typeclaw 0.47.2 → 0.48.1
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/src/agent/index.ts +1 -2
- package/src/agent/loop-guard.ts +71 -41
- package/src/agent/plugin-tools.ts +234 -58
- package/src/agent/system-prompt.ts +1 -1
- package/src/agent/turn-runner.ts +12 -2
- package/src/agent-messenger/config-dir.ts +131 -0
- package/src/agent-messenger/host-config-dir.ts +121 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/agent-browser/index.ts +0 -38
- package/src/bundled-plugins/agent-browser/skills/agent-browser/SKILL.md +1 -1
- package/src/bundled-plugins/guard/policies/non-workspace-write.ts +16 -1
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/append-tool.ts +75 -2
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/frontmatter.ts +13 -2
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/load-memory.ts +1 -1
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/memory-logger.ts +5 -1
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/secret-detector.ts +7 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/vector/hybrid.ts +3 -1
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/vector/passages.ts +5 -1
- package/src/bundled-plugins/security/index.ts +148 -98
- package/src/bundled-plugins/security/policies/private-surface-read.ts +43 -28
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord-bot-edit.ts +3 -5
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord-bot-reactions.ts +4 -6
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord-bot-slash-commands.ts +3 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord-bot.ts +20 -23
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord-edit.ts +3 -5
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord-reactions.ts +4 -6
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord.ts +1 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/decoy-reviewer.ts +2 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/history.ts +2 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/inbound.ts +4 -11
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/index.ts +6 -9
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/outbound.ts +3 -6
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/reactions.ts +3 -2
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/reconcile-cooldown-store.ts +4 -6
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/reconcile-open-prs.ts +5 -4
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/recover-failed-deliveries.ts +2 -5
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/review-state.ts +3 -2
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/review-thread-resolver.ts +3 -2
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/webhook-register.ts +5 -8
- package/src/channels/adapters/instagram-channel-resolver.ts +3 -5
- package/src/channels/adapters/instagram.ts +1 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/kakaotalk-author-resolver.ts +2 -5
- package/src/channels/adapters/kakaotalk-channel-resolver.ts +3 -5
- package/src/channels/adapters/kakaotalk-fetch-attachment.ts +2 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/kakaotalk-membership.ts +2 -5
- package/src/channels/adapters/kakaotalk-typing.ts +1 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/kakaotalk.ts +1 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/line-channel-resolver.ts +3 -5
- package/src/channels/adapters/line.ts +1 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/slack-bot-edit.ts +1 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/slack-bot-reactions.ts +4 -6
- package/src/channels/adapters/slack-bot.ts +8 -8
- package/src/channels/adapters/slack-edit.ts +3 -5
- package/src/channels/adapters/slack-reactions.ts +4 -6
- package/src/channels/adapters/slack.ts +1 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/teams-edit.ts +2 -5
- package/src/channels/adapters/teams.ts +1 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/telegram-bot-edit.ts +4 -7
- package/src/channels/adapters/telegram-bot.ts +1 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/webex-bot.ts +1 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/webex-edit.ts +3 -5
- package/src/channels/adapters/webex.ts +1 -1
- package/src/channels/github-review-claim.ts +89 -4
- package/src/channels/github-token-bridge.ts +2 -1
- package/src/channels/manager.ts +478 -64
- package/src/channels/membership-cache.ts +2 -5
- package/src/channels/persistence.ts +3 -6
- package/src/channels/reloadable.ts +23 -6
- package/src/channels/router.ts +134 -56
- package/src/channels/tunnel-bridge.ts +2 -1
- package/src/channels/types.ts +6 -3
- package/src/cli/channel.ts +15 -16
- package/src/cli/hostd.ts +61 -38
- package/src/cli/init.ts +21 -7
- package/src/cli/model.ts +6 -3
- package/src/cli/restart.ts +13 -15
- package/src/compose/restart.ts +14 -6
- package/src/config/config.ts +10 -0
- package/src/config/providers.ts +68 -0
- package/src/container/agent-operation-lock.ts +85 -0
- package/src/container/controller.ts +6 -0
- package/src/container/index.ts +8 -0
- package/src/container/restart.ts +55 -0
- package/src/container/shared.ts +5 -0
- package/src/container/start.ts +70 -4
- package/src/container/stop.ts +17 -1
- package/src/dependencies/bin-resolver.ts +88 -0
- package/src/dependencies/bins.ts +227 -0
- package/src/dependencies/index.ts +17 -0
- package/src/doctor/checks.ts +2 -0
- package/src/doctor/operational-incidents.ts +32 -0
- package/src/hostd/credential-rotation-apply.ts +94 -0
- package/src/hostd/daemon.ts +1 -1
- package/src/hostd/paths.ts +17 -0
- package/src/hostd/supervisor.ts +27 -10
- package/src/init/dockerfile.ts +6 -5
- package/src/init/env-file.ts +42 -18
- package/src/init/instagram-auth.ts +55 -31
- package/src/init/kakaotalk-auth.ts +1 -5
- package/src/init/line-auth.ts +45 -29
- package/src/init/models-dev.ts +131 -10
- package/src/init/opengateway-catalog.ts +120 -0
- package/src/init/validate-api-key.ts +26 -4
- package/src/operations/classify-tool-outcome.ts +151 -0
- package/src/operations/incidents.ts +274 -0
- package/src/operations/index.ts +3 -0
- package/src/operations/remediations.ts +41 -0
- package/src/reload/client.ts +8 -2
- package/src/reload/docker-exec-client.ts +10 -2
- package/src/reload/index.ts +1 -1
- package/src/reload/recover.ts +5 -3
- package/src/reload/registry.ts +5 -5
- package/src/reload/types.ts +9 -1
- package/src/run/index.ts +5 -0
- package/src/sandbox/canonical-secrets.ts +10 -1
- package/src/sandbox/dependency-bins.ts +125 -0
- package/src/sandbox/hidden-paths.ts +4 -1
- package/src/sandbox/index.ts +8 -0
- package/src/sandbox/policy.ts +1 -1
- package/src/sandbox/privileged-runtime.ts +7 -12
- package/src/sandbox/runtime-private.ts +4 -0
- package/src/sandbox/writable-zones.ts +4 -4
- package/src/server/index.ts +7 -5
- package/src/shared/protocol.ts +6 -1
- package/src/test-helpers/fake-agent-operation-lock.ts +66 -0
- package/typeclaw.schema.json +10 -5
- package/src/bundled-plugins/agent-browser/shim-install.ts +0 -179
- package/src/bundled-plugins/agent-browser/shim.ts +0 -108
- /package/src/channels/{adapters/describe-error.ts → describe-error.ts} +0 -0
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import { definePlugin } from '@/plugin'
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import { definePlugin, type PluginLogger } from '@/plugin'
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import { resolveHiddenPaths } from '@/sandbox'
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import { HIGH_TIER_PER_GUARD_PERMISSIONS, SECURITY_PERMISSIONS, SEVERITY_PERMISSION } from './permissions'
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}
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}
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const INTERNAL_SECURITY_GUARD_REASON =
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'The tool call was blocked because an internal security guard error prevented safe evaluation.'
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function reportInternalGuardError(logger: PluginLogger, guard: string, error: unknown): void {
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const detail = error instanceof Error ? (error.stack ?? error.message) : String(error)
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const code = error instanceof Error && 'code' in error && typeof error.code === 'string' ? ` code=${error.code}` : ''
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logger.error(`internal security guard error guard=${guard}${code}: ${detail}`)
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}
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export default definePlugin({
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permissions: Object.values(SECURITY_PERMISSIONS),
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// No wildcard exclusions: owner bypasses every security tier by default
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applyPromptInjectionDefense(event)
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},
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'tool.before': async (event) => {
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try {
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const can = (perm: string) => ctx.permissions.has(event.origin, perm)
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const canBypass = (severity: SecuritySeverity, perGuardPerm: string): boolean =>
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can(SEVERITY_PERMISSION[severity]) || can(perGuardPerm)
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// The cron guard blocks deferred work that fires as a role granting
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// permissions the caller lacks. Capability dominance — target's
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// permission set must be a SUBSET of the caller's — not the coarse
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// `compareRoleSeverity` tower: every configured custom role ranks
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// equal there, so rank `>= 0` would let one custom role schedule as a
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// different custom role (or `trusted` schedule as a custom role with
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// an extra grant), laundering permissions the caller never had. Unknown
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// caller/target role => undefined permissions => fail closed.
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const callerRole = ctx.permissions.resolveRole(event.origin)
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const canScheduleAs = (targetRole: string | undefined): boolean => {
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if (targetRole === undefined) return false
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const callerPermissions = ctx.permissions.permissionsForRole(callerRole)
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const targetPermissions = ctx.permissions.permissionsForRole(targetRole)
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if (callerPermissions === undefined || targetPermissions === undefined) return false
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const callerSet = new Set(callerPermissions)
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return targetPermissions.every((permission) => callerSet.has(permission))
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}
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const rolePromotionResult = canBypass(GUARD_ROLE_PROMOTION_SEVERITY, SECURITY_PERMISSIONS.bypassRolePromotion)
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? undefined
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: withPermissionHint(
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await checkRolePromotionGuard({ tool: event.tool, args: event.args, agentDir: ctx.agentDir }),
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SECURITY_PERMISSIONS.bypassRolePromotion,
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GUARD_ROLE_PROMOTION_SEVERITY,
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)
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if (rolePromotionResult) return rolePromotionResult
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const cronPromotionResult = canBypass(GUARD_CRON_PROMOTION_SEVERITY, SECURITY_PERMISSIONS.bypassCronPromotion)
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? undefined
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: withPermissionHint(
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await checkCronPromotionGuard({
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tool: event.tool,
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args: event.args,
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agentDir: ctx.agentDir,
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canScheduleAs,
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}),
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SECURITY_PERMISSIONS.bypassCronPromotion,
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GUARD_CRON_PROMOTION_SEVERITY,
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)
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if (cronPromotionResult) return cronPromotionResult
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const pluginAdditionResult = canBypass(
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SECURITY_PERMISSIONS.bypassPluginAddition,
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)
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? undefined
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: withPermissionHint(
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await checkPluginAdditionGuard({ tool: event.tool, args: event.args, agentDir: ctx.agentDir }),
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SECURITY_PERMISSIONS.bypassPluginAddition,
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GUARD_PLUGIN_ADDITION_SEVERITY,
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)
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if (pluginAdditionResult) return pluginAdditionResult
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const checks: (SecurityBlock | undefined)[] = [
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GUARD_SECRET_EXFIL_READ_SEVERITY,
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)
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)
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if (secretExfilReadResult) return secretExfilReadResult
|
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// Not severity-bypassed: private directories remain role-derived,
|
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// while canonical credential-store denial is unconditional. Mirrors
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// the bash masks onto every non-bash path-bearing tool.
|
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checkPrivateSurfaceReadGuard(
|
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|
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|
-
|
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-
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-
|
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const privateSurfaceReadResult = checkPrivateSurfaceReadGuard(
|
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{
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tool: event.tool,
|
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args: event.args,
|
|
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agentDir: ctx.agentDir,
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hidden: resolveHiddenPaths(ctx.permissions, event.origin, ctx.agentDir),
|
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...(event.fileOperands !== undefined ? { fileOperands: event.fileOperands } : {}),
|
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+
},
|
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{
|
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onInternalError: (error) => reportInternalGuardError(ctx.logger, 'privateSurfaceRead', error),
|
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},
|
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)
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if (privateSurfaceReadResult) return privateSurfaceReadResult
|
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+
|
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const ssrfResult = canBypass(GUARD_SSRF_SEVERITY, SECURITY_PERMISSIONS.bypassSsrf)
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? undefined
|
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: withPermissionHint(
|
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250
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checkSsrfGuard({ tool: event.tool, args: event.args }),
|
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251
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SECURITY_PERMISSIONS.bypassSsrf,
|
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252
|
GUARD_SSRF_SEVERITY,
|
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-
)
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-
|
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+
)
|
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if (ssrfResult) return ssrfResult
|
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+
|
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+
const sessionSearchSecretsResult = canBypass(
|
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GUARD_SESSION_SEARCH_SECRETS_SEVERITY,
|
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SECURITY_PERMISSIONS.bypassSessionSearchSecrets,
|
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+
)
|
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260
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? undefined
|
|
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261
|
: withPermissionHint(
|
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262
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checkSessionSearchSecretsGuard({ tool: event.tool, args: event.args }),
|
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263
|
SECURITY_PERMISSIONS.bypassSessionSearchSecrets,
|
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264
|
GUARD_SESSION_SEARCH_SECRETS_SEVERITY,
|
|
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-
)
|
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-
|
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)
|
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|
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if (sessionSearchSecretsResult) return sessionSearchSecretsResult
|
|
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+
|
|
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const systemPromptLeakResult = canBypass(
|
|
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|
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GUARD_SYSTEM_PROMPT_LEAK_SEVERITY,
|
|
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SECURITY_PERMISSIONS.bypassSystemPromptLeak,
|
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+
)
|
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272
|
? undefined
|
|
230
273
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: withPermissionHint(
|
|
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274
|
checkSystemPromptLeakGuard({ tool: event.tool, args: event.args }),
|
|
232
275
|
SECURITY_PERMISSIONS.bypassSystemPromptLeak,
|
|
233
276
|
GUARD_SYSTEM_PROMPT_LEAK_SEVERITY,
|
|
234
|
-
)
|
|
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|
-
|
|
277
|
+
)
|
|
278
|
+
if (systemPromptLeakResult) return systemPromptLeakResult
|
|
279
|
+
|
|
280
|
+
const outboundSecretResult = canBypass(
|
|
281
|
+
GUARD_OUTBOUND_SECRET_SEVERITY,
|
|
282
|
+
SECURITY_PERMISSIONS.bypassOutboundSecret,
|
|
283
|
+
)
|
|
236
284
|
? undefined
|
|
237
285
|
: withPermissionHint(
|
|
238
286
|
checkOutboundSecretGuard({ tool: event.tool, args: event.args }),
|
|
239
287
|
SECURITY_PERMISSIONS.bypassOutboundSecret,
|
|
240
288
|
GUARD_OUTBOUND_SECRET_SEVERITY,
|
|
241
|
-
)
|
|
242
|
-
|
|
243
|
-
|
|
244
|
-
|
|
289
|
+
)
|
|
290
|
+
if (outboundSecretResult) return outboundSecretResult
|
|
291
|
+
|
|
292
|
+
return undefined
|
|
293
|
+
} catch (error) {
|
|
294
|
+
reportInternalGuardError(ctx.logger, 'tool.before', error)
|
|
295
|
+
return { block: true, reason: INTERNAL_SECURITY_GUARD_REASON }
|
|
245
296
|
}
|
|
246
|
-
return undefined
|
|
247
297
|
},
|
|
248
298
|
'session.end': async (event) => {
|
|
249
299
|
clearSessionTaints(event.sessionId)
|
|
@@ -81,24 +81,33 @@ export function checkPrivateSurfaceReadGuard(
|
|
|
81
81
|
): SecurityBlock | undefined {
|
|
82
82
|
const { tool, args, agentDir, hidden, fileOperands } = options
|
|
83
83
|
if (UNSCANNED_TOOLS.has(tool)) return undefined
|
|
84
|
-
|
|
85
|
-
|
|
86
|
-
|
|
87
|
-
|
|
88
|
-
|
|
89
|
-
|
|
90
|
-
const
|
|
91
|
-
|
|
92
|
-
|
|
93
|
-
|
|
94
|
-
|
|
95
|
-
|
|
96
|
-
|
|
97
|
-
|
|
84
|
+
try {
|
|
85
|
+
const { deniedDirs, deniedFiles } = deniedSurface(agentDir, hidden)
|
|
86
|
+
if (deniedDirs.length === 0 && deniedFiles.length === 0) return undefined
|
|
87
|
+
const identityScanner = createHardlinkIdentityScanner(agentDir, deniedDirs, deniedFiles, hooks)
|
|
88
|
+
const realpath = hooks.realpathNative ?? realpathSync.native
|
|
89
|
+
|
|
90
|
+
const nonFile = fileOperands?.nonFile === undefined ? undefined : new Set(fileOperands.nonFile)
|
|
91
|
+
for (const candidate of collectPathCandidates(args, tool, nonFile)) {
|
|
92
|
+
const hit = matchHidden(candidate, agentDir, deniedDirs, deniedFiles, identityScanner, realpath)
|
|
93
|
+
if (hit !== undefined) {
|
|
94
|
+
return {
|
|
95
|
+
block: true,
|
|
96
|
+
reason: [
|
|
97
|
+
`Guard \`${GUARD_PRIVATE_SURFACE_READ}\` blocked ${tool}: argument \`${candidate}\` resolves to ${hit}, which is not available to LLM tools.`,
|
|
98
|
+
'The bash sandbox masks the same path. Privileged roles cannot bypass canonical agent credential files; use host-side redacted diagnostics such as `typeclaw doctor`, `typeclaw provider list`, or `typeclaw channel list` instead.',
|
|
99
|
+
].join(' '),
|
|
100
|
+
}
|
|
98
101
|
}
|
|
99
102
|
}
|
|
103
|
+
return undefined
|
|
104
|
+
} catch (error) {
|
|
105
|
+
hooks.onInternalError?.(error)
|
|
106
|
+
return {
|
|
107
|
+
block: true,
|
|
108
|
+
reason: `Guard \`${GUARD_PRIVATE_SURFACE_READ}\` blocked ${tool}: an internal guard error prevented safe path validation.`,
|
|
109
|
+
}
|
|
100
110
|
}
|
|
101
|
-
return undefined
|
|
102
111
|
}
|
|
103
112
|
|
|
104
113
|
type PrivateSurfaceIdentityOptions = {
|
|
@@ -111,6 +120,8 @@ export type PrivateSurfaceIdentityScanHooks = {
|
|
|
111
120
|
maxEntries?: number
|
|
112
121
|
openDirectory?(directory: string): Pick<Dir, 'readSync' | 'closeSync'>
|
|
113
122
|
lstat?(candidate: string): Stats
|
|
123
|
+
realpathNative?(candidate: string): string
|
|
124
|
+
onInternalError?(error: unknown): void
|
|
114
125
|
afterEntryLstat?(candidate: string, stats: Stats): void
|
|
115
126
|
}
|
|
116
127
|
|
|
@@ -157,6 +168,7 @@ function createHardlinkIdentityScanner(
|
|
|
157
168
|
? openDescriptorAnchoredDirectory
|
|
158
169
|
: createPathDirectoryOpener(hooks.openDirectory, lstat),
|
|
159
170
|
lstat,
|
|
171
|
+
realpath: hooks.realpathNative ?? realpathSync.native,
|
|
160
172
|
afterEntryLstat: hooks.afterEntryLstat,
|
|
161
173
|
})
|
|
162
174
|
}
|
|
@@ -341,18 +353,19 @@ function matchHidden(
|
|
|
341
353
|
deniedDirs: string[],
|
|
342
354
|
deniedFiles: string[],
|
|
343
355
|
identityScanner: HardlinkIdentityScanner,
|
|
356
|
+
realpath: (candidate: string) => string,
|
|
344
357
|
): string | undefined {
|
|
345
358
|
const lexicalHit = matchLexicallyDenied(candidate, agentDir, deniedDirs, deniedFiles)
|
|
346
359
|
if (lexicalHit !== undefined) return lexicalHit
|
|
347
360
|
const lexical = path.resolve(agentDir, candidate)
|
|
348
|
-
const resolved = realpathRealIntendedPath(lexical)
|
|
361
|
+
const resolved = realpathRealIntendedPath(lexical, realpath)
|
|
349
362
|
const virtualRoot = virtualFilesystemRoot(lexical) ?? virtualFilesystemRoot(resolved)
|
|
350
363
|
if (virtualRoot !== undefined) return `${virtualRoot}, a virtual or process-backed filesystem`
|
|
351
364
|
for (const file of deniedFiles) {
|
|
352
|
-
if (resolved === realpathRealIntendedPath(file) || hasSameFileIdentity(resolved, file)) return file
|
|
365
|
+
if (resolved === realpathRealIntendedPath(file, realpath) || hasSameFileIdentity(resolved, file)) return file
|
|
353
366
|
}
|
|
354
367
|
for (const dir of deniedDirs) {
|
|
355
|
-
const realDir = realpathRealIntendedPath(dir)
|
|
368
|
+
const realDir = realpathRealIntendedPath(dir, realpath)
|
|
356
369
|
// realpathRealIntendedPath joins with the platform separator, so the
|
|
357
370
|
// under-dir test must use path.sep too — a hardcoded "/" never matches the
|
|
358
371
|
// "\"-joined paths a win32 test runner produces.
|
|
@@ -510,6 +523,7 @@ type HardlinkIdentityScannerOptions = {
|
|
|
510
523
|
maxEntries: number
|
|
511
524
|
openDirectory(directory: string): HardlinkDirectory
|
|
512
525
|
lstat(candidate: string): Stats
|
|
526
|
+
realpath(candidate: string): string
|
|
513
527
|
afterEntryLstat?(candidate: string, stats: Stats): void
|
|
514
528
|
}
|
|
515
529
|
|
|
@@ -565,9 +579,11 @@ class HardlinkIdentityScanner {
|
|
|
565
579
|
private scanVisibleTree(): void {
|
|
566
580
|
if (this.visibleScanned) return
|
|
567
581
|
this.visibleScanned = true
|
|
568
|
-
const root = realpathRealIntendedPath(this.options.agentDir)
|
|
569
|
-
const deniedRoots = this.options.deniedDirs.map(realpathRealIntendedPath)
|
|
570
|
-
const deniedFiles = new Set(
|
|
582
|
+
const root = realpathRealIntendedPath(this.options.agentDir, this.options.realpath)
|
|
583
|
+
const deniedRoots = this.options.deniedDirs.map((dir) => realpathRealIntendedPath(dir, this.options.realpath))
|
|
584
|
+
const deniedFiles = new Set(
|
|
585
|
+
this.options.deniedFiles.map((file) => realpathRealIntendedPath(file, this.options.realpath)),
|
|
586
|
+
)
|
|
571
587
|
const rootStats = this.readRootStats(root, 'visible')
|
|
572
588
|
if (rootStats === undefined) return
|
|
573
589
|
const rootDirectory = this.openVerifiedDirectory(root, rootStats, 'visible')
|
|
@@ -619,7 +635,7 @@ class HardlinkIdentityScanner {
|
|
|
619
635
|
let rootStats: Stats
|
|
620
636
|
let root: string
|
|
621
637
|
try {
|
|
622
|
-
root = realpathRealIntendedPath(deniedDir)
|
|
638
|
+
root = realpathRealIntendedPath(deniedDir, this.options.realpath)
|
|
623
639
|
rootStats = this.options.lstat(root)
|
|
624
640
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
625
641
|
if (isNotFoundError(error)) continue
|
|
@@ -950,16 +966,15 @@ function hasSameFileIdentity(candidate: string, deniedFile: string): boolean {
|
|
|
950
966
|
// symlinked component including a planted symlink), and rejoin the remainder.
|
|
951
967
|
// This catches `public/leak/x` where `public/leak` is a symlink into a hidden
|
|
952
968
|
// dir even though `public/leak/x` itself does not exist. Sync (realpathSync)
|
|
953
|
-
// keeps the guard synchronous
|
|
954
|
-
//
|
|
955
|
-
//
|
|
956
|
-
|
|
957
|
-
function realpathRealIntendedPath(absolutePath: string): string {
|
|
969
|
+
// keeps the guard synchronous; the cost is one syscall per existing component,
|
|
970
|
+
// negligible at the tool-call boundary. Sync mirror of resolveRealIntendedPath
|
|
971
|
+
// in the guard plugin's non-workspace-write policy.
|
|
972
|
+
function realpathRealIntendedPath(absolutePath: string, realpath: (candidate: string) => string): string {
|
|
958
973
|
const pending: string[] = []
|
|
959
974
|
let current = absolutePath
|
|
960
975
|
while (true) {
|
|
961
976
|
try {
|
|
962
|
-
return path.join(
|
|
977
|
+
return path.join(realpath(current), ...pending.reverse())
|
|
963
978
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
964
979
|
if (!isNotFoundError(err)) throw err
|
|
965
980
|
}
|
|
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ import type { DiscordBotClient } from 'agent-messenger/discordbot'
|
|
|
2
2
|
|
|
3
3
|
import type { EditMessageCallback, EditMessageResult } from '@/channels/types'
|
|
4
4
|
|
|
5
|
+
import { describeError } from '../describe-error'
|
|
6
|
+
|
|
5
7
|
export function createDiscordEditMessageCallback(deps: {
|
|
6
8
|
client: Pick<DiscordBotClient, 'editMessage'>
|
|
7
9
|
}): EditMessageCallback {
|
|
@@ -17,7 +19,7 @@ export function createDiscordEditMessageCallback(deps: {
|
|
|
17
19
|
try {
|
|
18
20
|
await deps.client.editMessage(channelId, req.messageId, req.text)
|
|
19
21
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
20
|
-
return { ok: false, error:
|
|
22
|
+
return { ok: false, error: describeError(err), code: classifyEditError(err) }
|
|
21
23
|
}
|
|
22
24
|
return { ok: true }
|
|
23
25
|
}
|
|
@@ -43,7 +45,3 @@ function classifyEditError(err: unknown): NonNullable<(EditMessageResult & { ok:
|
|
|
43
45
|
return 'not-found'
|
|
44
46
|
}
|
|
45
47
|
}
|
|
46
|
-
|
|
47
|
-
function describe(err: unknown): string {
|
|
48
|
-
return err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)
|
|
49
|
-
}
|
|
@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ import type {
|
|
|
8
8
|
RemoveReactionCallback,
|
|
9
9
|
} from '@/channels/types'
|
|
10
10
|
|
|
11
|
+
import { describeError } from '../describe-error'
|
|
12
|
+
|
|
11
13
|
// The reactable target on Discord: a message is addressed by its channel id
|
|
12
14
|
// plus the message id. The classifier stamps this because both values are on
|
|
13
15
|
// the gateway event but `chat`/`externalMessageId` are the only ones that
|
|
@@ -99,7 +101,7 @@ export function createDiscordReactionCallback(deps: {
|
|
|
99
101
|
try {
|
|
100
102
|
await deps.client.addReaction(target.channel, target.message, unicode)
|
|
101
103
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
102
|
-
return { ok: false, error:
|
|
104
|
+
return { ok: false, error: describeError(err), code: classifyDiscordError(err) }
|
|
103
105
|
}
|
|
104
106
|
return { ok: true, reactionRef: encodeDiscordRemovalRef({ ...target, emoji: unicode }) }
|
|
105
107
|
}
|
|
@@ -117,7 +119,7 @@ export function createDiscordRemoveReactionCallback(deps: {
|
|
|
117
119
|
try {
|
|
118
120
|
await deps.client.removeReaction(target.channel, target.message, target.emoji)
|
|
119
121
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
120
|
-
return { ok: false, error:
|
|
122
|
+
return { ok: false, error: describeError(err), code: classifyDiscordError(err) }
|
|
121
123
|
}
|
|
122
124
|
return { ok: true }
|
|
123
125
|
}
|
|
@@ -159,7 +161,3 @@ function parseRecord(value: string): Record<string, unknown> | null {
|
|
|
159
161
|
? (parsed as Record<string, unknown>)
|
|
160
162
|
: null
|
|
161
163
|
}
|
|
162
|
-
|
|
163
|
-
function describe(err: unknown): string {
|
|
164
|
-
return err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)
|
|
165
|
-
}
|
|
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ import type { DiscordGatewayInteractionEvent } from 'agent-messenger/discordbot'
|
|
|
2
2
|
|
|
3
3
|
import type { ChannelKey } from '@/channels/types'
|
|
4
4
|
|
|
5
|
+
import { describeError } from '../describe-error'
|
|
6
|
+
|
|
5
7
|
const DISCORD_API_BASE = 'https://discord.com/api/v10'
|
|
6
8
|
|
|
7
9
|
// CHAT_INPUT is the only Discord application-command type that maps to the
|
|
@@ -63,7 +65,7 @@ export async function registerCommands(args: RegisterCommandsArgs): Promise<Regi
|
|
|
63
65
|
}
|
|
64
66
|
return { ok: true }
|
|
65
67
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
66
|
-
return { ok: false, error:
|
|
68
|
+
return { ok: false, error: describeError(err) }
|
|
67
69
|
}
|
|
68
70
|
}
|
|
69
71
|
|