typeclaw 0.47.2 → 0.48.1
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/src/agent/index.ts +1 -2
- package/src/agent/loop-guard.ts +71 -41
- package/src/agent/plugin-tools.ts +234 -58
- package/src/agent/system-prompt.ts +1 -1
- package/src/agent/turn-runner.ts +12 -2
- package/src/agent-messenger/config-dir.ts +131 -0
- package/src/agent-messenger/host-config-dir.ts +121 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/agent-browser/index.ts +0 -38
- package/src/bundled-plugins/agent-browser/skills/agent-browser/SKILL.md +1 -1
- package/src/bundled-plugins/guard/policies/non-workspace-write.ts +16 -1
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/append-tool.ts +75 -2
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/frontmatter.ts +13 -2
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/load-memory.ts +1 -1
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/memory-logger.ts +5 -1
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/secret-detector.ts +7 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/vector/hybrid.ts +3 -1
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/vector/passages.ts +5 -1
- package/src/bundled-plugins/security/index.ts +148 -98
- package/src/bundled-plugins/security/policies/private-surface-read.ts +43 -28
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord-bot-edit.ts +3 -5
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord-bot-reactions.ts +4 -6
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord-bot-slash-commands.ts +3 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord-bot.ts +20 -23
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord-edit.ts +3 -5
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord-reactions.ts +4 -6
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord.ts +1 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/decoy-reviewer.ts +2 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/history.ts +2 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/inbound.ts +4 -11
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/index.ts +6 -9
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/outbound.ts +3 -6
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/reactions.ts +3 -2
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/reconcile-cooldown-store.ts +4 -6
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/reconcile-open-prs.ts +5 -4
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/recover-failed-deliveries.ts +2 -5
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/review-state.ts +3 -2
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/review-thread-resolver.ts +3 -2
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/webhook-register.ts +5 -8
- package/src/channels/adapters/instagram-channel-resolver.ts +3 -5
- package/src/channels/adapters/instagram.ts +1 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/kakaotalk-author-resolver.ts +2 -5
- package/src/channels/adapters/kakaotalk-channel-resolver.ts +3 -5
- package/src/channels/adapters/kakaotalk-fetch-attachment.ts +2 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/kakaotalk-membership.ts +2 -5
- package/src/channels/adapters/kakaotalk-typing.ts +1 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/kakaotalk.ts +1 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/line-channel-resolver.ts +3 -5
- package/src/channels/adapters/line.ts +1 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/slack-bot-edit.ts +1 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/slack-bot-reactions.ts +4 -6
- package/src/channels/adapters/slack-bot.ts +8 -8
- package/src/channels/adapters/slack-edit.ts +3 -5
- package/src/channels/adapters/slack-reactions.ts +4 -6
- package/src/channels/adapters/slack.ts +1 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/teams-edit.ts +2 -5
- package/src/channels/adapters/teams.ts +1 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/telegram-bot-edit.ts +4 -7
- package/src/channels/adapters/telegram-bot.ts +1 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/webex-bot.ts +1 -1
- package/src/channels/adapters/webex-edit.ts +3 -5
- package/src/channels/adapters/webex.ts +1 -1
- package/src/channels/github-review-claim.ts +89 -4
- package/src/channels/github-token-bridge.ts +2 -1
- package/src/channels/manager.ts +478 -64
- package/src/channels/membership-cache.ts +2 -5
- package/src/channels/persistence.ts +3 -6
- package/src/channels/reloadable.ts +23 -6
- package/src/channels/router.ts +134 -56
- package/src/channels/tunnel-bridge.ts +2 -1
- package/src/channels/types.ts +6 -3
- package/src/cli/channel.ts +15 -16
- package/src/cli/hostd.ts +61 -38
- package/src/cli/init.ts +21 -7
- package/src/cli/model.ts +6 -3
- package/src/cli/restart.ts +13 -15
- package/src/compose/restart.ts +14 -6
- package/src/config/config.ts +10 -0
- package/src/config/providers.ts +68 -0
- package/src/container/agent-operation-lock.ts +85 -0
- package/src/container/controller.ts +6 -0
- package/src/container/index.ts +8 -0
- package/src/container/restart.ts +55 -0
- package/src/container/shared.ts +5 -0
- package/src/container/start.ts +70 -4
- package/src/container/stop.ts +17 -1
- package/src/dependencies/bin-resolver.ts +88 -0
- package/src/dependencies/bins.ts +227 -0
- package/src/dependencies/index.ts +17 -0
- package/src/doctor/checks.ts +2 -0
- package/src/doctor/operational-incidents.ts +32 -0
- package/src/hostd/credential-rotation-apply.ts +94 -0
- package/src/hostd/daemon.ts +1 -1
- package/src/hostd/paths.ts +17 -0
- package/src/hostd/supervisor.ts +27 -10
- package/src/init/dockerfile.ts +6 -5
- package/src/init/env-file.ts +42 -18
- package/src/init/instagram-auth.ts +55 -31
- package/src/init/kakaotalk-auth.ts +1 -5
- package/src/init/line-auth.ts +45 -29
- package/src/init/models-dev.ts +131 -10
- package/src/init/opengateway-catalog.ts +120 -0
- package/src/init/validate-api-key.ts +26 -4
- package/src/operations/classify-tool-outcome.ts +151 -0
- package/src/operations/incidents.ts +274 -0
- package/src/operations/index.ts +3 -0
- package/src/operations/remediations.ts +41 -0
- package/src/reload/client.ts +8 -2
- package/src/reload/docker-exec-client.ts +10 -2
- package/src/reload/index.ts +1 -1
- package/src/reload/recover.ts +5 -3
- package/src/reload/registry.ts +5 -5
- package/src/reload/types.ts +9 -1
- package/src/run/index.ts +5 -0
- package/src/sandbox/canonical-secrets.ts +10 -1
- package/src/sandbox/dependency-bins.ts +125 -0
- package/src/sandbox/hidden-paths.ts +4 -1
- package/src/sandbox/index.ts +8 -0
- package/src/sandbox/policy.ts +1 -1
- package/src/sandbox/privileged-runtime.ts +7 -12
- package/src/sandbox/runtime-private.ts +4 -0
- package/src/sandbox/writable-zones.ts +4 -4
- package/src/server/index.ts +7 -5
- package/src/shared/protocol.ts +6 -1
- package/src/test-helpers/fake-agent-operation-lock.ts +66 -0
- package/typeclaw.schema.json +10 -5
- package/src/bundled-plugins/agent-browser/shim-install.ts +0 -179
- package/src/bundled-plugins/agent-browser/shim.ts +0 -108
- /package/src/channels/{adapters/describe-error.ts → describe-error.ts} +0 -0
package/package.json
CHANGED
package/src/agent/index.ts
CHANGED
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@@ -272,6 +272,7 @@ export async function createSessionWithDispose(options: CreateSessionOptions = {
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// the chain when it recreates a session after the previous ref failed.
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const activeRef: ModelRef = options.refOverride ?? resolved.ref
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const { authStorage, modelRegistry } = getAuthFor(providerForModelRef(activeRef))
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const sessionManager = options.sessionManager ?? SessionManager.inMemory()
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const materializedSkills =
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options.plugins && options.plugins.registry.skills.length > 0
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@@ -357,8 +358,6 @@ export async function createSessionWithDispose(options: CreateSessionOptions = {
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// session's stable identity (sessionManager.getSessionId()). Subscribers use
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// that ID to distinguish the originating session from siblings on the
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// container-restarting broadcast.
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const sessionManager = options.sessionManager ?? SessionManager.inMemory()
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-
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// Stamp a one-shot custom entry naming the session's origin kind so
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// `typeclaw usage` can bucket tokens by tui/cron/channel/subagent. Pi's
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// `appendCustomEntry` is the blessed extension point: the entry persists
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package/src/agent/loop-guard.ts
CHANGED
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@@ -11,9 +11,10 @@ import { posix } from 'node:path'
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// consecutive detector cannot see, e.g. read(a)→edit(b)→read(a)→edit(b)…, or
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// re-reading one file with drifting offsets. Over a sliding window of the
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// last WINDOW_SIZE calls, if one signature recurs WINDOW_SOFT_WARN times it
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// warns and WINDOW_HARD_BLOCK times it blocks. Path-
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//
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//
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// warns and WINDOW_HARD_BLOCK times it blocks. Path-only tools coarsen their
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// signature to the path, while search tools retain the query as part of the
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// target. Read and search calls additionally recognize one assistant tool
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// batch, and reads recognize successfully-observed forward pagination, so
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// productive inspection does not look like a reactive cycle.
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//
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// Both warn/block decisions carry the byte-identical or coarsened nudge text.
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export const WINDOW_SOFT_WARN = 4
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export const WINDOW_HARD_BLOCK = 6
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//
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//
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// offset/limit collapses to a single signature. Two classes, because the
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// builtins differ in whether the path is required:
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// Path-bearing tools need coarser window signatures so presentation-only args
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// cannot disguise repeated work. The target differs by tool class:
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//
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// - REQUIRED-path tools (read/write/edit): path is mandatory. Coarsen only
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// when a path key is present; an absent path is malformed input, not a
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// default, so we must NOT collapse such calls to a shared target.
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// - DEFAULT-path tools (
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//
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//
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// - DEFAULT-path tools (ls): path is OPTIONAL and defaults to the cwd (".").
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// Omitting the path and varying only non-target args still hits the same
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// directory, so an omitted/empty path coarsens to `${tool}#path:.` —
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// otherwise those calls would evade the detector.
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// - SEARCH-path tools (grep/find): path is also optional, but the pattern and
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// matching controls are part of the research target. Different queries on
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// one large file are legitimate fan-out, not repeated work.
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//
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// `glob` is intentionally absent: pi-coding-agent has no `glob` builtin (the
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// glob-pattern arg lives inside grep/find), so listing it here matched nothing.
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const REQUIRED_PATH_TOOLS = new Set(['read', 'write', 'edit'])
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const DEFAULT_PATH_TOOLS = new Set(['
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const DEFAULT_PATH_TOOLS = new Set(['ls'])
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const SEARCH_PATH_TOOLS = new Set(['grep', 'find'])
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const PATH_ARG_KEYS = ['path', 'file', 'filePath', 'filename']
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const DEFAULT_PATH_TARGET = '.'
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// Undoes the one observation a prior `check` recorded, identified by its
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// receipt. Pops that signature from the windowed history and, when the
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// current consecutive streak is the call this receipt named, rewinds the
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// streak by one. Suppressed same-batch
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// streak by one. Suppressed same-batch target receipts are explicit no-ops so
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// parallel sibling completion cannot retract the recorded observation. Used
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// post-execution for a
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// `subagent_output` poll that returned `status: 'running'` — a still-pending
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// A block on such a signature is enforced pre-execute (not deferred), so a
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// completed task is not re-polled forever just to re-learn it is done.
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termKnown: Set<string>
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// Parallel research siblings cannot react to one another's results. Counting
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// a duplicated target within that batch toward a session-aborting threshold
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// gives the model no chance to heed the warning and choose another approach.
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targetTurnId: number | undefined
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targetsThisTurn: Set<string>
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// Observed contiguous line progress per recently-read canonical path.
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// Suppressed siblings may wait here for earlier siblings to complete, but
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// only exact adjacency advances the frontier.
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window: [],
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windowWarned: new Set(),
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termKnown: new Set(),
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targetTurnId: undefined,
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targetsThisTurn: new Set(),
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readFrontiers: new Map(),
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}
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const readTarget = parseReadTarget(tool, args, context?.cwd)
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const readPage = parseReadPage(tool, args, context?.cwd)
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const turnTarget =
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readTarget !== undefined ? readPathSignature(readTarget.path) : makeSearchTargetSignature(tool, args)
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if (turnTarget !== undefined && context?.turnId !== undefined) {
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if (targetSeenThisTurn(state, turnTarget, context.turnId, windowSize)) {
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const receipt: LoopGuardReceipt = {
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sessionId,
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tool,
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signature,
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windowSignature:
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windowSignature: turnTarget,
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recorded: false,
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...(readPage !== undefined ? { readPage } : {}),
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}
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for (const sig of state.termKnown) {
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if (signatureBelongsToTool(sig, tool)) state.termKnown.delete(sig)
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}
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state.
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state.readPathsThisTurn.clear()
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state.readFrontiers.clear()
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for (const target of state.targetsThisTurn) {
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if (signatureBelongsToTool(target, tool)) state.targetsThisTurn.delete(target)
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}
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if (state.targetsThisTurn.size === 0) state.targetTurnId = undefined
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if (tool === 'read') state.readFrontiers.clear()
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},
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retract(receipt) {
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if (!receipt.recorded) return
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}
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}
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// target path
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// signature.
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// Coarsened signature for windowed detection: path-only tools key on their
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// target path, while searches keep semantic query arguments so parallel
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// investigation of one large file does not look like repeated work. All other
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// tools fall back to the exact signature.
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function makeWindowSignature(tool: string, args: unknown, state: SessionState, cwd: string | undefined): string {
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const readPage = parseReadPage(tool, args, cwd)
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: coarse
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}
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const searchTarget = makeSearchTargetSignature(tool, args)
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if (searchTarget !== undefined) return searchTarget
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if (SEARCH_PATH_TOOLS.has(tool)) return makeCallSignature(tool, args)
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const isRequiredPath = REQUIRED_PATH_TOOLS.has(tool)
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if ((isRequiredPath || isDefaultPath) && args !== null && typeof args === 'object') {
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function
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function makeSearchTargetSignature(tool: string, args: unknown): string | undefined {
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if (!SEARCH_PATH_TOOLS.has(tool) || args === null || typeof args !== 'object') return undefined
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const record = args as Record<string, unknown>
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const { pattern } = record
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const path = PATH_ARG_KEYS.map((key) => record[key]).find(
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(value): value is string => typeof value === 'string' && value.length > 0,
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)
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const query =
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? {
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pattern,
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...(typeof record.glob === 'string' && record.glob.length > 0 ? { glob: record.glob } : {}),
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}
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: { pattern }
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return `${tool}#search:${stableStringify({ path: path ?? DEFAULT_PATH_TARGET, query })}`
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}
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function targetSeenThisTurn(state: SessionState, target: string, turnId: number, maxTargets: number): boolean {
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}
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const seen = state.
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if (seen) state.
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state.
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523
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-
while (state.
|
|
524
|
-
const oldest = state.
|
|
550
|
+
const seen = state.targetsThisTurn.has(target)
|
|
551
|
+
if (seen) state.targetsThisTurn.delete(target)
|
|
552
|
+
state.targetsThisTurn.add(target)
|
|
553
|
+
while (state.targetsThisTurn.size > maxTargets) {
|
|
554
|
+
const oldest = state.targetsThisTurn.values().next().value
|
|
525
555
|
if (oldest === undefined) break
|
|
526
|
-
state.
|
|
556
|
+
state.targetsThisTurn.delete(oldest)
|
|
527
557
|
}
|
|
528
558
|
return seen
|
|
529
559
|
}
|
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
import { AsyncLocalStorage } from 'node:async_hooks'
|
|
2
2
|
import { mkdir } from 'node:fs/promises'
|
|
3
|
-
import { join } from 'node:path'
|
|
3
|
+
import { join, relative, sep } from 'node:path'
|
|
4
4
|
|
|
5
5
|
import {
|
|
6
6
|
createBashToolDefinition as piCreateBashToolDefinition,
|
|
@@ -25,6 +25,16 @@ import {
|
|
|
25
25
|
} from '@/bundled-plugins/guard/policy'
|
|
26
26
|
import { config, getSandboxWritablePathSpecs } from '@/config/config'
|
|
27
27
|
import { readEnvFile } from '@/init/env-file'
|
|
28
|
+
import {
|
|
29
|
+
classifyToolOutcome,
|
|
30
|
+
deriveMechanicallyVerifiedIncidentFingerprints,
|
|
31
|
+
IncidentLedger,
|
|
32
|
+
operationalRemediations,
|
|
33
|
+
renderIncidentHint,
|
|
34
|
+
renderUntrackedIncidentHint,
|
|
35
|
+
repairAndRetryOnce,
|
|
36
|
+
} from '@/operations'
|
|
37
|
+
import type { RemediationRegistry } from '@/operations'
|
|
28
38
|
import type { PermissionService } from '@/permissions/permissions'
|
|
29
39
|
import type {
|
|
30
40
|
BuiltinToolRef,
|
|
@@ -43,12 +53,15 @@ import {
|
|
|
43
53
|
cleanupPrivilegedSandboxRuntime,
|
|
44
54
|
commandNeedsRealProc,
|
|
45
55
|
DEFAULT_SANDBOX_ENV,
|
|
56
|
+
DEPENDENCY_BIN_SANDBOX_DIR,
|
|
57
|
+
dependencyBinUnavailableHint,
|
|
46
58
|
ensureBwrapAvailable,
|
|
47
59
|
ensureHiddenMaskTargets,
|
|
48
60
|
ensureSessionTmpDir,
|
|
49
61
|
getProcBindSafetyVerdict,
|
|
50
62
|
isGitControlPath,
|
|
51
63
|
mapVirtualTmpPath,
|
|
64
|
+
reconcileDependencyBinWrappers,
|
|
52
65
|
resolveHiddenPaths,
|
|
53
66
|
resolvePrivilegedSandboxRuntime,
|
|
54
67
|
resolveProcBindSafetyWithRetry,
|
|
@@ -59,6 +72,7 @@ import {
|
|
|
59
72
|
SandboxPolicyError,
|
|
60
73
|
SandboxDegradedProcError,
|
|
61
74
|
SandboxProcProbeUnverifiedError,
|
|
75
|
+
type DependencyBinReconciliation,
|
|
62
76
|
subtractMasked,
|
|
63
77
|
verifyHiddenMaskTargets,
|
|
64
78
|
verifyPrivilegedSandboxRuntime,
|
|
@@ -284,6 +298,9 @@ export type WrapSystemToolOptions = {
|
|
|
284
298
|
// `src/agent/reviewer-bash-policy.ts`.
|
|
285
299
|
bashPolicy?: SubagentBashPolicy
|
|
286
300
|
bashSandboxBoundary?: BashSandboxBoundary
|
|
301
|
+
realProcDependencyCheck?: typeof commandNeedsRealProc
|
|
302
|
+
remediations?: RemediationRegistry
|
|
303
|
+
incidentLedger?: IncidentLedger
|
|
287
304
|
}
|
|
288
305
|
|
|
289
306
|
// Zod 4 emits a top-level `"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"`
|
|
@@ -519,6 +536,8 @@ export function wrapBuiltinToolDefinition<TParams extends TSchema, TDetails = un
|
|
|
519
536
|
parameters: withGuardAcknowledgements(tool.name, tool.parameters),
|
|
520
537
|
async execute(toolCallId, params, signal, onUpdate, ctx) {
|
|
521
538
|
const mutableArgs = params as Record<string, unknown>
|
|
539
|
+
const originalBashCommand =
|
|
540
|
+
tool.name === 'bash' && typeof mutableArgs.command === 'string' ? mutableArgs.command : undefined
|
|
522
541
|
normalizeDefaultTreeRoot(tool.name, mutableArgs)
|
|
523
542
|
const liveOrigin = opts.getOrigin?.()
|
|
524
543
|
// Defense-in-depth: strip any pre-existing internal env-overlay key
|
|
@@ -574,59 +593,85 @@ export function wrapBuiltinToolDefinition<TParams extends TSchema, TDetails = un
|
|
|
574
593
|
let rawResult: ToolResult | undefined
|
|
575
594
|
let executionError: unknown
|
|
576
595
|
let cleanupError: unknown
|
|
596
|
+
let sandboxedRealProcSucceeded = false
|
|
577
597
|
const sandboxBoundary = opts.bashSandboxBoundary ?? DEFAULT_BASH_SANDBOX_BOUNDARY
|
|
578
|
-
|
|
579
|
-
|
|
580
|
-
|
|
581
|
-
|
|
598
|
+
const incidentLedger = opts.incidentLedger ?? new IncidentLedger(opts.agentDir)
|
|
599
|
+
const originalArgs = { ...mutableArgs }
|
|
600
|
+
const executeAttempt = async (): Promise<void> => {
|
|
601
|
+
preparedSandboxRuntime = undefined
|
|
602
|
+
pinnedFiles = undefined
|
|
603
|
+
tmpRedirect = undefined
|
|
604
|
+
rawResult = undefined
|
|
605
|
+
executionError = undefined
|
|
606
|
+
cleanupError = undefined
|
|
607
|
+
sandboxedRealProcSucceeded = false
|
|
608
|
+
const attemptArgs = { ...originalArgs }
|
|
609
|
+
try {
|
|
610
|
+
if (tool.name === 'bash') {
|
|
611
|
+
if (opts.permissions === undefined) {
|
|
612
|
+
throw new SandboxPolicyError(
|
|
613
|
+
'model-driven bash has no permission service; refusing unsandboxed execution',
|
|
614
|
+
)
|
|
615
|
+
}
|
|
616
|
+
preparedSandboxRuntime = await applyBashSandbox(
|
|
617
|
+
attemptArgs,
|
|
618
|
+
opts.permissions,
|
|
619
|
+
liveOrigin,
|
|
620
|
+
opts.agentDir,
|
|
621
|
+
opts.sessionId,
|
|
622
|
+
bashEnvOverlay,
|
|
623
|
+
sandboxBoundary,
|
|
624
|
+
)
|
|
582
625
|
}
|
|
583
|
-
|
|
584
|
-
|
|
585
|
-
opts.permissions
|
|
586
|
-
|
|
587
|
-
|
|
588
|
-
|
|
589
|
-
|
|
590
|
-
|
|
626
|
+
|
|
627
|
+
tmpRedirect =
|
|
628
|
+
TMP_REDIRECT_TOOLS.has(tool.name) && opts.permissions !== undefined
|
|
629
|
+
? await applyTmpPathRedirect(attemptArgs, opts.permissions, liveOrigin, opts.agentDir, opts.sessionId)
|
|
630
|
+
: undefined
|
|
631
|
+
pinnedFiles = await enforceAndPinToolFiles({
|
|
632
|
+
tool: tool.name,
|
|
633
|
+
args: attemptArgs,
|
|
634
|
+
agentDir: opts.agentDir,
|
|
635
|
+
...(opts.permissions !== undefined
|
|
636
|
+
? {
|
|
637
|
+
hidden:
|
|
638
|
+
preparedSandboxRuntime?.withheld.paths ??
|
|
639
|
+
resolveHiddenPaths(opts.permissions, liveOrigin, opts.agentDir),
|
|
640
|
+
}
|
|
641
|
+
: {}),
|
|
642
|
+
signal,
|
|
643
|
+
})
|
|
644
|
+
await preparedSandboxRuntime?.verify()
|
|
645
|
+
const spawnEnvContext: BashSpawnEnvContext | undefined =
|
|
646
|
+
bashEnvOverlay !== undefined || preparedSandboxRuntime?.spawnEnv !== undefined
|
|
647
|
+
? {
|
|
648
|
+
...(bashEnvOverlay !== undefined ? { overlay: bashEnvOverlay } : {}),
|
|
649
|
+
...(preparedSandboxRuntime?.spawnEnv !== undefined
|
|
650
|
+
? { sandboxSpawnEnv: preparedSandboxRuntime.spawnEnv }
|
|
651
|
+
: {}),
|
|
652
|
+
}
|
|
653
|
+
: undefined
|
|
654
|
+
rawResult = await bashEnvStore.run(spawnEnvContext, () =>
|
|
655
|
+
tool.execute(toolCallId, attemptArgs as Static<TParams>, signal, onUpdate, ctx),
|
|
656
|
+
)
|
|
657
|
+
const originalCommand = originalArgs.command
|
|
658
|
+
sandboxedRealProcSucceeded =
|
|
659
|
+
preparedSandboxRuntime !== undefined &&
|
|
660
|
+
typeof originalCommand === 'string' &&
|
|
661
|
+
(opts.realProcDependencyCheck ?? commandNeedsRealProc)(originalCommand)
|
|
662
|
+
} catch (error) {
|
|
663
|
+
executionError = error
|
|
664
|
+
} finally {
|
|
665
|
+
const cleanup = [pinnedFiles?.cleanup(), preparedSandboxRuntime?.cleanup()].filter(
|
|
666
|
+
(task): task is Promise<void> => task !== undefined,
|
|
591
667
|
)
|
|
668
|
+
const outcomes = await Promise.allSettled(cleanup)
|
|
669
|
+
const failed = outcomes.find((outcome) => outcome.status === 'rejected')
|
|
670
|
+
if (failed?.status === 'rejected') cleanupError = failed.reason
|
|
592
671
|
}
|
|
593
|
-
|
|
594
|
-
tmpRedirect =
|
|
595
|
-
TMP_REDIRECT_TOOLS.has(tool.name) && opts.permissions !== undefined
|
|
596
|
-
? await applyTmpPathRedirect(mutableArgs, opts.permissions, liveOrigin, opts.agentDir, opts.sessionId)
|
|
597
|
-
: undefined
|
|
598
|
-
pinnedFiles = await enforceAndPinToolFiles({
|
|
599
|
-
tool: tool.name,
|
|
600
|
-
args: mutableArgs,
|
|
601
|
-
agentDir: opts.agentDir,
|
|
602
|
-
...(opts.permissions !== undefined
|
|
603
|
-
? { hidden: resolveHiddenPaths(opts.permissions, liveOrigin, opts.agentDir) }
|
|
604
|
-
: {}),
|
|
605
|
-
signal,
|
|
606
|
-
})
|
|
607
|
-
await preparedSandboxRuntime?.verify()
|
|
608
|
-
const spawnEnvContext: BashSpawnEnvContext | undefined =
|
|
609
|
-
bashEnvOverlay !== undefined || preparedSandboxRuntime?.spawnEnv !== undefined
|
|
610
|
-
? {
|
|
611
|
-
...(bashEnvOverlay !== undefined ? { overlay: bashEnvOverlay } : {}),
|
|
612
|
-
...(preparedSandboxRuntime?.spawnEnv !== undefined
|
|
613
|
-
? { sandboxSpawnEnv: preparedSandboxRuntime.spawnEnv }
|
|
614
|
-
: {}),
|
|
615
|
-
}
|
|
616
|
-
: undefined
|
|
617
|
-
rawResult = await bashEnvStore.run(spawnEnvContext, () =>
|
|
618
|
-
tool.execute(toolCallId, mutableArgs as Static<TParams>, signal, onUpdate, ctx),
|
|
619
|
-
)
|
|
620
|
-
} catch (error) {
|
|
621
|
-
executionError = error
|
|
622
|
-
} finally {
|
|
623
|
-
const cleanup = [pinnedFiles?.cleanup(), preparedSandboxRuntime?.cleanup()].filter(
|
|
624
|
-
(task): task is Promise<void> => task !== undefined,
|
|
625
|
-
)
|
|
626
|
-
const outcomes = await Promise.allSettled(cleanup)
|
|
627
|
-
const failed = outcomes.find((outcome) => outcome.status === 'rejected')
|
|
628
|
-
if (failed?.status === 'rejected') cleanupError = failed.reason
|
|
629
672
|
}
|
|
673
|
+
|
|
674
|
+
await executeAttempt()
|
|
630
675
|
// Decorate genuine, user-correctable builtin file-tool failures with a
|
|
631
676
|
// recovery hint so weaker models retry correctly. Only executionError (not
|
|
632
677
|
// cleanupError) and only non-aborted Error instances; remediation is a
|
|
@@ -635,16 +680,77 @@ export function wrapBuiltinToolDefinition<TParams extends TSchema, TDetails = un
|
|
|
635
680
|
// preserves the error's subclass and stack for the rethrow.
|
|
636
681
|
if (executionError instanceof Error && signal?.aborted !== true) {
|
|
637
682
|
executionError.message = remediateToolErrorMessage(tool.name, executionError.message)
|
|
683
|
+
const incidentFact = classifyToolOutcome({ tool: tool.name, error: executionError })
|
|
684
|
+
if (incidentFact !== null) {
|
|
685
|
+
const initialError = executionError
|
|
686
|
+
let recordedFingerprint: string | undefined
|
|
687
|
+
let incidentHint = renderUntrackedIncidentHint(incidentFact)
|
|
688
|
+
try {
|
|
689
|
+
const incident = await incidentLedger.record(incidentFact, opts.sessionId)
|
|
690
|
+
recordedFingerprint = incident.fingerprint
|
|
691
|
+
incidentHint = renderIncidentHint(incident)
|
|
692
|
+
} catch {
|
|
693
|
+
// Incident persistence must never hide the originating tool failure.
|
|
694
|
+
}
|
|
695
|
+
const remediation = await repairAndRetryOnce(
|
|
696
|
+
opts.remediations ?? operationalRemediations,
|
|
697
|
+
incidentFact,
|
|
698
|
+
initialError,
|
|
699
|
+
async () => {
|
|
700
|
+
await executeAttempt()
|
|
701
|
+
const retryError = executionError ?? cleanupError
|
|
702
|
+
if (retryError !== undefined) throw retryError
|
|
703
|
+
},
|
|
704
|
+
)
|
|
705
|
+
if (remediation.outcome === 'retried') {
|
|
706
|
+
const retrySuccessFingerprints = deriveMechanicallyVerifiedIncidentFingerprints({
|
|
707
|
+
tool: tool.name,
|
|
708
|
+
args: originalArgs,
|
|
709
|
+
sandboxedRealProcSucceeded,
|
|
710
|
+
})
|
|
711
|
+
if (recordedFingerprint !== undefined && retrySuccessFingerprints.has(recordedFingerprint)) {
|
|
712
|
+
await incidentLedger.resolve(recordedFingerprint).catch(() => false)
|
|
713
|
+
}
|
|
714
|
+
} else {
|
|
715
|
+
const failedError = remediation.outcome === 'retry-failed' ? remediation.error : initialError
|
|
716
|
+
const finalIncidentError = failedError instanceof Error ? failedError : new Error(String(failedError))
|
|
717
|
+
finalIncidentError.message = remediateToolErrorMessage(tool.name, finalIncidentError.message)
|
|
718
|
+
finalIncidentError.message = `${finalIncidentError.message}\n\n${incidentHint}`
|
|
719
|
+
executionError = finalIncidentError
|
|
720
|
+
cleanupError = undefined
|
|
721
|
+
}
|
|
722
|
+
}
|
|
638
723
|
}
|
|
639
|
-
|
|
724
|
+
let finalError = executionError ?? cleanupError
|
|
640
725
|
if (finalError !== undefined) {
|
|
726
|
+
// The builtin reports command failures as execution errors rather than
|
|
727
|
+
// result details. Once the sandbox was prepared, annotate every such
|
|
728
|
+
// error without parsing its arbitrary or localized text. Cleanup-only
|
|
729
|
+
// failures are not command failures and remain unchanged.
|
|
730
|
+
if (executionError !== undefined && preparedSandboxRuntime !== undefined) {
|
|
731
|
+
finalError = appendErrorText(
|
|
732
|
+
finalError,
|
|
733
|
+
renderSandboxPolicyNote(preparedSandboxRuntime.withheld, opts.agentDir),
|
|
734
|
+
)
|
|
735
|
+
}
|
|
641
736
|
await runToolAfterSafely(opts, tool.name, toolCallId, toErrorResult(finalError))
|
|
642
737
|
throw finalError
|
|
643
738
|
}
|
|
644
739
|
if (pinnedFiles === undefined) throw new Error('tool file boundary was not initialized')
|
|
645
740
|
if (rawResult === undefined) throw new Error('tool execution returned no result')
|
|
646
741
|
const pinnedResult = pinnedFiles.restoreResult(rawResult)
|
|
647
|
-
|
|
742
|
+
let result = tmpRedirect !== undefined ? restoreTmpPathInResult(pinnedResult, tmpRedirect) : pinnedResult
|
|
743
|
+
if (
|
|
744
|
+
originalBashCommand !== undefined &&
|
|
745
|
+
preparedSandboxRuntime?.dependencyBins !== undefined &&
|
|
746
|
+
bashResultIsCommandNotFound(result)
|
|
747
|
+
) {
|
|
748
|
+
const hint = dependencyBinUnavailableHint(originalBashCommand, preparedSandboxRuntime.dependencyBins)
|
|
749
|
+
if (hint !== undefined) result = appendTextResult(result, hint)
|
|
750
|
+
}
|
|
751
|
+
if (preparedSandboxRuntime !== undefined && bashResultHasNonzeroExit(result)) {
|
|
752
|
+
result = appendTextResult(result, renderSandboxPolicyNote(preparedSandboxRuntime.withheld, opts.agentDir))
|
|
753
|
+
}
|
|
648
754
|
const resolved = loopGate.resolve({ content: result.content as ContentPart[], details: result.details })
|
|
649
755
|
if ('deferredBlock' in resolved) {
|
|
650
756
|
fireLoopAbort(opts.getAbort, 'loop_guard:deferred_block')
|
|
@@ -657,6 +763,12 @@ export function wrapBuiltinToolDefinition<TParams extends TSchema, TDetails = un
|
|
|
657
763
|
callId: toolCallId,
|
|
658
764
|
result: hookResult,
|
|
659
765
|
})
|
|
766
|
+
const successFingerprints = deriveMechanicallyVerifiedIncidentFingerprints({
|
|
767
|
+
tool: tool.name,
|
|
768
|
+
args: originalArgs,
|
|
769
|
+
sandboxedRealProcSucceeded,
|
|
770
|
+
})
|
|
771
|
+
await incidentLedger.resolveObservedSuccess(successFingerprints).catch(() => 0)
|
|
660
772
|
return {
|
|
661
773
|
content: hookResult.content as ContentPart[],
|
|
662
774
|
details: hookResult.details as TDetails,
|
|
@@ -705,6 +817,11 @@ type PreparedBashSandbox = {
|
|
|
705
817
|
verify: () => Promise<void>
|
|
706
818
|
cleanup: () => Promise<void>
|
|
707
819
|
spawnEnv?: Record<string, string>
|
|
820
|
+
dependencyBins?: DependencyBinReconciliation
|
|
821
|
+
withheld: {
|
|
822
|
+
paths: { dirs: string[]; files: string[] }
|
|
823
|
+
envNames: string[]
|
|
824
|
+
}
|
|
708
825
|
}
|
|
709
826
|
|
|
710
827
|
export function buildBashFilesystemPolicy(options: BashFilesystemPolicyOptions) {
|
|
@@ -730,22 +847,34 @@ async function applyBashSandbox(
|
|
|
730
847
|
boundary: BashSandboxBoundary,
|
|
731
848
|
): Promise<PreparedBashSandbox> {
|
|
732
849
|
const command = mutableArgs.command
|
|
733
|
-
if (typeof command !== 'string')
|
|
850
|
+
if (typeof command !== 'string') {
|
|
851
|
+
return {
|
|
852
|
+
verify: async () => {},
|
|
853
|
+
cleanup: async () => {},
|
|
854
|
+
withheld: { paths: { dirs: [], files: [] }, envNames: [] },
|
|
855
|
+
}
|
|
856
|
+
}
|
|
734
857
|
|
|
735
858
|
const { dirs, files } = resolveHiddenPaths(permissions, origin, agentDir)
|
|
859
|
+
const envNames = resolveExposableBashEnvNames(agentDir)
|
|
736
860
|
const sandboxEnvOverlay = buildRoleScopedConfigEnv(agentDir, dirs, envOverlay)
|
|
737
861
|
const maskTargets = await ensureHiddenMaskTargets({ dirs, files })
|
|
738
862
|
await boundary.ensureAvailable()
|
|
739
863
|
const sessionTmp = await ensureSessionTmpDir(sessionId)
|
|
864
|
+
const dependencyBins = await reconcileDependencyBinWrappers({ agentDir, sessionTmp })
|
|
740
865
|
const writable = subtractMasked(await resolveWritableZones(agentDir, getSandboxWritablePathSpecs(config)), {
|
|
741
866
|
dirs,
|
|
742
867
|
files,
|
|
743
868
|
})
|
|
744
869
|
const writableRoot = canWriteAgentRootInSandbox(permissions, origin)
|
|
745
|
-
const
|
|
870
|
+
const baseProtectedZones =
|
|
746
871
|
writableRoot || writable.dirs.includes(join(agentDir, '.git'))
|
|
747
872
|
? subtractMasked(await resolveProtectedZones(agentDir), { dirs, files })
|
|
748
873
|
: { dirs: [], files: [] }
|
|
874
|
+
const protectedZones = {
|
|
875
|
+
dirs: baseProtectedZones.dirs,
|
|
876
|
+
files: [...new Set([...baseProtectedZones.files, ...dependencyBins.protectedFiles])],
|
|
877
|
+
}
|
|
749
878
|
const writableDirSet = new Set(writable.dirs)
|
|
750
879
|
const sandboxHome = DEFAULT_SANDBOX_ENV.HOME ?? '/tmp'
|
|
751
880
|
const symlinks = resolveSandboxSymlinks(agentDir, config.sandbox.symlinks, sandboxHome).filter((op) =>
|
|
@@ -768,6 +897,10 @@ async function applyBashSandbox(
|
|
|
768
897
|
mounts: [
|
|
769
898
|
{ type: 'ro-bind', source: agentDir, dest: agentDir },
|
|
770
899
|
{ type: 'bind', source: sessionTmp, dest: '/tmp' },
|
|
900
|
+
// `/tmp` is writable, but PATH entries must remain runtime-owned for
|
|
901
|
+
// the lifetime of this command. Last-op-wins makes this narrow re-bind
|
|
902
|
+
// read-only without adding any broader filesystem exposure.
|
|
903
|
+
{ type: 'ro-bind', source: dependencyBins.wrapperDir, dest: DEPENDENCY_BIN_SANDBOX_DIR },
|
|
771
904
|
...(privilegedRuntime?.mounts ?? []),
|
|
772
905
|
],
|
|
773
906
|
...(writableRoot
|
|
@@ -778,9 +911,7 @@ async function applyBashSandbox(
|
|
|
778
911
|
cwd: agentDir,
|
|
779
912
|
proc,
|
|
780
913
|
procSelfExe: resolveProcSelfExe(),
|
|
781
|
-
...spreadSandboxEnv(
|
|
782
|
-
buildSandboxEnvPolicy(sandboxEnvOverlay, privilegedRuntime?.env, resolveExposableBashEnvNames(agentDir)),
|
|
783
|
-
),
|
|
914
|
+
...spreadSandboxEnv(buildSandboxEnvPolicy(sandboxEnvOverlay, privilegedRuntime?.env, envNames.exposable)),
|
|
784
915
|
})
|
|
785
916
|
mutableArgs.command = commandString
|
|
786
917
|
// The overlay carries command-scoped secret VALUES (e.g. a per-repo GH_TOKEN)
|
|
@@ -793,6 +924,8 @@ async function applyBashSandbox(
|
|
|
793
924
|
verify: async () => (boundary.verifyRuntime ?? verifyPrivilegedSandboxRuntime)(privilegedRuntime),
|
|
794
925
|
cleanup,
|
|
795
926
|
spawnEnv: mergedSpawnEnv,
|
|
927
|
+
dependencyBins,
|
|
928
|
+
withheld: { paths: maskTargets, envNames: envNames.withheld },
|
|
796
929
|
}
|
|
797
930
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
798
931
|
await cleanup()
|
|
@@ -800,6 +933,43 @@ async function applyBashSandbox(
|
|
|
800
933
|
}
|
|
801
934
|
}
|
|
802
935
|
|
|
936
|
+
function bashResultIsCommandNotFound(result: ToolResult): boolean {
|
|
937
|
+
if (isRecord(result.details) && result.details.exitCode === 127) return true
|
|
938
|
+
return (result.content as ContentPart[]).some(
|
|
939
|
+
(part) => part.type === 'text' && /command not found(?:\s|$)/i.test(part.text),
|
|
940
|
+
)
|
|
941
|
+
}
|
|
942
|
+
|
|
943
|
+
function bashResultHasNonzeroExit(result: ToolResult): boolean {
|
|
944
|
+
// A numeric nonzero exit is the command's tool-agnostic failure signal. Do
|
|
945
|
+
// not infer failure from arbitrary or localized output text.
|
|
946
|
+
return isRecord(result.details) && typeof result.details.exitCode === 'number' && result.details.exitCode !== 0
|
|
947
|
+
}
|
|
948
|
+
|
|
949
|
+
function renderSandboxPolicyNote(withheld: PreparedBashSandbox['withheld'], agentDir: string): string {
|
|
950
|
+
const maskedPaths = [...withheld.paths.dirs, ...withheld.paths.files].map(
|
|
951
|
+
(target) => `agent/${relative(agentDir, target).split(sep).join('/')}`,
|
|
952
|
+
)
|
|
953
|
+
return (
|
|
954
|
+
`[TypeClaw sandbox policy (LOCAL): masked credential/private paths: ${maskedPaths.join(', ') || 'none'}; ` +
|
|
955
|
+
`withheld env names: ${withheld.envNames.join(', ') || 'none'}. This may be unrelated to this failure; ` +
|
|
956
|
+
'it is NOT evidence about authentication of any account, workspace, or upstream service and must not be ' +
|
|
957
|
+
'reported as such.]'
|
|
958
|
+
)
|
|
959
|
+
}
|
|
960
|
+
|
|
961
|
+
function appendErrorText(error: unknown, text: string): Error {
|
|
962
|
+
if (error instanceof Error) {
|
|
963
|
+
error.message = `${error.message}\n\n${text}`
|
|
964
|
+
return error
|
|
965
|
+
}
|
|
966
|
+
return new Error(`${String(error)}\n\n${text}`)
|
|
967
|
+
}
|
|
968
|
+
|
|
969
|
+
function appendTextResult(result: ToolResult, text: string): ToolResult {
|
|
970
|
+
return { ...result, content: [...(result.content as ContentPart[]), { type: 'text', text }] }
|
|
971
|
+
}
|
|
972
|
+
|
|
803
973
|
export function buildSandboxEnvPolicy(
|
|
804
974
|
overlay: BashEnvOverlay | undefined,
|
|
805
975
|
runtimeEnv: Record<string, string> | undefined,
|
|
@@ -845,8 +1015,14 @@ function spreadSandboxEnv(policy: ReturnType<typeof buildSandboxEnvPolicy>): {
|
|
|
845
1015
|
return Object.keys(policy).length > 0 ? { env: policy } : {}
|
|
846
1016
|
}
|
|
847
1017
|
|
|
848
|
-
function resolveExposableBashEnvNames(agentDir: string): string[] {
|
|
849
|
-
|
|
1018
|
+
function resolveExposableBashEnvNames(agentDir: string): { exposable: string[]; withheld: string[] } {
|
|
1019
|
+
const declaredEnv = readEnvFile(agentDir)
|
|
1020
|
+
const exposable = resolveExposableEnvNames(declaredEnv)
|
|
1021
|
+
const exposableSet = new Set(exposable)
|
|
1022
|
+
const withheld = [...declaredEnv]
|
|
1023
|
+
.filter(([name, value]) => value.length > 0 && !exposableSet.has(name))
|
|
1024
|
+
.map(([name]) => name)
|
|
1025
|
+
return { exposable, withheld }
|
|
850
1026
|
}
|
|
851
1027
|
|
|
852
1028
|
function buildRoleScopedConfigEnv(
|
|
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
import { formatLocalDateTime, formatLocalWeekday, resolveLocalTimezoneName } from '@/shared'
|
|
2
2
|
|
|
3
3
|
const PACKAGE_JSON_INSTALL_RULE =
|
|
4
|
-
|
|
4
|
+
'`package.json` is operator-owned because direct dependencies define sandbox-visible commands. Do not edit it or install dependencies; tell the operator which package and command are needed.'
|
|
5
5
|
|
|
6
6
|
// The orchestration roster (the `Briefly: ...` enumeration of public subagents)
|
|
7
7
|
// is GENERATED from the registry by `renderPublicSubagentRoster` and threaded in
|