mrplex 0.0.1

package/dist/shell/audit.d.ts

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+/**
+ * Audit log — auth-shell plan §1 (audit), decision 8; noauth-plan decision 7.
+ *
+ * Append-only JSONL, one line per authenticated call: `{ ts, principal, op,
+ * repo, path, outcome }` (+ engine `error` when the forwarded call failed).
+ * Written by the guard's audit sink — a single choke point, so no surface can
+ * forget to log. The engine's `author` column is *attribution* (who wrote the
+ * content); this log is *accountability* (who called the shell). Different
+ * facts, stored in different places on purpose.
+ */
+import type { AuditSink } from "./guard.js";
+/** One serialized audit record. Field order is stable for greppability. */
+export type AuditRecord = {
+    ts: string;
+    principal: string;
+    op: string;
+    repo?: string;
+    path?: string;
+    outcome: "ok" | "forbidden";
+    error?: string;
+};
+/**
+ * Build an `AuditSink` bound to a principal that appends JSONL to `path`. The
+ * guard is principal-agnostic (it knows only the entitlement), so the principal
+ * is closed over here — one sink per authenticated session/request.
+ *
+ * Appends are synchronous: an audit record must be durable before the call's
+ * effect is observable, and the volume (one line per op) doesn't justify an
+ * async writer. A write failure throws — losing the audit trail silently is
+ * worse than failing the call.
+ */
+export declare function fileAuditSink(path: string, principal: string): AuditSink;

package/dist/shell/audit.js

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+/**
+ * Audit log — auth-shell plan §1 (audit), decision 8; noauth-plan decision 7.
+ *
+ * Append-only JSONL, one line per authenticated call: `{ ts, principal, op,
+ * repo, path, outcome }` (+ engine `error` when the forwarded call failed).
+ * Written by the guard's audit sink — a single choke point, so no surface can
+ * forget to log. The engine's `author` column is *attribution* (who wrote the
+ * content); this log is *accountability* (who called the shell). Different
+ * facts, stored in different places on purpose.
+ */
+import { appendFileSync } from "node:fs";
+/**
+ * Build an `AuditSink` bound to a principal that appends JSONL to `path`. The
+ * guard is principal-agnostic (it knows only the entitlement), so the principal
+ * is closed over here — one sink per authenticated session/request.
+ *
+ * Appends are synchronous: an audit record must be durable before the call's
+ * effect is observable, and the volume (one line per op) doesn't justify an
+ * async writer. A write failure throws — losing the audit trail silently is
+ * worse than failing the call.
+ */
+export function fileAuditSink(path, principal) {
+    return (event) => {
+        const record = { ts: new Date().toISOString(), principal, ...event };
+        appendFileSync(path, `${JSON.stringify(record)}\n`);
+    };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=audit.js.map

package/dist/shell/audit.js.map

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package/dist/shell/guard.d.ts

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+/**
+ * guardKernel — the access-and-identity decorator (auth-shell plan §1, WS2).
+ *
+ * The shell's core is NOT a proxy: it is an object with the same shape as the
+ * `Kernel` interface whose every method
+ *   • stamps `ctx.author` from the entitlement (never trusts the caller's,
+ *     unless `impersonate`),
+ *   • forwards reads with `ctx.scope = entitlement.read` (the engine does the
+ *     filtering — search ranking, pagination, graph traversal stay kernel-side),
+ *   • enforces write policy against the TYPED call arguments using
+ *     `entitlement.write` and the engine's own glob dialect,
+ *   • gates destructive ops on `entitlement.destructive`,
+ *   • and forwards to the wrapped kernel.
+ *
+ * The kernel never learns any of this exists. The shell imports only the
+ * kernel's public seam (`Kernel`, `CallContext`, `ScopeClaim`, the glob engine
+ * via `normalizeClaims`); nothing here reaches into engine internals, so the
+ * whole module could be extracted to its own package without touching engine
+ * code — that extractability is the test of the boundary (plan §intro).
+ *
+ * Write enforcement replays the old design §8.2 rules (plan decision 5):
+ * both-endpoints on moves, system-sigil endpoints skipped (the kernel's
+ * validatePath owns that namespace), and write does NOT imply read — so writes
+ * forward with no read-scope, or the engine's repo-visibility check would
+ * block a write to a repo the caller can't read (plan decision, §1 writes).
+ */
+import type { Kernel } from "../kernel/kernel.js";
+import type { Entitlement } from "./policy.js";
+/**
+ * One audited call. The guard supplies the operation-shaped fields; the sink's
+ * owner (embedded serve / stdio launcher) adds `ts` and `principal` — the guard
+ * is principal-agnostic, it only knows the compiled entitlement.
+ */
+export type AuditEvent = {
+    /** Dotted op name, e.g. `docs.put`, `repos.delete`, `query`. */
+    op: string;
+    repo?: string;
+    path?: string;
+    outcome: "ok" | "forbidden";
+    /** Kernel error code when the forwarded call threw (outcome stays "ok" — the
+     * shell allowed it; the engine rejected it for its own reasons). */
+    error?: string;
+};
+export type AuditSink = (event: AuditEvent) => void;
+/**
+ * Wrap a full-trust kernel in an entitlement. The returned object satisfies the
+ * `Kernel` interface exactly, so any surface (embedded HTTP, stdio MCP) mounts
+ * it unchanged.
+ */
+export declare function guardKernel(kernel: Kernel, entitlement: Entitlement, audit?: AuditSink): Kernel;

package/dist/shell/guard.js

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+/**
+ * guardKernel — the access-and-identity decorator (auth-shell plan §1, WS2).
+ *
+ * The shell's core is NOT a proxy: it is an object with the same shape as the
+ * `Kernel` interface whose every method
+ *   • stamps `ctx.author` from the entitlement (never trusts the caller's,
+ *     unless `impersonate`),
+ *   • forwards reads with `ctx.scope = entitlement.read` (the engine does the
+ *     filtering — search ranking, pagination, graph traversal stay kernel-side),
+ *   • enforces write policy against the TYPED call arguments using
+ *     `entitlement.write` and the engine's own glob dialect,
+ *   • gates destructive ops on `entitlement.destructive`,
+ *   • and forwards to the wrapped kernel.
+ *
+ * The kernel never learns any of this exists. The shell imports only the
+ * kernel's public seam (`Kernel`, `CallContext`, `ScopeClaim`, the glob engine
+ * via `normalizeClaims`); nothing here reaches into engine internals, so the
+ * whole module could be extracted to its own package without touching engine
+ * code — that extractability is the test of the boundary (plan §intro).
+ *
+ * Write enforcement replays the old design §8.2 rules (plan decision 5):
+ * both-endpoints on moves, system-sigil endpoints skipped (the kernel's
+ * validatePath owns that namespace), and write does NOT imply read — so writes
+ * forward with no read-scope, or the engine's repo-visibility check would
+ * block a write to a repo the caller can't read (plan decision, §1 writes).
+ */
+import { claimsGrantRead as claimsCoverPath, normalizeClaims } from "../kernel/auth/scope.js";
+import { pathIsInSystemNamespace } from "../kernel/deletion.js";
+import { forbidden } from "../kernel/errors.js";
+import { HARDCODED_DEFAULTS } from "../kernel/path-config.js";
+/**
+ * Wrap a full-trust kernel in an entitlement. The returned object satisfies the
+ * `Kernel` interface exactly, so any surface (embedded HTTP, stdio MCP) mounts
+ * it unchanged.
+ */
+export function guardKernel(kernel, entitlement, audit) {
+    const writeMatchers = normalizeClaims(entitlement.write);
+    const sigils = HARDCODED_DEFAULTS.system_sigils;
+    /** Identity stamped on writes — the caller's author only when impersonating. */
+    function authorFor(ctx) {
+        return entitlement.impersonate && ctx.author !== undefined ? ctx.author : entitlement.author;
+    }
+    /** Context for a read: the entitlement's read scope, nothing caller-supplied. */
+    function readCtx() {
+        return { scope: entitlement.read };
+    }
+    /**
+     * Context for a write/destructive op: the derived author and NO scope. Write
+     * does not imply read (plan decision 5), so forwarding a read scope here would
+     * make the engine's repo-visibility check reject a legitimate write.
+     */
+    function writeCtx(ctx) {
+        return { author: authorFor(ctx) };
+    }
+    function emit(event) {
+        audit?.(event);
+    }
+    /** Enforce write policy on one endpoint. System-sigil paths are the kernel's
+     * to police (validatePath), so the shell skips them. */
+    function assertWritable(op, repo, path) {
+        if (pathIsInSystemNamespace(path, sigils))
+            return;
+        if (!claimsCoverPath(writeMatchers, repo, path)) {
+            emit({ op, repo, path, outcome: "forbidden" });
+            throw forbidden();
+        }
+    }
+    function assertDestructive(op, repo) {
+        if (!entitlement.destructive) {
+            emit({ op, repo, outcome: "forbidden" });
+            throw forbidden();
+        }
+    }
+    /** Forward a call, auditing the outcome (ok, or ok-with-engine-error). */
+    async function forward(op, meta, run) {
+        try {
+            const result = await run();
+            emit({ op, ...meta, outcome: "ok" });
+            return result;
+        }
+        catch (err) {
+            emit({ op, ...meta, outcome: "ok", error: errorCode(err) });
+            throw err;
+        }
+    }
+    return {
+        repos: {
+            list: (_ctx, opts) => forward("repos.list", {}, () => kernel.repos.list(readCtx(), opts)),
+            get: (_ctx, slug) => forward("repos.get", { repo: slug }, () => kernel.repos.get(readCtx(), slug)),
+            create: async (ctx, slug) => {
+                assertDestructive("repos.create", slug);
+                return forward("repos.create", { repo: slug }, () => kernel.repos.create(writeCtx(ctx), slug));
+            },
+            rename: async (ctx, slug, newSlug) => {
+                assertDestructive("repos.rename", slug);
+                return forward("repos.rename", { repo: slug }, () => kernel.repos.rename(writeCtx(ctx), slug, newSlug));
+            },
+            delete: async (ctx, slug) => {
+                assertDestructive("repos.delete", slug);
+                return forward("repos.delete", { repo: slug }, () => kernel.repos.delete(writeCtx(ctx), slug));
+            },
+            set_path_config: async (ctx, slug, config) => {
+                assertDestructive("repos.set_path_config", slug);
+                return forward("repos.set_path_config", { repo: slug }, () => kernel.repos.set_path_config(writeCtx(ctx), slug, config));
+            },
+            set_link_config: async (ctx, slug, config) => {
+                assertDestructive("repos.set_link_config", slug);
+                return forward("repos.set_link_config", { repo: slug }, () => kernel.repos.set_link_config(writeCtx(ctx), slug, config));
+            },
+        },
+        docs: {
+            get: (_ctx, repo, path) => forward("docs.get", { repo, path }, () => kernel.docs.get(readCtx(), repo, path)),
+            get_many: (_ctx, repo, paths) => forward("docs.get_many", { repo }, () => kernel.docs.get_many(readCtx(), repo, paths)),
+            get_version: (_ctx, repo, versionId) => forward("docs.get_version", { repo }, () => kernel.docs.get_version(readCtx(), repo, versionId)),
+            history: (_ctx, repo, path, opts) => forward("docs.history", { repo, path }, () => kernel.docs.history(readCtx(), repo, path, opts)),
+            diff: (_ctx, repo, path, from, to) => forward("docs.diff", { repo, path }, () => kernel.docs.diff(readCtx(), repo, path, from, to)),
+            create: async (ctx, repo, path, input) => {
+                assertWritable("docs.create", repo, path);
+                return forward("docs.create", { repo, path }, () => kernel.docs.create(writeCtx(ctx), repo, path, input));
+            },
+            put: async (ctx, repo, prevVersionId, path, input) => {
+                // A put may move the doc. Enforce write on the destination and — when
+                // the source differs — on the source too (both-endpoints, §8.2). The
+                // source path is the path of the version being superseded; resolve it
+                // with full visibility (the guard is trusted to look up what it must
+                // police), so a write-without-read grant still works.
+                const source = await kernel.docs.get_version({}, repo, prevVersionId);
+                assertWritable("docs.put", repo, source.path);
+                assertWritable("docs.put", repo, path);
+                return forward("docs.put", { repo, path }, () => kernel.docs.put(writeCtx(ctx), repo, prevVersionId, path, input));
+            },
+            delete: async (ctx, repo, prevVersionId) => {
+                const target = await kernel.docs.get_version({}, repo, prevVersionId);
+                assertWritable("docs.delete", repo, target.path);
+                return forward("docs.delete", { repo, path: target.path }, () => kernel.docs.delete(writeCtx(ctx), repo, prevVersionId));
+            },
+        },
+        links: {
+            backfill: async (ctx, repo) => {
+                assertDestructive("links.backfill", repo);
+                return forward("links.backfill", { repo }, () => kernel.links.backfill(writeCtx(ctx), repo));
+            },
+            // Read-only listing; scoped to read visibility like any other read.
+            stale: (_ctx, repo) => forward("links.stale", { repo }, () => kernel.links.stale(readCtx(), repo)),
+            repair: async (ctx, repo, opts) => {
+                const dryRun = opts?.dry_run ?? false;
+                // A live repair mutates docs → destructive. A dry run only plans → a
+                // read, bounded by read visibility (which docs the caller may see).
+                if (!dryRun)
+                    assertDestructive("links.repair", repo);
+                const forwardCtx = dryRun
+                    ? { scope: entitlement.read }
+                    : { author: authorFor(ctx), scope: entitlement.read };
+                return forward("links.repair", { repo }, () => kernel.links.repair(forwardCtx, repo, opts));
+            },
+        },
+        query: (_ctx, spec) => forward("query", {}, () => kernel.query(readCtx(), spec)),
+        // Read-only neighborhood expansion; scoped to read visibility. Traversal
+        // stays kernel-side (the engine applies scope∧filter as visibility).
+        graph: (_ctx, spec) => forward("graph", { repo: spec.repo }, () => kernel.graph(readCtx(), spec)),
+        history: {
+            // Read-only change feed; the engine applies read scope to each ref's
+            // endpoints (a ref is delivered only if the caller can see either end).
+            since: (_ctx, input) => forward("history.since", { repo: input.repo }, () => kernel.history.since(readCtx(), input)),
+            index: (_ctx, input) => forward("history.index", { repo: input.repo }, () => kernel.history.index(readCtx(), input)),
+            list: (_ctx, input) => forward("history.list", { repo: input.repo }, () => kernel.history.list(readCtx(), input)),
+        },
+    };
+}
+function errorCode(err) {
+    if (err && typeof err === "object" && "code" in err && typeof err.code === "string") {
+        return err.code;
+    }
+    return "error";
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=guard.js.map

package/dist/shell/guard.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/shell/keys.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/**
+ * API keys — auth-shell plan §1 (authn front 1), decision 9.
+ *
+ * High-entropy shell-generated secrets, stored as `sha256:<hex>` hashes in the
+ * policy file itself. There is no key database: issuance is a line appended to
+ * a diffable file (`key mint`), revocation is deleting the line. A key is a
+ * non-human-chosen 256-bit random secret, so a plain sha256 — no KDF, no salt —
+ * is the right primitive: deterministic lookup, and there is no low-entropy
+ * password to protect against brute force (the old design §8.1 argument,
+ * carried over intact).
+ *
+ * Presented to the shell as `Authorization: Bearer <plaintext-key>`.
+ */
+import type { Policy } from "./policy.js";
+/**
+ * Mint a fresh plaintext key and its policy-file hash. The plaintext is shown
+ * to the operator ONCE (by `key mint`) and never stored; only the hash lives
+ * in the policy file. base64url keeps it copy-paste-safe in shell/env/headers.
+ */
+export declare function mintKey(): {
+    plaintext: string;
+    hash: string;
+};
+/** The `sha256:<hex>` hash of a plaintext key — the policy-file storage form. */
+export declare function hashKey(plaintext: string): string;
+/**
+ * Resolve a presented plaintext key to its principal id, or null if no
+ * principal lists its hash. Comparison is constant-time per candidate hash so
+ * a timing side-channel can't distinguish "no such key" from "wrong key".
+ */
+export declare function principalForKey(policy: Policy, plaintext: string): string | null;
+/**
+ * Extract a bearer token from an `Authorization` header value, or null. Case-
+ * insensitive on the scheme per RFC 7235; the token is returned verbatim.
+ */
+export declare function bearerToken(authorization: string | undefined): string | null;

package/dist/shell/keys.js

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+/**
+ * API keys — auth-shell plan §1 (authn front 1), decision 9.
+ *
+ * High-entropy shell-generated secrets, stored as `sha256:<hex>` hashes in the
+ * policy file itself. There is no key database: issuance is a line appended to
+ * a diffable file (`key mint`), revocation is deleting the line. A key is a
+ * non-human-chosen 256-bit random secret, so a plain sha256 — no KDF, no salt —
+ * is the right primitive: deterministic lookup, and there is no low-entropy
+ * password to protect against brute force (the old design §8.1 argument,
+ * carried over intact).
+ *
+ * Presented to the shell as `Authorization: Bearer <plaintext-key>`.
+ */
+import { createHash, randomBytes, timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto";
+/** Bytes of entropy in a minted key. 32 = 256 bits. */
+const KEY_BYTES = 32;
+/**
+ * Mint a fresh plaintext key and its policy-file hash. The plaintext is shown
+ * to the operator ONCE (by `key mint`) and never stored; only the hash lives
+ * in the policy file. base64url keeps it copy-paste-safe in shell/env/headers.
+ */
+export function mintKey() {
+    const plaintext = randomBytes(KEY_BYTES).toString("base64url");
+    return { plaintext, hash: hashKey(plaintext) };
+}
+/** The `sha256:<hex>` hash of a plaintext key — the policy-file storage form. */
+export function hashKey(plaintext) {
+    const hex = createHash("sha256").update(plaintext, "utf8").digest("hex");
+    return `sha256:${hex}`;
+}
+/**
+ * Resolve a presented plaintext key to its principal id, or null if no
+ * principal lists its hash. Comparison is constant-time per candidate hash so
+ * a timing side-channel can't distinguish "no such key" from "wrong key".
+ */
+export function principalForKey(policy, plaintext) {
+    const presented = Buffer.from(hashKey(plaintext), "utf8");
+    let match = null;
+    for (const [id, principal] of Object.entries(policy.principals)) {
+        for (const stored of principal.keys ?? []) {
+            const storedBuf = Buffer.from(stored, "utf8");
+            // Length differs only for a malformed stored hash (validation forbids
+            // it), but timingSafeEqual throws on unequal lengths, so guard it.
+            if (storedBuf.length === presented.length && timingSafeEqual(storedBuf, presented)) {
+                // Don't early-return: keep scanning so total work doesn't leak which
+                // principal matched. Record the first (and, given unique keys, only) hit.
+                if (match === null)
+                    match = id;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    return match;
+}
+/**
+ * Extract a bearer token from an `Authorization` header value, or null. Case-
+ * insensitive on the scheme per RFC 7235; the token is returned verbatim.
+ */
+export function bearerToken(authorization) {
+    if (!authorization)
+        return null;
+    const m = /^Bearer[ \t]+(.+)$/i.exec(authorization.trim());
+    return m ? m[1].trim() : null;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=keys.js.map

package/dist/shell/keys.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/shell/login.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/**
+ * OAuth device-authorization login — auth-shell plan §1 (login), WS5.
+ *
+ * `mrplex login` runs the OAuth 2.0 **device authorization flow** (RFC 8628):
+ * request a device+user code, show the user a URL and code to enter, then poll
+ * the token endpoint until they approve. The resulting access + refresh tokens
+ * are cached under the config dir (mode 600); `mcp-stdio` uses the cached
+ * access token when no explicit credential is given, and refreshes it mid-
+ * session (recompiling the entitlement on refresh, so long-lived agent sessions
+ * neither die at token expiry nor outlive a policy change indefinitely).
+ *
+ * The IdP is the authorization server; mrplex is only the resource server, so
+ * this file speaks the standard endpoints and stores tokens — it verifies
+ * nothing (that's oidc.ts, on the serving side).
+ */
+export type DeviceFlowConfig = {
+    /** OAuth device-authorization endpoint. */
+    deviceAuthorizationEndpoint: string;
+    /** OAuth token endpoint. */
+    tokenEndpoint: string;
+    clientId: string;
+    /** Space-delimited scopes (e.g. "openid email profile offline_access"). */
+    scope?: string;
+    /**
+     * OAuth `audience` — the API the token is for. Auth0 (and some other IdPs)
+     * only issue a *JWT* access token when the device-authorization request names
+     * an audience; without it they return an opaque token that fails the shell's
+     * JWKS verification. Sent in the device-authorization request when set. This
+     * is the shell's `--oidc-audience` value.
+     */
+    audience?: string;
+};
+export type TokenSet = {
+    access_token: string;
+    refresh_token?: string;
+    /** Absolute expiry (epoch ms), computed from `expires_in` at grant time. */
+    expires_at?: number;
+    token_type?: string;
+};
+/** Where the token cache lives — `${XDG_CONFIG_HOME}/mrplex/token.json`. */
+export declare function tokenCachePath(): string;
+export declare function loadTokenSet(): TokenSet | null;
+export declare function saveTokenSet(tokens: TokenSet): void;
+/** A token is fresh if it exists and isn't within `skewMs` of expiry. */
+export declare function isFresh(tokens: TokenSet, skewMs?: number): boolean;
+/**
+ * Run the device flow to completion. Prompts via `prompt` (defaults to stderr),
+ * polls the token endpoint honoring `interval` and `slow_down`, and returns the
+ * granted token set. Throws on denial, expiry, or endpoint error.
+ */
+export declare function deviceFlowLogin(config: DeviceFlowConfig, prompt?: (msg: string) => void): Promise<TokenSet>;
+/**
+ * Exchange a refresh token for a fresh access token. Returns the new token set,
+ * carrying the refresh token forward if the IdP didn't rotate it.
+ */
+export declare function refreshTokens(config: Pick<DeviceFlowConfig, "tokenEndpoint" | "clientId">, refreshToken: string): Promise<TokenSet>;

package/dist/shell/login.js

@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+/**
+ * OAuth device-authorization login — auth-shell plan §1 (login), WS5.
+ *
+ * `mrplex login` runs the OAuth 2.0 **device authorization flow** (RFC 8628):
+ * request a device+user code, show the user a URL and code to enter, then poll
+ * the token endpoint until they approve. The resulting access + refresh tokens
+ * are cached under the config dir (mode 600); `mcp-stdio` uses the cached
+ * access token when no explicit credential is given, and refreshes it mid-
+ * session (recompiling the entitlement on refresh, so long-lived agent sessions
+ * neither die at token expiry nor outlive a policy change indefinitely).
+ *
+ * The IdP is the authorization server; mrplex is only the resource server, so
+ * this file speaks the standard endpoints and stores tokens — it verifies
+ * nothing (that's oidc.ts, on the serving side).
+ */
+import { chmodSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
+import { homedir } from "node:os";
+import { dirname, join } from "node:path";
+/** Where the token cache lives — `${XDG_CONFIG_HOME}/mrplex/token.json`. */
+export function tokenCachePath() {
+    const xdg = process.env.XDG_CONFIG_HOME || join(homedir(), ".config");
+    return join(xdg, "mrplex", "token.json");
+}
+export function loadTokenSet() {
+    try {
+        return JSON.parse(readFileSync(tokenCachePath(), "utf8"));
+    }
+    catch {
+        return null;
+    }
+}
+export function saveTokenSet(tokens) {
+    const path = tokenCachePath();
+    mkdirSync(dirname(path), { recursive: true });
+    writeFileSync(path, `${JSON.stringify(tokens, null, 2)}\n`, { mode: 0o600 });
+    try {
+        chmodSync(path, 0o600);
+    }
+    catch {
+        // POSIX mode unsupported (Windows) — best-effort.
+    }
+}
+/** A token is fresh if it exists and isn't within `skewMs` of expiry. */
+export function isFresh(tokens, skewMs = 30_000) {
+    if (tokens.expires_at === undefined)
+        return true; // no expiry info → assume usable
+    return Date.now() + skewMs < tokens.expires_at;
+}
+function toTokenSet(raw) {
+    const set = { access_token: String(raw.access_token) };
+    if (typeof raw.refresh_token === "string")
+        set.refresh_token = raw.refresh_token;
+    if (typeof raw.token_type === "string")
+        set.token_type = raw.token_type;
+    if (typeof raw.expires_in === "number")
+        set.expires_at = Date.now() + raw.expires_in * 1000;
+    return set;
+}
+/**
+ * Run the device flow to completion. Prompts via `prompt` (defaults to stderr),
+ * polls the token endpoint honoring `interval` and `slow_down`, and returns the
+ * granted token set. Throws on denial, expiry, or endpoint error.
+ */
+export async function deviceFlowLogin(config, prompt = (m) => process.stderr.write(`${m}\n`)) {
+    const authResp = await postForm(config.deviceAuthorizationEndpoint, {
+        client_id: config.clientId,
+        scope: config.scope ?? "openid email profile offline_access",
+        // Only include audience when set — some IdPs reject an empty/unknown one.
+        ...(config.audience !== undefined ? { audience: config.audience } : {}),
+    });
+    if (!authResp.ok) {
+        throw new Error(`device authorization failed: HTTP ${authResp.status}`);
+    }
+    const auth = (await authResp.json());
+    const uri = auth.verification_uri_complete ?? auth.verification_uri;
+    prompt(`To sign in, visit:\n  ${uri}\nand enter code:  ${auth.user_code}`);
+    let intervalMs = (auth.interval ?? 5) * 1000;
+    const deadline = Date.now() + auth.expires_in * 1000;
+    while (Date.now() < deadline) {
+        await sleep(intervalMs);
+        const tokenResp = await postForm(config.tokenEndpoint, {
+            grant_type: "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code",
+            device_code: auth.device_code,
+            client_id: config.clientId,
+        });
+        const body = (await tokenResp.json());
+        if (tokenResp.ok)
+            return toTokenSet(body);
+        // Standard device-flow polling errors (RFC 8628 §3.5).
+        const error = String(body.error ?? "");
+        if (error === "authorization_pending")
+            continue;
+        if (error === "slow_down") {
+            intervalMs += 5_000;
+            continue;
+        }
+        throw new Error(`device token request failed: ${error || `HTTP ${tokenResp.status}`}`);
+    }
+    throw new Error("device flow timed out before the user approved");
+}
+/**
+ * Exchange a refresh token for a fresh access token. Returns the new token set,
+ * carrying the refresh token forward if the IdP didn't rotate it.
+ */
+export async function refreshTokens(config, refreshToken) {
+    const resp = await postForm(config.tokenEndpoint, {
+        grant_type: "refresh_token",
+        refresh_token: refreshToken,
+        client_id: config.clientId,
+    });
+    const body = (await resp.json());
+    if (!resp.ok) {
+        throw new Error(`token refresh failed: ${String(body.error ?? `HTTP ${resp.status}`)}`);
+    }
+    const next = toTokenSet(body);
+    if (next.refresh_token === undefined)
+        next.refresh_token = refreshToken;
+    return next;
+}
+function postForm(url, form) {
+    return fetch(url, {
+        method: "POST",
+        headers: { "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },
+        body: new URLSearchParams(form).toString(),
+    });
+}
+function sleep(ms) {
+    return new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, ms));
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=login.js.map

package/dist/shell/login.js.map

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