xploitscan-shared-rules 2.0.2 → 2.1.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +2 -2
- package/dist/index.cjs +677 -60
- package/dist/index.cjs.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.d.cts +125 -7
- package/dist/index.d.ts +125 -7
- package/dist/index.js +670 -60
- package/dist/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/package.json +1 -1
package/dist/index.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -53,9 +53,9 @@ function isInlineSilenced(content, matchIndex, ruleId) {
|
|
|
53
53
|
}
|
|
54
54
|
function isLineSilenced(lines, lineIdx, ruleId) {
|
|
55
55
|
const matchLine = lines[lineIdx] ?? "";
|
|
56
|
-
const marker = new RegExp(`(
|
|
56
|
+
const marker = new RegExp(`(?://|/\\*|#|--)\\s*(?:${ruleId}|scanner)-OK\\b`, "i");
|
|
57
57
|
if (marker.test(matchLine)) return true;
|
|
58
|
-
const COMMENT_LINE = /^\s*[{(]?\s*(
|
|
58
|
+
const COMMENT_LINE = /^\s*[{(]?\s*(?:\/\/|#|\/\*|\*|--)/;
|
|
59
59
|
const MAX_BLOCK_LINES = 20;
|
|
60
60
|
for (let i = lineIdx - 1, seen = 0; i >= 0 && seen < MAX_BLOCK_LINES; i--, seen++) {
|
|
61
61
|
const line = lines[i] ?? "";
|
|
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ var RULE_IMPACTS = {
|
|
|
84
84
|
VC008: "Without rate limiting, an attacker can flood your API with requests causing denial of service, brute-force attacks, or excessive cloud billing.",
|
|
85
85
|
VC009: "With CORS set to allow all origins, any website can make authenticated requests to your API from a user's browser, enabling cross-site data theft.",
|
|
86
86
|
VC010: "Hiding UI elements without server-side checks means an attacker can call your API directly and bypass the restriction entirely.",
|
|
87
|
-
VC011: "
|
|
87
|
+
VC011: "A browser-exposed prefix (NEXT_PUBLIC_, VITE_, REACT_APP_, EXPO_PUBLIC_ and the like) puts this value in the bundle shipped to every visitor or app user. If it's a secret, anyone viewing your site's JavaScript can extract it.",
|
|
88
88
|
VC012: "While Firebase API keys aren't strictly secret, an unrestricted key lets attackers abuse your project's quotas, run up Firebase costs, or hit endpoints that should be locked down by App Check or HTTP referrer rules.",
|
|
89
89
|
VC013: "Performing privileged operations with the anon key either fails outright or silently bypasses RLS in unsafe ways, leading to leaked rows or broken auth checks that any logged-in user can exploit.",
|
|
90
90
|
VC014: "An unignored .env file gets committed on the next git add, leaking database passwords, API keys, and OAuth secrets to anyone with repo access \u2014 including the entire internet if the repo is public.",
|
|
@@ -287,7 +287,16 @@ var RULE_IMPACTS = {
|
|
|
287
287
|
VC211: "A real credit card number in source is cardholder data sitting in git history, CI logs, and every backup \u2014 a direct PCI-DSS violation. Anyone with repo access can read it, and it cannot be un-leaked once committed; the card must be treated as compromised.",
|
|
288
288
|
VC212: "A hardcoded Social Security Number is regulated PII permanently embedded in your git history and backups. It exposes a real person to identity theft, and its presence in source can trigger breach-notification and privacy-law obligations the moment the repo is accessed.",
|
|
289
289
|
VC213: "Anything read from localStorage belongs to the user, not to you. If a plan, role or permission is read from browser storage and branched on, unlocking the feature takes one line in devtools \u2014 no exploit, no tooling, just typing. Every paid tier and admin panel gated this way is open to anyone who opens the console.",
|
|
290
|
-
VC214: "Browser storage is per-device and per-profile, so per-account state kept there resets on a fresh login, cleared cookies, a private window or a second machine \u2014 and the app greets a long-standing customer as brand new. It is not a security hole, it is a trust one: the product visibly does not remember who you are."
|
|
290
|
+
VC214: "Browser storage is per-device and per-profile, so per-account state kept there resets on a fresh login, cleared cookies, a private window or a second machine \u2014 and the app greets a long-standing customer as brand new. It is not a security hole, it is a trust one: the product visibly does not remember who you are.",
|
|
291
|
+
VC215: "The Supabase anon key ships in every browser, so the row level security in your migrations is the only access control. Depending on the finding: with RLS off, or a write policy that is always true, anyone with that key can change or delete the table's rows (and read them, unless grants were revoked or a later migration fixed it); an insert-only open policy lets anyone add rows; a policy that reads user_metadata lets users grant themselves whatever role or tenant it checks.",
|
|
292
|
+
VC216: "A Firebase app has no server in front of its database, so the rules file is the only thing deciding who gets in. Depending on the finding: open rules let anyone, or anyone who signs up, read, change or delete the data behind the app, including other users' records and uploads; an open create rule lets anyone add records; and expired test-mode rules already deny everything, so the risk is that they get extended instead of replaced.",
|
|
293
|
+
VC217: "This key ends up in code shipped to every visitor or app user \u2014 the JavaScript bundle or the installed app \u2014 so anyone can copy it and run AI requests, or reach whatever the secret unlocks, on your account and your bill.",
|
|
294
|
+
VC220: "Anyone who finds this endpoint's URL \u2014 it ships in your JavaScript bundle \u2014 can send it requests that run your AI model on your account, so a script in a loop can burn through your AI credits or API budget while you pay the bill.",
|
|
295
|
+
VC218: "Base44 serves every backend function as a public endpoint, and asServiceRole ignores every access rule, so a function that uses it without asking who is calling lets anyone on the internet read, change or delete the records it touches.",
|
|
296
|
+
VC219: "Supabase user_metadata and Clerk unsafeMetadata can be rewritten by the signed-in user from the browser, so a role, plan or permission checked there can be granted by any user to themselves with one API call.",
|
|
297
|
+
VC221: "A server that takes the caller's identity from Supabase getSession(), jwt.decode() or a JWT decoded with signature checks off believes whatever the cookie or token says, so anyone can forge one and be treated as any user, including an admin.",
|
|
298
|
+
VC222: "Your API answers every website's origin with credentials allowed, so if it uses cookie sessions, any page a signed-in user visits can call it as that user and read the responses.",
|
|
299
|
+
VC223: "The check meant to stop path traversal also lets through any sibling folder whose name starts with the base folder's name, so a request for /srv/uploads-private passes a guard for /srv/uploads."
|
|
291
300
|
};
|
|
292
301
|
|
|
293
302
|
// src/exposure.ts
|
|
@@ -866,6 +875,77 @@ function checkIntent(files, findings) {
|
|
|
866
875
|
return { statements, mismatches, sources, unchallenged, uncheckable };
|
|
867
876
|
}
|
|
868
877
|
|
|
878
|
+
// src/public-env.ts
|
|
879
|
+
var PUBLIC_ENV_PREFIX_RE = /^(?:NEXT_PUBLIC_|NUXT_PUBLIC_|EXPO_PUBLIC_|REACT_APP_|GATSBY_|VITE_|PUBLIC_)/i;
|
|
880
|
+
var STRONG_SECRET_ENV_WORD_RE = /SECRET|PASSWORD|PASSWD|SERVICE_?ROLE|SUPABASE_SERVICE/;
|
|
881
|
+
var QUALIFIED_SECRET_ENV_WORD_RE = /PRIVATE|ADMIN|SERVER|SERVICE_?ACCOUNT|PERSONAL|MANAGEMENT|MASTER/;
|
|
882
|
+
var NON_SECRET_KEY_TAIL = "ADDRESS|ADDR|SYMBOL|URL|URI|ID|IDS|NAME|DECIMALS?|LIST|CONTRACT|LOGO|IMAGE|ICON|PRICE|MINT|CHAIN|AMOUNT|SUPPLY|TYPE|EXPIRY|EXPIRES|EXPIRATION|TTL|LIFETIME|ENDPOINT|HEADER|STORAGE|PREFIX|PATH|FILE|LENGTH|SIZE|LIMIT|ENABLED|DISABLED|MODE|COUNT|NETWORK|STANDARD|PAIR|PROGRAM|ACCOUNT|TICKER|DENOM|CURRENCY|UNIT|ISSUER|POOL|FACTORY|ROUTER|BRIDGE|GATE|GATED|GATING|HOLDER|BALANCE|VAULT";
|
|
883
|
+
var KEY_SEGMENT_RE = new RegExp(
|
|
884
|
+
`(?:^|_)(?:(?:API|ACCESS|AUTH|BEARER|REFRESH|SESSION)_?TOKENS|(?:API|ACCESS|AUTH|SECRET|PRIVATE|MASTER|SIGNING|ENCRYPTION|LICENSE|APP|SERVICE|WRITE|READ|ADMIN|BEARER|REFRESH|SESSION|OPENAI|GEMINI|GROQ|ANTHROPIC|CLAUDE|MISTRAL|COHERE|DEEPSEEK|PERPLEXITY|REPLICATE|ELEVENLABS|HUGGINGFACE|OPENROUTER)?(?:KEYS?|TOKEN))(?:_?V?\\d{1,3})?(?:_(?!(?:${NON_SECRET_KEY_TAIL})(?:_|\\d|$))[A-Z]{1,12}(?:_?\\d{1,3})?)?$`
|
|
885
|
+
);
|
|
886
|
+
var KEYISH_WORD_RE = /SECRET|PASSWORD|PASSWD|CREDENTIALS?$|(?:^|_)PRIVATE$/;
|
|
887
|
+
var NON_SECRET_WORD_VALUE_RE = /^(?:true|false|yes|no|on|off|null|undefined)$/i;
|
|
888
|
+
var NUMBER_VALUE_RE = /^-?\d+(?:\.\d+)?$/;
|
|
889
|
+
var SECRET_TAIL_RE = /(?:SECRET|PASSWORD|PASSWD|PASSCODE|PIN)(?:_KEY)?$/;
|
|
890
|
+
var NUMERIC_SECRET_VALUE_RE = /^\d{4,}$/;
|
|
891
|
+
var PLAIN_URL_VALUE_RE = /^https?:\/\/[^\s@]+$/i;
|
|
892
|
+
function urlCarriesToken(url) {
|
|
893
|
+
const rest = url.replace(/^https?:\/\/[^/?#]*/i, "");
|
|
894
|
+
for (const seg of rest.split(/[/?#&=.:;,]/)) {
|
|
895
|
+
if (seg.length < 20 || !/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/.test(seg)) continue;
|
|
896
|
+
if (!/\d/.test(seg) || !/[A-Za-z]/.test(seg)) continue;
|
|
897
|
+
if (seg.split(/[-_]/).some((run) => run.length >= 16)) return true;
|
|
898
|
+
}
|
|
899
|
+
return false;
|
|
900
|
+
}
|
|
901
|
+
var PUBLIC_BY_DESIGN_ENV_RE = /PUBLISHABLE|ANON_?KEY|PUBLIC_?KEY|SITE_?KEY|FIREBASE|(?:^|_)MAPS?(?:_|$)|MAPBOX|PUSHER|REVERB|ALGOLIA_SEARCH|SEARCH_ONLY|POSTHOG|MIXPANEL|AMPLITUDE|SEGMENT_WRITE|CLIENT_?(?:KEY|TOKEN)|VAPID|RECAPTCHA|HCAPTCHA|TURNSTILE|(?:^|_)IDS?$|(?:WEB3FORMS|REVENUECAT|TINYMCE|BUGSNAG|OPTIMIZELY|FLAGSMITH|CONFIGCAT|VEXO)(?![A-Z0-9_]{0,80}TOKEN)|(?:^|_)SDK_?KEY(?:_?\d{1,3})?$/;
|
|
902
|
+
var PUBLIC_VALUE_PREFIX_RE = /^(?:pk_(?:test|live)_|sb_publishable_|phc_|pk\.ey|(?:appl|goog|amzn|strp)_)/;
|
|
903
|
+
var SECRET_VALUE_PREFIX_RE = /^(?:phx_|sk\.ey|sk_[A-Za-z0-9_]{16}|ser\.[A-Za-z0-9]{16}|sdk-[0-9a-f]{8}-)/;
|
|
904
|
+
function isAnonJwt(value) {
|
|
905
|
+
const m = /^eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,200}\.(eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,2000})\./.exec(value);
|
|
906
|
+
if (!m) return false;
|
|
907
|
+
try {
|
|
908
|
+
const b64 = m[1].replace(/-/g, "+").replace(/_/g, "/");
|
|
909
|
+
const json = typeof atob === "function" ? atob(b64 + "=".repeat((4 - b64.length % 4) % 4)) : "";
|
|
910
|
+
return /"role"\s*:\s*"anon"/.test(json);
|
|
911
|
+
} catch {
|
|
912
|
+
return false;
|
|
913
|
+
}
|
|
914
|
+
}
|
|
915
|
+
function classifyPublicEnvVar(name, value = "") {
|
|
916
|
+
const m = PUBLIC_ENV_PREFIX_RE.exec(name);
|
|
917
|
+
if (!m) return null;
|
|
918
|
+
const prefix = m[0].toUpperCase();
|
|
919
|
+
const upper = name.toUpperCase();
|
|
920
|
+
const rest = upper.slice(prefix.length);
|
|
921
|
+
const v = value.trim().replace(/^["'`]/, "");
|
|
922
|
+
const notSecret = { prefix, secret: false, publicByDesign: true };
|
|
923
|
+
if (PUBLIC_VALUE_PREFIX_RE.test(v) || NON_SECRET_WORD_VALUE_RE.test(v) || isAnonJwt(v)) return notSecret;
|
|
924
|
+
if (NUMBER_VALUE_RE.test(v) && !(SECRET_TAIL_RE.test(rest) && NUMERIC_SECRET_VALUE_RE.test(v))) return notSecret;
|
|
925
|
+
if (PLAIN_URL_VALUE_RE.test(v) && !urlCarriesToken(v)) return notSecret;
|
|
926
|
+
if (SECRET_VALUE_PREFIX_RE.test(v)) return { prefix, secret: true, publicByDesign: false };
|
|
927
|
+
const keyish = KEY_SEGMENT_RE.test(rest) || KEYISH_WORD_RE.test(rest);
|
|
928
|
+
if (STRONG_SECRET_ENV_WORD_RE.test(rest)) return { prefix, secret: true, publicByDesign: false };
|
|
929
|
+
if (QUALIFIED_SECRET_ENV_WORD_RE.test(rest) && keyish) return { prefix, secret: true, publicByDesign: false };
|
|
930
|
+
if (PUBLIC_BY_DESIGN_ENV_RE.test(upper)) return notSecret;
|
|
931
|
+
return { prefix, secret: keyish, publicByDesign: false };
|
|
932
|
+
}
|
|
933
|
+
var DOTENV_FILE_RE = /(?:^|\/)(?:\.env(?:\.[\w.-]+)?|[\w.-]+\.env)$/;
|
|
934
|
+
function isDotenvPath(filePath) {
|
|
935
|
+
return DOTENV_FILE_RE.test(filePath);
|
|
936
|
+
}
|
|
937
|
+
var DOTENV_ASSIGN_RE = /^\s*(?:export\s+)?([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]{0,127})\s*=\s*([^\r\n]*)/;
|
|
938
|
+
function dotenvValue(raw) {
|
|
939
|
+
const v = raw.trim();
|
|
940
|
+
const q = v[0];
|
|
941
|
+
if (q === '"' || q === "'" || q === "`") {
|
|
942
|
+
const end = v.indexOf(q, 1);
|
|
943
|
+
return end === -1 ? v.slice(1) : v.slice(1, end);
|
|
944
|
+
}
|
|
945
|
+
const hash = v.search(/\s#/);
|
|
946
|
+
return (hash === -1 ? v : v.slice(0, hash)).trim();
|
|
947
|
+
}
|
|
948
|
+
|
|
869
949
|
// src/ast/parse.ts
|
|
870
950
|
import { parse } from "@babel/parser";
|
|
871
951
|
var MAX_CACHE = 256;
|
|
@@ -1413,7 +1493,23 @@ function isTestFile(filePath) {
|
|
|
1413
1493
|
}
|
|
1414
1494
|
var HANDLER_HEADER_RE = /(?:\b(?:async\s+)?function\b|=>\s*$|=>\s*\{?\s*$|\.(?:get|post|put|patch|delete|use|all)\s*\(|\bexport\s+(?:async\s+)?(?:function|const)\s+(?:GET|POST|PUT|PATCH|DELETE)\b|\b(?:Deno\.)?serve\s*\()/i;
|
|
1415
1495
|
function maskComments(content) {
|
|
1416
|
-
return content
|
|
1496
|
+
return replaceBlockComments(content, (c) => c.replace(/[^\n]/g, " ")).replace(/(^|[^:])\/\/[^\n]*/gm, (m, p1) => p1 + " ".repeat(m.length - p1.length));
|
|
1497
|
+
}
|
|
1498
|
+
function replaceBlockComments(content, replace) {
|
|
1499
|
+
let open = content.indexOf("/*");
|
|
1500
|
+
if (open === -1) return content;
|
|
1501
|
+
const parts = [];
|
|
1502
|
+
let copied = 0;
|
|
1503
|
+
while (open !== -1) {
|
|
1504
|
+
const close = content.indexOf("*/", open + 2);
|
|
1505
|
+
if (close === -1) break;
|
|
1506
|
+
parts.push(content.slice(copied, open), replace(content.slice(open, close + 2)));
|
|
1507
|
+
copied = close + 2;
|
|
1508
|
+
open = content.indexOf("/*", copied);
|
|
1509
|
+
}
|
|
1510
|
+
if (parts.length === 0) return content;
|
|
1511
|
+
parts.push(content.slice(copied));
|
|
1512
|
+
return parts.join("");
|
|
1417
1513
|
}
|
|
1418
1514
|
function enclosingHandler(content, index) {
|
|
1419
1515
|
const MAX_LEVELS = 6;
|
|
@@ -1486,10 +1582,11 @@ var SERVER_SIDE_PATH_RE = new RegExp(
|
|
|
1486
1582
|
"i"
|
|
1487
1583
|
);
|
|
1488
1584
|
var SERVER_SIDE_CONTENT_RE = /\b(?:req|request)\.(?:body|query|params|headers|cookies)\b|\b(?:app|router)\.(?:get|post|put|patch|delete|use|all)\s*\(|\bctx\.request\b|\bevent\.(?:body|queryStringParameters|pathParameters)\b|\(\s*req\s*,\s*res\b|(?:import|require)\b[^;\n]{0,200}['"]express['"]|\bNextFunction\b/;
|
|
1585
|
+
var USE_SERVER_DIRECTIVE_RE = /^[ \t\uFEFF]*["']use server["']/m;
|
|
1489
1586
|
function isServerSideFile(filePath, content) {
|
|
1490
1587
|
if (isTestFile(filePath)) return false;
|
|
1491
1588
|
if (SERVER_SIDE_PATH_RE.test(filePath)) return true;
|
|
1492
|
-
if (content &&
|
|
1589
|
+
if (content && USE_SERVER_DIRECTIVE_RE.test(content)) return true;
|
|
1493
1590
|
if (content && SERVER_SIDE_CONTENT_RE.test(content)) return true;
|
|
1494
1591
|
return false;
|
|
1495
1592
|
}
|
|
@@ -1599,6 +1696,27 @@ function isNamespacedSlotKey(name, value) {
|
|
|
1599
1696
|
}
|
|
1600
1697
|
var CREDENTIAL_NAME = /SECRET|SIGN|ENCRYPT|CRYPT|CIPHER|HMAC|JWT|PRIVATE|API|ACCESS|AUTH|MASTER|ADMIN|SESSION|PASS|TOKEN|CLIENT|SALT|PEPPER|LICEN[CS]E|WEBHOOK|STRIPE|AWS|SERVICE/;
|
|
1601
1698
|
var CREDENTIAL_WORD = /secret|passw|token|private|signing|apikey|credential/i;
|
|
1699
|
+
function isPlaceholderToken(token) {
|
|
1700
|
+
if (/(.)\1{7,}/.test(token)) return true;
|
|
1701
|
+
if (new Set(token).size < 8) return true;
|
|
1702
|
+
return /example|placeholder|redacted|your_?(?:api_?)?(?:key|token)|insert_?your|replace_?me/i.test(token);
|
|
1703
|
+
}
|
|
1704
|
+
var GEMINI_FILE_CONTEXT_RE = /generativelanguage\.googleapis\.com|@google\/generative-ai|@google\/genai|\bGoogleGenerativeAI\b|\bGoogleGenAI\b|\bgoogle\.generativeai\b|\bfrom\s+google\s+import\s+genai\b/;
|
|
1705
|
+
var GEMINI_NAME_RE = /gemini|generative/i;
|
|
1706
|
+
var PUBLIC_GOOGLE_KEY_NAME_RE = /firebase|maps?(?:\b|_)|places|recaptcha|youtube/i;
|
|
1707
|
+
var FIREBASE_CONFIG_FIELD_RE = /\b(?:authDomain|messagingSenderId|storageBucket)\b/;
|
|
1708
|
+
function isGeminiKeyContext(lines, line, fileIsGemini) {
|
|
1709
|
+
const lineText = lines[line - 1] ?? "";
|
|
1710
|
+
const keyAt = lineText.search(/AIza[\w-]{35}/);
|
|
1711
|
+
const before = keyAt === -1 ? lineText : lineText.slice(0, keyAt);
|
|
1712
|
+
if (PUBLIC_GOOGLE_KEY_NAME_RE.test(before)) return false;
|
|
1713
|
+
const from = Math.max(0, line - 4);
|
|
1714
|
+
const to = Math.min(lines.length, line + 3);
|
|
1715
|
+
for (let i = from; i < to; i++) {
|
|
1716
|
+
if (FIREBASE_CONFIG_FIELD_RE.test(lines[i])) return false;
|
|
1717
|
+
}
|
|
1718
|
+
return fileIsGemini || GEMINI_NAME_RE.test(before);
|
|
1719
|
+
}
|
|
1602
1720
|
var hardcodedSecrets = {
|
|
1603
1721
|
id: "VC001",
|
|
1604
1722
|
title: "Hardcoded API Key or Secret",
|
|
@@ -1618,8 +1736,16 @@ var hardcodedSecrets = {
|
|
|
1618
1736
|
/(?:sk_live|pk_live|sk_test|pk_test)_[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}/g,
|
|
1619
1737
|
// Supabase anon/service keys (JWT format)
|
|
1620
1738
|
/(?:supabase[_-]?(?:anon|service)[_-]?key|SUPABASE_(?:ANON|SERVICE_ROLE)_KEY)\s*[:=]\s*["'`](eyJ[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{50,})["'`]/gi,
|
|
1621
|
-
// OpenAI keys
|
|
1622
|
-
|
|
1739
|
+
// OpenAI keys. Every OpenAI secret key carries `T3BlbkFJ` (base64 of
|
|
1740
|
+
// "OpenAI") in the middle, which is what keeps this near zero false
|
|
1741
|
+
// positives. This used to be `sk-[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}T3BlbkFJ…`, the legacy
|
|
1742
|
+
// user-key shape: its character class has no `-`, so it could not get
|
|
1743
|
+
// past the second hyphen of `sk-proj-`, and every project, service
|
|
1744
|
+
// account and admin key OpenAI has issued since 2024 went unreported.
|
|
1745
|
+
// Prefixes and the `-`/`_` body follow gitleaks' openai-api-key rule.
|
|
1746
|
+
// Bounded on both sides so a hostile run of key characters cannot
|
|
1747
|
+
// backtrack a whole line.
|
|
1748
|
+
/sk-(?:(?:proj|svcacct|admin)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,80}|[A-Za-z0-9]{20,80})T3BlbkFJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,80}/g,
|
|
1623
1749
|
// Generic tokens in assignments — require standalone word and longer min length
|
|
1624
1750
|
/(?:^|[\s,({])(?:token|secret|password|passwd|pwd)\s*[:=]\s*["'`]([a-zA-Z0-9_\-!@#$%^&*]{20,})["'`]/gim,
|
|
1625
1751
|
// SCREAMING_CASE identifiers ending in SECRET/TOKEN/KEY/PASSWORD
|
|
@@ -1636,20 +1762,42 @@ var hardcodedSecrets = {
|
|
|
1636
1762
|
// Private keys
|
|
1637
1763
|
/-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |DSA )?PRIVATE KEY-----/g,
|
|
1638
1764
|
// Database URLs with credentials
|
|
1639
|
-
/(?:postgres|mysql|mongodb(?:\+srv)?):\/\/[^:]+:[^@]+@[^/\s"'`]+/gi
|
|
1765
|
+
/(?:postgres|mysql|mongodb(?:\+srv)?):\/\/[^:]+:[^@]+@[^/\s"'`]+/gi,
|
|
1766
|
+
// ── [11]–[14] Fixed-prefix AI-provider and payment keys ──
|
|
1767
|
+
// These match the token itself, so they fire whatever it is bound to:
|
|
1768
|
+
// `const k = "…"`, a positional `new OpenAI("…")`, an unquoted .env
|
|
1769
|
+
// value. The name-based patterns above only see a key that sits in a
|
|
1770
|
+
// slot called apiKey / token / *_KEY. Shapes follow gitleaks.
|
|
1771
|
+
// [11] Hugging Face user access token: `hf_` + 34 letters.
|
|
1772
|
+
/\bhf_[A-Za-z]{34}\b/g,
|
|
1773
|
+
// [12] OpenRouter: `sk-or-v1-` + 64 hex.
|
|
1774
|
+
/\bsk-or-v1-[a-f0-9]{64}\b/g,
|
|
1775
|
+
// [13] Stripe restricted key. `rk_` keys are scoped, but a live one can
|
|
1776
|
+
// still read customers or issue refunds, and [2] above only knows
|
|
1777
|
+
// `sk_`/`pk_`. No trailing anchor: Stripe keys run to ~100 characters
|
|
1778
|
+
// and the match only needs the prefix plus a real body.
|
|
1779
|
+
/\brk_(?:live|test)_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,200}/g,
|
|
1780
|
+
// [14] Google API key — reported only in a Gemini context, see
|
|
1781
|
+
// GEMINI_FILE_CONTEXT_RE. The lookahead stands in for `\b`, which the
|
|
1782
|
+
// `-` in the key alphabet would break.
|
|
1783
|
+
/AIza[\w-]{35}(?![\w-])/g
|
|
1640
1784
|
];
|
|
1641
1785
|
const fixMessages = [
|
|
1642
1786
|
"Move this API key to an environment variable. If this key has been committed, rotate it immediately \u2014 it may have already been scraped by bots.",
|
|
1643
1787
|
"AWS access key detected \u2014 may grant full account access (EC2, S3, IAM, billing). Rotate immediately in AWS Console \u2192 IAM \u2192 Security Credentials. Use IAM roles or environment variables instead.",
|
|
1644
1788
|
"Stripe key detected. sk_live_ keys can process real charges, issue refunds, and access customer payment data. sk_test_ keys are lower risk but should still not be committed. Rotate in Stripe Dashboard \u2192 Developers \u2192 API Keys.",
|
|
1645
1789
|
"Supabase key detected. Service role keys bypass Row Level Security and grant full database read/write access. Move to a server-side environment variable immediately.",
|
|
1646
|
-
"OpenAI API key detected
|
|
1790
|
+
"OpenAI API key detected (sk-proj-, sk-svcacct-, sk-admin- or a legacy sk- key). Anyone holding it can run models on your bill, and an admin key can also manage your organization's keys and members. Revoke it at platform.openai.com \u2192 API keys and load the replacement from server-side configuration. Browser code cannot keep a key secret, so browser features must reach OpenAI through your own backend.",
|
|
1647
1791
|
"Hardcoded token or password detected. Move to an environment variable and rotate the credential if it has been committed to version control.",
|
|
1648
1792
|
"Named secret constant detected (XXX_SECRET / XXX_TOKEN / XXX_KEY). If it's a real credential, move it to server-side configuration \u2014 an environment variable read by server code (`process.env.NAME` in Node) \u2014 and rotate it if this file has been committed. Code that runs in the browser can't keep a secret: everything it loads is public, and `process` doesn't exist there without a bundler, so a browser-side credential has to move behind your own server. If the value is an identifier rather than a credential (a storage key, a cookie or cache name), there is nothing to rotate.",
|
|
1649
1793
|
"Credential assigned to a config object property. Move to an environment variable \u2014 `apiKey: process.env.API_KEY` \u2014 and rotate the value if this file has been committed.",
|
|
1650
1794
|
"Hardcoded password detected in a config object. Move to an environment variable (`password: process.env.DB_PASSWORD`) and rotate the password if this file has been committed.",
|
|
1651
1795
|
"Private key found in source code. If this has been committed to version control, consider the key compromised \u2014 generate a new key pair and revoke the old one.",
|
|
1652
|
-
"Database credentials in connection string. An attacker with this URL has full database access. Move to an environment variable, restrict network access, and rotate the password."
|
|
1796
|
+
"Database credentials in connection string. An attacker with this URL has full database access. Move to an environment variable, restrict network access, and rotate the password.",
|
|
1797
|
+
"Hugging Face access token detected (hf_). Depending on its scope it can read your private models and datasets, push to your repos, and run paid Inference Endpoints. Revoke it at huggingface.co \u2192 Settings \u2192 Access Tokens and load the replacement from server-side configuration.",
|
|
1798
|
+
"OpenRouter API key detected (sk-or-v1-). It spends your OpenRouter credits on any model the account can reach. Delete it at openrouter.ai \u2192 Keys and load the replacement from server-side configuration. Browser features must reach OpenRouter through your own backend.",
|
|
1799
|
+
"Stripe restricted key detected (rk_). Whatever it was granted \u2014 reading customers, creating charges, issuing refunds \u2014 anyone with this file has too. Roll it in Stripe Dashboard \u2192 Developers \u2192 API keys and load the replacement from server-side configuration.",
|
|
1800
|
+
"Google API key in code that calls Gemini. If the Generative Language API is enabled on its project, anyone with the key can run Gemini requests billed to you. Delete or regenerate it in Google Cloud Console \u2192 APIs & Services \u2192 Credentials, and call Gemini from your own backend with a key that is not in source."
|
|
1653
1801
|
];
|
|
1654
1802
|
const minLen = [
|
|
1655
1803
|
12,
|
|
@@ -1660,8 +1808,12 @@ var hardcodedSecrets = {
|
|
|
1660
1808
|
// [2] Stripe
|
|
1661
1809
|
50,
|
|
1662
1810
|
// [3] Supabase JWT
|
|
1663
|
-
|
|
1664
|
-
//
|
|
1811
|
+
// [4] OpenAI and [11]–[14] fixed-prefix tokens: the regex already
|
|
1812
|
+
// fixes the length. The floor check reads the FIRST quoted value on the
|
|
1813
|
+
// line, which in `a = "x"; key = "sk-proj-…"` is not the token, so it
|
|
1814
|
+
// must not run for them. ([4] was 40, which the regex's minimum of 48
|
|
1815
|
+
// made redundant everywhere except that misread.)
|
|
1816
|
+
0,
|
|
1665
1817
|
20,
|
|
1666
1818
|
// [5] generic tokens with {20,} in the regex
|
|
1667
1819
|
12,
|
|
@@ -1672,18 +1824,49 @@ var hardcodedSecrets = {
|
|
|
1672
1824
|
// [8] password: "..." — lower floor per the pattern comment above
|
|
1673
1825
|
0,
|
|
1674
1826
|
// [9] private keys — no length check
|
|
1675
|
-
0
|
|
1827
|
+
0,
|
|
1676
1828
|
// [10] DB URLs — no length check
|
|
1829
|
+
0,
|
|
1830
|
+
0,
|
|
1831
|
+
0,
|
|
1832
|
+
0
|
|
1833
|
+
// [11]–[14] see [4]
|
|
1677
1834
|
];
|
|
1835
|
+
const OPENAI_PI = 4;
|
|
1836
|
+
const FIRST_TOKEN_PI = 11;
|
|
1837
|
+
const STRIPE_RESTRICTED_PI = 13;
|
|
1838
|
+
const GOOGLE_PI = 14;
|
|
1839
|
+
const lines = content.split("\n");
|
|
1840
|
+
const fileIsGemini = GEMINI_FILE_CONTEXT_RE.test(content);
|
|
1678
1841
|
const matches = [];
|
|
1679
1842
|
for (let pi = 0; pi < patterns.length; pi++) {
|
|
1680
1843
|
const pattern = patterns[pi];
|
|
1681
|
-
|
|
1844
|
+
if (pi === GOOGLE_PI && !fileIsGemini && !GEMINI_NAME_RE.test(content)) continue;
|
|
1845
|
+
const matchedText = [];
|
|
1846
|
+
const rawMatches = findMatches(content, pattern, hardcodedSecrets, filePath, (m) => {
|
|
1847
|
+
matchedText.push(m[0]);
|
|
1848
|
+
return fixMessages[pi];
|
|
1849
|
+
});
|
|
1682
1850
|
const floor = minLen[pi] ?? 12;
|
|
1683
|
-
|
|
1684
|
-
|
|
1851
|
+
const isTokenPattern = pi === OPENAI_PI || pi >= FIRST_TOKEN_PI;
|
|
1852
|
+
for (let ri = 0; ri < rawMatches.length; ri++) {
|
|
1853
|
+
const rm = rawMatches[ri];
|
|
1854
|
+
const lineText = lines[rm.line - 1] || "";
|
|
1685
1855
|
const trimmed = lineText.trimStart();
|
|
1686
1856
|
if (trimmed.startsWith("//") || trimmed.startsWith("#")) continue;
|
|
1857
|
+
if (isTokenPattern) {
|
|
1858
|
+
const token = matchedText[ri] ?? "";
|
|
1859
|
+
if (isPlaceholderToken(token)) continue;
|
|
1860
|
+
if (pi === GOOGLE_PI) {
|
|
1861
|
+
if (!isGeminiKeyContext(lines, rm.line, fileIsGemini)) continue;
|
|
1862
|
+
matches.push({ ...rm, severity: "high" });
|
|
1863
|
+
continue;
|
|
1864
|
+
}
|
|
1865
|
+
if (pi === STRIPE_RESTRICTED_PI && !token.startsWith("rk_live_")) {
|
|
1866
|
+
matches.push({ ...rm, severity: "high" });
|
|
1867
|
+
continue;
|
|
1868
|
+
}
|
|
1869
|
+
}
|
|
1687
1870
|
if (floor > 0) {
|
|
1688
1871
|
const secretMatch = lineText.match(/[:=]\s*["'`]([^"'`]*)["'`]/);
|
|
1689
1872
|
if (secretMatch && secretMatch[1].length < floor) continue;
|
|
@@ -1800,6 +1983,323 @@ function stripCorsHeaderList(codeOnly) {
|
|
|
1800
1983
|
""
|
|
1801
1984
|
);
|
|
1802
1985
|
}
|
|
1986
|
+
function blankKeepLines(s) {
|
|
1987
|
+
return s.replace(/[^\n]/g, " ");
|
|
1988
|
+
}
|
|
1989
|
+
function closingBrace(text, open, limit) {
|
|
1990
|
+
let depth = 0;
|
|
1991
|
+
const end = Math.min(text.length, open + limit);
|
|
1992
|
+
for (let i = open; i < end; i++) {
|
|
1993
|
+
const c = text.charCodeAt(i);
|
|
1994
|
+
if (c === 34 || c === 39) {
|
|
1995
|
+
let j = i + 1;
|
|
1996
|
+
while (j < end) {
|
|
1997
|
+
const d = text.charCodeAt(j);
|
|
1998
|
+
if (d === 92) {
|
|
1999
|
+
j += 2;
|
|
2000
|
+
continue;
|
|
2001
|
+
}
|
|
2002
|
+
if (d === c || d === 10) break;
|
|
2003
|
+
j++;
|
|
2004
|
+
}
|
|
2005
|
+
i = j;
|
|
2006
|
+
continue;
|
|
2007
|
+
}
|
|
2008
|
+
if (c === 123) depth++;
|
|
2009
|
+
else if (c === 125) {
|
|
2010
|
+
depth--;
|
|
2011
|
+
if (depth === 0) return i;
|
|
2012
|
+
}
|
|
2013
|
+
}
|
|
2014
|
+
return -1;
|
|
2015
|
+
}
|
|
2016
|
+
var INBOUND_CREDENTIAL_READ_RE = /\b(?:req|request|c\.req|ctx\.request|event)\s*\.\s*headers?\b|\.headers\s*\.\s*get\s*\(|\bget(?:Request)?Header\s*\(|\bauth(?:orization)?Header\b/i;
|
|
2017
|
+
function forwardsCallerCredential(headersInner, readsCaller) {
|
|
2018
|
+
const CRED_ENTRY_RE = /["']?(?:authorization|x-api-key|api-key|apikey|x-auth-token|x-access-token|cookie)["']?\s*:\s*([^,\n}]{0,300})/gi;
|
|
2019
|
+
let e;
|
|
2020
|
+
while ((e = CRED_ENTRY_RE.exec(headersInner)) !== null) {
|
|
2021
|
+
const value = e[1].replace(/process\.env\.\w{1,80}|import\.meta\.env\.\w{1,80}|Deno\.env\.get\([^)]{0,80}\)|\benv\.\w{1,80}/g, "");
|
|
2022
|
+
if (/\b(?:token|accessToken|access_token|idToken|id_token|authToken|userToken|bearerToken|jwt|session|cookies?)\b/i.test(value)) {
|
|
2023
|
+
return true;
|
|
2024
|
+
}
|
|
2025
|
+
if (readsCaller?.(value)) return true;
|
|
2026
|
+
}
|
|
2027
|
+
return false;
|
|
2028
|
+
}
|
|
2029
|
+
var INBOUND_REQUEST_READ_RE = /\b(?:req|request|c\.req|ctx\.req(?:uest)?|event)\s*\.\s*(?:headers?|cookies|body|json|text|formData|query|params)\b|\bcookies\s*\(\s*\)|\bheaders\s*\(\s*\)\s*\.\s*get\b|\b\w{0,40}[Cc]ookies?\w{0,20}\s*(?:\.\s*get\s*\(|\[)|\bget(?:Request)?(?:Header|Cookie)s?\s*\(|[\w$]\s*\(\s*(?:req|request|ctx|event)\s*[,)]/;
|
|
2030
|
+
var BINDING_RE = /\b(?:const|let|var)\s+(?:([A-Za-z_$][\w$]{0,60})|\{([^{}]{0,400})\})\s*(?::[^=\n]{0,120})?=(?![=>])\s*([^;\n]{0,300})/g;
|
|
2031
|
+
var MAX_BINDINGS = 4096;
|
|
2032
|
+
function collectBindings(code) {
|
|
2033
|
+
const byName = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
|
|
2034
|
+
const add = (name, at, rhs) => {
|
|
2035
|
+
const list = byName.get(name);
|
|
2036
|
+
if (list) list.push({ at, rhs });
|
|
2037
|
+
else byName.set(name, [{ at, rhs }]);
|
|
2038
|
+
};
|
|
2039
|
+
let count = 0;
|
|
2040
|
+
let b;
|
|
2041
|
+
BINDING_RE.lastIndex = 0;
|
|
2042
|
+
while ((b = BINDING_RE.exec(code)) !== null && count < MAX_BINDINGS) {
|
|
2043
|
+
count++;
|
|
2044
|
+
if (b[1]) {
|
|
2045
|
+
add(b[1], b.index, b[3]);
|
|
2046
|
+
continue;
|
|
2047
|
+
}
|
|
2048
|
+
for (const part of b[2].split(",")) {
|
|
2049
|
+
const local = part.replace(/=[^]*$/, "").replace(/^[^:]*:/, "").trim().replace(/^\.\.\./, "");
|
|
2050
|
+
if (/^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]{0,60}$/.test(local)) add(local, b.index, b[3]);
|
|
2051
|
+
}
|
|
2052
|
+
}
|
|
2053
|
+
return byName;
|
|
2054
|
+
}
|
|
2055
|
+
function credentialValueReadsCaller(value, at, bindings) {
|
|
2056
|
+
if (INBOUND_CREDENTIAL_READ_RE.test(value) || INBOUND_REQUEST_READ_RE.test(value)) return true;
|
|
2057
|
+
const roots = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
|
|
2058
|
+
const INTERP_RE = /\$\{\s*([A-Za-z_$][\w$]{0,60})/g;
|
|
2059
|
+
const ROOT_RE = /(?<![\w$.])[A-Za-z_$][\w$]{0,60}/g;
|
|
2060
|
+
let r;
|
|
2061
|
+
while ((r = INTERP_RE.exec(value)) !== null && roots.size < 6) roots.add(r[1]);
|
|
2062
|
+
const bare = value.replace(/"[^"\n]{0,300}"|'[^'\n]{0,300}'|`[^`]{0,300}(?:`|$)/g, " ");
|
|
2063
|
+
while ((r = ROOT_RE.exec(bare)) !== null && roots.size < 6) roots.add(r[0]);
|
|
2064
|
+
for (const name of roots) {
|
|
2065
|
+
const list = bindings().get(name);
|
|
2066
|
+
if (!list || list[0].at >= at) continue;
|
|
2067
|
+
let lo = 0;
|
|
2068
|
+
let hi = list.length - 1;
|
|
2069
|
+
while (lo < hi) {
|
|
2070
|
+
const mid = lo + hi + 1 >> 1;
|
|
2071
|
+
if (list[mid].at < at) lo = mid;
|
|
2072
|
+
else hi = mid - 1;
|
|
2073
|
+
}
|
|
2074
|
+
if (INBOUND_REQUEST_READ_RE.test(list[lo].rhs)) return true;
|
|
2075
|
+
}
|
|
2076
|
+
return false;
|
|
2077
|
+
}
|
|
2078
|
+
function maskOutboundAuthNoise(code) {
|
|
2079
|
+
let out = code.replace(
|
|
2080
|
+
/(["']?)role\1\s{0,20}:\s{0,20}["'](?:user|assistant|system|developer|tool|model|function)["']/g,
|
|
2081
|
+
blankKeepLines
|
|
2082
|
+
);
|
|
2083
|
+
if (/["'`]assistant["'`]/.test(out)) {
|
|
2084
|
+
out = out.replace(/["'`](?:user|assistant|system|developer|tool)["'`]/g, blankKeepLines);
|
|
2085
|
+
}
|
|
2086
|
+
const envNames = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
|
|
2087
|
+
const ENV_BIND_RE = /\b(?:const|let|var)\s+([A-Za-z_$][\w$]{0,60})\s*(?::[^=\n]{0,60})?=\s*(?:Deno\.env\.get\s*\(|process\.env\b|import\.meta\.env\b)/g;
|
|
2088
|
+
let b;
|
|
2089
|
+
while ((b = ENV_BIND_RE.exec(out)) !== null && envNames.size < 32) {
|
|
2090
|
+
if (!/secret|webhook|signing|cron|internal|admin|password|passwd/i.test(b[1])) envNames.add(b[1]);
|
|
2091
|
+
}
|
|
2092
|
+
if (envNames.size > 0) {
|
|
2093
|
+
const names = [...envNames].map((n) => n.replace(/\$/g, "\\$")).join("|");
|
|
2094
|
+
out = out.replace(new RegExp(`(?<![\\w$.])(?:${names})(?![\\w$])`, "g"), blankKeepLines);
|
|
2095
|
+
}
|
|
2096
|
+
out = out.replace(
|
|
2097
|
+
/\bapi_?key["']?\s{0,20}:\s{0,20}(?:process\.env\.\w{1,80}|Deno\.env\.get\(\s*["'][\w-]{1,80}["']\s*\)|import\.meta\.env\.\w{1,80}|[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]{2,79}\b)/gi,
|
|
2098
|
+
blankKeepLines
|
|
2099
|
+
);
|
|
2100
|
+
let bindingMap = null;
|
|
2101
|
+
const bindingSource = out;
|
|
2102
|
+
const bindings = () => bindingMap ??= collectBindings(bindingSource);
|
|
2103
|
+
out = out.replace(
|
|
2104
|
+
/\b\w{0,40}[Hh]eaders\s*\.\s*(?:set|append)\s*\(\s*["'](?:authorization|x-api-key|api-key|x-goog-api-key)["']\s*,([^\n]{0,300})/gi,
|
|
2105
|
+
(call, value, at) => credentialValueReadsCaller(value, at, bindings) ? call : blankKeepLines(call)
|
|
2106
|
+
);
|
|
2107
|
+
const OPEN_RE = /\b(?:headers\s*[:=]|new\s+Headers\s*\()\s*\{/g;
|
|
2108
|
+
const MAX_OBJECTS = 64;
|
|
2109
|
+
const MAX_OBJECT_LEN = 3e3;
|
|
2110
|
+
let examined = 0;
|
|
2111
|
+
let m;
|
|
2112
|
+
const parts = [];
|
|
2113
|
+
let copied = 0;
|
|
2114
|
+
while ((m = OPEN_RE.exec(out)) !== null) {
|
|
2115
|
+
if (++examined > MAX_OBJECTS) break;
|
|
2116
|
+
const open = m.index + m[0].length - 1;
|
|
2117
|
+
const close = closingBrace(out, open, MAX_OBJECT_LEN);
|
|
2118
|
+
if (close === -1) continue;
|
|
2119
|
+
const inner = out.slice(open + 1, close);
|
|
2120
|
+
const readsCaller = (value) => credentialValueReadsCaller(value, open, bindings);
|
|
2121
|
+
if (!INBOUND_CREDENTIAL_READ_RE.test(inner) && !forwardsCallerCredential(inner, readsCaller)) {
|
|
2122
|
+
parts.push(out.slice(copied, open + 1), blankKeepLines(inner));
|
|
2123
|
+
copied = close;
|
|
2124
|
+
}
|
|
2125
|
+
OPEN_RE.lastIndex = close + 1;
|
|
2126
|
+
}
|
|
2127
|
+
if (parts.length === 0) return out;
|
|
2128
|
+
parts.push(out.slice(copied));
|
|
2129
|
+
return parts.join("");
|
|
2130
|
+
}
|
|
2131
|
+
function maskProseStrings(code) {
|
|
2132
|
+
return code.replace(
|
|
2133
|
+
/(?<!\\)"(?:[^"\\\n]|\\.){0,2000}"|(?<!\\)'(?:[^'\\\n]|\\.){0,2000}'|(?<!\\)`(?:[^`\\]|\\.){0,8000}`/g,
|
|
2134
|
+
(lit) => /\S\s+\S+\s+\S+\s+\S/.test(lit) ? blankKeepLines(lit) : lit
|
|
2135
|
+
);
|
|
2136
|
+
}
|
|
2137
|
+
var TANSTACK_START_IMPORT_RE = /["']@tanstack\/(?:(?:react|solid)-)?start(?:\/[\w-]{1,40})?["']/;
|
|
2138
|
+
var TANSTACK_ROUTER_IMPORT_RE = /["']@tanstack\/(?:react|solid)-router["']/;
|
|
2139
|
+
var TANSTACK_AUTH_MIDDLEWARE_RE = /\bmiddleware\s*[:(]\s*\[([^\]]{0,600})\]/g;
|
|
2140
|
+
var AUTH_MIDDLEWARE_NAME_RE = /auth|session|protect|require|guard|user|admin|clerk|signed|logged|login|member|owner|role|permission/i;
|
|
2141
|
+
var TANSTACK_HANDLER_AUTH_RE = [
|
|
2142
|
+
/\bget(?:User|Claims|Session|ServerSession|Auth|Token)\s*\(/,
|
|
2143
|
+
/\bget(?:Authed|Authenticated|Current|Signed\w{0,8}|Logged\w{0,8}|Session)\w{0,30}\s*\(/,
|
|
2144
|
+
/\bcurrentUser\b/,
|
|
2145
|
+
/\buse\w{0,30}Session\s*\(/,
|
|
2146
|
+
/\b(?:check|verify|require|assert|ensure|validate)\w{0,30}(?:Auth|Admin|Session|User|Password|Token|Role|Owner|Permission|Access|Signature|Secret|Member)\w{0,30}\s*\(/i,
|
|
2147
|
+
// `requireX()` / `assertX()` / `ensureX()` / `authorizeX()` is the
|
|
2148
|
+
// near-universal spelling of a bespoke gate — tanstack.com's own
|
|
2149
|
+
// `requireModerateShowcases()`, `requireCaller()`. Suppression only.
|
|
2150
|
+
/\b(?:require|assert|ensure|guard|protect|authori[sz]e)[A-Z]\w{0,40}\s*\(/,
|
|
2151
|
+
/\b(?:can|has)(?:Permission|Access|Role|Capability|Scope)\w{0,30}\s*\(/,
|
|
2152
|
+
/\bisAuthenticated\b/,
|
|
2153
|
+
/\bauth\s*\(\s*\)/,
|
|
2154
|
+
/\bauth\s*\.\s*api\s*\.\s*getSession\b/,
|
|
2155
|
+
/\.auth\s*\.\s*(?:getUser|getClaims|getSession)\b/,
|
|
2156
|
+
/\bcontext\s*\.\s*(?:user|userId|session|auth|claims|supabase)\b/,
|
|
2157
|
+
/\b(?:jwt\.verify|jwtVerify|verifyIdToken|verifyToken|timingSafeEqual|constructEvent\w{0,20}|createHmac)\s*\(/,
|
|
2158
|
+
/\bstatus(?:Code)?\s*[:(]\s*401\b/,
|
|
2159
|
+
/\bunauthori[sz]ed\b/i,
|
|
2160
|
+
/\bnot\s+(?:authenticated|authori[sz]ed|logged\s+in|signed\s+in)\b/i,
|
|
2161
|
+
// Reads the caller's credential. Forwarding it to a row-level-security
|
|
2162
|
+
// client scopes every query to the caller, which is the safe Supabase shape.
|
|
2163
|
+
/\bauthorization\b/i,
|
|
2164
|
+
// A capability-token lookup: the row is found by an unguessable value the
|
|
2165
|
+
// caller holds (`.eq("token", data.token)`, `.eq("id", body.session_id)`).
|
|
2166
|
+
// Share links, anonymous votes, guest chat sessions — the token in the
|
|
2167
|
+
// request IS the credential, the same family VC003 already accepts via a
|
|
2168
|
+
// 401 on the Next.js shapes. Calibration: every such handler in the sample
|
|
2169
|
+
// was public by design.
|
|
2170
|
+
/\.(?:eq|match)\(\s*["'`]\w{0,40}(?:token|secret|code|hash|key)["'`]/i,
|
|
2171
|
+
/\.eq\(\s*["'`]\w{1,40}["'`]\s*,\s*[\w$.]{0,60}(?:[Tt]oken|[Ss]ession_?(?:[Ii]d|[Kk]ey)|[Ss]ecret|[Hh]ash)\b/,
|
|
2172
|
+
// A shared-secret comparison (`data.password !== process.env.ADMIN_PASSWORD`).
|
|
2173
|
+
/[!=]==?\s*(?:process\.env\.|import\.meta\.env\.|Deno\.env\.get\(\s*["']|\w{1,40}\.){0,2}\w{0,40}(?:SECRET|PASSWORD|Secret|Password|secret|password)\w{0,20}/
|
|
2174
|
+
];
|
|
2175
|
+
var TANSTACK_MUTATION_RE = [
|
|
2176
|
+
// Supabase: .from("orders").update(…) / .upsert(…) / .delete()
|
|
2177
|
+
/\.from\(\s*["'`][\w.-]{1,64}["'`]\s*\)\s*\.\s*(?:update|upsert|delete)\s*\(/,
|
|
2178
|
+
// Supabase admin auth API: listUsers, deleteUser, updateUserById, …
|
|
2179
|
+
/\.auth\s*\.\s*admin\s*\.\s*\w{1,40}\s*\(/,
|
|
2180
|
+
// Prisma: prisma.order.delete(…), db.user.updateMany(…)
|
|
2181
|
+
/\b(?:prisma|db|tx)\s*\.\s*\w{1,64}\s*\.\s*(?:update|upsert|delete|updateMany|deleteMany)\s*\(/,
|
|
2182
|
+
// Drizzle: db.update(orders) / db.delete(orders)
|
|
2183
|
+
/\b(?:db|tx)\s*\.\s*(?:update|delete)\s*\(\s*\w/,
|
|
2184
|
+
// Firestore admin: .doc(id).update(…) / .delete()
|
|
2185
|
+
/\.doc\([^()\n]{0,200}\)\s*\.\s*(?:update|delete|set)\s*\(/,
|
|
2186
|
+
// Raw SQL
|
|
2187
|
+
/\b(?:UPDATE\s+["`]?\w{1,64}["`]?\s+SET|DELETE\s+FROM)\b/
|
|
2188
|
+
];
|
|
2189
|
+
var SUPABASE_WRITE_TABLE_RE = /\.from\(\s*["'`]([\w.-]{1,64})["'`]\s*\)\s*\.\s*(?:update|upsert|delete)\s*\(/g;
|
|
2190
|
+
var ANALYTICS_TABLE_RE = /(?:^|[_.-])(?:page_?views?|views?|visits?|visitors?|analytics?|tracking|clicks?|impressions?|heartbeats?|presence|metrics?|stats?|counters?)(?:[_.-]|$)/i;
|
|
2191
|
+
var TANSTACK_PUBLIC_FN_NAME_RE = /^(?:sign[-_]?(?:in|up|out)|log[-_]?(?:in|out)|register|reset|forgot|verify|confirm|accept[-_]?invite|redeem|callback|oauth|magic|otp|request(?:Password|Magic|Otp|Reset|Access)|track|record(?:View|Visit|Click|Event|Impression)|log(?:View|Visit|Event|Click)|increment|bump|count(?:View|Visit|Click)|subscribe|unsubscribe|join(?:Waitlist|Newsletter)|submit(?:Contact|Lead|Feedback|Inquiry|Enquiry|Waitlist|Newsletter))/i;
|
|
2192
|
+
var TANSTACK_PUBLIC_ROUTE_PATH_RE = /(^|[/_.[-])(auth|login|signin|sign-in|signup|sign-up|register|logout|signout|sign-out|callback|oauth|sso|session|reset-password|forgot-password|forgot|magic-?link|verify-?email|confirm|otp|invite|token|webhooks?|cron|health(?:z|check)?|sitemap|robots|og)([/\]_.-]|$)/i;
|
|
2193
|
+
function closingParen(text, open, limit) {
|
|
2194
|
+
let depth = 0;
|
|
2195
|
+
const end = Math.min(text.length, limit);
|
|
2196
|
+
for (let i = open; i < end; i++) {
|
|
2197
|
+
const c = text.charCodeAt(i);
|
|
2198
|
+
if (c === 34 || c === 39 || c === 96) {
|
|
2199
|
+
let j = i + 1;
|
|
2200
|
+
while (j < end) {
|
|
2201
|
+
const d = text.charCodeAt(j);
|
|
2202
|
+
if (d === 92) {
|
|
2203
|
+
j += 2;
|
|
2204
|
+
continue;
|
|
2205
|
+
}
|
|
2206
|
+
if (d === c || c !== 96 && d === 10) break;
|
|
2207
|
+
j++;
|
|
2208
|
+
}
|
|
2209
|
+
i = j;
|
|
2210
|
+
continue;
|
|
2211
|
+
}
|
|
2212
|
+
if (c === 40) depth++;
|
|
2213
|
+
else if (c === 41) {
|
|
2214
|
+
depth--;
|
|
2215
|
+
if (depth === 0) return i;
|
|
2216
|
+
}
|
|
2217
|
+
}
|
|
2218
|
+
return -1;
|
|
2219
|
+
}
|
|
2220
|
+
function hasAuthMiddleware(text) {
|
|
2221
|
+
TANSTACK_AUTH_MIDDLEWARE_RE.lastIndex = 0;
|
|
2222
|
+
let m;
|
|
2223
|
+
while ((m = TANSTACK_AUTH_MIDDLEWARE_RE.exec(text)) !== null) {
|
|
2224
|
+
if (AUTH_MIDDLEWARE_NAME_RE.test(m[1])) return true;
|
|
2225
|
+
}
|
|
2226
|
+
return false;
|
|
2227
|
+
}
|
|
2228
|
+
function unauthenticatedTanStackHandlers(masked, filePath) {
|
|
2229
|
+
const isStart = TANSTACK_START_IMPORT_RE.test(masked);
|
|
2230
|
+
const hasServerFn = /\bcreateServerFn\s*\(/.test(masked);
|
|
2231
|
+
const hasServerRoute = /\bcreateServerFileRoute\s*\(|\bcreateAPIFileRoute\s*\(/.test(masked) || /\bserver\s*:\s*\{/.test(masked) && /\bhandlers\s*:/.test(masked);
|
|
2232
|
+
if (!hasServerFn && !hasServerRoute) return [];
|
|
2233
|
+
if (!isStart && !(hasServerRoute && TANSTACK_ROUTER_IMPORT_RE.test(masked))) return [];
|
|
2234
|
+
if (TANSTACK_PUBLIC_ROUTE_PATH_RE.test(filePath)) return [];
|
|
2235
|
+
const hits = [];
|
|
2236
|
+
const touchesData = (body) => {
|
|
2237
|
+
const supabaseWrites = [...body.matchAll(SUPABASE_WRITE_TABLE_RE)].map((w) => w[1]);
|
|
2238
|
+
const otherWrites = TANSTACK_MUTATION_RE.slice(1).some((p) => p.test(body));
|
|
2239
|
+
if (otherWrites) return true;
|
|
2240
|
+
return supabaseWrites.some((t) => !ANALYTICS_TABLE_RE.test(t));
|
|
2241
|
+
};
|
|
2242
|
+
const establishesCaller = (body) => hasAuthMiddleware(body) || TANSTACK_HANDLER_AUTH_RE.some((p) => p.test(body));
|
|
2243
|
+
if (hasServerFn) {
|
|
2244
|
+
const starts = [];
|
|
2245
|
+
const FN_RE = /\bcreateServerFn\s*\(/g;
|
|
2246
|
+
let m;
|
|
2247
|
+
while ((m = FN_RE.exec(masked)) !== null && starts.length < 500) starts.push(m.index);
|
|
2248
|
+
for (let k = 0; k < starts.length; k++) {
|
|
2249
|
+
const start = starts[k];
|
|
2250
|
+
const limit = k + 1 < starts.length ? starts[k + 1] : Math.min(masked.length, start + 4e4);
|
|
2251
|
+
const h = /\.handler\s*\(/.exec(masked.slice(start, limit));
|
|
2252
|
+
if (!h) continue;
|
|
2253
|
+
const open = start + h.index + h[0].length - 1;
|
|
2254
|
+
const close = closingParen(masked, open, limit);
|
|
2255
|
+
const chain = masked.slice(start, close === -1 ? limit : close + 1);
|
|
2256
|
+
const header = masked.slice(start, open);
|
|
2257
|
+
const body = masked.slice(open, close === -1 ? limit : close + 1);
|
|
2258
|
+
const before = masked.slice(Math.max(0, start - 120), start);
|
|
2259
|
+
const nameMatch = before.match(/\b(?:const|let|var)\s+(\w{1,80})\s*(?::[^=\n]{0,80})?=\s*$/);
|
|
2260
|
+
if (nameMatch && TANSTACK_PUBLIC_FN_NAME_RE.test(nameMatch[1])) continue;
|
|
2261
|
+
if (hasAuthMiddleware(header)) continue;
|
|
2262
|
+
if (!touchesData(body)) continue;
|
|
2263
|
+
if (establishesCaller(chain)) continue;
|
|
2264
|
+
hits.push(nameMatch && nameMatch.index !== void 0 ? start - before.length + nameMatch.index : start);
|
|
2265
|
+
if (hits.length >= 50) return hits;
|
|
2266
|
+
}
|
|
2267
|
+
}
|
|
2268
|
+
if (hasServerRoute) {
|
|
2269
|
+
const serverBlock = /\bserver\s*:\s*\{/.exec(masked);
|
|
2270
|
+
const routeLevelAuth = serverBlock !== null && (() => {
|
|
2271
|
+
const close = closingBrace(masked, serverBlock.index + serverBlock[0].length - 1, 6e4);
|
|
2272
|
+
const block = masked.slice(serverBlock.index, close === -1 ? masked.length : close);
|
|
2273
|
+
const handlersAt = block.search(/\bhandlers\s*:/);
|
|
2274
|
+
return hasAuthMiddleware(handlersAt === -1 ? block : block.slice(0, handlersAt));
|
|
2275
|
+
})();
|
|
2276
|
+
if (!routeLevelAuth) {
|
|
2277
|
+
const METHOD_RE = /\b(GET|POST|PUT|PATCH|DELETE)\s*:\s*(?:async\s+)?(?:\(|function\b|\{|[A-Za-z_$][\w$]{0,40}\s*=>)/g;
|
|
2278
|
+
const methodStarts = [];
|
|
2279
|
+
let m;
|
|
2280
|
+
while ((m = METHOD_RE.exec(masked)) !== null && methodStarts.length < 200) methodStarts.push(m.index);
|
|
2281
|
+
for (let k = 0; k < methodStarts.length; k++) {
|
|
2282
|
+
const start = methodStarts[k];
|
|
2283
|
+
const limit = k + 1 < methodStarts.length ? methodStarts[k + 1] : Math.min(masked.length, start + 4e4);
|
|
2284
|
+
const head = masked.slice(start, Math.min(limit, start + 400));
|
|
2285
|
+
const opener = /^\w+\s*:\s*\{/.exec(head) ?? /=>\s*\{/.exec(head) ?? /\)\s*\{/.exec(head);
|
|
2286
|
+
let body;
|
|
2287
|
+
if (opener) {
|
|
2288
|
+
const braceAt = start + opener.index + opener[0].length - 1;
|
|
2289
|
+
const close = closingBrace(masked, braceAt, limit - braceAt);
|
|
2290
|
+
body = masked.slice(start, close === -1 ? limit : close + 1);
|
|
2291
|
+
} else {
|
|
2292
|
+
body = masked.slice(start, limit);
|
|
2293
|
+
}
|
|
2294
|
+
if (!touchesData(body)) continue;
|
|
2295
|
+
if (establishesCaller(body)) continue;
|
|
2296
|
+
hits.push(start);
|
|
2297
|
+
if (hits.length >= 50) return hits;
|
|
2298
|
+
}
|
|
2299
|
+
}
|
|
2300
|
+
}
|
|
2301
|
+
return hits;
|
|
2302
|
+
}
|
|
1803
2303
|
var missingAuthMiddleware = {
|
|
1804
2304
|
id: "VC003",
|
|
1805
2305
|
title: "API Route Missing Authentication",
|
|
@@ -1807,7 +2307,9 @@ var missingAuthMiddleware = {
|
|
|
1807
2307
|
category: "Authentication",
|
|
1808
2308
|
description: "API routes without authentication checks allow unauthorized access.",
|
|
1809
2309
|
check(content, filePath, project) {
|
|
1810
|
-
|
|
2310
|
+
const serverSide = isServerSideFile(filePath, content);
|
|
2311
|
+
const tanstackCandidate = !serverSide && !isTestFile(filePath) && /@tanstack\/(?:(?:react|solid)-)?(?:start|router)\b/.test(content);
|
|
2312
|
+
if (!serverSide && !tanstackCandidate) return [];
|
|
1811
2313
|
if (PUBLIC_BY_CONVENTION_ROUTE.test(routeSegmentName(filePath))) return [];
|
|
1812
2314
|
const routePatterns = [
|
|
1813
2315
|
// Express/Hono style
|
|
@@ -1823,7 +2325,7 @@ var missingAuthMiddleware = {
|
|
|
1823
2325
|
/module\.exports\s*=\s*(?:async\s+)?(?:function\b|\()/g
|
|
1824
2326
|
);
|
|
1825
2327
|
}
|
|
1826
|
-
if (
|
|
2328
|
+
if (USE_SERVER_DIRECTIVE_RE.test(content)) {
|
|
1827
2329
|
routePatterns.push(
|
|
1828
2330
|
/export\s+(?:async\s+)?function\s+\w+\s*\(/g,
|
|
1829
2331
|
/export\s+const\s+\w+\s*(?::[^=\n]{0,120})?=\s*(?:async\s*)?\(/g
|
|
@@ -1847,7 +2349,7 @@ var missingAuthMiddleware = {
|
|
|
1847
2349
|
if (isAuthRoute) return [];
|
|
1848
2350
|
const isWebhookRoute = /\/webhook/i.test(filePath) || /(?:^|[/_-])webhooks?(?:[/_.-]|$)/i.test(filePath);
|
|
1849
2351
|
if (isWebhookRoute) return [];
|
|
1850
|
-
const codeOnly = content
|
|
2352
|
+
const codeOnly = replaceBlockComments(content, () => "").replace(/(^|[^:])\/\/.*$/gm, "$1").replace(/^[ \t\uFEFF]*#.*$/gm, "");
|
|
1851
2353
|
const authPatterns = [
|
|
1852
2354
|
/\bgetUser\b/i,
|
|
1853
2355
|
/\bcurrentUser\b/i,
|
|
@@ -1863,6 +2365,13 @@ var missingAuthMiddleware = {
|
|
|
1863
2365
|
/\bcheckApiKey\b/i,
|
|
1864
2366
|
/\bverifyCronSecret\b/i,
|
|
1865
2367
|
/\bverifySecret\b/i,
|
|
2368
|
+
// Signed-request receivers: `await verifyQstashSignature({ req, rawBody })`,
|
|
2369
|
+
// `verifyWebhookSignature(…)`, Upstash's `receiver.verify({ signature,
|
|
2370
|
+
// body })`. Since outbound headers are masked, a route that relied on
|
|
2371
|
+
// its own outbound `Bearer ${key}` to pass no longer does, and these
|
|
2372
|
+
// are what actually authenticate it.
|
|
2373
|
+
/\bverify\w{0,20}Signature\w{0,20}\s*\(/i,
|
|
2374
|
+
/\b\w{0,30}[Rr]eceiver\s*\.\s*verify\s*\(/,
|
|
1866
2375
|
/supabase\.auth/i,
|
|
1867
2376
|
/firebase\.auth/i,
|
|
1868
2377
|
/\bclerk\b/i,
|
|
@@ -1901,16 +2410,17 @@ var missingAuthMiddleware = {
|
|
|
1901
2410
|
const handlerAuthPatterns = authPatterns.filter(
|
|
1902
2411
|
(p) => !APP_LEVEL_AUTH.some((a) => a.source === p.source)
|
|
1903
2412
|
);
|
|
1904
|
-
const maskedForScope = maskComments(content);
|
|
2413
|
+
const maskedForScope = maskOutboundAuthNoise(maskComments(content));
|
|
2414
|
+
const codeForAuth = maskOutboundAuthNoise(codeOnly);
|
|
1905
2415
|
const handlerHasAuth = (index) => {
|
|
1906
2416
|
const bodyStart = maskedForScope.indexOf("{", index);
|
|
1907
2417
|
const probe = bodyStart === -1 ? index : bodyStart + 1;
|
|
1908
2418
|
const scope = enclosingHandler(maskedForScope, probe);
|
|
1909
|
-
if (scope === null) return handlerAuthPatterns.some((p) => p.test(
|
|
2419
|
+
if (scope === null) return handlerAuthPatterns.some((p) => p.test(codeForAuth));
|
|
1910
2420
|
return handlerAuthPatterns.some((p) => p.test(scope));
|
|
1911
2421
|
};
|
|
1912
2422
|
const matches = [];
|
|
1913
|
-
for (const pattern of routePatterns) {
|
|
2423
|
+
for (const pattern of serverSide ? routePatterns : []) {
|
|
1914
2424
|
matches.push(
|
|
1915
2425
|
...findMatches(
|
|
1916
2426
|
content,
|
|
@@ -1921,11 +2431,11 @@ var missingAuthMiddleware = {
|
|
|
1921
2431
|
)
|
|
1922
2432
|
);
|
|
1923
2433
|
}
|
|
1924
|
-
if (matches.length === 0 && SUPABASE_EDGE_FN_RE.test(filePath) && isDenoEdgeEntry(codeOnly) && !isPublicByDesignEdgePath(filePath)) {
|
|
2434
|
+
if (matches.length === 0 && serverSide && SUPABASE_EDGE_FN_RE.test(filePath) && isDenoEdgeEntry(codeOnly) && !isPublicByDesignEdgePath(filePath)) {
|
|
1925
2435
|
const fnName = supabaseFunctionName(filePath);
|
|
1926
2436
|
const verifyJwt = fnName && project?.supabaseEdgeVerifyJwt ? project.supabaseEdgeVerifyJwt.get(fnName) : void 0;
|
|
1927
2437
|
if (verifyJwt !== true) {
|
|
1928
|
-
const withoutCors = stripCorsHeaderList(codeOnly);
|
|
2438
|
+
const withoutCors = maskProseStrings(maskOutboundAuthNoise(stripCorsHeaderList(codeOnly)));
|
|
1929
2439
|
const hasWeakHint = verifyJwt === false ? false : EDGE_WEAK_AUTH_HINTS.some((p) => p.test(withoutCors));
|
|
1930
2440
|
if (!hasWeakHint) {
|
|
1931
2441
|
matches.push(
|
|
@@ -1946,6 +2456,21 @@ var missingAuthMiddleware = {
|
|
|
1946
2456
|
}
|
|
1947
2457
|
const indexOfLine = (line) => lineStarts[Math.max(0, Math.min(line - 1, lineStarts.length - 1))];
|
|
1948
2458
|
const unauthenticated = matches.filter((m) => !handlerHasAuth(indexOfLine(m.line)));
|
|
2459
|
+
if (serverSide || tanstackCandidate) {
|
|
2460
|
+
for (const idx of unauthenticatedTanStackHandlers(maskedForScope, filePath)) {
|
|
2461
|
+
const line = lineNumberAt(content, idx);
|
|
2462
|
+
unauthenticated.push({
|
|
2463
|
+
rule: "VC003",
|
|
2464
|
+
title: missingAuthMiddleware.title,
|
|
2465
|
+
severity: "high",
|
|
2466
|
+
category: missingAuthMiddleware.category,
|
|
2467
|
+
file: filePath,
|
|
2468
|
+
line,
|
|
2469
|
+
snippet: getSnippet(content, line),
|
|
2470
|
+
fix: "This TanStack Start handler changes data and is callable by anyone who can reach the app: server functions and server routes are public endpoints, and a route's beforeLoad guard does not protect them. Attach an auth middleware (`.middleware([requireSupabaseAuth])` in Lovable projects) and scope the write to the caller (`context.userId`), or verify the caller inside the handler and return 401. If it is public by design, add an inline `// VC003-OK: <reason>` comment above it."
|
|
2471
|
+
});
|
|
2472
|
+
}
|
|
2473
|
+
}
|
|
1949
2474
|
return filterSilenced(unauthenticated, content, "VC003");
|
|
1950
2475
|
}
|
|
1951
2476
|
};
|
|
@@ -2316,35 +2841,61 @@ var clientSideAuth = {
|
|
|
2316
2841
|
return matches;
|
|
2317
2842
|
}
|
|
2318
2843
|
};
|
|
2844
|
+
var PUBLIC_ENV_FIX = {
|
|
2845
|
+
NEXT_PUBLIC_: "Remove the NEXT_PUBLIC_ prefix. Only use NEXT_PUBLIC_ for values safe to expose in the browser.",
|
|
2846
|
+
VITE_: "Vite inlines every VITE_ variable that client code reads into the JavaScript bundle each visitor downloads. Rename it without the VITE_ prefix and use it only in server code \u2014 an API route or edge function that makes the call for the browser \u2014 then rotate the key if a build has been deployed.",
|
|
2847
|
+
REACT_APP_: "Create React App inlines every REACT_APP_ variable into the JavaScript bundle each visitor downloads. Rename it without the REACT_APP_ prefix and use it only in server code \u2014 an API route or serverless function that makes the call for the browser \u2014 then rotate the key if a build has been deployed.",
|
|
2848
|
+
EXPO_PUBLIC_: "Expo inlines EXPO_PUBLIC_ variables into the app bundle, which anyone can unpack from the installed app. Rename it without the EXPO_PUBLIC_ prefix and make the call from your backend, then rotate the key if a build has shipped.",
|
|
2849
|
+
GATSBY_: "Gatsby inlines GATSBY_ variables into the JavaScript bundle each visitor downloads. Rename it without the GATSBY_ prefix and use it only in server code (a Gatsby Function or your API), then rotate the key if a build has been deployed.",
|
|
2850
|
+
PUBLIC_: "SvelteKit ($env/static/public) and Astro send PUBLIC_ variables to the browser. Rename it without the PUBLIC_ prefix and read it only in server code ($env/static/private, or a server endpoint), then rotate the key if a build has been deployed.",
|
|
2851
|
+
NUXT_PUBLIC_: "Nuxt copies NUXT_PUBLIC_ variables into runtimeConfig.public, which is sent to every client. Rename it to NUXT_<NAME> so it lands in the private runtimeConfig and use it only in server routes, then rotate the key if a build has been deployed."
|
|
2852
|
+
};
|
|
2853
|
+
var NEXT_PUBLIC_ASSIGN_RE = /(?:^|[^A-Za-z0-9_])(NEXT_PUBLIC_[A-Za-z0-9_]{1,128})\s*=\s*([^\r\n]*)/i;
|
|
2319
2854
|
var nextPublicSecret = {
|
|
2320
2855
|
id: "VC011",
|
|
2321
|
-
title: "Secret in
|
|
2856
|
+
title: "Secret in Browser-Exposed Environment Variable",
|
|
2322
2857
|
severity: "critical",
|
|
2323
2858
|
category: "Secrets",
|
|
2324
|
-
description: "NEXT_PUBLIC_
|
|
2859
|
+
description: "Variables with a browser-exposed prefix (NEXT_PUBLIC_, VITE_, REACT_APP_, EXPO_PUBLIC_, GATSBY_, PUBLIC_, NUXT_PUBLIC_) are built into code shipped to every visitor or app user. A secret placed in one is visible to anyone.",
|
|
2325
2860
|
check(content, filePath) {
|
|
2326
|
-
|
|
2327
|
-
const
|
|
2328
|
-
|
|
2329
|
-
|
|
2330
|
-
];
|
|
2861
|
+
const legacyScope = /\.env/.test(filePath) || /next\.config/.test(filePath);
|
|
2862
|
+
const dotenvScope = isDotenvPath(filePath);
|
|
2863
|
+
if (!legacyScope && !dotenvScope) return [];
|
|
2864
|
+
if (!/(?:NEXT_PUBLIC_|NUXT_PUBLIC_|EXPO_PUBLIC_|REACT_APP_|GATSBY_|VITE_|PUBLIC_)/i.test(content)) return [];
|
|
2331
2865
|
const matches = [];
|
|
2332
|
-
|
|
2333
|
-
|
|
2334
|
-
|
|
2335
|
-
|
|
2336
|
-
|
|
2337
|
-
|
|
2338
|
-
|
|
2339
|
-
);
|
|
2340
|
-
|
|
2341
|
-
|
|
2342
|
-
|
|
2343
|
-
|
|
2344
|
-
|
|
2345
|
-
if (
|
|
2346
|
-
|
|
2866
|
+
const lines = content.split("\n");
|
|
2867
|
+
for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
|
|
2868
|
+
const line = lines[i];
|
|
2869
|
+
const trimmed = line.trimStart();
|
|
2870
|
+
if (/^(?:#|\/\/|\*|\/\*|<!--)/.test(trimmed)) continue;
|
|
2871
|
+
let name;
|
|
2872
|
+
let value = "";
|
|
2873
|
+
const a = dotenvScope ? DOTENV_ASSIGN_RE.exec(line) : null;
|
|
2874
|
+
if (a && PUBLIC_ENV_PREFIX_RE.test(a[1])) {
|
|
2875
|
+
name = a[1];
|
|
2876
|
+
value = a[2];
|
|
2877
|
+
} else if (legacyScope) {
|
|
2878
|
+
const n = NEXT_PUBLIC_ASSIGN_RE.exec(line);
|
|
2879
|
+
if (n) {
|
|
2880
|
+
name = n[1];
|
|
2881
|
+
value = n[2];
|
|
2882
|
+
}
|
|
2347
2883
|
}
|
|
2884
|
+
if (!name) continue;
|
|
2885
|
+
const bare = dotenvValue(value);
|
|
2886
|
+
if (bare === "" || /^pk_(?:test|live)_$/.test(bare)) continue;
|
|
2887
|
+
const verdict = classifyPublicEnvVar(name, bare);
|
|
2888
|
+
if (!verdict || !verdict.secret) continue;
|
|
2889
|
+
matches.push({
|
|
2890
|
+
rule: "VC011",
|
|
2891
|
+
title: nextPublicSecret.title,
|
|
2892
|
+
severity: "critical",
|
|
2893
|
+
category: "Secrets",
|
|
2894
|
+
file: filePath,
|
|
2895
|
+
line: i + 1,
|
|
2896
|
+
snippet: getSnippet(content, i + 1),
|
|
2897
|
+
fix: PUBLIC_ENV_FIX[verdict.prefix] ?? PUBLIC_ENV_FIX.NEXT_PUBLIC_
|
|
2898
|
+
});
|
|
2348
2899
|
}
|
|
2349
2900
|
return matches;
|
|
2350
2901
|
}
|
|
@@ -3298,8 +3849,29 @@ var complianceMap = {
|
|
|
3298
3849
|
// VC213–VC214: account state held in browser storage
|
|
3299
3850
|
VC213: { owasp: "A01:2021", cwe: "CWE-602" },
|
|
3300
3851
|
// entitlement from web storage (client-side enforcement)
|
|
3301
|
-
VC214: { owasp: "A04:2021", cwe: "CWE-1188" }
|
|
3852
|
+
VC214: { owasp: "A04:2021", cwe: "CWE-1188" },
|
|
3302
3853
|
// per-account state from web storage (insecure default state)
|
|
3854
|
+
// VC215: Supabase migration lint — RLS off, always-true write policy, user_metadata in a policy
|
|
3855
|
+
VC215: { owasp: "A01:2021", cwe: "CWE-732" },
|
|
3856
|
+
// incorrect permission assignment for a critical resource
|
|
3857
|
+
VC216: { owasp: "A01:2021", cwe: "CWE-732" },
|
|
3858
|
+
// Firebase rules: open, any-signed-in-user, or test mode
|
|
3859
|
+
// VC217: AI or secret key shipped to the browser
|
|
3860
|
+
VC217: { owasp: "A07:2021", cwe: "CWE-798" },
|
|
3861
|
+
// key inlined into the client bundle (as VC066 / VC149)
|
|
3862
|
+
VC220: { owasp: "A01:2021", cwe: "CWE-862" },
|
|
3863
|
+
// unauthenticated AI/LLM proxy (denial of wallet); same class as VC003
|
|
3864
|
+
// VC218–VC219: caller identity never checked, or checked against data the caller controls
|
|
3865
|
+
VC218: { owasp: "A01:2021", cwe: "CWE-862" },
|
|
3866
|
+
// Base44 asServiceRole with no caller check (missing authorization, as VC003)
|
|
3867
|
+
VC219: { owasp: "A01:2021", cwe: "CWE-269" },
|
|
3868
|
+
// role/plan from user_metadata / unsafeMetadata (improper privilege management)
|
|
3869
|
+
VC221: { owasp: "A07:2021", cwe: "CWE-347" },
|
|
3870
|
+
// server trusts unverified session / decoded JWT
|
|
3871
|
+
VC222: { owasp: "A05:2021", cwe: "CWE-942" },
|
|
3872
|
+
// Python CORS wildcard with credentials (origin echoed)
|
|
3873
|
+
VC223: { owasp: "A01:2021", cwe: "CWE-22" }
|
|
3874
|
+
// prefix-only path containment check (startsWith without separator)
|
|
3303
3875
|
};
|
|
3304
3876
|
var consoleLogProduction = {
|
|
3305
3877
|
id: "VC097",
|
|
@@ -3484,15 +4056,15 @@ function runCustomRules(content, filePath, disabledRules = [], tier = "free", ex
|
|
|
3484
4056
|
|
|
3485
4057
|
// src/rule-counts.ts
|
|
3486
4058
|
var FREE_RULE_COUNT = 30;
|
|
3487
|
-
var PRO_RULE_COUNT =
|
|
3488
|
-
var TOTAL_RULE_COUNT =
|
|
4059
|
+
var PRO_RULE_COUNT = 193;
|
|
4060
|
+
var TOTAL_RULE_COUNT = 223;
|
|
3489
4061
|
|
|
3490
4062
|
// src/ai-fp-filter.ts
|
|
3491
4063
|
import Anthropic from "@anthropic-ai/sdk";
|
|
3492
4064
|
var REVIEW_SYSTEM_PROMPT = `You are reviewing security scan findings for false positives. Your job is to look at each finding and the surrounding code to determine if it's a REAL security vulnerability or a FALSE POSITIVE.
|
|
3493
4065
|
|
|
3494
4066
|
Common false positive patterns you should catch:
|
|
3495
|
-
- Auth check exists inside the function body (requireUser, requireUserForApi,
|
|
4067
|
+
- Auth check exists inside the function body (requireUser, requireUserForApi, supabase.auth.getUser, jwt.verify, etc.) but the scanner only checked the function signature. These are NOT auth checks in server code: supabase.auth.getSession() (it reads the cookie without verifying it), jwt.decode() / decodeJwt() / jwtDecode(), or PyJWT with verify_signature False. A finding that says the server trusts one of them is real unless the same code also verifies the token
|
|
3496
4068
|
- The flagged pattern is in example/documentation/tutorial code, not production code
|
|
3497
4069
|
- The variable is developer-controlled (constants, config values, static strings), not user input
|
|
3498
4070
|
- The flagged function is a database method (conn.exec, db.exec, prisma.$executeRaw) not a shell command (child_process.exec)
|
|
@@ -3780,10 +4352,18 @@ var SAFE_PATTERNS = [
|
|
|
3780
4352
|
// double-flag these. They are designed to ship to the browser.
|
|
3781
4353
|
/^pk_(?:live|test|[a-z0-9]+)_/,
|
|
3782
4354
|
// Stripe / Clerk publishable
|
|
4355
|
+
// A string that IS an env-var name — `required: ["VITE_SUPABASE_URL", …]`.
|
|
4356
|
+
// This tests the VALUE, never the variable it is assigned to: a secret held
|
|
4357
|
+
// in a public-prefixed variable is decided by classifyPublicEnvVar below.
|
|
3783
4358
|
/^NEXT_PUBLIC_|^VITE_|^REACT_APP_/,
|
|
3784
|
-
// Build-time public env vars
|
|
3785
4359
|
/^pub_/,
|
|
3786
4360
|
// Segment etc.
|
|
4361
|
+
// dotenvx ciphertext: `STRIPE_SECRET_KEY="encrypted:BE9Y…"`. dotenvx
|
|
4362
|
+
// encrypts each value to the file's public key (ECIES); the private key
|
|
4363
|
+
// stays in the git-ignored .env.keys, and committing the encrypted file is
|
|
4364
|
+
// the documented workflow (Supabase's own dotenvx example does). The value
|
|
4365
|
+
// is not usable without that key, so it is not a leaked secret.
|
|
4366
|
+
/^encrypted:[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{20,}$/,
|
|
3787
4367
|
/^ey[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.ey[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\./,
|
|
3788
4368
|
// JWT header.payload prefix — don't flag solely on entropy
|
|
3789
4369
|
// Content-Security-Policy hashes / nonces in HTML/JSON
|
|
@@ -3810,6 +4390,8 @@ var VERIFICATION_BLOCK_RE = /\bverification\s*:\s*\{/;
|
|
|
3810
4390
|
var VERIFICATION_KEY_NAMES = /^(?:google|yandex|yahoo|bing|me|other|["']?(?:google-site-verification|facebook-domain-verification|msvalidate\.01|norton-safeweb-site-verification|ahrefs-site-verification|p:domain_verify|wot-verification)["']?)$/i;
|
|
3811
4391
|
var VERIFICATION_META_RE = /<meta[^>]+name\s*=\s*["'][^"']*(?:site-verification|domain-verification|msvalidate|domain_verify)[^"']*["']/i;
|
|
3812
4392
|
var SECRET_VAR_NAMES = /(?:^|[^a-z])(?:key|secret|token|password|passwd|pwd|api[_-]?key|auth|credential|private|signing|bearer|access[_-]?token|refresh[_-]?token|session[_-]?id)(?:$|[^a-z])/i;
|
|
4393
|
+
var DOTENV_EXAMPLE_RE = /\.(?:example|sample|template|dist|defaults?)$/i;
|
|
4394
|
+
var MAX_DOTENV_VALUE = 256;
|
|
3813
4395
|
function getSnippet2(content, line) {
|
|
3814
4396
|
const lines = content.split("\n");
|
|
3815
4397
|
const start = Math.max(0, line - 2);
|
|
@@ -3832,6 +4414,7 @@ function scanEntropy(files) {
|
|
|
3832
4414
|
if (/pro-rules-bundle|\.bundle\.|\.chunk\./i.test(filePath)) continue;
|
|
3833
4415
|
if (/(?:\.test\.|\.spec\.|__tests__|__mocks__|fixtures?\/)/i.test(filePath)) continue;
|
|
3834
4416
|
const vendored = isVendoredPath(filePath);
|
|
4417
|
+
const dotenv = isDotenvPath(filePath) && !DOTENV_EXAMPLE_RE.test(filePath);
|
|
3835
4418
|
const lines = content.split("\n");
|
|
3836
4419
|
let verificationDepth = -1;
|
|
3837
4420
|
let braceDepth = 0;
|
|
@@ -3850,14 +4433,27 @@ function scanEntropy(files) {
|
|
|
3850
4433
|
const inVerificationBlock = verificationDepth !== -1;
|
|
3851
4434
|
const trimmed = line.trimStart();
|
|
3852
4435
|
if (trimmed.startsWith("//") || trimmed.startsWith("#") || trimmed.startsWith("*") || trimmed.startsWith("/*")) continue;
|
|
3853
|
-
const
|
|
3854
|
-
|
|
3855
|
-
|
|
3856
|
-
|
|
4436
|
+
const candidates = [];
|
|
4437
|
+
const assign = dotenv ? DOTENV_ASSIGN_RE.exec(line) : null;
|
|
4438
|
+
const assignValue = assign ? dotenvValue(assign[2]) : "";
|
|
4439
|
+
const structured = assign !== null && (assignValue.length > MAX_DOTENV_VALUE || /^[{[]/.test(assignValue));
|
|
4440
|
+
if (assign && !structured) {
|
|
4441
|
+
if (assignValue.length >= 20) {
|
|
4442
|
+
candidates.push({ value: assignValue, beforeAssign: assign[1], dotenvName: assign[1] });
|
|
4443
|
+
}
|
|
4444
|
+
} else {
|
|
4445
|
+
const stringPattern = /(?:[:=]\s*)(["'`])([^"'`\n]{20,120})\1/g;
|
|
4446
|
+
let match;
|
|
4447
|
+
while ((match = stringPattern.exec(line)) !== null) {
|
|
4448
|
+
let beforeAssign = line.substring(0, match.index);
|
|
4449
|
+
if (structured) beforeAssign = beforeAssign.slice(Math.max(beforeAssign.lastIndexOf(","), beforeAssign.lastIndexOf("{")) + 1);
|
|
4450
|
+
candidates.push({ value: match[2], beforeAssign });
|
|
4451
|
+
}
|
|
4452
|
+
}
|
|
4453
|
+
for (const { value, beforeAssign, dotenvName } of candidates) {
|
|
3857
4454
|
if (value.includes("${")) continue;
|
|
3858
4455
|
if (SAFE_PATTERNS.some((p) => p.test(value))) continue;
|
|
3859
4456
|
if (HASH_PREFIX_RE.test(value)) continue;
|
|
3860
|
-
const beforeAssign = line.substring(0, match.index);
|
|
3861
4457
|
if (SAFE_VAR_NAMES.test(beforeAssign)) continue;
|
|
3862
4458
|
if (/^https?:\/\/[^:@]*$/.test(value)) continue;
|
|
3863
4459
|
if ((value.match(/\s/g) || []).length > 2) continue;
|
|
@@ -3869,11 +4465,15 @@ function scanEntropy(files) {
|
|
|
3869
4465
|
if (value.length < 20) continue;
|
|
3870
4466
|
const entropy = shannonEntropy(value);
|
|
3871
4467
|
if (entropy < threshold) continue;
|
|
3872
|
-
const varName = beforeAssign.match(/["']([^"']+)["']\s*$/)?.[1] || beforeAssign.match(/([\w$-]+)\s*$/)?.[1] || "";
|
|
4468
|
+
const varName = dotenvName || beforeAssign.match(/["']([^"']+)["']\s*$/)?.[1] || beforeAssign.match(/([\w$-]+)\s*$/)?.[1] || "";
|
|
3873
4469
|
if (inVerificationBlock && VERIFICATION_KEY_NAMES.test(varName)) continue;
|
|
3874
4470
|
if (VERIFICATION_META_RE.test(line)) continue;
|
|
3875
4471
|
if (HASH_LIKE_VAR_NAMES.test(varName) && (isHex || isBase64)) continue;
|
|
3876
|
-
|
|
4472
|
+
if (/^DOTENV_PUBLIC_KEY(?:_\w{1,60})?$/.test(varName) && /^0[23][0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/.test(value)) continue;
|
|
4473
|
+
const publicEnv = classifyPublicEnvVar(varName, value);
|
|
4474
|
+
if (publicEnv && publicEnv.publicByDesign) continue;
|
|
4475
|
+
if (dotenvName && /(?:^|_)IDS?$/i.test(dotenvName) && !SECRET_VAR_NAMES.test(dotenvName)) continue;
|
|
4476
|
+
const isLikelySecret = SECRET_VAR_NAMES.test(varName) || publicEnv?.secret === true;
|
|
3877
4477
|
if (entropy < 4.5 && !isLikelySecret) continue;
|
|
3878
4478
|
if (isLineSilenced(lines, i, "ENTROPY")) continue;
|
|
3879
4479
|
const masked = value.substring(0, 6) + "..." + value.substring(value.length - 4);
|
|
@@ -3887,7 +4487,10 @@ function scanEntropy(files) {
|
|
|
3887
4487
|
file: filePath,
|
|
3888
4488
|
line: i + 1,
|
|
3889
4489
|
snippet: getSnippet2(content, i + 1),
|
|
3890
|
-
|
|
4490
|
+
// The generic advice ("move it to an environment variable") is
|
|
4491
|
+
// wrong for a value that is already in one, so dotenv findings get
|
|
4492
|
+
// advice about the file, and public-prefixed ones about the prefix.
|
|
4493
|
+
fix: publicEnv?.secret ? `${varName} has a browser-exposed prefix (${publicEnv.prefix}), so the framework writes its value into any browser code that reads it. Rename it without the prefix, use it only in server code, and rotate the credential if a build has been deployed.` : dotenvName ? "If this is a live credential, keep this env file out of version control (add it to .gitignore and run `git rm --cached` on it) and rotate the credential if the file has been committed. If it's not a secret, add an inline `# ENTROPY-OK: <reason>` comment above the line." : "If this is a secret, move it to an environment variable. If it's not a secret (e.g. a hash, encoded data, or a public verification token), add an inline `// ENTROPY-OK: <reason>` comment above the line, or add the file to .xploitscanignore.",
|
|
3891
4494
|
category: "Secrets",
|
|
3892
4495
|
source: "custom",
|
|
3893
4496
|
owasp: "A02:2021",
|
|
@@ -7584,6 +8187,7 @@ function scanQuality(input, rules = qualityRules) {
|
|
|
7584
8187
|
}
|
|
7585
8188
|
export {
|
|
7586
8189
|
CHECKABLE_CLAIMS,
|
|
8190
|
+
DOTENV_ASSIGN_RE,
|
|
7587
8191
|
FREE_RULE_COUNT,
|
|
7588
8192
|
INTENT_EXPECTATIONS,
|
|
7589
8193
|
MODEL_ANALYSIS,
|
|
@@ -7593,6 +8197,7 @@ export {
|
|
|
7593
8197
|
MODEL_TRIAGE,
|
|
7594
8198
|
NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS,
|
|
7595
8199
|
PRO_RULE_COUNT,
|
|
8200
|
+
PUBLIC_ENV_PREFIX_RE,
|
|
7596
8201
|
QUALITY_EXAMPLES,
|
|
7597
8202
|
RULE_IMPACTS,
|
|
7598
8203
|
TEST_FILE_PATTERN,
|
|
@@ -7607,6 +8212,7 @@ export {
|
|
|
7607
8212
|
callSpreads,
|
|
7608
8213
|
checkIntent,
|
|
7609
8214
|
classifyExposure,
|
|
8215
|
+
classifyPublicEnvVar,
|
|
7610
8216
|
classifyStatement,
|
|
7611
8217
|
clientSideAuth,
|
|
7612
8218
|
complianceMap,
|
|
@@ -7618,6 +8224,7 @@ export {
|
|
|
7618
8224
|
detectFramework,
|
|
7619
8225
|
detectPlatform,
|
|
7620
8226
|
disabledTLSVerification,
|
|
8227
|
+
dotenvValue,
|
|
7621
8228
|
emptyCatchBlock,
|
|
7622
8229
|
enclosingHandler,
|
|
7623
8230
|
envNotGitignored,
|
|
@@ -7643,6 +8250,7 @@ export {
|
|
|
7643
8250
|
isCalleeNamed,
|
|
7644
8251
|
isClientTarget,
|
|
7645
8252
|
isCommentLine,
|
|
8253
|
+
isDotenvPath,
|
|
7646
8254
|
isInlineSilenced,
|
|
7647
8255
|
isInsideFixMessage,
|
|
7648
8256
|
isLineSilenced,
|
|
@@ -7656,6 +8264,7 @@ export {
|
|
|
7656
8264
|
lineNumberAt,
|
|
7657
8265
|
lineTextAt,
|
|
7658
8266
|
maskComments,
|
|
8267
|
+
maskOutboundAuthNoise,
|
|
7659
8268
|
missingAuthMiddleware,
|
|
7660
8269
|
missingCSP,
|
|
7661
8270
|
missingErrorBoundary,
|
|
@@ -7668,6 +8277,7 @@ export {
|
|
|
7668
8277
|
parseScanTarget,
|
|
7669
8278
|
parseSupabaseConfig,
|
|
7670
8279
|
qualityRules,
|
|
8280
|
+
replaceBlockComments,
|
|
7671
8281
|
routeForFile,
|
|
7672
8282
|
runCustomRules,
|
|
7673
8283
|
scanEntropy,
|