seisin 0.5.0 → 0.6.0

package/src/intake.js

@@ -22,24 +22,19 @@
  * Pulled out of run.js, which held both handlers inline between the spawn and
  * the signal handling — 180 lines of policy arithmetic inside the launcher.
  */
-import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
-import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
 import { join } from "node:path";
-import { toRepoRelative } from "./paths.js";
-import { explain, ownersOf, keyHolders, inKeyDir } from "./owners.js";
+import { browserFor } from "./browsers.js";
+import { toRepoRelative, samePath } from "./paths.js";
+import { explain, ownersOf, keyHolders, inKeyDir, privateOwner } from "./owners.js";
 import { append, logPath } from "./log.js";
 import { record, requestsPath } from "./requests.js";
 import { inScope, scopeOf, reachedForContent } from "./violations.js";
 import { mcpServer } from "./hook.js";
+import { policyId } from "./config.js";
+import { expectedOf, kindOf } from "./kinds.js";
 
-/** A hash of the policy file as it is now, short: it names a version, it proves nothing. */
-export function policyId(config) {
-  try {
-    return createHash("sha256").update(readFileSync(config.path)).digest("hex").slice(0, 12);
-  } catch {
-    return null;
-  }
-}
+/** Moved to config.js, where the handoff decisions read it too; kept here for callers. */
+export { policyId };
 
 /**
  * The handlers for one run.
@@ -47,20 +42,47 @@ export function policyId(config) {
  * `fromHook(to, entry)` is the spool's sink; `fromKernel(denial)` is
  * watchDenials' callback; `stats` counts what the kernel said that was left
  * out on purpose, for the line at the end of the run.
+ *
+ * `expectDenied` is the paths the caller said it expects to be denied
+ * (`seisin run --expect-denied`): taken from the parent's own argv, never from
+ * anything the sandbox can reach. See expectedByCaller below.
  */
-export function intake({ config, role, runId, observe = false, settings, notify }) {
-  const stamp = { run: runId.slice(0, 8), policy: policyId(config) };
+export function intake({ config, role, runId, observe = false, settings, notify, chain = null, expectDenied = [], trace = {} }) {
+  // `trace` is the launcher's (trace.js), read by the parent: in the stamp, so a
+  // line the sandbox sends cannot claim another run's trace.
+  const stamp = { run: runId.slice(0, 8), policy: policyId(config), ...trace };
   // No `at` from here or from the sandbox: append() stamps the parent's clock and
   // ignores any other. The confined process chose the time of its own lines —
   // it could date them into or out of every `since` window, or make its
   // requests look old enough to be passed over.
   const log = (entry) => append(logPath(config.root), { ...entry, ...stamp });
-  const ask = (asked) => { record(requestsPath(config.root), asked); notify?.maybe(asked); };
+  // The chain is this run's (run.js, --handoff), the same for every request it
+  // files; nothing the sandbox sends can set or change it.
+  const ask = (asked) => { record(requestsPath(config.root), { ...asked, chain }); notify?.maybe(asked); };
 
   const scope = scopeOf(settings, config.root);
   const keyDirs = (config.keyDirs ?? []).map((d) => (d.startsWith("/") ? d : join(config.root, d)));
   const connects = new Set();         // one line per refused target per run
-  const stats = { offPolicy: 0, walks: 0 };
+  const systems = new Set();          // one line per operation and service per run
+  const stats = { offPolicy: 0, walks: 0, expected: 0, probes: 0, atomic: [], browsers: [] };
+
+  /**
+   * A denial the caller asked for is recorded, and asked about by nobody.
+   *
+   * An orchestrator that probes the sandbox with a write it expects to be
+   * denied — its own canary, beside seisin's — got a request for it: a line in
+   * the queue, a notification, and a handoff decision that routed the probe to
+   * whichever role owns the repo root, which an orchestrator obeying the
+   * decision would then have started. The denial is the answer the caller
+   * wanted, so it stays in the log, marked `expected`, and files nothing.
+   *
+   * Exact paths, compared in one spelling (paths.js, samePath): a denial on any
+   * other path, the directory around it included, is still a request. The
+   * list is the parent's, from its own argv; the hook inside never suppresses
+   * anything, and nothing it sends can add to the list (docs/decisions.md).
+   */
+  const probes = new Set(expectDenied.map((p) => samePath(config, p)).filter(Boolean));
+  const expectedByCaller = (target) => probes.size > 0 && probes.has(samePath(config, target));
 
   /**
    * Nothing from inside the sandbox is taken at its word.
@@ -126,6 +148,9 @@ export function intake({ config, role, runId, observe = false, settings, notify
       const expected = observe
         ? "observed"
         : explain(config, role, entry.action, entry.target).allowed ? "allowed" : "denied";
+      // Marked only when the hook and the parent agree it was a denial: the
+      // hook's word alone does not make a line expected.
+      const asked = entry.verdict === "denied" && expected === "denied" && expectedByCaller(entry.target);
       return void log({
         role,
         tool: String(entry.tool ?? "").slice(0, 40),
@@ -136,6 +161,7 @@ export function intake({ config, role, runId, observe = false, settings, notify
         owners: ownersOf(config, entry.target),      // recomputed, never taken
         reason: String(entry.reason ?? "").slice(0, 500),
         ...(expected !== entry.verdict ? { disputed: expected } : {}),
+        ...(asked ? { expected: true } : {}),
       });
     }
 
@@ -160,7 +186,10 @@ export function intake({ config, role, runId, observe = false, settings, notify
      * grant can open.
      */
     const v = explain(config, role, entry.action, entry.target);
-    if (v.allowed || v.neverWrites || v.gitMetadata || v.protected) return;
+    if (v.allowed || v.neverWrites || v.gitMetadata || v.protected || v.privateTo) return;
+    if (temporary(entry.action, entry.target)) return;
+    // The caller's probe: its log line above says it was expected.
+    if (expectedByCaller(entry.target)) return;
     // The owners explain found: for a key that is who declares it, not who
     // writes the directory it sits in — the queue said "owned by dev" about
     // backend's key because dev writes `**`.
@@ -180,6 +209,30 @@ export function intake({ config, role, runId, observe = false, settings, notify
      * is not a territory anyone owns, so there is nobody to hand it to — the
      * sentence says what the policy would have to change instead.
      */
+    /**
+     * A refused Mach service, sysctl or the like: logged by operation and name,
+     * never queued — see SYSTEM in violations.js.
+     *
+     * Once per operation and name per run, and a trailing pid is folded into
+     * the name for that count: a browser whose children cannot find its
+     * rendezvous service ask for it a thousand times in forty seconds, each
+     * under the parent's pid, and the second line says nothing the first did not.
+     */
+    if (d.action === "system") {
+      const key = `${d.operation} ${d.path.replace(/\.\d+$/, ".<pid>")}`;
+      if (systems.has(key)) return;
+      systems.add(key);
+      // The one that kills a browser at start, and that a preset answers: named
+      // at the end of the run, because the agent saw only a crash.
+      const preset = d.operation === "mach-register" ? browserFor(d.path) : null;
+      if (preset && !stats.browsers.includes(preset)) stats.browsers.push(preset);
+      log({
+        role, tool: "kernel", source: "kernel",
+        action: d.operation, kind: "system", target: d.path.slice(0, 1000), verdict: "denied",
+        owners: [], reason: d.operation,
+      });
+      return;
+    }
     if (d.action === "connect") {
       if (connects.has(d.path)) return;
       connects.add(d.path);
@@ -197,6 +250,11 @@ export function intake({ config, role, runId, observe = false, settings, notify
     // ~/.ssh under `isolate`, and "../../../.ssh/id_rsa" would be a worse
     // answer to "what was refused" than the path itself.
     const rel = toRepoRelative(config, d.path);
+    // Recorded like any other, and counted apart, so the end of the run can
+    // say it was expected instead of leaving it to read as a failure.
+    if (expectedOf(rel)) stats.expected++;
+    const asked = expectedByCaller(rel);
+    if (asked) stats.probes++;
 
     /**
      * A refusal the hook never saw still leaves a request behind.
@@ -213,11 +271,13 @@ export function intake({ config, role, runId, observe = false, settings, notify
      * reason this exists. Inside the repo only: `~/.ssh` is refused on purpose
      * under `isolate` and is not a territory anyone is meant to ask for.
      */
-    const verdict = rel !== d.path && d.action === "write"
-      ? explain(config, role, "write", rel)
+    // Reads are asked too when they land in another role's private folder:
+    // that refusal is the policy, not a missing grant, so it is not queued.
+    const verdict = rel !== d.path && (d.action === "write" || (d.action === "read" && privateOwner(config, rel)))
+      ? explain(config, role, d.action === "write" ? "write" : "read", rel)
       : null;
     const barred = verdict?.neverWrites ?? null;
-    const unaskable = verdict?.gitMetadata === true || verdict?.protected != null;
+    const unaskable = verdict?.gitMetadata === true || verdict?.protected != null || verdict?.privateTo != null;
     // A request for something the policy already grants cannot be approved into
     // anything: it is misattribution or a kernel/policy mismatch, and either way
     // the line in the log is the evidence, not a question for a person. The hook
@@ -227,9 +287,28 @@ export function intake({ config, role, runId, observe = false, settings, notify
     // A key is declared, not owned: who a write lookup finds for `.secrets/x`
     // is always nobody, and the queue said "(unowned)" over another role's key.
     const whose = d.action === "read" && inKeyDir(config, rel) ? keyHolders(config, rel) : ownersOf(config, rel);
-    if (rel !== d.path && !barred && !unaskable && !granted)
+    const scratch = rel !== d.path && temporary(d.action, rel);
+    if (rel !== d.path && !barred && !unaskable && !granted && !scratch && !asked)
       ask({ role, action: d.action, target: rel, owners: whose });
 
+    /**
+     * An atomic save's temporary file stands for the file it replaces.
+     *
+     * Not queued as itself (temporary(), below), and until now not at all —
+     * measured: Write was refused at `health.ts.tmp.<pid>`, nothing was queued,
+     * and the agent concluded the directory was missing. The question a person
+     * can answer is the destination: another role's file is asked for like any
+     * write; a file this role may write is the runtime refusing the temporary
+     * file beside it, which no grant can name, and the end of the run says so.
+     */
+    const destination = scratch && !asked ? destinationOf(rel) : null;
+    if (destination) {
+      const v = explain(config, role, "write", destination);
+      if (v.allowed) stats.atomic.push(destination);
+      else if (!v.neverWrites && !v.gitMetadata && v.protected == null && v.privateTo == null)
+        ask({ role, action: "write", target: destination, owners: ownersOf(config, destination) });
+    }
+
     log({
       role,
       tool: "kernel",
@@ -244,8 +323,39 @@ export function intake({ config, role, runId, observe = false, settings, notify
       // and a protected file from a territory somebody could be asked for.
       ...(barred ? { neverWrites: barred } : {}),
       ...(verdict?.protected ? { protected: verdict.protected } : {}),
+      ...(verdict?.privateTo ? { privateTo: verdict.privateTo } : {}),
+      // Why no request was queued for it: a temporary file is not territory.
+      ...(scratch ? { nature: "temporary" } : {}),
+      // The file an atomic save was replacing, which is what was asked for.
+      ...(destination ? { destination } : {}),
+      // Why no request was queued for it: the caller said it would be denied.
+      ...(asked ? { expected: true } : {}),
     });
   }
 
   return { fromHook, fromKernel, stats };
 }
+
+/**
+ * A write to a temporary file (kinds.js) is recorded and never queued.
+ *
+ * Its name changes on every run — `BACKLOG.md.tmp.32029.03c4…`, the atomic
+ * write of an editor or of Claude Code — so a grant of it opens nothing the
+ * next run will use, and the request's id is its directory: at the root of the
+ * repo, `dev:write:.`, which reads as asking for the whole repository. The
+ * answer is the folder of the file it replaces, or $TMPDIR, and `check` and
+ * `review` say so; a request in front of a person says the wrong thing.
+ */
+function temporary(action, target) {
+  return action === "write" && kindOf(target).kind === "temporary";
+}
+
+/**
+ * The file a write-then-rename was replacing, from its temporary file's name:
+ * `src/health.ts.tmp.48213.3fa9c1d2e0b4` → `src/health.ts`. Claude Code's form,
+ * and the general `<file>.tmp.<anything>`; null for any other temporary file.
+ */
+export function destinationOf(target) {
+  const m = /^(.+[^/])\.tmp\.[^/]+$/.exec(target);
+  return m ? m[1] : null;
+}