web-agent-bridge 3.2.0 → 3.4.0

package/server/security/human-gate.js

@@ -0,0 +1,281 @@
+'use strict';
+
+/**
+ * WAB Safety Shield — Out-of-Band Human Gate (SPEC §8.11)
+ *
+ * For high-risk actions on Pro+ sites, an agent's request is held in a
+ * "pending" state and a one-time confirmation code is dispatched to a
+ * channel the agent CANNOT see (Telegram bot, WhatsApp, email, Slack
+ * webhook, etc.). Only after a human approves OOB can the agent retry
+ * with `confirmation_id` and have the request executed.
+ *
+ * Design properties:
+ *   1. The challenge code is generated server-side; the agent never
+ *      sees it. Even a fully prompt-injected agent cannot self-approve.
+ *   2. Approval is bound to (session, site, action, paramsHash) — drift
+ *      invalidates the approval (mirrors dry-run binding).
+ *   3. Approvals are single-use.
+ *   4. Pending challenges expire (default 10 min, max 30 min).
+ *
+ * This module is transport-agnostic. Transports are registered via
+ * `setTransport(name, fn)`; sites pick one in `humanGate.transport`.
+ * The default `null` transport is a no-op (used in tests + offline mode)
+ * and the challenge code is also returned via an internal admin API
+ * (`GET /api/wab/human-gate/:id/peek`) gated by an admin token, so
+ * operators can recover from a misconfigured channel.
+ */
+
+const crypto = require('crypto');
+const { isDestructiveAction } = require('./token-scope');
+
+const DEFAULT_TTL_MS = 10 * 60 * 1000;
+const MAX_TTL_MS = 30 * 60 * 1000;
+const STORE_MAX = 5000;
+
+const STATUS = Object.freeze({
+  PENDING: 'pending',
+  APPROVED: 'approved',
+  REJECTED: 'rejected',
+  CONSUMED: 'consumed',
+});
+
+const _store = new Map(); // challenge_id -> entry
+const _transports = new Map();
+
+// ─── helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+function _hashParams(params) {
+  const canon = JSON.stringify(_canonicalize(params || {}));
+  return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(canon).digest('hex').slice(0, 24);
+}
+function _canonicalize(value) {
+  if (value === null || typeof value !== 'object') return value;
+  if (Array.isArray(value)) return value.map(_canonicalize);
+  const out = {};
+  for (const k of Object.keys(value).sort()) out[k] = _canonicalize(value[k]);
+  return out;
+}
+function _fingerprint(token) {
+  if (!token) return null;
+  return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(String(token)).digest('hex').slice(0, 16);
+}
+function _genCode() {
+  // 6-digit numeric. Avoids confusing chars on phones.
+  return String(crypto.randomInt(100000, 1000000));
+}
+function _genId() {
+  return 'wabh_' + crypto.randomBytes(16).toString('hex');
+}
+function _evictIfFull() {
+  if (_store.size <= STORE_MAX) return;
+  const drop = Math.ceil(STORE_MAX * 0.1);
+  let i = 0;
+  for (const k of _store.keys()) {
+    if (i++ >= drop) break;
+    _store.delete(k);
+  }
+}
+
+// ─── transports ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+function setTransport(name, fn) {
+  if (typeof fn !== 'function') throw new TypeError('transport must be a function');
+  _transports.set(String(name).toLowerCase(), fn);
+}
+
+function _resolveTransport(siteConfig = {}) {
+  const name = String(siteConfig?.humanGate?.transport || 'null').toLowerCase();
+  return _transports.get(name) || null;
+}
+
+// Default null transport — no-op; useful for offline/dev/tests.
+setTransport('null', async () => ({ ok: true, channel: 'null' }));
+
+// ─── policy ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+/**
+ * Whether the named action requires an OOB human gate.
+ * Trigger conditions:
+ *   - site.humanGate.enabled === true   AND
+ *   - tier ∈ {pro, premium, enterprise} OR site.humanGate.force === true
+ *   - action is destructive OR appears in site.humanGate.actions[]
+ */
+function requiresHumanGate(actionName, siteConfig = {}, tier = 'free') {
+  const cfg = siteConfig?.humanGate || {};
+  if (!cfg.enabled) return false;
+  const tierOk = ['pro', 'premium', 'enterprise'].includes(String(tier).toLowerCase()) || cfg.force === true;
+  if (!tierOk) return false;
+  if (Array.isArray(cfg.actions) && cfg.actions.includes(actionName)) return true;
+  // Default: gate destructive verbs (reuse classification from token-scope).
+  return isDestructiveAction(actionName, siteConfig);
+}
+
+// ─── challenge lifecycle ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+/**
+ * Create a challenge and dispatch it OOB.
+ * Returns { challenge_id, expires_at, dispatched_to, status:'pending' }.
+ * The plaintext code is NEVER returned to the caller path of the agent;
+ * it is delivered only via the configured transport (or visible to the
+ * site operator via the admin peek endpoint).
+ */
+async function issueChallenge(ctx, opts = {}) {
+  const ttl = Math.min(Math.max(opts.ttlMs || DEFAULT_TTL_MS, 1000), MAX_TTL_MS);
+  const id = _genId();
+  const code = _genCode();
+  const codeHash = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(code).digest('hex');
+  const now = Date.now();
+  const entry = {
+    id,
+    status: STATUS.PENDING,
+    code_hash: codeHash,
+    code_preview_for_admin: code, // used by admin peek only
+    session_fingerprint: _fingerprint(ctx.sessionToken),
+    site_id: ctx.siteId,
+    actor_id: ctx.actorId || null,
+    action_name: ctx.actionName,
+    params_hash: _hashParams(ctx.params),
+    created_at: now,
+    expires_at: now + ttl,
+    attempts: 0,
+    rejected_reason: null,
+  };
+  _store.set(id, entry);
+  _evictIfFull();
+
+  let dispatchResult = { ok: true, channel: 'none' };
+  const transport = opts.transport || _resolveTransport(opts.siteConfig);
+  if (transport) {
+    try {
+      dispatchResult = await transport({
+        challenge_id: id,
+        code,
+        site_id: ctx.siteId,
+        action_name: ctx.actionName,
+        actor_id: ctx.actorId || null,
+        expires_at: new Date(entry.expires_at).toISOString(),
+        siteConfig: opts.siteConfig || {},
+      }) || { ok: true, channel: 'unknown' };
+    } catch (err) {
+      dispatchResult = { ok: false, channel: 'error', error: err.message };
+    }
+  }
+
+  return {
+    challenge_id: id,
+    status: entry.status,
+    expires_at: new Date(entry.expires_at).toISOString(),
+    dispatched_to: dispatchResult.channel || null,
+    dispatch_ok: dispatchResult.ok !== false,
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Approve a challenge using its OOB code (called by the human's webhook
+ * receiver or the operator UI). Rate-limited per challenge to 5 attempts.
+ */
+function approveChallenge(challengeId, code) {
+  const entry = _store.get(challengeId);
+  if (!entry) return { ok: false, code: 'HUMAN_GATE_NOT_FOUND' };
+  if (Date.now() > entry.expires_at) {
+    _store.delete(challengeId);
+    return { ok: false, code: 'HUMAN_GATE_EXPIRED' };
+  }
+  if (entry.status !== STATUS.PENDING) {
+    return { ok: false, code: 'HUMAN_GATE_BAD_STATE', message: `cannot approve: ${entry.status}` };
+  }
+  entry.attempts += 1;
+  if (entry.attempts > 5) {
+    entry.status = STATUS.REJECTED;
+    entry.rejected_reason = 'too_many_attempts';
+    return { ok: false, code: 'HUMAN_GATE_LOCKED' };
+  }
+  const supplied = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(String(code || '')).digest('hex');
+  let match = false;
+  try {
+    match = crypto.timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(supplied, 'hex'), Buffer.from(entry.code_hash, 'hex'));
+  } catch { match = false; }
+  if (!match) return { ok: false, code: 'HUMAN_GATE_BAD_CODE' };
+  entry.status = STATUS.APPROVED;
+  entry.approved_at = Date.now();
+  return { ok: true, status: entry.status };
+}
+
+function rejectChallenge(challengeId, reason) {
+  const entry = _store.get(challengeId);
+  if (!entry) return { ok: false, code: 'HUMAN_GATE_NOT_FOUND' };
+  if (entry.status !== STATUS.PENDING) {
+    return { ok: false, code: 'HUMAN_GATE_BAD_STATE' };
+  }
+  entry.status = STATUS.REJECTED;
+  entry.rejected_reason = String(reason || 'rejected_by_human').slice(0, 200);
+  return { ok: true, status: entry.status };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Consume an APPROVED challenge during the agent's retry. Validates
+ * binding to the original (session, site, action, params). Single-use.
+ */
+function consumeApproved(challengeId, ctx) {
+  if (!challengeId) return { ok: false, code: 'HUMAN_GATE_REQUIRED' };
+  const entry = _store.get(challengeId);
+  if (!entry) return { ok: false, code: 'HUMAN_GATE_NOT_FOUND' };
+  if (Date.now() > entry.expires_at) {
+    _store.delete(challengeId);
+    return { ok: false, code: 'HUMAN_GATE_EXPIRED' };
+  }
+  if (entry.status === STATUS.PENDING) return { ok: false, code: 'HUMAN_GATE_PENDING' };
+  if (entry.status === STATUS.REJECTED) return { ok: false, code: 'HUMAN_GATE_REJECTED', message: entry.rejected_reason || 'rejected' };
+  if (entry.status === STATUS.CONSUMED) return { ok: false, code: 'HUMAN_GATE_CONSUMED' };
+  if (entry.status !== STATUS.APPROVED) return { ok: false, code: 'HUMAN_GATE_BAD_STATE' };
+  // Binding checks
+  if (entry.session_fingerprint !== _fingerprint(ctx.sessionToken)) {
+    return { ok: false, code: 'HUMAN_GATE_MISMATCH', message: 'approval issued to a different session' };
+  }
+  if (entry.site_id !== ctx.siteId) {
+    return { ok: false, code: 'HUMAN_GATE_MISMATCH', message: 'approval issued for a different site' };
+  }
+  if (entry.action_name !== ctx.actionName) {
+    return { ok: false, code: 'HUMAN_GATE_MISMATCH', message: 'approval issued for a different action' };
+  }
+  if (entry.params_hash !== _hashParams(ctx.params)) {
+    return { ok: false, code: 'HUMAN_GATE_MISMATCH', message: 'parameters changed since approval' };
+  }
+  entry.status = STATUS.CONSUMED;
+  entry.consumed_at = Date.now();
+  return { ok: true, entry };
+}
+
+function getStatus(challengeId) {
+  const entry = _store.get(challengeId);
+  if (!entry) return null;
+  return {
+    challenge_id: entry.id,
+    status: entry.status,
+    expires_at: new Date(entry.expires_at).toISOString(),
+    rejected_reason: entry.rejected_reason || undefined,
+  };
+}
+
+function _resetForTests() { _store.clear(); }
+function _peekForAdmin(challengeId) {
+  const e = _store.get(challengeId);
+  return e ? { ...e } : null;
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  STATUS,
+  setTransport,
+  requiresHumanGate,
+  issueChallenge,
+  approveChallenge,
+  rejectChallenge,
+  consumeApproved,
+  getStatus,
+  // test/admin helpers
+  _resetForTests,
+  _peekForAdmin,
+  _hashParams,
+  DEFAULT_TTL_MS,
+  MAX_TTL_MS,
+};