xploitscan-shared-rules 2.0.2 → 2.1.0

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
package/dist/index.cjs CHANGED
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ var __toCommonJS = (mod) => __copyProps(__defProp({}, "__esModule", { value: tru
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  var index_exports = {};
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  __export(index_exports, {
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  CHECKABLE_CLAIMS: () => CHECKABLE_CLAIMS,
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+ DOTENV_ASSIGN_RE: () => DOTENV_ASSIGN_RE,
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  FREE_RULE_COUNT: () => FREE_RULE_COUNT,
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  INTENT_EXPECTATIONS: () => INTENT_EXPECTATIONS,
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  MODEL_ANALYSIS: () => MODEL_ANALYSIS,
@@ -40,6 +41,7 @@ __export(index_exports, {
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  MODEL_TRIAGE: () => MODEL_TRIAGE,
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  NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS: () => NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS,
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  PRO_RULE_COUNT: () => PRO_RULE_COUNT,
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+ PUBLIC_ENV_PREFIX_RE: () => PUBLIC_ENV_PREFIX_RE,
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  QUALITY_EXAMPLES: () => QUALITY_EXAMPLES,
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  RULE_IMPACTS: () => RULE_IMPACTS,
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  TEST_FILE_PATTERN: () => TEST_FILE_PATTERN,
@@ -54,6 +56,7 @@ __export(index_exports, {
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  callSpreads: () => callSpreads,
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  checkIntent: () => checkIntent,
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  classifyExposure: () => classifyExposure,
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+ classifyPublicEnvVar: () => classifyPublicEnvVar,
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  classifyStatement: () => classifyStatement,
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  clientSideAuth: () => clientSideAuth,
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  complianceMap: () => complianceMap,
@@ -65,6 +68,7 @@ __export(index_exports, {
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  detectFramework: () => detectFramework,
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  detectPlatform: () => detectPlatform,
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  disabledTLSVerification: () => disabledTLSVerification,
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+ dotenvValue: () => dotenvValue,
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  emptyCatchBlock: () => emptyCatchBlock,
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  enclosingHandler: () => enclosingHandler,
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  envNotGitignored: () => envNotGitignored,
@@ -90,6 +94,7 @@ __export(index_exports, {
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  isCalleeNamed: () => isCalleeNamed,
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  isClientTarget: () => isClientTarget,
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  isCommentLine: () => isCommentLine,
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+ isDotenvPath: () => isDotenvPath,
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  isInlineSilenced: () => isInlineSilenced,
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  isInsideFixMessage: () => isInsideFixMessage,
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  isLineSilenced: () => isLineSilenced,
@@ -103,6 +108,7 @@ __export(index_exports, {
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  lineNumberAt: () => lineNumberAt,
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  lineTextAt: () => lineTextAt,
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  maskComments: () => maskComments,
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+ maskOutboundAuthNoise: () => maskOutboundAuthNoise,
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  missingAuthMiddleware: () => missingAuthMiddleware,
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  missingCSP: () => missingCSP,
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  missingErrorBoundary: () => missingErrorBoundary,
@@ -115,6 +121,7 @@ __export(index_exports, {
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  parseScanTarget: () => parseScanTarget,
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  parseSupabaseConfig: () => parseSupabaseConfig,
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  qualityRules: () => qualityRules,
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+ replaceBlockComments: () => replaceBlockComments,
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  routeForFile: () => routeForFile,
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  runCustomRules: () => runCustomRules,
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  scanEntropy: () => scanEntropy,
@@ -190,9 +197,9 @@ function isInlineSilenced(content, matchIndex, ruleId) {
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  }
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  function isLineSilenced(lines, lineIdx, ruleId) {
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  const matchLine = lines[lineIdx] ?? "";
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- const marker = new RegExp(`(?://|/\\*|#)\\s*(?:${ruleId}|scanner)-OK\\b`, "i");
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+ const marker = new RegExp(`(?://|/\\*|#|--)\\s*(?:${ruleId}|scanner)-OK\\b`, "i");
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  if (marker.test(matchLine)) return true;
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- const COMMENT_LINE = /^\s*[{(]?\s*(?:\/\/|#|\/\*|\*)/;
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+ const COMMENT_LINE = /^\s*[{(]?\s*(?:\/\/|#|\/\*|\*|--)/;
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  const MAX_BLOCK_LINES = 20;
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  for (let i = lineIdx - 1, seen = 0; i >= 0 && seen < MAX_BLOCK_LINES; i--, seen++) {
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  const line = lines[i] ?? "";
@@ -221,7 +228,7 @@ var RULE_IMPACTS = {
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  VC008: "Without rate limiting, an attacker can flood your API with requests causing denial of service, brute-force attacks, or excessive cloud billing.",
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  VC009: "With CORS set to allow all origins, any website can make authenticated requests to your API from a user's browser, enabling cross-site data theft.",
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  VC010: "Hiding UI elements without server-side checks means an attacker can call your API directly and bypass the restriction entirely.",
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- VC011: "The NEXT_PUBLIC_ prefix exposes this value in the browser bundle. If it's a secret, anyone viewing your site's JavaScript can extract it.",
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+ VC011: "A browser-exposed prefix (NEXT_PUBLIC_, VITE_, REACT_APP_, EXPO_PUBLIC_ and the like) puts this value in the bundle shipped to every visitor or app user. If it's a secret, anyone viewing your site's JavaScript can extract it.",
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  VC012: "While Firebase API keys aren't strictly secret, an unrestricted key lets attackers abuse your project's quotas, run up Firebase costs, or hit endpoints that should be locked down by App Check or HTTP referrer rules.",
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  VC013: "Performing privileged operations with the anon key either fails outright or silently bypasses RLS in unsafe ways, leading to leaked rows or broken auth checks that any logged-in user can exploit.",
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  VC014: "An unignored .env file gets committed on the next git add, leaking database passwords, API keys, and OAuth secrets to anyone with repo access \u2014 including the entire internet if the repo is public.",
@@ -424,7 +431,16 @@ var RULE_IMPACTS = {
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  VC211: "A real credit card number in source is cardholder data sitting in git history, CI logs, and every backup \u2014 a direct PCI-DSS violation. Anyone with repo access can read it, and it cannot be un-leaked once committed; the card must be treated as compromised.",
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  VC212: "A hardcoded Social Security Number is regulated PII permanently embedded in your git history and backups. It exposes a real person to identity theft, and its presence in source can trigger breach-notification and privacy-law obligations the moment the repo is accessed.",
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  VC213: "Anything read from localStorage belongs to the user, not to you. If a plan, role or permission is read from browser storage and branched on, unlocking the feature takes one line in devtools \u2014 no exploit, no tooling, just typing. Every paid tier and admin panel gated this way is open to anyone who opens the console.",
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- VC214: "Browser storage is per-device and per-profile, so per-account state kept there resets on a fresh login, cleared cookies, a private window or a second machine \u2014 and the app greets a long-standing customer as brand new. It is not a security hole, it is a trust one: the product visibly does not remember who you are."
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+ VC214: "Browser storage is per-device and per-profile, so per-account state kept there resets on a fresh login, cleared cookies, a private window or a second machine \u2014 and the app greets a long-standing customer as brand new. It is not a security hole, it is a trust one: the product visibly does not remember who you are.",
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+ VC215: "The Supabase anon key ships in every browser, so the row level security in your migrations is the only access control. Depending on the finding: with RLS off, or a write policy that is always true, anyone with that key can change or delete the table's rows (and read them, unless grants were revoked or a later migration fixed it); an insert-only open policy lets anyone add rows; a policy that reads user_metadata lets users grant themselves whatever role or tenant it checks.",
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+ VC216: "A Firebase app has no server in front of its database, so the rules file is the only thing deciding who gets in. Depending on the finding: open rules let anyone, or anyone who signs up, read, change or delete the data behind the app, including other users' records and uploads; an open create rule lets anyone add records; and expired test-mode rules already deny everything, so the risk is that they get extended instead of replaced.",
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+ VC217: "This key ends up in code shipped to every visitor or app user \u2014 the JavaScript bundle or the installed app \u2014 so anyone can copy it and run AI requests, or reach whatever the secret unlocks, on your account and your bill.",
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+ VC220: "Anyone who finds this endpoint's URL \u2014 it ships in your JavaScript bundle \u2014 can send it requests that run your AI model on your account, so a script in a loop can burn through your AI credits or API budget while you pay the bill.",
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+ VC218: "Base44 serves every backend function as a public endpoint, and asServiceRole ignores every access rule, so a function that uses it without asking who is calling lets anyone on the internet read, change or delete the records it touches.",
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+ VC219: "Supabase user_metadata and Clerk unsafeMetadata can be rewritten by the signed-in user from the browser, so a role, plan or permission checked there can be granted by any user to themselves with one API call.",
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+ VC221: "A server that takes the caller's identity from Supabase getSession(), jwt.decode() or a JWT decoded with signature checks off believes whatever the cookie or token says, so anyone can forge one and be treated as any user, including an admin.",
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+ VC222: "Your API answers every website's origin with credentials allowed, so if it uses cookie sessions, any page a signed-in user visits can call it as that user and read the responses.",
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+ VC223: "The check meant to stop path traversal also lets through any sibling folder whose name starts with the base folder's name, so a request for /srv/uploads-private passes a guard for /srv/uploads."
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  };
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  // src/exposure.ts
@@ -1003,6 +1019,77 @@ function checkIntent(files, findings) {
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  return { statements, mismatches, sources, unchallenged, uncheckable };
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  }
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+ // src/public-env.ts
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+ var PUBLIC_ENV_PREFIX_RE = /^(?:NEXT_PUBLIC_|NUXT_PUBLIC_|EXPO_PUBLIC_|REACT_APP_|GATSBY_|VITE_|PUBLIC_)/i;
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+ var STRONG_SECRET_ENV_WORD_RE = /SECRET|PASSWORD|PASSWD|SERVICE_?ROLE|SUPABASE_SERVICE/;
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+ var QUALIFIED_SECRET_ENV_WORD_RE = /PRIVATE|ADMIN|SERVER|SERVICE_?ACCOUNT|PERSONAL|MANAGEMENT|MASTER/;
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+ var NON_SECRET_KEY_TAIL = "ADDRESS|ADDR|SYMBOL|URL|URI|ID|IDS|NAME|DECIMALS?|LIST|CONTRACT|LOGO|IMAGE|ICON|PRICE|MINT|CHAIN|AMOUNT|SUPPLY|TYPE|EXPIRY|EXPIRES|EXPIRATION|TTL|LIFETIME|ENDPOINT|HEADER|STORAGE|PREFIX|PATH|FILE|LENGTH|SIZE|LIMIT|ENABLED|DISABLED|MODE|COUNT|NETWORK|STANDARD|PAIR|PROGRAM|ACCOUNT|TICKER|DENOM|CURRENCY|UNIT|ISSUER|POOL|FACTORY|ROUTER|BRIDGE|GATE|GATED|GATING|HOLDER|BALANCE|VAULT";
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+ var KEY_SEGMENT_RE = new RegExp(
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+ `(?:^|_)(?:(?:API|ACCESS|AUTH|BEARER|REFRESH|SESSION)_?TOKENS|(?:API|ACCESS|AUTH|SECRET|PRIVATE|MASTER|SIGNING|ENCRYPTION|LICENSE|APP|SERVICE|WRITE|READ|ADMIN|BEARER|REFRESH|SESSION|OPENAI|GEMINI|GROQ|ANTHROPIC|CLAUDE|MISTRAL|COHERE|DEEPSEEK|PERPLEXITY|REPLICATE|ELEVENLABS|HUGGINGFACE|OPENROUTER)?(?:KEYS?|TOKEN))(?:_?V?\\d{1,3})?(?:_(?!(?:${NON_SECRET_KEY_TAIL})(?:_|\\d|$))[A-Z]{1,12}(?:_?\\d{1,3})?)?$`
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+ );
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+ var KEYISH_WORD_RE = /SECRET|PASSWORD|PASSWD|CREDENTIALS?$|(?:^|_)PRIVATE$/;
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+ var NON_SECRET_WORD_VALUE_RE = /^(?:true|false|yes|no|on|off|null|undefined)$/i;
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+ var NUMBER_VALUE_RE = /^-?\d+(?:\.\d+)?$/;
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+ var SECRET_TAIL_RE = /(?:SECRET|PASSWORD|PASSWD|PASSCODE|PIN)(?:_KEY)?$/;
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+ var NUMERIC_SECRET_VALUE_RE = /^\d{4,}$/;
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+ var PLAIN_URL_VALUE_RE = /^https?:\/\/[^\s@]+$/i;
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+ function urlCarriesToken(url) {
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+ const rest = url.replace(/^https?:\/\/[^/?#]*/i, "");
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+ for (const seg of rest.split(/[/?#&=.:;,]/)) {
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+ if (seg.length < 20 || !/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/.test(seg)) continue;
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+ if (!/\d/.test(seg) || !/[A-Za-z]/.test(seg)) continue;
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+ if (seg.split(/[-_]/).some((run) => run.length >= 16)) return true;
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+ }
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+ return false;
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+ }
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+ var PUBLIC_BY_DESIGN_ENV_RE = /PUBLISHABLE|ANON_?KEY|PUBLIC_?KEY|SITE_?KEY|FIREBASE|(?:^|_)MAPS?(?:_|$)|MAPBOX|PUSHER|REVERB|ALGOLIA_SEARCH|SEARCH_ONLY|POSTHOG|MIXPANEL|AMPLITUDE|SEGMENT_WRITE|CLIENT_?(?:KEY|TOKEN)|VAPID|RECAPTCHA|HCAPTCHA|TURNSTILE|(?:^|_)IDS?$|(?:WEB3FORMS|REVENUECAT|TINYMCE|BUGSNAG|OPTIMIZELY|FLAGSMITH|CONFIGCAT|VEXO)(?![A-Z0-9_]{0,80}TOKEN)|(?:^|_)SDK_?KEY(?:_?\d{1,3})?$/;
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+ var PUBLIC_VALUE_PREFIX_RE = /^(?:pk_(?:test|live)_|sb_publishable_|phc_|pk\.ey|(?:appl|goog|amzn|strp)_)/;
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+ var SECRET_VALUE_PREFIX_RE = /^(?:phx_|sk\.ey|sk_[A-Za-z0-9_]{16}|ser\.[A-Za-z0-9]{16}|sdk-[0-9a-f]{8}-)/;
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+ function isAnonJwt(value) {
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+ const m = /^eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,200}\.(eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,2000})\./.exec(value);
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+ if (!m) return false;
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+ try {
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+ const b64 = m[1].replace(/-/g, "+").replace(/_/g, "/");
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+ const json = typeof atob === "function" ? atob(b64 + "=".repeat((4 - b64.length % 4) % 4)) : "";
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+ return /"role"\s*:\s*"anon"/.test(json);
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+ } catch {
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+ return false;
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+ }
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+ }
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+ function classifyPublicEnvVar(name, value = "") {
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+ const m = PUBLIC_ENV_PREFIX_RE.exec(name);
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+ if (!m) return null;
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+ const prefix = m[0].toUpperCase();
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+ const upper = name.toUpperCase();
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+ const rest = upper.slice(prefix.length);
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+ const v = value.trim().replace(/^["'`]/, "");
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+ const notSecret = { prefix, secret: false, publicByDesign: true };
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+ if (PUBLIC_VALUE_PREFIX_RE.test(v) || NON_SECRET_WORD_VALUE_RE.test(v) || isAnonJwt(v)) return notSecret;
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+ if (NUMBER_VALUE_RE.test(v) && !(SECRET_TAIL_RE.test(rest) && NUMERIC_SECRET_VALUE_RE.test(v))) return notSecret;
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+ if (PLAIN_URL_VALUE_RE.test(v) && !urlCarriesToken(v)) return notSecret;
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+ if (SECRET_VALUE_PREFIX_RE.test(v)) return { prefix, secret: true, publicByDesign: false };
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+ const keyish = KEY_SEGMENT_RE.test(rest) || KEYISH_WORD_RE.test(rest);
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+ if (STRONG_SECRET_ENV_WORD_RE.test(rest)) return { prefix, secret: true, publicByDesign: false };
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+ if (QUALIFIED_SECRET_ENV_WORD_RE.test(rest) && keyish) return { prefix, secret: true, publicByDesign: false };
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+ if (PUBLIC_BY_DESIGN_ENV_RE.test(upper)) return notSecret;
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+ return { prefix, secret: keyish, publicByDesign: false };
1076
+ }
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+ var DOTENV_FILE_RE = /(?:^|\/)(?:\.env(?:\.[\w.-]+)?|[\w.-]+\.env)$/;
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+ function isDotenvPath(filePath) {
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+ return DOTENV_FILE_RE.test(filePath);
1080
+ }
1081
+ var DOTENV_ASSIGN_RE = /^\s*(?:export\s+)?([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]{0,127})\s*=\s*([^\r\n]*)/;
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+ function dotenvValue(raw) {
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+ const v = raw.trim();
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+ const q = v[0];
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+ if (q === '"' || q === "'" || q === "`") {
1086
+ const end = v.indexOf(q, 1);
1087
+ return end === -1 ? v.slice(1) : v.slice(1, end);
1088
+ }
1089
+ const hash = v.search(/\s#/);
1090
+ return (hash === -1 ? v : v.slice(0, hash)).trim();
1091
+ }
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+
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  // src/ast/parse.ts
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  var import_parser = require("@babel/parser");
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  var MAX_CACHE = 256;
@@ -1550,7 +1637,23 @@ function isTestFile(filePath) {
1550
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  }
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  var HANDLER_HEADER_RE = /(?:\b(?:async\s+)?function\b|=>\s*$|=>\s*\{?\s*$|\.(?:get|post|put|patch|delete|use|all)\s*\(|\bexport\s+(?:async\s+)?(?:function|const)\s+(?:GET|POST|PUT|PATCH|DELETE)\b|\b(?:Deno\.)?serve\s*\()/i;
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1639
  function maskComments(content) {
1553
- return content.replace(/\/\*[\s\S]*?\*\//g, (m) => m.replace(/[^\n]/g, " ")).replace(/(^|[^:])\/\/[^\n]*/gm, (m, p1) => p1 + " ".repeat(m.length - p1.length));
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+ return replaceBlockComments(content, (c) => c.replace(/[^\n]/g, " ")).replace(/(^|[^:])\/\/[^\n]*/gm, (m, p1) => p1 + " ".repeat(m.length - p1.length));
1641
+ }
1642
+ function replaceBlockComments(content, replace) {
1643
+ let open = content.indexOf("/*");
1644
+ if (open === -1) return content;
1645
+ const parts = [];
1646
+ let copied = 0;
1647
+ while (open !== -1) {
1648
+ const close = content.indexOf("*/", open + 2);
1649
+ if (close === -1) break;
1650
+ parts.push(content.slice(copied, open), replace(content.slice(open, close + 2)));
1651
+ copied = close + 2;
1652
+ open = content.indexOf("/*", copied);
1653
+ }
1654
+ if (parts.length === 0) return content;
1655
+ parts.push(content.slice(copied));
1656
+ return parts.join("");
1554
1657
  }
1555
1658
  function enclosingHandler(content, index) {
1556
1659
  const MAX_LEVELS = 6;
@@ -1623,10 +1726,11 @@ var SERVER_SIDE_PATH_RE = new RegExp(
1623
1726
  "i"
1624
1727
  );
1625
1728
  var SERVER_SIDE_CONTENT_RE = /\b(?:req|request)\.(?:body|query|params|headers|cookies)\b|\b(?:app|router)\.(?:get|post|put|patch|delete|use|all)\s*\(|\bctx\.request\b|\bevent\.(?:body|queryStringParameters|pathParameters)\b|\(\s*req\s*,\s*res\b|(?:import|require)\b[^;\n]{0,200}['"]express['"]|\bNextFunction\b/;
1729
+ var USE_SERVER_DIRECTIVE_RE = /^[ \t\uFEFF]*["']use server["']/m;
1626
1730
  function isServerSideFile(filePath, content) {
1627
1731
  if (isTestFile(filePath)) return false;
1628
1732
  if (SERVER_SIDE_PATH_RE.test(filePath)) return true;
1629
- if (content && /^\s*["']use server["']/m.test(content)) return true;
1733
+ if (content && USE_SERVER_DIRECTIVE_RE.test(content)) return true;
1630
1734
  if (content && SERVER_SIDE_CONTENT_RE.test(content)) return true;
1631
1735
  return false;
1632
1736
  }
@@ -1736,6 +1840,27 @@ function isNamespacedSlotKey(name, value) {
1736
1840
  }
1737
1841
  var CREDENTIAL_NAME = /SECRET|SIGN|ENCRYPT|CRYPT|CIPHER|HMAC|JWT|PRIVATE|API|ACCESS|AUTH|MASTER|ADMIN|SESSION|PASS|TOKEN|CLIENT|SALT|PEPPER|LICEN[CS]E|WEBHOOK|STRIPE|AWS|SERVICE/;
1738
1842
  var CREDENTIAL_WORD = /secret|passw|token|private|signing|apikey|credential/i;
1843
+ function isPlaceholderToken(token) {
1844
+ if (/(.)\1{7,}/.test(token)) return true;
1845
+ if (new Set(token).size < 8) return true;
1846
+ return /example|placeholder|redacted|your_?(?:api_?)?(?:key|token)|insert_?your|replace_?me/i.test(token);
1847
+ }
1848
+ var GEMINI_FILE_CONTEXT_RE = /generativelanguage\.googleapis\.com|@google\/generative-ai|@google\/genai|\bGoogleGenerativeAI\b|\bGoogleGenAI\b|\bgoogle\.generativeai\b|\bfrom\s+google\s+import\s+genai\b/;
1849
+ var GEMINI_NAME_RE = /gemini|generative/i;
1850
+ var PUBLIC_GOOGLE_KEY_NAME_RE = /firebase|maps?(?:\b|_)|places|recaptcha|youtube/i;
1851
+ var FIREBASE_CONFIG_FIELD_RE = /\b(?:authDomain|messagingSenderId|storageBucket)\b/;
1852
+ function isGeminiKeyContext(lines, line, fileIsGemini) {
1853
+ const lineText = lines[line - 1] ?? "";
1854
+ const keyAt = lineText.search(/AIza[\w-]{35}/);
1855
+ const before = keyAt === -1 ? lineText : lineText.slice(0, keyAt);
1856
+ if (PUBLIC_GOOGLE_KEY_NAME_RE.test(before)) return false;
1857
+ const from = Math.max(0, line - 4);
1858
+ const to = Math.min(lines.length, line + 3);
1859
+ for (let i = from; i < to; i++) {
1860
+ if (FIREBASE_CONFIG_FIELD_RE.test(lines[i])) return false;
1861
+ }
1862
+ return fileIsGemini || GEMINI_NAME_RE.test(before);
1863
+ }
1739
1864
  var hardcodedSecrets = {
1740
1865
  id: "VC001",
1741
1866
  title: "Hardcoded API Key or Secret",
@@ -1755,8 +1880,16 @@ var hardcodedSecrets = {
1755
1880
  /(?:sk_live|pk_live|sk_test|pk_test)_[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}/g,
1756
1881
  // Supabase anon/service keys (JWT format)
1757
1882
  /(?:supabase[_-]?(?:anon|service)[_-]?key|SUPABASE_(?:ANON|SERVICE_ROLE)_KEY)\s*[:=]\s*["'`](eyJ[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{50,})["'`]/gi,
1758
- // OpenAI keys
1759
- /sk-[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}T3BlbkFJ[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}/g,
1883
+ // OpenAI keys. Every OpenAI secret key carries `T3BlbkFJ` (base64 of
1884
+ // "OpenAI") in the middle, which is what keeps this near zero false
1885
+ // positives. This used to be `sk-[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}T3BlbkFJ…`, the legacy
1886
+ // user-key shape: its character class has no `-`, so it could not get
1887
+ // past the second hyphen of `sk-proj-`, and every project, service
1888
+ // account and admin key OpenAI has issued since 2024 went unreported.
1889
+ // Prefixes and the `-`/`_` body follow gitleaks' openai-api-key rule.
1890
+ // Bounded on both sides so a hostile run of key characters cannot
1891
+ // backtrack a whole line.
1892
+ /sk-(?:(?:proj|svcacct|admin)-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,80}|[A-Za-z0-9]{20,80})T3BlbkFJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,80}/g,
1760
1893
  // Generic tokens in assignments — require standalone word and longer min length
1761
1894
  /(?:^|[\s,({])(?:token|secret|password|passwd|pwd)\s*[:=]\s*["'`]([a-zA-Z0-9_\-!@#$%^&*]{20,})["'`]/gim,
1762
1895
  // SCREAMING_CASE identifiers ending in SECRET/TOKEN/KEY/PASSWORD
@@ -1773,20 +1906,42 @@ var hardcodedSecrets = {
1773
1906
  // Private keys
1774
1907
  /-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |DSA )?PRIVATE KEY-----/g,
1775
1908
  // Database URLs with credentials
1776
- /(?:postgres|mysql|mongodb(?:\+srv)?):\/\/[^:]+:[^@]+@[^/\s"'`]+/gi
1909
+ /(?:postgres|mysql|mongodb(?:\+srv)?):\/\/[^:]+:[^@]+@[^/\s"'`]+/gi,
1910
+ // ── [11]–[14] Fixed-prefix AI-provider and payment keys ──
1911
+ // These match the token itself, so they fire whatever it is bound to:
1912
+ // `const k = "…"`, a positional `new OpenAI("…")`, an unquoted .env
1913
+ // value. The name-based patterns above only see a key that sits in a
1914
+ // slot called apiKey / token / *_KEY. Shapes follow gitleaks.
1915
+ // [11] Hugging Face user access token: `hf_` + 34 letters.
1916
+ /\bhf_[A-Za-z]{34}\b/g,
1917
+ // [12] OpenRouter: `sk-or-v1-` + 64 hex.
1918
+ /\bsk-or-v1-[a-f0-9]{64}\b/g,
1919
+ // [13] Stripe restricted key. `rk_` keys are scoped, but a live one can
1920
+ // still read customers or issue refunds, and [2] above only knows
1921
+ // `sk_`/`pk_`. No trailing anchor: Stripe keys run to ~100 characters
1922
+ // and the match only needs the prefix plus a real body.
1923
+ /\brk_(?:live|test)_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,200}/g,
1924
+ // [14] Google API key — reported only in a Gemini context, see
1925
+ // GEMINI_FILE_CONTEXT_RE. The lookahead stands in for `\b`, which the
1926
+ // `-` in the key alphabet would break.
1927
+ /AIza[\w-]{35}(?![\w-])/g
1777
1928
  ];
1778
1929
  const fixMessages = [
1779
1930
  "Move this API key to an environment variable. If this key has been committed, rotate it immediately \u2014 it may have already been scraped by bots.",
1780
1931
  "AWS access key detected \u2014 may grant full account access (EC2, S3, IAM, billing). Rotate immediately in AWS Console \u2192 IAM \u2192 Security Credentials. Use IAM roles or environment variables instead.",
1781
1932
  "Stripe key detected. sk_live_ keys can process real charges, issue refunds, and access customer payment data. sk_test_ keys are lower risk but should still not be committed. Rotate in Stripe Dashboard \u2192 Developers \u2192 API Keys.",
1782
1933
  "Supabase key detected. Service role keys bypass Row Level Security and grant full database read/write access. Move to a server-side environment variable immediately.",
1783
- "OpenAI API key detected \u2014 grants full API access and can incur charges. Rotate at platform.openai.com \u2192 API Keys.",
1934
+ "OpenAI API key detected (sk-proj-, sk-svcacct-, sk-admin- or a legacy sk- key). Anyone holding it can run models on your bill, and an admin key can also manage your organization's keys and members. Revoke it at platform.openai.com \u2192 API keys and load the replacement from server-side configuration. Browser code cannot keep a key secret, so browser features must reach OpenAI through your own backend.",
1784
1935
  "Hardcoded token or password detected. Move to an environment variable and rotate the credential if it has been committed to version control.",
1785
1936
  "Named secret constant detected (XXX_SECRET / XXX_TOKEN / XXX_KEY). If it's a real credential, move it to server-side configuration \u2014 an environment variable read by server code (`process.env.NAME` in Node) \u2014 and rotate it if this file has been committed. Code that runs in the browser can't keep a secret: everything it loads is public, and `process` doesn't exist there without a bundler, so a browser-side credential has to move behind your own server. If the value is an identifier rather than a credential (a storage key, a cookie or cache name), there is nothing to rotate.",
1786
1937
  "Credential assigned to a config object property. Move to an environment variable \u2014 `apiKey: process.env.API_KEY` \u2014 and rotate the value if this file has been committed.",
1787
1938
  "Hardcoded password detected in a config object. Move to an environment variable (`password: process.env.DB_PASSWORD`) and rotate the password if this file has been committed.",
1788
1939
  "Private key found in source code. If this has been committed to version control, consider the key compromised \u2014 generate a new key pair and revoke the old one.",
1789
- "Database credentials in connection string. An attacker with this URL has full database access. Move to an environment variable, restrict network access, and rotate the password."
1940
+ "Database credentials in connection string. An attacker with this URL has full database access. Move to an environment variable, restrict network access, and rotate the password.",
1941
+ "Hugging Face access token detected (hf_). Depending on its scope it can read your private models and datasets, push to your repos, and run paid Inference Endpoints. Revoke it at huggingface.co \u2192 Settings \u2192 Access Tokens and load the replacement from server-side configuration.",
1942
+ "OpenRouter API key detected (sk-or-v1-). It spends your OpenRouter credits on any model the account can reach. Delete it at openrouter.ai \u2192 Keys and load the replacement from server-side configuration. Browser features must reach OpenRouter through your own backend.",
1943
+ "Stripe restricted key detected (rk_). Whatever it was granted \u2014 reading customers, creating charges, issuing refunds \u2014 anyone with this file has too. Roll it in Stripe Dashboard \u2192 Developers \u2192 API keys and load the replacement from server-side configuration.",
1944
+ "Google API key in code that calls Gemini. If the Generative Language API is enabled on its project, anyone with the key can run Gemini requests billed to you. Delete or regenerate it in Google Cloud Console \u2192 APIs & Services \u2192 Credentials, and call Gemini from your own backend with a key that is not in source."
1790
1945
  ];
1791
1946
  const minLen = [
1792
1947
  12,
@@ -1797,8 +1952,12 @@ var hardcodedSecrets = {
1797
1952
  // [2] Stripe
1798
1953
  50,
1799
1954
  // [3] Supabase JWT
1800
- 40,
1801
- // [4] OpenAI
1955
+ // [4] OpenAI and [11]–[14] fixed-prefix tokens: the regex already
1956
+ // fixes the length. The floor check reads the FIRST quoted value on the
1957
+ // line, which in `a = "x"; key = "sk-proj-…"` is not the token, so it
1958
+ // must not run for them. ([4] was 40, which the regex's minimum of 48
1959
+ // made redundant everywhere except that misread.)
1960
+ 0,
1802
1961
  20,
1803
1962
  // [5] generic tokens with {20,} in the regex
1804
1963
  12,
@@ -1809,18 +1968,49 @@ var hardcodedSecrets = {
1809
1968
  // [8] password: "..." — lower floor per the pattern comment above
1810
1969
  0,
1811
1970
  // [9] private keys — no length check
1812
- 0
1971
+ 0,
1813
1972
  // [10] DB URLs — no length check
1973
+ 0,
1974
+ 0,
1975
+ 0,
1976
+ 0
1977
+ // [11]–[14] see [4]
1814
1978
  ];
1979
+ const OPENAI_PI = 4;
1980
+ const FIRST_TOKEN_PI = 11;
1981
+ const STRIPE_RESTRICTED_PI = 13;
1982
+ const GOOGLE_PI = 14;
1983
+ const lines = content.split("\n");
1984
+ const fileIsGemini = GEMINI_FILE_CONTEXT_RE.test(content);
1815
1985
  const matches = [];
1816
1986
  for (let pi = 0; pi < patterns.length; pi++) {
1817
1987
  const pattern = patterns[pi];
1818
- const rawMatches = findMatches(content, pattern, hardcodedSecrets, filePath, () => fixMessages[pi]);
1988
+ if (pi === GOOGLE_PI && !fileIsGemini && !GEMINI_NAME_RE.test(content)) continue;
1989
+ const matchedText = [];
1990
+ const rawMatches = findMatches(content, pattern, hardcodedSecrets, filePath, (m) => {
1991
+ matchedText.push(m[0]);
1992
+ return fixMessages[pi];
1993
+ });
1819
1994
  const floor = minLen[pi] ?? 12;
1820
- for (const rm of rawMatches) {
1821
- const lineText = content.split("\n")[rm.line - 1] || "";
1995
+ const isTokenPattern = pi === OPENAI_PI || pi >= FIRST_TOKEN_PI;
1996
+ for (let ri = 0; ri < rawMatches.length; ri++) {
1997
+ const rm = rawMatches[ri];
1998
+ const lineText = lines[rm.line - 1] || "";
1822
1999
  const trimmed = lineText.trimStart();
1823
2000
  if (trimmed.startsWith("//") || trimmed.startsWith("#")) continue;
2001
+ if (isTokenPattern) {
2002
+ const token = matchedText[ri] ?? "";
2003
+ if (isPlaceholderToken(token)) continue;
2004
+ if (pi === GOOGLE_PI) {
2005
+ if (!isGeminiKeyContext(lines, rm.line, fileIsGemini)) continue;
2006
+ matches.push({ ...rm, severity: "high" });
2007
+ continue;
2008
+ }
2009
+ if (pi === STRIPE_RESTRICTED_PI && !token.startsWith("rk_live_")) {
2010
+ matches.push({ ...rm, severity: "high" });
2011
+ continue;
2012
+ }
2013
+ }
1824
2014
  if (floor > 0) {
1825
2015
  const secretMatch = lineText.match(/[:=]\s*["'`]([^"'`]*)["'`]/);
1826
2016
  if (secretMatch && secretMatch[1].length < floor) continue;
@@ -1937,6 +2127,323 @@ function stripCorsHeaderList(codeOnly) {
1937
2127
  ""
1938
2128
  );
1939
2129
  }
2130
+ function blankKeepLines(s) {
2131
+ return s.replace(/[^\n]/g, " ");
2132
+ }
2133
+ function closingBrace(text, open, limit) {
2134
+ let depth = 0;
2135
+ const end = Math.min(text.length, open + limit);
2136
+ for (let i = open; i < end; i++) {
2137
+ const c = text.charCodeAt(i);
2138
+ if (c === 34 || c === 39) {
2139
+ let j = i + 1;
2140
+ while (j < end) {
2141
+ const d = text.charCodeAt(j);
2142
+ if (d === 92) {
2143
+ j += 2;
2144
+ continue;
2145
+ }
2146
+ if (d === c || d === 10) break;
2147
+ j++;
2148
+ }
2149
+ i = j;
2150
+ continue;
2151
+ }
2152
+ if (c === 123) depth++;
2153
+ else if (c === 125) {
2154
+ depth--;
2155
+ if (depth === 0) return i;
2156
+ }
2157
+ }
2158
+ return -1;
2159
+ }
2160
+ var INBOUND_CREDENTIAL_READ_RE = /\b(?:req|request|c\.req|ctx\.request|event)\s*\.\s*headers?\b|\.headers\s*\.\s*get\s*\(|\bget(?:Request)?Header\s*\(|\bauth(?:orization)?Header\b/i;
2161
+ function forwardsCallerCredential(headersInner, readsCaller) {
2162
+ const CRED_ENTRY_RE = /["']?(?:authorization|x-api-key|api-key|apikey|x-auth-token|x-access-token|cookie)["']?\s*:\s*([^,\n}]{0,300})/gi;
2163
+ let e;
2164
+ while ((e = CRED_ENTRY_RE.exec(headersInner)) !== null) {
2165
+ const value = e[1].replace(/process\.env\.\w{1,80}|import\.meta\.env\.\w{1,80}|Deno\.env\.get\([^)]{0,80}\)|\benv\.\w{1,80}/g, "");
2166
+ if (/\b(?:token|accessToken|access_token|idToken|id_token|authToken|userToken|bearerToken|jwt|session|cookies?)\b/i.test(value)) {
2167
+ return true;
2168
+ }
2169
+ if (readsCaller?.(value)) return true;
2170
+ }
2171
+ return false;
2172
+ }
2173
+ var INBOUND_REQUEST_READ_RE = /\b(?:req|request|c\.req|ctx\.req(?:uest)?|event)\s*\.\s*(?:headers?|cookies|body|json|text|formData|query|params)\b|\bcookies\s*\(\s*\)|\bheaders\s*\(\s*\)\s*\.\s*get\b|\b\w{0,40}[Cc]ookies?\w{0,20}\s*(?:\.\s*get\s*\(|\[)|\bget(?:Request)?(?:Header|Cookie)s?\s*\(|[\w$]\s*\(\s*(?:req|request|ctx|event)\s*[,)]/;
2174
+ var BINDING_RE = /\b(?:const|let|var)\s+(?:([A-Za-z_$][\w$]{0,60})|\{([^{}]{0,400})\})\s*(?::[^=\n]{0,120})?=(?![=>])\s*([^;\n]{0,300})/g;
2175
+ var MAX_BINDINGS = 4096;
2176
+ function collectBindings(code) {
2177
+ const byName = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
2178
+ const add = (name, at, rhs) => {
2179
+ const list = byName.get(name);
2180
+ if (list) list.push({ at, rhs });
2181
+ else byName.set(name, [{ at, rhs }]);
2182
+ };
2183
+ let count = 0;
2184
+ let b;
2185
+ BINDING_RE.lastIndex = 0;
2186
+ while ((b = BINDING_RE.exec(code)) !== null && count < MAX_BINDINGS) {
2187
+ count++;
2188
+ if (b[1]) {
2189
+ add(b[1], b.index, b[3]);
2190
+ continue;
2191
+ }
2192
+ for (const part of b[2].split(",")) {
2193
+ const local = part.replace(/=[^]*$/, "").replace(/^[^:]*:/, "").trim().replace(/^\.\.\./, "");
2194
+ if (/^[A-Za-z_$][\w$]{0,60}$/.test(local)) add(local, b.index, b[3]);
2195
+ }
2196
+ }
2197
+ return byName;
2198
+ }
2199
+ function credentialValueReadsCaller(value, at, bindings) {
2200
+ if (INBOUND_CREDENTIAL_READ_RE.test(value) || INBOUND_REQUEST_READ_RE.test(value)) return true;
2201
+ const roots = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
2202
+ const INTERP_RE = /\$\{\s*([A-Za-z_$][\w$]{0,60})/g;
2203
+ const ROOT_RE = /(?<![\w$.])[A-Za-z_$][\w$]{0,60}/g;
2204
+ let r;
2205
+ while ((r = INTERP_RE.exec(value)) !== null && roots.size < 6) roots.add(r[1]);
2206
+ const bare = value.replace(/"[^"\n]{0,300}"|'[^'\n]{0,300}'|`[^`]{0,300}(?:`|$)/g, " ");
2207
+ while ((r = ROOT_RE.exec(bare)) !== null && roots.size < 6) roots.add(r[0]);
2208
+ for (const name of roots) {
2209
+ const list = bindings().get(name);
2210
+ if (!list || list[0].at >= at) continue;
2211
+ let lo = 0;
2212
+ let hi = list.length - 1;
2213
+ while (lo < hi) {
2214
+ const mid = lo + hi + 1 >> 1;
2215
+ if (list[mid].at < at) lo = mid;
2216
+ else hi = mid - 1;
2217
+ }
2218
+ if (INBOUND_REQUEST_READ_RE.test(list[lo].rhs)) return true;
2219
+ }
2220
+ return false;
2221
+ }
2222
+ function maskOutboundAuthNoise(code) {
2223
+ let out = code.replace(
2224
+ /(["']?)role\1\s{0,20}:\s{0,20}["'](?:user|assistant|system|developer|tool|model|function)["']/g,
2225
+ blankKeepLines
2226
+ );
2227
+ if (/["'`]assistant["'`]/.test(out)) {
2228
+ out = out.replace(/["'`](?:user|assistant|system|developer|tool)["'`]/g, blankKeepLines);
2229
+ }
2230
+ const envNames = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
2231
+ const ENV_BIND_RE = /\b(?:const|let|var)\s+([A-Za-z_$][\w$]{0,60})\s*(?::[^=\n]{0,60})?=\s*(?:Deno\.env\.get\s*\(|process\.env\b|import\.meta\.env\b)/g;
2232
+ let b;
2233
+ while ((b = ENV_BIND_RE.exec(out)) !== null && envNames.size < 32) {
2234
+ if (!/secret|webhook|signing|cron|internal|admin|password|passwd/i.test(b[1])) envNames.add(b[1]);
2235
+ }
2236
+ if (envNames.size > 0) {
2237
+ const names = [...envNames].map((n) => n.replace(/\$/g, "\\$")).join("|");
2238
+ out = out.replace(new RegExp(`(?<![\\w$.])(?:${names})(?![\\w$])`, "g"), blankKeepLines);
2239
+ }
2240
+ out = out.replace(
2241
+ /\bapi_?key["']?\s{0,20}:\s{0,20}(?:process\.env\.\w{1,80}|Deno\.env\.get\(\s*["'][\w-]{1,80}["']\s*\)|import\.meta\.env\.\w{1,80}|[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]{2,79}\b)/gi,
2242
+ blankKeepLines
2243
+ );
2244
+ let bindingMap = null;
2245
+ const bindingSource = out;
2246
+ const bindings = () => bindingMap ??= collectBindings(bindingSource);
2247
+ out = out.replace(
2248
+ /\b\w{0,40}[Hh]eaders\s*\.\s*(?:set|append)\s*\(\s*["'](?:authorization|x-api-key|api-key|x-goog-api-key)["']\s*,([^\n]{0,300})/gi,
2249
+ (call, value, at) => credentialValueReadsCaller(value, at, bindings) ? call : blankKeepLines(call)
2250
+ );
2251
+ const OPEN_RE = /\b(?:headers\s*[:=]|new\s+Headers\s*\()\s*\{/g;
2252
+ const MAX_OBJECTS = 64;
2253
+ const MAX_OBJECT_LEN = 3e3;
2254
+ let examined = 0;
2255
+ let m;
2256
+ const parts = [];
2257
+ let copied = 0;
2258
+ while ((m = OPEN_RE.exec(out)) !== null) {
2259
+ if (++examined > MAX_OBJECTS) break;
2260
+ const open = m.index + m[0].length - 1;
2261
+ const close = closingBrace(out, open, MAX_OBJECT_LEN);
2262
+ if (close === -1) continue;
2263
+ const inner = out.slice(open + 1, close);
2264
+ const readsCaller = (value) => credentialValueReadsCaller(value, open, bindings);
2265
+ if (!INBOUND_CREDENTIAL_READ_RE.test(inner) && !forwardsCallerCredential(inner, readsCaller)) {
2266
+ parts.push(out.slice(copied, open + 1), blankKeepLines(inner));
2267
+ copied = close;
2268
+ }
2269
+ OPEN_RE.lastIndex = close + 1;
2270
+ }
2271
+ if (parts.length === 0) return out;
2272
+ parts.push(out.slice(copied));
2273
+ return parts.join("");
2274
+ }
2275
+ function maskProseStrings(code) {
2276
+ return code.replace(
2277
+ /(?<!\\)"(?:[^"\\\n]|\\.){0,2000}"|(?<!\\)'(?:[^'\\\n]|\\.){0,2000}'|(?<!\\)`(?:[^`\\]|\\.){0,8000}`/g,
2278
+ (lit) => /\S\s+\S+\s+\S+\s+\S/.test(lit) ? blankKeepLines(lit) : lit
2279
+ );
2280
+ }
2281
+ var TANSTACK_START_IMPORT_RE = /["']@tanstack\/(?:(?:react|solid)-)?start(?:\/[\w-]{1,40})?["']/;
2282
+ var TANSTACK_ROUTER_IMPORT_RE = /["']@tanstack\/(?:react|solid)-router["']/;
2283
+ var TANSTACK_AUTH_MIDDLEWARE_RE = /\bmiddleware\s*[:(]\s*\[([^\]]{0,600})\]/g;
2284
+ var AUTH_MIDDLEWARE_NAME_RE = /auth|session|protect|require|guard|user|admin|clerk|signed|logged|login|member|owner|role|permission/i;
2285
+ var TANSTACK_HANDLER_AUTH_RE = [
2286
+ /\bget(?:User|Claims|Session|ServerSession|Auth|Token)\s*\(/,
2287
+ /\bget(?:Authed|Authenticated|Current|Signed\w{0,8}|Logged\w{0,8}|Session)\w{0,30}\s*\(/,
2288
+ /\bcurrentUser\b/,
2289
+ /\buse\w{0,30}Session\s*\(/,
2290
+ /\b(?:check|verify|require|assert|ensure|validate)\w{0,30}(?:Auth|Admin|Session|User|Password|Token|Role|Owner|Permission|Access|Signature|Secret|Member)\w{0,30}\s*\(/i,
2291
+ // `requireX()` / `assertX()` / `ensureX()` / `authorizeX()` is the
2292
+ // near-universal spelling of a bespoke gate — tanstack.com's own
2293
+ // `requireModerateShowcases()`, `requireCaller()`. Suppression only.
2294
+ /\b(?:require|assert|ensure|guard|protect|authori[sz]e)[A-Z]\w{0,40}\s*\(/,
2295
+ /\b(?:can|has)(?:Permission|Access|Role|Capability|Scope)\w{0,30}\s*\(/,
2296
+ /\bisAuthenticated\b/,
2297
+ /\bauth\s*\(\s*\)/,
2298
+ /\bauth\s*\.\s*api\s*\.\s*getSession\b/,
2299
+ /\.auth\s*\.\s*(?:getUser|getClaims|getSession)\b/,
2300
+ /\bcontext\s*\.\s*(?:user|userId|session|auth|claims|supabase)\b/,
2301
+ /\b(?:jwt\.verify|jwtVerify|verifyIdToken|verifyToken|timingSafeEqual|constructEvent\w{0,20}|createHmac)\s*\(/,
2302
+ /\bstatus(?:Code)?\s*[:(]\s*401\b/,
2303
+ /\bunauthori[sz]ed\b/i,
2304
+ /\bnot\s+(?:authenticated|authori[sz]ed|logged\s+in|signed\s+in)\b/i,
2305
+ // Reads the caller's credential. Forwarding it to a row-level-security
2306
+ // client scopes every query to the caller, which is the safe Supabase shape.
2307
+ /\bauthorization\b/i,
2308
+ // A capability-token lookup: the row is found by an unguessable value the
2309
+ // caller holds (`.eq("token", data.token)`, `.eq("id", body.session_id)`).
2310
+ // Share links, anonymous votes, guest chat sessions — the token in the
2311
+ // request IS the credential, the same family VC003 already accepts via a
2312
+ // 401 on the Next.js shapes. Calibration: every such handler in the sample
2313
+ // was public by design.
2314
+ /\.(?:eq|match)\(\s*["'`]\w{0,40}(?:token|secret|code|hash|key)["'`]/i,
2315
+ /\.eq\(\s*["'`]\w{1,40}["'`]\s*,\s*[\w$.]{0,60}(?:[Tt]oken|[Ss]ession_?(?:[Ii]d|[Kk]ey)|[Ss]ecret|[Hh]ash)\b/,
2316
+ // A shared-secret comparison (`data.password !== process.env.ADMIN_PASSWORD`).
2317
+ /[!=]==?\s*(?:process\.env\.|import\.meta\.env\.|Deno\.env\.get\(\s*["']|\w{1,40}\.){0,2}\w{0,40}(?:SECRET|PASSWORD|Secret|Password|secret|password)\w{0,20}/
2318
+ ];
2319
+ var TANSTACK_MUTATION_RE = [
2320
+ // Supabase: .from("orders").update(…) / .upsert(…) / .delete()
2321
+ /\.from\(\s*["'`][\w.-]{1,64}["'`]\s*\)\s*\.\s*(?:update|upsert|delete)\s*\(/,
2322
+ // Supabase admin auth API: listUsers, deleteUser, updateUserById, …
2323
+ /\.auth\s*\.\s*admin\s*\.\s*\w{1,40}\s*\(/,
2324
+ // Prisma: prisma.order.delete(…), db.user.updateMany(…)
2325
+ /\b(?:prisma|db|tx)\s*\.\s*\w{1,64}\s*\.\s*(?:update|upsert|delete|updateMany|deleteMany)\s*\(/,
2326
+ // Drizzle: db.update(orders) / db.delete(orders)
2327
+ /\b(?:db|tx)\s*\.\s*(?:update|delete)\s*\(\s*\w/,
2328
+ // Firestore admin: .doc(id).update(…) / .delete()
2329
+ /\.doc\([^()\n]{0,200}\)\s*\.\s*(?:update|delete|set)\s*\(/,
2330
+ // Raw SQL
2331
+ /\b(?:UPDATE\s+["`]?\w{1,64}["`]?\s+SET|DELETE\s+FROM)\b/
2332
+ ];
2333
+ var SUPABASE_WRITE_TABLE_RE = /\.from\(\s*["'`]([\w.-]{1,64})["'`]\s*\)\s*\.\s*(?:update|upsert|delete)\s*\(/g;
2334
+ var ANALYTICS_TABLE_RE = /(?:^|[_.-])(?:page_?views?|views?|visits?|visitors?|analytics?|tracking|clicks?|impressions?|heartbeats?|presence|metrics?|stats?|counters?)(?:[_.-]|$)/i;
2335
+ var TANSTACK_PUBLIC_FN_NAME_RE = /^(?:sign[-_]?(?:in|up|out)|log[-_]?(?:in|out)|register|reset|forgot|verify|confirm|accept[-_]?invite|redeem|callback|oauth|magic|otp|request(?:Password|Magic|Otp|Reset|Access)|track|record(?:View|Visit|Click|Event|Impression)|log(?:View|Visit|Event|Click)|increment|bump|count(?:View|Visit|Click)|subscribe|unsubscribe|join(?:Waitlist|Newsletter)|submit(?:Contact|Lead|Feedback|Inquiry|Enquiry|Waitlist|Newsletter))/i;
2336
+ var TANSTACK_PUBLIC_ROUTE_PATH_RE = /(^|[/_.[-])(auth|login|signin|sign-in|signup|sign-up|register|logout|signout|sign-out|callback|oauth|sso|session|reset-password|forgot-password|forgot|magic-?link|verify-?email|confirm|otp|invite|token|webhooks?|cron|health(?:z|check)?|sitemap|robots|og)([/\]_.-]|$)/i;
2337
+ function closingParen(text, open, limit) {
2338
+ let depth = 0;
2339
+ const end = Math.min(text.length, limit);
2340
+ for (let i = open; i < end; i++) {
2341
+ const c = text.charCodeAt(i);
2342
+ if (c === 34 || c === 39 || c === 96) {
2343
+ let j = i + 1;
2344
+ while (j < end) {
2345
+ const d = text.charCodeAt(j);
2346
+ if (d === 92) {
2347
+ j += 2;
2348
+ continue;
2349
+ }
2350
+ if (d === c || c !== 96 && d === 10) break;
2351
+ j++;
2352
+ }
2353
+ i = j;
2354
+ continue;
2355
+ }
2356
+ if (c === 40) depth++;
2357
+ else if (c === 41) {
2358
+ depth--;
2359
+ if (depth === 0) return i;
2360
+ }
2361
+ }
2362
+ return -1;
2363
+ }
2364
+ function hasAuthMiddleware(text) {
2365
+ TANSTACK_AUTH_MIDDLEWARE_RE.lastIndex = 0;
2366
+ let m;
2367
+ while ((m = TANSTACK_AUTH_MIDDLEWARE_RE.exec(text)) !== null) {
2368
+ if (AUTH_MIDDLEWARE_NAME_RE.test(m[1])) return true;
2369
+ }
2370
+ return false;
2371
+ }
2372
+ function unauthenticatedTanStackHandlers(masked, filePath) {
2373
+ const isStart = TANSTACK_START_IMPORT_RE.test(masked);
2374
+ const hasServerFn = /\bcreateServerFn\s*\(/.test(masked);
2375
+ const hasServerRoute = /\bcreateServerFileRoute\s*\(|\bcreateAPIFileRoute\s*\(/.test(masked) || /\bserver\s*:\s*\{/.test(masked) && /\bhandlers\s*:/.test(masked);
2376
+ if (!hasServerFn && !hasServerRoute) return [];
2377
+ if (!isStart && !(hasServerRoute && TANSTACK_ROUTER_IMPORT_RE.test(masked))) return [];
2378
+ if (TANSTACK_PUBLIC_ROUTE_PATH_RE.test(filePath)) return [];
2379
+ const hits = [];
2380
+ const touchesData = (body) => {
2381
+ const supabaseWrites = [...body.matchAll(SUPABASE_WRITE_TABLE_RE)].map((w) => w[1]);
2382
+ const otherWrites = TANSTACK_MUTATION_RE.slice(1).some((p) => p.test(body));
2383
+ if (otherWrites) return true;
2384
+ return supabaseWrites.some((t) => !ANALYTICS_TABLE_RE.test(t));
2385
+ };
2386
+ const establishesCaller = (body) => hasAuthMiddleware(body) || TANSTACK_HANDLER_AUTH_RE.some((p) => p.test(body));
2387
+ if (hasServerFn) {
2388
+ const starts = [];
2389
+ const FN_RE = /\bcreateServerFn\s*\(/g;
2390
+ let m;
2391
+ while ((m = FN_RE.exec(masked)) !== null && starts.length < 500) starts.push(m.index);
2392
+ for (let k = 0; k < starts.length; k++) {
2393
+ const start = starts[k];
2394
+ const limit = k + 1 < starts.length ? starts[k + 1] : Math.min(masked.length, start + 4e4);
2395
+ const h = /\.handler\s*\(/.exec(masked.slice(start, limit));
2396
+ if (!h) continue;
2397
+ const open = start + h.index + h[0].length - 1;
2398
+ const close = closingParen(masked, open, limit);
2399
+ const chain = masked.slice(start, close === -1 ? limit : close + 1);
2400
+ const header = masked.slice(start, open);
2401
+ const body = masked.slice(open, close === -1 ? limit : close + 1);
2402
+ const before = masked.slice(Math.max(0, start - 120), start);
2403
+ const nameMatch = before.match(/\b(?:const|let|var)\s+(\w{1,80})\s*(?::[^=\n]{0,80})?=\s*$/);
2404
+ if (nameMatch && TANSTACK_PUBLIC_FN_NAME_RE.test(nameMatch[1])) continue;
2405
+ if (hasAuthMiddleware(header)) continue;
2406
+ if (!touchesData(body)) continue;
2407
+ if (establishesCaller(chain)) continue;
2408
+ hits.push(nameMatch && nameMatch.index !== void 0 ? start - before.length + nameMatch.index : start);
2409
+ if (hits.length >= 50) return hits;
2410
+ }
2411
+ }
2412
+ if (hasServerRoute) {
2413
+ const serverBlock = /\bserver\s*:\s*\{/.exec(masked);
2414
+ const routeLevelAuth = serverBlock !== null && (() => {
2415
+ const close = closingBrace(masked, serverBlock.index + serverBlock[0].length - 1, 6e4);
2416
+ const block = masked.slice(serverBlock.index, close === -1 ? masked.length : close);
2417
+ const handlersAt = block.search(/\bhandlers\s*:/);
2418
+ return hasAuthMiddleware(handlersAt === -1 ? block : block.slice(0, handlersAt));
2419
+ })();
2420
+ if (!routeLevelAuth) {
2421
+ const METHOD_RE = /\b(GET|POST|PUT|PATCH|DELETE)\s*:\s*(?:async\s+)?(?:\(|function\b|\{|[A-Za-z_$][\w$]{0,40}\s*=>)/g;
2422
+ const methodStarts = [];
2423
+ let m;
2424
+ while ((m = METHOD_RE.exec(masked)) !== null && methodStarts.length < 200) methodStarts.push(m.index);
2425
+ for (let k = 0; k < methodStarts.length; k++) {
2426
+ const start = methodStarts[k];
2427
+ const limit = k + 1 < methodStarts.length ? methodStarts[k + 1] : Math.min(masked.length, start + 4e4);
2428
+ const head = masked.slice(start, Math.min(limit, start + 400));
2429
+ const opener = /^\w+\s*:\s*\{/.exec(head) ?? /=>\s*\{/.exec(head) ?? /\)\s*\{/.exec(head);
2430
+ let body;
2431
+ if (opener) {
2432
+ const braceAt = start + opener.index + opener[0].length - 1;
2433
+ const close = closingBrace(masked, braceAt, limit - braceAt);
2434
+ body = masked.slice(start, close === -1 ? limit : close + 1);
2435
+ } else {
2436
+ body = masked.slice(start, limit);
2437
+ }
2438
+ if (!touchesData(body)) continue;
2439
+ if (establishesCaller(body)) continue;
2440
+ hits.push(start);
2441
+ if (hits.length >= 50) return hits;
2442
+ }
2443
+ }
2444
+ }
2445
+ return hits;
2446
+ }
1940
2447
  var missingAuthMiddleware = {
1941
2448
  id: "VC003",
1942
2449
  title: "API Route Missing Authentication",
@@ -1944,7 +2451,9 @@ var missingAuthMiddleware = {
1944
2451
  category: "Authentication",
1945
2452
  description: "API routes without authentication checks allow unauthorized access.",
1946
2453
  check(content, filePath, project) {
1947
- if (!isServerSideFile(filePath, content)) return [];
2454
+ const serverSide = isServerSideFile(filePath, content);
2455
+ const tanstackCandidate = !serverSide && !isTestFile(filePath) && /@tanstack\/(?:(?:react|solid)-)?(?:start|router)\b/.test(content);
2456
+ if (!serverSide && !tanstackCandidate) return [];
1948
2457
  if (PUBLIC_BY_CONVENTION_ROUTE.test(routeSegmentName(filePath))) return [];
1949
2458
  const routePatterns = [
1950
2459
  // Express/Hono style
@@ -1960,7 +2469,7 @@ var missingAuthMiddleware = {
1960
2469
  /module\.exports\s*=\s*(?:async\s+)?(?:function\b|\()/g
1961
2470
  );
1962
2471
  }
1963
- if (/^\s*["']use server["']/m.test(content)) {
2472
+ if (USE_SERVER_DIRECTIVE_RE.test(content)) {
1964
2473
  routePatterns.push(
1965
2474
  /export\s+(?:async\s+)?function\s+\w+\s*\(/g,
1966
2475
  /export\s+const\s+\w+\s*(?::[^=\n]{0,120})?=\s*(?:async\s*)?\(/g
@@ -1984,7 +2493,7 @@ var missingAuthMiddleware = {
1984
2493
  if (isAuthRoute) return [];
1985
2494
  const isWebhookRoute = /\/webhook/i.test(filePath) || /(?:^|[/_-])webhooks?(?:[/_.-]|$)/i.test(filePath);
1986
2495
  if (isWebhookRoute) return [];
1987
- const codeOnly = content.replace(/\/\*[\s\S]*?\*\//g, "").replace(/(^|[^:])\/\/.*$/gm, "$1").replace(/^\s*#.*$/gm, "");
2496
+ const codeOnly = replaceBlockComments(content, () => "").replace(/(^|[^:])\/\/.*$/gm, "$1").replace(/^[ \t\uFEFF]*#.*$/gm, "");
1988
2497
  const authPatterns = [
1989
2498
  /\bgetUser\b/i,
1990
2499
  /\bcurrentUser\b/i,
@@ -2000,6 +2509,13 @@ var missingAuthMiddleware = {
2000
2509
  /\bcheckApiKey\b/i,
2001
2510
  /\bverifyCronSecret\b/i,
2002
2511
  /\bverifySecret\b/i,
2512
+ // Signed-request receivers: `await verifyQstashSignature({ req, rawBody })`,
2513
+ // `verifyWebhookSignature(…)`, Upstash's `receiver.verify({ signature,
2514
+ // body })`. Since outbound headers are masked, a route that relied on
2515
+ // its own outbound `Bearer ${key}` to pass no longer does, and these
2516
+ // are what actually authenticate it.
2517
+ /\bverify\w{0,20}Signature\w{0,20}\s*\(/i,
2518
+ /\b\w{0,30}[Rr]eceiver\s*\.\s*verify\s*\(/,
2003
2519
  /supabase\.auth/i,
2004
2520
  /firebase\.auth/i,
2005
2521
  /\bclerk\b/i,
@@ -2038,16 +2554,17 @@ var missingAuthMiddleware = {
2038
2554
  const handlerAuthPatterns = authPatterns.filter(
2039
2555
  (p) => !APP_LEVEL_AUTH.some((a) => a.source === p.source)
2040
2556
  );
2041
- const maskedForScope = maskComments(content);
2557
+ const maskedForScope = maskOutboundAuthNoise(maskComments(content));
2558
+ const codeForAuth = maskOutboundAuthNoise(codeOnly);
2042
2559
  const handlerHasAuth = (index) => {
2043
2560
  const bodyStart = maskedForScope.indexOf("{", index);
2044
2561
  const probe = bodyStart === -1 ? index : bodyStart + 1;
2045
2562
  const scope = enclosingHandler(maskedForScope, probe);
2046
- if (scope === null) return handlerAuthPatterns.some((p) => p.test(codeOnly));
2563
+ if (scope === null) return handlerAuthPatterns.some((p) => p.test(codeForAuth));
2047
2564
  return handlerAuthPatterns.some((p) => p.test(scope));
2048
2565
  };
2049
2566
  const matches = [];
2050
- for (const pattern of routePatterns) {
2567
+ for (const pattern of serverSide ? routePatterns : []) {
2051
2568
  matches.push(
2052
2569
  ...findMatches(
2053
2570
  content,
@@ -2058,11 +2575,11 @@ var missingAuthMiddleware = {
2058
2575
  )
2059
2576
  );
2060
2577
  }
2061
- if (matches.length === 0 && SUPABASE_EDGE_FN_RE.test(filePath) && isDenoEdgeEntry(codeOnly) && !isPublicByDesignEdgePath(filePath)) {
2578
+ if (matches.length === 0 && serverSide && SUPABASE_EDGE_FN_RE.test(filePath) && isDenoEdgeEntry(codeOnly) && !isPublicByDesignEdgePath(filePath)) {
2062
2579
  const fnName = supabaseFunctionName(filePath);
2063
2580
  const verifyJwt = fnName && project?.supabaseEdgeVerifyJwt ? project.supabaseEdgeVerifyJwt.get(fnName) : void 0;
2064
2581
  if (verifyJwt !== true) {
2065
- const withoutCors = stripCorsHeaderList(codeOnly);
2582
+ const withoutCors = maskProseStrings(maskOutboundAuthNoise(stripCorsHeaderList(codeOnly)));
2066
2583
  const hasWeakHint = verifyJwt === false ? false : EDGE_WEAK_AUTH_HINTS.some((p) => p.test(withoutCors));
2067
2584
  if (!hasWeakHint) {
2068
2585
  matches.push(
@@ -2083,6 +2600,21 @@ var missingAuthMiddleware = {
2083
2600
  }
2084
2601
  const indexOfLine = (line) => lineStarts[Math.max(0, Math.min(line - 1, lineStarts.length - 1))];
2085
2602
  const unauthenticated = matches.filter((m) => !handlerHasAuth(indexOfLine(m.line)));
2603
+ if (serverSide || tanstackCandidate) {
2604
+ for (const idx of unauthenticatedTanStackHandlers(maskedForScope, filePath)) {
2605
+ const line = lineNumberAt(content, idx);
2606
+ unauthenticated.push({
2607
+ rule: "VC003",
2608
+ title: missingAuthMiddleware.title,
2609
+ severity: "high",
2610
+ category: missingAuthMiddleware.category,
2611
+ file: filePath,
2612
+ line,
2613
+ snippet: getSnippet(content, line),
2614
+ fix: "This TanStack Start handler changes data and is callable by anyone who can reach the app: server functions and server routes are public endpoints, and a route's beforeLoad guard does not protect them. Attach an auth middleware (`.middleware([requireSupabaseAuth])` in Lovable projects) and scope the write to the caller (`context.userId`), or verify the caller inside the handler and return 401. If it is public by design, add an inline `// VC003-OK: <reason>` comment above it."
2615
+ });
2616
+ }
2617
+ }
2086
2618
  return filterSilenced(unauthenticated, content, "VC003");
2087
2619
  }
2088
2620
  };
@@ -2453,35 +2985,61 @@ var clientSideAuth = {
2453
2985
  return matches;
2454
2986
  }
2455
2987
  };
2988
+ var PUBLIC_ENV_FIX = {
2989
+ NEXT_PUBLIC_: "Remove the NEXT_PUBLIC_ prefix. Only use NEXT_PUBLIC_ for values safe to expose in the browser.",
2990
+ VITE_: "Vite inlines every VITE_ variable that client code reads into the JavaScript bundle each visitor downloads. Rename it without the VITE_ prefix and use it only in server code \u2014 an API route or edge function that makes the call for the browser \u2014 then rotate the key if a build has been deployed.",
2991
+ REACT_APP_: "Create React App inlines every REACT_APP_ variable into the JavaScript bundle each visitor downloads. Rename it without the REACT_APP_ prefix and use it only in server code \u2014 an API route or serverless function that makes the call for the browser \u2014 then rotate the key if a build has been deployed.",
2992
+ EXPO_PUBLIC_: "Expo inlines EXPO_PUBLIC_ variables into the app bundle, which anyone can unpack from the installed app. Rename it without the EXPO_PUBLIC_ prefix and make the call from your backend, then rotate the key if a build has shipped.",
2993
+ GATSBY_: "Gatsby inlines GATSBY_ variables into the JavaScript bundle each visitor downloads. Rename it without the GATSBY_ prefix and use it only in server code (a Gatsby Function or your API), then rotate the key if a build has been deployed.",
2994
+ PUBLIC_: "SvelteKit ($env/static/public) and Astro send PUBLIC_ variables to the browser. Rename it without the PUBLIC_ prefix and read it only in server code ($env/static/private, or a server endpoint), then rotate the key if a build has been deployed.",
2995
+ NUXT_PUBLIC_: "Nuxt copies NUXT_PUBLIC_ variables into runtimeConfig.public, which is sent to every client. Rename it to NUXT_<NAME> so it lands in the private runtimeConfig and use it only in server routes, then rotate the key if a build has been deployed."
2996
+ };
2997
+ var NEXT_PUBLIC_ASSIGN_RE = /(?:^|[^A-Za-z0-9_])(NEXT_PUBLIC_[A-Za-z0-9_]{1,128})\s*=\s*([^\r\n]*)/i;
2456
2998
  var nextPublicSecret = {
2457
2999
  id: "VC011",
2458
- title: "Secret in NEXT_PUBLIC_ Environment Variable",
3000
+ title: "Secret in Browser-Exposed Environment Variable",
2459
3001
  severity: "critical",
2460
3002
  category: "Secrets",
2461
- description: "NEXT_PUBLIC_ variables are exposed to the browser. Secrets placed here are visible to anyone.",
3003
+ description: "Variables with a browser-exposed prefix (NEXT_PUBLIC_, VITE_, REACT_APP_, EXPO_PUBLIC_, GATSBY_, PUBLIC_, NUXT_PUBLIC_) are built into code shipped to every visitor or app user. A secret placed in one is visible to anyone.",
2462
3004
  check(content, filePath) {
2463
- if (!filePath.match(/\.env/) && !filePath.match(/next\.config/)) return [];
2464
- const patterns = [
2465
- /NEXT_PUBLIC_[A-Z_]*(?:SECRET|KEY|TOKEN|PASSWORD|PRIVATE)[A-Z_]*\s*=\s*.+/gi,
2466
- /NEXT_PUBLIC_[A-Z_]*(?:SUPABASE_SERVICE|CLERK_SECRET|STRIPE_SECRET)[A-Z_]*\s*=\s*.+/gi
2467
- ];
3005
+ const legacyScope = /\.env/.test(filePath) || /next\.config/.test(filePath);
3006
+ const dotenvScope = isDotenvPath(filePath);
3007
+ if (!legacyScope && !dotenvScope) return [];
3008
+ if (!/(?:NEXT_PUBLIC_|NUXT_PUBLIC_|EXPO_PUBLIC_|REACT_APP_|GATSBY_|VITE_|PUBLIC_)/i.test(content)) return [];
2468
3009
  const matches = [];
2469
- for (const p of patterns) {
2470
- const raw = findMatches(
2471
- content,
2472
- p,
2473
- nextPublicSecret,
2474
- filePath,
2475
- () => "Remove the NEXT_PUBLIC_ prefix. Only use NEXT_PUBLIC_ for values safe to expose in the browser."
2476
- );
2477
- for (const m of raw) {
2478
- const lineText = content.split("\n")[m.line - 1] || "";
2479
- if (/PUBLISHABLE|ANON_KEY|PUBLIC_KEY/i.test(lineText)) continue;
2480
- if (/CLERK_PUBLISHABLE/i.test(lineText)) continue;
2481
- if (/STRIPE_PUBLISHABLE/i.test(lineText)) continue;
2482
- if (/=\s*["']?\s*$|=\s*["']?pk_(?:test|live)_["']?\s*$/.test(lineText)) continue;
2483
- matches.push(m);
3010
+ const lines = content.split("\n");
3011
+ for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
3012
+ const line = lines[i];
3013
+ const trimmed = line.trimStart();
3014
+ if (/^(?:#|\/\/|\*|\/\*|<!--)/.test(trimmed)) continue;
3015
+ let name;
3016
+ let value = "";
3017
+ const a = dotenvScope ? DOTENV_ASSIGN_RE.exec(line) : null;
3018
+ if (a && PUBLIC_ENV_PREFIX_RE.test(a[1])) {
3019
+ name = a[1];
3020
+ value = a[2];
3021
+ } else if (legacyScope) {
3022
+ const n = NEXT_PUBLIC_ASSIGN_RE.exec(line);
3023
+ if (n) {
3024
+ name = n[1];
3025
+ value = n[2];
3026
+ }
2484
3027
  }
3028
+ if (!name) continue;
3029
+ const bare = dotenvValue(value);
3030
+ if (bare === "" || /^pk_(?:test|live)_$/.test(bare)) continue;
3031
+ const verdict = classifyPublicEnvVar(name, bare);
3032
+ if (!verdict || !verdict.secret) continue;
3033
+ matches.push({
3034
+ rule: "VC011",
3035
+ title: nextPublicSecret.title,
3036
+ severity: "critical",
3037
+ category: "Secrets",
3038
+ file: filePath,
3039
+ line: i + 1,
3040
+ snippet: getSnippet(content, i + 1),
3041
+ fix: PUBLIC_ENV_FIX[verdict.prefix] ?? PUBLIC_ENV_FIX.NEXT_PUBLIC_
3042
+ });
2485
3043
  }
2486
3044
  return matches;
2487
3045
  }
@@ -3435,8 +3993,29 @@ var complianceMap = {
3435
3993
  // VC213–VC214: account state held in browser storage
3436
3994
  VC213: { owasp: "A01:2021", cwe: "CWE-602" },
3437
3995
  // entitlement from web storage (client-side enforcement)
3438
- VC214: { owasp: "A04:2021", cwe: "CWE-1188" }
3996
+ VC214: { owasp: "A04:2021", cwe: "CWE-1188" },
3439
3997
  // per-account state from web storage (insecure default state)
3998
+ // VC215: Supabase migration lint — RLS off, always-true write policy, user_metadata in a policy
3999
+ VC215: { owasp: "A01:2021", cwe: "CWE-732" },
4000
+ // incorrect permission assignment for a critical resource
4001
+ VC216: { owasp: "A01:2021", cwe: "CWE-732" },
4002
+ // Firebase rules: open, any-signed-in-user, or test mode
4003
+ // VC217: AI or secret key shipped to the browser
4004
+ VC217: { owasp: "A07:2021", cwe: "CWE-798" },
4005
+ // key inlined into the client bundle (as VC066 / VC149)
4006
+ VC220: { owasp: "A01:2021", cwe: "CWE-862" },
4007
+ // unauthenticated AI/LLM proxy (denial of wallet); same class as VC003
4008
+ // VC218–VC219: caller identity never checked, or checked against data the caller controls
4009
+ VC218: { owasp: "A01:2021", cwe: "CWE-862" },
4010
+ // Base44 asServiceRole with no caller check (missing authorization, as VC003)
4011
+ VC219: { owasp: "A01:2021", cwe: "CWE-269" },
4012
+ // role/plan from user_metadata / unsafeMetadata (improper privilege management)
4013
+ VC221: { owasp: "A07:2021", cwe: "CWE-347" },
4014
+ // server trusts unverified session / decoded JWT
4015
+ VC222: { owasp: "A05:2021", cwe: "CWE-942" },
4016
+ // Python CORS wildcard with credentials (origin echoed)
4017
+ VC223: { owasp: "A01:2021", cwe: "CWE-22" }
4018
+ // prefix-only path containment check (startsWith without separator)
3440
4019
  };
3441
4020
  var consoleLogProduction = {
3442
4021
  id: "VC097",
@@ -3621,15 +4200,15 @@ function runCustomRules(content, filePath, disabledRules = [], tier = "free", ex
3621
4200
 
3622
4201
  // src/rule-counts.ts
3623
4202
  var FREE_RULE_COUNT = 30;
3624
- var PRO_RULE_COUNT = 184;
3625
- var TOTAL_RULE_COUNT = 214;
4203
+ var PRO_RULE_COUNT = 193;
4204
+ var TOTAL_RULE_COUNT = 223;
3626
4205
 
3627
4206
  // src/ai-fp-filter.ts
3628
4207
  var import_sdk = __toESM(require("@anthropic-ai/sdk"), 1);
3629
4208
  var REVIEW_SYSTEM_PROMPT = `You are reviewing security scan findings for false positives. Your job is to look at each finding and the surrounding code to determine if it's a REAL security vulnerability or a FALSE POSITIVE.
3630
4209
 
3631
4210
  Common false positive patterns you should catch:
3632
- - Auth check exists inside the function body (requireUser, requireUserForApi, getSession, etc.) but the scanner only checked the function signature
4211
+ - Auth check exists inside the function body (requireUser, requireUserForApi, supabase.auth.getUser, jwt.verify, etc.) but the scanner only checked the function signature. These are NOT auth checks in server code: supabase.auth.getSession() (it reads the cookie without verifying it), jwt.decode() / decodeJwt() / jwtDecode(), or PyJWT with verify_signature False. A finding that says the server trusts one of them is real unless the same code also verifies the token
3633
4212
  - The flagged pattern is in example/documentation/tutorial code, not production code
3634
4213
  - The variable is developer-controlled (constants, config values, static strings), not user input
3635
4214
  - The flagged function is a database method (conn.exec, db.exec, prisma.$executeRaw) not a shell command (child_process.exec)
@@ -3917,10 +4496,18 @@ var SAFE_PATTERNS = [
3917
4496
  // double-flag these. They are designed to ship to the browser.
3918
4497
  /^pk_(?:live|test|[a-z0-9]+)_/,
3919
4498
  // Stripe / Clerk publishable
4499
+ // A string that IS an env-var name — `required: ["VITE_SUPABASE_URL", …]`.
4500
+ // This tests the VALUE, never the variable it is assigned to: a secret held
4501
+ // in a public-prefixed variable is decided by classifyPublicEnvVar below.
3920
4502
  /^NEXT_PUBLIC_|^VITE_|^REACT_APP_/,
3921
- // Build-time public env vars
3922
4503
  /^pub_/,
3923
4504
  // Segment etc.
4505
+ // dotenvx ciphertext: `STRIPE_SECRET_KEY="encrypted:BE9Y…"`. dotenvx
4506
+ // encrypts each value to the file's public key (ECIES); the private key
4507
+ // stays in the git-ignored .env.keys, and committing the encrypted file is
4508
+ // the documented workflow (Supabase's own dotenvx example does). The value
4509
+ // is not usable without that key, so it is not a leaked secret.
4510
+ /^encrypted:[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{20,}$/,
3924
4511
  /^ey[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.ey[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\./,
3925
4512
  // JWT header.payload prefix — don't flag solely on entropy
3926
4513
  // Content-Security-Policy hashes / nonces in HTML/JSON
@@ -3947,6 +4534,8 @@ var VERIFICATION_BLOCK_RE = /\bverification\s*:\s*\{/;
3947
4534
  var VERIFICATION_KEY_NAMES = /^(?:google|yandex|yahoo|bing|me|other|["']?(?:google-site-verification|facebook-domain-verification|msvalidate\.01|norton-safeweb-site-verification|ahrefs-site-verification|p:domain_verify|wot-verification)["']?)$/i;
3948
4535
  var VERIFICATION_META_RE = /<meta[^>]+name\s*=\s*["'][^"']*(?:site-verification|domain-verification|msvalidate|domain_verify)[^"']*["']/i;
3949
4536
  var SECRET_VAR_NAMES = /(?:^|[^a-z])(?:key|secret|token|password|passwd|pwd|api[_-]?key|auth|credential|private|signing|bearer|access[_-]?token|refresh[_-]?token|session[_-]?id)(?:$|[^a-z])/i;
4537
+ var DOTENV_EXAMPLE_RE = /\.(?:example|sample|template|dist|defaults?)$/i;
4538
+ var MAX_DOTENV_VALUE = 256;
3950
4539
  function getSnippet2(content, line) {
3951
4540
  const lines = content.split("\n");
3952
4541
  const start = Math.max(0, line - 2);
@@ -3969,6 +4558,7 @@ function scanEntropy(files) {
3969
4558
  if (/pro-rules-bundle|\.bundle\.|\.chunk\./i.test(filePath)) continue;
3970
4559
  if (/(?:\.test\.|\.spec\.|__tests__|__mocks__|fixtures?\/)/i.test(filePath)) continue;
3971
4560
  const vendored = isVendoredPath(filePath);
4561
+ const dotenv = isDotenvPath(filePath) && !DOTENV_EXAMPLE_RE.test(filePath);
3972
4562
  const lines = content.split("\n");
3973
4563
  let verificationDepth = -1;
3974
4564
  let braceDepth = 0;
@@ -3987,14 +4577,27 @@ function scanEntropy(files) {
3987
4577
  const inVerificationBlock = verificationDepth !== -1;
3988
4578
  const trimmed = line.trimStart();
3989
4579
  if (trimmed.startsWith("//") || trimmed.startsWith("#") || trimmed.startsWith("*") || trimmed.startsWith("/*")) continue;
3990
- const stringPattern = /(?:[:=]\s*)(["'`])([^"'`\n]{20,120})\1/g;
3991
- let match;
3992
- while ((match = stringPattern.exec(line)) !== null) {
3993
- const value = match[2];
4580
+ const candidates = [];
4581
+ const assign = dotenv ? DOTENV_ASSIGN_RE.exec(line) : null;
4582
+ const assignValue = assign ? dotenvValue(assign[2]) : "";
4583
+ const structured = assign !== null && (assignValue.length > MAX_DOTENV_VALUE || /^[{[]/.test(assignValue));
4584
+ if (assign && !structured) {
4585
+ if (assignValue.length >= 20) {
4586
+ candidates.push({ value: assignValue, beforeAssign: assign[1], dotenvName: assign[1] });
4587
+ }
4588
+ } else {
4589
+ const stringPattern = /(?:[:=]\s*)(["'`])([^"'`\n]{20,120})\1/g;
4590
+ let match;
4591
+ while ((match = stringPattern.exec(line)) !== null) {
4592
+ let beforeAssign = line.substring(0, match.index);
4593
+ if (structured) beforeAssign = beforeAssign.slice(Math.max(beforeAssign.lastIndexOf(","), beforeAssign.lastIndexOf("{")) + 1);
4594
+ candidates.push({ value: match[2], beforeAssign });
4595
+ }
4596
+ }
4597
+ for (const { value, beforeAssign, dotenvName } of candidates) {
3994
4598
  if (value.includes("${")) continue;
3995
4599
  if (SAFE_PATTERNS.some((p) => p.test(value))) continue;
3996
4600
  if (HASH_PREFIX_RE.test(value)) continue;
3997
- const beforeAssign = line.substring(0, match.index);
3998
4601
  if (SAFE_VAR_NAMES.test(beforeAssign)) continue;
3999
4602
  if (/^https?:\/\/[^:@]*$/.test(value)) continue;
4000
4603
  if ((value.match(/\s/g) || []).length > 2) continue;
@@ -4006,11 +4609,15 @@ function scanEntropy(files) {
4006
4609
  if (value.length < 20) continue;
4007
4610
  const entropy = shannonEntropy(value);
4008
4611
  if (entropy < threshold) continue;
4009
- const varName = beforeAssign.match(/["']([^"']+)["']\s*$/)?.[1] || beforeAssign.match(/([\w$-]+)\s*$/)?.[1] || "";
4612
+ const varName = dotenvName || beforeAssign.match(/["']([^"']+)["']\s*$/)?.[1] || beforeAssign.match(/([\w$-]+)\s*$/)?.[1] || "";
4010
4613
  if (inVerificationBlock && VERIFICATION_KEY_NAMES.test(varName)) continue;
4011
4614
  if (VERIFICATION_META_RE.test(line)) continue;
4012
4615
  if (HASH_LIKE_VAR_NAMES.test(varName) && (isHex || isBase64)) continue;
4013
- const isLikelySecret = SECRET_VAR_NAMES.test(varName);
4616
+ if (/^DOTENV_PUBLIC_KEY(?:_\w{1,60})?$/.test(varName) && /^0[23][0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/.test(value)) continue;
4617
+ const publicEnv = classifyPublicEnvVar(varName, value);
4618
+ if (publicEnv && publicEnv.publicByDesign) continue;
4619
+ if (dotenvName && /(?:^|_)IDS?$/i.test(dotenvName) && !SECRET_VAR_NAMES.test(dotenvName)) continue;
4620
+ const isLikelySecret = SECRET_VAR_NAMES.test(varName) || publicEnv?.secret === true;
4014
4621
  if (entropy < 4.5 && !isLikelySecret) continue;
4015
4622
  if (isLineSilenced(lines, i, "ENTROPY")) continue;
4016
4623
  const masked = value.substring(0, 6) + "..." + value.substring(value.length - 4);
@@ -4024,7 +4631,10 @@ function scanEntropy(files) {
4024
4631
  file: filePath,
4025
4632
  line: i + 1,
4026
4633
  snippet: getSnippet2(content, i + 1),
4027
- fix: "If this is a secret, move it to an environment variable. If it's not a secret (e.g. a hash, encoded data, or a public verification token), add an inline `// ENTROPY-OK: <reason>` comment above the line, or add the file to .xploitscanignore.",
4634
+ // The generic advice ("move it to an environment variable") is
4635
+ // wrong for a value that is already in one, so dotenv findings get
4636
+ // advice about the file, and public-prefixed ones about the prefix.
4637
+ fix: publicEnv?.secret ? `${varName} has a browser-exposed prefix (${publicEnv.prefix}), so the framework writes its value into any browser code that reads it. Rename it without the prefix, use it only in server code, and rotate the credential if a build has been deployed.` : dotenvName ? "If this is a live credential, keep this env file out of version control (add it to .gitignore and run `git rm --cached` on it) and rotate the credential if the file has been committed. If it's not a secret, add an inline `# ENTROPY-OK: <reason>` comment above the line." : "If this is a secret, move it to an environment variable. If it's not a secret (e.g. a hash, encoded data, or a public verification token), add an inline `// ENTROPY-OK: <reason>` comment above the line, or add the file to .xploitscanignore.",
4028
4638
  category: "Secrets",
4029
4639
  source: "custom",
4030
4640
  owasp: "A02:2021",
@@ -7722,6 +8332,7 @@ function scanQuality(input, rules = qualityRules) {
7722
8332
  // Annotate the CommonJS export names for ESM import in node:
7723
8333
  0 && (module.exports = {
7724
8334
  CHECKABLE_CLAIMS,
8335
+ DOTENV_ASSIGN_RE,
7725
8336
  FREE_RULE_COUNT,
7726
8337
  INTENT_EXPECTATIONS,
7727
8338
  MODEL_ANALYSIS,
@@ -7731,6 +8342,7 @@ function scanQuality(input, rules = qualityRules) {
7731
8342
  MODEL_TRIAGE,
7732
8343
  NON_APP_PATH_PATTERNS,
7733
8344
  PRO_RULE_COUNT,
8345
+ PUBLIC_ENV_PREFIX_RE,
7734
8346
  QUALITY_EXAMPLES,
7735
8347
  RULE_IMPACTS,
7736
8348
  TEST_FILE_PATTERN,
@@ -7745,6 +8357,7 @@ function scanQuality(input, rules = qualityRules) {
7745
8357
  callSpreads,
7746
8358
  checkIntent,
7747
8359
  classifyExposure,
8360
+ classifyPublicEnvVar,
7748
8361
  classifyStatement,
7749
8362
  clientSideAuth,
7750
8363
  complianceMap,
@@ -7756,6 +8369,7 @@ function scanQuality(input, rules = qualityRules) {
7756
8369
  detectFramework,
7757
8370
  detectPlatform,
7758
8371
  disabledTLSVerification,
8372
+ dotenvValue,
7759
8373
  emptyCatchBlock,
7760
8374
  enclosingHandler,
7761
8375
  envNotGitignored,
@@ -7781,6 +8395,7 @@ function scanQuality(input, rules = qualityRules) {
7781
8395
  isCalleeNamed,
7782
8396
  isClientTarget,
7783
8397
  isCommentLine,
8398
+ isDotenvPath,
7784
8399
  isInlineSilenced,
7785
8400
  isInsideFixMessage,
7786
8401
  isLineSilenced,
@@ -7794,6 +8409,7 @@ function scanQuality(input, rules = qualityRules) {
7794
8409
  lineNumberAt,
7795
8410
  lineTextAt,
7796
8411
  maskComments,
8412
+ maskOutboundAuthNoise,
7797
8413
  missingAuthMiddleware,
7798
8414
  missingCSP,
7799
8415
  missingErrorBoundary,
@@ -7806,6 +8422,7 @@ function scanQuality(input, rules = qualityRules) {
7806
8422
  parseScanTarget,
7807
8423
  parseSupabaseConfig,
7808
8424
  qualityRules,
8425
+ replaceBlockComments,
7809
8426
  routeForFile,
7810
8427
  runCustomRules,
7811
8428
  scanEntropy,