nexus-agents 8.76.2 → 8.78.0

package/dist/chunk-OZFXXGGZ.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/security/firewall/firewall-policy-mode.ts","../src/security/audit-trail.ts","../src/security/audit-bridge.ts","../src/security/trust-classifier.ts","../src/security/firewall/firewall-types.ts","../src/security/firewall/agent-trust-labels.ts","../src/security/firewall/firewall-passthrough.ts","../src/security/firewall/firewall-trust-reason.ts","../src/security/policy-gate.ts","../src/security/action-schema.ts","../src/security/firewall/firewall-policy-stage.ts","../src/security/corroboration-validator.ts","../src/security/firewall/firewall-pipeline.ts","../src/security/firewall/github-adapter.ts","../src/dogfooding/untrusted-input-firewall.ts","../src/scm/url-parsers.ts","../src/scm/github-provider-traits.ts","../src/dogfooding/issue-triage-types.ts","../src/dogfooding/issue-triage-helpers.ts","../src/dogfooding/issue-triage.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Rollout gate for `HostileInputFirewall` behaviour changes (#5382, epic #5281).\n *\n * `HostileInputFirewall` is a PUBLISHED API: re-exported through\n * `src/exports/security.ts`, carried in `api-surface.txt`, and pinned by an\n * export-contract test. Epic #5281 found it has fallen BEHIND the hand-composed\n * production path rather than being dead scaffolding, and its remaining children\n * change what `process()` decides — #5380 raises one policy check to seven,\n * #5381 makes reputation gating mode-aware.\n *\n * A supermajority panel ratified this gate FIRST (6 approve / 1 reject; the lone\n * rejection argued the gate binds even more firmly than proposed) so those\n * changes have somewhere to land that is not a silent behaviour change shipped\n * in a patch release to consumers this repo cannot see.\n *\n * The invariant that makes it a gate: **`off` is the default, and under `off`\n * behaviour is byte-identical to pre-#5382.** A gate whose default changes\n * behaviour has not gated anything.\n *\n * Deliberately NOT a new mechanism. This flag has the same shape as\n * `NEXUS_REPUTATION_GATING` (#3122) — and as `NEXUS_ACCESS_POLICY_MODE` did\n * until its reader, the access-constraint deriver, was deleted in #5108 — so it\n * delegates to the shared `resolveEnvMode` helper (#3130) and coerces\n * identically. These env-var names are a stability contract; adding another\n * resolver with subtly different coercion is the sprawl that helper exists to\n * prevent.\n *\n * @module security/firewall/firewall-policy-mode\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport { resolveEnvMode } from '../env-mode.js';\nimport type { ILogger } from '../../core/index.js';\n\n/**\n * Rollout state for firewall policy behaviour.\n *\n * - `off` — pre-#5382 behaviour exactly. The default.\n * - `audit` — compute the stricter outcome and REPORT it, but enforce the old\n *   one. This is the mode that makes a rollout measurable: it answers \"what\n *   would change?\" without changing it.\n * - `enforce` — apply the stricter outcome.\n */\nexport const FirewallPolicyModeSchema = z.enum(['off', 'audit', 'enforce']);\nexport type FirewallPolicyMode = z.infer<typeof FirewallPolicyModeSchema>;\n\n/**\n * Default is `off`, and that is the compatibility promise, not a placeholder.\n *\n * Note this differs from `DEFAULT_REPUTATION_GATING_MODE`, which is `enforce`\n * (#4667) — that flag governs an INTERNAL path this repo owns end to end, and\n * was flipped only after measurement over the real triage path. This one\n * governs a published surface with unknown external callers, so it starts off\n * and stays off until the same kind of measurement justifies a flip. Any future\n * flip is a MAJOR version change, not a patch.\n */\nexport const DEFAULT_FIREWALL_POLICY_MODE: FirewallPolicyMode = 'off';\n\n/** Env var carrying the mode. Named to match its two sibling flags. */\nexport const FIREWALL_POLICY_ENV_VAR = 'NEXUS_FIREWALL_POLICY';\n\n/**\n * Resolve the firewall policy mode from the environment.\n *\n * Never throws, because a security layer must not fail-closed at startup on an\n * operator typo (#3130). The two non-happy paths resolve DIFFERENTLY, though:\n * unset or empty resolves silently to `off` (absence is the normal state), while\n * an explicit-but-invalid value resolves to `audit` and emits one `warn`.\n *\n * @param env    Environment to read (injectable for tests).\n * @param logger Injectable for tests; defaults to the shared module logger.\n */\nexport function resolveFirewallPolicyMode(\n  env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env,\n  logger?: ILogger\n): FirewallPolicyMode {\n  return resolveEnvMode(\n    env[FIREWALL_POLICY_ENV_VAR],\n    FirewallPolicyModeSchema,\n    DEFAULT_FIREWALL_POLICY_MODE,\n    FIREWALL_POLICY_ENV_VAR,\n    {\n      ...(logger !== undefined ? { logger } : {}),\n      // An explicit-but-invalid value lands on `audit`, NOT on the unset\n      // default `off`. Unset means \"the operator has not opted in\" and `off` is\n      // right for it; a typo means \"the operator opted in and mistyped how\",\n      // and answering that with the most permissive mode hands them a firewall\n      // that refuses nothing while they believe it is on. `audit` reports\n      // without refusing, so it cannot break an external caller any more than\n      // `off` can, and it emits the `wouldRefuse` telemetry the rollout is\n      // supposed to be collecting — which `off` does not.\n      invalidFallback: 'audit',\n    }\n  );\n}\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/security - Audit Trail\n *\n * Machine-readable JSON audit events for security pipeline decisions.\n * Every trust classification, policy gate decision, corroboration check,\n * and reputation assessment is recorded as a structured event.\n *\n * Satisfies CLAUDE.md requirement: \"Every action on untrusted input must\n * log: trust tier, sources cited, policy gate decision, stripped content.\"\n *\n * @module security/audit-trail\n * (Source: Issue #832 — Security audit trail)\n */\n\nimport { getTimeProvider } from '../core/index.js';\nimport type { TrustTier } from './trust-types.js';\nimport type { AgentActionType } from './action-schema.js';\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Types\n// ============================================================================\n\n/** Maximum stored events before oldest are evicted. */\nconst MAX_EVENTS = 10_000;\n\n/**\n * Discriminated union of audit event types.\n * Each event captures a single security pipeline decision.\n */\nexport type AuditEvent =\n  | TrustClassificationEvent\n  | PolicyGateEvent\n  | CorroborationEvent\n  | ReputationEvent\n  | SanitizationEvent\n  | GraphExecutionAuditEvent\n  | ClawGuardViolationEvent;\n\n/** Base fields shared by all audit events. */\ninterface AuditEventBase {\n  readonly id: string;\n  readonly timestamp: string;\n  readonly component: string;\n}\n\n/** Trust classification decision. */\nexport interface TrustClassificationEvent extends AuditEventBase {\n  readonly type: 'trust_classification';\n  readonly username: string;\n  readonly assignedTier: TrustTier;\n  readonly userRole: string;\n  /**\n   * Present only when a maintainer allowlist was consulted (#4992). A\n   * classification that consulted no list records nothing here rather than\n   * `false` — \"not measured\" and \"measured false\" must stay distinguishable in\n   * the audit record.\n   */\n  readonly isAllowlisted?: boolean;\n  readonly wasDowngraded: boolean;\n  readonly reason: string;\n}\n\n/** Policy gate evaluation result. */\nexport interface PolicyGateEvent extends AuditEventBase {\n  readonly type: 'policy_gate';\n  /**\n   * The agent action evaluated, for the security policy-gate path\n   * (security/policy-gate.ts). Optional because the PIPELINE policy path\n   * (pipeline/policy-evaluator.ts → #3710) records stage-boundary policy\n   * decisions that have no `AgentAction` — they carry {@link stageType} +\n   * {@link mode} + {@link ruleIds} instead. Security emitters always set it.\n   */\n  readonly actionType?: AgentActionType;\n  readonly allowed: boolean;\n  readonly requiresApproval: boolean;\n  readonly inputTrustTier: TrustTier;\n  readonly violationRules: readonly string[];\n  /**\n   * Pipeline-policy fields (#3710). Carried for the dev-pipeline\n   * consensus→execute seam so the DURABLE record can distinguish soak (`warn`)\n   * from enforce (`block`) and which rules/stage fired — without these the\n   * persisted event is useless to the tune/readiness loop. Absent for the\n   * security policy-gate path.\n   */\n  /** Enforcement mode the decision was made under: `warn` (soak) or `block` (enforce). */\n  readonly mode?: 'off' | 'warn' | 'block';\n  /** IDs of the policy rules that fired (mirrors `violationRules` for the pipeline path). */\n  readonly ruleIds?: readonly string[];\n  /** Type of the stage the gate guarded (e.g. `execute`). */\n  readonly stageType?: string;\n  /**\n   * #3727: discriminates a per-EVALUATION SUMMARY record (`'summary'` — emitted\n   * once per pipeline policy evaluation INCLUDING clean ones, the DENOMINATOR for\n   * the would-block rate) from a per-VIOLATION record (`'violation'` — the\n   * existing #3710 per-violation records). Absent for the security policy-gate\n   * path. Denominator = count(recordKind==='summary'); numerator = summaries with\n   * `violationCount > 0`. Scope the #3710 count-parity assertion to `'violation'`.\n   */\n  readonly recordKind?: 'summary' | 'violation';\n  /** #3727: number of violations in THIS evaluation (set on the summary record). */\n  readonly violationCount?: number;\n}\n\n/** Corroboration validation result. */\nexport interface CorroborationEvent extends AuditEventBase {\n  readonly type: 'corroboration';\n  readonly actionType: AgentActionType;\n  readonly satisfied: boolean;\n  readonly sourceCount: number;\n  readonly missingRequirements: readonly string[];\n}\n\n/** Reputation assessment result. */\nexport interface ReputationEvent extends AuditEventBase {\n  readonly type: 'reputation';\n  readonly username: string;\n  readonly reputationScore: number;\n  readonly isSuspicious: boolean;\n  readonly effectiveTier: TrustTier;\n  readonly signalCount: number;\n}\n\n/** Summary of a single element stripped during sanitization. */\nexport interface StrippedElementSummary {\n  /** Truncated tag text (≤30 chars + '...' from the sanitizer). */\n  readonly tag: string;\n  /** Reason the element was removed (e.g. 'Trail of Bits injection vector'). */\n  readonly reason: string;\n}\n\n/** Max stripped-element details retained per sanitization event. */\nexport const MAX_STRIPPED_ELEMENTS_PER_EVENT = 20;\n\n/** Input sanitization result. */\nexport interface SanitizationEvent extends AuditEventBase {\n  readonly type: 'sanitization';\n  readonly source: string;\n  readonly wasModified: boolean;\n  /** Whether input exceeded the configured limit. Absent on events that predate this field. */\n  readonly truncated?: boolean;\n  readonly strippedCount: number;\n  readonly injectionFlagCount: number;\n  /**\n   * Per-element tag/reason details, truncated to at most\n   * MAX_STRIPPED_ELEMENTS_PER_EVENT entries. Required by CLAUDE.md's\n   * Untrusted Input Policy: \"Log stripped elements for audit trail.\"\n   */\n  readonly strippedElements: readonly StrippedElementSummary[];\n}\n\n/**\n * ClawGuard AUDIT-mode violation (#4097). Recorded a tool call that violated\n * the derived access policy but was allowed under `audit` mode. Its only\n * producer (the access-constraint deriver's MCP guard) was deleted in #5108,\n * so no new events of this type are written; the member stays in the union\n * because `AuditEvent` is published and existing ledgers may carry it.\n * Removal is a breaking change scheduled for the next major (#6319).\n */\nexport interface ClawGuardViolationEvent extends AuditEventBase {\n  readonly type: 'clawguard_violation';\n  /** The tool whose call violated the policy. */\n  readonly toolName: string;\n  /** Human-readable warning from the access decision (may be truncated). */\n  readonly warning: string;\n  /** Source of the derived policy (`llm` / `fallback-keyword` / `bypass`). */\n  readonly policySource: string;\n  /** Policy mode under which the violation was allowed (e.g. `audit`). */\n  readonly mode: string;\n  /** Request ID of the offending tool call, for correlation. */\n  readonly requestId: string;\n  /**\n   * Which rule produced the verdict (#5106) — `unbypassable:tool`,\n   * `unbypassable:path`, `allowedTools`, `allowedTools:confirm_risky`.\n   *\n   * A first-class field rather than prose inside `warning`, because `warning`\n   * is truncated at 500 chars and a long attacker-selectable `path` argument\n   * pushes the rule off the end. A chain reader must be able to tell an\n   * unbypassable denylist hit from an allowlist miss without parsing a string\n   * that may have been cut mid-word.\n   *\n   * Absent for verdicts that carry no rule (an audit-mode allowlist\n   * observation), which is why it is optional rather than defaulted — there is\n   * no rule to name, and inventing one would misreport.\n   */\n  readonly matchedRule?: string;\n}\n\n/** Graph execution lifecycle event (Issue #839). */\nexport interface GraphExecutionAuditEvent extends AuditEventBase {\n  readonly type: 'graph_execution';\n  readonly graphEvent: string;\n  readonly nodeId?: string;\n  readonly stepNumber: number;\n  readonly detail: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Query filter for retrieving audit events.\n *\n * The post-mortem dimensions (#3197) — `actionType`, `actor`, `violationRule`\n * — NARROW to events that actually carry the field (events lacking it are\n * excluded), unlike `trustTier`'s legacy keep-non-applicable behavior. Only\n * dimensions backed by a real event field are offered: `resource` and\n * `policyName` from the original ask were dropped because no AuditEvent\n * records them (a filter with no backing field would be dead config); the\n * policy-rule intent is served by `violationRule` (PolicyGateEvent's\n * `violationRules`).\n */\nexport interface AuditQuery {\n  readonly type?: AuditEvent['type'];\n  readonly since?: string;\n  readonly until?: string;\n  readonly trustTier?: TrustTier;\n  /** Match PolicyGate/Corroboration events by their `actionType`. */\n  readonly actionType?: AgentActionType;\n  /** Match Trust/Reputation events by `username` (the acting/assessed user). */\n  readonly actor?: string;\n  /** Match PolicyGate events whose `violationRules` include this rule name. */\n  readonly violationRule?: string;\n  readonly limit?: number;\n}\n\n// ============================================================================\n// AuditTrail\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Append-only audit trail for security pipeline decisions.\n * Events are bounded by MAX_EVENTS to prevent unbounded growth.\n */\n/**\n * Optional durable sink: receives every fully-formed event appended to the\n * trail, so security decisions can be mirrored to a persistent, hash-chained\n * store (see security/audit-bridge.ts). Default-off — when absent, the trail\n * behaves exactly as before (#3291).\n */\nexport type DurableAuditSink = (event: AuditEvent) => void;\n\nexport class AuditTrail {\n  private events: AuditEvent[] = [];\n  private nextId = 1;\n\n  constructor(private readonly durableSink?: DurableAuditSink) {}\n\n  /** Appends an event to the trail. Returns the assigned event ID. */\n  append(event: Omit<AuditEvent, 'id' | 'timestamp'>): string {\n    const id = `audit-${String(this.nextId++)}`;\n    const fullEvent = {\n      ...event,\n      id,\n      timestamp: getTimeProvider().nowIso(),\n    } as AuditEvent;\n\n    this.events.push(fullEvent);\n    this.enforceLimit();\n\n    // Mirror to the durable store when wired (#3291). Best-effort: a sink\n    // failure must never break the in-memory security pipeline.\n    if (this.durableSink !== undefined) {\n      try {\n        this.durableSink(fullEvent);\n      } catch {\n        // Sink implementations already swallow+log; this is belt-and-suspenders.\n      }\n    }\n\n    return id;\n  }\n\n  /** Queries events matching the given filter. */\n  query(filter: AuditQuery = {}): readonly AuditEvent[] {\n    let results = this.events as readonly AuditEvent[];\n\n    if (filter.type !== undefined) {\n      results = results.filter((e) => e.type === filter.type);\n    }\n\n    if (filter.since !== undefined) {\n      results = filterSince(results, filter.since);\n    }\n\n    if (filter.until !== undefined) {\n      results = filterUntil(results, filter.until);\n    }\n\n    if (filter.trustTier !== undefined) {\n      results = filterByTrustTier(results, filter.trustTier);\n    }\n\n    if (filter.actionType !== undefined) {\n      results = filterByActionType(results, filter.actionType);\n    }\n\n    if (filter.actor !== undefined) {\n      results = filterByActor(results, filter.actor);\n    }\n\n    if (filter.violationRule !== undefined) {\n      results = filterByViolationRule(results, filter.violationRule);\n    }\n\n    const limit = filter.limit ?? results.length;\n    return results.slice(-limit);\n  }\n\n  /** Returns the total number of events. */\n  get size(): number {\n    return this.events.length;\n  }\n\n  /** Clears all events. */\n  clear(): void {\n    this.events = [];\n  }\n\n  /** Enforces MAX_EVENTS bound. */\n  private enforceLimit(): void {\n    if (this.events.length > MAX_EVENTS) {\n      this.events = this.events.slice(-MAX_EVENTS);\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Filter Helpers\n// ============================================================================\n\nfunction filterSince(events: readonly AuditEvent[], since: string): readonly AuditEvent[] {\n  const sinceTime = new Date(since).getTime();\n  return events.filter((e) => new Date(e.timestamp).getTime() >= sinceTime);\n}\n\nfunction filterUntil(events: readonly AuditEvent[], until: string): readonly AuditEvent[] {\n  const untilTime = new Date(until).getTime();\n  return events.filter((e) => new Date(e.timestamp).getTime() <= untilTime);\n}\n\nfunction filterByTrustTier(events: readonly AuditEvent[], tier: TrustTier): readonly AuditEvent[] {\n  return events.filter((e) => {\n    if (e.type === 'trust_classification') return e.assignedTier === tier;\n    if (e.type === 'policy_gate') return e.inputTrustTier === tier;\n    if (e.type === 'reputation') return e.effectiveTier === tier;\n    return true;\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Narrow to events carrying the given `actionType` (#3197). Only PolicyGate and\n * Corroboration events have one; all others are excluded.\n */\nfunction filterByActionType(\n  events: readonly AuditEvent[],\n  actionType: AgentActionType\n): readonly AuditEvent[] {\n  return events.filter(\n    (e) => (e.type === 'policy_gate' || e.type === 'corroboration') && e.actionType === actionType\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * Narrow to events for the given actor (#3197), matched on `username`. Only\n * Trust-classification and Reputation events carry a username; others are\n * excluded so an actor filter never returns unrelated rows.\n */\nfunction filterByActor(events: readonly AuditEvent[], actor: string): readonly AuditEvent[] {\n  return events.filter(\n    (e) => (e.type === 'trust_classification' || e.type === 'reputation') && e.username === actor\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * Narrow to PolicyGate events whose `violationRules` include the given rule\n * name (#3197) — the security post-mortem \"who tripped rule X\" query.\n */\nfunction filterByViolationRule(events: readonly AuditEvent[], rule: string): readonly AuditEvent[] {\n  return events.filter((e) => e.type === 'policy_gate' && e.violationRules.includes(rule));\n}\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Convenience Emitters\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Records a trust classification decision.\n */\nexport function emitTrustEvent(\n  trail: AuditTrail,\n  data: Omit<TrustClassificationEvent, 'id' | 'timestamp' | 'type' | 'component'>\n): string {\n  return trail.append({\n    type: 'trust_classification',\n    component: 'trust-classifier',\n    ...data,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Records a policy gate evaluation.\n */\nexport function emitPolicyEvent(\n  trail: AuditTrail,\n  data: Omit<PolicyGateEvent, 'id' | 'timestamp' | 'type' | 'component'>\n): string {\n  return trail.append({\n    type: 'policy_gate',\n    component: 'policy-gate',\n    ...data,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Records a PIPELINE-policy gate decision (#3710) — the dev-pipeline\n * consensus→execute seam. Distinct from {@link emitPolicyEvent} (the security\n * policy-gate path with an `AgentAction`): this carries `mode`/`ruleIds`/\n * `stageType` so the durable record distinguishes soak(warn) from enforce(block)\n * and is usable by the tune/readiness loop. ONE append per call.\n */\nexport function emitPipelinePolicyEvent(\n  trail: AuditTrail,\n  data: Omit<PolicyGateEvent, 'id' | 'timestamp' | 'type' | 'component' | 'actionType'>\n): string {\n  return trail.append({\n    type: 'policy_gate',\n    component: 'pipeline-policy-evaluator',\n    ...data,\n  });\n}\n\n/** The pipeline-policy would-block rate over a window (#3727). */\nexport interface PolicyWouldBlockRate {\n  /** Total pipeline-policy evaluations (the denominator — summary records). */\n  readonly evaluations: number;\n  /** Evaluations that had ≥1 violation (what enforce mode WOULD block). */\n  readonly wouldBlock: number;\n  /** `wouldBlock / evaluations`; 0 when there are no evaluations. */\n  readonly rate: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Compute the pipeline-policy would-block RATE from durable audit events (#3727)\n * — the read-side of the per-evaluation summary records, and the signal the\n * #3769-enforce soak-readiness gate needs. Denominator = per-evaluation SUMMARY\n * records (`recordKind === 'summary'`); numerator = summaries with\n * `violationCount > 0` (the would-block fraction, independent of warn/block mode).\n * Per-violation records (`recordKind === 'violation'`) are intentionally NOT\n * counted — counting them would double-count and break the denominator.\n */\nexport function computePolicyWouldBlockRate(events: readonly AuditEvent[]): PolicyWouldBlockRate {\n  let evaluations = 0;\n  let wouldBlock = 0;\n  for (const e of events) {\n    if (e.type !== 'policy_gate' || e.recordKind !== 'summary') continue;\n    evaluations += 1;\n    if ((e.violationCount ?? 0) > 0) wouldBlock += 1;\n  }\n  return { evaluations, wouldBlock, rate: evaluations > 0 ? wouldBlock / evaluations : 0 };\n}\n\n/**\n * Records a corroboration validation.\n */\nexport function emitCorroborationEvent(\n  trail: AuditTrail,\n  data: Omit<CorroborationEvent, 'id' | 'timestamp' | 'type' | 'component'>\n): string {\n  return trail.append({\n    type: 'corroboration',\n    component: 'corroboration-validator',\n    ...data,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Records a reputation assessment.\n */\nexport function emitReputationEvent(\n  trail: AuditTrail,\n  data: Omit<ReputationEvent, 'id' | 'timestamp' | 'type' | 'component'>\n): string {\n  return trail.append({\n    type: 'reputation',\n    component: 'reputation-model',\n    ...data,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Records an input sanitization result.\n */\nexport function emitSanitizationEvent(\n  trail: AuditTrail,\n  data: Omit<SanitizationEvent, 'id' | 'timestamp' | 'type' | 'component'>\n): string {\n  return trail.append({\n    type: 'sanitization',\n    component: 'input-sanitizer',\n    ...data,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Records a graph execution lifecycle event.\n */\nexport function emitGraphExecutionEvent(\n  trail: AuditTrail,\n  data: Omit<GraphExecutionAuditEvent, 'id' | 'timestamp' | 'type' | 'component'>\n): string {\n  return trail.append({\n    type: 'graph_execution',\n    component: 'graph-executor',\n    ...data,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates an onEvent callback that bridges graph events to the audit trail.\n * Pass the returned function as `onEvent` in GraphExecuteOptions.\n *\n * @example\n * const trail = createAuditTrail();\n * await executeGraph(graph, inputs, { onEvent: createGraphAuditBridge(trail) });\n */\nexport function createGraphAuditBridge(\n  trail: AuditTrail\n): (event: { readonly type: string; readonly [key: string]: unknown }) => void {\n  return (event) => {\n    const nodeId = typeof event['nodeId'] === 'string' ? event['nodeId'] : undefined;\n    const stepNumber = typeof event['stepNumber'] === 'number' ? event['stepNumber'] : 0;\n    emitGraphExecutionEvent(trail, {\n      graphEvent: event.type,\n      ...(nodeId !== undefined ? { nodeId } : {}),\n      stepNumber,\n      detail: formatGraphEventDetail(event),\n    });\n  };\n}\n\ntype GraphEventLike = { readonly type: string; readonly [key: string]: unknown };\n\n/**\n * A node that produced nothing: paused for human input, or refused by its\n * precondition. The audit trail is hash-chained, so this must not land in it as\n * \"completed in 0ms\".\n */\nfunction formatNotCompleted(event: GraphEventLike): string {\n  const detail = event['detail'];\n  const suffix = typeof detail === 'string' && detail !== '' ? `: ${detail}` : '';\n  return `Node ${String(event['nodeId'])} ${String(event['reason'])} (did not complete)${suffix}`;\n}\n\n/** A completion, qualified when the run actually paused rather than finished. */\nfunction formatCompletion(event: GraphEventLike): string {\n  return event['halted'] === true\n    ? `HALTED awaiting input after ${String(event['totalSteps'])} steps, ${String(event['durationMs'])}ms — NOT complete`\n    : `Complete: ${String(event['totalSteps'])} steps, ${String(event['durationMs'])}ms`;\n}\n\n/** Formats a brief detail string from a graph event. */\nfunction formatGraphEventDetail(event: GraphEventLike): string {\n  if (event.type === 'node_not_completed') return formatNotCompleted(event);\n  switch (event.type) {\n    case 'node_started':\n      return `Node ${String(event['nodeId'])} starting`;\n    case 'node_completed':\n      return `Node ${String(event['nodeId'])} completed in ${String(event['durationMs'])}ms`;\n    case 'node_error':\n      return `Node ${String(event['nodeId'])} failed: ${String(event['error'])}`;\n    case 'state_updated':\n      return `State updated: ${String(event['updatedKeys'])}`;\n    case 'step_completed':\n      return `Step ${String(event['stepNumber'])}: ${String(event['nodesExecuted'])} nodes`;\n    case 'execution_complete':\n      return formatCompletion(event);\n    default:\n      return event.type;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates a new AuditTrail instance. Pass a {@link DurableAuditSink} (e.g. from\n * `createDurableAuditSink(auditLogger)`) to mirror appended security decisions\n * to a durable, hash-chained store (#3291). Default: in-memory only.\n */\nexport function createAuditTrail(durableSink?: DurableAuditSink): AuditTrail {\n  return new AuditTrail(durableSink);\n}\n","/**\n * Security → durable audit bridge (#3291, epic #3288 item 3).\n *\n * The security `AuditTrail` (audit-trail.ts) is in-memory-only, so every\n * trust/policy/reputation/sanitization decision is lost on process exit. The\n * durable `AuditLogger` (audit/) persists with a tamper-evident hash chain but\n * lacks these rich security event types. This bridge maps each security\n * `AuditEvent` (the discriminated union) into a durable `AuditEventInput` and\n * forwards it to an `IAuditLogger`, so security decisions become durable and\n * hash-verifiable — satisfying CLAUDE.md's \"immutable audit\" mandate.\n *\n * Per the #3291 confirmation vote (fold-in design): security events are folded\n * into the durable schema with `category`/`action` distinguishing them\n * (queryable by `action: 'security.*'`), rather than standing up a parallel\n * SecurityAuditLogger.\n *\n * @module security/audit-bridge\n */\n\nimport { createLogger, getErrorMessage } from '../core/index.js';\nimport { createAuditTrail } from './audit-trail.js';\nimport type {\n  AuditEvent as SecurityAuditEvent,\n  AuditTrail,\n  DurableAuditSink,\n} from './audit-trail.js';\nimport type {\n  AuditEventInput,\n  AuditActor,\n  AuditOutcome,\n  AuditSeverity,\n  IAuditLogger,\n} from '../audit/audit-types.js';\n\nconst logger = createLogger({ component: 'SecurityAuditBridge' });\n\nfunction systemActor(id: string, name?: string): AuditActor {\n  return name !== undefined ? { type: 'system', id, name } : { type: 'system', id };\n}\n\nfunction userActor(username: string): AuditActor {\n  return { type: 'user', id: username };\n}\n\ntype TrustEvent = Extract<SecurityAuditEvent, { type: 'trust_classification' }>;\ntype PolicyEvent = Extract<SecurityAuditEvent, { type: 'policy_gate' }>;\ntype CorroborationEvt = Extract<SecurityAuditEvent, { type: 'corroboration' }>;\ntype ReputationEvt = Extract<SecurityAuditEvent, { type: 'reputation' }>;\ntype SanitizationEvt = Extract<SecurityAuditEvent, { type: 'sanitization' }>;\ntype GraphEvt = Extract<SecurityAuditEvent, { type: 'graph_execution' }>;\ntype ClawGuardEvt = Extract<SecurityAuditEvent, { type: 'clawguard_violation' }>;\n\nfunction mapTrust(e: TrustEvent): AuditEventInput {\n  const severity: AuditSeverity = e.wasDowngraded ? 'warning' : 'info';\n  return {\n    category: 'authorization',\n    severity,\n    outcome: 'success',\n    action: 'security.trust_classification',\n    actor: userActor(e.username),\n    description: e.reason,\n    metadata: {\n      assignedTier: e.assignedTier,\n      userRole: e.userRole,\n      // Absent when no allowlist was consulted (#4992) — never a default false.\n      ...(e.isAllowlisted !== undefined ? { isAllowlisted: e.isAllowlisted } : {}),\n      wasDowngraded: e.wasDowngraded,\n      component: e.component,\n    },\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Optional pipeline-policy metadata fields, absent on the security path. Extracted\n * so {@link mapPolicyGate} stays under the complexity cap. `actionType`/`mode`/\n * `ruleIds`/`stageType` are the #3710 round-trip fields; `recordKind`/\n * `violationCount` are #3727 (the summary/violation discriminator + per-evaluation\n * count the durable would-block rate needs).\n */\nfunction pipelinePolicyMetadata(e: PolicyEvent): Record<string, unknown> {\n  return {\n    ...(e.actionType !== undefined ? { actionType: e.actionType } : {}),\n    ...(e.mode !== undefined ? { mode: e.mode } : {}),\n    ...(e.ruleIds !== undefined ? { ruleIds: e.ruleIds } : {}),\n    ...(e.stageType !== undefined ? { stageType: e.stageType } : {}),\n    ...(e.recordKind !== undefined ? { recordKind: e.recordKind } : {}),\n    ...(e.violationCount !== undefined ? { violationCount: e.violationCount } : {}),\n  };\n}\n\nfunction mapPolicyGate(e: PolicyEvent): AuditEventInput {\n  const outcome: AuditOutcome = e.allowed ? 'success' : 'denied';\n  // #3710/#3727: the pipeline-policy path carries mode/ruleIds/stageType +\n  // recordKind/violationCount and no actionType; these MUST round-trip into the\n  // durable metadata (see pipelinePolicyMetadata). The security path leaves them\n  // undefined and keeps its actionType-keyed shape.\n  return {\n    category: 'authorization',\n    severity: e.allowed ? 'info' : 'warning',\n    outcome,\n    action: 'security.policy_gate',\n    actor: systemActor(e.component),\n    policyName: 'security.policy_gate',\n    policyDecision: e.allowed ? 'allow' : 'deny',\n    ...(e.violationRules.length > 0 ? { violationType: e.violationRules.join(',') } : {}),\n    metadata: {\n      requiresApproval: e.requiresApproval,\n      inputTrustTier: e.inputTrustTier,\n      violationRules: e.violationRules,\n      ...pipelinePolicyMetadata(e),\n    },\n  };\n}\n\nfunction mapCorroboration(e: CorroborationEvt): AuditEventInput {\n  return {\n    category: 'security',\n    severity: e.satisfied ? 'info' : 'warning',\n    outcome: e.satisfied ? 'success' : 'denied',\n    action: 'security.corroboration',\n    actor: systemActor(e.component),\n    metadata: {\n      actionType: e.actionType,\n      sourceCount: e.sourceCount,\n      missingRequirements: e.missingRequirements,\n    },\n  };\n}\n\nfunction mapReputation(e: ReputationEvt): AuditEventInput {\n  return {\n    category: 'security',\n    severity: e.isSuspicious ? 'warning' : 'info',\n    outcome: 'success',\n    action: 'security.reputation',\n    actor: userActor(e.username),\n    metadata: {\n      reputationScore: e.reputationScore,\n      isSuspicious: e.isSuspicious,\n      effectiveTier: e.effectiveTier,\n      signalCount: e.signalCount,\n      component: e.component,\n    },\n  };\n}\n\nfunction mapSanitization(e: SanitizationEvt): AuditEventInput {\n  return {\n    category: 'security',\n    severity: e.injectionFlagCount > 0 ? 'warning' : 'info',\n    outcome: 'success',\n    action: 'security.sanitization',\n    actor: systemActor(e.component, e.source),\n    metadata: {\n      source: e.source,\n      wasModified: e.wasModified,\n      ...(e.truncated !== undefined ? { truncated: e.truncated } : {}),\n      strippedCount: e.strippedCount,\n      injectionFlagCount: e.injectionFlagCount,\n      strippedElements: e.strippedElements,\n    },\n  };\n}\n\nfunction mapGraphExecution(e: GraphEvt): AuditEventInput {\n  return {\n    category: 'system',\n    severity: 'info',\n    outcome: 'success',\n    action: 'security.graph_execution',\n    actor: systemActor(e.component),\n    description: e.detail,\n    metadata: {\n      graphEvent: e.graphEvent,\n      ...(e.nodeId !== undefined ? { nodeId: e.nodeId } : {}),\n      stepNumber: e.stepNumber,\n    },\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Map a ClawGuard AUDIT-mode violation (#4097) to a durable event. `outcome` is\n * `success` because audit mode ALLOWED the call (it is log-and-allow, not a\n * denial); `severity` is `warning` to flag the policy violation. Queryable by\n * `action: 'security.clawguard_violation'`.\n */\nfunction mapClawGuard(e: ClawGuardEvt): AuditEventInput {\n  return {\n    category: 'authorization',\n    severity: 'warning',\n    outcome: 'success',\n    action: 'security.clawguard_violation',\n    actor: systemActor(e.component),\n    metadata: {\n      toolName: e.toolName,\n      warning: e.warning,\n      policySource: e.policySource,\n      mode: e.mode,\n      requestId: e.requestId,\n    },\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Map a security `AuditEvent` (discriminated union) to a durable\n * `AuditEventInput`. Pure — no side effects. The durable logger assigns\n * id/timestamp/hash, so those are omitted here.\n */\nexport function securityAuditEventToInput(event: SecurityAuditEvent): AuditEventInput {\n  switch (event.type) {\n    case 'trust_classification':\n      return mapTrust(event);\n    case 'policy_gate':\n      return mapPolicyGate(event);\n    case 'corroboration':\n      return mapCorroboration(event);\n    case 'reputation':\n      return mapReputation(event);\n    case 'sanitization':\n      return mapSanitization(event);\n    case 'graph_execution':\n      return mapGraphExecution(event);\n    case 'clawguard_violation':\n      return mapClawGuard(event);\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Build a {@link SecurityAuditSink} that maps security events into the durable\n * schema and writes them through `auditLogger`. Errors are swallowed and logged\n * — durable mirroring must never break the security pipeline.\n */\nexport function createDurableAuditSink(auditLogger: IAuditLogger): DurableAuditSink {\n  return (event: SecurityAuditEvent) => {\n    try {\n      auditLogger.log(securityAuditEventToInput(event));\n    } catch (error) {\n      logger.warn('Failed to mirror security event to durable audit log', {\n        type: event.type,\n        error: getErrorMessage(error),\n      });\n    }\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Wrap an optional `auditLogger` into a durable {@link AuditTrail} (#4097) — the\n * single representation of \"mirror security events to the shared hash chain when\n * a logger is threaded.\" Returns undefined when none is present, so the no-logger\n * path establishes NO trail and stays byte-identical (mirrors the dev-pipeline\n * `buildPolicyAuditTrail` guard). Consumers establish the trail ONLY when this\n * returns one; `run-graph-workflow.ts` is the remaining caller since #5108.\n */\nexport function createDurableAuditTrail(auditLogger?: IAuditLogger): AuditTrail | undefined {\n  if (auditLogger === undefined) return undefined;\n  return createAuditTrail(createDurableAuditSink(auditLogger));\n}\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/security - Trust Classifier\n *\n * Classifies GitHub users and content into trust tiers based on\n * repository relationship, allowlist membership, and content analysis.\n * Works with the input sanitizer to determine how agent decisions\n * should weight each input source.\n *\n * @module security/trust-classifier\n * (Source: Issue #818, #819 — Phase 1: Input Sanitization)\n */\n\nimport type { TrustTier, GitHubUserRole, SanitizedInput, SanitizerConfig } from './trust-types.js';\nimport { ROLE_DEFAULT_TRUST, TRUST_TIER_NUMERIC } from './trust-types.js';\n\n// ============================================================================\n// GitHub Author Association Mapping\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Maps GitHub API author_association values to our GitHubUserRole enum.\n * See: https://docs.github.com/en/graphql/reference/enums#commentauthorassociation\n */\nexport function mapAuthorAssociation(association: string): GitHubUserRole {\n  switch (association.toUpperCase()) {\n    case 'OWNER':\n      return 'owner';\n    case 'MEMBER':\n      return 'member';\n    case 'COLLABORATOR':\n      return 'collaborator';\n    case 'CONTRIBUTOR':\n      return 'contributor';\n    case 'FIRST_TIMER':\n    case 'FIRST_TIME_CONTRIBUTOR':\n    case 'NONE':\n      return 'unknown';\n    case 'MANNEQUIN':\n      return 'unknown';\n    default:\n      return 'unknown';\n  }\n}\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Trust Classification\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Input for trust classification.\n */\nexport interface ClassifyInput {\n  /** GitHub username. */\n  readonly username: string;\n  /** GitHub API author_association value. */\n  readonly authorAssociation: string;\n  /** Sanitized input (if content has already been through the sanitizer). */\n  readonly sanitizedInput?: SanitizedInput;\n  /** Sanitizer config (for allowlist check). */\n  readonly config?: Partial<SanitizerConfig>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Result of trust classification.\n */\nexport interface ClassifyResult {\n  /** Assigned trust tier. */\n  readonly trustTier: TrustTier;\n  /** GitHub user role. */\n  readonly userRole: GitHubUserRole;\n  /** Whether the user is on the maintainer allowlist. */\n  readonly isAllowlisted: boolean;\n  /** Whether content triggered a trust downgrade. */\n  readonly wasDowngraded: boolean;\n  /** Reason for the assigned tier. */\n  readonly reason: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Classifies a GitHub user and their content into a trust tier.\n *\n * The trust tier is determined by:\n * 1. Allowlist membership (always Tier 1)\n * 2. GitHub author_association → role → default tier\n * 3. Content injection analysis (can only downgrade, never upgrade)\n *\n * ⚠ **Use HostileInputFirewall.process() in agent code paths.** The live\n * paths (`dogfooding/issue-triage`, `dogfooding/pr-reviewer`) route through\n * it as of #4992. Calling classifyTrust() directly emits no audit-trail\n * event, and unless the caller supplies `config.allowlistedMaintainers` no\n * allowlist is consulted — `isAllowlisted: false` is then a default, not a\n * measurement, and must not be recorded as one. Direct use is for unit tests\n * and non-decision analysis only. (The Rule of Two is enforced separately by\n * `evaluatePolicy` in policy-gate; the firewall evaluates it too, as a\n * signal, and refuses on it only under `NEXUS_FIREWALL_POLICY=enforce`.)\n *\n * @see packages/nexus-agents/src/security/firewall/firewall-pipeline.ts\n * @see packages/nexus-agents/src/security/policy-gate.ts\n */\nexport function classifyTrust(input: ClassifyInput): ClassifyResult {\n  const allowlistedMaintainers = input.config?.allowlistedMaintainers ?? [];\n  const isAllowlisted = allowlistedMaintainers.includes(input.username);\n  const userRole = mapAuthorAssociation(input.authorAssociation);\n\n  if (isAllowlisted) {\n    return {\n      trustTier: '1',\n      userRole,\n      isAllowlisted: true,\n      wasDowngraded: false,\n      reason: `User ${input.username} is on the maintainer allowlist`,\n    };\n  }\n\n  const baseTier = ROLE_DEFAULT_TRUST[userRole];\n\n  // Explicit false means the sanitization stage did not measure content.\n  // Absence is legacy sanitizer output and remains measured fail-closed.\n  if (input.sanitizedInput !== undefined && input.sanitizedInput.contentTierMeasured !== false) {\n    const contentTier = input.sanitizedInput.trustTier;\n    const downgraded = TRUST_TIER_NUMERIC[contentTier] > TRUST_TIER_NUMERIC[baseTier];\n\n    return {\n      trustTier: downgraded ? contentTier : baseTier,\n      userRole,\n      isAllowlisted: false,\n      wasDowngraded: downgraded,\n      reason: downgraded\n        ? `Downgraded from Tier ${baseTier} to ${contentTier}: injection patterns detected`\n        : `Role ${userRole} → Tier ${baseTier}`,\n    };\n  }\n\n  return {\n    trustTier: baseTier,\n    userRole,\n    isAllowlisted: false,\n    wasDowngraded: false,\n    reason: `Role ${userRole} → Tier ${baseTier}`,\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Checks whether a trust tier can influence agent decisions.\n * Tiers 3-4 are informational only — they cannot drive actions.\n */\nexport function canInfluenceDecisions(tier: TrustTier): boolean {\n  return TRUST_TIER_NUMERIC[tier] <= 2;\n}\n\n/**\n * Checks whether a trust tier requires corroboration with Tier 1 sources.\n * Tier 2 requires corroboration; Tier 1 is self-sufficient.\n */\nexport function requiresCorroboration(tier: TrustTier): boolean {\n  return tier === '2';\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns the minimum trust tier required for a given action type.\n * Actions that modify state require higher trust.\n */\nexport function getRequiredTrustTier(actionType: string): TrustTier {\n  switch (actionType) {\n    case 'GeneratePatchPlan':\n      return '1'; // Requires maintainer-level trust\n    case 'DraftReply':\n    case 'ProposeLabels':\n      return '2'; // Requires at least collaborator-level trust\n    case 'SummarizeIssue':\n    case 'ClassifyIssue':\n    case 'IdentifyDuplicates':\n      return '3'; // Read-only, can use any input\n    case 'RequestHumanApproval':\n    case 'RefuseAction':\n      return '4'; // Always allowed (safety actions)\n    default:\n      return '1'; // Unknown actions require highest trust\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/security/firewall - Types\n *\n * Configuration, result, and adapter interface types for the\n * HostileInputFirewall pipeline. Uses Zod schemas for runtime\n * validation at construction boundaries.\n *\n * @module security/firewall/firewall-types\n * (Source: Issue #826 — Reusable Hostile Input Firewall)\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport type { IAuditLogger } from '../../audit/audit-types.js';\nimport type { AgentAction } from '../action-schema.js';\nimport type { Violation } from '../policy-gate.js';\nimport type { FirewallPolicyMode } from './firewall-policy-mode.js';\nimport type {\n  ReputationAssessment,\n  ReputationGatingMode,\n  GitHubUserMetadata,\n} from '../reputation-model.js';\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Source Adapter Interface\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Metadata extracted from a platform-specific input source.\n */\nexport interface SourceMetadata {\n  readonly username: string;\n  readonly authorAssociation: string;\n  readonly content: string;\n  readonly sourceType: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Adapter that extracts normalized metadata from platform-specific input.\n * Each platform (GitHub, GitLab, etc.) implements this interface.\n */\nexport interface ISourceAdapter {\n  readonly platform: string;\n  extractMetadata(input: unknown): SourceMetadata;\n}\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Stage Configuration\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Controls which pipeline stages run. Disabled stages use safe defaults.\n */\nexport const FirewallStagesSchema = z.object({\n  sanitization: z.boolean().default(true),\n  trustClassification: z.boolean().default(true),\n  reputationAssessment: z.boolean().default(false),\n  policyEnforcement: z.boolean().default(true),\n  corroboration: z.boolean().default(false),\n  audit: z.boolean().default(true),\n});\nexport type FirewallStages = z.infer<typeof FirewallStagesSchema>;\n\n/** Creates default stage configuration. */\nexport function createDefaultStages(): FirewallStages {\n  return FirewallStagesSchema.parse({});\n}\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Firewall Configuration\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Configuration for the HostileInputFirewall.\n * The adapter is required; all other fields have sensible defaults.\n */\nexport const FirewallConfigSchema = z.object({\n  stages: FirewallStagesSchema.default(() => ({\n    sanitization: true,\n    trustClassification: true,\n    reputationAssessment: false,\n    policyEnforcement: true,\n    corroboration: false,\n    audit: true,\n  })),\n  allowlistedMaintainers: z.array(z.string().min(1)).default([]),\n  maxInputLength: z.number().int().positive().default(50_000),\n  context: z\n    .object({\n      hasWriteAccess: z.boolean().default(false),\n      hasSecretAccess: z.boolean().default(false),\n    })\n    .default(() => ({\n      hasWriteAccess: false,\n      hasSecretAccess: false,\n    })),\n});\n\n/**\n * Full config including the adapter (not Zod-validated since it's an interface).\n */\nexport interface FirewallConfig {\n  readonly adapter: ISourceAdapter;\n  readonly stages?: Partial<FirewallStages>;\n  readonly allowlistedMaintainers?: readonly string[];\n  readonly maxInputLength?: number;\n  readonly context?: {\n    readonly hasWriteAccess?: boolean;\n    readonly hasSecretAccess?: boolean;\n  };\n  /**\n   * Rollout gate for behaviour changes to this published API (#5382).\n   * Defaults to `NEXUS_FIREWALL_POLICY`, and to `off` when that is unset —\n   * under `off` the firewall behaves exactly as it did before #5382.\n   *\n   * Explicit here as well as in the environment because the firewall is a\n   * library: an embedding consumer must be able to opt in per instance without\n   * setting a process-wide variable.\n   */\n  readonly policyMode?: FirewallPolicyMode;\n  /**\n   * Environment to resolve `policyMode` from when it is not given explicitly.\n   * Injectable so the resolution path itself is testable — without this the\n   * flag could be unreachable in production with every unit test still passing.\n   */\n  readonly env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;\n  /**\n   * Optional durable audit logger. When provided, every security decision the\n   * firewall records is mirrored to this persistent, hash-chained store via\n   * the audit bridge (#3291). When absent, decisions are in-memory only.\n   */\n  readonly auditLogger?: IAuditLogger;\n  /**\n   * Rollout gate for REPUTATION demotion (#5381). Distinct from `policyMode`:\n   * different env var (`NEXUS_REPUTATION_GATING`) and — load-bearing — a\n   * different default, `enforce` rather than `off`. Production reads this same\n   * knob (`issue-triage.ts`, `pr-reviewer-helpers.ts`), and the firewall reading\n   * a different one is what let the two compositions disagree under identical\n   * configuration.\n   */\n  readonly reputationGatingMode?: ReputationGatingMode;\n  /**\n   * Supplies the reputation assessment. Defaults to `assessReputation` over the\n   * instance's cache.\n   *\n   * Injectable for the same reason as `env` above: without it the reconciliation\n   * is unobservable. The firewall hands the reputation engine only\n   * `authorAssociation` + `injectionFlags` — the two inputs the trust classifier\n   * already consumed — so reputation is never stricter than the classifier and\n   * `reconcileTrustTier` returns the classifier tier every time. Deleting the\n   * reconciliation passed 1588 tests (#5405). This seam is what lets a test\n   * present a stricter tier and prove the check can fire.\n   */\n  readonly reputationAssessor?: (metadata: GitHubUserMetadata) => ReputationAssessment;\n  /**\n   * Whether the sanitizer's content tier is applied as a classification\n   * downgrade (#4992). Default `true` — the firewall's behaviour since #826:\n   * injection-bearing content from a Tier-2 author classifies as Tier 4.\n   *\n   * `false` keeps the classifier role-only. The sanitization stage still runs\n   * and still records its injection flags — only the tier downgrade is\n   * withheld. The dogfooding paths (`issue-triage`, `pr-reviewer`) set this\n   * because they route content signals through reputation gating, which has\n   * its own rollout knob (`NEXUS_REPUTATION_GATING`); applying the same signal\n   * at classification too would bypass that knob and change the recorded\n   * `trustTier` under the default `NEXUS_FIREWALL_POLICY=off`, which #5382\n   * promises is pass-through.\n   */\n  readonly contentDowngrade?: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Per-call inputs to {@link HostileInputFirewall.process} (#4992).\n *\n * These are the facts that vary by CALL rather than by instance, so a\n * process-wide firewall (the dogfooding singleton) can serve many repositories\n * and many access postures without holding any of them globally.\n */\nexport interface FirewallProcessOptions {\n  /**\n   * Maintainer allowlist for THIS call, from the repository context. Replaces —\n   * does not merge with — the construction-time list, and is forgotten after\n   * the call. When neither this nor the construction-time list was supplied,\n   * no allowlist is consulted and `FirewallResult.isAllowlisted` is absent.\n   */\n  readonly allowlistedMaintainers?: readonly string[];\n  /**\n   * Access posture of the caller for THIS call, feeding the Rule-of-Two check.\n   * Replaces the construction-time `context` for the call. Without it a shared\n   * instance would evaluate every caller against one posture, and\n   * `wouldRefuse` could never fire for a caller whose posture differs.\n   */\n  readonly context?: {\n    readonly hasWriteAccess: boolean;\n    readonly hasSecretAccess: boolean;\n  };\n  /**\n   * The caller's own reputation measurement for THIS call. When present, the\n   * reputation gate runs on it under `NEXUS_REPUTATION_GATING`, whether or not\n   * the instance's `reputationAssessment` stage is on: `effectiveTrustTier` is\n   * the enforced tier, `reputationGate` is returned, and the Rule-of-Two check,\n   * `wouldRefuse` and the trust audit event all use that tier. This is what\n   * lets a caller with richer signals than the firewall can see (account age,\n   * comment history) act on ONE gate rather than two that can disagree.\n   *\n   * `assessment: undefined` means the caller measured nothing (reputation\n   * disabled) but still wants the gate decision recorded on the classifier\n   * tier; omitting the option entirely leaves the stage to the instance config.\n   */\n  readonly reputation?: {\n    readonly assessment: ReputationAssessment | undefined;\n  };\n  /**\n   * The action the caller intends to take on this input, for THIS call (#5380).\n   *\n   * With it, the `policyEnforcement` stage runs the full `evaluatePolicy` set —\n   * the same seven checks production runs — against the enforced tier and the\n   * call's access posture, and `FirewallResult.policy` carries every violation\n   * plus the decision's own `requiresApproval`. Without it only the Rule of\n   * Two, the one context-only check, can run; the six action-scoped checks are\n   * then listed under `policy.unmeasured` rather than silently counted as\n   * passed. `process()` is input-shaped and constructs no action itself, so\n   * this is the only way those checks reach it.\n   */\n  readonly action?: AgentAction;\n  /**\n   * The repository's label set, consulted by the label-validity check when\n   * `action` is a `ProposeLabels` (#5380). When absent, `evaluatePolicy`\n   * reports `LABEL_SET_UNAVAILABLE` as a blocking violation — unevaluable\n   * label validity fails closed, exactly as it does on the production path.\n   */\n  readonly existingLabels?: ReadonlySet<string>;\n}\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Agent Trust Label (ATL) Data\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Structured data for an Agent Trust Label.\n */\nexport const ATLDataSchema = z.object({\n  tier: z.enum(['1', '2', '3', '4']),\n  source: z.string().min(1),\n  user: z.string().min(1),\n  sanitized: z.boolean(),\n  rep: z.number().min(0).max(1).optional(),\n});\nexport type ATLData = z.infer<typeof ATLDataSchema>;\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Firewall Error\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Error codes for firewall pipeline failures.\n */\nexport type FirewallErrorCode =\n  | 'EXTRACTION_FAILED'\n  | 'SANITIZATION_FAILED'\n  | 'CLASSIFICATION_FAILED'\n  | 'REPUTATION_FAILED'\n  | 'INVALID_CONFIG'\n  /**\n   * #5382: a blocking policy violation refused the input outright, rather than\n   * being surfaced as a signal on a successful result. Only reachable when the\n   * firewall policy mode is `enforce` — under the default `off` a violation is\n   * still returned via `ruleOfTwoViolation` on an `ok()` result.\n   */\n  | 'POLICY_REFUSED';\n\n/**\n * Structured error from the firewall pipeline.\n */\nexport interface FirewallError {\n  readonly code: FirewallErrorCode;\n  readonly message: string;\n  readonly stage: string;\n  /**\n   * The blocking policy violations behind a `POLICY_REFUSED` from the policy\n   * stage (#5383) — the structured form of the rules `message` names, so a\n   * consumer that maps a refusal onto its own action record can list the rule\n   * ids without parsing the message. Absent for every other code, and for the\n   * corroboration stage's refusal, which carries `missing` instead.\n   */\n  readonly violations?: readonly Violation[];\n  /**\n   * The unmet corroboration requirements behind a `POLICY_REFUSED` from the\n   * corroboration stage (#6309) — the structured form of what `message`\n   * names, so a consumer recording the refusal can list them without parsing\n   * prose. Absent for every other code and stage.\n   */\n  readonly missing?: readonly string[];\n}\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/security/firewall - Agent Trust Labels (ATL)\n *\n * Generates and parses structured trust labels that travel with\n * processed inputs through the agent pipeline. Format:\n *   [ATL:tier=3,source=github-comment,user=octocat,sanitized=true,rep=0.45]\n *\n * @module security/firewall/agent-trust-labels\n * (Source: Issue #826 — Reusable Hostile Input Firewall)\n */\n\nimport type { ATLData } from './firewall-types.js';\nimport { ATLDataSchema } from './firewall-types.js';\n\n/** ATL prefix and suffix markers. */\nconst ATL_PREFIX = '[ATL:';\nconst ATL_SUFFIX = ']';\n\n/** Pattern to match and extract ATL strings. */\nconst ATL_PATTERN = /^\\[ATL:(.+)\\]$/;\n\n/**\n * Generates an Agent Trust Label string from structured data.\n *\n * @example\n * generateATL({ tier: '3', source: 'github-comment', user: 'octocat', sanitized: true })\n * // => \"[ATL:tier=3,source=github-comment,user=octocat,sanitized=true]\"\n */\nexport function generateATL(data: ATLData): string {\n  const validated = ATLDataSchema.parse(data);\n  const parts: string[] = [\n    `tier=${validated.tier}`,\n    `source=${encodeATLValue(validated.source)}`,\n    `user=${encodeATLValue(validated.user)}`,\n    `sanitized=${String(validated.sanitized)}`,\n  ];\n\n  if (validated.rep !== undefined) {\n    parts.push(`rep=${validated.rep.toFixed(2)}`);\n  }\n\n  return `${ATL_PREFIX}${parts.join(',')}${ATL_SUFFIX}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Parses an ATL string back into structured data.\n * Returns undefined if the string is not a valid ATL.\n */\nexport function parseATL(atl: string): ATLData | undefined {\n  const match = ATL_PATTERN.exec(atl.trim());\n  if (match === null) return undefined;\n\n  const body = match[1];\n  if (body === undefined) return undefined;\n\n  const raw = parseKeyValuePairs(body);\n  if (raw === undefined) return undefined;\n\n  return validateParsedATL(raw);\n}\n\n/** Parses comma-separated key=value pairs into a record. */\nfunction parseKeyValuePairs(body: string): Record<string, string> | undefined {\n  const pairs = body.split(',');\n  const raw: Record<string, string> = {};\n  for (const pair of pairs) {\n    const eqIndex = pair.indexOf('=');\n    if (eqIndex < 1) return undefined;\n    raw[pair.slice(0, eqIndex)] = pair.slice(eqIndex + 1);\n  }\n  return raw;\n}\n\n/** Validates and converts raw key-value pairs to ATLData. */\nfunction validateParsedATL(raw: Record<string, string>): ATLData | undefined {\n  const tier = raw['tier'];\n  const source = raw['source'];\n  const user = raw['user'];\n  const sanitized = raw['sanitized'];\n  if (tier === undefined || source === undefined || user === undefined || sanitized === undefined) {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n\n  const parsed: ATLData = {\n    tier: tier as ATLData['tier'],\n    source: decodeATLValue(source),\n    user: decodeATLValue(user),\n    sanitized: sanitized === 'true',\n    ...(raw['rep'] !== undefined ? { rep: parseFloat(raw['rep']) } : {}),\n  };\n\n  const result = ATLDataSchema.safeParse(parsed);\n  return result.success ? result.data : undefined;\n}\n\n/** Encodes special characters in ATL values. */\nfunction encodeATLValue(value: string): string {\n  return value.replace(/,/g, '%2C').replace(/=/g, '%3D').replace(/\\]/g, '%5D');\n}\n\n/** Decodes special characters in ATL values. */\nfunction decodeATLValue(value: string): string {\n  return value.replace(/%2C/g, ',').replace(/%3D/g, '=').replace(/%5D/g, ']');\n}\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/security/firewall - Passthrough defaults for disabled stages\n *\n * Split out of the pipeline so it stays under the file-size lint (#4992).\n *\n * @module security/firewall/firewall-passthrough\n */\n\nimport { mapAuthorAssociation } from '../trust-classifier.js';\nimport type { ClassifyResult } from '../trust-classifier.js';\nimport { ROLE_DEFAULT_TRUST } from '../trust-types.js';\nimport type { SanitizedInput } from '../trust-types.js';\nimport type { SourceMetadata } from './firewall-types.js';\n\nexport function createPassthroughSanitized(meta: SourceMetadata): SanitizedInput {\n  const userRole = mapAuthorAssociation(meta.authorAssociation);\n  return {\n    content: meta.content,\n    originalLength: meta.content.length,\n    trustTier: ROLE_DEFAULT_TRUST[userRole],\n    contentTierMeasured: false,\n    userRole,\n    injectionFlags: [],\n    strippedElements: [],\n    truncated: false,\n    wasModified: false,\n    sanitizedAt: new Date().toISOString(),\n  };\n}\n\nexport function createPassthroughClassification(meta: SourceMetadata): ClassifyResult {\n  return {\n    trustTier: '3',\n    userRole: mapAuthorAssociation(meta.authorAssociation),\n    isAllowlisted: false,\n    wasDowngraded: false,\n    reason: 'Trust classification disabled — default Tier 3',\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/security/firewall - Trust audit reason\n *\n * The trust audit event's `reason` must state what the reputation gate did —\n * or, under `audit`, what it would have done (#4992 review). A suppressed\n * demotion that leaves no trace reads as a clean classification.\n *\n * @module security/firewall/firewall-trust-reason\n */\n\nimport type { ReputationGateDecision } from '../reputation-model.js';\n\n/**\n * Appends the gate's effect to the classifier's reason.\n *\n * @param reason  The classifier's own reason.\n * @param demoted Whether the enforced tier differs from the classifier tier.\n * @param gate    The gate decision, or `undefined` when no gate ran.\n */\nexport function describeGate(\n  reason: string,\n  demoted: boolean,\n  gate: ReputationGateDecision | undefined\n): string {\n  if (gate === undefined) return reason;\n  if (demoted) {\n    return `${reason}; demoted to Tier ${gate.enforcedTier} by reputation gating (${gate.mode})`;\n  }\n  if (gate.demotionSuppressed) {\n    return `${reason}; would demote to Tier ${gate.reconciledTier} (reputation gating: ${gate.mode})`;\n  }\n  return reason;\n}\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/security - Policy Gate\n *\n * Deterministic rule engine that validates all agent actions before\n * GitHub state mutations can occur. No LLM in the validation path.\n *\n * Defense layer 2 of the three-layer hardening architecture.\n * See: docs/architecture/UNTRUSTED_INPUT_HARDENING.md\n *\n * @module security/policy-gate\n * (Source: Issue #818, #822 — Phase 2: Policy Gate)\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\n\nimport type { AgentAction, AgentActionType, SourceCitation } from './action-schema.js';\nimport {\n  isMutatingAction,\n  isReadOnlyAction,\n  requiresCitation,\n  requiresHumanApproval,\n} from './action-schema.js';\nimport type { TrustTier } from './trust-types.js';\nimport { TRUST_TIER_NUMERIC } from './trust-types.js';\nimport { getRequiredTrustTier, canInfluenceDecisions } from './trust-classifier.js';\nimport type { AuditTrail } from './audit-trail.js';\nimport { emitPolicyEvent } from './audit-trail.js';\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Types\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Violation detected by the policy gate.\n */\nexport const ViolationSchema = z.object({\n  /** Machine-readable rule identifier. */\n  rule: z.string().min(1),\n  /** Human-readable description of the violation. */\n  message: z.string().min(1),\n  /** Severity: 'block' prevents execution, 'warn' logs only. */\n  severity: z.enum(['block', 'warn']),\n});\nexport type Violation = z.infer<typeof ViolationSchema>;\n\n/**\n * Decision returned by the policy gate.\n */\nexport interface PolicyDecision {\n  /** Whether the action is allowed to proceed. */\n  readonly allowed: boolean;\n  /** Whether human approval is required before execution. */\n  readonly requiresApproval: boolean;\n  /** All detected violations (blocking and warnings). */\n  readonly violations: readonly Violation[];\n  /** Timestamp of the evaluation (ISO 8601). */\n  readonly evaluatedAt: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Context for evaluating a policy decision.\n */\nexport interface ActionContext {\n  /** Trust tier of the primary input source. */\n  readonly inputTrustTier: TrustTier;\n  /** Whether the agent currently has write access to the repository. */\n  readonly hasWriteAccess: boolean;\n  /** Whether the agent currently has access to secrets/tokens. */\n  readonly hasSecretAccess: boolean;\n  /** Set of labels that exist on the repository (for ProposeLabels validation). */\n  readonly existingLabels?: ReadonlySet<string>;\n}\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Policy Rules\n// ============================================================================\n\n/** Extract sources from an action, handling actions that lack a sources field. */\nfunction getActionSources(action: AgentAction): readonly SourceCitation[] {\n  if ('sources' in action) {\n    return action.sources;\n  }\n  return [];\n}\n\n/** Check that citations exist for actions that require them. */\nfunction checkCitationRequirement(action: AgentAction): Violation | undefined {\n  if (!requiresCitation(action.type)) return undefined;\n  const sources = getActionSources(action);\n  if (sources.length === 0) {\n    return {\n      rule: 'REQUIRE_CITATION',\n      message: `Action '${action.type}' requires at least one source citation`,\n      severity: 'block',\n    };\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n\n/** Check that the input trust tier meets action requirements. */\nfunction checkTrustRequirement(action: AgentAction, context: ActionContext): Violation | undefined {\n  const requiredTier = getRequiredTrustTier(action.type);\n  const requiredNumeric = TRUST_TIER_NUMERIC[requiredTier];\n  const inputNumeric = TRUST_TIER_NUMERIC[context.inputTrustTier];\n\n  if (inputNumeric > requiredNumeric) {\n    return {\n      rule: 'INSUFFICIENT_TRUST',\n      message: `Action '${action.type}' requires Tier ${requiredTier} but input is Tier ${context.inputTrustTier}`,\n      severity: 'block',\n    };\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n\n/** Check that Tier 3-4 input cannot drive decisions. */\nfunction checkInfluenceBlock(action: AgentAction, context: ActionContext): Violation | undefined {\n  if (!canInfluenceDecisions(context.inputTrustTier) && isMutatingAction(action.type)) {\n    return {\n      rule: 'UNTRUSTED_INFLUENCE',\n      message: `Tier ${context.inputTrustTier} input cannot drive mutating action '${action.type}'`,\n      severity: 'block',\n    };\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Enforce the Rule of Two: no agent may simultaneously\n * (a) process untrusted input, (b) have write access, AND (c) access secrets.\n *\n * A violation is REFUSED, never routed to human approval (#4735, panel\n * option A, 7-0). The rule measures the capability posture of the process —\n * callers derive `hasWriteAccess` from `!dryRun` and `hasSecretAccess` from\n * token presence for the whole run — not the blast radius of one action, so a\n * human approving one action would not remove the agent's simultaneous\n * possession of all three legs. The only remedy is to drop a leg, and the\n * violation message names all three so the caller's existing logging carries\n * the diagnosis (this module has no logger of its own).\n *\n * Exported (#3198) so the firewall's `policyEnforcement` stage can surface the\n * same assessment during input composition without duplicating the predicate.\n */\nexport function checkRuleOfTwo(context: ActionContext): Violation | undefined {\n  const isUntrusted = TRUST_TIER_NUMERIC[context.inputTrustTier] >= 3;\n  if (isUntrusted && context.hasWriteAccess && context.hasSecretAccess) {\n    return {\n      rule: 'RULE_OF_TWO',\n      message:\n        `RULE_OF_TWO: agent simultaneously (a) processes untrusted input ` +\n        `(Tier ${context.inputTrustTier}), (b) has write access, and ` +\n        `(c) has secret/token access. Refused; there is no approval path — ` +\n        `drop a leg: dry-run, run without the token, or split the agent (#4735).`,\n      severity: 'block',\n    };\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Labels that GRANT PRIVILEGE or REDUCE SCRUTINY, and so may never be proposed\n * by an agent acting on external input (#4688).\n *\n * These are not ordinary taxonomy labels. In this repository they are control\n * inputs to CI:\n *\n * - `owner-ratified` — the label `check-governor-ratification.ts` accepts as\n *   proof of owner ratification. Applying it BYPASSES the governance-of-the-\n *   governor gate on `src/audit/`, `.rules/`, `CODEOWNERS` and friends.\n * - `skip-pr-review` — suppresses the PR review workflow.\n * - `pr-review-ci` — triggers the review workflow; less dangerous than the\n *   two above, but still a workflow control rather than a description.\n *\n * Why this exists BEFORE it is needed: no production code applies a proposed\n * label today (`addLabels` has no non-test caller), so the path is latent. But\n * the consensus panel's dissenting seat was right that labels are not\n * zero-blast-radius, and the day someone wires triage output to `addLabels` is\n * the day an issue body can propose its own ratification. A guard added after\n * that wiring is a guard added after the incident.\n *\n * This is deliberately checked on the ACTION's effect rather than the author's\n * trust: an OWNER-authored body proposing `owner-ratified` is precisely the\n * self-modification the governor exists to prevent, so author trust must not\n * soften it.\n */\nconst PRIVILEGE_GRANTING_LABELS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([\n  'owner-ratified',\n  'skip-pr-review',\n  'pr-review-ci',\n]);\n\n/**\n * Refuse any proposal naming a privilege-granting label.\n *\n * Independent of {@link checkLabelValidity} on purpose: this check needs no\n * repository world state and reports privileged labels even when label\n * validity is unevaluated.\n */\nfunction checkPrivilegedLabels(action: AgentAction): Violation | undefined {\n  if (action.type !== 'ProposeLabels') return undefined;\n\n  // Case-insensitive, because the gate this protects is (#4689 follow-up):\n  // `check-governor-ratification.ts` compares `l.toLowerCase()`, so\n  // `Owner-Ratified` would satisfy ratification while slipping an exact-match\n  // denylist. A guard must be at least as permissive in what it REJECTS as its\n  // consumer is in what it ACCEPTS.\n  const privileged = action.labels.filter((l) => PRIVILEGE_GRANTING_LABELS.has(l.toLowerCase()));\n  if (privileged.length === 0) return undefined;\n\n  return {\n    rule: 'PRIVILEGED_LABEL',\n    message:\n      `Proposed labels grant privilege or reduce review scrutiny: ` +\n      `${privileged.join(', ')}. These are CI control inputs, not descriptions, ` +\n      `and are never proposable from agent-processed input (#4688).`,\n    severity: 'block',\n  };\n}\n\n/** Check that proposed labels exist in the repository's label set. */\nfunction checkLabelValidity(action: AgentAction, context: ActionContext): Violation | undefined {\n  if (action.type !== 'ProposeLabels') return undefined;\n  const labels = context.existingLabels;\n  if (labels === undefined) {\n    return {\n      rule: 'LABEL_SET_UNAVAILABLE',\n      message: 'repository label set not supplied; label validity unevaluated',\n      severity: 'block',\n    };\n  }\n\n  const invalid = action.labels.filter((l) => !labels.has(l));\n  if (invalid.length > 0) {\n    return {\n      rule: 'INVALID_LABELS',\n      message: `Proposed labels not in repository: ${invalid.join(', ')}`,\n      severity: 'block',\n    };\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n\n/** Check that source citations meet trust requirements for the action. */\nfunction checkSourceTrustTiers(action: AgentAction): Violation | undefined {\n  const sources = getActionSources(action);\n  if (sources.length === 0) return undefined;\n\n  const requiredTier = getRequiredTrustTier(action.type);\n  const requiredNumeric = TRUST_TIER_NUMERIC[requiredTier];\n\n  for (const source of sources) {\n    if (source.type === 'issueComment') {\n      const sourceTierNumeric = TRUST_TIER_NUMERIC[source.authorTrustTier];\n      if (sourceTierNumeric > requiredNumeric) {\n        return {\n          rule: 'SOURCE_TRUST_MISMATCH',\n          message: `Source from '${source.author}' (Tier ${source.authorTrustTier}) insufficient for action requiring Tier ${requiredTier}`,\n          severity: 'warn',\n        };\n      }\n    }\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Public API\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Rule ids that only an ACTION-shaped evaluation can produce (#5380).\n *\n * Of the seven checks {@link evaluatePolicy} runs, one — {@link checkRuleOfTwo}\n * — reads the `ActionContext` alone; the other six read the `AgentAction` and\n * emit these ids. A caller that has a context but no action (the firewall's\n * input-shaped `process()` without a supplied action) can run only the Rule of\n * Two, and must report THESE as unmeasured rather than let their absence from\n * a violation list read as a pass. Kept beside the check list below so a new\n * action-scoped check is added to both or to neither.\n */\nexport const ACTION_SCOPED_POLICY_RULES: readonly string[] = [\n  'REQUIRE_CITATION',\n  'INSUFFICIENT_TRUST',\n  'UNTRUSTED_INFLUENCE',\n  'LABEL_SET_UNAVAILABLE',\n  'INVALID_LABELS',\n  'PRIVILEGED_LABEL',\n  'SOURCE_TRUST_MISMATCH',\n];\n\n/**\n * Evaluate an agent action against the policy gate.\n *\n * This is a deterministic check — no LLM in the loop. Returns a\n * PolicyDecision indicating whether the action is allowed, requires\n * human approval, or is blocked.\n *\n * @param action - The validated AgentAction to evaluate.\n * @param context - The current execution context.\n * @returns PolicyDecision with violations and approval requirements.\n */\nexport function evaluatePolicy(\n  action: AgentAction,\n  context: ActionContext,\n  auditTrail?: AuditTrail\n): PolicyDecision {\n  const violations: Violation[] = [];\n\n  const checks = [\n    checkCitationRequirement(action),\n    checkTrustRequirement(action, context),\n    checkInfluenceBlock(action, context),\n    checkRuleOfTwo(context),\n    checkLabelValidity(action, context),\n    checkPrivilegedLabels(action),\n    checkSourceTrustTiers(action),\n  ];\n\n  for (const violation of checks) {\n    if (violation !== undefined) {\n      violations.push(violation);\n    }\n  }\n\n  const hasBlockingViolation = violations.some((v) => v.severity === 'block');\n  // #4463: gate on irreversibility + external visibility, not on mutation as\n  // such. ProposeLabels and GeneratePatchPlan are reversible and internal, and\n  // reach here having already cleared citation, trust-tier, influence-block,\n  // Rule-of-Two and label-validity checks. DraftReply still gates because it\n  // publishes text under the project's identity on a surface others read.\n  // `isMutatingAction` stays broad above (line ~113) for the influence block:\n  // low-trust input must not drive ANY mutating action, approved or not.\n  const needsApproval = !hasBlockingViolation && requiresHumanApproval(action.type);\n\n  const decision: PolicyDecision = {\n    allowed: !hasBlockingViolation,\n    requiresApproval: needsApproval,\n    violations,\n    evaluatedAt: new Date().toISOString(),\n  };\n\n  // #3191: when an audit trail is supplied, record the decision so policy\n  // outcomes are part of the durable audit record (the gate previously emitted\n  // nothing). Optional — pure callers pass no trail and incur no side effect.\n  if (auditTrail !== undefined) {\n    emitPolicyEvent(auditTrail, {\n      actionType: action.type,\n      allowed: decision.allowed,\n      requiresApproval: decision.requiresApproval,\n      inputTrustTier: context.inputTrustTier,\n      violationRules: violations.map((v) => v.rule),\n    });\n  }\n\n  return decision;\n}\n\n/**\n * Quick check: can this action type proceed at all given the input trust tier?\n * Useful for early rejection before full policy evaluation.\n */\nexport function canProceed(actionType: AgentActionType, inputTrustTier: TrustTier): boolean {\n  if (isReadOnlyAction(actionType)) {\n    const requiredTier = getRequiredTrustTier(actionType);\n    return TRUST_TIER_NUMERIC[inputTrustTier] <= TRUST_TIER_NUMERIC[requiredTier];\n  }\n  return canInfluenceDecisions(inputTrustTier);\n}\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/security - Typed Action Schema\n *\n * Zod schemas and TypeScript types for the typed action constraint system.\n * Agents processing untrusted GitHub input MUST emit only predefined typed\n * actions (never free-form tool calls). This module defines those action\n * schemas, validates them at runtime, and classifies them as read-only or\n * mutating for the policy gate.\n *\n * @module security/action-schema\n * (Source: Issue #818, #820)\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\n\nimport { TrustTierSchema } from './trust-types.js';\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Result Type (local — avoids circular dependency with core/types)\n// ============================================================================\n\n/** Validation result using the project Result pattern. */\nexport type ActionValidationResult =\n  { ok: true; value: AgentAction } | { ok: false; error: string };\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Source Citations\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Source citation from a file tracked in the repository.\n *\n * `existsOnBaseRef` records whether the cited path was present on the base ref\n * *before* the untrusted change under review. A citation built from a PR's own\n * changed-file list can name a path the author invented in that same PR, which\n * is repo evidence in name only — the same mislabel #4667 fixed for issue\n * bodies. Absent means the producer did not check; `false` means it checked and\n * the path is author-supplied.\n */\nconst RepoFileSource = z.object({\n  type: z.literal('repoFile'),\n  path: z.string().min(1),\n  line: z.number().int().positive().optional(),\n  existsOnBaseRef: z.boolean().optional(),\n  commit: z\n    .string()\n    .regex(/^[a-f0-9]{7,40}$/)\n    .optional(),\n});\n\n/** Source citation from a GitHub issue comment. */\nconst IssueCommentSource = z.object({\n  type: z.literal('issueComment'),\n  issueNumber: z.number().int().positive(),\n  commentId: z.number().int().positive(),\n  author: z.string().min(1),\n  authorTrustTier: TrustTierSchema,\n});\n\n/**\n * Source citation from the body of a GitHub issue (#4667).\n *\n * Triage previously cited the issue as a `repoFile` with a synthesised path\n * (`issues/42`). That is not a repo file, and the mislabel is why corroboration\n * always passed: `hasSourceAtTier` treats repo files as Tier 1 unconditionally,\n * so untrusted issue text was corroborating actions at maintainer trust.\n *\n * Modelled on `IssueCommentSource` — it carries the author and their tier, so\n * the trust of the content travels with the citation. It is deliberately NOT an\n * `issueComment`: that requires a `commentId`, and faking one to fix a mislabel\n * would trade an honest error for a dishonest one.\n */\nconst IssueBodySource = z.object({\n  type: z.literal('issueBody'),\n  issueNumber: z.number().int().positive(),\n  author: z.string().min(1),\n  authorTrustTier: TrustTierSchema,\n});\n\n/** Source citation from a CI pipeline result. */\nconst CIResultSource = z.object({\n  type: z.literal('ciResult'),\n  runId: z.number().int().positive(),\n  status: z.enum(['pass', 'fail']),\n  job: z.string().min(1),\n});\n\n/** Source citation from a policy or governance document. */\nconst PolicyDocSource = z.object({\n  type: z.literal('policyDoc'),\n  path: z.string().min(1),\n  section: z.string().min(1),\n});\n\n/** Source citation from a maintainer slash-command or explicit instruction. */\nconst MaintainerCommandSource = z.object({\n  type: z.literal('maintainerCommand'),\n  username: z.string().min(1),\n  commentId: z.number().int().positive(),\n});\n\n/**\n * Discriminated union of all valid source citation types.\n * Every decision-making action MUST cite at least one source.\n */\nexport const SourceCitationSchema = z.discriminatedUnion('type', [\n  IssueBodySource,\n  RepoFileSource,\n  IssueCommentSource,\n  CIResultSource,\n  PolicyDocSource,\n  MaintainerCommandSource,\n]);\n\n/** Inferred TypeScript type for a source citation. */\nexport type SourceCitation = z.infer<typeof SourceCitationSchema>;\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Typed Actions\n// ============================================================================\n\n/** Read-only analysis action: summarize an issue with citations. */\nconst SummarizeIssueAction = z.object({\n  type: z.literal('SummarizeIssue'),\n  summary: z.string().min(10).max(2000),\n  sources: z.array(SourceCitationSchema).min(1).max(20),\n});\n\n/** Suggest labels for an issue (max 5, must match existing label set). */\nconst ProposeLabelsAction = z.object({\n  type: z.literal('ProposeLabels'),\n  labels: z.array(z.string()).min(1).max(5),\n  reason: z.string().min(10).max(500),\n  sources: z.array(SourceCitationSchema).min(1).max(20),\n});\n\n/** Draft a reply comment (always requires human approval before posting). */\nexport const DRAFT_REPLY_BODY_MAX_LENGTH = 2000;\n\nconst DraftReplyAction = z.object({\n  type: z.literal('DraftReply'),\n  body: z.string().min(10).max(DRAFT_REPLY_BODY_MAX_LENGTH),\n  requiresApproval: z.literal(true),\n  sources: z.array(SourceCitationSchema).min(1).max(20),\n});\n\n/** Explicit escalation to a human maintainer with reason and context. */\nconst RequestHumanApprovalAction = z.object({\n  type: z.literal('RequestHumanApproval'),\n  reason: z.string().min(10).max(500),\n  context: z.string().min(10).max(2000),\n});\n\n/**\n * Propose a set of file modifications (requires maintainer corroboration).\n * Forbidden from Tier 3-4 input without maintainer corroboration.\n */\nconst GeneratePatchPlanAction = z.object({\n  type: z.literal('GeneratePatchPlan'),\n  files: z\n    .array(\n      z.object({\n        path: z.string().min(1),\n        operation: z.enum(['modify', 'create', 'delete']),\n        description: z.string().min(10).max(500),\n      })\n    )\n    .min(1)\n    .max(10),\n  rationale: z.string().min(10).max(1000),\n  requiresApproval: z.literal(true),\n  sources: z.array(SourceCitationSchema).min(2).max(20),\n});\n\n/** Categorize an issue by type with confidence score. */\nconst ClassifyIssueAction = z.object({\n  type: z.literal('ClassifyIssue'),\n  category: z.enum(['bug', 'feature', 'question', 'documentation', 'security', 'performance']),\n  confidence: z.number().min(0).max(1),\n  sources: z.array(SourceCitationSchema).min(1).max(20),\n});\n\n/** Identify potential duplicate issues with similarity scores. */\nconst IdentifyDuplicatesAction = z.object({\n  type: z.literal('IdentifyDuplicates'),\n  candidates: z.array(z.number().int().positive()).min(1).max(10),\n  similarity: z.array(z.number().min(0).max(1)),\n  sources: z.array(SourceCitationSchema).min(1).max(20),\n});\n\n/** Explicit refusal to act, with escalation target. */\nconst RefuseActionAction = z.object({\n  type: z.literal('RefuseAction'),\n  reason: z.string().min(10).max(500),\n  escalateTo: z.enum(['maintainer', 'security']),\n});\n\n/** Handoff delegation from one agent to another by capability. (Issue #834) */\nconst HandoffMessageAction = z.object({\n  type: z.literal('HandoffMessage'),\n  targetCapability: z.string().min(1).max(100),\n  reason: z.string().min(5).max(500),\n  inputTrustTier: z.enum(['1', '2', '3', '4']),\n  sources: z.array(SourceCitationSchema).min(1).max(20),\n});\n\n/**\n * Discriminated union of all valid agent actions.\n * This is the ONLY schema agents may emit when processing untrusted input.\n */\nexport const AgentActionSchema = z.discriminatedUnion('type', [\n  SummarizeIssueAction,\n  ProposeLabelsAction,\n  DraftReplyAction,\n  RequestHumanApprovalAction,\n  GeneratePatchPlanAction,\n  ClassifyIssueAction,\n  IdentifyDuplicatesAction,\n  RefuseActionAction,\n  HandoffMessageAction,\n]);\n\n/** Inferred TypeScript type for an agent action. */\nexport type AgentAction = z.infer<typeof AgentActionSchema>;\n\n/** All valid action type discriminator values. */\nexport type AgentActionType = AgentAction['type'];\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Action Classification\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Action types that are read-only and do not modify GitHub state.\n * These can be executed without human approval (subject to policy gate).\n */\nconst READ_ONLY_ACTIONS: ReadonlySet<AgentActionType> = new Set<AgentActionType>([\n  'SummarizeIssue',\n  'ClassifyIssue',\n  'IdentifyDuplicates',\n  'RefuseAction',\n  'RequestHumanApproval',\n  'HandoffMessage',\n]);\n\n/**\n * Action types that can modify GitHub state (labels, comments, code).\n *\n * Used for the untrusted-input influence block: low-trust input must not drive\n * ANY of these, approved or not. NOT the approval set — see\n * {@link APPROVAL_REQUIRED_ACTIONS}, which is narrower (#4463).\n */\nconst MUTATING_ACTIONS: ReadonlySet<AgentActionType> = new Set<AgentActionType>([\n  'ProposeLabels',\n  'DraftReply',\n  'GeneratePatchPlan',\n]);\n\n/**\n * Action types that MUST include at least one source citation.\n * Escalation and refusal actions are exempt (they report inability to act).\n */\nconst CITATION_REQUIRED_ACTIONS: ReadonlySet<AgentActionType> = new Set<AgentActionType>([\n  'SummarizeIssue',\n  'ProposeLabels',\n  'DraftReply',\n  'GeneratePatchPlan',\n  'ClassifyIssue',\n  'IdentifyDuplicates',\n  'HandoffMessage',\n]);\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Helper Functions\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Validate an unknown value against the AgentActionSchema.\n * Returns a Result: `{ ok: true; value }` on success or `{ ok: false; error }` on failure.\n *\n * @param input - The value to validate (typically parsed JSON from an agent).\n * @returns Validation result following the project Result pattern.\n */\nexport function validateAgentAction(input: unknown): ActionValidationResult {\n  const result = AgentActionSchema.safeParse(input);\n  if (result.success) {\n    return { ok: true, value: result.data };\n  }\n  const messages = result.error.issues.map((issue) => `${issue.path.join('.')}: ${issue.message}`);\n  return { ok: false, error: `Action validation failed: ${messages.join('; ')}` };\n}\n\n/**\n * Check whether an action type is read-only (does not modify GitHub state).\n *\n * @param actionType - The action type discriminator value.\n * @returns True if the action is read-only.\n */\nexport function isReadOnlyAction(actionType: AgentActionType): boolean {\n  return READ_ONLY_ACTIONS.has(actionType);\n}\n\n/**\n * Check whether an action type can modify GitHub state.\n * Mutating actions always require human approval before execution.\n *\n * @param actionType - The action type discriminator value.\n * @returns True if the action can modify state.\n */\nexport function isMutatingAction(actionType: AgentActionType): boolean {\n  return MUTATING_ACTIONS.has(actionType);\n}\n\n/**\n * Action types that still require human approval after every policy check has\n * passed (#4463).\n *\n * Deliberately narrower than {@link MUTATING_ACTIONS}. Approval is a gate on\n * IRREVERSIBILITY and EXTERNAL VISIBILITY, not on mutation as such:\n *\n * - `ProposeLabels` — reversible in one click, internal to the tracker, and its\n *   schema carries no `requiresApproval` field. Not gated: it reaches this point\n *   having already passed citation, trust-tier, influence-block, Rule-of-Two and\n *   label-validity checks, so pausing bought delay, not safety.\n * - `DraftReply` — **publishes text under the project's identity**, on a surface\n *   other people read. Untrusted issue/PR content is in scope by definition\n *   here, so a prompt-injected reply is attacker-authored text posted publicly.\n *   Deleting it afterwards does not un-publish it.\n * - `GeneratePatchPlan` — gated, and deliberately so: its own schema encodes\n *   `requiresApproval: z.literal(true)` alongside a two-source corroboration\n *   minimum (`sources.min(2)`). Dropping the gate here while the schema still\n *   mandates the flag would put two sources of truth in conflict, and the\n *   two-factor design is intentional for an action that proposes file writes\n *   from potentially untrusted input.\n */\nconst APPROVAL_REQUIRED_ACTIONS: ReadonlySet<AgentActionType> = new Set<AgentActionType>([\n  'DraftReply',\n  'GeneratePatchPlan',\n]);\n\n/**\n * Whether an action needs human approval even after passing every policy check.\n *\n * Distinct from {@link isMutatingAction}, which stays broad because it also\n * drives the untrusted-input influence block — low-trust input must not be able\n * to drive ANY mutating action, approved or not.\n *\n * @param actionType - The action type discriminator value.\n * @returns True if a human must approve before execution.\n */\nexport function requiresHumanApproval(actionType: AgentActionType): boolean {\n  return APPROVAL_REQUIRED_ACTIONS.has(actionType);\n}\n\n/**\n * Check whether an action type requires at least one source citation.\n * Escalation (RequestHumanApproval) and refusal (RefuseAction) are exempt.\n *\n * @param actionType - The action type discriminator value.\n * @returns True if the action must include source citations.\n */\nexport function requiresCitation(actionType: AgentActionType): boolean {\n  return CITATION_REQUIRED_ACTIONS.has(actionType);\n}\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/security/firewall - Policy stage\n *\n * The `policyEnforcement` stage of {@link HostileInputFirewall} (#5380). It\n * used to run ONE of the seven checks `evaluatePolicy` runs — `checkRuleOfTwo`,\n * the only one that reads the `ActionContext` alone. The other six read an\n * `AgentAction`, which input-shaped `process()` never had, so they were not\n * \"passing\": they were never evaluated, and the result could not say so.\n *\n * This module gives the stage two honest shapes. With the action the caller\n * intends to take (`FirewallProcessOptions.action`) it runs `evaluatePolicy` in\n * full; without one it runs the Rule of Two and NAMES the six action-scoped\n * rules as unmeasured, so their absence from the violation list cannot be read\n * as a pass.\n *\n * @module security/firewall/firewall-policy-stage\n */\n\nimport { createLogger } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport type { AgentAction, AgentActionType } from '../action-schema.js';\nimport type { AuditTrail } from '../audit-trail.js';\nimport { ACTION_SCOPED_POLICY_RULES, checkRuleOfTwo, evaluatePolicy } from '../policy-gate.js';\nimport type { ActionContext, Violation } from '../policy-gate.js';\nimport type { TrustTier } from '../trust-types.js';\nimport type { FirewallPolicyMode } from './firewall-policy-mode.js';\nimport type { FirewallError, FirewallProcessOptions } from './firewall-types.js';\n\nconst logger = createLogger({ component: 'HostileInputFirewall' });\n\n/**\n * What the `policyEnforcement` stage evaluated, and against what (#5380).\n *\n * A discriminated union keeps a reader from mistaking one shape for the other:\n *\n * - `scope: 'action'` — an action was supplied; all seven checks ran and\n *   `violations` is the complete list. `allowed` and `requiresApproval` are\n *   the decision's own fields (`PolicyDecision`), surfaced, not re-derived;\n *   the firewall does not act on `requiresApproval` any more than the\n *   production gate does (#4735: Rule of Two is refuse-only, and there is no\n *   approval path here).\n * - `scope: 'context'` — no action was supplied; only the Rule of Two (the one\n *   check that reads the context alone) ran. The six action-scoped checks are\n *   listed in `unmeasured` by rule id, and `requiresApproval` — which depends\n *   on the action type — is not reported at all rather than defaulted.\n */\nexport type FirewallPolicyEvaluation =\n  | {\n      readonly scope: 'action';\n      readonly actionType: AgentActionType;\n      readonly allowed: boolean;\n      readonly requiresApproval: boolean;\n      readonly violations: readonly Violation[];\n      /** Always empty for a full evaluation; present so both shapes read the same way. */\n      readonly unmeasured: readonly string[];\n    }\n  | {\n      readonly scope: 'context';\n      /** Why the six action-scoped checks did not run. */\n      readonly reason: 'no-action-supplied';\n      /** At most the `RULE_OF_TWO` violation. */\n      readonly violations: readonly Violation[];\n      /** The rule ids `evaluatePolicy` could not evaluate without an action. */\n      readonly unmeasured: readonly string[];\n    };\n\n/**\n * Builds the `ActionContext` for one call from the facts the pipeline has:\n * the ENFORCED tier (post reputation gate), the call's access posture, and the\n * repository label set when the caller supplied one. `existingLabels` is\n * spread in only when present so `evaluatePolicy` sees absence as absence and\n * fails the label-validity check closed (`LABEL_SET_UNAVAILABLE`).\n */\nexport function buildActionContext(\n  effectiveTrustTier: TrustTier,\n  context: { readonly hasWriteAccess: boolean; readonly hasSecretAccess: boolean },\n  options: FirewallProcessOptions | undefined\n): ActionContext {\n  return {\n    inputTrustTier: effectiveTrustTier,\n    hasWriteAccess: context.hasWriteAccess,\n    hasSecretAccess: context.hasSecretAccess,\n    ...(options?.existingLabels !== undefined ? { existingLabels: options.existingLabels } : {}),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Runs the policy checks the call's facts allow.\n *\n * With an action: `evaluatePolicy` in full — the seven checks production runs\n * — with the decision recorded on `auditTrail` as a `policy_gate` event when\n * one is given, so the durable record carries the verdict and not just the\n * trust tier. Without one: the Rule of Two alone (previously the stage's whole\n * behaviour, #3198), with the action-scoped rule ids reported as unmeasured.\n */\nexport function evaluateFirewallPolicy(\n  context: ActionContext,\n  action: AgentAction | undefined,\n  auditTrail: AuditTrail | undefined\n): FirewallPolicyEvaluation {\n  if (action === undefined) {\n    const violation = checkRuleOfTwo(context);\n    return {\n      scope: 'context',\n      reason: 'no-action-supplied',\n      violations: violation !== undefined ? [violation] : [],\n      unmeasured: ACTION_SCOPED_POLICY_RULES,\n    };\n  }\n  const decision = evaluatePolicy(action, context, auditTrail);\n  return {\n    scope: 'action',\n    actionType: action.type,\n    allowed: decision.allowed,\n    requiresApproval: decision.requiresApproval,\n    violations: decision.violations,\n    unmeasured: [],\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * The violations that refuse under `enforce` and count as `wouldRefuse` under\n * `audit`: every `severity: 'block'` entry, whichever check produced it. A\n * `warn` violation never refuses, and an absent evaluation (stage disabled)\n * yields none — the mode gates the response to a violation, never its\n * detection.\n */\nexport function blockingViolations(\n  policy: FirewallPolicyEvaluation | undefined\n): readonly Violation[] {\n  return policy?.violations.filter((v) => v.severity === 'block') ?? [];\n}\n\n/**\n * The fail-closed half of the #5382 gate: under `enforce`, a blocking policy\n * violation refuses the input instead of riding along as a signal on an\n * `ok()` result that a caller checking only `result.ok` walks straight past.\n *\n * This gates the RESPONSE to a violation, never its detection. It cannot\n * manufacture a refusal where the `policyEnforcement` stage never ran, and it\n * cannot refuse a non-blocking (`warn`) violation — so `enforce` is not a\n * kill switch, and an allowlisted maintainer stays served. Any `block`\n * violation refuses, whichever of the seven checks produced it (#5380), and\n * the message names every blocking rule. `requiresApproval` never refuses —\n * it is not a violation, and there is no approval path here.\n *\n * @returns the refusal, or `undefined` when the input passes or the mode has\n *          not opted in.\n */\nexport function policyRefusal(\n  policy: FirewallPolicyEvaluation | undefined,\n  policyMode: FirewallPolicyMode,\n  user: string,\n  effectiveTrustTier: TrustTier\n): FirewallError | undefined {\n  const blocking = blockingViolations(policy);\n  if (blocking.length === 0 || policyMode !== 'enforce') return undefined;\n  logger.warn('Firewall REFUSED input under enforce mode', {\n    user,\n    effectiveTrustTier,\n    rules: blocking.map((v) => v.rule),\n  });\n  return {\n    code: 'POLICY_REFUSED',\n    message:\n      `Refused by firewall policy: ` + blocking.map((v) => `${v.rule} — ${v.message}`).join('; '),\n    stage: 'policy',\n    violations: blocking,\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/security - Corroboration Validator\n *\n * Validates that agent decisions are backed by sufficient evidence from\n * authoritative sources. Each action type has specific corroboration\n * requirements (e.g., closing issues requires CI pass or maintainer comment).\n *\n * Defense layer 3 of the three-layer hardening architecture.\n * See: docs/architecture/UNTRUSTED_INPUT_HARDENING.md\n *\n * @module security/corroboration-validator\n * (Source: Issue #818, #823 — Phase 2: Corroboration Validator)\n */\n\nimport type { AgentAction, AgentActionType, SourceCitation } from './action-schema.js';\nimport type { TrustTier } from './trust-types.js';\nimport { TRUST_TIER_NUMERIC } from './trust-types.js';\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Types\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Result of corroboration validation.\n */\nexport interface CorroborationResult {\n  /** Whether corroboration requirements are satisfied. */\n  readonly satisfied: boolean;\n  /** Sources that contributed to corroboration. */\n  readonly corroboratingSources: readonly SourceCitation[];\n  /** Missing corroboration requirements (empty when satisfied). */\n  readonly missing: readonly string[];\n  /** Action type that was validated. */\n  readonly actionType: AgentActionType;\n  /**\n   * True when the floor was cleared, and EVERY `repoFile` citation that cleared\n   * it is one the producer checked and found absent from the base ref\n   * (`existsOnBaseRef === false`) — i.e. a path the author of the untrusted\n   * change invented in that same change.\n   *\n   * `satisfied` deliberately does not read this: which actions are permitted is\n   * unchanged. What changes is that the record can now say the corroboration\n   * was author-supplied, instead of attributing repo provenance to a path that\n   * has none. False when any citation is verified, when none were checked, or\n   * when the floor was not cleared at all.\n   */\n  readonly clearedOnlyByUnverifiedSources: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Rule defining what corroboration an action requires.\n */\nexport interface CorroborationRule {\n  /** Human-readable description of what's required. */\n  readonly description: string;\n  /** Predicate: does this set of sources satisfy the requirement? */\n  readonly isSatisfied: (sources: readonly SourceCitation[]) => boolean;\n}\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Source Helpers\n// ============================================================================\n\n/** Check if sources include a passing CI result. */\nfunction hasCIPass(sources: readonly SourceCitation[]): boolean {\n  return sources.some((s) => s.type === 'ciResult' && s.status === 'pass');\n}\n\n/** Check if sources include a maintainer command. */\nfunction hasMaintainerCommand(sources: readonly SourceCitation[]): boolean {\n  return sources.some((s) => s.type === 'maintainerCommand');\n}\n\n/** Check if sources include a Tier 1 issue comment. */\nfunction hasTier1Comment(sources: readonly SourceCitation[]): boolean {\n  return sources.some((s) => s.type === 'issueComment' && s.authorTrustTier === '1');\n}\n\n/**\n * Did every `repoFile` citation get checked against the base ref and found\n * absent? Requires at least one such citation, so an empty or unchecked set is\n * false rather than vacuously true — the empty case here means \"nothing to\n * report\", not \"everything is unverified\".\n */\nfunction allRepoFilesAreAuthorSupplied(sources: readonly SourceCitation[]): boolean {\n  const repoFiles = sources.filter((s) => s.type === 'repoFile');\n  if (repoFiles.length === 0) return false;\n  return repoFiles.every((s) => s.existsOnBaseRef === false);\n}\n\n/** Check if sources include a repo file reference. */\nfunction hasRepoFileRef(sources: readonly SourceCitation[]): boolean {\n  return sources.some((s) => s.type === 'repoFile');\n}\n\n/** Check if sources include a repo file with line reference. */\nfunction hasCodeLevelEvidence(sources: readonly SourceCitation[]): boolean {\n  return sources.some((s) => s.type === 'repoFile' && s.line !== undefined);\n}\n\n/** Check if sources include a policy document reference. */\nfunction hasPolicyDocRef(sources: readonly SourceCitation[]): boolean {\n  return sources.some((s) => s.type === 'policyDoc');\n}\n\n/**\n * True when an ISSUE BODY source is authored at or above `maxTier` (#4667).\n *\n * Deliberately narrower than {@link hasSourceAtTier}, which returns `true` for\n * any non-authored source — repo files, CI results and policy docs are all\n * Tier 1 there. Reusing it here made a CI result alone satisfy ProposeLabels,\n * which the corroboration tests correctly forbid.\n */\nfunction hasIssueBodyAtTier(sources: readonly SourceCitation[], maxTier: TrustTier): boolean {\n  const maxNumeric = TRUST_TIER_NUMERIC[maxTier];\n  return sources.some(\n    (s) => s.type === 'issueBody' && TRUST_TIER_NUMERIC[s.authorTrustTier] <= maxNumeric\n  );\n}\n\n/** Check if at least one source meets a minimum trust tier. */\nfunction hasSourceAtTier(sources: readonly SourceCitation[], maxTier: TrustTier): boolean {\n  const maxNumeric = TRUST_TIER_NUMERIC[maxTier];\n  return sources.some((s) => {\n    // Author-attributed content carries its author's trust, not the repo's.\n    // `issueBody` was previously cited as a `repoFile` and so counted as Tier 1\n    // unconditionally — untrusted issue text corroborating at maintainer trust\n    // (#4667).\n    if (s.type === 'issueComment' || s.type === 'issueBody') {\n      return TRUST_TIER_NUMERIC[s.authorTrustTier] <= maxNumeric;\n    }\n    // Repo files, CI results, policy docs, maintainer commands = Tier 1\n    return true;\n  });\n}\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Per-Action Corroboration Rules\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Corroboration rules for each action type.\n * See CLAUDE.md \"Corroboration Requirements\" table.\n */\nconst ACTION_CORROBORATION_RULES: Readonly<Record<AgentActionType, readonly CorroborationRule[]>> =\n  {\n    SummarizeIssue: [\n      {\n        description: 'At least one Tier 1/2 source',\n        isSatisfied: (s) => hasSourceAtTier(s, '2'),\n      },\n    ],\n    ProposeLabels: [\n      {\n        // #4667: the old description read \"issue body (repo file)\" — the rule\n        // was written when triage cited the issue as a `repoFile`, so an issue\n        // body satisfied it unconditionally regardless of who wrote it. Now\n        // that the citation is honest (`issueBody`, carrying its author's\n        // tier), the rule has to say what it always meant: an issue body\n        // corroborates a label proposal only from a sufficiently trusted\n        // author. Dropping the clause entirely would make this rule\n        // unsatisfiable for every author including the repo owner — trading a\n        // check that could never fail for one that can never pass.\n        description:\n          'Issue body from a Tier 1/2 author, OR repo file / maintainer instruction / policy doc',\n        isSatisfied: (s) =>\n          hasIssueBodyAtTier(s, '2') ||\n          hasRepoFileRef(s) ||\n          hasMaintainerCommand(s) ||\n          hasPolicyDocRef(s),\n      },\n    ],\n    DraftReply: [\n      {\n        description: 'At least one Tier 1 source citation',\n        isSatisfied: (s) =>\n          hasRepoFileRef(s) ||\n          hasCIPass(s) ||\n          hasMaintainerCommand(s) ||\n          hasPolicyDocRef(s) ||\n          hasTier1Comment(s),\n      },\n    ],\n    GeneratePatchPlan: [\n      {\n        description: 'Failing test OR bug reproduction steps (code-level evidence)',\n        isSatisfied: (s) => hasCodeLevelEvidence(s) || hasCIPass(s),\n      },\n      {\n        description: 'Maintainer corroboration',\n        isSatisfied: (s) => hasMaintainerCommand(s) || hasTier1Comment(s),\n      },\n    ],\n    ClassifyIssue: [\n      {\n        description: 'At least one source citation',\n        isSatisfied: (s) => s.length > 0,\n      },\n    ],\n    IdentifyDuplicates: [\n      {\n        description: 'At least one source citation',\n        isSatisfied: (s) => s.length > 0,\n      },\n    ],\n    RequestHumanApproval: [],\n    RefuseAction: [],\n    HandoffMessage: [\n      {\n        description: 'At least one source citation for trust tier propagation',\n        isSatisfied: (s) => s.length > 0,\n      },\n    ],\n  };\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Public API\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Validate that an agent action has sufficient corroboration from\n * authoritative sources.\n *\n * @param action - The validated AgentAction to check.\n * @returns CorroborationResult indicating whether requirements are met.\n */\nexport function validateCorroboration(action: AgentAction): CorroborationResult {\n  const rules = ACTION_CORROBORATION_RULES[action.type];\n  const sources: readonly SourceCitation[] = 'sources' in action ? action.sources : [];\n\n  if (rules.length === 0) {\n    return {\n      satisfied: true,\n      corroboratingSources: sources,\n      missing: [],\n      actionType: action.type,\n      clearedOnlyByUnverifiedSources: allRepoFilesAreAuthorSupplied(sources),\n    };\n  }\n\n  const missing: string[] = [];\n  const corroborating: SourceCitation[] = [];\n\n  for (const rule of rules) {\n    if (rule.isSatisfied(sources)) {\n      for (const s of sources) {\n        if (!corroborating.includes(s)) {\n          corroborating.push(s);\n        }\n      }\n    } else {\n      missing.push(rule.description);\n    }\n  }\n\n  const satisfied = missing.length === 0;\n  return {\n    satisfied,\n    corroboratingSources: corroborating,\n    missing,\n    actionType: action.type,\n    // Only meaningful about a floor that was actually cleared; a refused action\n    // has no corroboration to characterise.\n    clearedOnlyByUnverifiedSources: satisfied && allRepoFilesAreAuthorSupplied(corroborating),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Get the corroboration rules for an action type.\n * Useful for displaying requirements to users.\n */\nexport function getCorroborationRules(actionType: AgentActionType): readonly CorroborationRule[] {\n  return ACTION_CORROBORATION_RULES[actionType];\n}\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/security/firewall - Pipeline Engine\n *\n * HostileInputFirewall: a composition layer that orchestrates existing\n * security modules (sanitizer, trust-classifier, reputation-model,\n * audit-trail) into a configurable, source-agnostic pipeline.\n *\n * Replaces ad-hoc manual composition found in issue-triage, pr-reviewer,\n * and secure-handler with a single reusable abstraction.\n *\n * @module security/firewall/firewall-pipeline\n * (Source: Issue #826 — Reusable Hostile Input Firewall)\n */\n\nimport type { Result } from '../../core/result.js';\nimport { err, ok } from '../../core/result.js';\nimport { resolveFirewallPolicyMode, type FirewallPolicyMode } from './firewall-policy-mode.js';\nimport {\n  AuditTrail,\n  createAuditTrail,\n  emitReputationEvent,\n  emitSanitizationEvent,\n  MAX_STRIPPED_ELEMENTS_PER_EVENT,\n  emitTrustEvent,\n} from '../audit-trail.js';\nimport { createDurableAuditSink } from '../audit-bridge.js';\nimport { sanitizeInput } from '../input-sanitizer.js';\nimport type {\n  ReputationAssessment,\n  GitHubUserMetadata,\n  ReputationGatingMode,\n} from '../reputation-model.js';\nimport {\n  assessReputation,\n  ReputationCache,\n  gateWithReputation,\n  resolveReputationGatingMode,\n} from '../reputation-model.js';\nimport type { ReputationGateDecision } from '../reputation-model.js';\nimport type { ClassifyResult } from '../trust-classifier.js';\nimport { classifyTrust, mapAuthorAssociation } from '../trust-classifier.js';\nimport type { SanitizedInput, TrustTier } from '../trust-types.js';\nimport { generateATL } from './agent-trust-labels.js';\nimport {\n  createPassthroughClassification,\n  createPassthroughSanitized,\n} from './firewall-passthrough.js';\nimport { describeGate } from './firewall-trust-reason.js';\nimport type {\n  ATLData,\n  FirewallConfig,\n  FirewallError,\n  FirewallProcessOptions,\n  FirewallStages,\n  SourceMetadata,\n} from './firewall-types.js';\nimport { FirewallConfigSchema } from './firewall-types.js';\nimport type { Violation } from '../policy-gate.js';\nimport {\n  blockingViolations,\n  buildActionContext,\n  evaluateFirewallPolicy,\n  policyRefusal,\n  type FirewallPolicyEvaluation,\n} from './firewall-policy-stage.js';\nimport { validateCorroboration } from '../corroboration-validator.js';\nimport type { AgentAction, SourceCitation } from '../action-schema.js';\nimport { createLogger } from '../../core/index.js';\n\nconst logger = createLogger({ component: 'HostileInputFirewall' });\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Firewall Result\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Output of the firewall pipeline. Aggregates results from each stage.\n */\nexport interface FirewallResult {\n  readonly sanitized: SanitizedInput;\n  readonly trust: ClassifyResult;\n  /**\n   * Whether the author is on the maintainer allowlist — present ONLY when an\n   * allowlist was consulted (#4992), i.e. one was supplied at construction or\n   * per call. `trust.isAllowlisted` is the classifier's published always-boolean\n   * field and reads `false` whether the list was empty or never supplied; this\n   * field is the one to record, because absence here means \"not measured\"\n   * rather than \"measured false\" — the same treatment `reputationGate` gets.\n   */\n  readonly isAllowlisted?: boolean;\n  readonly reputation?: ReputationAssessment;\n  /**\n   * The tier consumers should ENFORCE on (#3106): the classifier tier\n   * reconciled with the reputation assessment (demotion-only; Tier-1/allowlist\n   * wins; equals `trust.trustTier` when reputation is absent). Previously the\n   * reputation tier was computed but dropped — `trust.trustTier` alone left\n   * reputation unenforced.\n   */\n  readonly effectiveTrustTier: TrustTier;\n  /**\n   * The reputation gating decision behind `effectiveTrustTier` (#5381).\n   *\n   * **Absent means the reputation stage did not run** — not \"it ran and\n   * suppressed nothing\". `ReputationGateDecision.demotionSuppressed` is a\n   * required boolean, so surfacing it unconditionally would report `false` for a\n   * check that never happened. Since the stage defaults to off, that\n   * unevaluated case is the common one.\n   */\n  readonly reputationGate?: ReputationGateDecision;\n  readonly atl: string;\n  /**\n   * Rule-of-Two assessment surfaced by the `policyEnforcement` stage (#3198):\n   * present (`severity: 'block'`) when the effective tier is untrusted AND the\n   * context has both write and secret access; `undefined` when the stage is\n   * disabled or the rule holds. Since #5380 a view onto {@link policy} — its\n   * `RULE_OF_TWO` entry — kept so existing consumers read the same field.\n   */\n  readonly ruleOfTwoViolation?: Violation;\n  /**\n   * The `policyEnforcement` stage's full verdict (#5380). **Absent means the\n   * stage did not run.** Its `scope` says how much of `evaluatePolicy` could be\n   * evaluated ({@link FirewallPolicyEvaluation}), so \"seven checks, none fired\"\n   * is distinguishable from \"one check, six unmeasured\". `wouldRefuse` and the\n   * `enforce` refusal both derive from `policy.violations`, whichever scope.\n   */\n  readonly policy?: FirewallPolicyEvaluation;\n  /**\n   * The rollout mode this run was evaluated under (#5382). Recorded on the\n   * result rather than left implicit so a consumer reading a verdict can tell\n   * WHICH policy produced it — a result that does not say which rules were in\n   * force cannot be audited later.\n   */\n  readonly policyMode: FirewallPolicyMode;\n  /**\n   * Whether `enforce` would have refused this input.\n   *\n   * This is what makes `audit` mode measurable, and it is the field that makes\n   * the mode a real gate rather than a switch with two indistinguishable\n   * settings: under `audit` the answer is computed and reported while the input\n   * is still allowed through, so an operator can size the impact of flipping to\n   * `enforce` before flipping it.\n   *\n   * Always `false` under `enforce`, because an input that would be refused IS\n   * refused — it comes back as a `POLICY_REFUSED` error, not a result.\n   */\n  readonly wouldRefuse: boolean;\n  readonly auditEvents: readonly { readonly id: string; readonly type: string }[];\n  /**\n   * Whether a durable `AuditLogger` was configured for this instance (#4992\n   * review). `configured` means this run's events were HANDED to that logger;\n   * delivery to the hash chain is subject to the logger's own severity filter\n   * (trust events are `info`), its bounded queue and its timed, fail-loud\n   * flush, and is NOT confirmed per call — the write is queued. `none` means\n   * the events exist only in the in-memory trail, which the next `process()`\n   * call clears. This is a construction-time fact, not a per-call outcome.\n   */\n  readonly auditSink: 'configured' | 'none';\n  readonly durationMs: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Outcome of {@link HostileInputFirewall.validateAction} (#5382).\n *\n * A discriminated union rather than a struct with optional fields, deliberately:\n * a caller cannot read `satisfied` without first narrowing on `evaluated`, so\n * \"the stage did not run\" is structurally impossible to misread as \"the stage\n * ran and passed\". `stages.corroboration` defaults to `false`, which makes the\n * unevaluated branch the COMMON case — exactly where a silent `satisfied: true`\n * would do the most damage.\n */\nexport type ActionValidation =\n  | {\n      readonly evaluated: false;\n      /** Why no verdict exists. Absence is attributable, not anonymous. */\n      readonly reason: 'corroboration-stage-disabled';\n      readonly policyMode: FirewallPolicyMode;\n    }\n  | {\n      readonly evaluated: true;\n      readonly satisfied: boolean;\n      /** Unmet corroboration requirements; empty when satisfied. */\n      readonly missing: readonly string[];\n      readonly corroboratingSources: readonly SourceCitation[];\n      /**\n       * The validator's #5796 marker: the floor was cleared, and only by\n       * `repoFile` citations the producer found absent from the base ref.\n       * Carried so a consumer can report it without re-deriving the rule.\n       */\n      readonly clearedOnlyByUnverifiedSources: boolean;\n      readonly policyMode: FirewallPolicyMode;\n      /** Whether `enforce` would have refused this action (see FirewallResult). */\n      readonly wouldRefuse: boolean;\n    };\n\n// ============================================================================\n// HostileInputFirewall\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Orchestrates existing security modules into a configurable pipeline.\n * Each stage is independently toggleable via config.stages.\n */\nexport class HostileInputFirewall {\n  private readonly stages: FirewallStages;\n  /**\n   * Construction-time allowlist, or `undefined` when none was supplied (#4992).\n   * The Zod default of `[]` is deliberately NOT taken here: an absent list and\n   * an empty list must stay distinguishable so `isAllowlisted` can be omitted\n   * rather than recorded as `false` when nothing was consulted.\n   */\n  private readonly allowlisted: readonly string[] | undefined;\n  private readonly maxInputLength: number;\n  private readonly adapter: FirewallConfig['adapter'];\n  private readonly reputationCache: ReputationCache;\n  private readonly auditTrail: AuditTrail;\n  private readonly context: { readonly hasWriteAccess: boolean; readonly hasSecretAccess: boolean };\n  /** #5382 rollout gate; resolved once at construction, not per call. */\n  private readonly policyMode: FirewallPolicyMode;\n  /** #5381 reputation-demotion gate; a DIFFERENT knob from `policyMode`. */\n  private readonly reputationGatingMode: ReputationGatingMode;\n  /** #5405 seam: how a reputation assessment is obtained. */\n  private readonly assessReputationFn: (metadata: GitHubUserMetadata) => ReputationAssessment;\n  /** #4992: whether the sanitizer's content tier downgrades the classifier tier. */\n  private readonly contentDowngrade: boolean;\n  /** #4992 review: whether a durable logger was configured (not per-call delivery). */\n  private readonly auditSink: 'configured' | 'none';\n\n  constructor(config: FirewallConfig) {\n    const validated = FirewallConfigSchema.parse({\n      stages: config.stages,\n      allowlistedMaintainers: config.allowlistedMaintainers,\n      maxInputLength: config.maxInputLength,\n      context: config.context,\n    });\n    this.stages = validated.stages;\n    this.allowlisted =\n      config.allowlistedMaintainers !== undefined ? validated.allowlistedMaintainers : undefined;\n    this.maxInputLength = validated.maxInputLength;\n    this.adapter = config.adapter;\n    this.reputationCache = new ReputationCache();\n    // Mirror security decisions to the durable, hash-chained audit log when a\n    // logger is provided; otherwise stay in-memory only (#3291).\n    this.auditTrail = createAuditTrail(\n      config.auditLogger !== undefined ? createDurableAuditSink(config.auditLogger) : undefined\n    );\n    this.auditSink = config.auditLogger !== undefined ? 'configured' : 'none';\n    this.context = validated.context;\n    // Explicit config wins; otherwise the environment; otherwise `off`. Resolved\n    // once here rather than per `process()` call so a mid-run env change cannot\n    // make two inputs in the same batch answer to different policies.\n    this.policyMode = config.policyMode ?? resolveFirewallPolicyMode(config.env ?? process.env);\n    // Same resolve-once discipline, but a SEPARATE knob: `NEXUS_REPUTATION_GATING`,\n    // defaulting to `enforce`. Production reads this one, so the firewall reading\n    // it too is what makes the two compositions agree under one configuration.\n    this.reputationGatingMode =\n      config.reputationGatingMode ?? resolveReputationGatingMode(config.env ?? process.env);\n    this.assessReputationFn =\n      config.reputationAssessor ?? ((metadata) => assessReputation(metadata, this.reputationCache));\n    this.contentDowngrade = config.contentDowngrade ?? true;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Processes untrusted input through the firewall pipeline.\n   * Returns a structured FirewallResult or a typed FirewallError.\n   *\n   * `options` carries the per-call facts (#4992): the repository's maintainer\n   * allowlist and the caller's access posture. Each replaces its\n   * construction-time counterpart for this call only, so one shared instance\n   * never holds a repository's allowlist or a caller's posture process-wide.\n   */\n  process(input: unknown, options?: FirewallProcessOptions): Result<FirewallResult, FirewallError> {\n    const start = Date.now();\n    this.auditTrail.clear();\n    const allowlist = options?.allowlistedMaintainers ?? this.allowlisted;\n    const context = options?.context ?? this.context;\n\n    // Stage 1: Extract metadata via adapter\n    const metaResult = this.runExtraction(input);\n    if (!metaResult.ok) return metaResult;\n    const meta = metaResult.value;\n\n    // Stage 2: Sanitize input\n    const sanitized = this.runSanitization(meta, allowlist);\n\n    // Stage 3: Classify trust\n    const trust = this.runClassification(meta, sanitized, allowlist);\n\n    // Stage 4: Assess reputation — the caller's when supplied, else the stage.\n    const reputation = this.runReputation(meta, sanitized, options?.reputation);\n\n    const { tier: effectiveTrustTier, gate: reputationGate } = this.runReputationGate(\n      trust.trustTier,\n      reputation,\n      options?.reputation !== undefined\n    );\n\n    // Trust event on the tier the consumer acts on, not the pre-reputation one.\n    this.recordTrustDecision(meta, trust, effectiveTrustTier, reputationGate, allowlist);\n\n    // Stage 5: Generate ATL (labelled with the enforced tier)\n    const atl = this.buildATL(meta, effectiveTrustTier, sanitized, reputation);\n\n    // Stage 6: policy enforcement (#3198, #5380). Signal only: the consumer\n    // enforces — except under `enforce`, where a blocking violation refuses (#5382).\n    const policy = this.runPolicyEnforcement(meta, effectiveTrustTier, context, options);\n    const refusal = policyRefusal(policy, this.policyMode, meta.username, effectiveTrustTier);\n    if (refusal !== undefined) return err(refusal);\n\n    return ok(\n      this.assembleResult({\n        sanitized,\n        trust,\n        // Measured or absent: present only when an allowlist was consulted.\n        isAllowlisted: allowlist !== undefined ? trust.isAllowlisted : undefined,\n        reputation,\n        effectiveTrustTier,\n        reputationGate,\n        atl,\n        policy,\n        start,\n      })\n    );\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Runs the policy checks the call's facts allow — see\n   * {@link evaluateFirewallPolicy} (#5380; Rule-of-Two-only since #3198). The\n   * decision reaches the audit trail when the audit stage is on. Returns\n   * `undefined` when the stage is disabled, so absence keeps meaning \"not run\".\n   */\n  private runPolicyEnforcement(\n    meta: SourceMetadata,\n    effectiveTrustTier: TrustTier,\n    context: { readonly hasWriteAccess: boolean; readonly hasSecretAccess: boolean },\n    options: FirewallProcessOptions | undefined\n  ): FirewallPolicyEvaluation | undefined {\n    if (!this.stages.policyEnforcement) return undefined;\n\n    const evaluation = evaluateFirewallPolicy(\n      buildActionContext(effectiveTrustTier, context, options),\n      options?.action,\n      this.stages.audit ? this.auditTrail : undefined\n    );\n    const blocking = blockingViolations(evaluation);\n    if (blocking.length > 0) {\n      logger.warn('Firewall surfaced blocking policy violations', {\n        user: meta.username,\n        effectiveTrustTier,\n        scope: evaluation.scope,\n        rules: blocking.map((v) => v.rule),\n      });\n    }\n    return evaluation;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Builds the successful result. Optional fields are spread in only when they\n   * were evaluated, so absence keeps meaning \"not measured\" (see the field\n   * docs on {@link FirewallResult}).\n   */\n  private assembleResult(parts: {\n    readonly sanitized: SanitizedInput;\n    readonly trust: ClassifyResult;\n    readonly isAllowlisted: boolean | undefined;\n    readonly reputation: ReputationAssessment | undefined;\n    readonly effectiveTrustTier: TrustTier;\n    readonly reputationGate: ReputationGateDecision | undefined;\n    readonly atl: string;\n    readonly policy: FirewallPolicyEvaluation | undefined;\n    readonly start: number;\n  }): FirewallResult {\n    const { isAllowlisted, reputation, reputationGate, policy } = parts;\n    const ruleOfTwoViolation = policy?.violations.find((v) => v.rule === 'RULE_OF_TWO');\n    const blocking = blockingViolations(policy).length > 0;\n    return {\n      sanitized: parts.sanitized,\n      trust: parts.trust,\n      ...(isAllowlisted !== undefined ? { isAllowlisted } : {}),\n      ...(reputation !== undefined ? { reputation } : {}),\n      effectiveTrustTier: parts.effectiveTrustTier,\n      ...(reputationGate !== undefined ? { reputationGate } : {}),\n      atl: parts.atl,\n      ...(ruleOfTwoViolation !== undefined ? { ruleOfTwoViolation } : {}),\n      ...(policy !== undefined ? { policy } : {}),\n      policyMode: this.policyMode,\n      // Reached only when we did NOT refuse, so this is \"audit mode saw\n      // something enforce would have stopped\". Under `off` it stays false: the\n      // signal is already on `policy.violations`, and reporting a would-be\n      // refusal for a mode that has not opted in would overstate the gate.\n      wouldRefuse: blocking && this.policyMode === 'audit',\n      auditEvents: this.auditTrail.query().map((e) => ({ id: e.id, type: e.type })),\n      auditSink: this.auditSink,\n      durationMs: Date.now() - parts.start,\n    };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Validates corroboration for a decided action (#5382).\n   *\n   * Separate from {@link process} because the two operate at different points\n   * in the lifecycle, which is the real shape of the divergence epic #5281\n   * found: `process()` is INPUT-shaped — it sanitizes, classifies and labels\n   * untrusted content — while corroboration is ACTION-shaped, asking whether a\n   * decision the consumer has now reached is backed by sources of sufficient\n   * tier. There is no `AgentAction` in scope during `process()`, so the\n   * `stages.corroboration` flag could never have been wired there; this is the\n   * entry point that makes it readable.\n   *\n   * It is also the shape #5383 needs: production validates corroboration per\n   * action (`issue-triage.ts:391`), so those callers cannot migrate onto the\n   * firewall unless it offers a per-action surface.\n   *\n   * Returns `evaluated: false` when the stage is disabled — never a satisfied\n   * verdict for a check that did not run. Under `enforce` an unsatisfied action\n   * is refused with `POLICY_REFUSED`; under `audit` the would-be refusal is\n   * reported via `wouldRefuse` and the action is allowed through.\n   */\n  validateAction(action: AgentAction): Result<ActionValidation, FirewallError> {\n    if (!this.stages.corroboration) {\n      return ok({\n        evaluated: false,\n        reason: 'corroboration-stage-disabled',\n        policyMode: this.policyMode,\n      });\n    }\n\n    const corroboration = validateCorroboration(action);\n\n    if (!corroboration.satisfied && this.policyMode === 'enforce') {\n      logger.warn('Firewall REFUSED an uncorroborated action under enforce mode', {\n        actionType: corroboration.actionType,\n        missing: corroboration.missing,\n      });\n      return err({\n        code: 'POLICY_REFUSED',\n        message:\n          `Refused by firewall policy: ${corroboration.actionType} lacks required ` +\n          `corroboration — ${corroboration.missing.join('; ')}`,\n        stage: 'corroboration',\n        missing: corroboration.missing,\n      });\n    }\n\n    return ok({\n      evaluated: true,\n      satisfied: corroboration.satisfied,\n      missing: corroboration.missing,\n      corroboratingSources: corroboration.corroboratingSources,\n      clearedOnlyByUnverifiedSources: corroboration.clearedOnlyByUnverifiedSources,\n      policyMode: this.policyMode,\n      wouldRefuse: !corroboration.satisfied && this.policyMode === 'audit',\n    });\n  }\n\n  /** Returns the internal audit trail for inspection. */\n  getAuditTrail(): AuditTrail {\n    return this.auditTrail;\n  }\n\n  // ==========================================================================\n  // Pipeline Stages (private)\n  // ==========================================================================\n\n  private runExtraction(input: unknown): Result<SourceMetadata, FirewallError> {\n    try {\n      const meta = this.adapter.extractMetadata(input);\n      return ok(meta);\n    } catch (cause: unknown) {\n      const message = cause instanceof Error ? cause.message : String(cause);\n      return err({\n        code: 'EXTRACTION_FAILED',\n        message: `Adapter extraction failed: ${message}`,\n        stage: 'extraction',\n      });\n    }\n  }\n\n  private runSanitization(\n    meta: SourceMetadata,\n    allowlist: readonly string[] | undefined\n  ): SanitizedInput {\n    if (!this.stages.sanitization) {\n      return createPassthroughSanitized(meta);\n    }\n\n    const result = sanitizeInput(\n      meta.content,\n      mapAuthorAssociation(meta.authorAssociation),\n      meta.username,\n      {\n        allowlistedMaintainers: [...(allowlist ?? [])],\n        maxInputLength: this.maxInputLength,\n      }\n    );\n\n    if (this.stages.audit) {\n      emitSanitizationEvent(this.auditTrail, {\n        source: meta.sourceType,\n        wasModified: result.wasModified,\n        ...(result.truncated !== undefined ? { truncated: result.truncated } : {}),\n        strippedCount: result.strippedElements.length,\n        injectionFlagCount: result.injectionFlags.length,\n        strippedElements: result.strippedElements\n          .slice(0, MAX_STRIPPED_ELEMENTS_PER_EVENT)\n          .map((e) => ({ tag: e.tag, reason: e.reason })),\n      });\n    }\n\n    return result;\n  }\n\n  private runClassification(\n    meta: SourceMetadata,\n    sanitized: SanitizedInput,\n    allowlist: readonly string[] | undefined\n  ): ClassifyResult {\n    if (!this.stages.trustClassification) {\n      return createPassthroughClassification(meta);\n    }\n\n    return classifyTrust({\n      username: meta.username,\n      authorAssociation: meta.authorAssociation,\n      // #4992: `contentDowngrade: false` withholds the sanitizer's content tier\n      // from the classifier; the flags themselves were still measured above.\n      ...(this.contentDowngrade && sanitized.contentTierMeasured !== false\n        ? { sanitizedInput: sanitized }\n        : {}),\n      config: {\n        allowlistedMaintainers: [...(allowlist ?? [])],\n      },\n    });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Emits the trust audit event for the tier the consumer acts on — after the\n   * reputation gate, so the record cannot describe a tier nobody enforced\n   * (#4992 review). A demotion is named in `reason`.\n   */\n  private recordTrustDecision(\n    meta: SourceMetadata,\n    trust: ClassifyResult,\n    effectiveTrustTier: TrustTier,\n    gate: ReputationGateDecision | undefined,\n    allowlist: readonly string[] | undefined\n  ): void {\n    if (!this.stages.audit) return;\n    const demoted = effectiveTrustTier !== trust.trustTier;\n    emitTrustEvent(this.auditTrail, {\n      username: meta.username,\n      assignedTier: effectiveTrustTier,\n      userRole: trust.userRole,\n      // Recorded only when an allowlist was consulted (#4992).\n      ...(allowlist !== undefined ? { isAllowlisted: trust.isAllowlisted } : {}),\n      wasDowngraded: trust.wasDowngraded || demoted,\n      reason: describeGate(trust.reason, demoted, gate),\n    });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Reconcile the classifier tier with reputation, under the rollout mode\n   * production honours (#3106 reconciliation, #5381 gating).\n   *\n   * #3106's reconciliation is demotion-only; Tier-1/allowlist wins; it equals\n   * the classifier tier when reputation is absent. #5381 puts it behind\n   * `NEXUS_REPUTATION_GATING`, so `audit` is audit-only here too — previously\n   * the firewall enforced unconditionally while production suppressed, on\n   * identical configuration.\n   *\n   * Returns no gate at all when the stage is off, so absence in the result\n   * means \"not evaluated\" rather than \"evaluated, nothing suppressed\" —\n   * `demotionSuppressed` is a required boolean and would otherwise report\n   * `false` for a check that never ran.\n   */\n  private runReputationGate(\n    classifierTier: TrustTier,\n    reputation: ReputationAssessment | undefined,\n    callerSupplied: boolean\n  ): { readonly tier: TrustTier; readonly gate?: ReputationGateDecision } {\n    // A caller-supplied measurement runs the gate even when the instance's own\n    // reputation stage is off (#4992 review): the caller measured, so record it.\n    if (!this.stages.reputationAssessment && !callerSupplied) return { tier: classifierTier };\n    const gate = gateWithReputation(classifierTier, reputation, this.reputationGatingMode);\n    return { tier: gate.enforcedTier, gate };\n  }\n\n  private runReputation(\n    meta: SourceMetadata,\n    sanitized: SanitizedInput,\n    supplied: { readonly assessment: ReputationAssessment | undefined } | undefined\n  ): ReputationAssessment | undefined {\n    if (supplied !== undefined) {\n      // The caller's measurement replaces the instance's stage for this call;\n      // `undefined` means the caller measured nothing, so nothing is emitted.\n      if (supplied.assessment !== undefined && this.stages.audit) {\n        emitReputationEvent(this.auditTrail, {\n          username: meta.username,\n          reputationScore: supplied.assessment.reputationScore,\n          isSuspicious: supplied.assessment.isSuspicious,\n          effectiveTier: supplied.assessment.effectiveTrustTier,\n          signalCount: supplied.assessment.suspiciousSignals.length,\n        });\n      }\n      return supplied.assessment;\n    }\n    if (!this.stages.reputationAssessment) return undefined;\n\n    // #3106: only supply what the firewall actually knows from the event —\n    // author association + injection flags. Account-age / contribution /\n    // recent-comment data is NOT available here (it's fetched at the wiring\n    // layer in a later phase), so it is OMITTED, not fabricated. The engine\n    // skips the account/activity signals when their data is absent; until the\n    // fetch lands, the firewall's reputation reflects injection + authority\n    // signals only — honest rather than always-benign.\n    const metadata: GitHubUserMetadata = {\n      username: meta.username,\n      authorAssociation: meta.authorAssociation.toUpperCase(),\n      injectionFlags: sanitized.injectionFlags,\n    };\n\n    const result = this.assessReputationFn(metadata);\n\n    if (this.stages.audit) {\n      emitReputationEvent(this.auditTrail, {\n        username: meta.username,\n        reputationScore: result.reputationScore,\n        isSuspicious: result.isSuspicious,\n        effectiveTier: result.effectiveTrustTier,\n        signalCount: result.suspiciousSignals.length,\n      });\n    }\n\n    return result;\n  }\n\n  private buildATL(\n    meta: SourceMetadata,\n    effectiveTrustTier: TrustTier,\n    sanitized: SanitizedInput,\n    reputation?: ReputationAssessment\n  ): string {\n    const data: ATLData = {\n      tier: effectiveTrustTier,\n      source: meta.sourceType,\n      user: meta.username,\n      sanitized: sanitized.wasModified,\n      ...(reputation !== undefined ? { rep: reputation.reputationScore / 100 } : {}),\n    };\n    return generateATL(data);\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/security/firewall - GitHub Adapter\n *\n * ISourceAdapter implementation for GitHub issues, PRs, and comments.\n * Extracts normalized metadata from GitHub API payloads.\n *\n * @module security/firewall/github-adapter\n * (Source: Issue #826 — Reusable Hostile Input Firewall)\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\n\nimport { mapAuthorAssociation } from '../trust-classifier.js';\nimport type { ISourceAdapter, SourceMetadata } from './firewall-types.js';\n\n// ============================================================================\n// GitHub Input Types\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Discriminated union of GitHub input types the adapter can process.\n */\nconst GitHubIssueSchema = z.object({\n  type: z.literal('issue'),\n  username: z.string().min(1),\n  authorAssociation: z.string().min(1),\n  title: z.string().default(''),\n  body: z.string().default(''),\n});\n\nconst GitHubCommentSchema = z.object({\n  type: z.literal('comment'),\n  username: z.string().min(1),\n  authorAssociation: z.string().min(1),\n  body: z.string().default(''),\n});\n\nconst GitHubPRSchema = z.object({\n  type: z.literal('pull_request'),\n  username: z.string().min(1),\n  authorAssociation: z.string().min(1),\n  title: z.string().default(''),\n  body: z.string().default(''),\n});\n\nexport const GitHubInputSchema = z.discriminatedUnion('type', [\n  GitHubIssueSchema,\n  GitHubCommentSchema,\n  GitHubPRSchema,\n]);\nexport type GitHubInput = z.infer<typeof GitHubInputSchema>;\n\n// ============================================================================\n// GitHub Adapter\n// ============================================================================\n\n/** Maps input type to source type string. */\nfunction toSourceType(type: GitHubInput['type']): string {\n  const mapping: Record<GitHubInput['type'], string> = {\n    issue: 'github-issue',\n    comment: 'github-comment',\n    pull_request: 'github-pr',\n  };\n  return mapping[type];\n}\n\n/** Extracts content from a GitHub input. */\nfunction extractContent(input: GitHubInput): string {\n  if (input.type === 'comment') return input.body;\n  const title = input.title;\n  const body = input.body;\n  return title && body ? `${title}\\n\\n${body}` : title || body;\n}\n\n/**\n * Creates a GitHub source adapter.\n * Validates input with Zod and maps GitHub API fields to SourceMetadata.\n */\nexport function createGitHubAdapter(): ISourceAdapter {\n  return {\n    platform: 'github',\n    extractMetadata(input: unknown): SourceMetadata {\n      const result = GitHubInputSchema.safeParse(input);\n      if (!result.success) {\n        const issues = result.error.issues\n          .map((i) => `${i.path.join('.')}: ${i.message}`)\n          .join('; ');\n        throw new Error(`GitHub input validation failed: ${issues}`);\n      }\n      const parsed = result.data;\n      const role = mapAuthorAssociation(parsed.authorAssociation);\n      return {\n        username: parsed.username,\n        authorAssociation: role,\n        content: extractContent(parsed),\n        sourceType: toSourceType(parsed.type),\n      };\n    },\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/dogfooding - Untrusted-input firewall (shared instance)\n *\n * The one `HostileInputFirewall` the live untrusted-input paths route through\n * (#4992): `issue-triage` and `pr-reviewer`. Before this module both called\n * `classifyTrust()` directly, which meant no trust classification on any live\n * path reached the security audit trail, and the maintainer allowlist the\n * classifier reads from `config` was never supplied — `isAllowlisted: false`\n * was recorded on every result without ever being measured.\n *\n * Division of labour, ratified by the #4992 panel and completed by #5383:\n *\n * - The firewall is the ONE composition: it sanitizes, classifies, runs the\n *   reputation gate, evaluates policy against the caller's access posture, and\n *   records every decision on the audit trail. Under the default\n *   `NEXUS_FIREWALL_POLICY=off` it REFUSES nothing — but it still evaluates.\n * - It is entered twice per live input, because the callers only know their\n *   actions after they know the tier. `runUntrustedInputFirewall` is the\n *   INPUT-shaped entry (no action; the Rule of Two measured, the six\n *   action-scoped checks named `unmeasured`, `policy.scope: 'context'`), and\n *   `evaluateActionThroughFirewall` is the ACTION-shaped entry, called once per\n *   action the caller intends to take, which runs the full `evaluatePolicy` set\n *   (#5380) and hands back the decision from `FirewallResult.policy`. Neither\n *   caller calls `evaluatePolicy` itself any more (#5383): the #4992 panel let\n *   them keep it only because the firewall had no action-shaped entry then.\n *   `validateActionCorroboration` is the third entry (#6309): the per-action\n *   corroboration check, run by the firewall's `corroboration` stage — which\n *   this instance enables — rather than composed beside it by the callers.\n * - The callers still measure reputation themselves, with metadata the\n *   firewall cannot see (account age, comment history), and pass that\n *   measurement per call; the firewall runs the ONE reputation gate, so the\n *   trust event, the policy checks and the `wouldRefuse` count all use the one\n *   enforced tier. The callers cross-check that the action-shaped run enforced\n *   the tier the input-shaped run did, and fail closed if not.\n * - Facts that vary per call — the caller's access posture, the action, the\n *   repository label set and, when a source for one exists, the maintainer\n *   allowlist — are passed per call via `FirewallProcessOptions`, never held on\n *   the shared instance. No allowlist source exists today (no config field, no\n *   env var), so the callers pass none and `isAllowlisted` stays absent.\n *\n * @module dogfooding/untrusted-input-firewall\n */\n\nimport type { Result } from '../core/index.js';\nimport { ok, err, createLogger } from '../core/index.js';\nimport type { IAuditLogger } from '../audit/audit-types.js';\nimport { HostileInputFirewall } from '../security/firewall/firewall-pipeline.js';\nimport type { FirewallResult } from '../security/firewall/firewall-pipeline.js';\nimport type { FirewallError, FirewallProcessOptions } from '../security/firewall/firewall-types.js';\nimport type { FirewallPolicyMode } from '../security/firewall/firewall-policy-mode.js';\nimport { createGitHubAdapter } from '../security/firewall/github-adapter.js';\nimport type { GitHubInput } from '../security/firewall/github-adapter.js';\nimport type { AgentAction, SourceCitation } from '../security/action-schema.js';\nimport type { Violation } from '../security/policy-gate.js';\nimport type { TrustTier } from '../security/trust-types.js';\n\nconst logger = createLogger({ component: 'UntrustedInputFirewall' });\n\nlet singleton: HostileInputFirewall | undefined;\n/** The process's durable audit logger, when the bootstrap has one (#4992 review). */\nlet configuredAuditLogger: IAuditLogger | undefined;\n\n/**\n * Supplies the process-wide durable audit logger to the shared firewall.\n *\n * The MCP server creates exactly one `AuditLogger` at startup\n * (`initializeAuditLogger`, gated on `security.audit.enabled`) and threads it\n * by DI; there is no global accessor. `initV2PipelineSubsystems` calls this\n * with that logger so trust events on the live paths reach the hash-chained\n * log instead of an in-memory buffer the next call clears. Without it — the\n * CLI review path, or audit disabled — the firewall reports `auditSink: 'none'`\n * and claims no emission.\n *\n * Replaces the cached instance so the sink cannot be missed by an instance\n * built before bootstrap reached this point.\n */\nexport function configureUntrustedInputFirewall(deps: { auditLogger?: IAuditLogger }): void {\n  configuredAuditLogger = deps.auditLogger;\n  singleton = undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * The process-wide firewall, constructed on first use.\n *\n * `contentDowngrade: false` is what keeps the default mode pass-through: the\n * firewall's own classifier is content-aware (injection-bearing content from a\n * Tier-2 author classifies as Tier 4), while the production paths classify by\n * role and route content signals through reputation gating, which has its own\n * rollout knob (`NEXUS_REPUTATION_GATING`). The injection flags are still\n * measured and recorded by the sanitization stage; only the tier downgrade is\n * withheld so the recorded `trustTier` is unchanged under `off`.\n *\n * The reputation stage stays off: the callers assess reputation themselves\n * with metadata the firewall never sees. The corroboration stage is ON\n * (#6309, panel option R): it defaults to off because the firewall is a\n * published API, but the live paths validate corroboration per action and\n * that check runs here, through `validateActionCorroboration`, not beside the\n * firewall. `policyMode` is resolved from `NEXUS_FIREWALL_POLICY` once, at\n * construction.\n */\nexport function getUntrustedInputFirewall(): HostileInputFirewall {\n  singleton ??= new HostileInputFirewall({\n    adapter: createGitHubAdapter(),\n    contentDowngrade: false,\n    stages: { corroboration: true },\n    ...(configuredAuditLogger !== undefined ? { auditLogger: configuredAuditLogger } : {}),\n  });\n  return singleton;\n}\n\n// @export-no-consumer-yet — see #4992. Test-only seam: drops or replaces the\n// cached instance so a test can re-read the env or observe the audit trail.\nexport function _setUntrustedInputFirewallForTests(\n  firewall: HostileInputFirewall | undefined\n): void {\n  singleton = firewall;\n}\n\n/**\n * Runs one untrusted GitHub payload through the shared firewall.\n *\n * Maps the firewall's typed error into the `Result<_, Error>` shape the\n * callers already return, failing closed on every code: an unparseable payload\n * (`EXTRACTION_FAILED`) is as much a reason not to proceed as a policy\n * refusal (`POLICY_REFUSED`, only reachable under `enforce`). Under `audit` a\n * would-be refusal is logged and the result is returned unchanged — that log\n * line is the telemetry an operator sizes the flip to `enforce` on.\n */\nexport function runUntrustedInputFirewall(\n  input: GitHubInput,\n  options: FirewallProcessOptions\n): Result<FirewallResult, Error> {\n  const result = processAndLog(input, options);\n  if (!result.ok) return err(asError(result.error));\n  return ok(result.value);\n}\n\n/**\n * The firewall's verdict on ONE action a live caller intends to take (#5383),\n * read from `FirewallResult.policy` — the same `evaluatePolicy` decision the\n * callers used to compute beside the firewall, now computed inside it and\n * recorded on the audit trail as a `policy_gate` event.\n *\n * Two shapes, because the mode changes who refuses, never what was decided:\n *\n * - `refused: false` — under `off` and `audit` the firewall returns the\n *   decision and the CALLER enforces it, exactly as it did with the direct\n *   call: `allowed` is `evaluatePolicy`'s own verdict, whatever the mode.\n *   `wouldRefuse` is `audit`'s telemetry.\n * - `refused: true` — under `enforce` the firewall refused the action itself\n *   (`POLICY_REFUSED`). `violations` is the blocking list it refused on, so the\n *   caller's record can still name the rules; `requiresApproval` is absent\n *   because the decision never reached the caller.\n *\n * Either way `allowed` is what the caller acts on, so a per-action decision\n * cannot silently weaken when the mode is `off`.\n */\nexport type FirewallActionDecision =\n  | {\n      readonly refused: false;\n      readonly allowed: boolean;\n      readonly requiresApproval: boolean;\n      readonly violations: readonly Violation[];\n      /** The tier this run enforced — equal to the caller's `enforcedTier`, or the call failed. */\n      readonly effectiveTrustTier: TrustTier;\n      readonly policyMode: FirewallPolicyMode;\n      readonly wouldRefuse: boolean;\n    }\n  | {\n      readonly refused: true;\n      readonly allowed: false;\n      readonly violations: readonly Violation[];\n      readonly policyMode: 'enforce';\n    };\n\n/**\n * Runs one action through the shared firewall and returns its policy verdict.\n *\n * `enforcedTier` is the tier the caller's classification run enforced (the\n * reputation gate's, #3122) and stamped on the action's citations. The\n * firewall recomputes that gate here from the same measurement; a run that\n * enforces a DIFFERENT tier fails the call, because a record that disagrees\n * with what was enforced is worse than none (#5719).\n *\n * Fails closed — an `Error`, not a verdict — wherever no verdict exists: that\n * tier disagreement, a non-policy firewall error (an unparseable payload), and\n * a run whose `policy` is absent or `scope: 'context'`, which means the policy\n * stage did not evaluate this action. None of these is \"denied\"; recording\n * `allowed: false` for them would put a measurement where none was taken.\n */\nexport function evaluateActionThroughFirewall(\n  input: GitHubInput,\n  options: FirewallProcessOptions & {\n    readonly action: AgentAction;\n    readonly enforcedTier: TrustTier;\n  }\n): Result<FirewallActionDecision, Error> {\n  const { enforcedTier, ...processOptions } = options;\n  const result = processAndLog(input, processOptions);\n  if (!result.ok) {\n    const { code, stage, violations } = result.error;\n    if (code !== 'POLICY_REFUSED' || stage !== 'policy') return err(asError(result.error));\n    // A refusal that names no rule cannot be recorded as a policy decision.\n    if (violations === undefined || violations.length === 0) return err(asError(result.error));\n    return ok({ refused: true, allowed: false, violations, policyMode: 'enforce' });\n  }\n  const { policy, policyMode, wouldRefuse, effectiveTrustTier } = result.value;\n  if (policy?.scope !== 'action') {\n    const why = policy === undefined ? 'the policy stage is disabled' : `scope was ${policy.scope}`;\n    return err(\n      new Error(\n        `Untrusted-input firewall did not evaluate policy for action ${options.action.type} (${why})`\n      )\n    );\n  }\n  if (effectiveTrustTier !== enforcedTier) {\n    return err(\n      new Error(\n        `Untrusted-input firewall enforced tier ${effectiveTrustTier} for action ` +\n          `${options.action.type} but tier ${enforcedTier} for the classification`\n      )\n    );\n  }\n  return ok({\n    refused: false,\n    allowed: policy.allowed,\n    requiresApproval: policy.requiresApproval,\n    violations: policy.violations,\n    effectiveTrustTier,\n    policyMode,\n    wouldRefuse,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * The firewall's corroboration verdict on ONE action (#6309), read from\n * `HostileInputFirewall.validateAction` — the same `validateCorroboration`\n * result the callers used to compute beside the firewall, now computed by its\n * corroboration stage under the one `NEXUS_FIREWALL_POLICY` mode.\n *\n * The same two shapes as {@link FirewallActionDecision}, for the same reason:\n *\n * - `refused: false` — under `off` and `audit` the firewall returns the\n *   validator's verdict and the CALLER records it (`corroborated`,\n *   `INSUFFICIENT_CORROBORATION`), exactly as it did with the direct call.\n *   `wouldRefuse` is `audit`'s telemetry; `missing` names the unmet\n *   requirements it would refuse on, so a soak can measure the refusal rate.\n * - `refused: true` — under `enforce` the firewall refused the action itself\n *   (`POLICY_REFUSED` at stage `corroboration`). `missing` is what it refused\n *   on, so the caller's record can still name it.\n */\nexport type FirewallCorroborationDecision =\n  | {\n      readonly refused: false;\n      readonly satisfied: boolean;\n      readonly missing: readonly string[];\n      readonly corroboratingSources: readonly SourceCitation[];\n      readonly clearedOnlyByUnverifiedSources: boolean;\n      readonly policyMode: FirewallPolicyMode;\n      readonly wouldRefuse: boolean;\n    }\n  | {\n      readonly refused: true;\n      readonly satisfied: false;\n      readonly stage: 'corroboration';\n      readonly missing: readonly string[];\n      readonly policyMode: 'enforce';\n    };\n\n/**\n * Runs one action through the shared firewall's corroboration stage.\n *\n * Fails closed — an `Error`, not a verdict — where no verdict exists. The\n * named empty case is `evaluated: false`: the stage did not run, so neither\n * `corroborated: true` nor `corroborated: false` is an honest record of it;\n * `satisfied` is never read off it. The shared instance enables the stage, so\n * on the live paths this is reachable only through a replaced instance, and it\n * fails the same way an unevaluated policy stage does. A refusal that names\n * nothing missing is likewise an error, not a corroboration decision.\n */\nexport function validateActionCorroboration(\n  action: AgentAction\n): Result<FirewallCorroborationDecision, Error> {\n  const result = getUntrustedInputFirewall().validateAction(action);\n  if (!result.ok) {\n    const { code, stage, missing } = result.error;\n    if (code !== 'POLICY_REFUSED' || stage !== 'corroboration') return err(asError(result.error));\n    if (missing === undefined || missing.length === 0) return err(asError(result.error));\n    logger.warn('Untrusted-input firewall refused an uncorroborated action (enforce mode)', {\n      actionType: action.type,\n      stage,\n      missing,\n    });\n    return ok({ refused: true, satisfied: false, stage, missing, policyMode: 'enforce' });\n  }\n  const validation = result.value;\n  if (!validation.evaluated) {\n    return err(\n      new Error(\n        `Untrusted-input firewall did not evaluate corroboration for action ${action.type} ` +\n          `(${validation.reason})`\n      )\n    );\n  }\n  if (validation.wouldRefuse) {\n    logger.warn('Untrusted-input firewall would refuse under enforce (audit mode)', {\n      actionType: action.type,\n      stage: 'corroboration',\n      missing: validation.missing,\n    });\n  }\n  return ok({\n    refused: false,\n    satisfied: validation.satisfied,\n    missing: validation.missing,\n    corroboratingSources: validation.corroboratingSources,\n    clearedOnlyByUnverifiedSources: validation.clearedOnlyByUnverifiedSources,\n    policyMode: validation.policyMode,\n    wouldRefuse: validation.wouldRefuse,\n  });\n}\n\n/** One `process()` call site for both input entries, so the log lines cannot drift. */\nfunction processAndLog(\n  input: GitHubInput,\n  options: FirewallProcessOptions\n): Result<FirewallResult, FirewallError> {\n  const result = getUntrustedInputFirewall().process(input, options);\n  if (!result.ok) {\n    logger.warn('Untrusted-input firewall rejected the input', {\n      user: input.username,\n      sourceType: input.type,\n      ...(options.action !== undefined ? { actionType: options.action.type } : {}),\n      code: result.error.code,\n      stage: result.error.stage,\n    });\n    return result;\n  }\n  if (result.value.wouldRefuse) {\n    // Names every blocking rule and the checks that could NOT run (#5380), so\n    // the telemetry sizes the flip to `enforce` on what was measured.\n    const policy = result.value.policy;\n    logger.warn('Untrusted-input firewall would refuse under enforce (audit mode)', {\n      user: input.username,\n      sourceType: input.type,\n      ...(options.action !== undefined ? { actionType: options.action.type } : {}),\n      trustTier: result.value.effectiveTrustTier,\n      scope: policy?.scope,\n      rules: policy?.violations.filter((v) => v.severity === 'block').map((v) => v.rule),\n      unmeasured: policy?.unmeasured,\n    });\n  }\n  return result;\n}\n\nfunction asError({ code, stage, message }: FirewallError): Error {\n  return new Error(`Untrusted-input firewall ${code} at stage ${stage}: ${message}`);\n}\n\n/**\n * The one mapping from a caller's issue or PR metadata to the firewall's\n * input (#5383), so the classification run and every per-action run of one\n * caller are fed the same payload by construction.\n */\nexport function firewallInputFor(\n  type: GitHubInput['type'],\n  source: {\n    readonly author: string;\n    readonly authorAssociation: string;\n    readonly title: string;\n    readonly body: string;\n  }\n): GitHubInput {\n  return {\n    type,\n    username: source.author,\n    authorAssociation: source.authorAssociation,\n    title: source.title,\n    body: source.body,\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/scm - URL parsers\n *\n * Pure parsers for GitHub PR and issue URLs. Lifted from\n * `dogfooding/github-client.ts` as part of the #2553 consolidation —\n * URL parsing has no transport-layer dependency, so it belongs in the\n * canonical SCM module alongside the rest of the GitHub surface.\n *\n * @module scm/url-parsers\n */\n\nimport type { Result } from '../core/index.js';\nimport { ok, err } from '../core/index.js';\n\n/**\n * Parses a PR URL into owner, repo, and number. Accepts:\n *\n * - `https://github.com/owner/repo/pull/123`\n * - `https://www.github.com/owner/repo/pull/123`\n * - `owner/repo#123`\n * - `owner/repo/pull/123`\n */\nexport function parsePRUrl(url: string): Result<\n  {\n    owner: string;\n    repo: string;\n    prNumber: number;\n  },\n  Error\n> {\n  const httpPattern = /github\\.com\\/([^/]+)\\/([^/]+)\\/pull\\/(\\d+)/;\n  const shortPattern = /^([^/]+)\\/([^/#]+)(?:#|\\/pull\\/)(\\d+)$/;\n\n  const match = httpPattern.exec(url) ?? shortPattern.exec(url);\n\n  if (match === null) {\n    return err(new Error(`Invalid PR URL format: ${url}`));\n  }\n\n  const owner = match[1];\n  const repo = match[2];\n  const numberStr = match[3];\n\n  if (owner === undefined || repo === undefined || numberStr === undefined) {\n    return err(new Error(`Invalid PR URL format: ${url}`));\n  }\n\n  const prNumber = parseInt(numberStr, 10);\n\n  if (isNaN(prNumber)) {\n    return err(new Error(`Invalid PR URL format: ${url}`));\n  }\n\n  return ok({ owner, repo, prNumber });\n}\n\n/**\n * Parses an issue URL into owner, repo, and number. Accepts:\n *\n * - `https://github.com/owner/repo/issues/123`\n * - `owner/repo#123`\n */\nexport function parseIssueUrl(url: string): Result<\n  {\n    owner: string;\n    repo: string;\n    issueNumber: number;\n  },\n  Error\n> {\n  const httpPattern = /github\\.com\\/([^/]+)\\/([^/]+)\\/issues\\/(\\d+)/;\n  const shortPattern = /^([^/]+)\\/([^/#]+)#(\\d+)$/;\n\n  const match = httpPattern.exec(url) ?? shortPattern.exec(url);\n\n  if (match === null) {\n    return err(new Error(`Invalid issue URL format: ${url}`));\n  }\n\n  const owner = match[1];\n  const repo = match[2];\n  const numberStr = match[3];\n\n  if (owner === undefined || repo === undefined || numberStr === undefined) {\n    return err(new Error(`Invalid issue URL format: ${url}`));\n  }\n\n  const issueNumber = parseInt(numberStr, 10);\n\n  if (isNaN(issueNumber)) {\n    return err(new Error(`Invalid issue URL format: ${url}`));\n  }\n\n  return ok({ owner, repo, issueNumber });\n}\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/scm - GitHub Provider Trait Implementations\n *\n * Implements IScmReviewer and IScmUserInfo trait interfaces for GitHub.\n * Uses `gh api` for REST API access to get detailed data.\n *\n * @module scm/github-provider-traits\n * (Source: Issue #1136 — Centralized SCM Provider Module)\n */\n\nimport type { Result } from '../core/index.js';\nimport { ok, err, createLogger, getErrorMessage } from '../core/index.js';\nimport type {\n  IScmReviewer,\n  IScmUserInfo,\n  ScmPullRequestDetail,\n  ScmIssueDetail,\n  ScmCommentDetail,\n  ScmReviewDecision,\n  ScmUserMetadata,\n  ScmFileChange,\n} from './types.js';\nimport { ScmError } from './types.js';\nimport { GitHubProvider } from './github-provider.js';\nimport { CLI_SUBPROCESS_TIMEOUTS } from '../config/timeouts.js';\n\nconst logger = createLogger({ component: 'GitHubProviderTraits' });\n\n// ============================================================================\n// gh API JSON types (internal)\n// ============================================================================\n\ninterface GhApiPrJson {\n  number: number;\n  title: string;\n  body: string | null;\n  html_url: string;\n  user: { login: string };\n  author_association: string;\n  base: { ref: string };\n  head: { ref: string; sha: string };\n  draft: boolean;\n  labels: Array<{ name: string }>;\n  additions: number;\n  deletions: number;\n}\n\ninterface GhApiFileJson {\n  filename: string;\n  status: string;\n  additions: number;\n  deletions: number;\n  patch?: string;\n  previous_filename?: string;\n}\n\ninterface GhApiIssueJson {\n  number: number;\n  title: string;\n  body: string | null;\n  user: { login: string };\n  author_association: string;\n  state: string;\n  html_url: string;\n  labels: Array<{ name: string }>;\n  created_at: string;\n}\n\ninterface GhApiCommentJson {\n  id: number;\n  body: string;\n  user: { login: string };\n  author_association: string;\n  created_at: string;\n}\n\ninterface GhApiUserJson {\n  login: string;\n  name: string | null;\n  company: string | null;\n  followers: number;\n  following: number;\n  public_repos: number;\n  created_at: string;\n}\n\n// ============================================================================\n// gh API executor\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Resolves a GitHub token from env vars or `gh auth token`.\n * Caches the result to avoid repeated subprocess calls.\n */\nlet cachedGhToken: string | undefined | null = null;\nlet ghTokenPromise: Promise<string | undefined> | undefined;\n\n/** Reset the cached token (for testing). */\nexport function resetGhTokenCache(): void {\n  cachedGhToken = null;\n  ghTokenPromise = undefined;\n}\n\nasync function resolveGhToken(): Promise<string | undefined> {\n  if (cachedGhToken !== null) return cachedGhToken;\n\n  ghTokenPromise ??= resolveGhTokenImpl().finally(() => {\n    ghTokenPromise = undefined;\n  });\n  return ghTokenPromise;\n}\n\nasync function resolveGhTokenImpl(): Promise<string | undefined> {\n  const envToken = process.env['GITHUB_TOKEN'] ?? process.env['GH_TOKEN'];\n  if (envToken !== undefined && envToken.length > 0) {\n    cachedGhToken = envToken;\n    return envToken;\n  }\n\n  try {\n    const { execFile } = await import('node:child_process');\n    const { promisify } = await import('node:util');\n    const exec = promisify(execFile);\n    const { stdout } = await exec('gh', ['auth', 'token'], { timeout: 5_000 });\n    const token = stdout.trim();\n    cachedGhToken = token.length > 0 ? token : undefined;\n  } catch {\n    cachedGhToken = undefined;\n  }\n  return cachedGhToken;\n}\n\n/** Page size for paginated list endpoints; GitHub's maximum, and its default is 30. */\nconst GH_API_PAGE_SIZE = 100;\n\nasync function execGhApiRaw(args: readonly string[]): Promise<Result<string, ScmError>> {\n  const { execFile } = await import('node:child_process');\n  const { promisify } = await import('node:util');\n  const exec = promisify(execFile);\n\n  // Inject token into subprocess environment to prevent keyring access failures\n  const token = await resolveGhToken();\n  const env = token !== undefined ? { ...process.env, GH_TOKEN: token } : undefined;\n\n  try {\n    const { stdout } = await exec('gh', [...args], {\n      maxBuffer: 10 * 1024 * 1024,\n      timeout: CLI_SUBPROCESS_TIMEOUTS.ghCommandMs,\n      ...(env !== undefined ? { env } : {}),\n    });\n    return ok(stdout.trim());\n  } catch (error) {\n    const execError = error as { message: string; stderr?: string };\n    return err(\n      new ScmError(`gh api failed: ${execError.message}`, 'github', undefined, {\n        endpoint: args[1] ?? '',\n        stderr: execError.stderr,\n      })\n    );\n  }\n}\n\nasync function execGhApi(endpoint: string, method?: string): Promise<Result<string, ScmError>> {\n  const args = ['api', endpoint];\n  if (method !== undefined) args.push('--method', method);\n  return execGhApiRaw(args);\n}\n\n/**\n * Fetch EVERY page of a `gh api` list endpoint, as one object per line.\n *\n * A bare `gh api <list-endpoint>` returns GitHub's default first page of 30 and\n * discards the `Link` cursor, so `getPullRequestDetail` saw at most 30 changed\n * files of any PR and `listCommentDetails` at most the 30 OLDEST comments —\n * both returned `ok(...)` with nothing to say a page had been left behind. The\n * review pipeline then computed `reviewCoverage: 'full'` against that truncated\n * denominator and posted \"30 of 30 files reviewed\" on a 120-file PR.\n *\n * `--paginate` alone is not enough: on a JSON-array endpoint it concatenates one\n * array per page, which is not valid JSON. `--slurp` would fix that but landed\n * in gh 2.51 and this repo runs against 2.45. `--jq '.[]'` emits one compact\n * object per line across all pages, which parses on every version.\n */\nasync function execGhApiList<T>(endpoint: string): Promise<Result<T[], ScmError>> {\n  const separator = endpoint.includes('?') ? '&' : '?';\n  const result = await execGhApiRaw([\n    'api',\n    `${endpoint}${separator}per_page=${String(GH_API_PAGE_SIZE)}`,\n    '--paginate',\n    '--jq',\n    '.[]',\n  ]);\n  if (!result.ok) return result;\n\n  // An endpoint with no items yields empty stdout. `''.split('\\n')` is `['']`,\n  // so the filter is what keeps \"no comments\" from parsing as one bad line.\n  const lines = result.value.split('\\n').filter((l) => l.trim() !== '');\n  try {\n    return ok(lines.map((l) => JSON.parse(l) as T));\n  } catch (error) {\n    return err(\n      new ScmError(\n        `gh api returned unparseable page data: ${getErrorMessage(error)}`,\n        'github',\n        undefined,\n        {\n          endpoint,\n        }\n      )\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Mappers\n// ============================================================================\n\nfunction mapFileChange(raw: GhApiFileJson): ScmFileChange {\n  const statusMap: Record<string, ScmFileChange['status']> = {\n    added: 'added',\n    removed: 'removed',\n    modified: 'modified',\n    renamed: 'renamed',\n    copied: 'copied',\n    changed: 'changed',\n    unchanged: 'unchanged',\n  };\n  const status = statusMap[raw.status] ?? 'unknown';\n  return {\n    filename: raw.filename,\n    status,\n    ...(status === 'unknown' ? { rawStatus: raw.status } : {}),\n    additions: raw.additions,\n    deletions: raw.deletions,\n    ...(raw.patch !== undefined ? { patch: raw.patch } : {}),\n    ...(raw.previous_filename !== undefined ? { previousFilename: raw.previous_filename } : {}),\n  };\n}\n\n// ============================================================================\n// GitHubReviewer — implements IScmReviewer\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * GitHub-specific reviewer that adds PR detail and review capabilities\n * to a GitHubProvider. Implements IScmReviewer trait.\n *\n * @example\n * ```typescript\n * const provider = createGitHubProvider('owner/repo');\n * const reviewer = new GitHubReviewer(provider);\n * const detail = await reviewer.getPullRequestDetail(42);\n * ```\n */\nexport class GitHubReviewer implements IScmReviewer {\n  constructor(private readonly provider: GitHubProvider) {}\n\n  async getPullRequestDetail(prNumber: number): Promise<Result<ScmPullRequestDetail, ScmError>> {\n    const repo = this.provider.repo;\n    logger.debug('Getting PR detail', { repo, prNumber });\n\n    const prResult = await execGhApi(`repos/${repo}/pulls/${String(prNumber)}`);\n    if (!prResult.ok) return prResult;\n\n    const filesResult = await execGhApiList<GhApiFileJson>(\n      `repos/${repo}/pulls/${String(prNumber)}/files`\n    );\n    if (!filesResult.ok) return filesResult;\n    const files = filesResult.value;\n\n    try {\n      const pr = JSON.parse(prResult.value) as GhApiPrJson;\n\n      return ok({\n        number: pr.number,\n        title: pr.title,\n        body: pr.body ?? '',\n        author: pr.user.login,\n        base: pr.base.ref,\n        head: pr.head.ref,\n        url: pr.html_url,\n        draft: pr.draft,\n        authorAssociation: pr.author_association,\n        labels: pr.labels.map((l) => l.name),\n        files: files.map(mapFileChange),\n        additions: pr.additions,\n        deletions: pr.deletions,\n        headSha: pr.head.sha,\n      });\n    } catch {\n      return err(new ScmError('Failed to parse PR detail JSON', 'github'));\n    }\n  }\n\n  async createReview(\n    prNumber: number,\n    body: string,\n    decision: ScmReviewDecision\n  ): Promise<Result<void, ScmError>> {\n    const repo = this.provider.repo;\n    const eventMap: Record<ScmReviewDecision, string> = {\n      approve: 'APPROVE',\n      request_changes: 'REQUEST_CHANGES',\n      comment: 'COMMENT',\n    };\n\n    logger.info('Creating review', { repo, prNumber, decision });\n\n    const { execFile } = await import('node:child_process');\n    const { promisify } = await import('node:util');\n    const exec = promisify(execFile);\n\n    try {\n      await exec(\n        'gh',\n        [\n          'api',\n          `repos/${repo}/pulls/${String(prNumber)}/reviews`,\n          '--method',\n          'POST',\n          '-f',\n          `body=${body}`,\n          '-f',\n          `event=${eventMap[decision]}`,\n        ],\n        { maxBuffer: 10 * 1024 * 1024, timeout: CLI_SUBPROCESS_TIMEOUTS.ghCommandMs }\n      );\n      return ok(undefined);\n    } catch (error) {\n      const execError = error as { message: string };\n      return err(new ScmError(`Failed to create review: ${execError.message}`, 'github'));\n    }\n  }\n\n  async getIssueDetail(issueNumber: number): Promise<Result<ScmIssueDetail, ScmError>> {\n    const repo = this.provider.repo;\n    logger.debug('Getting issue detail', { repo, issueNumber });\n\n    const result = await execGhApi(`repos/${repo}/issues/${String(issueNumber)}`);\n    if (!result.ok) return result;\n\n    try {\n      const raw = JSON.parse(result.value) as GhApiIssueJson;\n      return ok({\n        number: raw.number,\n        title: raw.title,\n        body: raw.body ?? '',\n        labels: raw.labels.map((l) => l.name),\n        author: raw.user.login,\n        createdAt: raw.created_at,\n        authorAssociation: raw.author_association,\n        state: raw.state,\n        url: raw.html_url,\n      });\n    } catch {\n      return err(new ScmError('Failed to parse issue detail JSON', 'github'));\n    }\n  }\n\n  async listCommentDetails(\n    issueNumber: number\n  ): Promise<Result<readonly ScmCommentDetail[], ScmError>> {\n    const repo = this.provider.repo;\n    logger.debug('Listing comment details', { repo, issueNumber });\n\n    const result = await execGhApiList<GhApiCommentJson>(\n      `repos/${repo}/issues/${String(issueNumber)}/comments`\n    );\n    if (!result.ok) return result;\n\n    try {\n      const comments = result.value;\n      return ok(\n        comments.map((c) => ({\n          id: c.id,\n          body: c.body,\n          author: c.user.login,\n          createdAt: c.created_at,\n          authorAssociation: c.author_association,\n        }))\n      );\n    } catch {\n      return err(new ScmError('Failed to parse comment details JSON', 'github'));\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n// ============================================================================\n// GitHubUserInfo — implements IScmUserInfo\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * GitHub-specific user info provider. Implements IScmUserInfo trait.\n */\nexport class GitHubUserInfo implements IScmUserInfo {\n  async fetchUserMetadata(username: string): Promise<Result<ScmUserMetadata, ScmError>> {\n    logger.debug('Fetching user metadata', { username });\n\n    const result = await execGhApi(`users/${username}`);\n    if (!result.ok) return result;\n\n    try {\n      const raw = JSON.parse(result.value) as GhApiUserJson;\n      return ok({\n        login: raw.login,\n        name: raw.name,\n        company: raw.company,\n        followers: raw.followers,\n        following: raw.following,\n        publicRepos: raw.public_repos,\n        createdAt: raw.created_at,\n      });\n    } catch {\n      return err(new ScmError('Failed to parse user metadata JSON', 'github'));\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Factory — compose provider with traits\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Creates a full-capability GitHub provider with all traits.\n *\n * Returns an object that implements IScmProvider & IScmReviewer & IScmUserInfo.\n * Consumers can narrow the type to only the traits they need.\n *\n * @example\n * ```typescript\n * const provider = createFullGitHubProvider('owner/repo');\n * // Use as ReviewCapableProvider\n * const detail = await provider.getPullRequestDetail(42);\n * // Use as IScmUserInfo\n * const user = await provider.fetchUserMetadata('octocat');\n * ```\n */\nexport function createFullGitHubProvider(\n  repo: string\n): GitHubProvider & IScmReviewer & IScmUserInfo {\n  const base = new GitHubProvider(repo);\n  const reviewer = new GitHubReviewer(base);\n  const userInfo = new GitHubUserInfo();\n\n  // Compose all trait methods onto the provider\n  return Object.assign(base, {\n    getPullRequestDetail: reviewer.getPullRequestDetail.bind(reviewer),\n    createReview: reviewer.createReview.bind(reviewer),\n    getIssueDetail: reviewer.getIssueDetail.bind(reviewer),\n    listCommentDetails: reviewer.listCommentDetails.bind(reviewer),\n    fetchUserMetadata: userInfo.fetchUserMetadata.bind(userInfo),\n  });\n}\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/dogfooding - Issue Triage Types\n *\n * Type definitions for automated GitHub issue triage using\n * the security pipeline (trust classification, corroboration,\n * reputation model).\n *\n * @module dogfooding/issue-triage-types\n * (Source: Issue #828 — Wire remaining security modules)\n */\n\nimport { z } from 'zod';\nimport type { ReputationAssessment } from '../security/reputation-model.js';\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Issue Metadata\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * GitHub issue metadata from the API.\n */\nexport interface IssueMetadata {\n  /** Issue number */\n  readonly number: number;\n  /** Issue title */\n  readonly title: string;\n  /** Issue body/description */\n  readonly body: string;\n  /** Author username */\n  readonly author: string;\n  /** GitHub API author_association (e.g., 'OWNER', 'COLLABORATOR', 'NONE') */\n  readonly authorAssociation: string;\n  /** Repository owner */\n  readonly owner: string;\n  /** Repository name */\n  readonly repo: string;\n  /** Issue URL */\n  readonly url: string;\n  /** Issue state ('open' | 'closed') */\n  readonly state: string;\n  /** Issue labels */\n  readonly labels: readonly string[];\n  /** Creation timestamp (ISO 8601) */\n  readonly createdAt: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * GitHub issue comment from the API.\n */\nexport interface IssueComment {\n  /** Comment ID */\n  readonly id: number;\n  /** Comment body */\n  readonly body: string;\n  /** Author username */\n  readonly author: string;\n  /** GitHub API author_association */\n  readonly authorAssociation: string;\n  /** Creation timestamp (ISO 8601) */\n  readonly createdAt: string;\n}\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Issue Classification\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Issue category determined by keyword-based classification.\n */\nexport type IssueCategory =\n  'bug' | 'feature' | 'question' | 'documentation' | 'security' | 'performance';\n\n/**\n * Display names for issue categories.\n */\nexport const CATEGORY_DISPLAY_NAMES: Record<IssueCategory, string> = {\n  bug: 'Bug Report',\n  feature: 'Feature Request',\n  question: 'Question',\n  documentation: 'Documentation',\n  security: 'Security',\n  performance: 'Performance',\n};\n\n/**\n * Emoji for issue categories (GitHub markdown).\n */\nexport const CATEGORY_EMOJI: Record<IssueCategory, string> = {\n  bug: ':bug:',\n  feature: ':sparkles:',\n  question: ':question:',\n  documentation: ':books:',\n  security: ':lock:',\n  performance: ':zap:',\n};\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Triage Configuration\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Configuration for issue triage.\n */\nexport interface IssueTriageConfig {\n  /** Whether to run in dry-run mode (no GitHub mutations). Default: true */\n  readonly dryRun: boolean;\n  /** GitHub token for API access */\n  readonly githubToken?: string | undefined;\n  /** Maximum comments to fetch per issue */\n  readonly maxComments: number;\n  /** Whether to use reputation model for trust assessment */\n  readonly enableReputation: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Default issue triage configuration.\n * Read-only by default — proposes actions without executing them.\n */\nexport const DEFAULT_ISSUE_TRIAGE_CONFIG: IssueTriageConfig = {\n  dryRun: true,\n  maxComments: 50,\n  enableReputation: true,\n};\n\n/**\n * Zod schema for issue triage configuration.\n */\nexport const IssueTriageConfigSchema = z.object({\n  dryRun: z.boolean().default(true),\n  githubToken: z.string().optional(),\n  maxComments: z.number().int().min(1).max(100).default(50),\n  enableReputation: z.boolean().default(true),\n});\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Proposed Actions\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * A proposed action from the triage pipeline.\n * All actions are validated through the security pipeline before output.\n */\nexport interface ProposedAction {\n  /** Action type (matches AgentActionType from security/action-schema) */\n  readonly type: string;\n  /** Human-readable description of the proposed action */\n  readonly description: string;\n  /**\n   * Whether this action was approved by the policy gate. Also `false` when the\n   * firewall REFUSED the action under `NEXUS_FIREWALL_POLICY=enforce` — at the\n   * policy stage (#5383) or the corroboration stage (#6309); `details` names\n   * the rules and, for the latter, `refusedAtStage: 'corroboration'`.\n   */\n  readonly policyApproved: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Whether corroboration requirements were satisfied — the validator's own\n   * verdict under every mode; `enforce` additionally refuses on `false`.\n   */\n  readonly corroborated: boolean;\n  /** Details specific to the action type */\n  readonly details: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Trust Assessment\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Trust assessment summary for the triage result.\n */\nexport interface TrustAssessment {\n  /** Author's trust tier (1-4) */\n  readonly trustTier: string;\n  /** Author's GitHub role */\n  readonly userRole: string;\n  /**\n   * Whether the author is on the maintainer allowlist — present only when an\n   * allowlist was consulted (#4992). Absent means \"no allowlist was consulted\",\n   * which is the state on every live path today; it was previously recorded\n   * as `false` without being measured.\n   */\n  readonly isAllowlisted?: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Whether a durable `AuditLogger` was configured for this process (#4992\n   * review). `configured` — the trust event was handed to it; delivery to the\n   * hash chain is subject to the logger's own severity filter (trust events\n   * are `info`), queue and fail-loud flush, and is not confirmed per call.\n   * `none` — no audit logger (audit disabled, or the CLI path), so the event\n   * exists only in the firewall's in-memory trail.\n   */\n  readonly auditSink: 'configured' | 'none';\n  /** Reputation score (0-100) if reputation model is enabled */\n  readonly reputationScore?: number | undefined;\n  /** Coverage of reputation dimensions; `unmeasured` is distinct from zero activity. */\n  readonly coverage?: ReputationAssessment['coverage'] | undefined;\n  /** Suspicious signals detected */\n  readonly suspiciousSignals: readonly string[];\n  /** Whether the author is flagged as suspicious */\n  readonly isSuspicious: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Tier the policy gate ACTUALLY enforced (#3122). Equals `trustTier` under\n   * `audit`/`off`; equals `reputationReconciledTier` under `enforce`. This is\n   * the tier `proposedActions[].policyApproved` was decided against.\n   */\n  readonly enforcedTrustTier?: string | undefined;\n  /**\n   * Tier reputation reconciliation computed — what `enforce` mode WOULD gate on\n   * (#3122). May exceed `trustTier` (more restrictive) when reputation demotes.\n   * Under `audit`/`off` this is reported for telemetry but NOT enforced — read\n   * `enforcedTrustTier` for the tier actually in effect.\n   */\n  readonly reputationReconciledTier?: string | undefined;\n  /** Reputation-gating rollout mode applied: `off` | `audit` | `enforce` (#3122). */\n  readonly gatingMode?: string | undefined;\n}\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Triage Result\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Complete triage result for a GitHub issue.\n */\nexport interface IssueTriageResult {\n  /** Issue number */\n  readonly issueNumber: number;\n  /** Repository (owner/repo) */\n  readonly repository: string;\n  /** Proposed actions (validated through security pipeline) */\n  readonly proposedActions: readonly ProposedAction[];\n  /** Trust assessment of the issue author */\n  readonly trustAssessment: TrustAssessment;\n  /** Detected issue category */\n  readonly category: IssueCategory;\n  /** Category confidence (0-1) */\n  readonly categoryConfidence: number;\n  /** Total execution time in ms */\n  readonly totalDurationMs: number;\n  /** Timestamp of triage (ISO 8601) */\n  readonly timestamp: string;\n}\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/dogfooding - Issue Triage Helpers\n *\n * Helper functions for issue classification, label extraction, per-action\n * validation and result formatting. Pure except `validateActionsThroughFirewall`,\n * which runs the shared untrusted-input firewall (#5383).\n *\n * @module dogfooding/issue-triage-helpers\n * (Source: Issue #828 — Wire remaining security modules)\n */\n\nimport type { Result } from '../core/index.js';\nimport { ok } from '../core/index.js';\nimport type { AgentAction } from '../security/action-schema.js';\nimport type { GitHubInput } from '../security/firewall/github-adapter.js';\nimport type { FirewallProcessOptions } from '../security/firewall/firewall-types.js';\nimport type { TrustTier } from '../security/trust-types.js';\nimport type { FirewallCorroborationDecision } from './untrusted-input-firewall.js';\nimport {\n  evaluateActionThroughFirewall,\n  validateActionCorroboration,\n} from './untrusted-input-firewall.js';\nimport type { ScmCommentDetail } from '../scm/types.js';\nimport type {\n  IssueCategory,\n  IssueComment,\n  IssueTriageResult,\n  ProposedAction,\n} from './issue-triage-types.js';\nimport { CATEGORY_DISPLAY_NAMES, CATEGORY_EMOJI } from './issue-triage-types.js';\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Issue Classification\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Keyword sets for each issue category.\n * Lower-cased for case-insensitive matching.\n */\nconst CATEGORY_KEYWORDS: Record<IssueCategory, readonly string[]> = {\n  bug: ['bug', 'error', 'crash', 'broken', 'fix', 'fail', 'issue', 'wrong', 'unexpected'],\n  feature: ['feature', 'request', 'enhancement', 'proposal', 'add', 'support', 'implement'],\n  question: ['question', 'how to', 'help', 'confused', 'explain', 'documentation'],\n  documentation: ['docs', 'documentation', 'readme', 'typo', 'example', 'guide'],\n  security: ['security', 'vulnerability', 'cve', 'exploit', 'injection', 'xss', 'csrf'],\n  performance: ['performance', 'slow', 'memory', 'leak', 'optimize', 'latency', 'timeout'],\n};\n\n/**\n * Classifies an issue by matching keywords in the title and body.\n * Returns the category with the highest keyword match count.\n *\n * @param title - Issue title\n * @param body - Issue body\n * @returns Tuple of [category, confidence]\n */\nexport function categorizeIssue(title: string, body: string): [IssueCategory, number] {\n  const text = `${title} ${body}`.toLowerCase();\n  const scores: Record<IssueCategory, number> = {\n    bug: 0,\n    feature: 0,\n    question: 0,\n    documentation: 0,\n    security: 0,\n    performance: 0,\n  };\n\n  let totalMatches = 0;\n\n  for (const [category, keywords] of Object.entries(CATEGORY_KEYWORDS)) {\n    for (const keyword of keywords) {\n      if (text.includes(keyword)) {\n        scores[category as IssueCategory]++;\n        totalMatches++;\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Find category with highest score\n  let bestCategory: IssueCategory = 'bug';\n  let bestScore = 0;\n  for (const [category, score] of Object.entries(scores)) {\n    if (score > bestScore) {\n      bestScore = score;\n      bestCategory = category as IssueCategory;\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Confidence: ratio of best score to total matches, minimum 0.1\n  const confidence = totalMatches > 0 ? Math.min(bestScore / totalMatches, 1) : 0.1;\n\n  return [bestCategory, Math.round(confidence * 100) / 100];\n}\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Label Extraction\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Common label patterns that can be extracted from issue text.\n */\nconst LABEL_HINTS: ReadonlyMap<string, string> = new Map([\n  ['bug', 'bug'],\n  ['feature request', 'enhancement'],\n  ['enhancement', 'enhancement'],\n  ['breaking change', 'breaking-change'],\n  ['documentation', 'documentation'],\n  ['help wanted', 'help wanted'],\n  ['good first issue', 'good first issue'],\n  ['security', 'security'],\n  ['performance', 'performance'],\n  ['regression', 'regression'],\n]);\n\n/**\n * Extracts suggested labels from issue title and body text.\n *\n * @param title - Issue title\n * @param body - Issue body\n * @returns Array of suggested label strings (max 5)\n */\nexport function extractLabelsFromBody(title: string, body: string): string[] {\n  const text = `${title} ${body}`.toLowerCase();\n  const labels: string[] = [];\n\n  for (const [pattern, label] of LABEL_HINTS) {\n    if (text.includes(pattern) && !labels.includes(label)) {\n      labels.push(label);\n    }\n  }\n\n  return labels.slice(0, 5);\n}\n\n/** Maps SCM comment details to the triage representation. */\nexport function mapIssueComments(comments: readonly ScmCommentDetail[]): IssueComment[] {\n  return comments.map((comment) => ({\n    id: comment.id,\n    body: comment.body,\n    author: comment.author,\n    authorAssociation: comment.authorAssociation,\n    createdAt: comment.createdAt,\n  }));\n}\n\n/** Creates a human-readable description for a typed action. */\nexport function describeAction(action: AgentAction): string {\n  switch (action.type) {\n    case 'ClassifyIssue':\n      return `Classified as ${action.category} (${String(Math.round(action.confidence * 100))}% confidence)`;\n    case 'ProposeLabels':\n      return `Suggest labels: ${action.labels.join(', ')}`;\n    case 'SummarizeIssue':\n      return action.summary.slice(0, 100);\n    default:\n      return `${action.type} action`;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Builds details object for a proposed action.\n *\n * A corroboration refusal (`enforce`, #6309) is recorded where a policy\n * refusal is: its rule joins `policyViolations`, and `refusedAtStage` names\n * the stage so the record cannot be read as a trust-tier block. Under `off`\n * and `audit` the check is recorded, never refused; `corroborationWouldRefuse`\n * is `audit`'s telemetry and is `false` under `off` by construction.\n */\nexport function buildActionDetails(\n  action: AgentAction,\n  policy: { allowed: boolean; violations: readonly { rule: string; message: string }[] },\n  corrob: FirewallCorroborationDecision\n): Record<string, unknown> {\n  const policyRules = policy.violations.map((violation) => violation.rule);\n  return {\n    ...(corrob.refused\n      ? {\n          policyViolations: [...policyRules, 'INSUFFICIENT_CORROBORATION'],\n          missingCorroboration: corrob.missing,\n          refusedAtStage: corrob.stage,\n        }\n      : {\n          policyViolations: policyRules,\n          missingCorroboration: corrob.missing,\n          corroborationWouldRefuse: corrob.wouldRefuse,\n        }),\n    ...(action.type === 'ClassifyIssue' && { category: action.category }),\n    ...(action.type === 'ProposeLabels' && { labels: action.labels }),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Validates every action through the firewall's policy gate and its\n * corroboration stage (originally Issue #828; #5383 moved the policy\n * evaluation inside the firewall and #6309 the corroboration check, so this\n * path has ONE composition).\n *\n * Each action is one firewall run with `action` and the repository label set,\n * then one `validateActionCorroboration` call. The policy decision is read\n * from `FirewallResult.policy` and enforced HERE as `policyApproved`, whatever\n * `NEXUS_FIREWALL_POLICY` is — the mode only decides whether the firewall\n * refuses on its own (`enforce`), and such a refusal lands on the record as\n * `policyApproved: false` with its rules, exactly where the direct\n * `evaluatePolicy` verdict used to land. A corroboration refusal lands the\n * same way (#6309 panel, option R): the action stays on the list, refused,\n * with `refusedAtStage: 'corroboration'` and what was missing — never\n * dropped. Under `off` and `audit` corroboration is recorded as\n * `corroborated`, as the direct `validateCorroboration` call recorded it.\n *\n * `gate.enforcedTier` is the classification run's (the reputation gate's under\n * the #3122 rollout mode); a per-action run that enforces a different tier\n * fails the whole call closed, because the citations were stamped with it. A\n * corroboration stage that did not run fails the call the same way.\n */\nexport function validateActionsThroughFirewall(\n  input: GitHubInput,\n  gate: Pick<FirewallProcessOptions, 'context' | 'reputation'> & {\n    readonly enforcedTier: TrustTier;\n  },\n  actions: readonly AgentAction[],\n  existingLabels: ReadonlySet<string> | undefined\n): Result<ProposedAction[], Error> {\n  // Spread in only when present, so the firewall sees absence as absence and\n  // fails the label-validity check closed (`LABEL_SET_UNAVAILABLE`).\n  const labels = existingLabels !== undefined ? { existingLabels } : {};\n  const proposed: ProposedAction[] = [];\n  for (const action of actions) {\n    const decision = evaluateActionThroughFirewall(input, { ...gate, ...labels, action });\n    if (!decision.ok) return decision;\n    const corroboration = validateActionCorroboration(action);\n    if (!corroboration.ok) return corroboration;\n    proposed.push({\n      type: action.type,\n      description: describeAction(action),\n      policyApproved: decision.value.allowed && !corroboration.value.refused,\n      corroborated: corroboration.value.satisfied,\n      details: buildActionDetails(action, decision.value, corroboration.value),\n    });\n  }\n  return ok(proposed);\n}\n\n// ============================================================================\n// Result Formatting\n// ============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Formats a triage result as a GitHub markdown comment.\n *\n * @param result - The complete triage result\n * @returns Formatted markdown string\n */\nexport function formatTriageComment(result: IssueTriageResult): string {\n  const emoji = CATEGORY_EMOJI[result.category];\n  const categoryName = CATEGORY_DISPLAY_NAMES[result.category];\n  const lines: string[] = [];\n\n  lines.push(`## ${emoji} Issue Triage: ${categoryName}`);\n  lines.push('');\n  lines.push(\n    `**Category:** ${categoryName} (${String(Math.round(result.categoryConfidence * 100))}% confidence)`\n  );\n  lines.push(\n    `**Trust Tier:** ${result.trustAssessment.trustTier} (${result.trustAssessment.userRole})`\n  );\n\n  if (result.trustAssessment.reputationScore !== undefined) {\n    lines.push(`**Reputation Score:** ${String(result.trustAssessment.reputationScore)}/100`);\n  }\n\n  if (result.trustAssessment.isSuspicious) {\n    lines.push('');\n    lines.push(':warning: **Suspicious signals detected:**');\n    for (const signal of result.trustAssessment.suspiciousSignals) {\n      lines.push(`- ${signal}`);\n    }\n  }\n\n  if (result.proposedActions.length > 0) {\n    lines.push('');\n    lines.push('### Proposed Actions');\n    lines.push('');\n    for (const action of result.proposedActions) {\n      const status = formatActionStatus(action);\n      lines.push(\n        `- ${status} **${action.type}**: ${action.description}${formatRefusalReason(action)}`\n      );\n    }\n  }\n\n  lines.push('');\n  lines.push(`---`);\n  lines.push(`_Triage completed in ${String(result.totalDurationMs)}ms_`);\n\n  return lines.join('\\n');\n}\n\n/**\n * Formats the policy/corroboration status of an action.\n */\nfunction formatActionStatus(action: ProposedAction): string {\n  if (action.policyApproved && action.corroborated) return ':white_check_mark:';\n  if (action.policyApproved && !action.corroborated) return ':yellow_circle:';\n  return ':no_entry:';\n}\n\n/** The refusal-bearing subset of `ProposedAction.details`, read with guards. */\ninterface ActionRefusalDetails {\n  readonly policyViolations: readonly string[];\n  readonly missingCorroboration: readonly string[];\n  readonly refusedAtStage?: 'corroboration';\n}\n\nfunction isStringArray(value: unknown): value is readonly string[] {\n  return Array.isArray(value) && value.every((v) => typeof v === 'string');\n}\n\n/**\n * Reads WHY an action was refused (or left uncorroborated) off its `details`\n * (#6309 review): `details` is untyped on the record, so this is the one\n * place the keys `buildActionDetails` writes are read back. A key that is\n * absent or malformed reads as empty, never as a rule.\n */\nexport function readActionRefusal(action: ProposedAction): ActionRefusalDetails {\n  const { policyViolations, missingCorroboration, refusedAtStage } = action.details;\n  return {\n    policyViolations: isStringArray(policyViolations) ? policyViolations : [],\n    missingCorroboration: isStringArray(missingCorroboration) ? missingCorroboration : [],\n    ...(refusedAtStage === 'corroboration' ? { refusedAtStage } : {}),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * The parenthetical after a refused action's line, so a corroboration refusal\n * is distinguishable from a policy refusal where a reader sees it (#6309\n * review). Empty for an action that was not refused.\n */\nfunction formatRefusalReason(action: ProposedAction): string {\n  if (action.policyApproved) return '';\n  const refusal = readActionRefusal(action);\n  const policyRules = refusal.policyViolations.filter((r) => r !== 'INSUFFICIENT_CORROBORATION');\n  const parts: string[] = [];\n  if (policyRules.length > 0) parts.push(`policy: ${policyRules.join(', ')}`);\n  if (refusal.refusedAtStage !== undefined) {\n    parts.push(`refused at ${refusal.refusedAtStage}: ${refusal.missingCorroboration.join('; ')}`);\n  }\n  // A refusal that names nothing is still a refusal; say so rather than print nothing.\n  return ` (${parts.length > 0 ? parts.join('; ') : 'refused: no rule recorded'})`;\n}\n","/**\n * nexus-agents/dogfooding - Issue Triage Processor\n *\n * Deterministic GitHub issue triage using the full security pipeline:\n * - Input sanitization (input-sanitizer.ts)\n * - Trust classification (trust-classifier.ts)\n * - Reputation assessment (reputation-model.ts) [NEW — #828]\n * - Typed agent actions (action-schema.ts)\n * - Policy gate validation (policy-gate.ts)\n * - Corroboration validation (corroboration-validator.ts) [NEW — #828]\n *\n * Read-only by default (dryRun: true). Proposes actions but never\n * auto-posts to GitHub without explicit opt-in.\n *\n * @module dogfooding/issue-triage\n * (Source: Issue #828 — Wire remaining security modules)\n */\n\nimport type { Result } from '../core/index.js';\nimport { ok, err, createLogger, getTimeProvider } from '../core/index.js';\nimport { sanitizeInput } from '../security/input-sanitizer.js';\nimport { hasToken } from '../scm/token-resolver.js';\nimport type { ClassifyResult } from '../security/trust-classifier.js';\nimport type { FirewallResult } from '../security/firewall/firewall-pipeline.js';\nimport { firewallInputFor, runUntrustedInputFirewall } from './untrusted-input-firewall.js';\nimport type { TrustTier } from '../security/trust-types.js';\nimport type { FirewallProcessOptions } from '../security/firewall/firewall-types.js';\nimport { assessReputation, ReputationCache } from '../security/reputation-model.js';\nimport type {\n  ReputationAssessment,\n  GitHubUserMetadata,\n  ReputationGateDecision,\n} from '../security/reputation-model.js';\nimport type { AgentAction, SourceCitation } from '../security/action-schema.js';\nimport { parseIssueUrl } from '../scm/url-parsers.js';\nimport { createFullGitHubProvider } from '../scm/github-provider-traits.js';\nimport type { ScmUserMetadata } from '../scm/types.js';\nimport {\n  categorizeIssue,\n  extractLabelsFromBody,\n  mapIssueComments,\n  validateActionsThroughFirewall,\n} from './issue-triage-helpers.js';\nimport type {\n  IssueMetadata,\n  IssueComment,\n  IssueTriageConfig,\n  IssueTriageResult,\n  ProposedAction,\n  TrustAssessment,\n} from './issue-triage-types.js';\nimport { DEFAULT_ISSUE_TRIAGE_CONFIG } from './issue-triage-types.js';\n\nconst logger = createLogger({ component: 'IssueTriage' });\n\n/**\n * Applies the two safety actions the untrusted-input rules mandate (#4667).\n *\n * They are mutually exclusive by construction: a hostile tier refuses, a\n * suspicious-but-not-hostile one escalates. Emitting both would ask a human to\n * approve something the system has already declined.\n */\nfunction applySafetyActions(\n  actions: readonly AgentAction[],\n  gateDecision: ReputationGateDecision,\n  reputation: ReputationAssessment | undefined,\n  issue: IssueMetadata\n): AgentAction[] {\n  const withRefusal = appendRefusalIfHostile(actions, gateDecision, issue);\n  return appendApprovalIfBorderline(withRefusal, gateDecision, reputation, issue);\n}\n\n/**\n * Appends a `RequestHumanApproval` for suspicious-but-not-hostile input (#4667).\n *\n * Triage was binary: tier 4 refuses, everything else proceeds. That left no way\n * to express the common real case — reputation noticed something (a new\n * account, rapid comments, a weak signal) without it amounting to hostility.\n * Those proposals are not safe to auto-apply and not fair to refuse, so they\n * escalate.\n *\n * Deliberately mutually exclusive with the refusal: a hostile tier already\n * emits `RefuseAction`, and stacking \"refused\" with \"please approve\" would ask\n * a human to approve something the system just declined.\n */\nfunction appendApprovalIfBorderline(\n  actions: readonly AgentAction[],\n  gateDecision: ReputationGateDecision,\n  reputation: ReputationAssessment | undefined,\n  issue: IssueMetadata\n): AgentAction[] {\n  if (gateDecision.enforcedTier === '4') return [...actions];\n  // Tier 1 is the allowlist escape hatch — asking a maintainer to approve a\n  // maintainer's own issue is noise, and it would undo the \"allowlist wins\"\n  // guarantee that tier exists to provide.\n  if (gateDecision.enforcedTier === '1') return [...actions];\n  if (reputation?.isSuspicious !== true) return [...actions];\n\n  // `no_prior_contributions` counts the author's comments ON THIS ISSUE\n  // (`countAuthorComments(author, comments)`), so a freshly filed issue always\n  // trips it — it is true for essentially every new issue and therefore carries\n  // no information. Escalating on it alone would escalate on everything, which\n  // is how an approval gate becomes noise and then gets ignored. Require at\n  // least one signal that actually distinguishes this author.\n  const distinguishing = reputation.suspiciousSignals.filter(\n    (sig) => sig !== 'no_prior_contributions'\n  );\n  if (distinguishing.length === 0) return [...actions];\n\n  const signals = distinguishing.join(', ');\n  return [\n    ...actions,\n    {\n      type: 'RequestHumanApproval',\n      reason:\n        `Issue #${String(issue.number)} carries suspicious reputation signals but did not ` +\n        `reach the hostile tier. Proposed actions need a human decision.`,\n      context:\n        `Author ${issue.author} at enforced tier ${gateDecision.enforcedTier} ` +\n        `(${gateDecision.mode} mode). Signals: ${signals.length > 0 ? signals : '(none recorded)'}.`,\n    },\n  ];\n}\n\n/**\n * Appends an explicit `RefuseAction` when the enforced tier is hostile (#4667).\n *\n * The generated actions are kept rather than replaced: they are the audit trail\n * of what was declined, and every one of them is already blocked by the policy\n * gate at tier 4. What was missing is a positive statement that the input was\n * refused and where to escalate it.\n */\nfunction appendRefusalIfHostile(\n  actions: readonly AgentAction[],\n  gateDecision: ReputationGateDecision,\n  issue: IssueMetadata\n): AgentAction[] {\n  if (gateDecision.enforcedTier !== '4') return [...actions];\n  return [\n    ...actions,\n    {\n      type: 'RefuseAction',\n      reason:\n        `Issue #${String(issue.number)} was classified at hostile trust tier 4 ` +\n        `(${gateDecision.mode} mode). Automated triage actions are withheld pending human review.`,\n      escalateTo: 'security',\n    },\n  ];\n}\n\n/**\n * GitHub issue triage processor.\n *\n * Wires all 8 security modules into a read-only triage pipeline:\n * 1. Fetch issue + comments from GitHub API\n * 2. Sanitize untrusted content (input-sanitizer)\n * 3. Classify author trust (trust-classifier)\n * 4. Assess author reputation (reputation-model) [#828]\n * 5. Generate typed actions (action-schema)\n * 6. Validate through policy gate (policy-gate)\n * 7. Validate corroboration (corroboration-validator) [#828]\n * 8. Return proposed actions\n */\n/** Warn when a demotion was computed but the gating mode did not enforce it (#3122). */\nfunction logSuppressedDemotion(\n  issueNumber: number,\n  author: string,\n  trustResult: ClassifyResult,\n  gateDecision: ReputationGateDecision\n): void {\n  if (!gateDecision.demotionSuppressed) return;\n  logger.warn('Reputation demotion suppressed by gating mode (would block under enforce)', {\n    issueNumber,\n    author,\n    mode: gateDecision.mode,\n    classifierTier: trustResult.trustTier,\n    reconciledTier: gateDecision.reconciledTier,\n  });\n}\n\nexport class IssueTriage {\n  private readonly config: IssueTriageConfig;\n  private readonly reputationCache: ReputationCache;\n\n  constructor(config?: Partial<IssueTriageConfig>) {\n    this.config = { ...DEFAULT_ISSUE_TRIAGE_CONFIG, ...config };\n    this.reputationCache = new ReputationCache();\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Triages a GitHub issue through the full security pipeline.\n   */\n  async triageIssue(issueUrl: string): Promise<Result<IssueTriageResult, Error>> {\n    const startTime = getTimeProvider().now();\n\n    logger.info('Starting issue triage', { issueUrl });\n\n    const parseResult = parseIssueUrl(issueUrl);\n    if (!parseResult.ok) return parseResult;\n\n    const { owner, repo, issueNumber } = parseResult.value;\n\n    const fetchResult = await this.fetchIssueData(owner, repo, issueNumber);\n    if (!fetchResult.ok) return fetchResult;\n\n    const { issue: issueResult, existingLabels } = fetchResult.value;\n\n    // Sanitize untrusted content (Issue #828 — input-sanitizer wiring)\n    const safeTitle = this.sanitizeContent(issueResult.title, issueResult.author);\n    const safeBody = this.sanitizeContent(issueResult.body, issueResult.author);\n\n    // Reputation is measured here, with data the firewall cannot see (account\n    // age, comment history), and handed to the firewall per call.\n    const reputation = this.assessAuthorReputation(fetchResult.value);\n\n    // #4992: classify through the shared HostileInputFirewall so the trust\n    // decision reaches the security audit trail. Refuses only under\n    // NEXUS_FIREWALL_POLICY=enforce; `validateActions` below re-enters the\n    // firewall per action for the policy decision (#5383). The firewall runs\n    // the ONE reputation gate (#3122: off/audit/enforce; audit reports a\n    // would-be demotion without enforcing it; the allowlist Tier 1 remains the\n    // escape hatch), so its Rule-of-Two signal and the per-action policy gate\n    // act on the same enforced tier.\n    const firewall = this.classifyAuthor(issueResult, reputation);\n    if (!firewall.ok) return firewall;\n    const trustResult = firewall.value.trust;\n    const gateDecision = firewall.value.reputationGate;\n    if (gateDecision === undefined) {\n      // Structurally unreachable — the option is always passed — but a missing\n      // gate must not be papered over with the classifier tier.\n      return err(new Error('Untrusted-input firewall returned no reputation gate decision'));\n    }\n    logSuppressedDemotion(issueNumber, issueResult.author, trustResult, gateDecision);\n\n    // Generate and validate actions, at the tier the gate ENFORCED (#5719)\n    const enforced = { ...trustResult, trustTier: gateDecision.enforcedTier };\n    const actions = this.generateActions(safeTitle, safeBody, issueResult, enforced);\n    // #4667: a hostile enforced tier must produce an explicit refusal. Before\n    // this, tier 4 merely meant every generated action failed the policy gate —\n    // the caller saw fewer approved actions and no statement that anything was\n    // refused, so the fail-closed escalation the rules mandate had no producer.\n    // RefuseAction is tier-4 \"always allowed\" (trust-classifier.ts:170), so it\n    // survives the gate that blocks the rest.\n    const withEscalation = applySafetyActions(actions, gateDecision, reputation, issueResult);\n    // #5383: each action is its own firewall run; the policy decision is the\n    // firewall's, enforced there as `policyApproved` under every mode.\n    const validatedActions = validateActionsThroughFirewall(\n      firewallInputFor('issue', issueResult),\n      { ...this.firewallOptions(reputation), enforcedTier: gateDecision.enforcedTier },\n      withEscalation,\n      existingLabels\n    );\n    if (!validatedActions.ok) return validatedActions;\n\n    const result = this.buildResult({\n      issue: issueResult,\n      actions: validatedActions.value,\n      trustResult,\n      isAllowlisted: firewall.value.isAllowlisted,\n      auditSink: firewall.value.auditSink,\n      reputation,\n      gateDecision,\n      safeContent: { title: safeTitle, body: safeBody },\n      startTime,\n    });\n\n    logger.info('Issue triage completed', {\n      issueNumber,\n      category: result.category,\n      actionCount: result.proposedActions.length,\n      durationMs: result.totalDurationMs,\n    });\n\n    return ok(result);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Sanitizes untrusted issue content before processing.\n   * (Source: Issue #828 — input-sanitizer wiring)\n   */\n  private sanitizeContent(text: string, author: string): string {\n    if (text.length === 0) return text;\n    const result = sanitizeInput(text, 'unknown', author);\n    if (result.wasModified) {\n      logger.warn('Issue content sanitized', {\n        author,\n        strippedCount: result.strippedElements.length,\n        injectionFlags: result.injectionFlags,\n      });\n    }\n    return result.content;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Classifies the issue author's trust tier through the shared firewall\n   * (#4992; originally Issue #828 — trust-classifier wiring).\n   *\n   * The access posture is passed per call so the firewall's Rule-of-Two check\n   * sees the same facts the per-action runs enforce on. No maintainer\n   * allowlist is passed: there is no source for one today (no config field, no\n   * env var), so none is consulted and `isAllowlisted` stays absent on the\n   * result rather than being recorded as `false`.\n   */\n  private classifyAuthor(\n    issue: IssueMetadata,\n    reputation: ReputationAssessment | undefined\n  ): Result<FirewallResult, Error> {\n    return runUntrustedInputFirewall(\n      firewallInputFor('issue', issue),\n      this.firewallOptions(reputation)\n    );\n  }\n\n  /** The per-call facts every firewall run of this triage shares (#4992, #5383). */\n  private firewallOptions(\n    reputation: ReputationAssessment | undefined\n  ): Pick<FirewallProcessOptions, 'context' | 'reputation'> {\n    return { context: this.accessContext(), reputation: { assessment: reputation } };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * The access posture this triage runs under — the two Rule-of-Two conjuncts\n   * that are about the agent rather than the input. Passed to every firewall\n   * run (#4992, #5383) so the classification and the per-action policy checks\n   * cannot disagree on it.\n   */\n  private accessContext(): { hasWriteAccess: boolean; hasSecretAccess: boolean } {\n    return {\n      hasWriteAccess: !this.config.dryRun,\n      // #4681: read the token from where it ACTUALLY comes from. The previous\n      // form (`this.config.githubToken !== undefined`) was written to make this\n      // conjunct \"real\", but no production caller ever sets `githubToken` — the\n      // SCM provider resolves the live credential from GITHUB_TOKEN/GH_TOKEN.\n      // So the conjunct was permanently false and Rule of Two could never trip,\n      // which is precisely the constant it was introduced to remove.\n      // `hasToken()` is the canonical resolver-backed check.\n      hasSecretAccess: this.config.githubToken !== undefined || hasToken('github'),\n    };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Assesses the issue author's reputation using the reputation model.\n   * This is one of the two NEW security module wirings completing #828.\n   * (Source: Issue #828 — reputation-model wiring)\n   */\n  private assessAuthorReputation(data: {\n    issue: IssueMetadata;\n    comments: readonly IssueComment[];\n    commentsAvailable: boolean;\n    accountAgeDays?: number;\n  }): ReputationAssessment | undefined {\n    if (!this.config.enableReputation) return undefined;\n    const { issue, comments, commentsAvailable, accountAgeDays } = data;\n\n    // #4681: scan BOTH the title and the body. Scanning only the body left a\n    // real bypass: an injection payload is plain text, so content-sanitization\n    // does not strip it from the title, and its flags were discarded here — the\n    // identical payload was refused at Tier 4 in the body but raised no signal\n    // at all in the title, then reached the emitted SummarizeIssue verbatim.\n    const bodyScan = sanitizeInput(issue.body, 'unknown', issue.author);\n    const titleScan = sanitizeInput(issue.title, 'unknown', issue.author);\n    const injectionFlags = [...new Set([...titleScan.injectionFlags, ...bodyScan.injectionFlags])];\n\n    // #3121: accountAgeDays is the author's REAL account age (fetched in\n    // fetchIssueData) or undefined when the lookup failed. When undefined it is\n    // OMITTED so the engine skips the new_account signal (#3106) — never\n    // fabricated. priorContributions/recentCommentCount use real comment data.\n    const metadata: GitHubUserMetadata = {\n      username: issue.author,\n      ...(accountAgeDays !== undefined ? { accountAgeDays } : {}),\n      ...(commentsAvailable\n        ? {\n            priorContributions: countAuthorComments(issue.author, comments),\n            recentCommentCount: countRecentComments(issue.author, comments),\n            recentCommentWindowMinutes: 10,\n          }\n        : {}),\n      authorAssociation: issue.authorAssociation,\n      injectionFlags,\n    };\n\n    return assessReputation(metadata, commentsAvailable ? this.reputationCache : undefined);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Generates typed agent actions based on issue analysis.\n   */\n  private generateActions(\n    safeTitle: string,\n    safeBody: string,\n    issue: IssueMetadata,\n    /**\n     * The classify result with `trustTier` RECONCILED to the tier the policy\n     * gate actually enforced (#5719). Stamping a citation with the\n     * pre-reputation tier makes the record disagree with what anyone enforced,\n     * and `checkSourceTrustTiers` inspects only `issueComment`, so nothing\n     * catches it. `userRole` is still the classifier's — that is what it names.\n     */\n    trustResult: ClassifyResult\n  ): AgentAction[] {\n    const actions: AgentAction[] = [];\n    const source = this.createIssueSource(issue, trustResult.trustTier);\n\n    // Always generate ClassifyIssue action\n    const [category, confidence] = categorizeIssue(safeTitle, safeBody);\n    actions.push({\n      type: 'ClassifyIssue',\n      category,\n      confidence,\n      sources: [source],\n    });\n\n    // Generate ProposeLabels if we found label hints\n    const labels = extractLabelsFromBody(safeTitle, safeBody);\n    if (labels.length > 0) {\n      actions.push({\n        type: 'ProposeLabels',\n        labels,\n        reason: `Keyword-based label extraction from issue #${String(issue.number)}`,\n        sources: [source],\n      });\n    }\n\n    // Generate SummarizeIssue for semi-trusted+ authors\n    if (trustResult.trustTier === '1' || trustResult.trustTier === '2') {\n      const summary = `Issue #${String(issue.number)} \"${safeTitle}\" by ${issue.author} (${trustResult.userRole})`;\n      actions.push({\n        type: 'SummarizeIssue',\n        summary: summary.length >= 10 ? summary : `${summary} — awaiting further analysis`,\n        sources: [source],\n      });\n    }\n\n    return actions;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Builds the final triage result.\n   */\n  private buildResult(opts: {\n    issue: IssueMetadata;\n    actions: readonly ProposedAction[];\n    trustResult: ClassifyResult;\n    /** Present only when the firewall consulted an allowlist (#4992). */\n    isAllowlisted: boolean | undefined;\n    auditSink: FirewallResult['auditSink'];\n    reputation: ReputationAssessment | undefined;\n    gateDecision: ReputationGateDecision;\n    safeContent: { title: string; body: string };\n    startTime: number;\n  }): IssueTriageResult {\n    const {\n      issue,\n      actions,\n      trustResult,\n      isAllowlisted,\n      auditSink,\n      reputation,\n      gateDecision,\n      safeContent,\n      startTime,\n    } = opts;\n    const [category, confidence] = categorizeIssue(safeContent.title, safeContent.body);\n\n    // Tier 1 actors (owner/maintainer) cannot be suspicious — reconcile\n    // the trust-classifier result with the reputation-model result.\n    const isTier1 = trustResult.trustTier === '1';\n\n    const trustAssessment: TrustAssessment = {\n      trustTier: trustResult.trustTier,\n      userRole: trustResult.userRole,\n      // Measured or absent (#4992): never the classifier's default `false`.\n      ...(isAllowlisted !== undefined ? { isAllowlisted } : {}),\n      auditSink,\n      reputationScore: reputation?.reputationScore,\n      coverage: reputation?.coverage,\n      suspiciousSignals: isTier1 ? [] : (reputation?.suspiciousSignals ?? []),\n      isSuspicious: isTier1 ? false : (reputation?.isSuspicious ?? false),\n      // #3122: surface both the enforced tier (what the gate used) and the\n      // reconciled tier (what reputation computed) so telemetry can't mistake\n      // a would-be demotion for an enforced one.\n      enforcedTrustTier: gateDecision.enforcedTier,\n      reputationReconciledTier: gateDecision.reconciledTier,\n      gatingMode: gateDecision.mode,\n    };\n\n    return {\n      issueNumber: issue.number,\n      repository: `${issue.owner}/${issue.repo}`,\n      proposedActions: actions,\n      trustAssessment,\n      category,\n      categoryConfidence: confidence,\n      totalDurationMs: getTimeProvider().now() - startTime,\n      timestamp: getTimeProvider().nowIso(),\n    };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Creates a repo file source citation for the triage.\n   */\n  private createIssueSource(issue: IssueMetadata, trustTier: TrustTier): SourceCitation {\n    return {\n      type: 'issueBody',\n      issueNumber: issue.number,\n      author: issue.author,\n      authorTrustTier: trustTier,\n    };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Fetches issue data from the SCM provider and maps to dogfooding types.\n   */\n  private async fetchIssueData(\n    owner: string,\n    repo: string,\n    issueNumber: number\n  ): Promise<\n    Result<\n      {\n        issue: IssueMetadata;\n        comments: IssueComment[];\n        commentsAvailable: boolean;\n        accountAgeDays?: number;\n        existingLabels?: ReadonlySet<string>;\n      },\n      Error\n    >\n  > {\n    const provider = createFullGitHubProvider(`${owner}/${repo}`);\n\n    const detailResult = await provider.getIssueDetail(issueNumber);\n    if (!detailResult.ok) return err(detailResult.error);\n\n    const detail = detailResult.value;\n    const issue: IssueMetadata = { ...detail, owner, repo };\n\n    const commentsResult = await provider.listCommentDetails(issueNumber);\n    if (!commentsResult.ok) {\n      logger.warn('Failed to fetch issue comments; activity reputation is unmeasured', {\n        issueNumber,\n        error: commentsResult.error.message,\n      });\n    }\n    const comments = commentsResult.ok ? mapIssueComments(commentsResult.value) : [];\n    const commentsAvailable = commentsResult.ok;\n\n    const labelsResult = await provider.listRepositoryLabels();\n    if (!labelsResult.ok) {\n      logger.warn('Failed to fetch repository labels; label validity is unmeasured', {\n        issueNumber,\n        error: labelsResult.error.message,\n      });\n    }\n\n    // #3121: fetch the author's REAL account age (their account creation date,\n    // not the issue date). Best-effort — on failure or an unparseable date we\n    // omit it, so the reputation engine SKIPS the new_account signal (#3106)\n    // rather than fabricating a value. Reputation must not block on this.\n    const accountAgeDays = await this.fetchAccountAgeDays(provider, detail.author);\n\n    return ok({\n      issue,\n      comments,\n      commentsAvailable,\n      ...(accountAgeDays !== undefined ? { accountAgeDays } : {}),\n      ...(labelsResult.ok ? { existingLabels: new Set(labelsResult.value) } : {}),\n    });\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Best-effort lookup of a GitHub user's account age in days. Returns\n   * `undefined` if the user-metadata fetch fails or the creation date can't be\n   * parsed (#3121) — callers must treat absence as \"unknown\", not \"benign\".\n   */\n  private async fetchAccountAgeDays(\n    provider: { fetchUserMetadata: (u: string) => Promise<Result<ScmUserMetadata, Error>> },\n    username: string\n  ): Promise<number | undefined> {\n    try {\n      const result = await provider.fetchUserMetadata(username);\n      if (!result.ok) return undefined;\n      const createdMs = Date.parse(result.value.createdAt);\n      if (!Number.isFinite(createdMs)) return undefined;\n      return Math.floor((getTimeProvider().now() - createdMs) / 86_400_000);\n    } catch {\n      // Truly best-effort: even an unexpected rejection (token resolution,\n      // transport) must not break triage — fall back to \"unknown\" age.\n      return undefined;\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/** Counts how many comments the author has made on the issue. */\nfunction countAuthorComments(author: 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