typeclaw 0.45.1 → 0.46.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +1 -1
- package/package.json +2 -1
- package/src/agent/git-nudge.ts +2 -1
- package/src/agent/index.ts +44 -30
- package/src/agent/live-subagents.ts +18 -0
- package/src/agent/multimodal/index.ts +1 -1
- package/src/agent/multimodal/look-at.ts +78 -44
- package/src/agent/multimodal/looker.ts +151 -39
- package/src/agent/network/response-body.ts +26 -0
- package/src/agent/network/safe-http.ts +198 -0
- package/src/agent/plugin-tools.ts +379 -157
- package/src/agent/provider-error.ts +52 -1
- package/src/agent/restart/index.ts +61 -40
- package/src/agent/restart-handoff/index.ts +73 -4
- package/src/agent/reviewer-bash-policy.ts +42 -1
- package/src/agent/session-origin.ts +2 -0
- package/src/agent/subagent-drain.ts +117 -7
- package/src/agent/subagents.ts +49 -16
- package/src/agent/throttle-circuit.ts +25 -5
- package/src/agent/tool-error-remediation.ts +72 -0
- package/src/agent/tool-file-safety.ts +1050 -0
- package/src/agent/tools/channel-fetch-attachment.ts +10 -3
- package/src/agent/tools/ddg.ts +16 -2
- package/src/agent/tools/post-github-review.ts +199 -0
- package/src/agent/tools/spawn-subagent.ts +21 -18
- package/src/agent/tools/webfetch/fetch.ts +143 -183
- package/src/agent/tools/webfetch/tool.ts +2 -3
- package/src/agent/tools/websearch.ts +23 -2
- package/src/agent/tools-without-local-file-operands.ts +27 -0
- package/src/agent/turn-runner.ts +86 -6
- package/src/bundled-plugins/backup/index.ts +2 -1
- package/src/bundled-plugins/backup/runner.ts +2 -1
- package/src/bundled-plugins/doc-render/render.ts +93 -12
- package/src/bundled-plugins/doc-render/skills/typeclaw-render-pdf/SKILL.md +13 -13
- package/src/bundled-plugins/github-cli-auth/effective-approval.ts +16 -6
- package/src/bundled-plugins/github-cli-auth/gh-command.ts +555 -15
- package/src/bundled-plugins/github-cli-auth/index.ts +131 -135
- package/src/bundled-plugins/github-cli-auth/review-checkout.ts +138 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/guard/policies/uncommitted-changes.ts +2 -1
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/README.md +23 -11
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/append-tool.ts +15 -8
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/citations.ts +22 -9
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/dreaming.ts +13 -8
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/find-entry-tool.ts +4 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/index.ts +0 -4
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/load-memory.ts +8 -3
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/provenance-index.ts +717 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/provenance-sanitize.ts +40 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/references/store-reference-tool.ts +4 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/search-tool.ts +163 -60
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/stream-events.ts +2 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/vector/hybrid.ts +126 -13
- package/src/bundled-plugins/researcher/write-report.ts +6 -3
- package/src/bundled-plugins/reviewer/index.ts +2 -2
- package/src/bundled-plugins/reviewer/reviewer.ts +10 -3
- package/src/bundled-plugins/reviewer/skills/code-review.ts +19 -9
- package/src/bundled-plugins/scout/scout.ts +8 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/security/index.ts +4 -4
- package/src/bundled-plugins/security/policies/outbound-secret-scan.ts +1 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/security/policies/private-surface-read.ts +220 -29
- package/src/bundled-plugins/security/policies/secret-exfil-read.ts +1 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/security/policies/ssrf.ts +29 -9
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord-bot-channel-resolver.ts +26 -14
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord-bot-thread-room.ts +44 -12
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord-bot.ts +66 -6
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord-channel-resolver.ts +91 -23
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord-id.ts +4 -0
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord-resolver-cache.ts +41 -0
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord.ts +57 -7
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/auth-app.ts +41 -12
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/index.ts +23 -11
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/review-submitter.ts +302 -0
- package/src/channels/adapters/kakaotalk-channel-resolver.ts +5 -3
- package/src/channels/adapters/kakaotalk-fetch-attachment.ts +8 -4
- package/src/channels/adapters/kakaotalk-typing.ts +17 -15
- package/src/channels/adapters/slack-attachment-download.ts +71 -0
- package/src/channels/adapters/slack-bot.ts +19 -8
- package/src/channels/adapters/slack-classify.ts +21 -2
- package/src/channels/adapters/slack.ts +59 -7
- package/src/channels/adapters/telegram-bot.ts +18 -5
- package/src/channels/adapters/webex-bot.ts +8 -3
- package/src/channels/adapters/webex.ts +8 -3
- package/src/channels/fetch-attachment.ts +43 -0
- package/src/{bundled-plugins/github-cli-auth/approve-idempotency.ts → channels/github-review-verdict-coordinator.ts} +25 -1
- package/src/channels/github-token-bridge.ts +10 -3
- package/src/channels/manager.ts +9 -0
- package/src/channels/router.ts +248 -6
- package/src/channels/types.ts +28 -1
- package/src/cli/channel.ts +1 -1
- package/src/cli/init.ts +1 -1
- package/src/cli/model.ts +57 -7
- package/src/compose/stop.ts +17 -5
- package/src/config/config.ts +6 -6
- package/src/config/models-mutation.ts +13 -1
- package/src/config/providers.ts +176 -0
- package/src/container/start.ts +49 -10
- package/src/doctor/checks.ts +3 -1
- package/src/doctor/commit.ts +2 -1
- package/src/doctor/file-ownership.ts +52 -0
- package/src/dreams/git.ts +2 -1
- package/src/git/hookless.ts +5 -0
- package/src/git/reconcile-ignored.ts +18 -5
- package/src/git/secret-history.ts +371 -0
- package/src/git/system-commit.ts +12 -6
- package/src/init/dockerfile.ts +86 -5
- package/src/init/index.ts +17 -5
- package/src/init/models-dev.ts +4 -0
- package/src/init/validate-api-key.ts +2 -0
- package/src/mcp/tools.ts +16 -3
- package/src/permissions/builtins.ts +3 -1
- package/src/plugin/context.ts +2 -0
- package/src/plugin/index.ts +1 -0
- package/src/plugin/manager.ts +4 -0
- package/src/plugin/types.ts +21 -0
- package/src/run/index.ts +40 -0
- package/src/run/llm-fetch-observer.ts +41 -4
- package/src/sandbox/build.ts +37 -15
- package/src/sandbox/canonical-secrets.ts +18 -0
- package/src/sandbox/env-exposure.ts +80 -0
- package/src/sandbox/errors.ts +13 -6
- package/src/sandbox/hidden-paths.ts +102 -44
- package/src/sandbox/index.ts +22 -4
- package/src/sandbox/package-install.ts +3 -27
- package/src/sandbox/policy.ts +11 -25
- package/src/sandbox/privileged-runtime.ts +255 -0
- package/src/sandbox/session-tmp.ts +8 -2
- package/src/sandbox/writable-zones.ts +204 -140
- package/src/secrets/index.ts +8 -0
- package/src/secrets/refresh-provider-oauth.ts +128 -0
- package/src/server/command-runner.ts +48 -4
- package/src/server/index.ts +4 -0
- package/src/skills/typeclaw-channel-github/SKILL.md +49 -56
- package/src/skills/typeclaw-claude-code/SKILL.md +24 -60
- package/src/skills/typeclaw-claude-code/references/auth-flow.md +17 -158
- package/src/skills/typeclaw-codex-cli/SKILL.md +19 -49
- package/src/skills/typeclaw-codex-cli/references/auth-flow.md +17 -154
- package/src/skills/typeclaw-config/SKILL.md +5 -5
- package/src/skills/typeclaw-config/references/recommended-mounts.md +24 -24
- package/src/skills/typeclaw-github-contributing/SKILL.md +23 -26
- package/src/skills/typeclaw-memory/SKILL.md +9 -3
- package/src/skills/typeclaw-permissions/SKILL.md +19 -15
- package/typeclaw.schema.json +20 -0
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import { lstat, mkdir, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises'
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import { join } from 'node:path'
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import { lstat, mkdir, opendir, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises'
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import { join, sep } from 'node:path'
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import type { SessionOrigin } from '@/agent/session-origin'
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import { CORE_PERMISSIONS } from '@/permissions/builtins'
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import type { PermissionService } from '@/permissions/permissions'
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import { CANONICAL_AGENT_SECRET_DIRS, CANONICAL_AGENT_SECRET_FILES } from './canonical-secrets'
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import { SandboxMaskTargetError } from './errors'
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export type HiddenPaths = {
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dirs: string[]
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files: string[]
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}
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const PRIVATE_DIRS = ['workspace', 'memory', 'sessions'] as const
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const
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const MAX_CANONICAL_SECRET_SCAN_ENTRIES = 4096
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// The
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//
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// The ordinary private working surface is role-scoped, but canonical credential
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// files and runtime-owned credential directories are always masked.
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// `permissions.has` resolves the role from the live origin and fails safe to
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// guest (empty permissions) for an unclear/undefined origin, so a missing
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// grant — whether from a low tier or an unresolvable author — hides the path.
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//
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// The security.bypass.* fallback keeps custom roles (which may never name
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// fs.see
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//
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//
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//
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// The security.bypass.* fallback keeps custom roles (which may never name
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// fs.see.private) working by capability. fs.see.secrets remains useful for
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// runtime-owned credential injection, but it deliberately cannot make raw
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// .env, secrets.json, or historical auth.json bytes available to an LLM.
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// Privileged diagnostics must
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// use host-side commands that report presence/status without returning values.
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export function resolveHiddenPaths(
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permissions: PermissionService,
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origin: SessionOrigin | undefined,
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agentDir: string,
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): HiddenPaths {
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const seesPrivate =
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const seesPrivate = canSeePrivateSurface(permissions, origin)
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const dirs = [
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...CANONICAL_AGENT_SECRET_DIRS.map((dir) => join(agentDir, dir)),
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...(seesPrivate ? [] : PRIVATE_DIRS.map((dir) => join(agentDir, dir))),
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]
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const files = CANONICAL_AGENT_SECRET_FILES.map((f) => join(agentDir, f))
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return { dirs, files }
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}
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// Before canonical secret masking became unconditional, roles carrying both
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// visibility capabilities ran bash unsandboxed and therefore had full write
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// access to the agent root. They now enter bwrap so canonical credential paths
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// can be masked, but must retain ordinary root-write capability. The policy
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// overlays the secret masks after the RW root bind, so this does not restore raw
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// credential access.
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export function canWriteAgentRootInSandbox(permissions: PermissionService, origin: SessionOrigin | undefined): boolean {
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return canSeePrivateSurface(permissions, origin) && seesSecrets
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}
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function canSeePrivateSurface(permissions: PermissionService, origin: SessionOrigin | undefined): boolean {
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)
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const dirs = await Promise.all(hidden.dirs.map((target) => ensureRequiredDirMaskTarget(target)))
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const files = await Promise.all(hidden.files.map((target) => ensureRequiredFileMaskTarget(target)))
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async function ensureRequiredFileMaskTarget(target: string): Promise<string> {
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async function verifyRequiredMaskTarget(target: string, kind: 'dir' | 'file'): Promise<void> {
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throw new SandboxMaskTargetError(target, `could not materialize or inspect a ${kind}`)
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})
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if (stats.isSymbolicLink()) throw new SandboxMaskTargetError(target, 'symlinks are not maskable safely')
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if (kind === 'dir' && !stats.isDirectory()) throw new SandboxMaskTargetError(target, 'target is not a directory')
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if (kind === 'file' && !stats.isFile()) throw new SandboxMaskTargetError(target, 'target is not a regular file')
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if (kind === 'file' && stats.nlink !== 1) throw new SandboxMaskTargetError(target, 'target has hardlink aliases')
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function isCanonicalSecretDir(target: string): boolean {
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}
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async function rejectHardlinksUnderCanonicalDir(root: string): Promise<void> {
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throw new SandboxMaskTargetError(root, 'canonical secret directory could not be scanned safely')
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throw new SandboxMaskTargetError(root, 'canonical secret directory exceeds bounded hardlink scan')
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}
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if (stats.isFile() && stats.nlink !== 1) {
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}
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} finally {
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try {
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} catch {
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|
-
}
|
|
100
|
-
}
|
package/src/sandbox/index.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,4 +1,10 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
export { buildSandboxedCommand, type SandboxedCommand } from './build'
|
|
2
|
+
export {
|
|
3
|
+
CANONICAL_AGENT_SECRET_DIRS,
|
|
4
|
+
CANONICAL_AGENT_SECRET_FILES,
|
|
5
|
+
CANONICAL_HOME_SECRET_DIRS,
|
|
6
|
+
CANONICAL_HOME_SECRET_FILES,
|
|
7
|
+
} from './canonical-secrets'
|
|
2
8
|
export {
|
|
3
9
|
buildProcBindProbeScript,
|
|
4
10
|
canBindProcSafely,
|
|
@@ -13,22 +19,34 @@ export {
|
|
|
13
19
|
_resetProcBindProbeCacheForTests,
|
|
14
20
|
_resetRealProcProbeCacheForTests,
|
|
15
21
|
} from './availability'
|
|
16
|
-
export { ensureHiddenMaskTargets, resolveHiddenPaths, type HiddenPaths } from './hidden-paths'
|
|
17
22
|
export {
|
|
18
|
-
|
|
23
|
+
canWriteAgentRootInSandbox,
|
|
24
|
+
ensureHiddenMaskTargets,
|
|
25
|
+
resolveHiddenPaths,
|
|
26
|
+
verifyHiddenMaskTargets,
|
|
27
|
+
type HiddenPaths,
|
|
28
|
+
} from './hidden-paths'
|
|
29
|
+
export {
|
|
19
30
|
resolveProtectedZones,
|
|
20
31
|
resolveWritableZones,
|
|
32
|
+
isGitControlPath,
|
|
21
33
|
subtractMasked,
|
|
22
|
-
type PackageInstallZones,
|
|
23
34
|
type ProtectedZones,
|
|
24
35
|
type WritableZones,
|
|
25
36
|
} from './writable-zones'
|
|
26
37
|
export { resolveSandboxSymlinks, type SandboxSymlinkSpec } from './symlinks'
|
|
27
|
-
export { commandNeedsRealProc
|
|
38
|
+
export { commandNeedsRealProc } from './package-install'
|
|
39
|
+
export {
|
|
40
|
+
cleanupPrivilegedSandboxRuntime,
|
|
41
|
+
resolvePrivilegedSandboxRuntime,
|
|
42
|
+
verifyPrivilegedSandboxRuntime,
|
|
43
|
+
type PrivilegedSandboxRuntime,
|
|
44
|
+
} from './privileged-runtime'
|
|
28
45
|
export { ensureSessionTmpDir, isUnderTmp, mapVirtualTmpPath, SESSION_TMP_ROOT, sessionTmpDir } from './session-tmp'
|
|
29
46
|
export { formatCommand, shellQuote } from './quote'
|
|
30
47
|
export {
|
|
31
48
|
SandboxDegradedProcError,
|
|
49
|
+
SandboxMaskTargetError,
|
|
32
50
|
SandboxPolicyError,
|
|
33
51
|
SandboxProcProbeUnverifiedError,
|
|
34
52
|
SandboxUnavailableError,
|
|
@@ -1,27 +1,3 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
// Recognizes the narrow command class that earns the package-install sandbox
|
|
2
|
-
// mode (RW project root). Deliberately conservative: a single standalone local
|
|
3
|
-
// `bun add` / `bun install` / `bun i` with NO shell metacharacters, chaining,
|
|
4
|
-
// redirects, or substitution. Anything fancier (`bun add x && rm -rf …`,
|
|
5
|
-
// `bun add x; curl …`, a subshell, a pipe) falls back to the default ro-root
|
|
6
|
-
// jail so the broad RW root can never be piggybacked onto an attacker-controlled
|
|
7
|
-
// second command. Global installs (`-g` / `--global`) are excluded — the
|
|
8
|
-
// bun-hygiene guard already blocks them and they write outside the jail anyway.
|
|
9
|
-
const SHELL_METACHARACTERS = /[;&|`$()<>\\\n\r{}!*?[\]"']/
|
|
10
|
-
|
|
11
|
-
const GLOBAL_FLAG = /^(-g|--global)$/
|
|
12
|
-
|
|
13
|
-
export function isPackageInstallCommand(command: string): boolean {
|
|
14
|
-
if (SHELL_METACHARACTERS.test(command)) return false
|
|
15
|
-
|
|
16
|
-
const words = command.trim().split(/\s+/)
|
|
17
|
-
if (words[0] !== 'bun') return false
|
|
18
|
-
|
|
19
|
-
const subcommand = words[1]
|
|
20
|
-
if (subcommand !== 'add' && subcommand !== 'install' && subcommand !== 'i') return false
|
|
21
|
-
|
|
22
|
-
return !words.some((word) => GLOBAL_FLAG.test(word))
|
|
23
|
-
}
|
|
24
|
-
|
|
25
1
|
// The bun subcommands whose work (or whose spawned child) reads the kernel-backed
|
|
26
2
|
// /proc/self/{fd,maps} magic symlinks: package installs (add/install/i), the
|
|
27
3
|
// package runners (x/create), and `run` (which can exec a package bin). Under the
|
|
@@ -41,11 +17,11 @@ const SHELL_COMMAND_SEPARATOR = /(?:&&|\|\||[;|&\n()])+/
|
|
|
41
17
|
|
|
42
18
|
// Whether a command will exercise the real /proc, so a caller can turn the
|
|
43
19
|
// degraded-mode `tmpfs` fallback into an actionable diagnostic instead of letting
|
|
44
|
-
// Bun surface its opaque "NotDir".
|
|
45
|
-
//
|
|
20
|
+
// Bun surface its opaque "NotDir". This is a DIAGNOSTIC heuristic, not a
|
|
21
|
+
// privilege gate — it deliberately fires through shell
|
|
46
22
|
// metacharacters and chained preludes (a `cd app && bunx foo` still runs bunx) and
|
|
47
23
|
// never widens the sandbox surface, so erring toward catching more only improves
|
|
48
|
-
// the error message.
|
|
24
|
+
// the error message. It is not an authorization boundary.
|
|
49
25
|
export function commandNeedsRealProc(command: string): boolean {
|
|
50
26
|
return command.split(SHELL_COMMAND_SEPARATOR).some((segment) => segmentInvokesRealProcBun(segment.trim()))
|
|
51
27
|
}
|
package/src/sandbox/policy.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ export type SandboxNetwork = 'none' | 'inherit'
|
|
|
9
9
|
// 'proc-bind' (the runtime default): --ro-bind /proc /proc binds the container's
|
|
10
10
|
// ALREADY-REAL procfs straight into the sandbox — no `unshare --mount-proc`, no
|
|
11
11
|
// CAP_SYS_ADMIN. A JS package runner's child gets a real /proc/self/{fd,maps,exe}
|
|
12
|
-
// so `bunx`/`bun
|
|
12
|
+
// so allowed `bunx`/`bun run <pkg-bin>` calls stop aborting with Bun's ENOTDIR. The
|
|
13
13
|
// agent runtime's /proc/<agent>/environ (OPENAI_API_KEY, GH_TOKEN) is NOT
|
|
14
14
|
// leaked: build.ts always emits --unshare-user, so the sandboxed bash runs as
|
|
15
15
|
// mapped-root in a CHILD user namespace that is not an ancestor of the agent
|
|
@@ -37,6 +37,11 @@ export type SandboxProcStrategy = 'tmpfs' | 'none' | 'real-proc' | 'proc-bind'
|
|
|
37
37
|
export type SandboxEnvPolicy = {
|
|
38
38
|
set?: Record<string, string>
|
|
39
39
|
passthrough?: string[]
|
|
40
|
+
// Preserve these names from bwrap's parent environment without rendering
|
|
41
|
+
// their values in argv. The builder switches from --clearenv to explicit
|
|
42
|
+
// --unsetenv for every other inherited name. Reserved for command-scoped
|
|
43
|
+
// secrets whose parent process is protected by the child-userns boundary.
|
|
44
|
+
inherit?: string[]
|
|
40
45
|
}
|
|
41
46
|
|
|
42
47
|
export type SandboxCommandFilter = {
|
|
@@ -94,36 +99,18 @@ export type SandboxSymlinkOp = {
|
|
|
94
99
|
dest: string
|
|
95
100
|
}
|
|
96
101
|
|
|
97
|
-
// A single RW bind
|
|
98
|
-
//
|
|
99
|
-
//
|
|
100
|
-
// directly under the root, so a file-level RW bind of `bun.lock` alone is
|
|
101
|
-
// insufficient — Bun needs DIRECTORY write to create its temp file. The default
|
|
102
|
-
// ro-root + narrow carve-out model can't express that, so this widens the root
|
|
103
|
-
// to RW for that command class only.
|
|
102
|
+
// A single RW bind that preserves ordinary agent-root writes for trusted/owner
|
|
103
|
+
// callers. Masks and protected zones overlay it; writableRoot provides no
|
|
104
|
+
// package-install isolation.
|
|
104
105
|
//
|
|
105
106
|
// CRITICAL ordering: unlike `writable` (rendered AFTER masks), `writableRoot`
|
|
106
107
|
// renders BEFORE masks so the broad RW root does not re-expose secrets. With
|
|
107
108
|
// last-op-wins the chain is: ro-bind root → writableRoot (RW root) → masks
|
|
108
|
-
// (re-hide .env/secrets.json/private dirs) → protected (
|
|
109
|
-
// packages, .agents/skills, .git/hooks, .git/config). Everything stays hidden or
|
|
110
|
-
// EROFS except the dirs a dependency install legitimately needs to write.
|
|
109
|
+
// (re-hide .env/secrets.json/private dirs) → protected (.git/hooks/.git/config).
|
|
111
110
|
export type SandboxWritableRootPolicy = {
|
|
112
111
|
dir: string
|
|
113
112
|
}
|
|
114
113
|
|
|
115
|
-
// Paths whose CREATION must be blocked under a writable root, rendered as
|
|
116
|
-
// `--ro-bind /dev/null <path>`. Used by the package-install path for the
|
|
117
|
-
// semantically-guarded managed files (cron.json / typeclaw.json) when they are
|
|
118
|
-
// ABSENT: the RW root would otherwise let a postinstall lifecycle script create
|
|
119
|
-
// them, bypassing the write/edit-tool guards. Binding /dev/null occupies the
|
|
120
|
-
// path with an empty read-only object (blocking creation) WITHOUT manufacturing
|
|
121
|
-
// a real invalid file on the host FS. Renders after writableRoot, with the
|
|
122
|
-
// protected binds, so last-op-wins keeps the path occupied.
|
|
123
|
-
export type SandboxBlockedCreationPolicy = {
|
|
124
|
-
files?: string[]
|
|
125
|
-
}
|
|
126
|
-
|
|
127
114
|
export type SandboxPolicy = {
|
|
128
115
|
bwrapPath?: string
|
|
129
116
|
cwd?: string
|
|
@@ -140,7 +127,6 @@ export type SandboxPolicy = {
|
|
|
140
127
|
masks?: SandboxMaskPolicy
|
|
141
128
|
writable?: SandboxWritablePolicy
|
|
142
129
|
protected?: SandboxProtectedPolicy
|
|
143
|
-
blockedCreation?: SandboxBlockedCreationPolicy
|
|
144
130
|
symlinks?: SandboxSymlinkOp[]
|
|
145
131
|
network?: SandboxNetwork
|
|
146
132
|
env?: SandboxEnvPolicy
|
|
@@ -158,7 +144,7 @@ export type SandboxPolicy = {
|
|
|
158
144
|
//
|
|
159
145
|
// BUN_TMPDIR / BUN_INSTALL both point under /tmp because `--clearenv` strips
|
|
160
146
|
// the host's TMPDIR, and bun refuses to run without a writable scratch dir it
|
|
161
|
-
// can discover: `bunx
|
|
147
|
+
// can discover: `bunx` and `bun run <pkg-bin>` abort with
|
|
162
148
|
// "Unexpected accessing temporary directory. Please set $BUN_TMPDIR or
|
|
163
149
|
// $BUN_INSTALL". /tmp is always writable inside the sandbox (fresh tmpfs, or
|
|
164
150
|
// the per-session bind that overrides it), so both are safe targets. Without
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
import { chmod, lstat, mkdtemp, readFile, rm, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises'
|
|
2
|
+
import { homedir, tmpdir } from 'node:os'
|
|
3
|
+
import path from 'node:path'
|
|
4
|
+
|
|
5
|
+
import { SandboxPolicyError } from './errors'
|
|
6
|
+
import type { SandboxMount } from './policy'
|
|
7
|
+
|
|
8
|
+
const SAFE_GIT_SUBCOMMANDS = new Set([
|
|
9
|
+
'add',
|
|
10
|
+
'branch',
|
|
11
|
+
'checkout',
|
|
12
|
+
'cherry-pick',
|
|
13
|
+
'commit',
|
|
14
|
+
'diff',
|
|
15
|
+
'log',
|
|
16
|
+
'merge',
|
|
17
|
+
'rebase',
|
|
18
|
+
'remote',
|
|
19
|
+
'reset',
|
|
20
|
+
'restore',
|
|
21
|
+
'rev-parse',
|
|
22
|
+
'show',
|
|
23
|
+
'status',
|
|
24
|
+
'switch',
|
|
25
|
+
'symbolic-ref',
|
|
26
|
+
'tag',
|
|
27
|
+
'worktree',
|
|
28
|
+
])
|
|
29
|
+
|
|
30
|
+
const SHELL_ACTIVE = new Set(['|', ';', '&', '\n', '\r', '(', ')', '{', '}', '<', '>', '`', '$', '\\'])
|
|
31
|
+
|
|
32
|
+
export type PrivilegedSandboxRuntime = {
|
|
33
|
+
env: Record<string, string>
|
|
34
|
+
mounts: SandboxMount[]
|
|
35
|
+
}
|
|
36
|
+
|
|
37
|
+
type StandaloneCommand = { executable: string; args: string[] }
|
|
38
|
+
type MountedIdentity = { birthtimeNs: bigint; ctimeNs: bigint; dev: bigint; ino: bigint }
|
|
39
|
+
const mountedIdentities = new WeakMap<PrivilegedSandboxRuntime, Map<string, MountedIdentity>>()
|
|
40
|
+
const cleanupDirs = new WeakMap<PrivilegedSandboxRuntime, Set<string>>()
|
|
41
|
+
|
|
42
|
+
export async function resolvePrivilegedSandboxRuntime(options: {
|
|
43
|
+
agentDir: string
|
|
44
|
+
command: string
|
|
45
|
+
env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv
|
|
46
|
+
homeDir?: string
|
|
47
|
+
}): Promise<PrivilegedSandboxRuntime> {
|
|
48
|
+
const runtime = emptyRuntime()
|
|
49
|
+
// TYPECLAW_GIT_TOKEN is set only after the auth analyzer accepts a Git command.
|
|
50
|
+
// Trust that decision rather than reparsing its command with a less capable
|
|
51
|
+
// detector (notably, the analyzer accepts quoted `git` executables).
|
|
52
|
+
if (options.env?.TYPECLAW_GIT_TOKEN !== undefined || containsGitInvocation(options.command)) {
|
|
53
|
+
runtime.env.HOME = options.agentDir
|
|
54
|
+
runtime.env.GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL = '/dev/null'
|
|
55
|
+
runtime.env.GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM = '1'
|
|
56
|
+
}
|
|
57
|
+
const parsed = parseStandaloneCommand(options.command)
|
|
58
|
+
if (parsed === null) return runtime
|
|
59
|
+
|
|
60
|
+
const homeDir = options.homeDir ?? homedir()
|
|
61
|
+
const executable = unwrapBunx(parsed)
|
|
62
|
+
if (executable === null) return runtime
|
|
63
|
+
|
|
64
|
+
// These CLIs can print or upload arbitrary files. Supplying their reusable
|
|
65
|
+
// auth profile to a model-controlled child would therefore make the CLI a
|
|
66
|
+
// confused deputy even when the outer shell is syntactically standalone.
|
|
67
|
+
if (
|
|
68
|
+
executable.executable === 'gws' ||
|
|
69
|
+
executable.executable === 'codex' ||
|
|
70
|
+
executable.executable === 'claude' ||
|
|
71
|
+
executable.executable.startsWith('agent-')
|
|
72
|
+
) {
|
|
73
|
+
return runtime
|
|
74
|
+
}
|
|
75
|
+
|
|
76
|
+
if (executable.executable === 'git') {
|
|
77
|
+
runtime.env.GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL = '/dev/null'
|
|
78
|
+
runtime.env.GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM = '1'
|
|
79
|
+
const subcommand = gitSubcommand(executable.args)
|
|
80
|
+
if (subcommand === null) return runtime
|
|
81
|
+
rejectNamedSubcommand(subcommand, new Set(['config', 'credential', 'credential-cache', 'credential-store']))
|
|
82
|
+
if (!SAFE_GIT_SUBCOMMANDS.has(subcommand)) return runtime
|
|
83
|
+
try {
|
|
84
|
+
await addSanitizedGitIdentity(runtime, path.join(homeDir, '.gitconfig'))
|
|
85
|
+
} catch (error) {
|
|
86
|
+
await cleanupPrivilegedSandboxRuntime(runtime)
|
|
87
|
+
throw error
|
|
88
|
+
}
|
|
89
|
+
}
|
|
90
|
+
|
|
91
|
+
return runtime
|
|
92
|
+
}
|
|
93
|
+
|
|
94
|
+
function containsGitInvocation(command: string): boolean {
|
|
95
|
+
return /(^|[;&|]\s*)git(?:\s|$)/.test(command.trim())
|
|
96
|
+
}
|
|
97
|
+
|
|
98
|
+
export async function verifyPrivilegedSandboxRuntime(runtime: PrivilegedSandboxRuntime): Promise<void> {
|
|
99
|
+
const identities = mountedIdentities.get(runtime) ?? new Map()
|
|
100
|
+
for (const mount of runtime.mounts) {
|
|
101
|
+
if (mount.type !== 'ro-bind') continue
|
|
102
|
+
const safe = await lstat(mount.source, { bigint: true })
|
|
103
|
+
.then(async (stats) => {
|
|
104
|
+
if (stats.isSymbolicLink()) return false
|
|
105
|
+
const expected = identities.get(mount.source)
|
|
106
|
+
return (
|
|
107
|
+
stats.isFile() &&
|
|
108
|
+
stats.nlink === 1n &&
|
|
109
|
+
expected !== undefined &&
|
|
110
|
+
stats.dev === expected.dev &&
|
|
111
|
+
stats.ino === expected.ino &&
|
|
112
|
+
stats.ctimeNs === expected.ctimeNs &&
|
|
113
|
+
stats.birthtimeNs === expected.birthtimeNs
|
|
114
|
+
)
|
|
115
|
+
})
|
|
116
|
+
.catch(() => false)
|
|
117
|
+
if (!safe) {
|
|
118
|
+
throw new SandboxPolicyError(`credential profile changed after validation: ${mount.source}. Refusing to run.`)
|
|
119
|
+
}
|
|
120
|
+
}
|
|
121
|
+
}
|
|
122
|
+
|
|
123
|
+
export async function cleanupPrivilegedSandboxRuntime(runtime: PrivilegedSandboxRuntime): Promise<void> {
|
|
124
|
+
const dirs = cleanupDirs.get(runtime) ?? new Set()
|
|
125
|
+
const outcomes = await Promise.allSettled([...dirs].map((dir) => rm(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })))
|
|
126
|
+
dirs.clear()
|
|
127
|
+
const failed = outcomes.find((outcome) => outcome.status === 'rejected')
|
|
128
|
+
if (failed?.status === 'rejected') throw failed.reason
|
|
129
|
+
}
|
|
130
|
+
|
|
131
|
+
function emptyRuntime(): PrivilegedSandboxRuntime {
|
|
132
|
+
const runtime = { env: {}, mounts: [] }
|
|
133
|
+
mountedIdentities.set(runtime, new Map())
|
|
134
|
+
cleanupDirs.set(runtime, new Set())
|
|
135
|
+
return runtime
|
|
136
|
+
}
|
|
137
|
+
|
|
138
|
+
function unwrapBunx(command: StandaloneCommand): StandaloneCommand | null {
|
|
139
|
+
if (command.executable !== 'bunx') return command
|
|
140
|
+
const args = [...command.args]
|
|
141
|
+
if (args[0] === '--bun') args.shift()
|
|
142
|
+
const executable = args.shift()
|
|
143
|
+
return executable === undefined ? null : { executable, args }
|
|
144
|
+
}
|
|
145
|
+
|
|
146
|
+
function rejectNamedSubcommand(subcommand: string, denied: ReadonlySet<string>): void {
|
|
147
|
+
if (denied.has(subcommand)) {
|
|
148
|
+
throw new SandboxPolicyError(
|
|
149
|
+
`credential or token management command \`${subcommand}\` is unavailable to model-driven bash; use a host-side login or redacted status command instead.`,
|
|
150
|
+
)
|
|
151
|
+
}
|
|
152
|
+
}
|
|
153
|
+
|
|
154
|
+
function gitSubcommand(args: readonly string[]): string | null {
|
|
155
|
+
for (let i = 0; i < args.length; i++) {
|
|
156
|
+
const arg = args[i] as string
|
|
157
|
+
if (arg === '-C') {
|
|
158
|
+
i += 1
|
|
159
|
+
continue
|
|
160
|
+
}
|
|
161
|
+
if (arg === '-c' || arg === '--config-env' || arg.startsWith('--config-env=')) return null
|
|
162
|
+
if (arg.startsWith('-')) continue
|
|
163
|
+
return arg
|
|
164
|
+
}
|
|
165
|
+
return null
|
|
166
|
+
}
|
|
167
|
+
|
|
168
|
+
async function addSanitizedGitIdentity(runtime: PrivilegedSandboxRuntime, source: string): Promise<void> {
|
|
169
|
+
const raw = await readFile(source, 'utf8').catch((error) => {
|
|
170
|
+
if (isNotFoundError(error)) return ''
|
|
171
|
+
throw error
|
|
172
|
+
})
|
|
173
|
+
if (raw === '') return
|
|
174
|
+
const values = parseGitUserIdentity(raw)
|
|
175
|
+
if (values.length === 0) return
|
|
176
|
+
const dir = await mkdtemp(path.join(tmpdir(), 'typeclaw-git-identity-'))
|
|
177
|
+
cleanupDirs.get(runtime)?.add(dir)
|
|
178
|
+
const generated = path.join(dir, 'config')
|
|
179
|
+
await writeFile(generated, `[user]\n${values.map(([key, value]) => `\t${key} = ${value}`).join('\n')}\n`, {
|
|
180
|
+
flag: 'wx',
|
|
181
|
+
})
|
|
182
|
+
await chmod(generated, 0o600)
|
|
183
|
+
const stats = await lstat(generated, { bigint: true })
|
|
184
|
+
mountedIdentities.get(runtime)?.set(generated, {
|
|
185
|
+
birthtimeNs: stats.birthtimeNs,
|
|
186
|
+
ctimeNs: stats.ctimeNs,
|
|
187
|
+
dev: stats.dev,
|
|
188
|
+
ino: stats.ino,
|
|
189
|
+
})
|
|
190
|
+
runtime.mounts.push({ type: 'ro-bind', source: generated, dest: '/tmp/.gitconfig' })
|
|
191
|
+
runtime.env.GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL = '/tmp/.gitconfig'
|
|
192
|
+
}
|
|
193
|
+
|
|
194
|
+
function parseGitUserIdentity(raw: string): Array<['name' | 'email', string]> {
|
|
195
|
+
const values = new Map<'name' | 'email', string>()
|
|
196
|
+
let inUser = false
|
|
197
|
+
for (const line of raw.split(/\r?\n/)) {
|
|
198
|
+
const section = line.match(/^\s*\[([^\]]+)]\s*$/)
|
|
199
|
+
if (section !== null) {
|
|
200
|
+
inUser = section[1]?.trim().toLocaleLowerCase() === 'user'
|
|
201
|
+
continue
|
|
202
|
+
}
|
|
203
|
+
if (!inUser) continue
|
|
204
|
+
const entry = line.match(/^\s*(name|email)\s*=\s*(.*?)\s*$/i)
|
|
205
|
+
if (entry === null || entry[2] === undefined) continue
|
|
206
|
+
const key = entry[1]?.toLocaleLowerCase() as 'name' | 'email'
|
|
207
|
+
const value = entry[2].replaceAll('\r', '').replaceAll('\n', '').replaceAll('\0', '')
|
|
208
|
+
if (value !== '') values.set(key, value)
|
|
209
|
+
}
|
|
210
|
+
return [...values.entries()]
|
|
211
|
+
}
|
|
212
|
+
|
|
213
|
+
function parseStandaloneCommand(command: string): StandaloneCommand | null {
|
|
214
|
+
const words: string[] = []
|
|
215
|
+
let word = ''
|
|
216
|
+
let quote: "'" | '"' | null = null
|
|
217
|
+
let active = false
|
|
218
|
+
for (const ch of command.trim()) {
|
|
219
|
+
if (quote === "'") {
|
|
220
|
+
if (ch === "'") quote = null
|
|
221
|
+
else word += ch
|
|
222
|
+
continue
|
|
223
|
+
}
|
|
224
|
+
if (quote === '"') {
|
|
225
|
+
if (ch === '"') quote = null
|
|
226
|
+
else if (ch === '$' || ch === '`' || ch === '\\') return null
|
|
227
|
+
else word += ch
|
|
228
|
+
continue
|
|
229
|
+
}
|
|
230
|
+
if (ch === "'" || ch === '"') {
|
|
231
|
+
quote = ch
|
|
232
|
+
active = true
|
|
233
|
+
continue
|
|
234
|
+
}
|
|
235
|
+
if (SHELL_ACTIVE.has(ch)) return null
|
|
236
|
+
if (/\s/.test(ch)) {
|
|
237
|
+
if (active) {
|
|
238
|
+
words.push(word)
|
|
239
|
+
word = ''
|
|
240
|
+
active = false
|
|
241
|
+
}
|
|
242
|
+
continue
|
|
243
|
+
}
|
|
244
|
+
word += ch
|
|
245
|
+
active = true
|
|
246
|
+
}
|
|
247
|
+
if (quote !== null) return null
|
|
248
|
+
if (active) words.push(word)
|
|
249
|
+
const executable = words.shift()
|
|
250
|
+
return executable === undefined ? null : { executable, args: words }
|
|
251
|
+
}
|
|
252
|
+
|
|
253
|
+
function isNotFoundError(error: unknown): boolean {
|
|
254
|
+
return error instanceof Error && 'code' in error && error.code === 'ENOENT'
|
|
255
|
+
}
|
|
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ export async function ensureSessionTmpDir(sessionId: string): Promise<string> {
|
|
|
27
27
|
|
|
28
28
|
export function isUnderTmp(agentDir: string, rawPath: string): boolean {
|
|
29
29
|
const resolved = resolve(agentDir, rawPath)
|
|
30
|
-
return
|
|
30
|
+
return isVirtualTmpPath(agentDir, resolved)
|
|
31
31
|
}
|
|
32
32
|
|
|
33
33
|
// Maps a model-facing /tmp path to its per-session backing path. Returns
|
|
@@ -37,11 +37,17 @@ export function isUnderTmp(agentDir: string, rawPath: string): boolean {
|
|
|
37
37
|
// for the sandboxed bash that reads it back.
|
|
38
38
|
export function mapVirtualTmpPath(agentDir: string, sessionId: string, rawPath: string): string | undefined {
|
|
39
39
|
const resolved = resolve(agentDir, rawPath)
|
|
40
|
-
if (
|
|
40
|
+
if (!isVirtualTmpPath(agentDir, resolved)) return undefined
|
|
41
41
|
const rel = relative('/tmp', resolved)
|
|
42
42
|
return rel === '' ? sessionTmpDir(sessionId) : join(sessionTmpDir(sessionId), rel)
|
|
43
43
|
}
|
|
44
44
|
|
|
45
|
+
function isVirtualTmpPath(agentDir: string, resolved: string): boolean {
|
|
46
|
+
const resolvedAgentDir = resolve(agentDir)
|
|
47
|
+
if (resolved === resolvedAgentDir || isInside(resolvedAgentDir, resolved)) return false
|
|
48
|
+
return resolved === '/tmp' || isInside('/tmp', resolved)
|
|
49
|
+
}
|
|
50
|
+
|
|
45
51
|
function isInside(parent: string, child: string): boolean {
|
|
46
52
|
const rel = relative(parent, child)
|
|
47
53
|
return rel !== '' && !rel.startsWith('..') && !isAbsolute(rel)
|