typeclaw 0.45.1 → 0.46.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +1 -1
- package/package.json +2 -1
- package/src/agent/git-nudge.ts +2 -1
- package/src/agent/index.ts +44 -30
- package/src/agent/live-subagents.ts +18 -0
- package/src/agent/multimodal/index.ts +1 -1
- package/src/agent/multimodal/look-at.ts +78 -44
- package/src/agent/multimodal/looker.ts +151 -39
- package/src/agent/network/response-body.ts +26 -0
- package/src/agent/network/safe-http.ts +198 -0
- package/src/agent/plugin-tools.ts +379 -157
- package/src/agent/provider-error.ts +52 -1
- package/src/agent/restart/index.ts +61 -40
- package/src/agent/restart-handoff/index.ts +73 -4
- package/src/agent/reviewer-bash-policy.ts +42 -1
- package/src/agent/session-origin.ts +2 -0
- package/src/agent/subagent-drain.ts +117 -7
- package/src/agent/subagents.ts +49 -16
- package/src/agent/throttle-circuit.ts +25 -5
- package/src/agent/tool-error-remediation.ts +72 -0
- package/src/agent/tool-file-safety.ts +1050 -0
- package/src/agent/tools/channel-fetch-attachment.ts +10 -3
- package/src/agent/tools/ddg.ts +16 -2
- package/src/agent/tools/post-github-review.ts +199 -0
- package/src/agent/tools/spawn-subagent.ts +21 -18
- package/src/agent/tools/webfetch/fetch.ts +143 -183
- package/src/agent/tools/webfetch/tool.ts +2 -3
- package/src/agent/tools/websearch.ts +23 -2
- package/src/agent/tools-without-local-file-operands.ts +27 -0
- package/src/agent/turn-runner.ts +86 -6
- package/src/bundled-plugins/backup/index.ts +2 -1
- package/src/bundled-plugins/backup/runner.ts +2 -1
- package/src/bundled-plugins/doc-render/render.ts +93 -12
- package/src/bundled-plugins/doc-render/skills/typeclaw-render-pdf/SKILL.md +13 -13
- package/src/bundled-plugins/github-cli-auth/effective-approval.ts +16 -6
- package/src/bundled-plugins/github-cli-auth/gh-command.ts +555 -15
- package/src/bundled-plugins/github-cli-auth/index.ts +131 -135
- package/src/bundled-plugins/github-cli-auth/review-checkout.ts +138 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/guard/policies/uncommitted-changes.ts +2 -1
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/README.md +23 -11
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/append-tool.ts +15 -8
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/citations.ts +22 -9
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/dreaming.ts +13 -8
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/find-entry-tool.ts +4 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/index.ts +0 -4
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/load-memory.ts +8 -3
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/provenance-index.ts +717 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/provenance-sanitize.ts +40 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/references/store-reference-tool.ts +4 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/search-tool.ts +163 -60
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/stream-events.ts +2 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/memory/vector/hybrid.ts +126 -13
- package/src/bundled-plugins/researcher/write-report.ts +6 -3
- package/src/bundled-plugins/reviewer/index.ts +2 -2
- package/src/bundled-plugins/reviewer/reviewer.ts +10 -3
- package/src/bundled-plugins/reviewer/skills/code-review.ts +19 -9
- package/src/bundled-plugins/scout/scout.ts +8 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/security/index.ts +4 -4
- package/src/bundled-plugins/security/policies/outbound-secret-scan.ts +1 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/security/policies/private-surface-read.ts +220 -29
- package/src/bundled-plugins/security/policies/secret-exfil-read.ts +1 -0
- package/src/bundled-plugins/security/policies/ssrf.ts +29 -9
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord-bot-channel-resolver.ts +26 -14
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord-bot-thread-room.ts +44 -12
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord-bot.ts +66 -6
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord-channel-resolver.ts +91 -23
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord-id.ts +4 -0
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord-resolver-cache.ts +41 -0
- package/src/channels/adapters/discord.ts +57 -7
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/auth-app.ts +41 -12
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/index.ts +23 -11
- package/src/channels/adapters/github/review-submitter.ts +302 -0
- package/src/channels/adapters/kakaotalk-channel-resolver.ts +5 -3
- package/src/channels/adapters/kakaotalk-fetch-attachment.ts +8 -4
- package/src/channels/adapters/kakaotalk-typing.ts +17 -15
- package/src/channels/adapters/slack-attachment-download.ts +71 -0
- package/src/channels/adapters/slack-bot.ts +19 -8
- package/src/channels/adapters/slack-classify.ts +21 -2
- package/src/channels/adapters/slack.ts +59 -7
- package/src/channels/adapters/telegram-bot.ts +18 -5
- package/src/channels/adapters/webex-bot.ts +8 -3
- package/src/channels/adapters/webex.ts +8 -3
- package/src/channels/fetch-attachment.ts +43 -0
- package/src/{bundled-plugins/github-cli-auth/approve-idempotency.ts → channels/github-review-verdict-coordinator.ts} +25 -1
- package/src/channels/github-token-bridge.ts +10 -3
- package/src/channels/manager.ts +9 -0
- package/src/channels/router.ts +248 -6
- package/src/channels/types.ts +28 -1
- package/src/cli/channel.ts +1 -1
- package/src/cli/init.ts +1 -1
- package/src/cli/model.ts +57 -7
- package/src/compose/stop.ts +17 -5
- package/src/config/config.ts +6 -6
- package/src/config/models-mutation.ts +13 -1
- package/src/config/providers.ts +176 -0
- package/src/container/start.ts +49 -10
- package/src/doctor/checks.ts +3 -1
- package/src/doctor/commit.ts +2 -1
- package/src/doctor/file-ownership.ts +52 -0
- package/src/dreams/git.ts +2 -1
- package/src/git/hookless.ts +5 -0
- package/src/git/reconcile-ignored.ts +18 -5
- package/src/git/secret-history.ts +371 -0
- package/src/git/system-commit.ts +12 -6
- package/src/init/dockerfile.ts +86 -5
- package/src/init/index.ts +17 -5
- package/src/init/models-dev.ts +4 -0
- package/src/init/validate-api-key.ts +2 -0
- package/src/mcp/tools.ts +16 -3
- package/src/permissions/builtins.ts +3 -1
- package/src/plugin/context.ts +2 -0
- package/src/plugin/index.ts +1 -0
- package/src/plugin/manager.ts +4 -0
- package/src/plugin/types.ts +21 -0
- package/src/run/index.ts +40 -0
- package/src/run/llm-fetch-observer.ts +41 -4
- package/src/sandbox/build.ts +37 -15
- package/src/sandbox/canonical-secrets.ts +18 -0
- package/src/sandbox/env-exposure.ts +80 -0
- package/src/sandbox/errors.ts +13 -6
- package/src/sandbox/hidden-paths.ts +102 -44
- package/src/sandbox/index.ts +22 -4
- package/src/sandbox/package-install.ts +3 -27
- package/src/sandbox/policy.ts +11 -25
- package/src/sandbox/privileged-runtime.ts +255 -0
- package/src/sandbox/session-tmp.ts +8 -2
- package/src/sandbox/writable-zones.ts +204 -140
- package/src/secrets/index.ts +8 -0
- package/src/secrets/refresh-provider-oauth.ts +128 -0
- package/src/server/command-runner.ts +48 -4
- package/src/server/index.ts +4 -0
- package/src/skills/typeclaw-channel-github/SKILL.md +49 -56
- package/src/skills/typeclaw-claude-code/SKILL.md +24 -60
- package/src/skills/typeclaw-claude-code/references/auth-flow.md +17 -158
- package/src/skills/typeclaw-codex-cli/SKILL.md +19 -49
- package/src/skills/typeclaw-codex-cli/references/auth-flow.md +17 -154
- package/src/skills/typeclaw-config/SKILL.md +5 -5
- package/src/skills/typeclaw-config/references/recommended-mounts.md +24 -24
- package/src/skills/typeclaw-github-contributing/SKILL.md +23 -26
- package/src/skills/typeclaw-memory/SKILL.md +9 -3
- package/src/skills/typeclaw-permissions/SKILL.md +19 -15
- package/typeclaw.schema.json +20 -0
package/src/mcp/tools.ts
CHANGED
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@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
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import type { CallToolResult } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/types.js'
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import { z } from 'zod'
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import { enforceAndPinToolFiles } from '@/agent/tool-file-safety'
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import { defineTool } from '@/plugin/define'
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import type { ContentPart, Tool, ToolResult } from '@/plugin/types'
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@@ -87,13 +88,25 @@ function createCallTool(manager: McpManager): Tool<McpCallArgs> {
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tool: z.string().describe('The bare tool name or namespaced server__tool id.'),
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args: z.record(z.string(), z.unknown()).optional().describe('Arguments matching the tool input schema.'),
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}),
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-
async execute(args) {
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async execute(args, ctx) {
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const resolved = resolveToolArgs(args.server, args.tool)
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const connection = await manager.ensureConnected(resolved.server)
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if (connection === undefined) return textResult(unknownServerMessage(manager, resolved.server))
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-
const
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-
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const toolArgs = args.args ?? {}
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const pinned = await enforceAndPinToolFiles({
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tool: 'mcp_call',
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args: toolArgs,
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agentDir: ctx.agentDir,
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genericInputs: true,
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signal: ctx.signal,
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})
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try {
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const result = await safeCallTool(connection, resolved.tool, toolArgs)
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return pinned.restoreResult(mapCallToolResult(resolved.server, resolved.tool, result))
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} finally {
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await pinned.cleanup()
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}
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},
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})
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}
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@@ -32,7 +32,9 @@ export const CORE_PERMISSIONS = {
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// Phrased as capabilities to SEE, not to hide, so the role tower stays
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// monotonic (a higher tier sees a strict superset of a lower tier).
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// resolveHiddenPaths masks whatever the resolved role lacks: fsSeePrivate
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-
// gates workspace/+memory/+sessions
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// gates workspace/+memory/+sessions/. fsSeeSecrets authorizes runtime-owned
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// credential use, never raw LLM tool access to canonical credential stores;
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// canonical files are unconditionally masked for every role.
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// The fail-safe floor is the undefined origin (see has() in
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// permissions.ts), not the guest role, which is now grantable.
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fsSeePrivate: 'fs.see.private',
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package/src/plugin/context.ts
CHANGED
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@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ export type CreatePluginContextOptions<TConfig> = {
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permissions: PermissionService
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resolveGithubTokenForRepo?: ResolveGithubTokenForRepo
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hasGithubAppTokenResolver?: () => boolean
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getGithubAppSelfLogin?: () => string | null
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spawnSubagent: SpawnSubagentFn
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isBooted: () => boolean
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}
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github: {
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resolveTokenForRepo: opts.resolveGithubTokenForRepo ?? githubTokenUnavailable,
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hasAppTokenResolver: opts.hasGithubAppTokenResolver ?? (() => false),
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getAppSelfLogin: opts.getGithubAppSelfLogin ?? (() => null),
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},
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spawnSubagent: async (name: string, payload?: unknown, options?: SpawnSubagentOptions) => {
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if (!opts.isBooted()) {
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package/src/plugin/index.ts
CHANGED
package/src/plugin/manager.ts
CHANGED
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roles?: RolesConfig
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resolveGithubTokenForRepo?: ResolveGithubTokenForRepo
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hasGithubAppTokenResolver?: () => boolean
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getGithubAppSelfLogin?: () => string | null
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// Bundled plugins resolved by the runtime (not from typeclaw.json). Loaded
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// before user-declared `entries` so a config block named after a bundled
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// plugin (e.g. "memory") is consumed by the bundled plugin, and so plugin-
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ctxDeps: {
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resolveGithubTokenForRepo: opts.resolveGithubTokenForRepo,
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hasGithubAppTokenResolver: opts.hasGithubAppTokenResolver,
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getGithubAppSelfLogin: opts.getGithubAppSelfLogin,
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spawnSubagent: (name, payload, options) => spawnSubagentImpl(name, payload, options),
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isBooted: () => booted,
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},
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@@ -224,6 +226,7 @@ type RegisterOnePluginArgs = {
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ctxDeps: {
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resolveGithubTokenForRepo?: ResolveGithubTokenForRepo
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hasGithubAppTokenResolver?: () => boolean
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getGithubAppSelfLogin?: () => string | null
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spawnSubagent: SpawnSubagentFn
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isBooted: () => boolean
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}
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permissions: args.permissions,
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resolveGithubTokenForRepo: args.ctxDeps.resolveGithubTokenForRepo,
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hasGithubAppTokenResolver: args.ctxDeps.hasGithubAppTokenResolver,
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getGithubAppSelfLogin: args.ctxDeps.getGithubAppSelfLogin,
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spawnSubagent: args.ctxDeps.spawnSubagent,
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isBooted: args.ctxDeps.isBooted,
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})
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package/src/plugin/types.ts
CHANGED
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logger: ToolLogger
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}
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export type ToolFileOperands = {
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input?: readonly string[]
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output?: readonly string[]
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destructive?: readonly string[]
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// Operand paths whose string values are control tokens or remote identifiers,
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// never a local file — the file-operand scanner skips them (like a first-party
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// prose operand) instead of rejecting a `word.ext`-shaped id or a value that
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// collides with an agent-root dir name. Scoped per operand path and survives
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// the runtime `__plugin_*` tool-name prefix that a static in-scanner table
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// cannot. Declare a real file input under `input` (it gets pinned), not here.
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nonFile?: readonly string[]
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}
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export type Tool<P = unknown> = {
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description: string
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parameters: z.ZodType<P>
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fileOperands?: ToolFileOperands
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execute: (args: P, ctx: ToolContext) => Promise<ToolResult>
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}
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@@ -211,6 +225,12 @@ export type ToolBeforeEvent = {
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callId: string
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args: Record<string, unknown>
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origin?: SessionOrigin
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// The tool author's operand declarations (never model-controlled — set on the
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// static Tool definition at registration). Carried so a guard that runs before
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// the file-operand scanner (private-surface-read) can honor the same
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// `nonFile` exemptions and not block a declared remote identifier that happens
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// to collide with a hidden dir name. Present only for plugin tools.
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fileOperands?: ToolFileOperands
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}
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export type ToolBeforeResult = void | undefined | { block: true; reason: string }
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export type PluginGithubServices = {
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resolveTokenForRepo: ResolveGithubTokenForRepo
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hasAppTokenResolver: () => boolean
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getAppSelfLogin?: () => string | null
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}
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export type PluginExports = {
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package/src/run/index.ts
CHANGED
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exportClaudeCredentialsFileForAgent,
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exportCodexAuthFileForAgent,
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hydrateChannelEnvFromSecrets,
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refreshProviderOAuthForAgent,
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} from '@/secrets'
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import { createServer, type Server } from '@/server'
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import {
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@@ -121,6 +122,10 @@ export type StartAgentOptions = {
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// over the real env + <cwd>/secrets.json. Injectable so tests can supply a
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// fake secrets provider without touching process.env.
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caps?: RuntimeCapabilities
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// Boot-time proactive provider-OAuth refresh. Injectable so a test can supply
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// a refresh that holds the real secrets lock on a gate, proving the boot
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// barrier settles this before any session-producing consumer starts.
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refreshProviderOAuth?: (options: { agentDir: string; log: (message: string) => void }) => Promise<unknown>
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}
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export type StartAgentResult = {
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@@ -181,6 +186,7 @@ async function startAgentRuntime(
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createChannelManager: createChannelManagerFor = createChannelManager,
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createTunnelManager: createTunnelManagerFor = createTunnelManager,
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caps = createRuntimeCapabilities(process.env, join(cwd, 'secrets.json')),
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refreshProviderOAuth = refreshProviderOAuthForAgent,
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}: StartAgentOptions,
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registerBootCleanup: (cleanup: () => void | Promise<void>) => void,
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): Promise<StartAgentResult> {
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@@ -287,6 +293,7 @@ async function startAgentRuntime(
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bundled: BUNDLED_PLUGINS,
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resolveGithubTokenForRepo: githubTokenBridge.resolveTokenForRepo,
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hasGithubAppTokenResolver: githubTokenBridge.hasAppTokenResolver,
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getGithubAppSelfLogin: githubTokenBridge.getAppSelfLogin,
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...(cwdConfig.roles !== undefined ? { roles: cwdConfig.roles } : {}),
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})
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const vectorStartupPromise = runVectorStartup(cwd)
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log: (message) => console.warn(message),
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})
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),
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liveSubagentRegistry
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function formatLine(fields: {
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// each emit `provider=openai-compatible seq=1`. The origin disambiguates them
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origin: string
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|
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|
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// pi-ai codex provider's internal loop stacked under typeclaw's own retries):
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seq: number
|
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status: number | null
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|
|
@@ -329,6 +351,8 @@ function formatLine(fields: {
|
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return [
|
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LOG_PREFIX,
|
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|
`provider=${fields.provider}`,
|
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|
+
`origin=${fields.origin}`,
|
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+
`seq=${fields.seq}`,
|
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356
|
`status=${fields.status === null ? 'null' : fields.status}`,
|
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357
|
`headers_ms=${fields.headersMs === null ? 'null' : fields.headersMs}`,
|
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|
`first_byte_ms=${fields.firstByteMs === null ? 'null' : fields.firstByteMs}`,
|
|
@@ -367,6 +391,8 @@ type ResolvedTimeouts = {
|
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391
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|
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392
|
type BodyTapConfig = {
|
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provider: string
|
|
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|
+
origin: string
|
|
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|
+
seq: number
|
|
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|
idleMs: number
|
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|
overallMs: number
|
|
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|
scheduler: TimeoutScheduler
|
|
@@ -387,6 +413,8 @@ function attachBodyTimingTap(
|
|
|
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413
|
logger.info(
|
|
388
414
|
formatLine({
|
|
389
415
|
provider: config.provider,
|
|
416
|
+
origin: config.origin,
|
|
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|
+
seq: config.seq,
|
|
390
418
|
status,
|
|
391
419
|
headersMs,
|
|
392
420
|
firstByteMs: null,
|
|
@@ -412,6 +440,8 @@ function attachBodyTimingTap(
|
|
|
412
440
|
logger.info(
|
|
413
441
|
formatLine({
|
|
414
442
|
provider: config.provider,
|
|
443
|
+
origin: config.origin,
|
|
444
|
+
seq: config.seq,
|
|
415
445
|
status,
|
|
416
446
|
headersMs,
|
|
417
447
|
firstByteMs,
|
|
@@ -577,6 +607,7 @@ export function installLlmFetchObserver(opts: LlmFetchObserverOptions = {}): ()
|
|
|
577
607
|
}
|
|
578
608
|
const originalFetch = globalThis.fetch
|
|
579
609
|
const adaptive = opts.adaptiveTracker ?? new AdaptiveTtfbTracker(now)
|
|
610
|
+
const fetchSeqByKey = new Map<string, number>()
|
|
580
611
|
// Adaptation is a property of the built-in floor default only. Any explicit
|
|
581
612
|
// static TTFB (observer opt, per-endpoint value, or a set TYPECLAW_*_TTFB_MS)
|
|
582
613
|
// means the operator pinned a deadline — honour it verbatim, no widening.
|
|
@@ -616,6 +647,8 @@ export function installLlmFetchObserver(opts: LlmFetchObserverOptions = {}): ()
|
|
|
616
647
|
const timeouts = resolveTimeouts(endpoint, perRequest)
|
|
617
648
|
const provider = endpoint.label
|
|
618
649
|
const adaptiveKey = `${provider}|${origin}`
|
|
650
|
+
const seq = (fetchSeqByKey.get(adaptiveKey) ?? 0) + 1
|
|
651
|
+
fetchSeqByKey.set(adaptiveKey, seq)
|
|
619
652
|
const usesAdaptiveTtfb = adaptiveEligible && perRequest?.ttfbMs === undefined && endpoint.ttfbMs === undefined
|
|
620
653
|
const effectiveTtfbMs = usesAdaptiveTtfb ? adaptive.resolve(adaptiveKey) : timeouts.ttfbMs
|
|
621
654
|
const start = now()
|
|
@@ -653,6 +686,8 @@ export function installLlmFetchObserver(opts: LlmFetchObserverOptions = {}): ()
|
|
|
653
686
|
logger.info(
|
|
654
687
|
formatLine({
|
|
655
688
|
provider,
|
|
689
|
+
origin,
|
|
690
|
+
seq,
|
|
656
691
|
status: null,
|
|
657
692
|
headersMs: null,
|
|
658
693
|
firstByteMs: null,
|
|
@@ -673,6 +708,8 @@ export function installLlmFetchObserver(opts: LlmFetchObserverOptions = {}): ()
|
|
|
673
708
|
const requestId = response.headers.get('x-request-id')
|
|
674
709
|
return attachBodyTimingTap(response, start, headersMs, response.status, retryAfter, requestId, now, logger, {
|
|
675
710
|
provider,
|
|
711
|
+
origin,
|
|
712
|
+
seq,
|
|
676
713
|
idleMs: timeouts.idleMs,
|
|
677
714
|
overallMs: timeouts.overallMs,
|
|
678
715
|
scheduler,
|
package/src/sandbox/build.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -15,6 +15,13 @@ const { dirname } = posix
|
|
|
15
15
|
export type SandboxedCommand = {
|
|
16
16
|
argv: string[]
|
|
17
17
|
commandString: string
|
|
18
|
+
// Exact environment the bwrap PARENT process must run with. bwrap only drops
|
|
19
|
+
// --clearenv when there are inherited names and then --unsetenv's the keys
|
|
20
|
+
// present in process.env AT BUILD TIME — a secret added to the live env between
|
|
21
|
+
// build and spawn would otherwise be inherited. The spawn must therefore start
|
|
22
|
+
// from THIS snapshot (defaults + resolved set + snapshotted inherited values),
|
|
23
|
+
// never the live process.env, so late-added keys can't reach the sandbox.
|
|
24
|
+
spawnEnv: Record<string, string>
|
|
18
25
|
}
|
|
19
26
|
|
|
20
27
|
// Fixed fd the rendered commandString opens to /dev/null for --ro-bind-data
|
|
@@ -35,7 +42,7 @@ export function buildSandboxedCommand(command: string, policy: SandboxPolicy = {
|
|
|
35
42
|
const argv = buildArgv(command, policy)
|
|
36
43
|
const needsMaskFd = (policy.masks?.files?.length ?? 0) > 0
|
|
37
44
|
const commandString = needsMaskFd ? `${formatCommand(argv)} ${MASK_DATA_FD}</dev/null` : formatCommand(argv)
|
|
38
|
-
return { argv, commandString }
|
|
45
|
+
return { argv, commandString, spawnEnv: resolveSpawnEnv(policy.env) }
|
|
39
46
|
}
|
|
40
47
|
|
|
41
48
|
function buildArgv(command: string, policy: SandboxPolicy): string[] {
|
|
@@ -84,8 +91,21 @@ function buildArgv(command: string, policy: SandboxPolicy): string[] {
|
|
|
84
91
|
argv.push('--die-with-parent')
|
|
85
92
|
}
|
|
86
93
|
|
|
87
|
-
|
|
94
|
+
const inheritedNames = new Set(policy.env?.inherit ?? [])
|
|
95
|
+
if (inheritedNames.size === 0) {
|
|
96
|
+
argv.push('--clearenv')
|
|
97
|
+
} else {
|
|
98
|
+
const retained = new Set([
|
|
99
|
+
...inheritedNames,
|
|
100
|
+
...Object.keys(DEFAULT_SANDBOX_ENV),
|
|
101
|
+
...Object.keys(policy.env?.set ?? {}),
|
|
102
|
+
])
|
|
103
|
+
for (const key of Object.keys(process.env).sort()) {
|
|
104
|
+
if (!retained.has(key)) argv.push('--unsetenv', key)
|
|
105
|
+
}
|
|
106
|
+
}
|
|
88
107
|
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(resolveEnv(policy.env))) {
|
|
108
|
+
if (inheritedNames.has(key)) continue
|
|
89
109
|
argv.push('--setenv', key, value)
|
|
90
110
|
}
|
|
91
111
|
|
|
@@ -168,10 +188,9 @@ function buildArgv(command: string, policy: SandboxPolicy): string[] {
|
|
|
168
188
|
}
|
|
169
189
|
|
|
170
190
|
appendWritableRoot(argv, policy)
|
|
171
|
-
appendMasks(argv, policy)
|
|
172
191
|
appendWritable(argv, policy)
|
|
192
|
+
appendMasks(argv, policy)
|
|
173
193
|
appendProtected(argv, policy)
|
|
174
|
-
appendBlockedCreation(argv, policy)
|
|
175
194
|
appendSymlinks(argv, policy)
|
|
176
195
|
|
|
177
196
|
if (policy.cwd !== undefined) {
|
|
@@ -218,17 +237,6 @@ function appendProtected(argv: string[], policy: SandboxPolicy): void {
|
|
|
218
237
|
}
|
|
219
238
|
}
|
|
220
239
|
|
|
221
|
-
// Occupies each path with an empty read-only object so a writable-root install
|
|
222
|
-
// script cannot CREATE a real file there. /dev/null always exists (bwrap mounts
|
|
223
|
-
// --dev), so unlike --ro-bind-data this needs no manufactured placeholder on the
|
|
224
|
-
// host FS. Renders after appendProtected: both are RO carve-outs of the RW root,
|
|
225
|
-
// last-op-wins.
|
|
226
|
-
function appendBlockedCreation(argv: string[], policy: SandboxPolicy): void {
|
|
227
|
-
for (const file of policy.blockedCreation?.files ?? []) {
|
|
228
|
-
argv.push('--ro-bind', '/dev/null', file)
|
|
229
|
-
}
|
|
230
|
-
}
|
|
231
|
-
|
|
232
240
|
// Rendered after every bind (incl. the /tmp session bind in policy.mounts) so
|
|
233
241
|
// last-op-wins keeps the symlink: a `/tmp/.foo` dest emitted before the /tmp
|
|
234
242
|
// bind would be erased by it. `--dir` ensures the symlink's parent exists inside
|
|
@@ -267,6 +275,20 @@ function resolveEnv(env: SandboxEnvPolicy | undefined): Record<string, string> {
|
|
|
267
275
|
return resolved
|
|
268
276
|
}
|
|
269
277
|
|
|
278
|
+
// The exact env for the bwrap parent process: the --setenv/passthrough values
|
|
279
|
+
// PLUS a one-shot snapshot of each inherited name's current value. Because the
|
|
280
|
+
// parent starts from exactly this map (and nothing else), a key added to the
|
|
281
|
+
// live process.env after this point cannot be inherited — closing the
|
|
282
|
+
// build-to-spawn TOCTOU on the --unsetenv enumeration.
|
|
283
|
+
function resolveSpawnEnv(env: SandboxEnvPolicy | undefined): Record<string, string> {
|
|
284
|
+
const resolved = resolveEnv(env)
|
|
285
|
+
for (const name of env?.inherit ?? []) {
|
|
286
|
+
const value = process.env[name]
|
|
287
|
+
if (value !== undefined) resolved[name] = value
|
|
288
|
+
}
|
|
289
|
+
return resolved
|
|
290
|
+
}
|
|
291
|
+
|
|
270
292
|
// Token-boundary match: the normalized command must equal a prefix exactly or
|
|
271
293
|
// start with `prefix + ' '`. Substring matching would let `git-evil ...` slip
|
|
272
294
|
// past a `git` prefix; this does not.
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
export const CANONICAL_AGENT_SECRET_DIRS = [
|
|
2
|
+
'workspace/.config/gws',
|
|
3
|
+
'workspace/.agent-messenger',
|
|
4
|
+
'.typeclaw/home',
|
|
5
|
+
] as const
|
|
6
|
+
|
|
7
|
+
export const CANONICAL_AGENT_SECRET_FILES = ['.env', 'secrets.json', 'auth.json'] as const
|
|
8
|
+
|
|
9
|
+
export const CANONICAL_HOME_SECRET_DIRS = [
|
|
10
|
+
'.ssh',
|
|
11
|
+
'.config/gh',
|
|
12
|
+
'.config/gws',
|
|
13
|
+
'.agent-messenger',
|
|
14
|
+
'.codex',
|
|
15
|
+
'.claude',
|
|
16
|
+
] as const
|
|
17
|
+
|
|
18
|
+
export const CANONICAL_HOME_SECRET_FILES = ['.gitconfig', '.claude.json', '.netrc'] as const
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
import { DEFAULT_SANDBOX_ENV } from './policy'
|
|
2
|
+
|
|
3
|
+
// DEFAULT_SANDBOX_ENV names are sandbox-OWNED: build.ts renders them via
|
|
4
|
+
// --setenv, but an inherited name skips that --setenv (inherit keeps the parent
|
|
5
|
+
// value), so letting `.env` PATH/HOME/BUN_* through would REPLACE the sandbox's
|
|
6
|
+
// safe fixed values — a PATH/loader hijack of the sandbox mechanism itself.
|
|
7
|
+
const RESERVED_SANDBOX_ENV_NAMES = new Set(Object.keys(DEFAULT_SANDBOX_ENV))
|
|
8
|
+
|
|
9
|
+
// Names TypeClaw's own runtime/broker OWNS: github-cli-auth gates GH_TOKEN /
|
|
10
|
+
// GITHUB_TOKEN behind a capability + command-scoped overlay (only a validated
|
|
11
|
+
// `gh` call gets the token, out of argv), and the TYPECLAW_* tokens are
|
|
12
|
+
// host/container-injected auth. Ambient inheritance would bypass the broker and
|
|
13
|
+
// hand a reusable credential to arbitrary bash — so these are withheld even when
|
|
14
|
+
// declared in `.env`. Not a credential-name registry: these five names are ones
|
|
15
|
+
// the runtime CLAIMS, distinct from operator credentials (which belong in
|
|
16
|
+
// secrets.json). A matching `.env` line would otherwise make the runtime value
|
|
17
|
+
// eligible; the parsed-value gate (below) also blocks the empty-declaration case.
|
|
18
|
+
const RUNTIME_OWNED_ENV_NAMES = new Set<string>([
|
|
19
|
+
'GH_TOKEN',
|
|
20
|
+
'GITHUB_TOKEN',
|
|
21
|
+
'TYPECLAW_TUI_TOKEN',
|
|
22
|
+
'TYPECLAW_HOSTD_TOKEN',
|
|
23
|
+
'TYPECLAW_HOSTD_BROKER_TOKEN',
|
|
24
|
+
])
|
|
25
|
+
|
|
26
|
+
// Process-hijack vectors: an inherited value here changes how the shell, loader,
|
|
27
|
+
// or a runtime INTERPRETS later commands (arbitrary code load, config override,
|
|
28
|
+
// credential-socket handoff). SHELLOPTS/BASHOPTS/PS4/BASH_XTRACEFD and the
|
|
29
|
+
// BASH_FUNC_ prefix are OUTER-shell controls that execute in the `bash -c` that
|
|
30
|
+
// launches bwrap — before confinement begins (e.g. SHELLOPTS=xtrace + a
|
|
31
|
+
// command-substituting PS4, or an exported `BASH_FUNC_bwrap%%` replacing the
|
|
32
|
+
// bwrap command). These subvert the sandbox rather than expose a value.
|
|
33
|
+
const EXECUTION_CONTROL_ENV_NAMES = new Set<string>([
|
|
34
|
+
'BASH_ENV',
|
|
35
|
+
'ENV',
|
|
36
|
+
'SHELLOPTS',
|
|
37
|
+
'BASHOPTS',
|
|
38
|
+
'PS4',
|
|
39
|
+
'BASH_XTRACEFD',
|
|
40
|
+
'LD_PRELOAD',
|
|
41
|
+
'LD_LIBRARY_PATH',
|
|
42
|
+
'LD_AUDIT',
|
|
43
|
+
'NODE_OPTIONS',
|
|
44
|
+
'BUN_OPTIONS',
|
|
45
|
+
'PYTHONPATH',
|
|
46
|
+
'PYTHONSTARTUP',
|
|
47
|
+
'RUBYOPT',
|
|
48
|
+
'PERL5OPT',
|
|
49
|
+
'SSH_AUTH_SOCK',
|
|
50
|
+
'KUBECONFIG',
|
|
51
|
+
])
|
|
52
|
+
|
|
53
|
+
const EXECUTION_CONTROL_ENV_PREFIXES = ['GIT_CONFIG', 'BASH_FUNC_'] as const
|
|
54
|
+
|
|
55
|
+
// Withheld ONLY when the name would compromise sandbox integrity or the runtime
|
|
56
|
+
// credential broker — not for being credential-shaped. `.env` is the operator's
|
|
57
|
+
// expose-to-the-agent surface: every value they declare there reaches model bash
|
|
58
|
+
// by design. Credentials that must stay hidden belong in secrets.json.
|
|
59
|
+
function isWithheldEnvName(name: string): boolean {
|
|
60
|
+
if (RESERVED_SANDBOX_ENV_NAMES.has(name)) return true
|
|
61
|
+
if (RUNTIME_OWNED_ENV_NAMES.has(name)) return true
|
|
62
|
+
if (EXECUTION_CONTROL_ENV_NAMES.has(name)) return true
|
|
63
|
+
return EXECUTION_CONTROL_ENV_PREFIXES.some((prefix) => name === prefix || name.startsWith(prefix))
|
|
64
|
+
}
|
|
65
|
+
|
|
66
|
+
// Every name an operator declared in the `.env` FILE with a non-empty value,
|
|
67
|
+
// minus the sandbox-integrity/broker withholds. Eligibility is decided from the
|
|
68
|
+
// PARSED `.env` value, never process.env: an empty `.env` line (`X=`) is not an
|
|
69
|
+
// operator expose-choice even if hydrateChannelEnvFromSecrets later fills
|
|
70
|
+
// process.env[X] from secrets.json. The inherited VALUE is still snapshotted
|
|
71
|
+
// from process.env at spawn time.
|
|
72
|
+
export function resolveExposableEnvNames(declaredEnv: ReadonlyMap<string, string>): string[] {
|
|
73
|
+
const out: string[] = []
|
|
74
|
+
for (const [name, fileValue] of declaredEnv) {
|
|
75
|
+
if (fileValue.length === 0) continue
|
|
76
|
+
if (isWithheldEnvName(name)) continue
|
|
77
|
+
out.push(name)
|
|
78
|
+
}
|
|
79
|
+
return out
|
|
80
|
+
}
|
package/src/sandbox/errors.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -7,6 +7,13 @@ export class SandboxUnavailableError extends Error {
|
|
|
7
7
|
}
|
|
8
8
|
}
|
|
9
9
|
|
|
10
|
+
export class SandboxMaskTargetError extends Error {
|
|
11
|
+
override readonly name = 'SandboxMaskTargetError'
|
|
12
|
+
constructor(target: string, reason: string) {
|
|
13
|
+
super(`sandbox canonical mask target is unsafe: ${target} (${reason}). Refusing to run model-driven bash.`)
|
|
14
|
+
}
|
|
15
|
+
}
|
|
16
|
+
|
|
10
17
|
// Raised by the optional command-filter knobs (allowPrefixes,
|
|
11
18
|
// rejectShellMetacharacters). These are consumer-opt-in restrictions layered
|
|
12
19
|
// ABOVE the always-on kernel containment, so a rejection here is a policy
|
|
@@ -20,9 +27,9 @@ export class SandboxPolicyError extends Error {
|
|
|
20
27
|
}
|
|
21
28
|
|
|
22
29
|
// Raised when the /proc strategy degraded to the empty `tmpfs` fallback AND the
|
|
23
|
-
// command needs a real /proc (
|
|
30
|
+
// command needs a real /proc (bunx / bun run that reads the
|
|
24
31
|
// kernel-backed /proc/self/{fd,maps}). Without this pre-check Bun aborts deep in
|
|
25
|
-
// its
|
|
32
|
+
// its runner pipeline with the opaque "NotDir" (ENOTDIR) error, which the model
|
|
26
33
|
// misreads as a bad package or a transient hiccup and retries forever. Surfacing
|
|
27
34
|
// it here, before the command runs, turns the failure into one the operator (or
|
|
28
35
|
// the model) can act on: it is an environment/runtime limitation, not the
|
|
@@ -31,8 +38,8 @@ export class SandboxDegradedProcError extends Error {
|
|
|
31
38
|
override readonly name = 'SandboxDegradedProcError'
|
|
32
39
|
constructor() {
|
|
33
40
|
super(
|
|
34
|
-
'sandbox /proc is in degraded tmpfs mode, so bun package
|
|
35
|
-
'(
|
|
41
|
+
'sandbox /proc is in degraded tmpfs mode, so bun package runners ' +
|
|
42
|
+
'(bunx / bun x / bun create / bun run) cannot run: Bun needs a real ' +
|
|
36
43
|
'/proc/self/fd, which this strategy cannot provide, and would otherwise ' +
|
|
37
44
|
'fail with an opaque "NotDir" error. This is a container/runtime limitation ' +
|
|
38
45
|
'(no usable user namespaces for the cap-free proc-bind strategy), not a ' +
|
|
@@ -59,8 +66,8 @@ export class SandboxProcProbeUnverifiedError extends Error {
|
|
|
59
66
|
super(
|
|
60
67
|
'sandbox /proc strategy could not be verified right now: the cap-free ' +
|
|
61
68
|
'proc-bind safety probe stayed inconclusive (usually transient load on the ' +
|
|
62
|
-
'host while the container was starting up), so this bun package
|
|
63
|
-
'(
|
|
69
|
+
'host while the container was starting up), so this bun package runner ' +
|
|
70
|
+
'(bunx / bun x / bun create / bun run) was held back rather than run ' +
|
|
64
71
|
'under a broken /proc. This is almost certainly temporary and NOT a problem ' +
|
|
65
72
|
'with the command or the package: retry the SAME command in a few seconds — ' +
|
|
66
73
|
'the next attempt re-probes and normally succeeds.',
|