nexus-agents 8.76.2 → 8.78.0

package/dist/chunk-ACXBBUW3.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/adapters/sdk/gateway-env.ts","../src/adapters/sdk/custom-api-validation.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Env resolver for the single-model `custom-openai` gateway path (#4392\n * increment 3).\n *\n * Two mechanisms read an OpenAI-compatible gateway from the environment:\n *\n *   A. the single-model SDK path — `SdkAdapter({ providerId: 'custom-openai' })`\n *      via `auto-adapter.ts`, which mints the `api:custom-openai` routing arm\n *      under `NEXUS_BILLING_MODE=api`;\n *   B. the discovery path — `openai-compat-adapter.ts`, which lists the\n *      gateway's models, serves voters in-process and registers ONE\n *      `api:<endpoint>` arm.\n *\n * Both take a base URL and a key. Mechanism A historically read\n * `NEXUS_CUSTOM_API_BASE_URL` / `NEXUS_CUSTOM_API_KEY`; mechanism B reads\n * `NEXUS_OPENAI_COMPAT_URL` / `NEXUS_OPENAI_COMPAT_KEY`. This module makes the\n * old pair a deprecated ALIAS of the new pair for mechanism A only — a pure\n * rename shim, resolution `new ?? old` per variable (panel\n * vote-1789558437481-yup142p runoff, option C). Mechanism B is deliberately\n * NOT fed from the alias: renaming to the new names is what opts an operator\n * into the gateway path, and the deprecation warn says so. The aliases are\n * dropped in the next major (#6291).\n *\n * @module adapters/sdk/gateway-env\n */\n\nimport type { ILogger } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { createLogger } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport {\n  DEPRECATED_GATEWAY_ENV_ALIASES,\n  OPENAI_COMPAT_KEY_ENV,\n  OPENAI_COMPAT_URL_ENV,\n} from './types.js';\n\n/** One deprecated gateway env name found set in the environment. */\nexport interface DeprecatedGatewayEnvUse {\n  readonly name: string;\n  readonly replacement: string;\n  /** True when the replacement is also set, so this alias is ignored. */\n  readonly shadowed: boolean;\n}\n\n/** The resolved mechanism-A gateway pair plus every deprecated name in use. */\nexport interface GatewayEnv {\n  /** `NEXUS_OPENAI_COMPAT_URL ?? NEXUS_CUSTOM_API_BASE_URL`, trimmed; empty is unset. */\n  readonly baseUrl: string | undefined;\n  /** `NEXUS_OPENAI_COMPAT_KEY ?? NEXUS_CUSTOM_API_KEY`, trimmed; empty is unset. */\n  readonly apiKey: string | undefined;\n  /** Deprecated names that are set, in table order — empty when none is. */\n  readonly deprecated: readonly DeprecatedGatewayEnvUse[];\n}\n\n/** A set env value, trimmed; `undefined` for unset, empty, or whitespace-only. */\nfunction readTrimmed(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv, name: string): string | undefined {\n  const value = env[name]?.trim();\n  return value === undefined || value === '' ? undefined : value;\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve the mechanism-A gateway pair from `env` (default `process.env`).\n * Pure: no logging, no once-guard. `readGatewayEnv` is the production entry;\n * this one serves the report surfaces (env-schema, doctor) that must not warn.\n */\nexport function resolveGatewayEnv(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): GatewayEnv {\n  const deprecated: DeprecatedGatewayEnvUse[] = [];\n  for (const alias of DEPRECATED_GATEWAY_ENV_ALIASES) {\n    if (readTrimmed(env, alias.deprecated) === undefined) continue;\n    deprecated.push({\n      name: alias.deprecated,\n      replacement: alias.replacement,\n      shadowed: readTrimmed(env, alias.replacement) !== undefined,\n    });\n  }\n  return {\n    baseUrl: readWithAlias(env, OPENAI_COMPAT_URL_ENV),\n    apiKey: readWithAlias(env, OPENAI_COMPAT_KEY_ENV),\n    deprecated,\n  };\n}\n\n/** `new ?? old` for one variable, the old spelling taken from the alias table. */\nfunction readWithAlias(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv, replacement: string): string | undefined {\n  const current = readTrimmed(env, replacement);\n  if (current !== undefined) return current;\n  const alias = DEPRECATED_GATEWAY_ENV_ALIASES.find((a) => a.replacement === replacement);\n  return alias === undefined ? undefined : readTrimmed(env, alias.deprecated);\n}\n\nconst defaultLogger = createLogger({ component: 'gateway-env' });\n\n/**\n * Once per process: a deprecated name is set, so the operator hears about it\n * exactly once, from whichever reader gets there first (or from server\n * startup). Names only — never a value.\n */\nlet deprecationWarned = false;\n\n/** Test-only: re-arm the once-guard. */\nexport function _resetDeprecatedGatewayEnvWarning(): void {\n  deprecationWarned = false;\n}\n\n/**\n * Emit the one deprecation warn if any deprecated gateway name is set and it\n * has not been emitted yet in this process. Safe to call from every reader;\n * the gateway bootstrap (`cli-server-gateway.ts` `tryWireGatewayAdapters`)\n * calls it at server startup so the line appears even when no reader of the\n * alias is reached (plan billing with a CLI available never consults\n * mechanism A).\n */\nexport function warnDeprecatedGatewayEnvOnce(\n  env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env,\n  logger: ILogger = defaultLogger\n): void {\n  if (deprecationWarned) return;\n  const { deprecated } = resolveGatewayEnv(env);\n  if (deprecated.length === 0) return;\n  deprecationWarned = true;\n  logger.warn(formatDeprecationWarning(deprecated));\n}\n\n/**\n * The warn line. Each name says whether it is honoured or ignored (shadowed\n * by its replacement), then the option-C consequence: these names configure\n * only the single-model `custom-openai` path, and the rename is the opt-in\n * to the gateway path. No value is ever interpolated — a URL can carry\n * userinfo and the key is the key.\n */\nfunction formatDeprecationWarning(deprecated: readonly DeprecatedGatewayEnvUse[]): string {\n  const uses = deprecated\n    .map((d) =>\n      d.shadowed\n        ? `${d.name} (ignored: ${d.replacement} is set)`\n        : `${d.name} (honoured; rename to ${d.replacement})`\n    )\n    .join('; ');\n  return (\n    `Deprecated gateway environment variable(s) set (#4392): ${uses}. ` +\n    'These names configure only the single-model custom-openai path and stay aliases ' +\n    'until the next major (#6291). Rename to NEXUS_OPENAI_COMPAT_* to opt into the ' +\n    'gateway path (model discovery, in-process voter transport, api:<endpoint> arm).'\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * The production reader for mechanism A: resolve the pair and emit the\n * once-per-process deprecation warn when a deprecated name is set.\n */\nexport function readGatewayEnv(\n  env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env,\n  logger: ILogger = defaultLogger\n): GatewayEnv {\n  const resolved = resolveGatewayEnv(env);\n  if (resolved.deprecated.length > 0) warnDeprecatedGatewayEnvOnce(env, logger);\n  return resolved;\n}\n\n/**\n * The host of a gateway base URL, for log lines and error messages. A base\n * URL can carry userinfo (`https://user:key@host/v1`), so the full string\n * must never reach a log. Two failure shapes, both replaced rather than\n * echoed: a string that does not parse at all, and a scheme-less paste such\n * as `key@host/v1`, which WHATWG parses with `key:` as the SCHEME and an\n * empty hostname (measured: `new URL('u:pw@host/v1').hostname === ''`).\n */\nexport function hostnameOf(baseUrl: string): string {\n  try {\n    const host = new URL(baseUrl).hostname;\n    return host === '' ? '<no host>' : host;\n  } catch {\n    return '<unparseable url>';\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Every exact occurrence of `apiKey` in `message` replaced with `<redacted>`.\n * The pattern-based sanitizer only knows vendor key shapes; a gateway key can\n * be any string, and a 401 body may echo the one it rejected. An empty key\n * matches nothing (`replaceAll('')` would interleave the marker).\n */\nexport function redactApiKey(message: string, apiKey: string | undefined): string {\n  return apiKey === undefined || apiKey === '' ? message : message.replaceAll(apiKey, '<redacted>');\n}\n","/**\n * Validation for the `custom-openai` SDK adapter's gateway URL.\n *\n * The base URL is user-provided, so without validation the adapter becomes\n * an SSRF vector: a malicious prompt that reshaped env vars, or a typo in\n * the config, could point nexus-agents at `http://169.254.169.254/` (AWS\n * metadata) or `http://localhost:5432/` (internal services). This module\n * rejects such URLs unless the user explicitly opts in via\n * `NEXUS_CUSTOM_API_ALLOW_PRIVATE=1`.\n *\n * Called out in the #2119 consensus vote by the Security Engineer role.\n *\n * @module adapters/sdk/custom-api-validation\n */\n\nimport { isIPv4, isIPv6 } from 'node:net';\nimport { lookup as dnsLookup } from 'node:dns/promises';\nimport { ConfigError, ok, err, createLogger, type Result } from '../../core/index.js';\nimport { CUSTOM_API_ALLOW_PRIVATE_ENV } from './types.js';\n\nconst logger = createLogger({ module: 'custom-api-validation' });\n\n/**\n * Why a given URL was rejected. Machine-readable so error messages can\n * distinguish root causes in downstream tooling.\n */\nexport type BaseUrlRejectionReason =\n  | 'empty'\n  | 'not_a_url'\n  | 'not_http_https'\n  | 'loopback'\n  | 'link_local'\n  | 'private_range'\n  | 'reserved';\n\ninterface RejectionDetail {\n  readonly reason: BaseUrlRejectionReason;\n  readonly message: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Validates a user-provided custom-gateway base URL. Returns the URL as an\n * `ok` Result if it passes, or a `ConfigError` with a machine-readable\n * reason if it fails.\n *\n * Pass `{ allowPrivate: true }` (or set the env var) to bypass the SSRF\n * checks — use this only when the gateway is on a trusted internal host\n * and you accept the risk.\n */\nexport function validateCustomApiBaseUrl(\n  raw: string | undefined,\n  opts: { readonly allowPrivate?: boolean } = {}\n): Result<URL, ConfigError> {\n  if (raw === undefined || raw.trim() === '') {\n    return err(\n      new ConfigError(\n        'Custom API base URL is required but missing. Set NEXUS_OPENAI_COMPAT_URL or pass `baseUrl` in config.'\n      )\n    );\n  }\n\n  let url: URL;\n  try {\n    url = new URL(raw);\n  } catch {\n    // Not echoed: these messages reach the resilient-adapter warn line, and\n    // the raw string can carry userinfo (#4392 inc 3).\n    return err(new ConfigError('Custom API base URL is not a valid URL'));\n  }\n\n  if (url.protocol !== 'http:' && url.protocol !== 'https:') {\n    return err(\n      new ConfigError(`Custom API base URL must use http or https, got \"${url.protocol}\"`)\n    );\n  }\n\n  const allowPrivate = opts.allowPrivate === true || resolveAllowPrivateFromEnv();\n  if (!allowPrivate) {\n    const rejection = classifyPrivateHost(url.hostname);\n    if (rejection !== null) {\n      return err(\n        new ConfigError(\n          `Custom API base URL rejected (SSRF guard, reason=\"${rejection.reason}\"): ${rejection.message}. ` +\n            `Set ${CUSTOM_API_ALLOW_PRIVATE_ENV}=1 to bypass if the gateway runs on a trusted internal host.`\n        )\n      );\n    }\n  }\n\n  return ok(url);\n}\n\nfunction resolveAllowPrivateFromEnv(): boolean {\n  // Deliberately strict (case-sensitive, not parseBoolEnv): this disables an\n  // SSRF guard, so we don't want extra case variants (e.g. `TRUE`) to loosen\n  // the control. Fail-closed on anything but exact `1`/`true` (#3297).\n  const v = process.env[CUSTOM_API_ALLOW_PRIVATE_ENV];\n  return v === '1' || v === 'true';\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns a rejection reason if the hostname resolves (by string form) to\n * a loopback, link-local, or RFC 1918 private address; `null` otherwise.\n *\n * Note: this is a string-level check. It does NOT perform DNS resolution,\n * so a public DNS name that secretly resolves to a private IP will pass.\n * For that level of defense, callers should additionally run\n * {@link assertCustomApiHostResolvesPublic}, which performs a DNS lookup\n * and classifies each resolved address with the same range tables below.\n */\nfunction classifyPrivateHost(hostname: string): RejectionDetail | null {\n  const normalized = normalizeHost(hostname);\n\n  // Literal IP addresses — classify directly against the range tables.\n  const literal = classifyIpAddress(normalized);\n  if (literal !== 'not_an_ip') {\n    return literal;\n  }\n\n  // Hostname literals that resolve to loopback without needing DNS\n  if (\n    normalized === 'localhost' ||\n    normalized.endsWith('.localhost') ||\n    normalized.endsWith('.local') // mDNS\n  ) {\n    return {\n      reason: 'loopback',\n      message: `hostname \"${hostname}\" resolves to loopback/mDNS`,\n    };\n  }\n\n  return null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Strips IPv6 bracket wrapping (URL.hostname yields \"[::1]\") and lowercases,\n * giving the bare form the `node:net` checks expect. Shared by the sync and\n * async guards so the normalization rule lives in one place.\n */\nfunction normalizeHost(hostname: string): string {\n  const stripped =\n    hostname.startsWith('[') && hostname.endsWith(']') ? hostname.slice(1, -1) : hostname;\n  return stripped.toLowerCase();\n}\n\n/**\n * Classifies a single (already normalized, bracket-stripped) address string.\n * Returns:\n *  - a {@link RejectionDetail} if it is a private/loopback/link-local/reserved IP,\n *  - `null` if it is a public IP literal (safe),\n *  - the sentinel `'not_an_ip'` if the string is not an IP literal at all.\n *\n * This is the shared per-address classifier reused by both the sync\n * string-level guard ({@link classifyPrivateHost}) and the async\n * DNS-resolve-time guard ({@link assertCustomApiHostResolvesPublic}), so the\n * IPv4/IPv6 range tables live in exactly one place.\n */\nfunction classifyIpAddress(normalized: string): RejectionDetail | null | 'not_an_ip' {\n  if (isIPv4(normalized)) {\n    return classifyIPv4(normalized);\n  }\n  if (isIPv6(normalized)) {\n    return classifyIPv6(normalized);\n  }\n  return 'not_an_ip';\n}\n\n/** Verdict for a host that is already an IP literal — no DNS required. */\nfunction classifyLiteral(hostname: string, normalized: string): Result<void, ConfigError> {\n  const literal = classifyIpAddress(normalized);\n  if (literal === null || literal === 'not_an_ip') return ok(undefined);\n  return err(\n    new ConfigError(\n      `Custom API host '${hostname}' is a ${literal.reason} address: ${literal.message}`\n    )\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * DNS-resolve-time SSRF guard for the custom-openai gateway.\n *\n * The sync {@link validateCustomApiBaseUrl} only inspects the hostname as a\n * string, so a PUBLIC DNS name that resolves to a PRIVATE/loopback/link-local\n * IP (e.g. an attacker-controlled `gateway.evil.test` pointing at\n * `169.254.169.254`) slips past it. This function closes that gap: it resolves\n * the hostname and runs the EXISTING IP classification against every returned\n * address, failing closed if ANY of them is private.\n *\n * Behaviour:\n *  - `allowPrivate` (opt or env) → bypass, returns `ok` (matches the sync guard).\n *  - hostname is already an IP literal → no DNS needed; the sync guard already\n *    classified literals at construction, so return `ok`.\n *  - otherwise `dns.lookup(hostname, { all: true })` and classify each address.\n *    If ANY resolves private → `err(ConfigError)`.\n *  - on a `dns.lookup` THROW (transient/NXDOMAIN/network error) → log debug and\n *    return `ok`. Failing closed here is too aggressive: it would break legit\n *    gateways on a flaky resolver, and this is additive defense-in-depth layered\n *    on top of the sync string guard that already ran at construction. We only\n *    REJECT on a SUCCESSFUL resolution to a private address.\n *\n * Residual risk (TOCTOU): this is RESOLVE-time, not socket-connect-time. A name\n * that passes here could rebind to a private IP before the actual connect\n * (DNS rebinding). A full fix needs a custom `fetch` `lookup` hook validating\n * the peer address at the socket layer — out of scope for this LOW\n * defense-in-depth pass (#3426).\n */\nexport async function assertCustomApiHostResolvesPublic(\n  hostname: string,\n  opts: { readonly allowPrivate?: boolean } = {}\n): Promise<Result<void, ConfigError>> {\n  const allowPrivate = opts.allowPrivate === true || resolveAllowPrivateFromEnv();\n  if (allowPrivate) {\n    return ok(undefined);\n  }\n\n  const normalized = normalizeHost(hostname);\n\n  // A literal needs no DNS, but it is still classified HERE rather than\n  // assumed handled elsewhere. This used to return ok for any literal on the\n  // grounds that the sync guard had classified it at construction — but\n  // `discoverModels` calls only this guard, never the sync one, so on that\n  // path each deferred to the other and neither ran. `http://169.254.169.254/`\n  // reached IMDS, from a base URL that can come from a file rather than from\n  // operator intent.\n  if (isIPv4(normalized) || isIPv6(normalized)) {\n    return classifyLiteral(hostname, normalized);\n  }\n\n  // Only `address` is read; the resolver's `family` is intentionally NOT\n  // trusted — `classifyIpAddress` re-derives v4/v6 from the address string, so\n  // a mislabeled family in the lookup result cannot let a private IP slip past.\n  let addresses: ReadonlyArray<{ readonly address: string }>;\n  try {\n    addresses = await dnsLookup(hostname, { all: true });\n  } catch (error) {\n    // Fail OPEN: transient/NXDOMAIN/network errors must not break legit\n    // gateways. The sync string guard already ran; this is additive only.\n    logger.debug('custom-api SSRF resolve check: DNS lookup failed, skipping (fail-open)', {\n      hostname,\n      error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error),\n    });\n    return ok(undefined);\n  }\n\n  const rejection = firstPrivateAddress(addresses);\n  if (rejection !== null) {\n    return err(\n      new ConfigError(\n        `Custom API base URL rejected (SSRF resolve guard, reason=\"${rejection.reason}\"): ` +\n          `hostname \"${hostname}\" resolved to ${rejection.message}. ` +\n          `Set ${CUSTOM_API_ALLOW_PRIVATE_ENV}=1 to bypass if the gateway runs on a trusted internal host.`\n      )\n    );\n  }\n\n  return ok(undefined);\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns the {@link RejectionDetail} for the first resolved address that\n * classifies as private/loopback/link-local/reserved, or `null` if every\n * address is public. Fail-closed: any single private hit trips the guard.\n */\nfunction firstPrivateAddress(\n  addresses: ReadonlyArray<{ readonly address: string }>\n): RejectionDetail | null {\n  for (const { address } of addresses) {\n    const rejection = classifyIpAddress(address.toLowerCase());\n    if (rejection !== null && rejection !== 'not_an_ip') {\n      return rejection;\n    }\n  }\n  return null;\n}\n\n/**\n * IPv4 ranges the SSRF guard rejects, in order of specificity.\n *\n * \"Not RFC1918\" is not the same as \"public\". The blocks below RFC1918 are\n * here because each is reachable from a host and serves something: 100.64/10\n * carries Alibaba Cloud's metadata endpoint, 192.0.0/24 carries a legacy\n * Oracle Cloud one, and multicast/reserved/broadcast reach the local segment\n * rather than the internet (second pass over #4884).\n */\nconst IPV4_RULES: ReadonlyArray<{\n  readonly match: (a: number, b: number, c: number) => boolean;\n  readonly reason: BaseUrlRejectionReason;\n  readonly label: string;\n}> = [\n  { match: (a) => a === 127, reason: 'loopback', label: 'IPv4 loopback' },\n  { match: (a) => a === 10, reason: 'private_range', label: 'IPv4 private (10/8)' },\n  {\n    match: (a, b) => a === 172 && b >= 16 && b <= 31,\n    reason: 'private_range',\n    label: 'IPv4 private (172.16/12)',\n  },\n  {\n    match: (a, b) => a === 192 && b === 168,\n    reason: 'private_range',\n    label: 'IPv4 private (192.168/16)',\n  },\n  {\n    match: (a, b) => a === 169 && b === 254,\n    reason: 'link_local',\n    label: 'IPv4 link-local (169.254/16 — AWS IMDS)',\n  },\n  { match: (a) => a === 0, reason: 'reserved', label: 'IPv4 reserved (0/8)' },\n  {\n    match: (a, b) => a === 100 && b >= 64 && b <= 127,\n    reason: 'private_range',\n    label: 'IPv4 shared address space (100.64/10 — CGNAT, Alibaba metadata)',\n  },\n  {\n    match: (a, b, c) => a === 192 && b === 0 && c === 0,\n    reason: 'reserved',\n    label: 'IPv4 IETF protocol assignments (192.0.0/24 — legacy Oracle metadata)',\n  },\n  {\n    match: (a, b) => a === 198 && (b === 18 || b === 19),\n    reason: 'reserved',\n    label: 'IPv4 benchmarking (198.18/15)',\n  },\n  { match: (a) => a >= 224 && a <= 239, reason: 'reserved', label: 'IPv4 multicast (224/4)' },\n  {\n    match: (a) => a >= 240,\n    reason: 'reserved',\n    label: 'IPv4 reserved (240/4, includes 255.255.255.255 broadcast)',\n  },\n];\n\nfunction classifyIPv4(ip: string): RejectionDetail | null {\n  const parts = ip.split('.').map((p) => Number.parseInt(p, 10));\n  if (parts.length !== 4 || parts.some((n) => Number.isNaN(n))) return null;\n  const [a, b, c] = parts as [number, number, number, number];\n  for (const rule of IPV4_RULES) {\n    if (rule.match(a, b, c)) {\n      return { reason: rule.reason, message: `${rule.label} (${ip})` };\n    }\n  }\n  return null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Expand an IPv6 literal to its eight 16-bit groups, or null if unparseable.\n *\n * A trailing dotted quad (`::ffff:1.2.3.4`) is folded into two groups first,\n * so callers see one representation regardless of spelling.\n */\nfunction foldTrailingQuad(s: string): string | null {\n  const dotted = /(?:^|:)((?:\\d{1,3}\\.){3}\\d{1,3})$/.exec(s);\n  if (dotted?.[1] === undefined) return s;\n  const q = dotted[1].split('.').map((n) => Number.parseInt(n, 10));\n  if (q.length !== 4 || q.some((n) => Number.isNaN(n) || n < 0 || n > 255)) return null;\n  const hi = (((q[0] ?? 0) << 8) | (q[1] ?? 0)).toString(16);\n  const lo = (((q[2] ?? 0) << 8) | (q[3] ?? 0)).toString(16);\n  return `${s.slice(0, s.length - dotted[1].length)}${hi}:${lo}`;\n}\n\nfunction toHextets(ip: string): number[] | null {\n  const s = foldTrailingQuad(ip.toLowerCase());\n  if (s === null) return null;\n  const halves = s.split('::');\n  if (halves.length > 2) return null;\n  const head = halves[0] === '' || halves[0] === undefined ? [] : halves[0].split(':');\n  const tail = halves[1] === '' || halves[1] === undefined ? [] : halves[1].split(':');\n  const groups =\n    halves.length === 1\n      ? head\n      : [...head, ...Array<string>(8 - head.length - tail.length).fill('0'), ...tail];\n  if (groups.length !== 8) return null;\n  const out = groups.map((g) => Number.parseInt(g === '' ? '0' : g, 16));\n  return out.some((n) => Number.isNaN(n) || n < 0 || n > 0xffff) ? null : out;\n}\n\n/**\n * The IPv4 address embedded in an IPv6 literal, in dotted form, or null.\n *\n * Covers every prefix that carries a routable IPv4 payload: IPv4-mapped\n * (`::ffff:0:0/96`), IPv4-translated (`::ffff:0:0:0/96`), the NAT64\n * well-known prefix (`64:ff9b::/96`), 6to4 (`2002::/16`), and the deprecated\n * IPv4-compatible form (`::a.b.c.d`). Each is the same destination under a\n * different spelling, and the IPv4 rules must apply to all of them.\n */\nfunction embeddedIPv4(g: readonly number[]): string | null {\n  // 6to4 is the odd one out: the payload sits in hextets 1-2, not 6-7, so it\n  // cannot share the trailing-quad extraction below.\n  if (g[0] === 0x2002) return hextetPairToDotted(g[1] ?? 0, g[2] ?? 0);\n  const top = g.slice(0, 6);\n  const prefixes: ReadonlyArray<readonly number[]> = [\n    [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff], // ::ffff:0:0/96    — IPv4-mapped\n    [0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0], // ::ffff:0:0:0/96  — IPv4-translated\n    [0x64, 0xff9b, 0, 0, 0, 0], // 64:ff9b::/96  — NAT64 well-known\n    [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0], // ::a.b.c.d           — deprecated IPv4-compatible\n  ];\n  const matched = prefixes.some((p) => p.every((v, i) => top[i] === v));\n  if (!matched) return null;\n  const g6 = g[6] ?? 0;\n  const g7 = g[7] ?? 0;\n  // `::` and `::1` are their own addresses, not embedded IPv4.\n  if (top.every((v) => v === 0) && g6 === 0 && g7 <= 1) return null;\n  return hextetPairToDotted(g6, g7);\n}\n\n/** The dotted IPv4 address carried by two consecutive 16-bit hextets. */\nfunction hextetPairToDotted(hi: number, lo: number): string {\n  return [(hi >> 8) & 255, hi & 255, (lo >> 8) & 255, lo & 255].join('.');\n}\n\n/**\n * Classify an IPv6 address by its first hextet, or null if it is not in a\n * non-global prefix.\n *\n * Numeric rather than a string prefix test. 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package/dist/{chunk-NBTG2OQC.js → chunk-AE2U6NUZ.js}

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import {
   getErrorMessage,
   getTimeProvider,
   ok
-} from "./chunk-WFHUSSKZ.js";
+} from "./chunk-5CIP4EWI.js";
 
 // src/context/session-memory.ts
 import * as fs from "node:fs";
@@ -370,4 +370,4 @@ export {
   SessionMemory,
   createSessionMemory
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-NBTG2OQC.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-AE2U6NUZ.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-ZVQ2Q7OM.js → chunk-AVEDKF3J.js}

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import {
 import {
   createLogger,
   getTimeProvider
-} from "./chunk-WFHUSSKZ.js";
+} from "./chunk-5CIP4EWI.js";
 
 // src/mcp/tools/scanner-registry-fetcher.ts
 import { z } from "zod";
@@ -740,4 +740,4 @@ export {
   generateSecurityPlan,
   buildPlanFromAnalysis
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-ZVQ2Q7OM.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-AVEDKF3J.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-IPI4I2UW.js → chunk-CMZPHXDH.js}

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import {
   createLogger,
   err,
   ok
-} from "./chunk-WFHUSSKZ.js";
+} from "./chunk-5CIP4EWI.js";
 
 // src/scm/token-resolver.ts
 import { execFile } from "node:child_process";
@@ -87,4 +87,4 @@ export {
   hasToken,
   getTokenEnvVars
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-IPI4I2UW.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-CMZPHXDH.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-MSPYAOAU.js → chunk-DWQ7TG5L.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   resolveClassGuardMs
-} from "./chunk-WFHUSSKZ.js";
+} from "./chunk-5CIP4EWI.js";
 
 // src/cli/cli-readiness.ts
 var READINESS_LEVELS = ["installed", "authenticated", "serves"];
@@ -90,4 +90,4 @@ export {
   SERVES_PROBE_PROMPT,
   probeServes
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-MSPYAOAU.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-DWQ7TG5L.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-6E3DFUYA.js → chunk-EMWRUQQS.js}

@@ -8,13 +8,13 @@ import {
   loadTechniquesRegistry,
   resolveInsideRoot,
   savePapersRegistry
-} from "./chunk-MRGBENPM.js";
+} from "./chunk-NEIPHVTA.js";
 import {
   resolveToken
-} from "./chunk-IPI4I2UW.js";
+} from "./chunk-CMZPHXDH.js";
 import {
   getToolMemory
-} from "./chunk-NOSQXAW3.js";
+} from "./chunk-YUDJV6JF.js";
 import {
   capitalizeWords,
   tokenizeFiltered,
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ import {
   ok,
   registerPersistentDistillerFactory,
   sigmoidConfidence
-} from "./chunk-WFHUSSKZ.js";
+} from "./chunk-5CIP4EWI.js";
 import {
   ensureLearningDir,
   getRulesFile
@@ -4241,4 +4241,4 @@ export {
   DEFAULT_CONTEXT_BUDGET_TOKENS,
   getContextPromptPrefix
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-6E3DFUYA.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-EMWRUQQS.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-F76Y5QXV.js → chunk-ER76ZRBU.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   isGatewayModelAdapter
-} from "./chunk-RC4ZQ4ZE.js";
+} from "./chunk-Q6JZQWQB.js";
 import {
   allOf
 } from "./chunk-OQB3XC5O.js";
@@ -24,20 +24,20 @@ import {
   toolSuccessStructured,
   withProgressHeartbeat,
   wrapToolWithTimeout
-} from "./chunk-J527NA52.js";
+} from "./chunk-5EXZHBAQ.js";
 import {
   VERSION
-} from "./chunk-EVBLCOEN.js";
+} from "./chunk-MYF73MI3.js";
 import {
   UNRESOLVED_MODEL_ID,
   assessPanelIndependence,
   countDistinctModels,
   createEvent,
   getGlobalRegistry
-} from "./chunk-CMG3P6OI.js";
+} from "./chunk-PSCY6MSD.js";
 import {
   getToolMemory
-} from "./chunk-NOSQXAW3.js";
+} from "./chunk-YUDJV6JF.js";
 import {
   authRemediation,
   classifyExtractedError,
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ import {
   sanitizeOutput,
   sleep,
   withTimeout
-} from "./chunk-UF3BNMOV.js";
+} from "./chunk-33HHRRKZ.js";
 import {
   AgentError,
   CLI_NAMES,
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ import {
   registerPersistentOutcomeStoreFactory,
   resolveClassGuardMs,
   resolveVoteTimeout
-} from "./chunk-WFHUSSKZ.js";
+} from "./chunk-5CIP4EWI.js";
 import {
   ensureLearningDir,
   getOutcomesFile
@@ -6410,7 +6410,7 @@ function logPartialProposal(bounded, log) {
 }
 async function runContrarianCheck(proposal, log, opts) {
   try {
-    const { executeExpert } = await import("./expert-bridge-F7V2AXUD.js");
+    const { executeExpert } = await import("./expert-bridge-5MFBN4ZW.js");
     const bounded = boundArtifactForReview(proposal, CONTRARIAN_PROPOSAL_BUDGET, "proposal");
     logPartialProposal(bounded, log);
     const result = await executeExpert("architecture", buildContrarianPrompt(bounded, opts), {
@@ -9188,4 +9188,4 @@ export {
   CONSENSUS_VOTE_TOOL_SCHEMA,
   registerConsensusVoteTool
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-F76Y5QXV.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-ER76ZRBU.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-T6W3N3N3.js → chunk-F7R2E74V.js}

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import {
   CACHE_TIMEOUTS,
   createLogger,
   getTimeProvider
-} from "./chunk-WFHUSSKZ.js";
+} from "./chunk-5CIP4EWI.js";
 
 // src/security/trust-types.ts
 import { z } from "zod";
@@ -610,4 +610,4 @@ export {
   resolveReputationGatingMode,
   gateWithReputation
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-T6W3N3N3.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-F7R2E74V.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-PJZQQYLJ.js → chunk-GHNHZSDW.js}

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 import {
   resolveCliSlot
-} from "./chunk-VFTP7WSH.js";
+} from "./chunk-J76ZM6QF.js";
 import {
   createLogger,
   getTimeProvider,
   isRateLimitText
-} from "./chunk-WFHUSSKZ.js";
+} from "./chunk-5CIP4EWI.js";
 
 // src/pipeline/expert-bridge.ts
 function resolveCliFromModelString(model) {
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ async function getMcpConfigPath() {
   if (cachedMcpConfigPath !== null) return cachedMcpConfigPath;
   mcpConfigInitPromise ??= (async () => {
     try {
-      const { generateMcpConfig } = await import("./child-mcp-config-3IELNFHI.js");
+      const { generateMcpConfig } = await import("./child-mcp-config-IRZHH2TU.js");
       const config = await generateMcpConfig();
       cachedMcpConfigPath = config.configPath;
       cachedMcpConfigCleanup = config.cleanup;
@@ -93,8 +93,8 @@ var routerInitPromise = null;
 async function getRouter() {
   if (cachedRouter !== null) return cachedRouter;
   routerInitPromise ??= (async () => {
-    const { createAllAdapters } = await import("./factory-MZTDIMCP.js");
-    const { createCompositeRouter } = await import("./composite-router-DSYVXQ7C.js");
+    const { createAllAdapters } = await import("./factory-3ZA63QDH.js");
+    const { createCompositeRouter } = await import("./composite-router-F3D2QRHI.js");
     const adapters = createAllAdapters();
     if (adapters.size === 0) {
       routerInitPromise = null;
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ async function getRouter() {
     }
     cachedRouter = adaptCompositeRouter(createCompositeRouter(adapters));
     try {
-      const { createCliCircuitBreakerIntegration } = await import("./cli-circuit-breaker-H5CESPLC.js");
+      const { createCliCircuitBreakerIntegration } = await import("./cli-circuit-breaker-DJU6WTWT.js");
       cachedCircuitBreaker = createCliCircuitBreakerIntegration([...adapters.values()]);
     } catch (error) {
       const msg = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
@@ -216,4 +216,4 @@ export {
   tokenSplitFromUsage,
   executeExpert
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-PJZQQYLJ.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-GHNHZSDW.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-VFTP7WSH.js → chunk-J76ZM6QF.js}

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import {
   MODEL_IDS,
   getTimeProvider,
   resolveModelIdentitySync
-} from "./chunk-WFHUSSKZ.js";
+} from "./chunk-5CIP4EWI.js";
 
 // src/config/model-availability.ts
 var DEFAULT_TTL_MS = 6e4;
@@ -150,4 +150,4 @@ export {
   resetAvailabilityCache,
   filterAvailableModels
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-VFTP7WSH.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-J76ZM6QF.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-AONC4VYB.js → chunk-LIVTFARG.js}

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import {
   ValidationError,
   createLogger,
   formatZodError
-} from "./chunk-WFHUSSKZ.js";
+} from "./chunk-5CIP4EWI.js";
 
 // src/security/ast-rule-runner.ts
 import { existsSync } from "node:fs";
@@ -241,4 +241,4 @@ export {
   collectAstQaFindings,
   runAstQaRules
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-AONC4VYB.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-LIVTFARG.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-EVBLCOEN.js → chunk-MYF73MI3.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 // src/version.ts
 import semver from "semver";
-var VERSION = true ? "8.76.2" : "dev";
+var VERSION = true ? "8.78.0" : "dev";
 var NODE_ENGINE_RANGE = ">=22.5.0";
 function isNodeVersionSupported(version) {
   return semver.satisfies(version, NODE_ENGINE_RANGE);
@@ -11,4 +11,4 @@ export {
   NODE_ENGINE_RANGE,
   isNodeVersionSupported
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-EVBLCOEN.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-MYF73MI3.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-MRGBENPM.js → chunk-NEIPHVTA.js}

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import {
   err,
   getErrorMessage,
   ok
-} from "./chunk-WFHUSSKZ.js";
+} from "./chunk-5CIP4EWI.js";
 import {
   findRepoRoot,
   getActiveWorkspaceRoot,
@@ -223,4 +223,4 @@ export {
   loadPapersRegistry,
   savePapersRegistry
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-MRGBENPM.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-NEIPHVTA.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-IDPA4X6J.js → chunk-NW5MCYOE.js}

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ import {
   toolStructuredError,
   toolSuccessStructured,
   wrapToolWithTimeout
-} from "./chunk-J527NA52.js";
+} from "./chunk-5EXZHBAQ.js";
 import {
   JsonlStore,
   SECURITY_KEYWORDS,
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ import {
   getTimeProvider,
   isDeclaredNeverDeprecate,
   isRegisteredToolName
-} from "./chunk-WFHUSSKZ.js";
+} from "./chunk-5CIP4EWI.js";
 import {
   getNexusDataDir,
   nexusDataPath
@@ -2282,4 +2282,4 @@ export {
   runImprovementReview,
   registerImprovementReviewTool
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-IDPA4X6J.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-NW5MCYOE.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-G744HQMZ.js → chunk-OZFXXGGZ.js}

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import {
   GitHubProvider,
   ScmError
-} from "./chunk-GOXBEH6M.js";
+} from "./chunk-VFFG3HIY.js";
 import {
   ROLE_DEFAULT_TRUST,
   ReputationCache,
@@ -12,10 +12,10 @@ import {
   resolveEnvMode,
   resolveReputationGatingMode,
   sanitizeInput
-} from "./chunk-T6W3N3N3.js";
+} from "./chunk-F7R2E74V.js";
 import {
   hasToken
-} from "./chunk-IPI4I2UW.js";
+} from "./chunk-CMZPHXDH.js";
 import {
   CLI_SUBPROCESS_TIMEOUTS,
   createLogger,
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ import {
   getErrorMessage,
   getTimeProvider,
   ok
-} from "./chunk-WFHUSSKZ.js";
+} from "./chunk-5CIP4EWI.js";
 
 // src/security/firewall/firewall-policy-mode.ts
 import { z } from "zod";
@@ -1336,7 +1336,8 @@ var HostileInputFirewall = class {
       return err({
         code: "POLICY_REFUSED",
         message: `Refused by firewall policy: ${corroboration.actionType} lacks required corroboration \u2014 ${corroboration.missing.join("; ")}`,
-        stage: "corroboration"
+        stage: "corroboration",
+        missing: corroboration.missing
       });
     }
     return ok({
@@ -1344,6 +1345,7 @@ var HostileInputFirewall = class {
       satisfied: corroboration.satisfied,
       missing: corroboration.missing,
       corroboratingSources: corroboration.corroboratingSources,
+      clearedOnlyByUnverifiedSources: corroboration.clearedOnlyByUnverifiedSources,
       policyMode: this.policyMode,
       wouldRefuse: !corroboration.satisfied && this.policyMode === "audit"
     });
@@ -1565,6 +1567,7 @@ function getUntrustedInputFirewall() {
   singleton ??= new HostileInputFirewall({
     adapter: createGitHubAdapter(),
     contentDowngrade: false,
+    stages: { corroboration: true },
     ...configuredAuditLogger !== void 0 ? { auditLogger: configuredAuditLogger } : {}
   });
   return singleton;
@@ -1609,6 +1612,44 @@ function evaluateActionThroughFirewall(input, options) {
     wouldRefuse
   });
 }
+function validateActionCorroboration(action) {
+  const result = getUntrustedInputFirewall().validateAction(action);
+  if (!result.ok) {
+    const { code, stage, missing } = result.error;
+    if (code !== "POLICY_REFUSED" || stage !== "corroboration") return err(asError(result.error));
+    if (missing === void 0 || missing.length === 0) return err(asError(result.error));
+    logger4.warn("Untrusted-input firewall refused an uncorroborated action (enforce mode)", {
+      actionType: action.type,
+      stage,
+      missing
+    });
+    return ok({ refused: true, satisfied: false, stage, missing, policyMode: "enforce" });
+  }
+  const validation = result.value;
+  if (!validation.evaluated) {
+    return err(
+      new Error(
+        `Untrusted-input firewall did not evaluate corroboration for action ${action.type} (${validation.reason})`
+      )
+    );
+  }
+  if (validation.wouldRefuse) {
+    logger4.warn("Untrusted-input firewall would refuse under enforce (audit mode)", {
+      actionType: action.type,
+      stage: "corroboration",
+      missing: validation.missing
+    });
+  }
+  return ok({
+    refused: false,
+    satisfied: validation.satisfied,
+    missing: validation.missing,
+    corroboratingSources: validation.corroboratingSources,
+    clearedOnlyByUnverifiedSources: validation.clearedOnlyByUnverifiedSources,
+    policyMode: validation.policyMode,
+    wouldRefuse: validation.wouldRefuse
+  });
+}
 function processAndLog(input, options) {
   const result = getUntrustedInputFirewall().process(input, options);
   if (!result.ok) {
@@ -2038,9 +2079,17 @@ function describeAction(action) {
   }
 }
 function buildActionDetails(action, policy, corrob) {
+  const policyRules = policy.violations.map((violation) => violation.rule);
   return {
-    policyViolations: policy.violations.map((violation) => violation.rule),
-    missingCorroboration: corrob.missing,
+    ...corrob.refused ? {
+      policyViolations: [...policyRules, "INSUFFICIENT_CORROBORATION"],
+      missingCorroboration: corrob.missing,
+      refusedAtStage: corrob.stage
+    } : {
+      policyViolations: policyRules,
+      missingCorroboration: corrob.missing,
+      corroborationWouldRefuse: corrob.wouldRefuse
+    },
     ...action.type === "ClassifyIssue" && { category: action.category },
     ...action.type === "ProposeLabels" && { labels: action.labels }
   };
@@ -2051,17 +2100,29 @@ function validateActionsThroughFirewall(input, gate, actions, existingLabels) {
   for (const action of actions) {
     const decision = evaluateActionThroughFirewall(input, { ...gate, ...labels, action });
     if (!decision.ok) return decision;
-    const corrobResult = validateCorroboration(action);
+    const corroboration = validateActionCorroboration(action);
+    if (!corroboration.ok) return corroboration;
     proposed.push({
       type: action.type,
       description: describeAction(action),
-      policyApproved: decision.value.allowed,
-      corroborated: corrobResult.satisfied,
-      details: buildActionDetails(action, decision.value, corrobResult)
+      policyApproved: decision.value.allowed && !corroboration.value.refused,
+      corroborated: corroboration.value.satisfied,
+      details: buildActionDetails(action, decision.value, corroboration.value)
     });
   }
   return ok(proposed);
 }
+function isStringArray(value) {
+  return Array.isArray(value) && value.every((v) => typeof v === "string");
+}
+function readActionRefusal(action) {
+  const { policyViolations, missingCorroboration, refusedAtStage } = action.details;
+  return {
+    policyViolations: isStringArray(policyViolations) ? policyViolations : [],
+    missingCorroboration: isStringArray(missingCorroboration) ? missingCorroboration : [],
+    ...refusedAtStage === "corroboration" ? { refusedAtStage } : {}
+  };
+}
 
 // src/dogfooding/issue-triage.ts
 var logger6 = createLogger({ component: "IssueTriage" });
@@ -2440,12 +2501,14 @@ export {
   configureUntrustedInputFirewall,
   runUntrustedInputFirewall,
   evaluateActionThroughFirewall,
+  validateActionCorroboration,
   firewallInputFor,
   parsePRUrl,
   GitHubReviewer,
   GitHubUserInfo,
   createFullGitHubProvider,
+  readActionRefusal,
   IssueTriage,
   createIssueTriage
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-G744HQMZ.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-OZFXXGGZ.js.map