pi-web-ui 0.94.0 → 0.95.0

package/dist/server/approval-rules.js

@@ -0,0 +1,550 @@
+/**
+ * server/approval-rules.ts
+ *
+ * 审批规则库与多维匹配引擎（Approval Rules Store & Match Engine）。
+ *
+ * 功能：
+ * 1. 规则数据模型（ApprovalRule / UiApprovalRule）：
+ *    - 工具名单（tools：["bash"]、["write", "edit"]、["*"]）
+ *    - 匹配字段（field："command" | "path" | "params"）
+ *    - 匹配方式（match："regex" | "glob" | "contains" | "prefix" | "outside_workspace"）
+ *    - 命中动作（action："ask" | "deny" | "allow"）
+ *      - "deny"：直接阻断执行并向模型报错（不弹窗、不产生 pending）
+ *      - "ask"：触发人工协同审批（弹窗让用户决定，带档位可「允许同类」）
+ *      - "allow"：免审直接放行（白名单，跳过后续规则与内置高危检测）
+ *    - 启停开关（enabled）+ 内置标记（builtin）
+ *    - 双语名称与拦截原因（label/labelEn, reason/reasonEn）
+ *
+ * 2. 匹配与判定纯函数（matchApprovalRule / evaluateApprovalRules）：
+ *    - 优先级规则：
+ *      先按规则列表自顶向下顺序遍历，遇到第一个匹配成功的启用规则即返回其判决；
+ *      若命中 "allow"，直接免审放行；
+ *      若命中 "deny"，直接拒绝执行；
+ *      若命中 "ask"，挂起审批弹窗；
+ *      若所有规则均未命中，回落至内置默认安全策略（兼容旧硬编码逻辑）。
+ *
+ * 3. 存储与多客户端同步（ApprovalRulesStore）：
+ *    - 存储路径：<dataDir>/approval-rules.json（所有客户端共享同一份）
+ *    - 播种 sidecar：<dataDir>/approval-rules.seeded.json（记录已播种过的内置规则 id，
+ *      老用户删掉的内置规则不会在重启后复活；发版新增的内置规则可安全合并进老用户文件）。
+ *    - 内存缓存 + 文件 mtime 感知，支持直接编辑 JSON 文件热生效。
+ */
+import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, renameSync, statSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
+import { dirname, isAbsolute, resolve, sep } from "node:path";
+/**
+ * 极简 glob 转 RegExp（只支持 * 单段、? 单字符、** 跨段）。
+ * 纯函数，支持正反斜杠统一归一为 /。
+ */
+export function globToRegex(pattern) {
+    const src = String(pattern ?? "")
+        .trim()
+        .replace(/\\/g, "/");
+    let re = "";
+    for (let i = 0; i < src.length; i++) {
+        const c = src[i];
+        if (c === "*") {
+            if (src[i + 1] === "*") {
+                if (src[i + 2] === "/") {
+                    re += "(?:.*/)?";
+                    i += 2;
+                }
+                else {
+                    re += ".*";
+                    i += 1;
+                }
+            }
+            else {
+                re += "[^/]*";
+            }
+        }
+        else if (c === "?") {
+            re += "[^/]";
+        }
+        else {
+            re += c.replace(/[.+^${}()|[\]\\]/, (m) => `\\${m}`);
+        }
+    }
+    return new RegExp(`^${re}$`, "i");
+}
+/**
+ * 从工具参数对象中提取待检查文本。
+ */
+export function extractRuleFieldValue(field, toolName, params) {
+    if (!params || typeof params !== "object") {
+        return typeof params === "string" ? params : "";
+    }
+    const obj = params;
+    if (field === "command") {
+        return String(obj.command ?? "");
+    }
+    if (field === "path") {
+        return String(obj.path ?? "");
+    }
+    if (field === "params") {
+        try {
+            return JSON.stringify(params);
+        }
+        catch {
+            return String(params);
+        }
+    }
+    return "";
+}
+/**
+ * 单条规则针对具体工具调用的匹配判定（纯函数）。
+ */
+export function matchApprovalRule(rule, toolName, params, cwd, workspaceRoots = []) {
+    if (!rule.enabled)
+        return false;
+    // 1. 工具名匹配
+    const targetTools = rule.tools.map((t) => t.trim().toLowerCase());
+    const toolMatches = targetTools.includes("*") || targetTools.includes(toolName.trim().toLowerCase());
+    if (!toolMatches)
+        return false;
+    // 2. 特殊匹配方式：outside_workspace（工作区外路径）
+    if (rule.match === "outside_workspace") {
+        const targetPath = extractRuleFieldValue("path", toolName, params);
+        if (!targetPath)
+            return false;
+        const abs = isAbsolute(targetPath) ? targetPath : resolve(cwd, targetPath);
+        const allRoots = [resolve(cwd), ...workspaceRoots.map((r) => resolve(r))];
+        const inside = allRoots.some((r) => abs === r || abs.startsWith(r + sep));
+        return !inside;
+    }
+    // 3. 提取字段文本
+    const fieldValue = extractRuleFieldValue(rule.field, toolName, params);
+    // 4. 按 match kind 进行文本判定
+    switch (rule.match) {
+        case "regex": {
+            try {
+                const re = new RegExp(rule.value, "i");
+                return re.test(fieldValue);
+            }
+            catch {
+                return false;
+            }
+        }
+        case "glob": {
+            try {
+                const re = globToRegex(rule.value);
+                return re.test(fieldValue.replace(/\\/g, "/"));
+            }
+            catch {
+                return false;
+            }
+        }
+        case "contains": {
+            return fieldValue.toLowerCase().includes(rule.value.toLowerCase());
+        }
+        case "prefix": {
+            return fieldValue.toLowerCase().startsWith(rule.value.toLowerCase());
+        }
+        default:
+            return false;
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * 完整评估规则列表对工具调用的决策（纯函数，按列表顺序首个匹配胜出）。
+ */
+export function evaluateApprovalRules(rules, toolName, params, cwd, workspaceRoots = []) {
+    for (const rule of rules) {
+        if (matchApprovalRule(rule, toolName, params, cwd, workspaceRoots)) {
+            const catId = rule.categoryId || rule.id;
+            const category = {
+                id: catId,
+                label: rule.label,
+                labelEn: rule.labelEn || rule.label,
+            };
+            return {
+                action: rule.action,
+                matchedRule: rule,
+                reason: rule.reason || rule.label,
+                reasonEn: rule.reasonEn || rule.labelEn || rule.label,
+                category,
+            };
+        }
+    }
+    return { action: "none" };
+}
+/**
+ * 内置默认审批规则（与 server/tool-approval.ts 既有内置检测表保持 100% 同口径与同一 id）。
+ */
+export const DEFAULT_APPROVAL_RULES = [
+    {
+        id: "builtin.bash.rm-rf",
+        enabled: true,
+        tools: ["bash"],
+        field: "command",
+        match: "regex",
+        value: "\\brm\\s+-[a-zA-Z0-9]*[rf][a-zA-Z0-9]*\\s+((\\/)|(~)|(\\.\\.)|(\\*)|(\\.\\/))",
+        action: "ask",
+        label: "递归/强制删除 (rm -rf)",
+        labelEn: "Recursive/force delete (rm -rf)",
+        reason: "检测到高风险的递归/强制删除大范围路径命令 (rm -rf)",
+        reasonEn: "Detected high-risk recursive/force deletion of wide paths (rm -rf)",
+        categoryId: "bash.rm-rf",
+        builtin: true,
+    },
+    {
+        id: "builtin.bash.win-del",
+        enabled: true,
+        tools: ["bash"],
+        field: "command",
+        match: "regex",
+        value: "\\b(del|rmdir)\\s+\\/[fsq]",
+        action: "ask",
+        label: "Windows 强制删除 (del/rmdir)",
+        labelEn: "Windows force delete (del/rmdir)",
+        reason: "检测到高风险的 Windows 强制/递归删除目录命令 (del/rmdir /s /q)",
+        reasonEn: "Detected high-risk Windows force/recursive deletion command (del/rmdir /s /q)",
+        categoryId: "bash.win-del",
+        builtin: true,
+    },
+    {
+        id: "builtin.bash.disk",
+        enabled: true,
+        tools: ["bash"],
+        field: "command",
+        match: "regex",
+        value: "\\b(mkfs|format\\s+[a-zA-Z]:|dd\\s+if=)",
+        action: "ask",
+        label: "磁盘格式化/底层写入",
+        labelEn: "Disk format / raw block write",
+        reason: "检测到磁盘格式化或底层块写入危险命令 (format/mkfs/dd)",
+        reasonEn: "Detected dangerous disk formatting or raw block write command (format/mkfs/dd)",
+        categoryId: "bash.disk",
+        builtin: true,
+    },
+    {
+        id: "builtin.bash.git-destructive",
+        enabled: true,
+        tools: ["bash"],
+        field: "command",
+        match: "regex",
+        value: "\\bgit\\s+(push\\s+.*?(--force|-[a-zA-Z0-9]*f)\\b|reset\\s+--hard|clean\\s+-[a-zA-Z0-9]*f|branch\\s+-[dD]\\b)",
+        action: "ask",
+        label: "破坏性 Git 操作",
+        labelEn: "Destructive git operation",
+        reason: "检测到不可逆的破坏性 Git 操作 (force push / reset --hard / clean -f)",
+        reasonEn: "Detected irreversible destructive Git operation (force push / reset --hard / clean -f)",
+        categoryId: "bash.git-destructive",
+        builtin: true,
+    },
+    {
+        id: "builtin.bash.chmod",
+        enabled: true,
+        tools: ["bash"],
+        field: "command",
+        match: "regex",
+        value: "\\bchmod\\s+(-R\\s+)?(777|000)\\b",
+        action: "ask",
+        label: "危险权限修改 (chmod)",
+        labelEn: "Dangerous permission change (chmod)",
+        reason: "检测到过度开放或全局破坏性的文件权限修改 (chmod 777/000)",
+        reasonEn: "Detected overly permissive or globally destructive file permission change (chmod 777/000)",
+        categoryId: "bash.chmod",
+        builtin: true,
+    },
+    {
+        id: "builtin.bash.system-redirect",
+        enabled: true,
+        tools: ["bash"],
+        field: "command",
+        match: "regex",
+        value: ">\\s*(\\/etc\\/|\\/boot\\/|C:\\\\Windows)",
+        action: "ask",
+        label: "写入系统关键目录",
+        labelEn: "Write into system directories",
+        reason: "检测到重定向写入系统关键目录的危险操作",
+        reasonEn: "Detected dangerous redirection writing into critical system directories",
+        categoryId: "bash.system-redirect",
+        builtin: true,
+    },
+    {
+        id: "builtin.file.sensitive.env",
+        enabled: true,
+        tools: ["write", "edit", "edit_soft"],
+        field: "path",
+        match: "regex",
+        value: "(^|[\\/\\\\])\\.env(\\.[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+)?$",
+        action: "ask",
+        label: "敏感配置 (.env)",
+        labelEn: "Sensitive config (.env)",
+        reason: "尝试修改敏感环境变量/密钥配置文件 (.env)",
+        reasonEn: "Attempting to modify sensitive environment/secret configuration (.env)",
+        categoryId: "file.sensitive.env",
+        builtin: true,
+    },
+    {
+        id: "builtin.file.sensitive.ssh",
+        enabled: true,
+        tools: ["write", "edit", "edit_soft"],
+        field: "path",
+        match: "regex",
+        value: "(^|[\\/\\\\])(id_rsa|id_ed25519|authorized_keys|known_hosts)$",
+        action: "ask",
+        label: "SSH 密钥/凭据",
+        labelEn: "SSH keys / credentials",
+        reason: "尝试修改 SSH 密钥或认证凭据文件",
+        reasonEn: "Attempting to modify SSH keys or authentication credentials",
+        categoryId: "file.sensitive.ssh",
+        builtin: true,
+    },
+    {
+        id: "builtin.file.sensitive.shell",
+        enabled: true,
+        tools: ["write", "edit", "edit_soft"],
+        field: "path",
+        match: "regex",
+        value: "(^|[\\/\\\\])(\\.bashrc|\\.zshrc|\\.profile|\\.bash_profile)$",
+        action: "ask",
+        label: "Shell 启动配置",
+        labelEn: "Shell profile",
+        reason: "尝试修改用户全局 Shell 启动配置文件",
+        reasonEn: "Attempting to modify user global Shell profile configuration",
+        categoryId: "file.sensitive.shell",
+        builtin: true,
+    },
+    {
+        id: "builtin.file.outside-workspace",
+        enabled: true,
+        tools: ["write", "edit", "edit_soft"],
+        field: "path",
+        match: "outside_workspace",
+        value: "",
+        action: "ask",
+        label: "工作区外写入",
+        labelEn: "Write outside workspace",
+        reason: "尝试在工作区外部写入/修改文件",
+        reasonEn: "Attempting to write/modify file outside the workspace",
+        categoryId: "file.outside-workspace",
+        builtin: true,
+    },
+];
+/** 归一化输入规则。脏数据或非法规则返回 null。 */
+export function normalizeApprovalRule(raw) {
+    if (!raw || typeof raw !== "object")
+        return null;
+    const o = raw;
+    const id = typeof o.id === "string" ? o.id.trim() : "";
+    if (!id || id.length > 120)
+        return null;
+    const label = typeof o.label === "string" ? o.label.trim() : "";
+    if (!label || label.length > 120)
+        return null;
+    const labelEn = typeof o.labelEn === "string" && o.labelEn.trim() ? o.labelEn.trim() : undefined;
+    const reason = typeof o.reason === "string" && o.reason.trim() ? o.reason.trim() : undefined;
+    const reasonEn = typeof o.reasonEn === "string" && o.reasonEn.trim() ? o.reasonEn.trim() : undefined;
+    const action = o.action === "deny" ? "deny" : o.action === "allow" ? "allow" : "ask";
+    const field = o.field === "path" ? "path" : o.field === "params" ? "params" : "command";
+    const match = o.match === "glob"
+        ? "glob"
+        : o.match === "contains"
+            ? "contains"
+            : o.match === "prefix"
+                ? "prefix"
+                : o.match === "outside_workspace"
+                    ? "outside_workspace"
+                    : "regex";
+    const value = typeof o.value === "string" ? o.value : "";
+    if (match === "regex") {
+        try {
+            new RegExp(value);
+        }
+        catch {
+            return null; // 非法正则拒绝
+        }
+    }
+    const tools = Array.isArray(o.tools)
+        ? o.tools
+            .filter((t) => typeof t === "string" && t.trim().length > 0)
+            .map((t) => t.trim().toLowerCase())
+        : ["*"];
+    return {
+        id,
+        enabled: o.enabled !== false,
+        tools: tools.length > 0 ? tools : ["*"],
+        field,
+        match,
+        value,
+        action,
+        label,
+        ...(labelEn ? { labelEn } : {}),
+        ...(reason ? { reason } : {}),
+        ...(reasonEn ? { reasonEn } : {}),
+        ...(typeof o.categoryId === "string" && o.categoryId.trim() ? { categoryId: o.categoryId.trim() } : {}),
+        builtin: o.builtin === true,
+    };
+}
+/** 全局审批规则库持久化与操作类。 */
+export class ApprovalRulesStore {
+    filePath;
+    rules = null;
+    lastMtime = 0;
+    constructor(filePath) {
+        this.filePath = filePath;
+    }
+    seededPath() {
+        return /\.json$/i.test(this.filePath)
+            ? this.filePath.replace(/\.json$/i, ".seeded.json")
+            : `${this.filePath}.seeded.json`;
+    }
+    loadSeeded() {
+        const out = new Set();
+        try {
+            const parsed = JSON.parse(readFileSync(this.seededPath(), "utf8"));
+            if (Array.isArray(parsed)) {
+                for (const item of parsed) {
+                    if (typeof item === "string" && item)
+                        out.add(item);
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        catch {
+            // 文件不存在时返回空集合
+        }
+        return out;
+    }
+    saveSeeded(names) {
+        try {
+            mkdirSync(dirname(this.seededPath()), { recursive: true });
+            const tmp = `${this.seededPath()}.${process.pid}.tmp`;
+            writeFileSync(tmp, JSON.stringify([...names].sort(), null, 2) + "\n");
+            renameSync(tmp, this.seededPath());
+        }
+        catch {
+            // best effort
+        }
+    }
+    load() {
+        let currentMtime = 0;
+        try {
+            if (existsSync(this.filePath)) {
+                currentMtime = statSync(this.filePath).mtimeMs;
+            }
+        }
+        catch {
+            currentMtime = 0;
+        }
+        if (this.rules && currentMtime > 0 && currentMtime === this.lastMtime) {
+            return this.rules;
+        }
+        let list = [];
+        try {
+            const parsed = JSON.parse(readFileSync(this.filePath, "utf8"));
+            if (Array.isArray(parsed)) {
+                list = parsed.map(normalizeApprovalRule).filter((r) => r !== null);
+            }
+        }
+        catch {
+            // 文件不存在或格式损坏，以默认规则初始化
+            list = DEFAULT_APPROVAL_RULES.map((r) => ({ ...r, tools: [...r.tools] }));
+        }
+        // 检查播种：老用户新增内置规则自动合并
+        const seeded = this.loadSeeded();
+        const existingIds = new Set(list.map((r) => r.id));
+        let grown = false;
+        for (const def of DEFAULT_APPROVAL_RULES) {
+            if (!existingIds.has(def.id) && !seeded.has(def.id)) {
+                list.push({ ...def, tools: [...def.tools] });
+                existingIds.add(def.id);
+                grown = true;
+            }
+            seeded.add(def.id);
+        }
+        if (grown || seeded.size > 0) {
+            this.saveSeeded(seeded);
+        }
+        this.rules = list;
+        this.lastMtime = currentMtime;
+        return this.rules;
+    }
+    persist() {
+        try {
+            mkdirSync(dirname(this.filePath), { recursive: true });
+            const tmp = `${this.filePath}.${process.pid}.tmp`;
+            writeFileSync(tmp, JSON.stringify(this.rules ?? [], null, 2) + "\n");
+            renameSync(tmp, this.filePath);
+            try {
+                this.lastMtime = statSync(this.filePath).mtimeMs;
+            }
+            catch {
+                // ignore
+            }
+        }
+        catch {
+            // best effort
+        }
+    }
+    /** 获取全部有效规则清单（深拷贝返回）。 */
+    list() {
+        return this.load().map((r) => ({ ...r, tools: [...r.tools] }));
+    }
+    /** Upsert 一条规则（同 id 替换，新 id 追加到列表末尾）。返回错误提示，成功返回 null。 */
+    upsert(input) {
+        const rule = normalizeApprovalRule(input);
+        if (!rule)
+            return "规则格式非法（缺少名称、工具列表或正则格式错误）";
+        const list = this.load();
+        const idx = list.findIndex((r) => r.id === rule.id);
+        if (idx >= 0) {
+            // 内置规则保留 builtin 标记
+            if (list[idx].builtin) {
+                rule.builtin = true;
+            }
+            list[idx] = rule;
+        }
+        else {
+            list.push(rule);
+        }
+        this.persist();
+        return null;
+    }
+    /** 批量重排/替换整份规则（供前端拖拽排序后保存）。 */
+    saveAll(inputs) {
+        if (!Array.isArray(inputs))
+            return "规则列表必须是数组";
+        const normalized = [];
+        const ids = new Set();
+        for (const raw of inputs) {
+            const r = normalizeApprovalRule(raw);
+            if (!r)
+                return "存在格式非法的规则项";
+            if (ids.has(r.id))
+                return `规则 id 冲突: ${r.id}`;
+            ids.add(r.id);
+            normalized.push(r);
+        }
+        this.rules = normalized;
+        this.persist();
+        return null;
+    }
+    /** 删除一条自定义规则（内置规则不可删除）。 */
+    remove(id) {
+        const list = this.load();
+        const idx = list.findIndex((r) => r.id === id);
+        if (idx < 0)
+            return false;
+        if (list[idx].builtin)
+            return false; // 内置规则不许直接删除，只允许禁用
+        list.splice(idx, 1);
+        this.persist();
+        return true;
+    }
+    /** 恢复某条内置规则到系统默认设定。 */
+    resetBuiltin(id) {
+        const def = DEFAULT_APPROVAL_RULES.find((r) => r.id === id);
+        if (!def)
+            return false;
+        const list = this.load();
+        const idx = list.findIndex((r) => r.id === id);
+        if (idx >= 0) {
+            list[idx] = { ...def, tools: [...def.tools] };
+        }
+        else {
+            list.push({ ...def, tools: [...def.tools] });
+        }
+        this.persist();
+        return true;
+    }
+}

package/dist/server/attachment-store.js

@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+/**
+ * attachment-store.ts — 基于 SHA-256 内容寻址（CAS）的附件存储。
+ *
+ * 借鉴 DSH 的 dsh-attachment 机制：
+ *  - 图片与大二进制附件以 sha256 哈希落盘到 `<dataDir>/attachments/<hash>.<ext>`；
+ *  - WebSocket 快照与会话转录中仅传递紧凑的 hash 引用与 URL；
+ *  - 浏览器通过 `/api/attachment/:hash` 经 HTTP 访问，带永久强缓存（immutable）；
+ *  - 避免快照和消息列表随会话进行出现数兆字节 base64 的膨胀。
+ */
+import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
+import { mkdirSync, existsSync, readdirSync } from "node:fs";
+import { readFile, writeFile, stat } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { join, extname } from "node:path";
+let storeDir = "";
+/** 初始化附件存储目录（服务启动时调用）。 */
+export function initAttachmentStore(dataDir) {
+    storeDir = join(dataDir, "attachments");
+    if (!existsSync(storeDir)) {
+        mkdirSync(storeDir, { recursive: true });
+    }
+    return storeDir;
+}
+const MIME_EXT_MAP = {
+    "image/png": ".png",
+    "image/jpeg": ".jpg",
+    "image/jpg": ".jpg",
+    "image/gif": ".gif",
+    "image/webp": ".webp",
+    "image/svg+xml": ".svg",
+    "image/bmp": ".bmp",
+    "application/pdf": ".pdf",
+};
+const EXT_MIME_MAP = {
+    ".png": "image/png",
+    ".jpg": "image/jpeg",
+    ".jpeg": "image/jpeg",
+    ".gif": "image/gif",
+    ".webp": "image/webp",
+    ".svg": "image/svg+xml",
+    ".bmp": "image/bmp",
+    ".pdf": "application/pdf",
+};
+/**
+ * 将二进制内容写入附件存储（内容寻址，幂等）：
+ * 已存在同哈希文件则直接返回元数据，不重复写盘。
+ */
+export async function saveAttachment(buffer, mimeType = "application/octet-stream", preferredExt) {
+    if (!storeDir) {
+        throw new Error("AttachmentStore has not been initialized with initAttachmentStore(dataDir)");
+    }
+    const hash = createHash("sha256").update(buffer).digest("hex");
+    const ext = preferredExt || MIME_EXT_MAP[mimeType] || ".bin";
+    const fileName = `${hash}${ext}`;
+    const filePath = join(storeDir, fileName);
+    if (!existsSync(filePath)) {
+        await writeFile(filePath, buffer);
+    }
+    return {
+        hash,
+        size: buffer.length,
+        mimeType,
+        ext,
+        url: `/api/attachment/${hash}`,
+        filePath,
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * 根据哈希查找已存储的附件文件路径及元数据。
+ */
+export async function findAttachment(hash) {
+    if (!storeDir || !existsSync(storeDir))
+        return null;
+    // 校验 hash 必须是 64 位十六进制字符串（防止目录遍历）
+    if (!/^[a-f0-9]{64}$/i.test(hash))
+        return null;
+    try {
+        const files = readdirSync(storeDir);
+        const match = files.find((f) => f.startsWith(hash));
+        if (!match)
+            return null;
+        const filePath = join(storeDir, match);
+        const st = await stat(filePath);
+        const ext = extname(match).toLowerCase();
+        const mimeType = EXT_MIME_MAP[ext] || "application/octet-stream";
+        return {
+            hash,
+            size: st.size,
+            mimeType,
+            ext,
+            url: `/api/attachment/${hash}`,
+            filePath,
+        };
+    }
+    catch {
+        return null;
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * 读取附件二进制数据。
+ */
+export async function readAttachment(hash) {
+    const record = await findAttachment(hash);
+    if (!record)
+        return null;
+    try {
+        const buffer = await readFile(record.filePath);
+        return { buffer, mimeType: record.mimeType };
+    }
+    catch {
+        return null;
+    }
+}