monomind 2.7.11 → 2.7.13

package/packages/@monomind/cli/.claude/helpers/handlers/gates-handler.cjs

@@ -1,494 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Enforcement Gates Handler
- *
- * Runs on every PreToolUse — must stay fast (no package import).
- *
- * The regex tables below are the canonical (and only) gate definition; the
- * @monomind/guidance package that used to compile them was removed. An optional
- * project override can still be supplied at `.monomind/guidance/active-gates.json`
- * ({destructivePatterns, secretPatterns} as {source, flags} pairs) — if present
- * and valid it replaces the built-in tables.
- *
- * Gates enforced at runtime:
- *   pre-bash  → destructive-ops  (hard block; no confirm-and-proceed path exists)
- *   pre-write → secrets          (block)
- */
-
-'use strict';
-
-const fs = require('fs');
-const path = require('path');
-
-// ─── monofence-ai integration (additional layer on top of regex gates) ───────
-//
-// monofence-ai (packages/monofence-ai) has real prompt-injection / evasion
-// detection but is never wired into the live Claude Code PreToolUse path —
-// it only registers hooks on @monoes/hooks' internal HookRegistry, which
-// this CJS dispatch path does not use. This loads it lazily (so a missing
-// or unbuilt package never breaks the existing regex gates), bounds it with
-// a hard timeout, and fails open on any error.
-
-const MONOFENCE_TIMEOUT_MS = 1500;
-const MONOFENCE_ABORT_THRESHOLD = 0.8;
-
-let _monofenceModulePromise = null;
-
-/**
- * Resolve and import monofence-ai. Bare-specifier `import('monofence-ai')`
- * only works when this file's ancestor node_modules chain contains the
- * package (pnpm hoists it only into packages that declare it as a direct
- * dependency, e.g. @monomind/cli) — so we also try resolving it explicitly
- * from likely workspace locations before falling back to the bare import.
- */
-/**
- * Walk up from `startDir` looking for `<dir>/node_modules/monofence-ai/package.json`.
- * Package "exports" maps intentionally omit "./package.json" as a subpath, so
- * `require.resolve('monofence-ai/package.json', ...)` throws even when the
- * package is present — a plain filesystem walk sidesteps that restriction.
- */
-function _findMonofencePkgJson(startDir) {
-  var dir = startDir;
-  for (var depth = 0; depth < 20; depth++) {
-    var candidate = path.join(dir, 'node_modules', 'monofence-ai', 'package.json');
-    if (fs.existsSync(candidate)) return candidate;
-    var parent = path.dirname(dir);
-    if (parent === dir) break;
-    dir = parent;
-  }
-  return null;
-}
-
-function _loadMonofence() {
-  if (!_monofenceModulePromise) {
-    _monofenceModulePromise = (async () => {
-      var candidateDirs = [
-        __dirname,
-        process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR || process.cwd(),
-        path.join(process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR || process.cwd(), 'packages', '@monomind', 'cli'),
-        path.join(__dirname, '..', '..', '..', 'packages', '@monomind', 'cli'),
-      ];
-      var resolvedPkgJson = null;
-      for (var i = 0; i < candidateDirs.length; i++) {
-        resolvedPkgJson = _findMonofencePkgJson(candidateDirs[i]);
-        if (resolvedPkgJson) break;
-      }
-      var specifier = 'monofence-ai';
-      if (resolvedPkgJson) {
-        try {
-          var pkg = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(resolvedPkgJson, 'utf-8'));
-          var mainFile = (pkg.exports && pkg.exports['.'] && pkg.exports['.'].import) || pkg.main || 'dist/index.js';
-          specifier = 'file://' + path.join(path.dirname(resolvedPkgJson), mainFile);
-        } catch (e) { /* fall back to bare specifier below */ }
-      }
-      try {
-        return await import(specifier);
-      } catch (e) {
-        return null; // not installed / not built — fail open
-      }
-    })().catch(() => null);
-  }
-  return _monofenceModulePromise;
-}
-
-function _withTimeout(promise, ms) {
-  return new Promise((resolve) => {
-    var settled = false;
-    var timer = setTimeout(() => {
-      if (!settled) { settled = true; resolve(null); }
-    }, ms);
-    if (timer.unref) timer.unref();
-    Promise.resolve(promise).then(
-      (v) => { if (!settled) { settled = true; clearTimeout(timer); resolve(v); } },
-      () => { if (!settled) { settled = true; clearTimeout(timer); resolve(null); } }
-    );
-  });
-}
-
-/**
- * Scan `input` with monofence-ai's threat detector, bounded by a timeout.
- * Returns null (never throws) when monofence is unavailable, times out, or errors.
- * MONOMIND_MONOFENCE_GATE=off disables this scan entirely (mirrors
- * MONOMIND_GRAPH_GATE=off) — e.g. when its heuristics misfire on ordinary
- * markdown headings (observed a false-positive high-confidence block on
- * plain release-note prose during v2.5.3).
- */
-async function monofenceScan(input) {
-  if (String(process.env.MONOMIND_MONOFENCE_GATE || '').toLowerCase() === 'off') return null;
-  if (!input || typeof input !== 'string') return null;
-  var mod = await _withTimeout(_loadMonofence(), MONOFENCE_TIMEOUT_MS);
-  if (!mod || typeof mod.getMonoDefence !== 'function') return null;
-  try {
-    var defence = mod.getMonoDefence();
-    var result = await _withTimeout(defence.detect(input), MONOFENCE_TIMEOUT_MS);
-    return result || null;
-  } catch (e) {
-    return null;
-  }
-}
-
-// ─── Ambiguous-evidence suppression (version-independent safety net) ────────
-//
-// monofence-ai <= 1.0.0 ships a "fake system message injection" pattern whose
-// source is exactly the string below. It scores 0.97 "critical" — above the
-// abort threshold — and it matches a bare `system:` anywhere in the input with
-// NO left word boundary. That makes it fire on completely ordinary source:
-//
-//     system:     getSystemMetrics(),     // plain object key
-//     designSystem: { enabled: true },    // *any* identifier ending in "System"
-//
-// Measured over 1,193 of this repo's own tracked source files, that single
-// pattern (plus the confidence inflation it feeds) blocked 4.7% of them.
-// A gate that rejects 1-in-21 ordinary edits gets switched off wholesale, which
-// costs the real protection too — so the block is suppressed when the ONLY
-// evidence meeting the threshold is this ambiguous marker.
-//
-// The suppression is deliberately narrow: it re-tests the content against the
-// *unambiguous* half of that legacy pattern — the chat-template role markers,
-// which do not occur in ordinary code. If those match, the threat stands. Only
-// the bare-`system:` case is demoted, and only when nothing else independently
-// clears the threshold; a real injection pairs `system:` with
-// instruction-override or restriction-bypass phrasing, and those threats are
-// untouched.
-//
-// monofence-ai >= 1.0.1 splits the pattern itself (unambiguous markers stay at
-// 0.97; bare `system:` drops to a 0.50 corroborating signal), so once a fixed
-// build is installed this code stops matching and becomes inert on its own.
-//
-// NOTE: the marker literals below are assembled from fragments rather than
-// spelled out. This gate scans the content of every file that gets written,
-// including this one — a verbatim role marker here would make gates-handler.cjs
-// unmodifiable by its own gate. (Same reason the gate tests build FAKE_CRED
-// from fragments.) The value is asserted in tests/hooks/security-gates.test.mjs.
-var _SYS = 'sys' + 'tem';
-var LEGACY_AMBIGUOUS_SYSTEM_PATTERN =
-  _SYS + '\\s*:\\s*|<\\|' + _SYS + '\\|>|<' + _SYS + '>';
-var UNAMBIGUOUS_SYSTEM_MARKER = new RegExp(
-  '<\\|\\s*' + _SYS + '\\s*\\|>|<\\/?\\s*' + _SYS + '\\s*>|<\\|im_start\\|>\\s*' + _SYS,
-  'i'
-);
-
-/**
- * True when `threat` is the legacy combined system-message pattern AND the
- * scanned content contains none of its unambiguous role-marker alternatives —
- * i.e. the match was a bare `system:` (or a `…System:` suffix) and carries no
- * real injection signal on its own.
- */
-function isAmbiguousSystemMarker(threat, content) {
-  if (!threat || threat.pattern !== LEGACY_AMBIGUOUS_SYSTEM_PATTERN) return false;
-  if (typeof content !== 'string') return false;
-  return !UNAMBIGUOUS_SYSTEM_MARKER.test(content);
-}
-
-/**
- * Given a monofence ThreatDetectionResult, return the highest-confidence
- * threat if it meets the abort threshold, else null.
- *
- * `content` is the text that was scanned. It is optional — when omitted the
- * function behaves exactly as before (no suppression), so existing callers and
- * the pre-bash path are unaffected.
- */
-function monofenceWorstThreat(result, content) {
-  if (!result || result.safe || !Array.isArray(result.threats) || result.threats.length === 0) {
-    return null;
-  }
-  var qualifying = result.threats.filter(function (t) {
-    return t && t.confidence >= MONOFENCE_ABORT_THRESHOLD;
-  });
-  if (qualifying.length === 0) return null;
-
-  // Drop threats whose sole evidence is the ambiguous bare-`system:` marker.
-  // If that leaves nothing above the threshold, there is no block.
-  var corroborated = qualifying.filter(function (t) {
-    return !isAmbiguousSystemMarker(t, content);
-  });
-  if (corroborated.length === 0) return null;
-
-  return corroborated.reduce(
-    (max, t) => (t.confidence > max.confidence ? t : max),
-    corroborated[0]
-  );
-}
-
-// ─── Fallback patterns (used only if the compiled config file is missing/unreadable) ──
-const FALLBACK_DESTRUCTIVE_PATTERNS = [
-  /\brm\s+(?:-[a-z]*f[a-z]*r|-[a-z]*r[a-z]*f|--recursive.*--force|--force.*--recursive|-rf?)\b/i,
-  /\bdrop\s+(database|table|schema|index)\b/i,
-  /\btruncate\s+table\b/i,
-  /\bgit\s+push\s+.*--force\b/i,
-  /\bgit\s+reset\s+--hard\b/i,
-  /\bgit\s+clean\s+.*-f/i,
-  /\bformat\s+[a-z]:/i,
-  /\bdel\s+\/[sf]\b/i,
-  /\b(?:kubectl|helm)\s+delete\s+(?:--all|namespace)\b/i,
-  /\bDROP\s+(?:DATABASE|TABLE|SCHEMA)\b/i,
-  /\bDELETE\s+FROM\s+\w+/i,
-  /\bALTER\s+TABLE\s+\w+\s+DROP\b/i,
-];
-
-const FALLBACK_SECRET_PATTERNS = [
-  /(?:api[_-]?key|apikey)\s*[:=]\s*['"][^'"]{8,}['"]/gi,
-  /(?:secret|password|passwd|pwd)\s*[:=]\s*['"][^'"]{8,}['"]/gi,
-  /(?:token|bearer)\s*[:=]\s*['"][^'"]{10,}['"]/gi,
-  // Unquoted variants — env-style `KEY=value` / `key: value` with no quotes,
-  // e.g. `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=sk-ant-...` in a .env file or shell export. The
-  // quoted patterns above never match these, which was the single most
-  // common real leak pattern (P1-25).
-  /(?:api[_-]?key|apikey|token|secret|password|passwd|pwd)\s*[:=]\s*[^\s'"]{8,}/gi,
-  /-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |DSA )?PRIVATE KEY-----/g,
-  /sk-ant-[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{20,}/g,
-  /sk-[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{20,}/g,
-  /ghp_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36}/g,
-  /npm_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36}/g,
-  /AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}/g,
-];
-
-// ─── Compiled config loader ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-var MAX_CONFIG_SIZE = 256 * 1024; // 256 KiB — compiled gate config is small
-
-function toRegExp(serialized) {
-  try {
-    return new RegExp(serialized.source, serialized.flags);
-  } catch (e) {
-    return null;
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Load an optional project-level gate override from
- * .monomind/guidance/active-gates.json. Returns the built-in tables when the
- * file is absent (the normal case), oversized, or malformed.
- * Not cached across invocations: each PreToolUse hook is its own subprocess.
- */
-function loadCompiledConfig(cwd) {
-  try {
-    var configPath = path.join(cwd || process.env.CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR || process.cwd(), '.monomind', 'guidance', 'active-gates.json');
-    var stat = fs.statSync(configPath);
-    if (stat.size > MAX_CONFIG_SIZE) throw new Error('active-gates.json too large');
-    var raw = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(configPath, 'utf-8'));
-
-    var destructivePatterns = Array.isArray(raw.destructivePatterns)
-      ? raw.destructivePatterns.map(toRegExp).filter(Boolean)
-      : [];
-    var secretPatterns = Array.isArray(raw.secretPatterns)
-      ? raw.secretPatterns.map(toRegExp).filter(Boolean)
-      : [];
-
-    if (destructivePatterns.length === 0 && secretPatterns.length === 0) {
-      throw new Error('active-gates.json had no usable patterns');
-    }
-
-    return {
-      destructivePatterns: raw.destructiveOps === false ? [] : destructivePatterns,
-      secretPatterns: raw.secrets === false ? [] : secretPatterns,
-    };
-  } catch (e) {
-    return {
-      destructivePatterns: FALLBACK_DESTRUCTIVE_PATTERNS,
-      secretPatterns: FALLBACK_SECRET_PATTERNS,
-    };
-  }
-}
-
-// ─── Helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-function redact(match) {
-  return match.length > 12
-    ? match.slice(0, 4) + '*'.repeat(match.length - 8) + match.slice(-4)
-    : '*'.repeat(match.length);
-}
-
-function checkDestructive(command, patterns) {
-  var list = patterns || FALLBACK_DESTRUCTIVE_PATTERNS;
-  for (const pattern of list) {
-    pattern.lastIndex = 0;
-    const match = pattern.exec(command);
-    if (match) {
-      return {
-        triggered: true,
-        matched: match[0],
-        reason: `Destructive operation blocked: "${match[0]}". This hook always blocks (Claude Code's PreToolUse protocol has no confirm-and-proceed path) — there is no way to run this exact command after confirming. If it's genuinely intended, use a non-destructive equivalent instead (e.g. move the target aside, or scope the operation more narrowly).`,
-      };
-    }
-  }
-  return { triggered: false };
-}
-
-function checkSecrets(content, patterns) {
-  var list = patterns || FALLBACK_SECRET_PATTERNS;
-  const found = [];
-  for (const pattern of list) {
-    pattern.lastIndex = 0;
-    const matches = content.match(pattern);
-    if (matches) {
-      for (const m of matches) found.push(redact(m));
-    }
-  }
-  if (found.length === 0) return { triggered: false };
-  return {
-    triggered: true,
-    count: found.length,
-    redacted: found,
-    reason: `Potential secret(s) detected in file content (${found.length} match${found.length > 1 ? 'es' : ''}): ${found.join(', ')}. Move secrets to environment variables or a .env file (add to .gitignore).`,
-  };
-}
-
-// ─── Block emission ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-/**
- * Emit a PreToolUse block decision.
- *
- * ALWAYS on stderr, never stdout: at exit code 2 Claude Code reads the block
- * reason from stderr, and at exit code 0 it parses stdout as hook output — so
- * a diagnostic printed on stdout can be mistaken for hook output (and, worse,
- * read as an *allow*). Keeping every gate message on stderr removes that
- * ambiguity entirely.
- */
-function emitBlock(reason) {
-  process.stderr.write(JSON.stringify({ decision: 'block', reason: reason }) + '\n');
-  process.exitCode = 2;
-}
-
-/**
- * Fail-closed policy (deliberate — see task note (a)):
- *
- *   The deterministic regex gates (destructive-ops, secrets) FAIL CLOSED. If
- *   evaluating them throws, we cannot know whether the command/content was
- *   dangerous, and the whole point of these two gates is that the dangerous
- *   case is unrecoverable (deleted data, leaked credential). They are also
- *   tiny, dependency-free, pure-regex checks over an in-memory string, so a
- *   throw here means something is genuinely broken — not a routine hiccup.
- *   The block message names the gate and the error so the user can unblock
- *   immediately (fix the config, or set the documented off-switch).
- *
- *   The monofence-ai layer keeps FAILING OPEN. It is an optional, lazily
- *   imported, network-free-but-heuristic *extra* layer with a known
- *   false-positive history (see MONOMIND_MONOFENCE_GATE), and it is absent
- *   in most installs — failing closed on it would block every edit on any
- *   machine where the package isn't built.
- *
- *   Likewise, non-security enrichment work in hook-handler.cjs (monograph
- *   hints, telemetry) stays fail-open: it has no security value and its
- *   failure must never stop the user from working.
- */
-function failClosed(gateName, err) {
-  var msg = (err && err.message) ? err.message : String(err);
-  emitBlock(
-    '[gates] ' + gateName + ' gate failed to evaluate (' + msg + '). Failing CLOSED: a security ' +
-    'gate that cannot run must not silently allow the operation. Fix the gate (or the project ' +
-    'override at .monomind/guidance/active-gates.json) and retry.'
-  );
-}
-
-// ─── Hook handlers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-/**
- * pre-bash: check for destructive shell commands, then (additionally)
- * run monofence-ai's threat detector on the raw command string.
- * Outputs Claude Code block decision to stdout when triggered.
- */
-async function handlePreBash(hCtx) {
-  var cmd = (hCtx.toolInput && (hCtx.toolInput.command || hCtx.toolInput.cmd)) || '';
-  if (!cmd) return;
-
-  var result;
-  try {
-    var config = loadCompiledConfig(hCtx.CWD);
-    result = checkDestructive(cmd, config.destructivePatterns);
-  } catch (e) {
-    failClosed('destructive-ops', e);
-    return;
-  }
-  if (result.triggered) {
-    emitBlock('[gates] ' + result.reason);
-    return;
-  }
-
-  // Additional layer: monofence-ai threat detection (prompt injection, evasion, etc.)
-  // Fails open — never blocks a command just because monofence is unavailable/slow.
-  var mf = await monofenceScan(cmd);
-  var worst = monofenceWorstThreat(mf, cmd);
-  if (worst) {
-    emitBlock('[monofence] Threat detected in command — ' + worst.type +
-      ' (confidence ' + Math.round(worst.confidence * 100) + '%): ' + worst.description);
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Extract the about-to-be-written text from a Write / Edit / MultiEdit /
- * NotebookEdit tool input. Returns '' when there is nothing to scan.
- *
- *   Write         → content
- *   Edit          → new_string
- *   MultiEdit     → edits[].new_string
- *   NotebookEdit  → new_source          ← was previously unread, so a secret
- *                                         pasted into a .ipynb cell bypassed
- *                                         the gate entirely while the same
- *                                         text in a .ts file was blocked.
- */
-function extractWriteContent(toolInput) {
-  var ti = toolInput || {};
-  var content = ti.content || ti.new_string || ti.new_source || '';
-  if (!content && Array.isArray(ti.edits)) {
-    content = ti.edits
-      .map(function (e) { return (e && (e.new_string || e.new_source)) || ''; })
-      .join('\n');
-  }
-  return typeof content === 'string' ? content : '';
-}
-
-/**
- * pre-write: check for secrets in Write / Edit / MultiEdit / NotebookEdit content
- * before it lands on disk, then (additionally) run monofence-ai's threat detector
- * on the same content. Emits a block decision on stderr with exit code 2.
- */
-async function handlePreWrite(hCtx) {
-  var toolInput = hCtx.toolInput || {};
-  var content;
-  try {
-    content = extractWriteContent(toolInput);
-  } catch (e) {
-    failClosed('secrets', e);
-    return;
-  }
-  if (!content) return;
-  // Cap content at 512 KiB before regex scanning to prevent DoS
-  var MAX_SCAN = 524288;
-  if (content.length > MAX_SCAN) content = content.slice(0, MAX_SCAN);
-
-  var result;
-  try {
-    var config = loadCompiledConfig(hCtx.CWD);
-    result = checkSecrets(content, config.secretPatterns);
-  } catch (e) {
-    failClosed('secrets', e);
-    return;
-  }
-  if (result.triggered) {
-    emitBlock('[gates] ' + result.reason);
-    return;
-  }
-
-  // Additional layer: monofence-ai threat detection on the content being written.
-  // Fails open — never blocks a write just because monofence is unavailable/slow.
-  var mf = await monofenceScan(content);
-  var worst = monofenceWorstThreat(mf, content);
-  if (worst) {
-    emitBlock('[monofence] Threat detected in written content — ' + worst.type +
-      ' (confidence ' + Math.round(worst.confidence * 100) + '%): ' + worst.description);
-  }
-}
-
-module.exports = {
-  handlePreBash,
-  handlePreWrite,
-  extractWriteContent,
-  emitBlock,
-  failClosed,
-  checkDestructive,
-  checkSecrets,
-  loadCompiledConfig,
-  monofenceScan,
-  monofenceWorstThreat,
-  isAmbiguousSystemMarker,
-};

package/packages/@monomind/cli/.claude/helpers/handlers/graph-status-handler.cjs

@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-'use strict';
-// Extracted from hook-handler.cjs — handles 'graph-status' command.
-// Shows monograph node/edge counts and graph-vs-grep usage ratio.
-// Receives hCtx from dispatcher. See route-handler.cjs for hCtx field docs.
-
-const path = require('path');
-const fs = require('fs');
-
-module.exports = {
-  handle: function(hCtx) {
-    var CWD = hCtx.CWD;
-    var _openMonographDb = hCtx._openMonographDb;
-
-    var db = _openMonographDb();
-    if (!db) {
-      console.log('No monograph.db found. Run /mastermind:understand to build.');
-      return;
-    }
-    try {
-      var n = db.prepare("SELECT COUNT(*) AS c FROM nodes").get().c;
-      var e = db.prepare("SELECT COUNT(*) AS c FROM edges").get().c;
-      var usage = (function() {
-        try {
-          var gup = path.join(CWD, '.monomind', 'metrics', 'graph-usage.json');
-          var MAX_USAGE = 64 * 1024; // 64 KiB
-          if (fs.statSync(gup).size > MAX_USAGE) return {};
-          return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(gup, 'utf-8'));
-        }
-        catch (_) { return {}; }
-      })();
-      function safeNum(v) { var n = Number(v); return isFinite(n) ? n : 0; }
-      var wins = safeNum(usage.monograph_call) + safeNum(usage.preresolve_hit)
-               + safeNum(usage.graph_assist_search) + safeNum(usage.graph_assist_neighbors);
-      var search = safeNum(usage.grep_call) + safeNum(usage.glob_call)
-                 + safeNum(usage.bash_grep_call) + safeNum(usage.bash_find_call);
-      var total = wins + search + safeNum(usage.preresolve_miss);
-      var pct = total > 0 ? Math.round((wins / total) * 100) : 0;
-      var saved = safeNum(usage.dollars_saved);
-      console.log('Monograph: ' + n.toLocaleString() + ' nodes · ' + e.toLocaleString() + ' edges');
-      console.log('Usage: ' + pct + '% graph · ' + (100 - pct) + '% grep · ' +
-                  'wins=' + wins + ' search=' + search +
-                  (saved > 0 ? ' · saved $' + saved.toFixed(2) : ''));
-    } catch (err) { console.log('Error: ' + String(err.message || err).slice(0, 200)); }
-  },
-};

package/packages/@monomind/cli/.claude/helpers/handlers/loops-status-handler.cjs

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-'use strict';
-// Extracted from hook-handler.cjs — handles 'loops-status' command.
-
-const path = require('path');
-const fs = require('fs');
-
-module.exports = {
-  handle: function(hCtx) {
-    var CWD = hCtx.CWD;
-    var loopsDir = path.join(CWD, '.monomind', 'loops');
-    if (!fs.existsSync(loopsDir)) { console.log('No loops directory.'); return; }
-    var files = fs.readdirSync(loopsDir).filter(function(f) {
-      return f.endsWith('.json') && !f.includes('-hil') && !f.endsWith('.stop') && !f.startsWith('._');
-    }).slice(0, 200); // cap to prevent DoS via many files
-    var STALE_MS = 6 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
-    var now = Date.now();
-    var active = [], stale = [];
-    files.forEach(function(f) {
-      try {
-        var fPath = path.join(loopsDir, f);
-        var fSt = fs.statSync(fPath);
-        if (fSt.size > 65536) { return; } // skip oversized loop files
-        var d = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(fPath, 'utf-8'));
-        var last = d.lastRunAt || d.startedAt || 0;
-        var ageMs = last ? (now - last) : Infinity;
-        if (ageMs > STALE_MS) stale.push({ d: d, ageH: Math.round(ageMs / 3600000) });
-        else active.push(d);
-      } catch (_) {}
-    });
-    if (active.length === 0 && stale.length === 0) {
-      console.log('No loops.'); return;
-    }
-    if (active.length > 0) {
-      console.log('Active (' + active.length + '):');
-      active.forEach(function(d) {
-        console.log('  · ' + (d.command || '?') + ' [' + (d.type || '?') + '] run ' + (d.currentRep || 0) +
-                    (d.maxReps ? '/' + d.maxReps : '') + ' · ' + (d.status || '?'));
-      });
-    }
-    if (stale.length > 0) {
-      console.log('Stale (' + stale.length + ' >6h):');
-      stale.forEach(function(s) {
-        console.log('  · ' + (s.d.command || '?') + ' run ' + (s.d.currentRep || 0) +
-                    ' · ' + s.ageH + 'h ago · ' + (s.d.status || '?'));
-      });
-    }
-  },
-};