peaks-loop 4.1.0 → 4.1.2

package/dist/services/loop/loop-bee-relation-store.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import type Database from 'better-sqlite3';
+import type { SqliteDatabase } from '../sqlite/sqlite-driver.js';
 import type { LoopBeeRelation, LoopBeeRelationRole } from './loop-bee-relation-types.js';
 /**
  * Low-level SQLite access for the `loop_bee_relation` table. The
@@ -10,13 +10,12 @@ import type { LoopBeeRelation, LoopBeeRelationRole } from './loop-bee-relation-t
  *
  * Defense in depth:
  *   - FK constraints enforce loop_release and bee_release referential
- *     integrity (better-sqlite3 + foreign_keys = ON).
+ *     integrity (foreign_keys = ON, applied by `openStateDb`).
  *   - Partial unique index `WHERE role = 'main'` enforces "at most one
  *     main bee per loop" at the storage layer (the service layer adds
  *     a friendlier error path on top).
  *   - UNIQUE (loop_release_id, bee_release_id) prevents accidental
  *     duplicate relations between the same loop and same bee release.
- *   - The migration does NOT touch any 4.x `bee_release` column (AC-3).
  *   - Lifecycle_status check on loop_release is NOT a DB-level constraint
  *     (the retirement rule is enforced in the service layer — see
  *     `LoopBeeRelationService.create`) so the DB stays decoupled from
@@ -27,7 +26,7 @@ import type { LoopBeeRelation, LoopBeeRelationRole } from './loop-bee-relation-t
  * database. Used by tests that build their own DB without the
  * openStateDb pipeline. Idempotent.
  */
-export declare function ensureLoopBeeRelationTable(db: Database.Database): void;
+export declare function ensureLoopBeeRelationTable(db: SqliteDatabase): void;
 /**
  * Insert a LoopBeeRelation row. The row's `schema_version` is taken from
  * the input (must equal `peaks.loop-bee-relation/1`); `id` and
@@ -40,14 +39,14 @@ export declare function ensureLoopBeeRelationTable(db: Database.Database): void;
  *
  * Returns the persisted row (with `id` filled in).
  */
-export declare function insertLoopBeeRelation(db: Database.Database, row: Omit<LoopBeeRelation, 'id' | 'created_at'>): LoopBeeRelation;
+export declare function insertLoopBeeRelation(db: SqliteDatabase, row: Omit<LoopBeeRelation, 'id' | 'created_at'>): LoopBeeRelation;
 /** Read a single LoopBeeRelation row by id; returns undefined if absent. */
-export declare function getLoopBeeRelation(db: Database.Database, id: number): LoopBeeRelation | undefined;
+export declare function getLoopBeeRelation(db: SqliteDatabase, id: number): LoopBeeRelation | undefined;
 /** List LoopBeeRelation rows for a given loop_release_id (optionally filtered by role). */
-export declare function listLoopBeeRelationsByLoop(db: Database.Database, loop_release_id: string, role?: LoopBeeRelationRole): LoopBeeRelation[];
+export declare function listLoopBeeRelationsByLoop(db: SqliteDatabase, loop_release_id: string, role?: LoopBeeRelationRole): LoopBeeRelation[];
 /** List LoopBeeRelation rows for a given bee_release_id (optionally filtered by role). */
-export declare function listLoopBeeRelationsByBee(db: Database.Database, bee_release_id: number, role?: LoopBeeRelationRole): LoopBeeRelation[];
+export declare function listLoopBeeRelationsByBee(db: SqliteDatabase, bee_release_id: number, role?: LoopBeeRelationRole): LoopBeeRelation[];
 /** Update the role of an existing relation. Returns the new row, or undefined if absent. */
-export declare function updateLoopBeeRelationRole(db: Database.Database, id: number, newRole: LoopBeeRelationRole): LoopBeeRelation | undefined;
+export declare function updateLoopBeeRelationRole(db: SqliteDatabase, id: number, newRole: LoopBeeRelationRole): LoopBeeRelation | undefined;
 /** Remove a LoopBeeRelation row by id. Returns true if a row was deleted. */
-export declare function removeLoopBeeRelation(db: Database.Database, id: number): boolean;
+export declare function removeLoopBeeRelation(db: SqliteDatabase, id: number): boolean;

package/dist/services/loop/loop-bee-relation-store.js

@@ -8,13 +8,12 @@
  *
  * Defense in depth:
  *   - FK constraints enforce loop_release and bee_release referential
- *     integrity (better-sqlite3 + foreign_keys = ON).
+ *     integrity (foreign_keys = ON, applied by `openStateDb`).
  *   - Partial unique index `WHERE role = 'main'` enforces "at most one
  *     main bee per loop" at the storage layer (the service layer adds
  *     a friendlier error path on top).
  *   - UNIQUE (loop_release_id, bee_release_id) prevents accidental
  *     duplicate relations between the same loop and same bee release.
- *   - The migration does NOT touch any 4.x `bee_release` column (AC-3).
  *   - Lifecycle_status check on loop_release is NOT a DB-level constraint
  *     (the retirement rule is enforced in the service layer — see
  *     `LoopBeeRelationService.create`) so the DB stays decoupled from

package/dist/services/loop/loop-bee-relation-types.d.ts

@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ export declare const LOOP_BEE_RELATION_ROLES: readonly LoopBeeRelationRole[];
  * `loop_release_id` must match the same kebab-case pattern as
  * `LoopRelease.id` — this is a defensive duplicate of the FK target's
  * shape, but the authoritative check is the FK constraint at insert
- * time (better-sqlite3 with `foreign_keys = ON`).
+ * time (with `foreign_keys = ON`, which `openStateDb` applies).
  *
  * `bee_release_id` is a positive integer; matching the
  * `bee_release.id` autoincrement INTEGER PK.

package/dist/services/loop/loop-bee-relation-types.js

@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ export const LOOP_BEE_RELATION_ROLES = [
  * `loop_release_id` must match the same kebab-case pattern as
  * `LoopRelease.id` — this is a defensive duplicate of the FK target's
  * shape, but the authoritative check is the FK constraint at insert
- * time (better-sqlite3 with `foreign_keys = ON`).
+ * time (with `foreign_keys = ON`, which `openStateDb` applies).
  *
  * `bee_release_id` is a positive integer; matching the
  * `bee_release.id` autoincrement INTEGER PK.

package/dist/services/loop/loop-release-service.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import type Database from 'better-sqlite3';
+import type { SqliteDatabase } from '../sqlite/sqlite-driver.js';
 import { type LoopRelease, type LoopReleaseInput, type LoopReleaseLifecycleStatus } from './loop-release-types.js';
 /**
  * Thin service wrapper around the loop_release store. M1 keeps the
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ import { type LoopRelease, type LoopReleaseInput, type LoopReleaseLifecycleStatu
  * deliberately deferred to M2 / M4 / M5 — shipping them here would
  * lock in an interface that the ratchet has not yet ratified.
  *
- * The constructor takes an open better-sqlite3 database (the existing
+ * The constructor takes an open SQLite database (the existing
  * `peaks state` boundary) so callers do not have to thread a path
  * through this layer; this matches the `retainRelease` pattern in
  * `src/services/skillhub/release-retain.ts`.
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ import { type LoopRelease, type LoopReleaseInput, type LoopReleaseLifecycleStatu
  */
 export declare class LoopReleaseService {
     private readonly db;
-    constructor(db: Database.Database);
+    constructor(db: SqliteDatabase);
     /**
      * Persist a new LoopRelease row. Re-validates the input via the
      * Zod schema; throws ZodError on failure.

package/dist/services/loop/loop-release-service.js

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ import { ensureLoopReleaseTable, insertLoopRelease, getLoopRelease, listLoopRele
  * deliberately deferred to M2 / M4 / M5 — shipping them here would
  * lock in an interface that the ratchet has not yet ratified.
  *
- * The constructor takes an open better-sqlite3 database (the existing
+ * The constructor takes an open SQLite database (the existing
  * `peaks state` boundary) so callers do not have to thread a path
  * through this layer; this matches the `retainRelease` pattern in
  * `src/services/skillhub/release-retain.ts`.

package/dist/services/loop/loop-release-store.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import type Database from 'better-sqlite3';
+import type { SqliteDatabase } from '../sqlite/sqlite-driver.js';
 import type { LoopRelease, LoopReleaseLifecycleStatus } from './loop-release-types.js';
 /**
  * Low-level SQLite access for the `loop_release` table. The
@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ import type { LoopRelease, LoopReleaseLifecycleStatus } from './loop-release-typ
  *     INDEX IF NOT EXISTS) so re-running it is safe.
  *   - The M3 migration (`004-loop-bee-extension.sql`) is non-breaking:
  *     it only adds new columns with DEFAULTs and does NOT touch any
- *     pre-existing column on `bee_release` (AC-3).
  */
 /**
  * Re-apply the loop_release table migration against an already-open
@@ -31,7 +30,7 @@ import type { LoopRelease, LoopReleaseLifecycleStatus } from './loop-release-typ
  * the columns will exist; for a freshly-built DB via this helper the
  * columns are baked in. Either way the schema converges.
  */
-export declare function ensureLoopReleaseTable(db: Database.Database): void;
+export declare function ensureLoopReleaseTable(db: SqliteDatabase): void;
 /**
  * Insert a LoopRelease row. The row's `schema_version` is taken from
  * the input (must equal `peaks.loop/1`); `archived_at` is stamped
@@ -41,15 +40,15 @@ export declare function ensureLoopReleaseTable(db: Database.Database): void;
  * same id throws a UNIQUE-constraint error; callers wanting upsert
  * semantics should use a separate path (M5 / crystallization event).
  */
-export declare function insertLoopRelease(db: Database.Database, row: LoopRelease): void;
+export declare function insertLoopRelease(db: SqliteDatabase, row: LoopRelease): void;
 /** Read a single LoopRelease row by id; returns undefined if absent. */
-export declare function getLoopRelease(db: Database.Database, id: string): LoopRelease | undefined;
+export declare function getLoopRelease(db: SqliteDatabase, id: string): LoopRelease | undefined;
 /** List LoopRelease rows filtered by lifecycle_status. */
-export declare function listLoopReleasesByStatus(db: Database.Database, status: LoopReleaseLifecycleStatus): LoopRelease[];
+export declare function listLoopReleasesByStatus(db: SqliteDatabase, status: LoopReleaseLifecycleStatus): LoopRelease[];
 /**
  * Search LoopRelease rows whose `scenario` contains the query string.
  * M1 uses a case-insensitive LIKE; FTS5 promotion is deferred. The
  * query is treated as a literal substring (no regex, no SQL
  * injection surface) — it is escaped via parameter binding.
  */
-export declare function searchLoopReleasesByScenario(db: Database.Database, query: string): LoopRelease[];
+export declare function searchLoopReleasesByScenario(db: SqliteDatabase, query: string): LoopRelease[];

package/dist/services/loop/loop-release-store.js

@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@
  *     INDEX IF NOT EXISTS) so re-running it is safe.
  *   - The M3 migration (`004-loop-bee-extension.sql`) is non-breaking:
  *     it only adds new columns with DEFAULTs and does NOT touch any
- *     pre-existing column on `bee_release` (AC-3).
  */
 /**
  * Re-apply the loop_release table migration against an already-open

package/dist/services/loop/monotonic-guard.d.ts

@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ export declare function toScoreRow(evaluator: string, gateAction: 'pass' | 'warn
 export declare const DEFAULT_MONOTONIC_THRESHOLD = 0.05;
 /** Compare `previous` against `current` and report monotonicity.
  *
- *  Rules (reflected in `tests/unit/loop/monotonic-guard.test.ts`):
  *    - missing previous cycle → skip (`MONOTONIC_NO_PREVIOUS`)
  *    - evaluators not present in both cycles → skip that evaluator
  *    - score unchanged / up → ok

package/dist/services/loop/monotonic-guard.js

@@ -50,7 +50,6 @@ export function toScoreRow(evaluator, gateAction, degraded, observedAtIso = new
 export const DEFAULT_MONOTONIC_THRESHOLD = 0.05;
 /** Compare `previous` against `current` and report monotonicity.
  *
- *  Rules (reflected in `tests/unit/loop/monotonic-guard.test.ts`):
  *    - missing previous cycle → skip (`MONOTONIC_NO_PREVIOUS`)
  *    - evaluators not present in both cycles → skip that evaluator
  *    - score unchanged / up → ok

package/dist/services/memory/memory-ingest-service.js

@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@
 // `peaks memory ingest` — pull memories written by the IDE-side agent into
 // the peaks-owned store.
 //
-// Slice 2026-09-09-memory-system-overhaul (A). Before this, "沉淀记忆" in a
 // peaks-code workflow landed in Claude Code's own per-project memory dir
 // (`~/.claude/projects/<hash>/memory/`) and never reached `.peaks/memory/`
 // — a split-brain write path with no single authority.

package/dist/services/memory/project-context-service.d.ts

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ export type ProjectContextSection = {
     body: string;
 };
 /**
- * Slice 2026-07-15-project-scan-bootstrap (G1 + G2):
  * generateProjectContext now also bootstraps the project-level
  * `.peaks/project-scan/` artifact set. The envelope is returned
  * alongside the context so `peaks project context` can surface

package/dist/services/memory/project-context-service.js

@@ -151,7 +151,6 @@ export async function generateProjectContext(projectRoot) {
         content = header + '\n' + sessionHistory + '\n';
     }
     writeFileSync(contextPath, content, 'utf8');
-    // Slice 2026-07-15-project-scan-bootstrap (G1 + G2):
     // After writing PROJECT.md, also bootstrap `.peaks/project-scan/`
     // (project-scan.md + 4 bundled audit/business templates). Idempotent
     // — re-running this call does not overwrite existing files (unless

package/dist/services/memory/project-memory-service/index/reindex.d.ts

@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ export interface ReindexUnclassified {
 export interface ReindexOrphanEntry {
     name: string;
     kind: string;
-    /** The `sourcePath` recorded in the previous index that no longer exists on disk. */
     sourcePath: string;
 }
 /**
@@ -49,7 +48,6 @@ export interface MemoryReindexReport {
     unclassified: ReindexUnclassified[];
     /** Distinct files that resolve to the same index name — reported, never overwritten. */
     nameConflicts: ReindexNameConflict[];
-    /** Previous index entries whose `sourcePath` no longer exists (error-class drift). */
     orphanIndex: ReindexOrphanEntry[];
     /** Files on disk that the rebuilt index does not contain (warn-class drift). */
     orphanDisk: string[];

package/dist/services/memory/project-memory-service/index/reindex.js

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@
 // the markdown files on disk, plus regeneration of the human/LLM-facing
 // `MEMORY.md` index and a drift report.
 //
-// Why this exists (slice 2026-09-09-memory-system-overhaul, B):
 //   - `peaks memory extract` only ever wrote memories FROM artifacts; it
 //     never re-scanned files already on disk, and there was no rebuild
 //     command. 78 top-level files were absent from index.json.

package/dist/services/memory/project-memory-service/index/search.d.ts

@@ -29,6 +29,5 @@ export declare function readProjectMemories(projectRoot: string): ProjectMemoryR
  * Read a single project memory's full body by name. Returns null when
  * the memory does not exist. The on-disk body is returned verbatim
  * (pretty). The CLI layer applies `formatMdCompact` when `format: 'compact'`
- * is requested. Slice 023 (R3).
  */
 export declare function readProjectMemoryBody(projectRoot: string, name: string): ProjectMemoryShowResult | null;

package/dist/services/memory/project-memory-service/index/search.js

@@ -145,7 +145,6 @@ export function readProjectMemories(projectRoot) {
  * Read a single project memory's full body by name. Returns null when
  * the memory does not exist. The on-disk body is returned verbatim
  * (pretty). The CLI layer applies `formatMdCompact` when `format: 'compact'`
- * is requested. Slice 023 (R3).
  */
 export function readProjectMemoryBody(projectRoot, name) {
     const normalizedRoot = normalizeRoot(projectRoot);

package/dist/services/memory/project-memory-service/index.d.ts

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ export type { ExtractedMemoryBlocks } from './parsers/markdown-pure.js';
 export { parseBlock, parseBlockResult, parseMemoryFrontmatter, parseStoredMemoryFile, renderMemoryFile, resolveMemoryKind, resolveMemoryName, slugify } from './parsers/frontmatter.js';
 export type { MemoryKindResolution, MemoryKindSource, MemoryNameResolution, MemoryNameSource, ParsedMemoryFrontmatter } from './parsers/frontmatter.js';
 export { assertInsideProject, assertSafeProjectMemoryDir, assertSafeSessionDir, normalizeRealRoot, normalizeRoot, realPathOrThrow, resolveProjectPath, safeRealpath } from './store/paths.js';
-export { assertSafeMemory, assertSafeMemoryFileContent, findSensitiveMemoryTitleTerm, hasSensitiveMemoryContent, SENSITIVE_MEMORY_CHECKS, UnsafeMemoryError, writeNewFile } from './store/atomic-write.js';
+export { assertSafeMemory, assertSafeMemoryFileContent, findSensitiveMemoryContentRule, findSensitiveMemoryTitleTerm, hasSensitiveMemoryContent, SENSITIVE_MEMORY_CHECKS, UnsafeMemoryError, writeNewFile } from './store/atomic-write.js';
 export { ensureMemoryBootstrap, emptyByKind, emptyIndex, listMarkdownFiles, readProjectMemories, readProjectMemoryBody } from './index/search.js';
 export { buildMemoryIndex, generateMemoryIndexFile, readExistingIndex, readMemoryFileMtime, readMemoryIndex, readStoredMemoryNames } from './index/ranking.js';
 export { executeMemoryReindex, renderMemoryMarkdown, KIND_ORDER, MEMORY_MD_BANNER, MEMORY_MD_FILENAME } from './index/reindex.js';

package/dist/services/memory/project-memory-service/index.js

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ export { describeMemoryBlockDrops, describeSessionScanFailures, summarizeBackupR
 export { parseBlock, parseBlockResult, parseMemoryFrontmatter, parseStoredMemoryFile, renderMemoryFile, resolveMemoryKind, resolveMemoryName, slugify } from './parsers/frontmatter.js';
 // Store: path safety + sensitive content
 export { assertInsideProject, assertSafeProjectMemoryDir, assertSafeSessionDir, normalizeRealRoot, normalizeRoot, realPathOrThrow, resolveProjectPath, safeRealpath } from './store/paths.js';
-export { assertSafeMemory, assertSafeMemoryFileContent, findSensitiveMemoryTitleTerm, hasSensitiveMemoryContent, SENSITIVE_MEMORY_CHECKS, UnsafeMemoryError, writeNewFile } from './store/atomic-write.js';
+export { assertSafeMemory, assertSafeMemoryFileContent, findSensitiveMemoryContentRule, findSensitiveMemoryTitleTerm, hasSensitiveMemoryContent, SENSITIVE_MEMORY_CHECKS, UnsafeMemoryError, writeNewFile } from './store/atomic-write.js';
 // Index: search / ranking / dispatch
 export { ensureMemoryBootstrap, emptyByKind, emptyIndex, listMarkdownFiles, readProjectMemories, readProjectMemoryBody } from './index/search.js';
 export { buildMemoryIndex, generateMemoryIndexFile, readExistingIndex, readMemoryFileMtime, readMemoryIndex, readStoredMemoryNames } from './index/ranking.js';

package/dist/services/memory/project-memory-service/memory-kinds.d.ts

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@
  * `--kind` help text all derive from this tuple. Adding a kind here is the
  * only edit required; TypeScript then forces `MEMORY_KIND_TIER` to cover it.
  *
- * Slice 2026-09-10-memory-vocab-and-rotate (E): the original 8 kinds are
  * unchanged. The 13 appended kinds were observed on disk with real values
  * that the index schema rejected (`peaks memory reindex` reported them as
  * `unrecognized kind value`). Accepting them moves those files into the

package/dist/services/memory/project-memory-service/memory-kinds.js

@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@
  * `--kind` help text all derive from this tuple. Adding a kind here is the
  * only edit required; TypeScript then forces `MEMORY_KIND_TIER` to cover it.
  *
- * Slice 2026-09-10-memory-vocab-and-rotate (E): the original 8 kinds are
  * unchanged. The 13 appended kinds were observed on disk with real values
  * that the index schema rejected (`peaks memory reindex` reported them as
  * `unrecognized kind value`). Accepting them moves those files into the

package/dist/services/memory/project-memory-service/parsers/frontmatter.d.ts

@@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ export interface ParsedMemoryFrontmatter {
  *   3. top-level `type:`        — tolerated by the pre-existing trim-based reader
  *   4. `none`                   — reported as unclassified; never invented
  *
- * Slice 2026-09-09-memory-system-overhaul (B): before this helper, files
  * using a top-level `kind:` were silently dropped by the reader (defect
  * #2). Falling through to `kind:` / `type:` is a strict superset of the
  * old behaviour — no previously-indexed file changes kind.

package/dist/services/memory/project-memory-service/parsers/frontmatter.js

@@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ export { parseBlock, parseBlockResult, renderMemoryFile, slugify, VALID_MEMORY_K
  *   3. top-level `type:`        — tolerated by the pre-existing trim-based reader
  *   4. `none`                   — reported as unclassified; never invented
  *
- * Slice 2026-09-09-memory-system-overhaul (B): before this helper, files
  * using a top-level `kind:` were silently dropped by the reader (defect
  * #2). Falling through to `kind:` / `type:` is a strict superset of the
  * old behaviour — no previously-indexed file changes kind.

package/dist/services/memory/project-memory-service/store/atomic-write.d.ts

@@ -24,6 +24,12 @@ export declare const SENSITIVE_MEMORY_CHECKS: {
  * a value — so echoing it into the error envelope cannot leak anything.
  */
 export declare function findSensitiveMemoryTitleTerm(title: string): string | null;
+/**
+ * Which content rule refused this text — the id, never the match. A rule whose
+ * candidate fails `shaped` does not stop the scan: a later rule may still fire,
+ * exactly as a later alternative in the old `||` chain would have.
+ */
+export declare function findSensitiveMemoryContentRule(content: string): string | null;
 export declare function hasSensitiveMemoryContent(content: string): boolean;
 /**
  * The refusal `assertSafeMemory` raises: the check that fired and the term it
@@ -42,19 +48,25 @@ export declare function hasSensitiveMemoryContent(content: string): boolean;
  * `check` for the same reason — a substring test against a message whose words
  * can be rewritten is not a routing rule, it is a guess.
  *
- * NOTHING HERE WEAKENS THE REDACTOR. The content scan never puts its match in
- * this object (see `matchedTerm` below), so no value can reach an envelope
- * through it; the redactor's guarantee is intact and is pinned by the cases in
+ * NOTHING HERE WEAKENS THE REDACTOR. Both scans put a NAME in this field, never
+ * a match: the title term comes from `SENSITIVE_PROSE_TERMS` and the content
+ * value from the closed id list in `SENSITIVE_CONTENT_RULES`, so no credential
+ * can reach an envelope through it. The redactor's guarantee over `message` is
+ * intact and is pinned by the cases in
  * `tests/unit/services/memory/memory-title-sensitive-scan.test.ts`.
  */
 export declare class UnsafeMemoryError extends Error {
     /** One of `SENSITIVE_MEMORY_CHECKS` — which rule refused the write. */
     readonly check: string;
     /**
-     * The credential term the TITLE scan matched, or `null` for the other two
-     * checks. `null` is not an omission: their match can BE the credential
-     * (`ghp_…`, the PEM header, the JWT), which is why their messages describe
-     * the pattern family and never echo the text.
+     * WHAT matched, as a name rather than a value: the credential term for the
+     * title scan, the rule id for the content scan, `null` only for the metadata
+     * key scan (whose predicate answers by a config-key vocabulary the memory
+     * metadata never contains — see the note on `assertSafeMemory`).
+     *
+     * It is never the match itself: for most content patterns the match IS the
+     * credential (`ghp_…`, the PEM header, the JWT), which is why their messages
+     * describe the pattern family and never echo the text.
      */
     readonly matchedTerm: string | null;
     constructor(check: string, detail: string, matchedTerm?: string | null);

package/dist/services/memory/project-memory-service/store/atomic-write.js

@@ -4,7 +4,9 @@
 //   - `hasSensitiveMemoryContent` — pattern check for api keys, tokens,
 //     PEM private keys, JWTs, GitHub / GitLab tokens, AWS access keys. Used
 //     both by the extract path (`assertSafeMemory`) and the backup path
-//     (`assertSafeMemoryFileContent`).
+//     (`assertSafeMemoryFileContent`). It is a wrapper over
+//     `findSensitiveMemoryContentRule`, which answers the same question and
+//     names the rule that answered it.
 //   - `findSensitiveMemoryTitleTerm` — the PROSE predicate for
 //     `memory.title`. It is deliberately NOT the config-key predicate: see
 //     the block comment above it (slice C0).
@@ -136,17 +138,89 @@ export function findSensitiveMemoryTitleTerm(title) {
     }
     return null;
 }
+/**
+ * Is this string shaped like a credential VALUE rather than like prose?
+ *
+ * WHY THIS EXISTS. The value-carrying patterns used to fire on the SEPARATOR
+ * alone: `password:` was a match whether or not anything followed it, so a
+ * memory writing `password: the field label in the form` or `myApiKey: from
+ * env` was refused for describing an interface. Two documents were killed that
+ * way before anyone could say which of ten rules had fired — and the rules
+ * could not be tightened, because nothing in them described the VALUE.
+ *
+ * THE TEST, AND WHAT IT COSTS. A value is credential-shaped when it is at least
+ * 5 characters AND carries a digit or one of `_ + / =`. `hunter2`,
+ * `abcdef123456`, `supp3rSecret` and every base64-ish token pass;
+ * `Authorization`, `the`, `from`, `abc`, `well-designed` fail. Given up
+ * deliberately: an all-letter opaque run (`bearer abcdefghijklmnopq`) is no
+ * longer caught, and neither is a 4-character real password. The alternative was
+ * a rule that cannot tell an English word from a random string, and the
+ * complaint on record is about English words. Digits are the discriminator
+ * rather than `-` and `.` because hyphens and full stops belong to ordinary
+ * prose; provider tokens in the wild carry digits, and the prefix-shaped
+ * patterns (`ghp_`, `AKIA`, the PEM header, the JWT) keep their own length floors
+ * and are untouched by this predicate.
+ */
+const MIN_VALUE_CHARS = 5;
+function isCredentialShapedValue(value) {
+    return value.length >= MIN_VALUE_CHARS && /[0-9_+/=]/.test(value);
+}
+/** A placeholder names where a value will go; it is not itself a secret. */
+const PLACEHOLDER_VALUE = /^[<[{(]|^(?:your|the|an|some|my|example|placeholder|todo|fake)/i;
+function isPlaceholderValue(value) {
+    return (PLACEHOLDER_VALUE.test(value) ||
+        /(?:replace|insert|provide|redact|<[a-z_]+>)/i.test(value) ||
+        /^[A-Za-z]+(?:_[A-Z*]+)+$/.test(value) // API_KEY_HERE-style constant
+    );
+}
+const SENSITIVE_CONTENT_RULES = [
+    {
+        id: 'credential-assignment',
+        pattern: /\b(?:api[_-]?key|access[_-]?token|auth[_-]?token|refresh[_-]?token|secret|password|passwd|credential|token|bearer)\s*[:=]\s*([^\s,;"'`]+)/gi,
+        shaped: (value) => isCredentialShapedValue(value) && !isPlaceholderValue(value)
+    },
+    {
+        id: 'authorization-bearer-header',
+        pattern: /\bauthorization\s*:\s*bearer\s+([^\s,;"'`]+)/gi,
+        shaped: (value) => isCredentialShapedValue(value) && !isPlaceholderValue(value)
+    },
+    {
+        id: 'bearer-value',
+        pattern: /\bbearer\s+([A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{8,})/gi,
+        shaped: (value) => isCredentialShapedValue(value) && !isPlaceholderValue(value)
+    },
+    {
+        id: 'sk-prefixed-key',
+        // The SUFFIX is captured, not the whole `sk-…`: `sk-abcdef is the prefix`
+        // is a sentence about the scheme, and the shape test on the suffix is what
+        // tells it from `sk-abcdef1234567890`.
+        pattern: /\bsk-([A-Za-z0-9_-]{6,})\b/g,
+        shaped: (value) => isCredentialShapedValue(value) && !isPlaceholderValue(value)
+    },
+    { id: 'gh-prefixed-key', pattern: /\bgh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}\b/g },
+    { id: 'github-pat', pattern: /\bgithub_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}\b/g },
+    { id: 'glpat-prefixed-key', pattern: /\bglpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\b/g },
+    { id: 'akia-prefixed-key', pattern: /\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/g },
+    { id: 'pem-private-key', pattern: /-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----/g },
+    { id: 'jwt-shaped-value', pattern: /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\b/g }
+];
+/**
+ * Which content rule refused this text — the id, never the match. A rule whose
+ * candidate fails `shaped` does not stop the scan: a later rule may still fire,
+ * exactly as a later alternative in the old `||` chain would have.
+ */
+export function findSensitiveMemoryContentRule(content) {
+    for (const rule of SENSITIVE_CONTENT_RULES) {
+        for (const match of content.matchAll(rule.pattern)) {
+            const candidate = match[1] ?? match[0];
+            if (rule.shaped === undefined || rule.shaped(candidate))
+                return rule.id;
+        }
+    }
+    return null;
+}
 export function hasSensitiveMemoryContent(content) {
-    return (/(?:api[_-]?key|token|secret|password|credential|bearer)\s*[:=]/i.test(content) ||
-        /\bauthorization\s*:\s*bearer\s+\S+/i.test(content) ||
-        /\bbearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{12,}\b/i.test(content) ||
-        /\bsk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{6,}\b/.test(content) ||
-        /\bgh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}\b/.test(content) ||
-        /\bgithub_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}\b/.test(content) ||
-        /\bglpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\b/.test(content) ||
-        /\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/.test(content) ||
-        /-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----/.test(content) ||
-        /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\b/.test(content));
+    return findSensitiveMemoryContentRule(content) !== null;
 }
 /**
  * The refusal `assertSafeMemory` raises: the check that fired and the term it
@@ -165,19 +239,25 @@ export function hasSensitiveMemoryContent(content) {
  * `check` for the same reason — a substring test against a message whose words
  * can be rewritten is not a routing rule, it is a guess.
  *
- * NOTHING HERE WEAKENS THE REDACTOR. The content scan never puts its match in
- * this object (see `matchedTerm` below), so no value can reach an envelope
- * through it; the redactor's guarantee is intact and is pinned by the cases in
+ * NOTHING HERE WEAKENS THE REDACTOR. Both scans put a NAME in this field, never
+ * a match: the title term comes from `SENSITIVE_PROSE_TERMS` and the content
+ * value from the closed id list in `SENSITIVE_CONTENT_RULES`, so no credential
+ * can reach an envelope through it. The redactor's guarantee over `message` is
+ * intact and is pinned by the cases in
  * `tests/unit/services/memory/memory-title-sensitive-scan.test.ts`.
  */
 export class UnsafeMemoryError extends Error {
     /** One of `SENSITIVE_MEMORY_CHECKS` — which rule refused the write. */
     check;
     /**
-     * The credential term the TITLE scan matched, or `null` for the other two
-     * checks. `null` is not an omission: their match can BE the credential
-     * (`ghp_…`, the PEM header, the JWT), which is why their messages describe
-     * the pattern family and never echo the text.
+     * WHAT matched, as a name rather than a value: the credential term for the
+     * title scan, the rule id for the content scan, `null` only for the metadata
+     * key scan (whose predicate answers by a config-key vocabulary the memory
+     * metadata never contains — see the note on `assertSafeMemory`).
+     *
+     * It is never the match itself: for most content patterns the match IS the
+     * credential (`ghp_…`, the PEM header, the JWT), which is why their messages
+     * describe the pattern family and never echo the text.
      */
     matchedTerm;
     constructor(check, detail, matchedTerm = null) {
@@ -193,19 +273,28 @@ export function assertSafeMemory(memory) {
     if (containsSensitiveConfigValue(metadata)) {
         throw new UnsafeMemoryError(SENSITIVE_MEMORY_CHECKS.metadataKey, 'matched a credential key in the memory metadata');
     }
-    if (hasSensitiveMemoryContent(content)) {
-        // The match is deliberately NOT echoed, in the message or in the error's
-        // fields: for most of these patterns the match IS the credential, so
+    const contentRule = findSensitiveMemoryContentRule(content);
+    if (contentRule !== null) {
+        // The matched TEXT is deliberately NOT echoed, in the message or in the
+        // error's fields: for most of these patterns the match IS the credential, so
         // copying it would write the value this scan exists to keep out.
         //
+        // The RULE ID is echoed, and it is echoed in `matchedTerm` rather than only
+        // in prose. This used to be the one refusal that could not say what fired:
+        // the predicate returned a boolean, so the caller had no match to report and
+        // `matchedTerm` was `null` by construction while the title scan named its
+        // term. A reader then had to guess across documents which of ten shapes had
+        // refused them. An id from a closed vocabulary leaks nothing and answers the
+        // question, so the two paths are diagnosable the same way.
+        //
         // The DETAIL is worded around the envelope redactor's vocabulary on
         // purpose. Its catch-all (`/(secret|token|password|api[-_ ]?key)/gi`)
         // rewrites those four words wherever they appear in a failure message, so
         // naming the pattern families in their own words arrives on the CLI as
         // "an [redacted] / [redacted] / [redacted] assignment" — a remedy sentence
-        // redacted into uselessness by the very policy it agrees with. Measured on
-        // the real CLI, both wordings; this one survives intact.
-        throw new UnsafeMemoryError(SENSITIVE_MEMORY_CHECKS.content, 'matched a credential value in the memory content (a `key=value` credential assignment, a Bearer header, a PEM private key, a JWT, or a provider credential)');
+        // redacted into uselessness by the very policy it agrees with. The rule ids
+        // above are spelled to survive that pass.
+        throw new UnsafeMemoryError(SENSITIVE_MEMORY_CHECKS.content, `matched the credential pattern "${contentRule}" in the memory content`, contentRule);
     }
     const titleTerm = findSensitiveMemoryTitleTerm(memory.title);
     if (titleTerm !== null) {
@@ -213,8 +302,13 @@ export function assertSafeMemory(memory) {
     }
 }
 export function assertSafeMemoryFileContent(content) {
-    if (hasSensitiveMemoryContent(content)) {
-        throw new Error('Refusing to back up sensitive memory content');
+    const rule = findSensitiveMemoryContentRule(content);
+    if (rule !== null) {
+        // The id travels here too. This path has no `UnsafeMemoryError` (it is not
+        // the extract gate, and its callers do not route on `check`), but a backup
+        // refusal that cannot say which shape fired is the same dead end as the one
+        // the extract path used to be.
+        throw new Error(`Refusing to back up sensitive memory content (rule: ${rule})`);
     }
 }
 export function writeNewFile(path, content) {

package/dist/services/memory/project-memory-service.js

@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@
 // Thin back-compat shim.
 //
 // The original 1032-line project-memory-service.ts was split on 2026-07-26
-// (rid-003) into the `./project-memory-service/` submodule:
 //
 //   - parsers/frontmatter.ts          — YAML frontmatter parse + render
 //   - parsers/markdown-pure.ts        — extract / summarize (pure)

package/dist/services/mode/mode-enforcement.js

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ const ASSISTED_CONFIRM_TRANSITIONS = new Set([
     'qa:verdict-issued'
 ]);
 export function requiresConfirmation(mode, transitionKey) {
-    // Slice 2026-09-09-mode-consolidation: `swarm` removed as a mode; the
     // two auto-proceed peers are `full-auto` and `24h`.
     if (mode === 'full-auto' || mode === '24h') {
         return false;

package/dist/services/mode/mode-status-service.d.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
 /**
- * Slice 2026-09-09-mode-consolidation (Slice D): one read for the whole
  * stacked mode picture.
  *
  * The autonomy model has two layers that used to be read by nothing in
@@ -82,7 +81,6 @@ export declare function resolvePresenceMode(projectRoot: string): ResolvedPresen
  * documented contract.
  *
  * The union is a superset of both the pre-2026-09-09 mapping (state
- * machine) and the 2026-09-09-mode-consolidation mapping (presence
  * mode): keep partial while the mode says `24h` even in
  * `WAITING_USER`, and keep it when only the state machine knows.
  * Nothing that resolved to `partial` before resolves to `standard`

package/dist/services/mode/mode-status-service.js

@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
 /**
- * Slice 2026-09-09-mode-consolidation (Slice D): one read for the whole
  * stacked mode picture.
  *
  * The autonomy model has two layers that used to be read by nothing in
@@ -95,7 +94,6 @@ function is24hRunEngaged(projectRoot) {
  * documented contract.
  *
  * The union is a superset of both the pre-2026-09-09 mapping (state
- * machine) and the 2026-09-09-mode-consolidation mapping (presence
  * mode): keep partial while the mode says `24h` even in
  * `WAITING_USER`, and keep it when only the state machine knows.
  * Nothing that resolved to `partial` before resolves to `standard`