  bool extended_master_secret : 1;
+
+  // pending_private_key_op is true if there is a pending private key operation
+  // in progress.
+  bool pending_private_key_op : 1;
+
+  // handback indicates that a server should pause the handshake after
+  // finishing operations that require private key material, in such a way that
+  // |SSL_get_error| returns |SSL_ERROR_HANDBACK|.  It is set by
+  // |SSL_apply_handoff|.
+  bool handback : 1;
+
+  // hints_requested indicates the caller has requested handshake hints. Only
+  // the first round-trip of the handshake will complete, after which the
+  // |hints| structure can be serialized.
+  bool hints_requested : 1;
+
+  // cert_compression_negotiated is true iff |cert_compression_alg_id| is valid.
+  bool cert_compression_negotiated : 1;
+
+  // apply_jdk11_workaround is true if the peer is probably a JDK 11 client
+  // which implemented TLS 1.3 incorrectly.
+  bool apply_jdk11_workaround : 1;
+
+  // can_release_private_key is true if the private key will no longer be used
+  // in this handshake.
+  bool can_release_private_key : 1;
+
+  // channel_id_negotiated is true if Channel ID should be used in this
+  // handshake.
+  bool channel_id_negotiated : 1;
+
+  // client_version is the value sent or received in the ClientHello version.
+  uint16_t client_version = 0;
+
+  // early_data_read is the amount of early data that has been read by the
+  // record layer.
+  uint16_t early_data_read = 0;
+
+  // early_data_written is the amount of early data that has been written by the
+  // record layer.
+  uint16_t early_data_written = 0;
+
+  // ech_config_id is the ECH config sent by the client.
+  uint8_t ech_config_id = 0;
+
+  // session_id is the session ID in the ClientHello.
+  uint8_t session_id[SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH] = {0};
+  uint8_t session_id_len = 0;
+
+  // grease_seed is the entropy for GREASE values.
+  uint8_t grease_seed[ssl_grease_last_index + 1] = {0};
+};
+
+UniquePtr<SSL_HANDSHAKE> ssl_handshake_new(SSL *ssl);
+
+// ssl_check_message_type checks if |msg| has type |type|. If so it returns
+// one. Otherwise, it sends an alert and returns zero.
+bool ssl_check_message_type(SSL *ssl, const SSLMessage &msg, int type);
+
+// ssl_run_handshake runs the TLS handshake. It returns one on success and <= 0
+// on error. It sets |out_early_return| to one if we've completed the handshake
+// early.
+int ssl_run_handshake(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, bool *out_early_return);
+
+// The following are implementations of |do_handshake| for the client and
+// server.
+enum ssl_hs_wait_t ssl_client_handshake(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+enum ssl_hs_wait_t ssl_server_handshake(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+enum ssl_hs_wait_t tls13_client_handshake(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+enum ssl_hs_wait_t tls13_server_handshake(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+// The following functions return human-readable representations of the TLS
+// handshake states for debugging.
+const char *ssl_client_handshake_state(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+const char *ssl_server_handshake_state(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+const char *tls13_client_handshake_state(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+const char *tls13_server_handshake_state(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+// tls13_add_key_update queues a KeyUpdate message on |ssl|. The
+// |update_requested| argument must be one of |SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED| or
+// |SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED|.
+bool tls13_add_key_update(SSL *ssl, int update_requested);
+
+// tls13_post_handshake processes a post-handshake message. It returns true on
+// success and false on failure.
+bool tls13_post_handshake(SSL *ssl, const SSLMessage &msg);
+
+bool tls13_process_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSLMessage &msg,
+                               bool allow_anonymous);
+bool tls13_process_certificate_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSLMessage &msg);
+
+// tls13_process_finished processes |msg| as a Finished message from the
+// peer. If |use_saved_value| is true, the verify_data is compared against
+// |hs->expected_client_finished| rather than computed fresh.
+bool tls13_process_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSLMessage &msg,
+                            bool use_saved_value);
+
+bool tls13_add_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+// tls13_add_certificate_verify adds a TLS 1.3 CertificateVerify message to the
+// handshake. If it returns |ssl_private_key_retry|, it should be called again
+// to retry when the signing operation is completed.
+enum ssl_private_key_result_t tls13_add_certificate_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+bool tls13_add_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+bool tls13_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *ssl, const SSLMessage &msg);
+bssl::UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> tls13_create_session_with_ticket(SSL *ssl,
+                                                              CBS *body);
+
+// ssl_setup_extension_permutation computes a ClientHello extension permutation
+// for |hs|, if applicable. It returns true on success and false on error.
+bool ssl_setup_extension_permutation(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+// ssl_setup_key_shares computes client key shares and saves them in |hs|. It
+// returns true on success and false on failure. If |override_group_id| is zero,
+// it offers the default groups, including GREASE. If it is non-zero, it offers
+// a single key share of the specified group.
+bool ssl_setup_key_shares(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint16_t override_group_id);
+
+bool ssl_ext_key_share_parse_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                         Array<uint8_t> *out_secret,
+                                         uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *contents);
+bool ssl_ext_key_share_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, bool *out_found,
+                                         Span<const uint8_t> *out_peer_key,
+                                         uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                         const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello);
+bool ssl_ext_key_share_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out);
+
+bool ssl_ext_pre_shared_key_parse_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                              uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                              CBS *contents);
+bool ssl_ext_pre_shared_key_parse_clienthello(
+    SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBS *out_ticket, CBS *out_binders,
+    uint32_t *out_obfuscated_ticket_age, uint8_t *out_alert,
+    const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello, CBS *contents);
+bool ssl_ext_pre_shared_key_add_serverhello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out);
+
+// ssl_is_sct_list_valid does a shallow parse of the SCT list in |contents| and
+// returns whether it's valid.
+bool ssl_is_sct_list_valid(const CBS *contents);
+
+// ssl_write_client_hello_without_extensions writes a ClientHello to |out|,
+// up to the extensions field. |type| determines the type of ClientHello to
+// write. If |omit_session_id| is true, the session ID is empty.
+bool ssl_write_client_hello_without_extensions(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                               CBB *cbb,
+                                               ssl_client_hello_type_t type,
+                                               bool empty_session_id);
+
+// ssl_add_client_hello constructs a ClientHello and adds it to the outgoing
+// flight. It returns true on success and false on error.
+bool ssl_add_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+struct ParsedServerHello {
+  CBS raw;
+  uint16_t legacy_version = 0;
+  CBS random;
+  CBS session_id;
+  uint16_t cipher_suite = 0;
+  uint8_t compression_method = 0;
+  CBS extensions;
+};
+
+// ssl_parse_server_hello parses |msg| as a ServerHello. On success, it writes
+// the result to |*out| and returns true. Otherwise, it returns false and sets
+// |*out_alert| to an alert to send to the peer.
+bool ssl_parse_server_hello(ParsedServerHello *out, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                            const SSLMessage &msg);
+
+enum ssl_cert_verify_context_t {
+  ssl_cert_verify_server,
+  ssl_cert_verify_client,
+  ssl_cert_verify_channel_id,
+};
+
+// tls13_get_cert_verify_signature_input generates the message to be signed for
+// TLS 1.3's CertificateVerify message. |cert_verify_context| determines the
+// type of signature. It sets |*out| to a newly allocated buffer containing the
+// result. This function returns true on success and false on failure.
+bool tls13_get_cert_verify_signature_input(
+    SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, Array<uint8_t> *out,
+    enum ssl_cert_verify_context_t cert_verify_context);
+
+// ssl_is_valid_alpn_list returns whether |in| is a valid ALPN protocol list.
+bool ssl_is_valid_alpn_list(Span<const uint8_t> in);
+
+// ssl_is_alpn_protocol_allowed returns whether |protocol| is a valid server
+// selection for |hs->ssl|'s client preferences.
+bool ssl_is_alpn_protocol_allowed(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                  Span<const uint8_t> protocol);
+
+// ssl_negotiate_alpn negotiates the ALPN extension, if applicable. It returns
+// true on successful negotiation or if nothing was negotiated. It returns false
+// and sets |*out_alert| to an alert on error.
+bool ssl_negotiate_alpn(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                        const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello);
+
+// ssl_get_local_application_settings looks up the configured ALPS value for
+// |protocol|. If found, it sets |*out_settings| to the value and returns true.
+// Otherwise, it returns false.
+bool ssl_get_local_application_settings(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                        Span<const uint8_t> *out_settings,
+                                        Span<const uint8_t> protocol);
+
+// ssl_negotiate_alps negotiates the ALPS extension, if applicable. It returns
+// true on successful negotiation or if nothing was negotiated. It returns false
+// and sets |*out_alert| to an alert on error.
+bool ssl_negotiate_alps(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                        const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello);
+
+struct SSLExtension {
+  SSLExtension(uint16_t type_arg, bool allowed_arg = true)
+      : type(type_arg), allowed(allowed_arg), present(false) {
+    CBS_init(&data, nullptr, 0);
+  }
+
+  uint16_t type;
+  bool allowed;
+  bool present;
+  CBS data;
+};
+
+// ssl_parse_extensions parses a TLS extensions block out of |cbs| and advances
+// it. It writes the parsed extensions to pointers in |extensions|. On success,
+// it fills in the |present| and |data| fields and returns true. Otherwise, it
+// sets |*out_alert| to an alert to send and returns false. Unknown extensions
+// are rejected unless |ignore_unknown| is true.
+bool ssl_parse_extensions(const CBS *cbs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                          std::initializer_list<SSLExtension *> extensions,
+                          bool ignore_unknown);
+
+// ssl_verify_peer_cert verifies the peer certificate for |hs|.
+enum ssl_verify_result_t ssl_verify_peer_cert(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+// ssl_reverify_peer_cert verifies the peer certificate for |hs| when resuming a
+// session.
+enum ssl_verify_result_t ssl_reverify_peer_cert(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                                bool send_alert);
+
+enum ssl_hs_wait_t ssl_get_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+bool ssl_send_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+bool ssl_output_cert_chain(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+// ssl_handshake_session returns the |SSL_SESSION| corresponding to the current
+// handshake. Note, in TLS 1.2 resumptions, this session is immutable.
+const SSL_SESSION *ssl_handshake_session(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+// ssl_done_writing_client_hello is called after the last ClientHello is written
+// by |hs|. It releases some memory that is no longer needed.
+void ssl_done_writing_client_hello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+
+// SSLKEYLOGFILE functions.
+
+// ssl_log_secret logs |secret| with label |label|, if logging is enabled for
+// |ssl|. It returns true on success and false on failure.
+bool ssl_log_secret(const SSL *ssl, const char *label,
+                    Span<const uint8_t> secret);
+
+
+// ClientHello functions.
+
+// ssl_client_hello_init parses |body| as a ClientHello message, excluding the
+// message header, and writes the result to |*out|. It returns true on success
+// and false on error. This function is exported for testing.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT bool ssl_client_hello_init(const SSL *ssl, SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *out,
+                                          Span<const uint8_t> body);
+
+bool ssl_parse_client_hello_with_trailing_data(const SSL *ssl, CBS *cbs,
+                                               SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *out);
+
+bool ssl_client_hello_get_extension(const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello,
+                                    CBS *out, uint16_t extension_type);
+
+bool ssl_client_cipher_list_contains_cipher(
+    const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello, uint16_t id);
+
+
+// GREASE.
+
+// ssl_get_grease_value returns a GREASE value for |hs|. For a given
+// connection, the values for each index will be deterministic. This allows the
+// same ClientHello be sent twice for a HelloRetryRequest or the same group be
+// advertised in both supported_groups and key_shares.
+uint16_t ssl_get_grease_value(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                              enum ssl_grease_index_t index);
+
+
+// Signature algorithms.
+
+// tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs parses |sigalgs| as the list of peer signature
+// algorithms and saves them on |hs|. It returns true on success and false on
+// error.
+bool tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const CBS *sigalgs);
+
+// tls1_get_legacy_signature_algorithm sets |*out| to the signature algorithm
+// that should be used with |pkey| in TLS 1.1 and earlier. It returns true on
+// success and false if |pkey| may not be used at those versions.
+bool tls1_get_legacy_signature_algorithm(uint16_t *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+
+// tls1_choose_signature_algorithm sets |*out| to a signature algorithm for use
+// with |hs|'s private key based on the peer's preferences and the algorithms
+// supported. It returns true on success and false on error.
+bool tls1_choose_signature_algorithm(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint16_t *out);
+
+// tls1_get_peer_verify_algorithms returns the signature schemes for which the
+// peer indicated support.
+//
+// NOTE: The related function |SSL_get0_peer_verify_algorithms| only has
+// well-defined behavior during the callbacks set by |SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb| and
+// |SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb|, or when the handshake is paused because of
+// them.
+Span<const uint16_t> tls1_get_peer_verify_algorithms(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+// tls12_add_verify_sigalgs adds the signature algorithms acceptable for the
+// peer signature to |out|. It returns true on success and false on error.
+bool tls12_add_verify_sigalgs(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out);
+
+// tls12_check_peer_sigalg checks if |sigalg| is acceptable for the peer
+// signature. It returns true on success and false on error, setting
+// |*out_alert| to an alert to send.
+bool tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                             uint16_t sigalg);
+
+
+// Underdocumented functions.
+//
+// Functions below here haven't been touched up and may be underdocumented.
+
+#define TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE 128
+
+// From RFC 4492, used in encoding the curve type in ECParameters
+#define NAMED_CURVE_TYPE 3
+
+struct CERT {
+  static constexpr bool kAllowUniquePtr = true;
+
+  explicit CERT(const SSL_X509_METHOD *x509_method);
+  ~CERT();
+
+  UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> privatekey;
+
+  // chain contains the certificate chain, with the leaf at the beginning. The
+  // first element of |chain| may be NULL to indicate that the leaf certificate
+  // has not yet been set.
+  //   If |chain| != NULL -> len(chain) >= 1
+  //   If |chain[0]| == NULL -> len(chain) >= 2.
+  //   |chain[1..]| != NULL
+  UniquePtr<STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER)> chain;
+
+  // x509_chain may contain a parsed copy of |chain[1..]|. This is only used as
+  // a cache in order to implement “get0” functions that return a non-owning
+  // pointer to the certificate chain.
+  STACK_OF(X509) *x509_chain = nullptr;
+
+  // x509_leaf may contain a parsed copy of the first element of |chain|. This
+  // is only used as a cache in order to implement “get0” functions that return
+  // a non-owning pointer to the certificate chain.
+  X509 *x509_leaf = nullptr;
+
+  // x509_stash contains the last |X509| object append to the chain. This is a
+  // workaround for some third-party code that continue to use an |X509| object
+  // even after passing ownership with an “add0” function.
+  X509 *x509_stash = nullptr;
+
+  // key_method, if non-NULL, is a set of callbacks to call for private key
+  // operations.
+  const SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD *key_method = nullptr;
+
+  // x509_method contains pointers to functions that might deal with |X509|
+  // compatibility, or might be a no-op, depending on the application.
+  const SSL_X509_METHOD *x509_method = nullptr;
+
+  // sigalgs, if non-empty, is the set of signature algorithms supported by
+  // |privatekey| in decreasing order of preference.
+  Array<uint16_t> sigalgs;
+
+  // Certificate setup callback: if set is called whenever a
+  // certificate may be required (client or server). the callback
+  // can then examine any appropriate parameters and setup any
+  // certificates required. This allows advanced applications
+  // to select certificates on the fly: for example based on
+  // supported signature algorithms or curves.
+  int (*cert_cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg) = nullptr;
+  void *cert_cb_arg = nullptr;
+
+  // Optional X509_STORE for certificate validation. If NULL the parent SSL_CTX
+  // store is used instead.
+  X509_STORE *verify_store = nullptr;
+
+  // Signed certificate timestamp list to be sent to the client, if requested
+  UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> signed_cert_timestamp_list;
+
+  // OCSP response to be sent to the client, if requested.
+  UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> ocsp_response;
+
+  // sid_ctx partitions the session space within a shared session cache or
+  // ticket key. Only sessions with a matching value will be accepted.
+  uint8_t sid_ctx_length = 0;
+  uint8_t sid_ctx[SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH] = {0};
+
+  // Delegated credentials.
+
+  // dc is the delegated credential to send to the peer (if requested).
+  UniquePtr<DC> dc = nullptr;
+
+  // dc_privatekey is used instead of |privatekey| or |key_method| to
+  // authenticate the host if a delegated credential is used in the handshake.
+  UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> dc_privatekey = nullptr;
+
+  // dc_key_method, if not NULL, is used instead of |dc_privatekey| to
+  // authenticate the host.
+  const SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD *dc_key_method = nullptr;
+};
+
+// |SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD| abstracts between TLS and DTLS.
+struct SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD {
+  bool is_dtls;
+  bool (*ssl_new)(SSL *ssl);
+  void (*ssl_free)(SSL *ssl);
+  // get_message sets |*out| to the current handshake message and returns true
+  // if one has been received. It returns false if more input is needed.
+  bool (*get_message)(const SSL *ssl, SSLMessage *out);
+  // next_message is called to release the current handshake message.
+  void (*next_message)(SSL *ssl);
+  // has_unprocessed_handshake_data returns whether there is buffered
+  // handshake data that has not been consumed by |get_message|.
+  bool (*has_unprocessed_handshake_data)(const SSL *ssl);
+  // Use the |ssl_open_handshake| wrapper.
+  ssl_open_record_t (*open_handshake)(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_consumed,
+                                      uint8_t *out_alert, Span<uint8_t> in);
+  // Use the |ssl_open_change_cipher_spec| wrapper.
+  ssl_open_record_t (*open_change_cipher_spec)(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_consumed,
+                                               uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                               Span<uint8_t> in);
+  // Use the |ssl_open_app_data| wrapper.
+  ssl_open_record_t (*open_app_data)(SSL *ssl, Span<uint8_t> *out,
+                                     size_t *out_consumed, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                     Span<uint8_t> in);
+  int (*write_app_data)(SSL *ssl, bool *out_needs_handshake, const uint8_t *buf,
+                        int len);
+  int (*dispatch_alert)(SSL *ssl);
+  // init_message begins a new handshake message of type |type|. |cbb| is the
+  // root CBB to be passed into |finish_message|. |*body| is set to a child CBB
+  // the caller should write to. It returns true on success and false on error.
+  bool (*init_message)(const SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb, CBB *body, uint8_t type);
+  // finish_message finishes a handshake message. It sets |*out_msg| to the
+  // serialized message. It returns true on success and false on error.
+  bool (*finish_message)(const SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb,
+                         bssl::Array<uint8_t> *out_msg);
+  // add_message adds a handshake message to the pending flight. It returns
+  // true on success and false on error.
+  bool (*add_message)(SSL *ssl, bssl::Array<uint8_t> msg);
+  // add_change_cipher_spec adds a ChangeCipherSpec record to the pending
+  // flight. It returns true on success and false on error.
+  bool (*add_change_cipher_spec)(SSL *ssl);
+  // flush_flight flushes the pending flight to the transport. It returns one on
+  // success and <= 0 on error.
+  int (*flush_flight)(SSL *ssl);
+  // on_handshake_complete is called when the handshake is complete.
+  void (*on_handshake_complete)(SSL *ssl);
+  // set_read_state sets |ssl|'s read cipher state and level to |aead_ctx| and
+  // |level|. In QUIC, |aead_ctx| is a placeholder object and |secret_for_quic|
+  // is the original secret. This function returns true on success and false on
+  // error.
+  bool (*set_read_state)(SSL *ssl, ssl_encryption_level_t level,
+                         UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> aead_ctx,
+                         Span<const uint8_t> secret_for_quic);
+  // set_write_state sets |ssl|'s write cipher state and level to |aead_ctx| and
+  // |level|. In QUIC, |aead_ctx| is a placeholder object and |secret_for_quic|
+  // is the original secret. This function returns true on success and false on
+  // error.
+  bool (*set_write_state)(SSL *ssl, ssl_encryption_level_t level,
+                          UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> aead_ctx,
+                          Span<const uint8_t> secret_for_quic);
+};
+
+// The following wrappers call |open_*| but handle |read_shutdown| correctly.
+
+// ssl_open_handshake processes a record from |in| for reading a handshake
+// message.
+ssl_open_record_t ssl_open_handshake(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_consumed,
+                                     uint8_t *out_alert, Span<uint8_t> in);
+
+// ssl_open_change_cipher_spec processes a record from |in| for reading a
+// ChangeCipherSpec.
+ssl_open_record_t ssl_open_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_consumed,
+                                              uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                              Span<uint8_t> in);
+
+// ssl_open_app_data processes a record from |in| for reading application data.
+// On success, it returns |ssl_open_record_success| and sets |*out| to the
+// input. If it encounters a post-handshake message, it returns
+// |ssl_open_record_discard|. The caller should then retry, after processing any
+// messages received with |get_message|.
+ssl_open_record_t ssl_open_app_data(SSL *ssl, Span<uint8_t> *out,
+                                    size_t *out_consumed, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                    Span<uint8_t> in);
+
+struct SSL_X509_METHOD {
+  // check_client_CA_list returns one if |names| is a good list of X.509
+  // distinguished names and zero otherwise. This is used to ensure that we can
+  // reject unparsable values at handshake time when using crypto/x509.
+  bool (*check_client_CA_list)(STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *names);
+
+  // cert_clear frees and NULLs all X509 certificate-related state.
+  void (*cert_clear)(CERT *cert);
+  // cert_free frees all X509-related state.
+  void (*cert_free)(CERT *cert);
+  // cert_flush_cached_chain drops any cached |X509|-based certificate chain
+  // from |cert|.
+  // cert_dup duplicates any needed fields from |cert| to |new_cert|.
+  void (*cert_dup)(CERT *new_cert, const CERT *cert);
+  void (*cert_flush_cached_chain)(CERT *cert);
+  // cert_flush_cached_chain drops any cached |X509|-based leaf certificate
+  // from |cert|.
+  void (*cert_flush_cached_leaf)(CERT *cert);
+
+  // session_cache_objects fills out |sess->x509_peer| and |sess->x509_chain|
+  // from |sess->certs| and erases |sess->x509_chain_without_leaf|. It returns
+  // true on success or false on error.
+  bool (*session_cache_objects)(SSL_SESSION *session);
+  // session_dup duplicates any needed fields from |session| to |new_session|.
+  // It returns true on success or false on error.
+  bool (*session_dup)(SSL_SESSION *new_session, const SSL_SESSION *session);
+  // session_clear frees any X509-related state from |session|.
+  void (*session_clear)(SSL_SESSION *session);
+  // session_verify_cert_chain verifies the certificate chain in |session|,
+  // sets |session->verify_result| and returns true on success or false on
+  // error.
+  bool (*session_verify_cert_chain)(SSL_SESSION *session, SSL_HANDSHAKE *ssl,
+                                    uint8_t *out_alert);
+
+  // hs_flush_cached_ca_names drops any cached |X509_NAME|s from |hs|.
+  void (*hs_flush_cached_ca_names)(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+  // ssl_new does any necessary initialisation of |hs|. It returns true on
+  // success or false on error.
+  bool (*ssl_new)(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+  // ssl_free frees anything created by |ssl_new|.
+  void (*ssl_config_free)(SSL_CONFIG *cfg);
+  // ssl_flush_cached_client_CA drops any cached |X509_NAME|s from |ssl|.
+  void (*ssl_flush_cached_client_CA)(SSL_CONFIG *cfg);
+  // ssl_auto_chain_if_needed runs the deprecated auto-chaining logic if
+  // necessary. On success, it updates |ssl|'s certificate configuration as
+  // needed and returns true. Otherwise, it returns false.
+  bool (*ssl_auto_chain_if_needed)(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+  // ssl_ctx_new does any necessary initialisation of |ctx|. It returns true on
+  // success or false on error.
+  bool (*ssl_ctx_new)(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+  // ssl_ctx_free frees anything created by |ssl_ctx_new|.
+  void (*ssl_ctx_free)(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+  // ssl_ctx_flush_cached_client_CA drops any cached |X509_NAME|s from |ctx|.
+  void (*ssl_ctx_flush_cached_client_CA)(SSL_CTX *ssl);
+};
+
+// ssl_crypto_x509_method provides the |SSL_X509_METHOD| functions using
+// crypto/x509.
+extern const SSL_X509_METHOD ssl_crypto_x509_method;
+
+// ssl_noop_x509_method provides the |SSL_X509_METHOD| functions that avoid
+// crypto/x509.
+extern const SSL_X509_METHOD ssl_noop_x509_method;
+
+struct TicketKey {
+  static constexpr bool kAllowUniquePtr = true;
+
+  uint8_t name[SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN] = {0};
+  uint8_t hmac_key[16] = {0};
+  uint8_t aes_key[16] = {0};
+  // next_rotation_tv_sec is the time (in seconds from the epoch) when the
+  // current key should be superseded by a new key, or the time when a previous
+  // key should be dropped. If zero, then the key should not be automatically
+  // rotated.
+  uint64_t next_rotation_tv_sec = 0;
+};
+
+struct CertCompressionAlg {
+  static constexpr bool kAllowUniquePtr = true;
+
+  ssl_cert_compression_func_t compress = nullptr;
+  ssl_cert_decompression_func_t decompress = nullptr;
+  uint16_t alg_id = 0;
+};
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
+
+DEFINE_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION)
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN
+
+// An ssl_shutdown_t describes the shutdown state of one end of the connection,
+// whether it is alive or has been shutdown via close_notify or fatal alert.
+enum ssl_shutdown_t {
+  ssl_shutdown_none = 0,
+  ssl_shutdown_close_notify = 1,
+  ssl_shutdown_error = 2,
+};
+
+enum ssl_ech_status_t {
+  // ssl_ech_none indicates ECH was not offered, or we have not gotten far
+  // enough in the handshake to determine the status.
+  ssl_ech_none,
+  // ssl_ech_accepted indicates the server accepted ECH.
+  ssl_ech_accepted,
+  // ssl_ech_rejected indicates the server was offered ECH but rejected it.
+  ssl_ech_rejected,
+};
+
+struct SSL3_STATE {
+  static constexpr bool kAllowUniquePtr = true;
+
+  SSL3_STATE();
+  ~SSL3_STATE();
+
+  uint8_t read_sequence[8] = {0};
+  uint8_t write_sequence[8] = {0};
+
+  uint8_t server_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE] = {0};
+  uint8_t client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE] = {0};
+
+  // read_buffer holds data from the transport to be processed.
+  SSLBuffer read_buffer;
+  // write_buffer holds data to be written to the transport.
+  SSLBuffer write_buffer;
+
+  // pending_app_data is the unconsumed application data. It points into
+  // |read_buffer|.
+  Span<uint8_t> pending_app_data;
+
+  // partial write - check the numbers match
+  unsigned int wnum = 0;  // number of bytes sent so far
+  int wpend_tot = 0;      // number bytes written
+  int wpend_type = 0;
+  int wpend_ret = 0;  // number of bytes submitted
+  const uint8_t *wpend_buf = nullptr;
+
+  // read_shutdown is the shutdown state for the read half of the connection.
+  enum ssl_shutdown_t read_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_none;
+
+  // write_shutdown is the shutdown state for the write half of the connection.
+  enum ssl_shutdown_t write_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_none;
+
+  // read_error, if |read_shutdown| is |ssl_shutdown_error|, is the error for
+  // the receive half of the connection.
+  UniquePtr<ERR_SAVE_STATE> read_error;
+
+  int total_renegotiations = 0;
+
+  // This holds a variable that indicates what we were doing when a 0 or -1 is
+  // returned.  This is needed for non-blocking IO so we know what request
+  // needs re-doing when in SSL_accept or SSL_connect
+  int rwstate = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
+
+  enum ssl_encryption_level_t read_level = ssl_encryption_initial;
+  enum ssl_encryption_level_t write_level = ssl_encryption_initial;
+
+  // early_data_skipped is the amount of early data that has been skipped by the
+  // record layer.
+  uint16_t early_data_skipped = 0;
+
+  // empty_record_count is the number of consecutive empty records received.
+  uint8_t empty_record_count = 0;
+
+  // warning_alert_count is the number of consecutive warning alerts
+  // received.
+  uint8_t warning_alert_count = 0;
+
+  // key_update_count is the number of consecutive KeyUpdates received.
+  uint8_t key_update_count = 0;
+
+  // ech_status indicates whether ECH was accepted by the server.
+  ssl_ech_status_t ech_status = ssl_ech_none;
+
+  // skip_early_data instructs the record layer to skip unexpected early data
+  // messages when 0RTT is rejected.
+  bool skip_early_data : 1;
+
+  // have_version is true if the connection's final version is known. Otherwise
+  // the version has not been negotiated yet.
+  bool have_version : 1;
+
+  // v2_hello_done is true if the peer's V2ClientHello, if any, has been handled
+  // and future messages should use the record layer.
+  bool v2_hello_done : 1;
+
+  // is_v2_hello is true if the current handshake message was derived from a
+  // V2ClientHello rather than received from the peer directly.
+  bool is_v2_hello : 1;
+
+  // has_message is true if the current handshake message has been returned
+  // at least once by |get_message| and false otherwise.
+  bool has_message : 1;
+
+  // initial_handshake_complete is true if the initial handshake has
+  // completed.
+  bool initial_handshake_complete : 1;
+
+  // session_reused indicates whether a session was resumed.
+  bool session_reused : 1;
+
+  // delegated_credential_used is whether we presented a delegated credential to
+  // the peer.
+  bool delegated_credential_used : 1;
+
+  bool send_connection_binding : 1;
+
+  // channel_id_valid is true if, on the server, the client has negotiated a
+  // Channel ID and the |channel_id| field is filled in.
+  bool channel_id_valid : 1;
+
+  // key_update_pending is true if we have a KeyUpdate acknowledgment
+  // outstanding.
+  bool key_update_pending : 1;
+
+  // wpend_pending is true if we have a pending write outstanding.
+  bool wpend_pending : 1;
+
+  // early_data_accepted is true if early data was accepted by the server.
+  bool early_data_accepted : 1;
+
+  // alert_dispatch is true there is an alert in |send_alert| to be sent.
+  bool alert_dispatch : 1;
+
+  // renegotiate_pending is whether the read half of the channel is blocked on a
+  // HelloRequest.
+  bool renegotiate_pending : 1;
+
+  // used_hello_retry_request is whether the handshake used a TLS 1.3
+  // HelloRetryRequest message.
+  bool used_hello_retry_request : 1;
+
+  // hs_buf is the buffer of handshake data to process.
+  UniquePtr<BUF_MEM> hs_buf;
+
+  // pending_hs_data contains the pending handshake data that has not yet
+  // been encrypted to |pending_flight|. This allows packing the handshake into
+  // fewer records.
+  UniquePtr<BUF_MEM> pending_hs_data;
+
+  // pending_flight is the pending outgoing flight. This is used to flush each
+  // handshake flight in a single write. |write_buffer| must be written out
+  // before this data.
+  UniquePtr<BUF_MEM> pending_flight;
+
+  // pending_flight_offset is the number of bytes of |pending_flight| which have
+  // been successfully written.
+  uint32_t pending_flight_offset = 0;
+
+  // ticket_age_skew is the difference, in seconds, between the client-sent
+  // ticket age and the server-computed value in TLS 1.3 server connections
+  // which resumed a session.
+  int32_t ticket_age_skew = 0;
+
+  // ssl_early_data_reason stores details on why 0-RTT was accepted or rejected.
+  enum ssl_early_data_reason_t early_data_reason = ssl_early_data_unknown;
+
+  // aead_read_ctx is the current read cipher state.
+  UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> aead_read_ctx;
+
+  // aead_write_ctx is the current write cipher state.
+  UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> aead_write_ctx;
+
+  // hs is the handshake state for the current handshake or NULL if there isn't
+  // one.
+  UniquePtr<SSL_HANDSHAKE> hs;
+
+  uint8_t write_traffic_secret[SSL_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
+  uint8_t read_traffic_secret[SSL_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
+  uint8_t exporter_secret[SSL_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
+  uint8_t write_traffic_secret_len = 0;
+  uint8_t read_traffic_secret_len = 0;
+  uint8_t exporter_secret_len = 0;
+
+  // Connection binding to prevent renegotiation attacks
+  uint8_t previous_client_finished[12] = {0};
+  uint8_t previous_client_finished_len = 0;
+  uint8_t previous_server_finished_len = 0;
+  uint8_t previous_server_finished[12] = {0};
+
+  uint8_t send_alert[2] = {0};
+
+  // established_session is the session established by the connection. This
+  // session is only filled upon the completion of the handshake and is
+  // immutable.
+  UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> established_session;
+
+  // Next protocol negotiation. For the client, this is the protocol that we
+  // sent in NextProtocol and is set when handling ServerHello extensions.
+  //
+  // For a server, this is the client's selected_protocol from NextProtocol and
+  // is set when handling the NextProtocol message, before the Finished
+  // message.
+  Array<uint8_t> next_proto_negotiated;
+
+  // ALPN information
+  // (we are in the process of transitioning from NPN to ALPN.)
+
+  // In a server these point to the selected ALPN protocol after the
+  // ClientHello has been processed. In a client these contain the protocol
+  // that the server selected once the ServerHello has been processed.
+  Array<uint8_t> alpn_selected;
+
+  // hostname, on the server, is the value of the SNI extension.
+  UniquePtr<char> hostname;
+
+  // For a server:
+  //     If |channel_id_valid| is true, then this contains the
+  //     verified Channel ID from the client: a P256 point, (x,y), where
+  //     each are big-endian values.
+  uint8_t channel_id[64] = {0};
+
+  // Contains the QUIC transport params received by the peer.
+  Array<uint8_t> peer_quic_transport_params;
+
+  // srtp_profile is the selected SRTP protection profile for
+  // DTLS-SRTP.
+  const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *srtp_profile = nullptr;
+};
+
+// lengths of messages
+#define DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH 256
+
+#define DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH 13
+
+#define DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH 12
+
+#define DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH 1
+
+#define DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH 2
+
+struct hm_header_st {
+  uint8_t type;
+  uint32_t msg_len;
+  uint16_t seq;
+  uint32_t frag_off;
+  uint32_t frag_len;
+};
+
+// An hm_fragment is an incoming DTLS message, possibly not yet assembled.
+struct hm_fragment {
+  static constexpr bool kAllowUniquePtr = true;
+
+  hm_fragment() {}
+  hm_fragment(const hm_fragment &) = delete;
+  hm_fragment &operator=(const hm_fragment &) = delete;
+
+  ~hm_fragment();
+
+  // type is the type of the message.
+  uint8_t type = 0;
+  // seq is the sequence number of this message.
+  uint16_t seq = 0;
+  // msg_len is the length of the message body.
+  uint32_t msg_len = 0;
+  // data is a pointer to the message, including message header. It has length
+  // |DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH| + |msg_len|.
+  uint8_t *data = nullptr;
+  // reassembly is a bitmask of |msg_len| bits corresponding to which parts of
+  // the message have been received. It is NULL if the message is complete.
+  uint8_t *reassembly = nullptr;
+};
+
+struct OPENSSL_timeval {
+  uint64_t tv_sec;
+  uint32_t tv_usec;
+};
+
+struct DTLS1_STATE {
+  static constexpr bool kAllowUniquePtr = true;
+
+  DTLS1_STATE();
+  ~DTLS1_STATE();
+
+  // has_change_cipher_spec is true if we have received a ChangeCipherSpec from
+  // the peer in this epoch.
+  bool has_change_cipher_spec : 1;
+
+  // outgoing_messages_complete is true if |outgoing_messages| has been
+  // completed by an attempt to flush it. Future calls to |add_message| and
+  // |add_change_cipher_spec| will start a new flight.
+  bool outgoing_messages_complete : 1;
+
+  // flight_has_reply is true if the current outgoing flight is complete and has
+  // processed at least one message. This is used to detect whether we or the
+  // peer sent the final flight.
+  bool flight_has_reply : 1;
+
+  uint8_t cookie[DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH] = {0};
+  size_t cookie_len = 0;
+
+  // The current data and handshake epoch.  This is initially undefined, and
+  // starts at zero once the initial handshake is completed.
+  uint16_t r_epoch = 0;
+  uint16_t w_epoch = 0;
+
+  // records being received in the current epoch
+  DTLS1_BITMAP bitmap;
+
+  uint16_t handshake_write_seq = 0;
+  uint16_t handshake_read_seq = 0;
+
+  // save last sequence number for retransmissions
+  uint8_t last_write_sequence[8] = {0};
+  UniquePtr<SSLAEADContext> last_aead_write_ctx;
+
+  // incoming_messages is a ring buffer of incoming handshake messages that have
+  // yet to be processed. The front of the ring buffer is message number
+  // |handshake_read_seq|, at position |handshake_read_seq| %
+  // |SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT|.
+  UniquePtr<hm_fragment> incoming_messages[SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT];
+
+  // outgoing_messages is the queue of outgoing messages from the last handshake
+  // flight.
+  DTLS_OUTGOING_MESSAGE outgoing_messages[SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT];
+  uint8_t outgoing_messages_len = 0;
+
+  // outgoing_written is the number of outgoing messages that have been
+  // written.
+  uint8_t outgoing_written = 0;
+  // outgoing_offset is the number of bytes of the next outgoing message have
+  // been written.
+  uint32_t outgoing_offset = 0;
+
+  unsigned mtu = 0;  // max DTLS packet size
+
+  // num_timeouts is the number of times the retransmit timer has fired since
+  // the last time it was reset.
+  unsigned num_timeouts = 0;
+
+  // Indicates when the last handshake msg or heartbeat sent will
+  // timeout.
+  struct OPENSSL_timeval next_timeout = {0, 0};
+
+  // timeout_duration_ms is the timeout duration in milliseconds.
+  unsigned timeout_duration_ms = 0;
+};
+
+// An ALPSConfig is a pair of ALPN protocol and settings value to use with ALPS.
+struct ALPSConfig {
+  Array<uint8_t> protocol;
+  Array<uint8_t> settings;
+};
+
+// SSL_CONFIG contains configuration bits that can be shed after the handshake
+// completes.  Objects of this type are not shared; they are unique to a
+// particular |SSL|.
+//
+// See SSL_shed_handshake_config() for more about the conditions under which
+// configuration can be shed.
+struct SSL_CONFIG {
+  static constexpr bool kAllowUniquePtr = true;
+
+  explicit SSL_CONFIG(SSL *ssl_arg);
+  ~SSL_CONFIG();
+
+  // ssl is a non-owning pointer to the parent |SSL| object.
+  SSL *const ssl = nullptr;
+
+  // conf_max_version is the maximum acceptable version configured by
+  // |SSL_set_max_proto_version|. Note this version is not normalized in DTLS
+  // and is further constrained by |SSL_OP_NO_*|.
+  uint16_t conf_max_version = 0;
+
+  // conf_min_version is the minimum acceptable version configured by
+  // |SSL_set_min_proto_version|. Note this version is not normalized in DTLS
+  // and is further constrained by |SSL_OP_NO_*|.
+  uint16_t conf_min_version = 0;
+
+  X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = nullptr;
+
+  // crypto
+  UniquePtr<SSLCipherPreferenceList> cipher_list;
+
+  // This is used to hold the local certificate used (i.e. the server
+  // certificate for a server or the client certificate for a client).
+  UniquePtr<CERT> cert;
+
+  int (*verify_callback)(int ok,
+                         X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) =
+      nullptr;  // fail if callback returns 0
+
+  enum ssl_verify_result_t (*custom_verify_callback)(
+      SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert) = nullptr;
+  // Server-only: psk_identity_hint is the identity hint to send in
+  // PSK-based key exchanges.
+  UniquePtr<char> psk_identity_hint;
+
+  unsigned (*psk_client_callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity,
+                                  unsigned max_identity_len, uint8_t *psk,
+                                  unsigned max_psk_len) = nullptr;
+  unsigned (*psk_server_callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, uint8_t *psk,
+                                  unsigned max_psk_len) = nullptr;
+
+  // for server side, keep the list of CA_dn we can use
+  UniquePtr<STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER)> client_CA;
+
+  // cached_x509_client_CA is a cache of parsed versions of the elements of
+  // |client_CA|.
+  STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *cached_x509_client_CA = nullptr;
+
+  Array<uint16_t> supported_group_list;  // our list
+
+  // channel_id_private is the client's Channel ID private key, or null if
+  // Channel ID should not be offered on this connection.
+  UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> channel_id_private;
+
+  // For a client, this contains the list of supported protocols in wire
+  // format.
+  Array<uint8_t> alpn_client_proto_list;
+
+  // alps_configs contains the list of supported protocols to use with ALPS,
+  // along with their corresponding ALPS values.
+  GrowableArray<ALPSConfig> alps_configs;
+
+  // Contains the QUIC transport params that this endpoint will send.
+  Array<uint8_t> quic_transport_params;
+
+  // Contains the context used to decide whether to accept early data in QUIC.
+  Array<uint8_t> quic_early_data_context;
+
+  // verify_sigalgs, if not empty, is the set of signature algorithms
+  // accepted from the peer in decreasing order of preference.
+  Array<uint16_t> verify_sigalgs;
+
+  // srtp_profiles is the list of configured SRTP protection profiles for
+  // DTLS-SRTP.
+  UniquePtr<STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE)> srtp_profiles;
+
+  // client_ech_config_list, if not empty, is a serialized ECHConfigList
+  // structure for the client to use when negotiating ECH.
+  Array<uint8_t> client_ech_config_list;
+
+  // verify_mode is a bitmask of |SSL_VERIFY_*| values.
+  uint8_t verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
+
+  // ech_grease_enabled controls whether ECH GREASE may be sent in the
+  // ClientHello.
+  bool ech_grease_enabled : 1;
+
+  // Enable signed certificate time stamps. Currently client only.
+  bool signed_cert_timestamps_enabled : 1;
+
+  // ocsp_stapling_enabled is only used by client connections and indicates
+  // whether OCSP stapling will be requested.
+  bool ocsp_stapling_enabled : 1;
+
+  // channel_id_enabled is copied from the |SSL_CTX|. For a server, it means
+  // that we'll accept Channel IDs from clients. It is ignored on the client.
+  bool channel_id_enabled : 1;
+
+  // If enforce_rsa_key_usage is true, the handshake will fail if the
+  // keyUsage extension is present and incompatible with the TLS usage.
+  // This field is not read until after certificate verification.
+  bool enforce_rsa_key_usage : 1;
+
+  // retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs is true if we should compute the SHA256
+  // hash of the peer's certificate and then discard it to save memory and
+  // session space. Only effective on the server side.
+  bool retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs : 1;
+
+  // handoff indicates that a server should stop after receiving the
+  // ClientHello and pause the handshake in such a way that |SSL_get_error|
+  // returns |SSL_ERROR_HANDOFF|. This is copied in |SSL_new| from the |SSL_CTX|
+  // element of the same name and may be cleared if the handoff is declined.
+  bool handoff : 1;
+
+  // shed_handshake_config indicates that the handshake config (this object!)
+  // should be freed after the handshake completes.
+  bool shed_handshake_config : 1;
+
+  // jdk11_workaround is whether to disable TLS 1.3 for JDK 11 clients, as a
+  // workaround for https://bugs.openjdk.java.net/browse/JDK-8211806.
+  bool jdk11_workaround : 1;
+
+  // QUIC drafts up to and including 32 used a different TLS extension
+  // codepoint to convey QUIC's transport parameters.
+  bool quic_use_legacy_codepoint : 1;
+
+  // permute_extensions is whether to permute extensions when sending messages.
+  bool permute_extensions : 1;
+};
+
+// From RFC 8446, used in determining PSK modes.
+#define SSL_PSK_DHE_KE 0x1
+
+// kMaxEarlyDataAccepted is the advertised number of plaintext bytes of early
+// data that will be accepted. This value should be slightly below
+// kMaxEarlyDataSkipped in tls_record.c, which is measured in ciphertext.
+static const size_t kMaxEarlyDataAccepted = 14336;
+
+UniquePtr<CERT> ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert);
+void ssl_cert_clear_certs(CERT *cert);
+bool ssl_set_cert(CERT *cert, UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buffer);
+bool ssl_is_key_type_supported(int key_type);
+// ssl_compare_public_and_private_key returns true if |pubkey| is the public
+// counterpart to |privkey|. Otherwise it returns false and pushes a helpful
+// message on the error queue.
+bool ssl_compare_public_and_private_key(const EVP_PKEY *pubkey,
+                                       const EVP_PKEY *privkey);
+bool ssl_cert_check_private_key(const CERT *cert, const EVP_PKEY *privkey);
+bool ssl_get_new_session(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+int ssl_encrypt_ticket(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out, const SSL_SESSION *session);
+int ssl_ctx_rotate_ticket_encryption_key(SSL_CTX *ctx);
+
+// ssl_session_new returns a newly-allocated blank |SSL_SESSION| or nullptr on
+// error.
+UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> ssl_session_new(const SSL_X509_METHOD *x509_method);
+
+// ssl_hash_session_id returns a hash of |session_id|, suitable for a hash table
+// keyed on session IDs.
+uint32_t ssl_hash_session_id(Span<const uint8_t> session_id);
+
+// SSL_SESSION_parse parses an |SSL_SESSION| from |cbs| and advances |cbs| over
+// the parsed data.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> SSL_SESSION_parse(
+    CBS *cbs, const SSL_X509_METHOD *x509_method, CRYPTO_BUFFER_POOL *pool);
+
+// ssl_session_serialize writes |in| to |cbb| as if it were serialising a
+// session for Session-ID resumption. It returns one on success and zero on
+// error.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT int ssl_session_serialize(const SSL_SESSION *in, CBB *cbb);
+
+// ssl_session_is_context_valid returns one if |session|'s session ID context
+// matches the one set on |hs| and zero otherwise.
+int ssl_session_is_context_valid(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                 const SSL_SESSION *session);
+
+// ssl_session_is_time_valid returns one if |session| is still valid and zero if
+// it has expired.
+int ssl_session_is_time_valid(const SSL *ssl, const SSL_SESSION *session);
+
+// ssl_session_is_resumable returns one if |session| is resumable for |hs| and
+// zero otherwise.
+int ssl_session_is_resumable(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                             const SSL_SESSION *session);
+
+// ssl_session_protocol_version returns the protocol version associated with
+// |session|. Note that despite the name, this is not the same as
+// |SSL_SESSION_get_protocol_version|. The latter is based on upstream's name.
+uint16_t ssl_session_protocol_version(const SSL_SESSION *session);
+
+// ssl_session_get_digest returns the digest used in |session|.
+const EVP_MD *ssl_session_get_digest(const SSL_SESSION *session);
+
+void ssl_set_session(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session);
+
+// ssl_get_prev_session looks up the previous session based on |client_hello|.
+// On success, it sets |*out_session| to the session or nullptr if none was
+// found. If the session could not be looked up synchronously, it returns
+// |ssl_hs_pending_session| and should be called again. If a ticket could not be
+// decrypted immediately it returns |ssl_hs_pending_ticket| and should also
+// be called again. Otherwise, it returns |ssl_hs_error|.
+enum ssl_hs_wait_t ssl_get_prev_session(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                        UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> *out_session,
+                                        bool *out_tickets_supported,
+                                        bool *out_renew_ticket,
+                                        const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello);
+
+// The following flags determine which parts of the session are duplicated.
+#define SSL_SESSION_DUP_AUTH_ONLY 0x0
+#define SSL_SESSION_INCLUDE_TICKET 0x1
+#define SSL_SESSION_INCLUDE_NONAUTH 0x2
+#define SSL_SESSION_DUP_ALL \
+  (SSL_SESSION_INCLUDE_TICKET | SSL_SESSION_INCLUDE_NONAUTH)
+
+// SSL_SESSION_dup returns a newly-allocated |SSL_SESSION| with a copy of the
+// fields in |session| or nullptr on error. The new session is non-resumable and
+// must be explicitly marked resumable once it has been filled in.
+OPENSSL_EXPORT UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> SSL_SESSION_dup(SSL_SESSION *session,
+                                                      int dup_flags);
+
+// ssl_session_rebase_time updates |session|'s start time to the current time,
+// adjusting the timeout so the expiration time is unchanged.
+void ssl_session_rebase_time(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session);
+
+// ssl_session_renew_timeout calls |ssl_session_rebase_time| and renews
+// |session|'s timeout to |timeout| (measured from the current time). The
+// renewal is clamped to the session's auth_timeout.
+void ssl_session_renew_timeout(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session,
+                               uint32_t timeout);
+
+void ssl_update_cache(SSL *ssl);
+
+void ssl_send_alert(SSL *ssl, int level, int desc);
+int ssl_send_alert_impl(SSL *ssl, int level, int desc);
+bool tls_get_message(const SSL *ssl, SSLMessage *out);
+ssl_open_record_t tls_open_handshake(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_consumed,
+                                     uint8_t *out_alert, Span<uint8_t> in);
+void tls_next_message(SSL *ssl);
+
+int tls_dispatch_alert(SSL *ssl);
+ssl_open_record_t tls_open_app_data(SSL *ssl, Span<uint8_t> *out,
+                                    size_t *out_consumed, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                    Span<uint8_t> in);
+ssl_open_record_t tls_open_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_consumed,
+                                              uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                              Span<uint8_t> in);
+int tls_write_app_data(SSL *ssl, bool *out_needs_handshake, const uint8_t *buf,
+                       int len);
+
+bool tls_new(SSL *ssl);
+void tls_free(SSL *ssl);
+
+bool tls_init_message(const SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb, CBB *body, uint8_t type);
+bool tls_finish_message(const SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb, Array<uint8_t> *out_msg);
+bool tls_add_message(SSL *ssl, Array<uint8_t> msg);
+bool tls_add_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl);
+int tls_flush_flight(SSL *ssl);
+
+bool dtls1_init_message(const SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb, CBB *body, uint8_t type);
+bool dtls1_finish_message(const SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb, Array<uint8_t> *out_msg);
+bool dtls1_add_message(SSL *ssl, Array<uint8_t> msg);
+bool dtls1_add_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl);
+int dtls1_flush_flight(SSL *ssl);
+
+// ssl_add_message_cbb finishes the handshake message in |cbb| and adds it to
+// the pending flight. It returns true on success and false on error.
+bool ssl_add_message_cbb(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb);
+
+// ssl_hash_message incorporates |msg| into the handshake hash. It returns true
+// on success and false on allocation failure.
+bool ssl_hash_message(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSLMessage &msg);
+
+ssl_open_record_t dtls1_open_app_data(SSL *ssl, Span<uint8_t> *out,
+                                      size_t *out_consumed, uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                      Span<uint8_t> in);
+ssl_open_record_t dtls1_open_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_consumed,
+                                                uint8_t *out_alert,
+                                                Span<uint8_t> in);
+
+int dtls1_write_app_data(SSL *ssl, bool *out_needs_handshake,
+                         const uint8_t *buf, int len);
+
+// dtls1_write_record sends a record. It returns one on success and <= 0 on
+// error.
+int dtls1_write_record(SSL *ssl, int type, const uint8_t *buf, size_t len,
+                       enum dtls1_use_epoch_t use_epoch);
+
+int dtls1_retransmit_outgoing_messages(SSL *ssl);
+bool dtls1_parse_fragment(CBS *cbs, struct hm_header_st *out_hdr,
+                          CBS *out_body);
+bool dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *ssl);
+
+void dtls1_start_timer(SSL *ssl);
+void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *ssl);
+bool dtls1_is_timer_expired(SSL *ssl);
+unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(void);
+
+bool dtls1_new(SSL *ssl);
+void dtls1_free(SSL *ssl);
+
+bool dtls1_get_message(const SSL *ssl, SSLMessage *out);
+ssl_open_record_t dtls1_open_handshake(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_consumed,
+                                       uint8_t *out_alert, Span<uint8_t> in);
+void dtls1_next_message(SSL *ssl);
+int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *ssl);
+
+// tls1_configure_aead configures either the read or write direction AEAD (as
+// determined by |direction|) using the keys generated by the TLS KDF. The
+// |key_block_cache| argument is used to store the generated key block, if
+// empty. Otherwise it's assumed that the key block is already contained within
+// it. It returns true on success or false on error.
+bool tls1_configure_aead(SSL *ssl, evp_aead_direction_t direction,
+                         Array<uint8_t> *key_block_cache,
+                         const SSL_SESSION *session,
+                         Span<const uint8_t> iv_override);
+
+bool tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                              evp_aead_direction_t direction);
+int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out,
+                                Span<const uint8_t> premaster);
+
+// tls1_get_grouplist returns the locally-configured group preference list.
+Span<const uint16_t> tls1_get_grouplist(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *ssl);
+
+// tls1_check_group_id returns whether |group_id| is consistent with locally-
+// configured group preferences.
+bool tls1_check_group_id(const SSL_HANDSHAKE *ssl, uint16_t group_id);
+
+// tls1_get_shared_group sets |*out_group_id| to the first preferred shared
+// group between client and server preferences and returns true. If none may be
+// found, it returns false.
+bool tls1_get_shared_group(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint16_t *out_group_id);
+
+// tls1_set_curves converts the array of NIDs in |curves| into a newly allocated
+// array of TLS group IDs. On success, the function returns true and writes the
+// array to |*out_group_ids|. Otherwise, it returns false.
+bool tls1_set_curves(Array<uint16_t> *out_group_ids, Span<const int> curves);
+
+// tls1_set_curves_list converts the string of curves pointed to by |curves|
+// into a newly allocated array of TLS group IDs. On success, the function
+// returns true and writes the array to |*out_group_ids|. Otherwise, it returns
+// false.
+bool tls1_set_curves_list(Array<uint16_t> *out_group_ids, const char *curves);
+
+// ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext writes ClientHello extensions to |out| for |type|.
+// It returns true on success and false on failure. The |header_len| argument is
+// the length of the ClientHello written so far and is used to compute the
+// padding length. (It does not include the record header or handshake headers.)
+//
+// If |type| is |ssl_client_hello_inner|, this function also writes the
+// compressed extensions to |out_encoded|. Otherwise, |out_encoded| should be
+// nullptr.
+//
+// On success, the function sets |*out_needs_psk_binder| to whether the last
+// ClientHello extension was the pre_shared_key extension and needs a PSK binder
+// filled in. The caller should then update |out| and, if applicable,
+// |out_encoded| with the binder after completing the whole message.
+bool ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out, CBB *out_encoded,
+                                bool *out_needs_psk_binder,
+                                ssl_client_hello_type_t type,
+                                size_t header_len);
+
+bool ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *out);
+bool ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
+                                  const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello);
+bool ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const CBS *extensions);
+
+#define tlsext_tick_md EVP_sha256
+
+// ssl_process_ticket processes a session ticket from the client. It returns
+// one of:
+//   |ssl_ticket_aead_success|: |*out_session| is set to the parsed session and
+//       |*out_renew_ticket| is set to whether the ticket should be renewed.
+//   |ssl_ticket_aead_ignore_ticket|: |*out_renew_ticket| is set to whether a
+//       fresh ticket should be sent, but the given ticket cannot be used.
+//   |ssl_ticket_aead_retry|: the ticket could not be immediately decrypted.
+//       Retry later.
+//   |ssl_ticket_aead_error|: an error occured that is fatal to the connection.
+enum ssl_ticket_aead_result_t ssl_process_ticket(
+    SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> *out_session,
+    bool *out_renew_ticket, Span<const uint8_t> ticket,
+    Span<const uint8_t> session_id);
+
+// tls1_verify_channel_id processes |msg| as a Channel ID message, and verifies
+// the signature. If the key is valid, it saves the Channel ID and returns true.
+// Otherwise, it returns false.
+bool tls1_verify_channel_id(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const SSLMessage &msg);
+
+// tls1_write_channel_id generates a Channel ID message and puts the output in
+// |cbb|. |ssl->channel_id_private| must already be set before calling.  This
+// function returns true on success and false on error.
+bool tls1_write_channel_id(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, CBB *cbb);
+
+// tls1_channel_id_hash computes the hash to be signed by Channel ID and writes
+// it to |out|, which must contain at least |EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE| bytes. It returns
+// true on success and false on failure.
+bool tls1_channel_id_hash(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len);
+
+// tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id records the current handshake
+// hashes in |hs->new_session| so that Channel ID resumptions can sign that
+// data.
+bool tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs);
+
+// ssl_can_write returns whether |ssl| is allowed to write.
+bool ssl_can_write(const SSL *ssl);
+
+// ssl_can_read returns wheter |ssl| is allowed to read.
+bool ssl_can_read(const SSL *ssl);
+
+void ssl_get_current_time(const SSL *ssl, struct OPENSSL_timeval *out_clock);
+void ssl_ctx_get_current_time(const SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                              struct OPENSSL_timeval *out_clock);
+
+// ssl_reset_error_state resets state for |SSL_get_error|.
+void ssl_reset_error_state(SSL *ssl);
+
+// ssl_set_read_error sets |ssl|'s read half into an error state, saving the
+// current state of the error queue.
+void ssl_set_read_error(SSL *ssl);
+
+BSSL_NAMESPACE_END
+
+
+// Opaque C types.
+//
+// The following types are exported to C code as public typedefs, so they must
+// be defined outside of the namespace.
+
+// ssl_method_st backs the public |SSL_METHOD| type. It is a compatibility
+// structure to support the legacy version-locked methods.
+struct ssl_method_st {
+  // version, if non-zero, is the only protocol version acceptable to an
+  // SSL_CTX initialized from this method.
+  uint16_t version;
+  // method is the underlying SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD that initializes the
+  // SSL_CTX.
+  const bssl::SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD *method;
+  // x509_method contains pointers to functions that might deal with |X509|
+  // compatibility, or might be a no-op, depending on the application.
+  const bssl::SSL_X509_METHOD *x509_method;
+};
+
+struct ssl_ctx_st {
+  explicit ssl_ctx_st(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method);
+  ssl_ctx_st(const ssl_ctx_st &) = delete;
+  ssl_ctx_st &operator=(const ssl_ctx_st &) = delete;
+
+  const bssl::SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD *method = nullptr;
+  const bssl::SSL_X509_METHOD *x509_method = nullptr;
+
+  // lock is used to protect various operations on this object.
+  CRYPTO_MUTEX lock;
+
+  // conf_max_version is the maximum acceptable protocol version configured by
+  // |SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version|. Note this version is normalized in DTLS
+  // and is further constrainted by |SSL_OP_NO_*|.
+  uint16_t conf_max_version = 0;
+
+  // conf_min_version is the minimum acceptable protocol version configured by
+  // |SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version|. Note this version is normalized in DTLS
+  // and is further constrainted by |SSL_OP_NO_*|.
+  uint16_t conf_min_version = 0;
+
+  // quic_method is the method table corresponding to the QUIC hooks.
+  const SSL_QUIC_METHOD *quic_method = nullptr;
+
+  bssl::UniquePtr<bssl::SSLCipherPreferenceList> cipher_list;
+
+  X509_STORE *cert_store = nullptr;
+  LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *sessions = nullptr;
+  // Most session-ids that will be cached, default is
+  // SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT. 0 is unlimited.
+  unsigned long session_cache_size = SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT;
+  SSL_SESSION *session_cache_head = nullptr;
+  SSL_SESSION *session_cache_tail = nullptr;
+
+  // handshakes_since_cache_flush is the number of successful handshakes since
+  // the last cache flush.
+  int handshakes_since_cache_flush = 0;
+
+  // This can have one of 2 values, ored together,
+  // SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT,
+  // SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER,
+  // Default is SSL_SESSION_CACHE_SERVER, which means only
+  // SSL_accept which cache SSL_SESSIONS.
+  int session_cache_mode = SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER;
+
+  // session_timeout is the default lifetime for new sessions in TLS 1.2 and
+  // earlier, in seconds.
+  uint32_t session_timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT;
+
+  // session_psk_dhe_timeout is the default lifetime for new sessions in TLS
+  // 1.3, in seconds.
+  uint32_t session_psk_dhe_timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_PSK_DHE_TIMEOUT;
+
+  // If this callback is not null, it will be called each time a session id is
+  // added to the cache.  If this function returns 1, it means that the
+  // callback will do a SSL_SESSION_free() when it has finished using it.
+  // Otherwise, on 0, it means the callback has finished with it. If
+  // remove_session_cb is not null, it will be called when a session-id is
+  // removed from the cache.  After the call, OpenSSL will SSL_SESSION_free()
+  // it.
+  int (*new_session_cb)(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess) = nullptr;
+  void (*remove_session_cb)(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess) = nullptr;
+  SSL_SESSION *(*get_session_cb)(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *data, int len,
+                                 int *copy) = nullptr;
+
+  CRYPTO_refcount_t references = 1;
+
+  // if defined, these override the X509_verify_cert() calls
+  int (*app_verify_callback)(X509_STORE_CTX *store_ctx, void *arg) = nullptr;
+  void *app_verify_arg = nullptr;
+
+  ssl_verify_result_t (*custom_verify_callback)(SSL *ssl,
+                                                uint8_t *out_alert) = nullptr;
+
+  // Default password callback.
+  pem_password_cb *default_passwd_callback = nullptr;
+
+  // Default password callback user data.
+  void *default_passwd_callback_userdata = nullptr;
+
+  // get client cert callback
+  int (*client_cert_cb)(SSL *ssl, X509 **out_x509,
+                        EVP_PKEY **out_pkey) = nullptr;
+
+  CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
+
+  // Default values used when no per-SSL value is defined follow
+
+  void (*info_callback)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int value) = nullptr;
+
+  // what we put in client cert requests
+  bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER)> client_CA;
+
+  // cached_x509_client_CA is a cache of parsed versions of the elements of
+  // |client_CA|.
+  STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *cached_x509_client_CA = nullptr;
+
+
+  // Default values to use in SSL structures follow (these are copied by
+  // SSL_new)
+
+  uint32_t options = 0;
+  // Disable the auto-chaining feature by default. wpa_supplicant relies on this
+  // feature, but require callers opt into it.
+  uint32_t mode = SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN;
+  uint32_t max_cert_list = SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT;
+
+  bssl::UniquePtr<bssl::CERT> cert;
+
+  // callback that allows applications to peek at protocol messages
+  void (*msg_callback)(int write_p, int version, int content_type,
+                       const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl,
+                       void *arg) = nullptr;
+  void *msg_callback_arg = nullptr;
+
+  int verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
+  int (*default_verify_callback)(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) =
+      nullptr;  // called 'verify_callback' in the SSL
+
+  X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = nullptr;
+
+  // select_certificate_cb is called before most ClientHello processing and
+  // before the decision whether to resume a session is made. See
+  // |ssl_select_cert_result_t| for details of the return values.
+  ssl_select_cert_result_t (*select_certificate_cb)(const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *) =
+      nullptr;
+
+  // dos_protection_cb is called once the resumption decision for a ClientHello
+  // has been made. It returns one to continue the handshake or zero to
+  // abort.
+  int (*dos_protection_cb)(const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *) = nullptr;
+
+  // Controls whether to verify certificates when resuming connections. They
+  // were already verified when the connection was first made, so the default is
+  // false. For now, this is only respected on clients, not servers.
+  bool reverify_on_resume = false;
+
+  // Maximum amount of data to send in one fragment. actual record size can be
+  // more than this due to padding and MAC overheads.
+  uint16_t max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+
+  // TLS extensions servername callback
+  int (*servername_callback)(SSL *, int *, void *) = nullptr;
+  void *servername_arg = nullptr;
+
+  // RFC 4507 session ticket keys. |ticket_key_current| may be NULL before the
+  // first handshake and |ticket_key_prev| may be NULL at any time.
+  // Automatically generated ticket keys are rotated as needed at handshake
+  // time. Hence, all access must be synchronized through |lock|.
+  bssl::UniquePtr<bssl::TicketKey> ticket_key_current;
+  bssl::UniquePtr<bssl::TicketKey> ticket_key_prev;
+
+  // Callback to support customisation of ticket key setting
+  int (*ticket_key_cb)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *name, uint8_t *iv,
+                       EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ectx, HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc) = nullptr;
+
+  // Server-only: psk_identity_hint is the default identity hint to send in
+  // PSK-based key exchanges.
+  bssl::UniquePtr<char> psk_identity_hint;
+
+  unsigned (*psk_client_callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity,
+                                  unsigned max_identity_len, uint8_t *psk,
+                                  unsigned max_psk_len) = nullptr;
+  unsigned (*psk_server_callback)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, uint8_t *psk,
+                                  unsigned max_psk_len) = nullptr;
+
+
+  // Next protocol negotiation information
+  // (for experimental NPN extension).
+
+  // For a server, this contains a callback function by which the set of
+  // advertised protocols can be provided.
+  int (*next_protos_advertised_cb)(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out,
+                                   unsigned *out_len, void *arg) = nullptr;
+  void *next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = nullptr;
+  // For a client, this contains a callback function that selects the
+  // next protocol from the list provided by the server.
+  int (*next_proto_select_cb)(SSL *ssl, uint8_t **out, uint8_t *out_len,
+                              const uint8_t *in, unsigned in_len,
+                              void *arg) = nullptr;
+  void *next_proto_select_cb_arg = nullptr;
+
+  // ALPN information
+  // (we are in the process of transitioning from NPN to ALPN.)
+
+  // For a server, this contains a callback function that allows the
+  // server to select the protocol for the connection.
+  //   out: on successful return, this must point to the raw protocol
+  //        name (without the length prefix).
+  //   outlen: on successful return, this contains the length of |*out|.
+  //   in: points to the client's list of supported protocols in
+  //       wire-format.
+  //   inlen: the length of |in|.
+  int (*alpn_select_cb)(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t **out, uint8_t *out_len,
+                        const uint8_t *in, unsigned in_len,
+                        void *arg) = nullptr;
+  void *alpn_select_cb_arg = nullptr;
+
+  // For a client, this contains the list of supported protocols in wire
+  // format.
+  bssl::Array<uint8_t> alpn_client_proto_list;
+
+  // SRTP profiles we are willing to do from RFC 5764
+  bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE)> srtp_profiles;
+
+  // Defined compression algorithms for certificates.
+  bssl::GrowableArray<bssl::CertCompressionAlg> cert_compression_algs;
+
+  // Supported group values inherited by SSL structure
+  bssl::Array<uint16_t> supported_group_list;
+
+  // channel_id_private is the client's Channel ID private key, or null if
+  // Channel ID should not be offered on this connection.
+  bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> channel_id_private;
+
+  // ech_keys contains the server's list of ECHConfig values and associated
+  // private keys. This list may be swapped out at any time, so all access must
+  // be synchronized through |lock|.
+  bssl::UniquePtr<SSL_ECH_KEYS> ech_keys;
+
+  // keylog_callback, if not NULL, is the key logging callback. See
+  // |SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback|.
+  void (*keylog_callback)(const SSL *ssl, const char *line) = nullptr;
+
+  // current_time_cb, if not NULL, is the function to use to get the current
+  // time. It sets |*out_clock| to the current time. The |ssl| argument is
+  // always NULL. See |SSL_CTX_set_current_time_cb|.
+  void (*current_time_cb)(const SSL *ssl, struct timeval *out_clock) = nullptr;
+
+  // pool is used for all |CRYPTO_BUFFER|s in case we wish to share certificate
+  // memory.
+  CRYPTO_BUFFER_POOL *pool = nullptr;
+
+  // ticket_aead_method contains function pointers for opening and sealing
+  // session tickets.
+  const SSL_TICKET_AEAD_METHOD *ticket_aead_method = nullptr;
+
+  // legacy_ocsp_callback implements an OCSP-related callback for OpenSSL
+  // compatibility.
+  int (*legacy_ocsp_callback)(SSL *ssl, void *arg) = nullptr;
+  void *legacy_ocsp_callback_arg = nullptr;
+
+  // verify_sigalgs, if not empty, is the set of signature algorithms
+  // accepted from the peer in decreasing order of preference.
+  bssl::Array<uint16_t> verify_sigalgs;
+
+  // retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs is true if we should compute the SHA256
+  // hash of the peer's certificate and then discard it to save memory and
+  // session space. Only effective on the server side.
+  bool retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs : 1;
+
+  // quiet_shutdown is true if the connection should not send a close_notify on
+  // shutdown.
+  bool quiet_shutdown : 1;
+
+  // ocsp_stapling_enabled is only used by client connections and indicates
+  // whether OCSP stapling will be requested.
+  bool ocsp_stapling_enabled : 1;
+
+  // If true, a client will request certificate timestamps.
+  bool signed_cert_timestamps_enabled : 1;
+
+  // channel_id_enabled is whether Channel ID is enabled. For a server, means
+  // that we'll accept Channel IDs from clients.  For a client, means that we'll
+  // advertise support.
+  bool channel_id_enabled : 1;
+
+  // grease_enabled is whether GREASE (RFC 8701) is enabled.
+  bool grease_enabled : 1;
+
+  // permute_extensions is whether to permute extensions when sending messages.
+  bool permute_extensions : 1;
+
+  // allow_unknown_alpn_protos is whether the client allows unsolicited ALPN
+  // protocols from the peer.
+  bool allow_unknown_alpn_protos : 1;
+
+  // false_start_allowed_without_alpn is whether False Start (if
+  // |SSL_MODE_ENABLE_FALSE_START| is enabled) is allowed without ALPN.
+  bool false_start_allowed_without_alpn : 1;
+
+  // handoff indicates that a server should stop after receiving the
+  // ClientHello and pause the handshake in such a way that |SSL_get_error|
+  // returns |SSL_ERROR_HANDOFF|.
+  bool handoff : 1;
+
+  // If enable_early_data is true, early data can be sent and accepted.
+  bool enable_early_data : 1;
+
+ private:
+  ~ssl_ctx_st();
+  friend void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *);
+};
+
+struct ssl_st {
+  explicit ssl_st(SSL_CTX *ctx_arg);
+  ssl_st(const ssl_st &) = delete;
+  ssl_st &operator=(const ssl_st &) = delete;
+  ~ssl_st();
+
+  // method is the method table corresponding to the current protocol (DTLS or
+  // TLS).
+  const bssl::SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD *method = nullptr;
+
+  // config is a container for handshake configuration.  Accesses to this field
+  // should check for nullptr, since configuration may be shed after the
+  // handshake completes.  (If you have the |SSL_HANDSHAKE| object at hand, use
+  // that instead, and skip the null check.)
+  bssl::UniquePtr<bssl::SSL_CONFIG> config;
+
+  // version is the protocol version.
+  uint16_t version = 0;
+
+  uint16_t max_send_fragment = 0;
+
+  // There are 2 BIO's even though they are normally both the same. This is so
+  // data can be read and written to different handlers
+
+  bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> rbio;  // used by SSL_read
+  bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> wbio;  // used by SSL_write
+
+  // do_handshake runs the handshake. On completion, it returns |ssl_hs_ok|.
+  // Otherwise, it returns a value corresponding to what operation is needed to
+  // progress.
+  bssl::ssl_hs_wait_t (*do_handshake)(bssl::SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) = nullptr;
+
+  bssl::SSL3_STATE *s3 = nullptr;   // TLS variables
+  bssl::DTLS1_STATE *d1 = nullptr;  // DTLS variables
+
+  // callback that allows applications to peek at protocol messages
+  void (*msg_callback)(int write_p, int version, int content_type,
+                       const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl,
+                       void *arg) = nullptr;
+  void *msg_callback_arg = nullptr;
+
+  // session info
+
+  // initial_timeout_duration_ms is the default DTLS timeout duration in
+  // milliseconds. It's used to initialize the timer any time it's restarted.
+  //
+  // RFC 6347 states that implementations SHOULD use an initial timer value of 1
+  // second.
+  unsigned initial_timeout_duration_ms = 1000;
+
+  // session is the configured session to be offered by the client. This session
+  // is immutable.
+  bssl::UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> session;
+
+  void (*info_callback)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int value) = nullptr;
+
+  bssl::UniquePtr<SSL_CTX> ctx;
+
+  // session_ctx is the |SSL_CTX| used for the session cache and related
+  // settings.
+  bssl::UniquePtr<SSL_CTX> session_ctx;
+
+  // extra application data
+  CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
+
+  uint32_t options = 0;  // protocol behaviour
+  uint32_t mode = 0;     // API behaviour
+  uint32_t max_cert_list = 0;
+  bssl::UniquePtr<char> hostname;
+
+  // quic_method is the method table corresponding to the QUIC hooks.
+  const SSL_QUIC_METHOD *quic_method = nullptr;
+
+  // renegotiate_mode controls how peer renegotiation attempts are handled.
+  ssl_renegotiate_mode_t renegotiate_mode = ssl_renegotiate_never;
+
+  // server is true iff the this SSL* is the server half. Note: before the SSL*
+  // is initialized by either SSL_set_accept_state or SSL_set_connect_state,
+  // the side is not determined. In this state, server is always false.
+  bool server : 1;
+
+  // quiet_shutdown is true if the connection should not send a close_notify on
+  // shutdown.
+  bool quiet_shutdown : 1;
+
+  // If enable_early_data is true, early data can be sent and accepted.
+  bool enable_early_data : 1;
+};
+
+struct ssl_session_st {
+  explicit ssl_session_st(const bssl::SSL_X509_METHOD *method);
+  ssl_session_st(const ssl_session_st &) = delete;
+  ssl_session_st &operator=(const ssl_session_st &) = delete;
+
+  CRYPTO_refcount_t references = 1;
+
+  // ssl_version is the (D)TLS version that established the session.
+  uint16_t ssl_version = 0;
+
+  // group_id is the ID of the ECDH group used to establish this session or zero
+  // if not applicable or unknown.
+  uint16_t group_id = 0;
+
+  // peer_signature_algorithm is the signature algorithm used to authenticate
+  // the peer, or zero if not applicable or unknown.
+  uint16_t peer_signature_algorithm = 0;
+
+  // secret, in TLS 1.2 and below, is the master secret associated with the
+  // session. In TLS 1.3 and up, it is the resumption PSK for sessions handed to
+  // the caller, but it stores the resumption secret when stored on |SSL|
+  // objects.
+  int secret_length = 0;
+  uint8_t secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH] = {0};
+
+  // session_id - valid?
+  unsigned session_id_length = 0;
+  uint8_t session_id[SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH] = {0};
+  // this is used to determine whether the session is being reused in
+  // the appropriate context. It is up to the application to set this,
+  // via SSL_new
+  uint8_t sid_ctx_length = 0;
+  uint8_t sid_ctx[SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH] = {0};
+
+  bssl::UniquePtr<char> psk_identity;
+
+  // certs contains the certificate chain from the peer, starting with the leaf
+  // certificate.
+  bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER)> certs;
+
+  const bssl::SSL_X509_METHOD *x509_method = nullptr;
+
+  // x509_peer is the peer's certificate.
+  X509 *x509_peer = nullptr;
+
+  // x509_chain is the certificate chain sent by the peer. NOTE: for historical
+  // reasons, when a client (so the peer is a server), the chain includes
+  // |peer|, but when a server it does not.
+  STACK_OF(X509) *x509_chain = nullptr;
+
+  // x509_chain_without_leaf is a lazily constructed copy of |x509_chain| that
+  // omits the leaf certificate. This exists because OpenSSL, historically,
+  // didn't include the leaf certificate in the chain for a server, but did for
+  // a client. The |x509_chain| always includes it and, if an API call requires
+  // a chain without, it is stored here.
+  STACK_OF(X509) *x509_chain_without_leaf = nullptr;
+
+  // verify_result is the result of certificate verification in the case of
+  // non-fatal certificate errors.
+  long verify_result = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
+
+  // timeout is the lifetime of the session in seconds, measured from |time|.
+  // This is renewable up to |auth_timeout|.
+  uint32_t timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT;
+
+  // auth_timeout is the non-renewable lifetime of the session in seconds,
+  // measured from |time|.
+  uint32_t auth_timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT;
+
+  // time is the time the session was issued, measured in seconds from the UNIX
+  // epoch.
+  uint64_t time = 0;
+
+  const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = nullptr;
+
+  CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;  // application specific data
+
+  // These are used to make removal of session-ids more efficient and to
+  // implement a maximum cache size.
+  SSL_SESSION *prev = nullptr, *next = nullptr;
+
+  bssl::Array<uint8_t> ticket;
+
+  bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> signed_cert_timestamp_list;
+
+  // The OCSP response that came with the session.
+  bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> ocsp_response;
+
+  // peer_sha256 contains the SHA-256 hash of the peer's certificate if
+  // |peer_sha256_valid| is true.
+  uint8_t peer_sha256[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH] = {0};
+
+  // original_handshake_hash contains the handshake hash (either SHA-1+MD5 or
+  // SHA-2, depending on TLS version) for the original, full handshake that
+  // created a session. This is used by Channel IDs during resumption.
+  uint8_t original_handshake_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE] = {0};
+  uint8_t original_handshake_hash_len = 0;
+
+  uint32_t ticket_lifetime_hint = 0;  // Session lifetime hint in seconds
+
+  uint32_t ticket_age_add = 0;
+
+  // ticket_max_early_data is the maximum amount of data allowed to be sent as
+  // early data. If zero, 0-RTT is disallowed.
+  uint32_t ticket_max_early_data = 0;
+
+  // early_alpn is the ALPN protocol from the initial handshake. This is only
+  // stored for TLS 1.3 and above in order to enforce ALPN matching for 0-RTT
+  // resumptions. For the current connection's ALPN protocol, see
+  // |alpn_selected| on |SSL3_STATE|.
+  bssl::Array<uint8_t> early_alpn;
+
+  // local_application_settings, if |has_application_settings| is true, is the
+  // local ALPS value for this connection.
+  bssl::Array<uint8_t> local_application_settings;
+
+  // peer_application_settings, if |has_application_settings| is true, is the
+  // peer ALPS value for this connection.
+  bssl::Array<uint8_t> peer_application_settings;
+
+  // extended_master_secret is whether the master secret in this session was
+  // generated using EMS and thus isn't vulnerable to the Triple Handshake
+  // attack.
+  bool extended_master_secret : 1;
+
+  // peer_sha256_valid is whether |peer_sha256| is valid.
+  bool peer_sha256_valid : 1;  // Non-zero if peer_sha256 is valid
+
+  // not_resumable is used to indicate that session resumption is disallowed.
+  bool not_resumable : 1;
+
+  // ticket_age_add_valid is whether |ticket_age_add| is valid.
+  bool ticket_age_add_valid : 1;
+
+  // is_server is whether this session was created by a server.
+  bool is_server : 1;
+
+  // is_quic indicates whether this session was created using QUIC.
+  bool is_quic : 1;
+
+  // has_application_settings indicates whether ALPS was negotiated in this
+  // session.
+  bool has_application_settings : 1;
+
+  // quic_early_data_context is used to determine whether early data must be
+  // rejected when performing a QUIC handshake.
+  bssl::Array<uint8_t> quic_early_data_context;
+
+ private:
+  ~ssl_session_st();
+  friend void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *);
+};
+
+struct ssl_ech_keys_st {
+  ssl_ech_keys_st() = default;
+  ssl_ech_keys_st(const ssl_ech_keys_st &) = delete;
+  ssl_ech_keys_st &operator=(const ssl_ech_keys_st &) = delete;
+
+  bssl::GrowableArray<bssl::UniquePtr<bssl::ECHServerConfig>> configs;
+  CRYPTO_refcount_t references = 1;
+
+ private:
+  ~ssl_ech_keys_st() = default;
+  friend void SSL_ECH_KEYS_free(SSL_ECH_KEYS *);
+};
+
+#endif  // OPENSSL_HEADER_SSL_INTERNAL_H