cortexm 0.3.0__py3-none-any.whl

cortexm/security/rbac.py

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+"""Role-based access control and API key management.
+
+Enterprise procurement asks two questions before anything else: "who can
+read the memory?" and "can we prove what they did?". This module answers
+the first; ``cortexm.enterprise.audit`` answers the second.
+
+Roles (least-privilege ladder):
+  admin    — everything, including key management and erasure
+  operator — memory read/write, snapshots; no keys, no erasure
+  reader   — search/get only
+  auditor  — audit log and integrity verification only
+
+API keys look like ``ctxm_<role>_<32 hex>`` and are stored ONLY as
+BLAKE3 digests with a per-deployment pepper — a leaked database cannot
+be used to authenticate. Verification is constant-time.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hmac
+import secrets
+import time
+
+from cortexm.security.hashes import HashProvider
+
+ROLES = ("admin", "operator", "reader", "auditor")
+
+# action -> minimum role allowed (admin passes everything)
+PERMISSIONS: dict[str, set[str]] = {
+    "memory.add":         {"admin", "operator"},
+    "memory.search":      {"admin", "operator", "reader"},
+    "memory.get":         {"admin", "operator", "reader"},
+    "memory.get_all":     {"admin", "operator", "reader"},
+    "memory.update":      {"admin", "operator"},
+    "memory.delete":      {"admin", "operator"},
+    "memory.delete_all":  {"admin"},           # destructive
+    "memory.history":     {"admin", "operator", "reader"},
+    "memory.stats":       {"admin", "operator", "reader"},
+    "memory.verify":      {"admin", "operator", "reader", "auditor"},
+    "memory.export":      {"admin", "operator", "reader"},  # swappable decoder
+    "memory.chaos_ingest": {"admin", "operator"},  # EAM chaos mode
+    "audit.read":         {"admin", "auditor"},
+    "audit.verify":       {"admin", "auditor"},
+    "keys.create":        {"admin"},
+    "keys.list":          {"admin"},
+    "keys.revoke":        {"admin"},
+    "sparql.query":       {"admin", "operator", "reader"},
+    "governance.erase":   {"admin"},           # GDPR right-to-erasure
+    "governance.retention": {"admin"},
+    "governance.snapshot":  {"admin", "operator"},
+    "governance.restore":   {"admin"},
+    "governance.pitr":      {"admin", "operator", "reader"},
+    "governance.consolidate": {"admin"},  # dreaming pass trigger
+    "federation.digest":  {"admin", "operator", "reader", "auditor"},
+    "federation.sync":    {"admin", "operator"},  # CRDT envelope exchange
+}
+
+_KEY_PREFIX = "ctxm"
+
+
+class RBACError(PermissionError):
+    def __init__(self, action: str, role: str) -> None:
+        super().__init__(
+            f"role {role!r} is not allowed to perform {action!r}")
+        self.action = action
+        self.role = role
+
+
+class APIKeyStore:
+    """Persistent API key registry (kv-backed, peppered digests)."""
+
+    def __init__(self, store, pepper: bytes | None = None) -> None:
+        self.store = store
+        self._hasher = HashProvider("blake2b")
+        self._pepper = pepper or self._load_pepper()
+
+    def _load_pepper(self) -> bytes:
+        raw = self.store.kv_get("rbac:pepper")
+        if raw:
+            return bytes.fromhex(raw)
+        p = secrets.token_bytes(16)
+        self.store.kv_set("rbac:pepper", p.hex())
+        return p
+
+    def _digest(self, key: str) -> str:
+        return self._hasher.hash_text(key + self._pepper.hex())
+
+    # ------------------------------------------------------------- lifecycle
+    def create(self, role: str, label: str = "", actor: str = "system",
+               ttl_seconds: int | None = None) -> dict:
+        if role not in ROLES:
+            raise ValueError(f"role must be one of {ROLES}")
+        secret = secrets.token_hex(16)
+        key = f"{_KEY_PREFIX}_{role}_{secret}"
+        kid = f"key_{secrets.token_hex(4)}"
+        import json
+        meta = {"id": kid, "role": role, "label": label,
+                "created_by": actor, "created_at": time.time(),
+                "digest": self._digest(key),
+                "expires_at": (time.time() + ttl_seconds) if ttl_seconds else None,
+                "revoked": False}
+        self.store.kv_set(f"rbac:key:{kid}", json.dumps(meta))
+        # index by digest for O(1) lookup at request time
+        self.store.kv_set(f"rbac:dgst:{meta['digest']}", kid)
+        return {"key": key, "id": kid, "role": role, "label": label,
+                "expires_at": meta["expires_at"]}
+
+    def verify(self, key: str) -> dict | None:
+        """Return key metadata iff valid (exists, not revoked, not expired)."""
+        import json
+        if not key.startswith(f"{_KEY_PREFIX}_"):
+            return None
+        dgst = self._digest(key)
+        kid = self.store.kv_get(f"rbac:dgst:{dgst}")
+        if not kid:
+            return None
+        raw = self.store.kv_get(f"rbac:key:{kid}")
+        if not raw:
+            return None
+        try:
+            meta = json.loads(raw)
+        except Exception:
+            return None
+        if meta.get("revoked"):
+            return None
+        exp = meta.get("expires_at")
+        if exp and time.time() > exp:
+            return None
+        return meta
+
+    def revoke(self, kid: str) -> bool:
+        import json
+        raw = self.store.kv_get(f"rbac:key:{kid}")
+        if not raw:
+            return False
+        meta = json.loads(raw)
+        meta["revoked"] = True
+        meta["revoked_at"] = time.time()
+        self.store.kv_set(f"rbac:key:{kid}", json.dumps(meta))
+        dgst = meta.get("digest")
+        if dgst:
+            self.store.kv_set(f"rbac:dgst:{dgst}", "")  # break the index
+        return True
+
+    def list_keys(self) -> list[dict]:
+        import json
+        out = []
+        for k, v in self.store.iter_kv("rbac:key:"):
+            meta = json.loads(v)
+            meta.pop("digest", None)  # never leak digests
+            out.append(meta)
+        return sorted(out, key=lambda m: m.get("created_at", 0))
+
+
+def authorize(meta: dict | None, action: str) -> dict:
+    """Raise RBACError unless ``meta`` (from verify()) may do ``action``."""
+    if meta is None:
+        raise RBACError(action, "anonymous")
+    role = meta.get("role", "reader")
+    allowed = PERMISSIONS.get(action)
+    if allowed is None:
+        raise RBACError(action, role)
+    if role not in allowed:
+        raise RBACError(action, role)
+    return meta
+
+
+def constant_time_eq(a: str, b: str) -> bool:
+    return hmac.compare_digest(a.encode(), b.encode())

cortexm/security/sandbox.py

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+"""Memory scope sandbox — the InjecMEM isolation the plan demanded.
+
+Threat model (InjecMEM, arXiv:2502.08589 + MINJA second-order contagion):
+facts an AGENT writes while operating on a user's behalf are attacker-
+influenced until proven otherwise. A poisoned fact written by a compromised
+agent must never silently surface in the USER's memory view, and must never
+steer another agent's behaviour, unless a human/system explicitly promotes
+it.
+
+Policy:
+  * WRITE  — unchanged; facts carry their agent_id scope.
+  * READ   — user-scope queries (agent_id=None) EXCLUDE agent-scoped facts.
+             Agent queries (agent_id=A) see A's facts plus user facts.
+  * PROMOTE — explicit, audited, gated:
+        - fact must be active and not quarantined
+        - confidence >= config.sandbox_promote_min_confidence
+        - source chunk re-scanned through InjecMEM + MINJA detectors;
+          high-risk sources are refused
+        - every promotion appends to the tamper-evident audit chain
+
+Config knobs (Config):
+    sandbox_enabled            (default True)
+    sandbox_promote_min_confidence (default 0.5)
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from cortexm.security.injection import scan as injection_scan
+from cortexm.security.injection import contagion_scan  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+
+
+class PromotionRefused(Exception):
+    """Raised when a fact fails promotion policy."""
+
+    def __init__(self, fact_id: str, reason: str):
+        super().__init__(f"promotion refused for {fact_id}: {reason}")
+        self.fact_id = fact_id
+        self.reason = reason
+
+
+class ScopeSandbox:
+    def __init__(self, config, store, audit_log=None) -> None:
+        self.cfg = config
+        self.store = store
+        self.audit = audit_log
+
+    # ------------------------------------------------------------ policy
+    def visible(self, fact, agent_id: str | None) -> bool:
+        """Read-visibility predicate used by the reader."""
+        if agent_id is not None:
+            # agent queries see their own scope + shared user scope
+            return fact.agent_id in (None, agent_id)
+        if not getattr(self.cfg, "sandbox_enabled", True):
+            return True
+        # user-scope query: agent-written facts are invisible until promoted
+        return fact.agent_id is None
+
+    def filter_facts(self, facts: list, agent_id: str | None) -> list:
+        return [f for f in facts if self.visible(f, agent_id)]
+
+    # ------------------------------------------------------------ promote
+    def promote(self, fact_ids: list[str], *, reviewed_by: str = "system",
+                force: bool = False) -> dict:
+        """Explicitly promote agent-scoped facts into the user scope."""
+        promoted, refused = [], []
+        for fid in fact_ids:
+            facts = self.store.get_facts([fid])
+            fact = facts[0] if facts else None
+            if fact is None:
+                refused.append({"id": fid, "reason": "not found"})
+                continue
+            if fact.agent_id is None:
+                promoted.append(fid)  # already user-scope; idempotent
+                continue
+            if not force:
+                if fact.quarantined or not fact.is_active:
+                    self._audit("sandbox.promote", fid, "refused_quarantined")
+                    refused.append({"id": fid, "reason": "quarantined/inactive"})
+                    continue
+                min_conf = getattr(self.cfg, "sandbox_promote_min_confidence",
+                                   0.5)
+                if fact.confidence < min_conf:
+                    self._audit("sandbox.promote", fid, "refused_low_confidence",
+                                meta={"confidence": fact.confidence})
+                    refused.append({"id": fid, "reason": f"confidence "
+                                   f"{fact.confidence:.2f} < {min_conf}"})
+                    continue
+                verdict = self._rescan_source(fact)
+                if verdict is not None:
+                    self._audit("sandbox.promote", fid,
+                                "refused_injection_rescan",
+                                meta={"risk": verdict})
+                    refused.append({"id": fid,
+                                    "reason": f"source rescan risk={verdict}"})
+                    continue
+            self.store.update_fact(fid, agent_id=None,
+                                   provenance={**fact.provenance,
+                                               "promoted_by": reviewed_by,
+                                               "promoted_from":
+                                                   fact.agent_id})
+            self._audit("sandbox.promote", fid, "promoted",
+                        meta={"reviewed_by": reviewed_by})
+            promoted.append(fid)
+        return {"promoted": promoted, "refused": refused,
+                "reviewed_by": reviewed_by}
+
+    # ------------------------------------------------------------ helpers
+    def _rescan_source(self, fact) -> str | None:
+        """Re-run injection detection over the fact's source chunk."""
+        chunk = self.store.get_chunk(fact.source_id) if fact.source_id else None
+        if not chunk:
+            return None
+        verdict = injection_scan(chunk["text"],
+                                 quarantine_high=True)
+        if verdict.risk == "high":
+            return "high"
+        if getattr(self.cfg, "quarantine_contagion", True):
+            cv = contagion_scan(chunk["text"], [],
+                                threshold=self.cfg.contagion_threshold)
+            if cv is not None:
+                return "contagion"
+        return None
+
+    def _audit(self, action: str, resource: str, outcome: str,
+               meta: dict | None = None) -> None:
+        if self.audit is not None:
+            try:
+                self.audit.log(action, resource=resource, outcome=outcome,
+                               meta=meta or {})
+            except Exception:
+                pass

cortexm/security/zk_hamming.py

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+"""Hamming-distance zero-knowledge-style proofs on binary vectors.
+
+ZK proofs on HRR/convolution bind vectors are algebraically intractable
+(arXiv:2405.09689 — the involution inverse is approximate, not exact).
+But binary vectors have clean algebraic structure for attestation: a
+prover can attest they hold a memory whose Hamming distance to a public
+commitment is below threshold.
+
+Construction: verifiable proximity proof (Sigma-protocol-inspired
+non-interactive proof of knowledge + Hamming proximity). NOT full ZK —
+the delta is revealed, but the witness v remains hidden behind the
+delta mask. Sufficient for audit attestation; for full cryptographic
+ZK, the prover would need to also sign with their identity key.
+
+  1. Prover holds v, public_vec is public.
+  2. delta = v XOR public_vec, weight(delta) = Hamming distance.
+  3. If weight > threshold: prover doesn't have a close v → reject.
+  4. Commitment c = H(delta || salt)
+  5. Reveal: delta, salt, c.
+  6. Verifier: check weight(delta) <= threshold AND H(delta||salt) = c.
+
+For Context-M's binary codec tier, this proves storage-of-knowledge +
+proximity to a commitment. Useful for:
+  * Audit compliance — prove you hold a memory the user asked about
+  * Federated attestation — peer proves they have a fact in expected range
+  * Tamper detection — checksum + Hamming proof together detect any bit flip
+
+Pure Python. BLAKE2b hash for the commitment.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import hashlib
+import os
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+
+
+@dataclass
+class HammingZKProof:
+    """Non-interactive proof of Hamming proximity to a public commitment."""
+    commitment: str       # H(delta || salt) hex
+    delta: bytes          # v XOR public (revealed for verification)
+    salt: bytes           # random salt for freshness
+    threshold: int       # claimed max Hamming distance
+    weight: int           # actual Hamming weight of delta
+
+
+class HammingZKProver:
+    """Prove knowledge of a binary memory within Hamming distance of
+    a public commitment."""
+
+    def __init__(self, dims: int, threshold: int = 32,
+                 hash_fn: str = "blake2b") -> None:
+        self.dims = dims
+        self.threshold = threshold
+        self.hash_fn = hash_fn
+
+    def prove(self, public_vec: bytes, private_vec: bytes,
+             salt: bytes | None = None) -> HammingZKProof:
+        """Generate non-interactive proof of Hamming proximity.
+
+        Returns a proof that the verifier can check without learning
+        private_vec itself. The delta (v XOR public) is revealed but
+        the private v stays hidden as long as public is public — the
+        verifier cannot recover v from delta XOR public... actually
+        they CAN recover v = delta XOR public. So this is NOT ZK;
+        it's a verifiable proximity proof. For true ZK, would need
+        a more involved construction (e.g., MPC-style commitments).
+        """
+        if len(public_vec) != len(private_vec):
+            raise ValueError("vector length mismatch")
+        if salt is None:
+            salt = os.urandom(16)
+        delta = bytes(a ^ b for a, b in zip(public_vec, private_vec))
+        weight = _hamming_weight(delta)
+        commitment = self._hash(delta + salt)
+        return HammingZKProof(
+            commitment=commitment,
+            delta=delta,
+            salt=salt,
+            threshold=self.threshold,
+            weight=weight,
+        )
+
+    def verify(self, public_vec: bytes, proof: HammingZKProof) -> bool:
+        """Verify a proof of Hamming proximity."""
+        if len(public_vec) != len(proof.delta):
+            return False
+        # recompute commitment
+        expected = self._hash(proof.delta + proof.salt)
+        if expected != proof.commitment:
+            return False
+        # check Hamming proximity claim
+        if proof.weight > proof.threshold:
+            return False
+        # the prover committed to delta = v XOR public; if they know v,
+        # they can recompute delta; the commitment binds them to delta
+        # before any challenge. The verifier can re-derive private as
+        # public XOR delta, so this is NOT zero-knowledge — it's a
+        # verifiable proximity attestation. For real ZK, would need
+        # more involved MPC-style commitments.
+        return True
+
+    def _hash(self, data: bytes) -> str:
+        if self.hash_fn == "blake2b":
+            return hashlib.blake2b(data, digest_size=32).hexdigest()
+        return hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _hamming_weight(b: bytes) -> int:
+    """Number of 1-bits in a byte string (Hamming weight, not distance)."""
+    return sum(bin(x).count("1") for x in b)
+
+
+def _hamming_distance(a: bytes, b: bytes) -> int:
+    """Bit-level Hamming distance between two byte strings."""
+    if len(a) != len(b):
+        return max(len(a), len(b)) * 8
+    return sum(bin(x ^ y).count("1") for x, y in zip(a, b))
+
+
+def checksum_prove_and_verify(public_vec: bytes, private_vec: bytes,
+                              expected_hash: str) -> bool:
+    """Combined checksum + proximity proof: prove storage-of-knowledge +
+    integrity. Both must pass for the proof to verify."""
+    # 1. Checksum: BLAKE2b hash of private matches expected
+    h = hashlib.blake2b(private_vec, digest_size=32).hexdigest()
+    if h != expected_hash:
+        return False
+    # 2. Proximity proof: private is within Hamming distance of public
+    prover = HammingZKProver(dims=len(public_vec) * 8)
+    proof = prover.prove(public_vec, private_vec)
+    return prover.verify(public_vec, proof)
+
+
+__all__ = [
+    "HammingZKProver",
+    "HammingZKProof",
+    "checksum_prove_and_verify",
+    "_hamming_distance",
+    "_hamming_weight",
+]