web-agent-bridge 3.4.0 → 3.9.0

package/server/security/cross-site-redactor.js

@@ -1,196 +1,196 @@
-'use strict';
-
-/**
- * Cross-Site Redactor — prevents PII / payment data from leaking between sites
- * via the agent mesh, multi-agent orchestration, or shared knowledge stores.
- *
- * Defense strategy:
- *   1. **Detect** common sensitive value patterns in any string field
- *      (credit cards via Luhn, IBANs, emails, phone numbers, JWTs, API keys,
- *      government IDs, addresses).
- *   2. **Strip** keys that look sensitive (`password`, `card`, `secret`, ...).
- *   3. **Hash** cross-site identifiers when they MUST cross a boundary
- *      (HMAC-SHA256 with a per-tenant pepper) so reverse engineering them is
- *      computationally hard.
- *   4. **Audit** every cross-site transfer in `cross_site_transfers` so a
- *      tenant admin can review what their agent shared.
- *
- * Use this whenever payload `(site_a, agent) → (site_b)` would carry
- * user-controlled fields. Specifically:
- *   - agent-mesh.shareKnowledge / shareTactic
- *   - multi-agent orchestration handoffs
- *   - cross-tenant analytics exports
- */
-
-const crypto = require('crypto');
-const { db } = require('../models/db');
-
-const SECRET_FIELDS = new Set([
-  'password', 'pass', 'pwd', 'secret', 'token', 'jwt',
-  'api_key', 'apikey', 'auth', 'authorization',
-  'card', 'card_number', 'cardnumber', 'cvv', 'cvc', 'pan',
-  'ssn', 'national_id', 'passport', 'iban', 'bban',
-  'session', 'cookie', 'private_key', 'privatekey',
-  'recovery', 'mnemonic', 'seed_phrase',
-]);
-
-const RE_EMAIL = /[a-z0-9._%+-]+@[a-z0-9.-]+\.[a-z]{2,}/gi;
-const RE_PHONE = /\+?\d[\d\s().-]{7,}\d/g;
-const RE_JWT = /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\b/g;
-const RE_LONG_HEX = /\b[a-f0-9]{32,}\b/gi;       // generic long secrets/hashes
-const RE_PAN_CANDIDATE = /\b(?:\d[ -]?){12,19}\b/g;
-const RE_IBAN = /\b[A-Z]{2}\d{2}[A-Z0-9]{11,30}\b/g;
-const RE_API_KEY = /\b(?:wab|sk|pk|sk_live|sk_test)[_-][a-z0-9_]{16,}\b/gi;
-
-function _luhn(num) {
-  const digits = String(num).replace(/\D/g, '');
-  if (digits.length < 12 || digits.length > 19) return false;
-  let sum = 0, alt = false;
-  for (let i = digits.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
-    let d = parseInt(digits[i], 10);
-    if (alt) { d *= 2; if (d > 9) d -= 9; }
-    sum += d;
-    alt = !alt;
-  }
-  return sum % 10 === 0;
-}
-
-function _redactString(s) {
-  if (typeof s !== 'string') return { value: s, hits: [] };
-  const hits = [];
-  let out = s;
-
-  out = out.replace(RE_JWT, () => { hits.push('jwt'); return '[REDACTED:JWT]'; });
-  out = out.replace(RE_API_KEY, () => { hits.push('api_key'); return '[REDACTED:KEY]'; });
-  out = out.replace(RE_IBAN, () => { hits.push('iban'); return '[REDACTED:IBAN]'; });
-  out = out.replace(RE_PAN_CANDIDATE, (m) => {
-    if (_luhn(m)) { hits.push('card'); return '[REDACTED:CARD]'; }
-    return m;
-  });
-  out = out.replace(RE_EMAIL, () => { hits.push('email'); return '[REDACTED:EMAIL]'; });
-  out = out.replace(RE_PHONE, () => { hits.push('phone'); return '[REDACTED:PHONE]'; });
-  out = out.replace(RE_LONG_HEX, () => { hits.push('hex_secret'); return '[REDACTED:HEX]'; });
-
-  return { value: out, hits };
-}
-
-function _isSecretKey(key) {
-  if (typeof key !== 'string') return false;
-  const k = key.toLowerCase().replace(/[\s_-]+/g, '_');
-  if (SECRET_FIELDS.has(k)) return true;
-  for (const f of SECRET_FIELDS) {
-    if (k.includes(f)) return true;
-  }
-  return false;
-}
-
-/**
- * Deeply redact an object. Returns { value, hits } where hits lists the
- * categories that were detected/redacted.
- */
-function redact(input, depth = 0, hits = []) {
-  if (depth > 6 || input == null) return { value: input, hits };
-  if (typeof input === 'string') {
-    const r = _redactString(input);
-    hits.push(...r.hits);
-    return { value: r.value, hits };
-  }
-  if (Array.isArray(input)) {
-    return {
-      value: input.map((v) => redact(v, depth + 1, hits).value),
-      hits,
-    };
-  }
-  if (typeof input === 'object') {
-    const out = {};
-    for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(input)) {
-      if (_isSecretKey(k)) {
-        hits.push(`field:${k}`);
-        out[k] = '[REDACTED]';
-        continue;
-      }
-      out[k] = redact(v, depth + 1, hits).value;
-    }
-    return { value: out, hits };
-  }
-  return { value: input, hits };
-}
-
-// ─── Cross-tenant identifier hashing ─────────────────────────────────
-
-const _peppers = new Map(); // tenantId → buffer
-function _peppers_get(tenantId) {
-  let p = _peppers.get(tenantId || '__default__');
-  if (!p) {
-    const seed = process.env.WAB_TENANT_PEPPER_SEED || crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
-    p = crypto.createHmac('sha256', seed).update(String(tenantId || '__default__')).digest();
-    _peppers.set(tenantId || '__default__', p);
-  }
-  return p;
-}
-
-/**
- * Produce a deterministic but non-reversible identifier for cross-site use.
- * Same id within a tenant maps to same hash; different tenants produce
- * different hashes for the same input.
- */
-function pseudonymize(value, tenantId) {
-  const pep = _peppers_get(tenantId);
-  return 'wabp_' + crypto.createHmac('sha256', pep).update(String(value)).digest('hex').slice(0, 24);
-}
-
-// ─── Audit ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-db.exec(`
-  CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS cross_site_transfers (
-    id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
-    from_site TEXT,
-    to_site TEXT,
-    agent_id TEXT,
-    purpose TEXT,
-    payload_hash TEXT,
-    redaction_hits TEXT DEFAULT '[]',
-    blocked INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
-    created_at TEXT DEFAULT (datetime('now'))
-  );
-  CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_cst_from_to ON cross_site_transfers(from_site, to_site);
-  CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_cst_blocked ON cross_site_transfers(blocked);
-`);
-
-/**
- * Audit + redact a cross-site payload. Use this at every boundary.
- * Returns the safe-to-forward payload. If `blockOnSensitive` is true and
- * highly sensitive hits (card/iban/jwt/api_key) are detected, returns null.
- */
-function auditAndRedact(opts) {
-  const { fromSite, toSite, agentId, purpose, payload, blockOnSensitive } = opts;
-  const { value, hits } = redact(payload);
-  const dangerous = hits.some((h) => /^(card|iban|jwt|api_key|field:)/.test(h));
-  const blocked = !!(blockOnSensitive && dangerous);
-
-  const payloadHash = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(JSON.stringify(payload || null)).digest('hex');
-
-  db.prepare(`INSERT INTO cross_site_transfers
-    (id, from_site, to_site, agent_id, purpose, payload_hash, redaction_hits, blocked)
-    VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`).run(
-    crypto.randomUUID(), fromSite || null, toSite || null, agentId || null,
-    purpose || null, payloadHash, JSON.stringify([...new Set(hits)]),
-    blocked ? 1 : 0
-  );
-
-  return blocked ? null : value;
-}
-
-function getRecentTransfers(limit = 100, fromSite) {
-  if (fromSite) {
-    return db.prepare(`SELECT * FROM cross_site_transfers WHERE from_site = ? ORDER BY rowid DESC LIMIT ?`).all(fromSite, limit);
-  }
-  return db.prepare(`SELECT * FROM cross_site_transfers ORDER BY rowid DESC LIMIT ?`).all(limit);
-}
-
-module.exports = {
-  redact,
-  auditAndRedact,
-  pseudonymize,
-  getRecentTransfers,
-};
+'use strict';
+
+/**
+ * Cross-Site Redactor — prevents PII / payment data from leaking between sites
+ * via the agent mesh, multi-agent orchestration, or shared knowledge stores.
+ *
+ * Defense strategy:
+ *   1. **Detect** common sensitive value patterns in any string field
+ *      (credit cards via Luhn, IBANs, emails, phone numbers, JWTs, API keys,
+ *      government IDs, addresses).
+ *   2. **Strip** keys that look sensitive (`password`, `card`, `secret`, ...).
+ *   3. **Hash** cross-site identifiers when they MUST cross a boundary
+ *      (HMAC-SHA256 with a per-tenant pepper) so reverse engineering them is
+ *      computationally hard.
+ *   4. **Audit** every cross-site transfer in `cross_site_transfers` so a
+ *      tenant admin can review what their agent shared.
+ *
+ * Use this whenever payload `(site_a, agent) → (site_b)` would carry
+ * user-controlled fields. Specifically:
+ *   - agent-mesh.shareKnowledge / shareTactic
+ *   - multi-agent orchestration handoffs
+ *   - cross-tenant analytics exports
+ */
+
+const crypto = require('crypto');
+const { db } = require('../models/db');
+
+const SECRET_FIELDS = new Set([
+  'password', 'pass', 'pwd', 'secret', 'token', 'jwt',
+  'api_key', 'apikey', 'auth', 'authorization',
+  'card', 'card_number', 'cardnumber', 'cvv', 'cvc', 'pan',
+  'ssn', 'national_id', 'passport', 'iban', 'bban',
+  'session', 'cookie', 'private_key', 'privatekey',
+  'recovery', 'mnemonic', 'seed_phrase',
+]);
+
+const RE_EMAIL = /[a-z0-9._%+-]+@[a-z0-9.-]+\.[a-z]{2,}/gi;
+const RE_PHONE = /\+?\d[\d\s().-]{7,}\d/g;
+const RE_JWT = /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\b/g;
+const RE_LONG_HEX = /\b[a-f0-9]{32,}\b/gi;       // generic long secrets/hashes
+const RE_PAN_CANDIDATE = /\b(?:\d[ -]?){12,19}\b/g;
+const RE_IBAN = /\b[A-Z]{2}\d{2}[A-Z0-9]{11,30}\b/g;
+const RE_API_KEY = /\b(?:wab|sk|pk|sk_live|sk_test)[_-][a-z0-9_]{16,}\b/gi;
+
+function _luhn(num) {
+  const digits = String(num).replace(/\D/g, '');
+  if (digits.length < 12 || digits.length > 19) return false;
+  let sum = 0, alt = false;
+  for (let i = digits.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+    let d = parseInt(digits[i], 10);
+    if (alt) { d *= 2; if (d > 9) d -= 9; }
+    sum += d;
+    alt = !alt;
+  }
+  return sum % 10 === 0;
+}
+
+function _redactString(s) {
+  if (typeof s !== 'string') return { value: s, hits: [] };
+  const hits = [];
+  let out = s;
+
+  out = out.replace(RE_JWT, () => { hits.push('jwt'); return '[REDACTED:JWT]'; });
+  out = out.replace(RE_API_KEY, () => { hits.push('api_key'); return '[REDACTED:KEY]'; });
+  out = out.replace(RE_IBAN, () => { hits.push('iban'); return '[REDACTED:IBAN]'; });
+  out = out.replace(RE_PAN_CANDIDATE, (m) => {
+    if (_luhn(m)) { hits.push('card'); return '[REDACTED:CARD]'; }
+    return m;
+  });
+  out = out.replace(RE_EMAIL, () => { hits.push('email'); return '[REDACTED:EMAIL]'; });
+  out = out.replace(RE_PHONE, () => { hits.push('phone'); return '[REDACTED:PHONE]'; });
+  out = out.replace(RE_LONG_HEX, () => { hits.push('hex_secret'); return '[REDACTED:HEX]'; });
+
+  return { value: out, hits };
+}
+
+function _isSecretKey(key) {
+  if (typeof key !== 'string') return false;
+  const k = key.toLowerCase().replace(/[\s_-]+/g, '_');
+  if (SECRET_FIELDS.has(k)) return true;
+  for (const f of SECRET_FIELDS) {
+    if (k.includes(f)) return true;
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Deeply redact an object. Returns { value, hits } where hits lists the
+ * categories that were detected/redacted.
+ */
+function redact(input, depth = 0, hits = []) {
+  if (depth > 6 || input == null) return { value: input, hits };
+  if (typeof input === 'string') {
+    const r = _redactString(input);
+    hits.push(...r.hits);
+    return { value: r.value, hits };
+  }
+  if (Array.isArray(input)) {
+    return {
+      value: input.map((v) => redact(v, depth + 1, hits).value),
+      hits,
+    };
+  }
+  if (typeof input === 'object') {
+    const out = {};
+    for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(input)) {
+      if (_isSecretKey(k)) {
+        hits.push(`field:${k}`);
+        out[k] = '[REDACTED]';
+        continue;
+      }
+      out[k] = redact(v, depth + 1, hits).value;
+    }
+    return { value: out, hits };
+  }
+  return { value: input, hits };
+}
+
+// ─── Cross-tenant identifier hashing ─────────────────────────────────
+
+const _peppers = new Map(); // tenantId → buffer
+function _peppers_get(tenantId) {
+  let p = _peppers.get(tenantId || '__default__');
+  if (!p) {
+    const seed = process.env.WAB_TENANT_PEPPER_SEED || crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
+    p = crypto.createHmac('sha256', seed).update(String(tenantId || '__default__')).digest();
+    _peppers.set(tenantId || '__default__', p);
+  }
+  return p;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Produce a deterministic but non-reversible identifier for cross-site use.
+ * Same id within a tenant maps to same hash; different tenants produce
+ * different hashes for the same input.
+ */
+function pseudonymize(value, tenantId) {
+  const pep = _peppers_get(tenantId);
+  return 'wabp_' + crypto.createHmac('sha256', pep).update(String(value)).digest('hex').slice(0, 24);
+}
+
+// ─── Audit ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+db.exec(`
+  CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS cross_site_transfers (
+    id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+    from_site TEXT,
+    to_site TEXT,
+    agent_id TEXT,
+    purpose TEXT,
+    payload_hash TEXT,
+    redaction_hits TEXT DEFAULT '[]',
+    blocked INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
+    created_at TEXT DEFAULT (datetime('now'))
+  );
+  CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_cst_from_to ON cross_site_transfers(from_site, to_site);
+  CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_cst_blocked ON cross_site_transfers(blocked);
+`);
+
+/**
+ * Audit + redact a cross-site payload. Use this at every boundary.
+ * Returns the safe-to-forward payload. If `blockOnSensitive` is true and
+ * highly sensitive hits (card/iban/jwt/api_key) are detected, returns null.
+ */
+function auditAndRedact(opts) {
+  const { fromSite, toSite, agentId, purpose, payload, blockOnSensitive } = opts;
+  const { value, hits } = redact(payload);
+  const dangerous = hits.some((h) => /^(card|iban|jwt|api_key|field:)/.test(h));
+  const blocked = !!(blockOnSensitive && dangerous);
+
+  const payloadHash = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(JSON.stringify(payload || null)).digest('hex');
+
+  db.prepare(`INSERT INTO cross_site_transfers
+    (id, from_site, to_site, agent_id, purpose, payload_hash, redaction_hits, blocked)
+    VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`).run(
+    crypto.randomUUID(), fromSite || null, toSite || null, agentId || null,
+    purpose || null, payloadHash, JSON.stringify([...new Set(hits)]),
+    blocked ? 1 : 0
+  );
+
+  return blocked ? null : value;
+}
+
+function getRecentTransfers(limit = 100, fromSite) {
+  if (fromSite) {
+    return db.prepare(`SELECT * FROM cross_site_transfers WHERE from_site = ? ORDER BY rowid DESC LIMIT ?`).all(fromSite, limit);
+  }
+  return db.prepare(`SELECT * FROM cross_site_transfers ORDER BY rowid DESC LIMIT ?`).all(limit);
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  redact,
+  auditAndRedact,
+  pseudonymize,
+  getRecentTransfers,
+};