promptgraph-mcp 2.4.7 → 2.4.8

package/registry/training/good/skills-store-validate.md

@@ -1,135 +0,0 @@
----
-name: validate
-description: Validate a finding — runs 7-Question Gate + 4-gate checklist. Kills weak findings before report writing. Prevents N/A submissions that hurt validity ratio. Usage: /validate
----
-
-# /validate
-
-Run full validation on the current finding before writing a report.
-
-## What This Does
-
-1. Runs 7-Question Gate (one wrong answer = kill it)
-2. Checks against the always-rejected list
-3. Runs 4 pre-submission gates
-4. Outputs: PASS (write the report) or KILL (move on)
-
-## Usage
-
-```
-/validate
-```
-
-Describe the finding when prompted. Include:
-- The endpoint
-- The bug class
-- What the PoC shows
-- The target program
-
-## The 7-Question Gate
-
-Answer each. ONE wrong answer = STOP.
-
-### Q1: Can I demonstrate this step-by-step RIGHT NOW?
-
-Write this out:
-```
-1. Setup:   I need [own account / another user's ID / no account]
-2. Request: [exact HTTP method, URL, headers, body]
-3. Result:  Response shows [exact data / action completed]
-4. Impact:  Real consequence is [account takeover / PII exposed / money stolen]
-5. Cost:    Time: [X min], Capital: [$0 / $X]
-```
-
-If step 2 is "I need to look at the code more" → KILL IT.
-
-### Q2: Is the impact accepted by this program?
-
-Check program scope page. Is your bug class listed? Is it excluded?
-
-### Q3: Is the vulnerable asset in scope?
-
-Exact domain in scope? Not staging/dev? Not a third-party service?
-
-### Q4: Does it need admin or privileged access that an attacker can't get?
-
-"Admin can do X" → KILL IT.
-"Regular user can do X that only admin should" → valid.
-
-### Q5: Is this known or documented behavior?
-
-Search disclosed reports + changelog + API docs.
-
-### Q6: Can you prove impact beyond "technically possible"?
-
-- XSS → actual cookie value in exfil request, not just alert()
-- SSRF → response body from internal service, not just DNS callback
-- IDOR → actual other-user's private data in response, not just 200 status
-
-### Q7: Is this on the never-submit list?
-
-```
-Missing headers, GraphQL introspection alone, clickjacking without PoC,
-self-XSS, open redirect alone, SSRF DNS-only, logout CSRF, banner disclosure,
-rate limit on non-critical forms, missing cookie flags alone...
-```
-
-If yes → KILL IT unless you have a chain.
-
-## Check: Conditionally Valid?
-
-If it's on the never-submit list, can you chain it?
-
-| You Have | Chain Available? |
-|---|---|
-| Open redirect | + OAuth code theft → ATO? |
-| SSRF DNS-only | + internal service data? |
-| Clickjacking | + sensitive action + PoC? |
-| CORS wildcard | + credentialed data exfil? |
-| Prompt injection | + IDOR → other user's data? |
-
-If no chain → KILL IT. If chain confirmed → report both together.
-
-## 4 Gates — All Must Pass
-
-**Gate 0 (30 sec):**
-```
-[ ] Confirmed with real HTTP requests (not just code reading)
-[ ] In scope (checked program page)
-[ ] Reproducible from scratch
-[ ] Evidence captured
-```
-
-**Gate 1 — Impact (2 min):**
-```
-[ ] Can answer "What does attacker walk away with?"
-[ ] More than "sees non-sensitive data"
-[ ] Real victim exists
-[ ] No unlikely preconditions
-```
-
-**Gate 2 — Dedup (5 min):**
-```
-[ ] Searched HackerOne Hacktivity for endpoint + bug class
-[ ] Searched GitHub issues
-[ ] Read 5 most recent disclosed reports
-[ ] Not in changelog as known issue
-```
-
-**Gate 3 — Report quality (10 min):**
-```
-[ ] Title formula: [Class] in [Endpoint] allows [actor] to [impact]
-[ ] Steps have exact HTTP request
-[ ] Evidence shows actual impact
-[ ] CVSS calculated
-[ ] Fix: 1-2 concrete sentences
-```
-
-## Output
-
-**PASS:** "All 7 questions pass. All 4 gates pass. Proceed to /report."
-
-**KILL:** "Q[N] fails because [reason]. Kill this finding. Reason: [explanation]. Move on."
-
-**DOWNGRADE:** "Q6 only shows technical possibility. Downgrade from High to Medium. Requires showing actual data exfil in PoC."
-

package/registry/training/good/skills-store-web3-audit.md

@@ -1,217 +0,0 @@
----
-name: web3-audit
-description: Smart contract security audit — runs through 10 bug class checklist (accounting desync, access control, incomplete path, off-by-one, oracle errors, ERC4626, reentrancy, flash loan, signature replay, proxy/upgrade). Applies pre-dive kill signals first. Generates Foundry PoC template for confirmed findings. Usage: /web3-audit <contract.sol>
----
-
-# /web3-audit
-
-Smart contract security audit using the 10-bug-class methodology.
-
-## Usage
-
-```
-/web3-audit VulnerableContract.sol
-/web3-audit https://github.com/protocol/contracts
-/web3-audit [paste contract code]
-```
-
-## Step 0: Pre-Dive Kill Signals
-
-ALWAYS check these BEFORE reading any code:
-
-```
-1. TVL < $500K → max payout too low for effort → SKIP
-2. 2+ top-tier audits (Halborn, ToB, Cyfrin, OZ) on simple protocol → SKIP
-3. Protocol < 500 lines, single A→B→C flow → minimal attack surface → SKIP
-4. max_payout = min(10% × TVL, program_cap) → if < $10K → SKIP
-
-Formula: Is [TVL * 10%] > [hours I'll spend * hourly rate]? If not, skip.
-```
-
-Only proceed if score >= 6/10:
-- TVL > $10M: +2
-- Immunefi Critical >= $50K: +2
-- No top-tier audit on current version: +2
-- < 30 days since deploy: +1
-- Protocol you've hunted before: +1
-- Upgradeable proxies present: +1
-
-## Step 1: Accounting State Desynchronization (28% of Criticals)
-
-```bash
-# Find accounting variables
-grep -rn "totalSupply\|totalShares\|totalAssets\|totalDebt\|cumulativeReward" contracts/
-
-# Find ALL early returns in critical functions
-grep -rn "\breturn\b" contracts/ -B3 | grep -B3 "if\b"
-```
-
-Check: For each early return in claim/redeem/withdraw functions:
-- Which state variables are updated in the normal path?
-- Are ALL of them also updated in the early return path?
-- If A updated but B isn't → potential desync bug
-
-## Step 2: Access Control (19% of Criticals)
-
-```bash
-# Sibling function families — do ALL have same modifier set?
-grep -rn "function vote\|function poke\|function reset\|function update\|function claim\|function harvest" contracts/ -A2
-
-# Ownership check: existence vs ownership
-grep -rn "_requireOwned\|ownerOf\|_isApprovedOrOwner" contracts/ -B5
-
-# Silent modifiers (if without revert)
-grep -rn "modifier\b" contracts/ -A8 | grep -B3 "if (" | grep -v "require\|revert"
-
-# Uninitialized proxy
-grep -rn "function initialize\b" contracts/ -A3
-grep -rn "_disableInitializers()" contracts/
-```
-
-Check: Does EVERY sibling function in a family have the SAME modifiers?
-
-## Step 3: Incomplete Code Path (17% of Criticals)
-
-The function family comparison test:
-```
-1. List all state changes in function A (deposit/place/create)
-2. List all state changes in function B (withdraw/update/cancel)
-3. For each state change in A: does B have the corresponding reverse?
-4. For each token transfer in A: does B have the corresponding refund?
-```
-
-```bash
-grep -rn "safeApprove\b" contracts/    # safeApprove without zero-reset?
-grep -rn "delete\b" contracts/ -B5     # delete before operation completes?
-grep -rn "function deposit\|function mint\|function withdraw\|function redeem" contracts/ -A10
-```
-
-## Step 4: Off-By-One (22% of Highs)
-
-Mental test: For EVERY `if (A > B)`: "What happens when A == B?" Is that correct?
-
-```bash
-# Boundary comparisons
-grep -rn "Period\|Epoch\|Deadline\|period\|epoch\|deadline" contracts/ -A3 | grep "[<>][^=]"
-
-# Loop breaks
-grep -rn "\bbreak\b" contracts/ -B10
-
-# Array bounds
-grep -rn "\.length\s*-\s*1\|i\s*<=\s*.*\.length\b" contracts/
-```
-
-## Step 5: Oracle / Price Manipulation
-
-```bash
-# Missing staleness check
-grep -rn "latestRoundData" contracts/ -A5 | grep -v "updatedAt\|timestamp"
-
-# Pyth confidence interval
-grep -rn "getPriceUnsafe\|getPrice\b" contracts/ -A8 | grep -v "conf\|confidence"
-
-# TWAP windows
-grep -rn "secondsAgo\|TWAP\|cardinality" contracts/ -A5
-```
-
-Check:
-- Is staleness checked? (`require(block.timestamp - updatedAt <= MAX_AGE)`)
-- Is Pyth confidence interval checked? (`require(conf * 10 <= price)`)
-- Is TWAP window > 1800 seconds (30 min)?
-
-## Step 6: ERC4626 Vaults
-
-```bash
-grep -rn "function deposit\|function mint\|function withdraw\|function redeem" contracts/ -A10
-grep -rn "function transfer\|function transferFrom" contracts/ -A15
-```
-
-Check:
-- Does `mint()` call the same validation as `deposit()`?
-- Does `transfer()` move lock records along with shares?
-- Is there a `_decimalsOffset()` virtual shares defense against first-depositor attack?
-
-## Step 7: Reentrancy
-
-```bash
-# Effects after interactions
-grep -rn "\.call{value\|safeTransfer\|transfer(" contracts/ -B10 | grep -v "require\|revert"
-
-# Missing nonReentrant
-grep -rn "function withdraw\|function redeem\|function claim" contracts/ -A2 | grep -v "nonReentrant"
-```
-
-Check: Does every function that transfers ETH or ERC20 follow CEI order?
-(Checks → Effects → Interactions)
-
-## Step 8: Flash Loan Oracle Manipulation
-
-```bash
-grep -rn "getReserves\|getAmountsOut\|slot0\b" contracts/ -A5
-```
-
-Check: Any spot price reading from Uniswap reserves/slot0? → flash loan manipulatable.
-
-## Step 9: Signature Replay
-
-```bash
-grep -rn "ecrecover\|ECDSA\.recover" contracts/ -B20
-grep -rn "nonce\|_nonces\|nonces\[" contracts/
-```
-
-Check: Does signed hash include: nonce + chainId + contract address?
-
-## Step 10: Proxy / Upgrade
-
-```bash
-grep -rn "function initialize\b\|_disableInitializers\|initializer" contracts/
-grep -rn "delegatecall\b" contracts/ -B3
-grep -rn "0x360894\|_IMPLEMENTATION_SLOT\|EIP1967" contracts/
-```
-
-Check:
-- `_disableInitializers()` in implementation constructor?
-- Implementation can't be initialized directly by attacker?
-- Storage layout compatible between versions?
-
-## Confirming a Finding
-
-Apply the 7-Question Gate:
-```
-1. Can I demonstrate this with a Foundry test?
-2. What is the financial impact (quantify in $)?
-3. Is this in the Immunefi scope?
-4. Is it a known issue or acknowledged behavior?
-5. Does my Foundry PoC actually run? (forge test -vvvv)
-```
-
-## Foundry PoC Template
-
-```solidity
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
-import "forge-std/Test.sol";
-import "../src/VulnerableContract.sol";
-
-contract ExploitTest is Test {
-    VulnerableContract target;
-    address attacker = makeAddr("attacker");
-
-    function setUp() public {
-        vm.createSelectFork("mainnet", BLOCK_NUMBER);
-        target = VulnerableContract(TARGET_ADDRESS);
-        deal(address(token), attacker, INITIAL_BALANCE);
-    }
-
-    function test_exploit() public {
-        uint256 before = token.balanceOf(attacker);
-        vm.startPrank(attacker);
-        // Execute exploit
-        vm.stopPrank();
-        assertGt(token.balanceOf(attacker), before, "Exploit failed");
-    }
-}
-```
-
-Run: `forge test --match-test test_exploit -vvvv`
-