mixdog 0.9.3 → 0.9.5

package/src/runtime/agent/orchestrator/session/compact/text-utils.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,326 @@
+// Text/token/message helpers and secret redaction for compaction. Extracted
+// verbatim from compact.mjs (behavior-preserving).
+import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
+import { estimateMessagesTokens } from '../context-utils.mjs';
+
+const TOOL_ARG_STRING_MAX_CHARS = 360;
+const TOOL_ARG_ARRAY_MAX_ITEMS = 8;
+const TOOL_ARG_MAX_DEPTH = 4;
+export const TOOL_CALL_ARGS_MAX_CHARS = 260;
+export const TOOL_CALL_FACT_ARGS_MAX_CHARS = 140;
+export const TOOL_CALLS_MAX = 4;
+const SENSITIVE_TOOL_ARG_KEY_RE = /(?:^|[_-])(?:api[_-]?key|authorization|auth|cookie|credential|passwd|password|refresh[_-]?token|secret|token)(?:$|[_-])/i;
+// Word alternation for raw-string (non-JSON) secret redaction. Mirrors the
+// keys in SENSITIVE_TOOL_ARG_KEY_RE and the session-ingest redactor so a raw
+// tool-call argument string like `authorization: Bearer abc.def` or
+// `password="abc def"` never reaches preserved facts or the compaction prompt.
+const SENSITIVE_TOOL_ARG_KEY_WORD = '(?:api[_-]?key|authorization|auth|cookie|credential|passwd|password|refresh[_-]?token|secret|token)';
+// Full key matcher: the sensitive WORD may carry a prefix and/or suffix segment
+// joined by `_`/`-` so prefixed variants like `access_token`, `access-token`,
+// `x-api-key`, and `bearer_token` are matched as whole keys (not just the bare
+// word at key start). Prefix/suffix are bounded by a `_`/`-` separator so the
+// word stays at an identifier boundary.
+const SENSITIVE_TOOL_ARG_KEY_FULL = `(?:[A-Za-z0-9_-]*[_-])?${SENSITIVE_TOOL_ARG_KEY_WORD}(?:[_-][A-Za-z0-9_-]*)?`;
+// camelCase variants (case-SENSITIVE, deliberately not /i): a capitalized
+// sensitive word CLOSING the key — `accessToken`, `authToken`, `bearerToken`,
+// `sessionSecret`, `myPassword`. Bounded so plural/compound counters
+// (`tokens`, `maxOutputTokens`, `budgetTokens`) do NOT match.
+const SENSITIVE_TOOL_ARG_KEY_CAMEL_WORD = '(?:Api[_-]?Key|Authorization|Auth|Cookie|Credential|Passwd|Password|Refresh[_-]?Token|Secret|Token)';
+const SENSITIVE_TOOL_ARG_KEY_CAMEL_RE = new RegExp(`[a-z0-9]${SENSITIVE_TOOL_ARG_KEY_CAMEL_WORD}s?$`);
+function isSensitiveToolArgKey(key) {
+    const k = String(key || '');
+    return SENSITIVE_TOOL_ARG_KEY_RE.test(k) || SENSITIVE_TOOL_ARG_KEY_CAMEL_RE.test(k);
+}
+const SENSITIVE_RAW_KEY_RES = [
+    new RegExp(`((?:^|[\\s,{(?&])["']?${SENSITIVE_TOOL_ARG_KEY_FULL}["']?\\s*[:=]\\s*)`, 'gi'),
+    // Case-sensitive camelCase raw keys (`accessToken=...`, `myAuthToken: ...`).
+    new RegExp(`((?:^|[\\s,{(?&])["']?[A-Za-z0-9_-]*[a-z0-9]${SENSITIVE_TOOL_ARG_KEY_CAMEL_WORD}["']?\\s*[:=]\\s*)`, 'g'),
+];
+
+// Redact `key: value` / `key=value` secret pairs inside a raw (non-JSON)
+// string. Consumes the WHOLE value after the key — spaces, `Bearer `/`Basic `
+// scheme words, quoted values with internal spaces, and `;`-separated cookie
+// pairs — so no secret fragment survives. Kept local to compact-core to avoid a
+// cross-module dependency on the memory lib; logic matches session-ingest's
+// redactRawArgString.
+export function redactRawSecretString(text) {
+    let value = String(text ?? '');
+    if (!value) return value;
+    for (const keyRe of SENSITIVE_RAW_KEY_RES) {
+        keyRe.lastIndex = 0;
+        let out = '';
+        let last = 0;
+        let match;
+        while ((match = keyRe.exec(value)) !== null) {
+            const prefixEnd = match.index + match[0].length;
+            out += value.slice(last, prefixEnd);
+            let i = prefixEnd;
+            const quote = value[i] === '"' || value[i] === "'" ? value[i] : '';
+            if (quote) {
+                i += 1;
+                while (i < value.length && value[i] !== quote) i += 1;
+                if (i < value.length) i += 1; // include closing quote
+            } else {
+                // Header-style `key: value` may carry scheme words and spaces
+                // (`authorization: Bearer abc.def`) — consume the whole value so
+                // no fragment survives. KV-style `key=value` stops at whitespace
+                // so space-separated trailing keys (`token=abc fileName=x`) are
+                // preserved.
+                const headerStyle = /:\s*$/.test(match[0]);
+                const stopRe = headerStyle ? /[,)}\n]/ : /[,)}\s]/;
+                while (i < value.length && !stopRe.test(value[i])) i += 1;
+            }
+            out += '[redacted]';
+            last = i;
+            keyRe.lastIndex = i;
+        }
+        out += value.slice(last);
+        value = out;
+    }
+    return value;
+}
+
+export function sha16(value) {
+    const text = typeof value === 'string' ? value : JSON.stringify(value ?? null);
+    return createHash('sha256').update(text).digest('hex').slice(0, 16);
+}
+
+export function roleCounts(messages) {
+    const counts = new Map();
+    for (const m of messages) counts.set(m?.role || 'unknown', (counts.get(m?.role || 'unknown') || 0) + 1);
+    return [...counts.entries()].map(([role, count]) => `${role}:${count}`).join(', ');
+}
+
+export function extractText(m) {
+    if (!m || typeof m !== 'object') return '';
+    if (typeof m.content === 'string') return m.content;
+    if (Array.isArray(m.content)) {
+        return m.content
+            .map((item) => {
+                if (!item || typeof item !== 'object') return '';
+                if (typeof item.text === 'string') return item.text;
+                if (typeof item.content === 'string') return item.content;
+                return '';
+            })
+            .filter(Boolean)
+            .join('\n');
+    }
+    try { return JSON.stringify(m.content ?? ''); } catch { return ''; }
+}
+
+export function truncateMiddle(text, maxChars) {
+    const value = String(text ?? '').replace(/\r\n/g, '\n');
+    if (maxChars <= 0 || value.length === 0) return '';
+    if (value.length <= maxChars) return value;
+    if (maxChars <= 8) return value.slice(0, maxChars);
+    const head = Math.ceil((maxChars - 5) / 2);
+    const tail = Math.floor((maxChars - 5) / 2);
+    return `${value.slice(0, head)} … ${value.slice(value.length - tail)}`;
+}
+
+function normalizeToolArgValue(value, key = '', depth = 0) {
+    if (isSensitiveToolArgKey(key)) return '[redacted]';
+    if (typeof value === 'bigint') return String(value);
+    // Defense-in-depth: a non-sensitive KEY can still carry a secret embedded
+    // in its string VALUE (e.g. a freeform `headers` string). Redact raw
+    // key:value secret pairs before truncating.
+    if (typeof value === 'string') return truncateMiddle(redactRawSecretString(value), TOOL_ARG_STRING_MAX_CHARS);
+    if (!value || typeof value !== 'object') return value ?? null;
+    if (depth >= TOOL_ARG_MAX_DEPTH) return Array.isArray(value) ? `[array:${value.length}]` : '[object]';
+    if (Array.isArray(value)) {
+        const out = value.slice(0, TOOL_ARG_ARRAY_MAX_ITEMS)
+            .map((item, index) => normalizeToolArgValue(item, String(index), depth + 1));
+        if (value.length > TOOL_ARG_ARRAY_MAX_ITEMS) out.push(`+${value.length - TOOL_ARG_ARRAY_MAX_ITEMS} more`);
+        return out;
+    }
+    const out = {};
+    for (const k of Object.keys(value).sort()) {
+        out[k] = normalizeToolArgValue(value[k], k, depth + 1);
+    }
+    return out;
+}
+
+function stableToolArgJson(value) {
+    if (value == null) return '';
+    if (typeof value === 'string') {
+        const text = value.trim();
+        if (!text) return '';
+        if (/^[\[{]/.test(text)) {
+            try { return JSON.stringify(normalizeToolArgValue(JSON.parse(text))); } catch { /* keep raw */ }
+        }
+        // Non-JSON raw string: redact secret key:value pairs before truncating
+        // so toolCallSummary / preserved facts / compaction prompt metadata
+        // never leak `authorization: Bearer ...`, passwords, cookies, tokens.
+        return truncateMiddle(redactRawSecretString(text), TOOL_ARG_STRING_MAX_CHARS);
+    }
+    try {
+        return JSON.stringify(normalizeToolArgValue(value));
+    } catch {
+        return truncateMiddle(redactRawSecretString(String(value || '')), TOOL_ARG_STRING_MAX_CHARS);
+    }
+}
+
+function toolCallArgsText(tc, maxChars = TOOL_CALL_ARGS_MAX_CHARS) {
+    if (!(maxChars > 0)) return '';
+    const raw = tc?.arguments ?? tc?.function?.arguments;
+    const text = stableToolArgJson(raw);
+    return text ? truncateMiddle(text, maxChars) : '';
+}
+
+export function summarizeToolCall(tc, maxArgChars = TOOL_CALL_ARGS_MAX_CHARS) {
+    const name = tc?.name || tc?.function?.name || tc?.id || '?';
+    const args = toolCallArgsText(tc, maxArgChars);
+    return args ? `${name}(${args})` : name;
+}
+
+export function toolCallArgBudget(perMessageChars) {
+    const chars = Number(perMessageChars);
+    if (!Number.isFinite(chars) || chars <= 0) return 0;
+    return Math.min(TOOL_CALL_ARGS_MAX_CHARS, Math.max(32, Math.floor(chars * 0.5)));
+}
+
+export function toolCallSummary(m, maxArgChars = TOOL_CALL_ARGS_MAX_CHARS) {
+    if (!Array.isArray(m?.toolCalls) || m.toolCalls.length === 0) return '';
+    const calls = m.toolCalls
+        .slice(0, TOOL_CALLS_MAX)
+        .map(tc => summarizeToolCall(tc, maxArgChars));
+    if (m.toolCalls.length > TOOL_CALLS_MAX) calls.push(`+${m.toolCalls.length - TOOL_CALLS_MAX} more`);
+    return ` tool_calls=${calls.join(';')}`;
+}
+
+export function toolResultId(m) {
+    return m?.role === 'tool' && m.toolCallId ? ` tool_result=${m.toolCallId}` : '';
+}
+
+export function safeEstimateMessagesTokens(messages) {
+    try { return estimateMessagesTokens(messages); }
+    catch { return null; }
+}
+
+export function textByteLength(text) {
+    try { return Buffer.byteLength(String(text || ''), 'utf8'); }
+    catch { return String(text || '').length; }
+}
+
+export function messageContentHasMarker(m, marker) {
+    if (!m || !marker) return false;
+    if (typeof m.content === 'string') return m.content.includes(marker);
+    if (Array.isArray(m.content)) {
+        return m.content.some((part) => {
+            if (!part || typeof part !== 'object') return false;
+            return String(part.text || part.content || '').includes(marker);
+        });
+    }
+    return false;
+}
+
+// --- Verbatim redaction for messages kept through compaction ---------------
+
+// Redaction-ONLY recursive walk for tool-call argument VALUES kept verbatim
+// through compaction. Unlike normalizeToolArgValue (which is for prompt-side
+// summaries and truncates/summarizes/key-sorts), this preserves shape exactly:
+//   - sensitive KEY  -> '[redacted]'
+//   - string value   -> redactRawSecretString(value)  (no truncation/middle-cut)
+//   - array          -> same length, items walked in order (no slicing/caps)
+//   - object         -> same keys in INSERTION order (no sorting/depth caps)
+//   - other primitive (number/boolean/bigint/null) -> returned unchanged
+// Returns { value, changed } so callers can preserve byte-exact input when the
+// walk altered nothing. Only sensitive-key values and embedded raw secret pairs
+// inside strings are altered; everything else is structure identical.
+function redactToolArgValueOnly(value, key = '') {
+    if (isSensitiveToolArgKey(key)) {
+        return { value: '[redacted]', changed: value !== '[redacted]' };
+    }
+    if (value == null) return { value, changed: false };
+    if (typeof value === 'string') {
+        const redacted = redactRawSecretString(value);
+        return { value: redacted, changed: redacted !== value };
+    }
+    if (Array.isArray(value)) {
+        let changed = false;
+        const out = value.map((item) => {
+            const r = redactToolArgValueOnly(item, '');
+            if (r.changed) changed = true;
+            return r.value;
+        });
+        return { value: changed ? out : value, changed };
+    }
+    if (typeof value === 'object') {
+        let changed = false;
+        const out = {};
+        for (const k of Object.keys(value)) {
+            const r = redactToolArgValueOnly(value[k], k);
+            if (r.changed) changed = true;
+            out[k] = r.value;
+        }
+        return { value: changed ? out : value, changed };
+    }
+    return { value, changed: false };
+}
+
+// Redact sensitive values inside a single tool-call arguments payload while
+// preserving its original shape (string stays a string, object stays an
+// object) so the provider-valid tool_call structure is not broken. Used to
+// scrub messages that survive compaction VERBATIM (preserved tail / mandatory
+// context), where prompt-side redaction does not apply. Redaction-only — no
+// truncation, summarization, key sorting, or depth/array caps.
+function redactToolCallArgumentsValue(rawArgs) {
+    if (rawArgs == null) return rawArgs;
+    if (typeof rawArgs === 'string') {
+        const trimmed = rawArgs.trim();
+        if (/^[\[{]/.test(trimmed)) {
+            try {
+                // Parse, redaction-only walk; only reserialize when the walk
+                // actually changed a sensitive value. When nothing changed,
+                // return the ORIGINAL string byte-exact (no JSON re-formatting).
+                const { value, changed } = redactToolArgValueOnly(JSON.parse(trimmed));
+                return changed ? JSON.stringify(value) : rawArgs;
+            } catch { /* fall through to raw redaction */ }
+        }
+        return redactRawSecretString(rawArgs);
+    }
+    if (typeof rawArgs === 'object') {
+        try {
+            const { value, changed } = redactToolArgValueOnly(rawArgs);
+            return changed ? value : rawArgs;
+        } catch { return rawArgs; }
+    }
+    return rawArgs;
+}
+
+// Return a copy of a message with sensitive tool-call argument values redacted,
+// keeping role / content / toolCallId / tool names+ids and non-sensitive args
+// intact. Non-tool-bearing messages are returned unchanged (same reference).
+function redactMessageToolCallSecrets(m) {
+    if (!m || typeof m !== 'object' || !Array.isArray(m.toolCalls) || m.toolCalls.length === 0) {
+        return m;
+    }
+    let changed = false;
+    const toolCalls = m.toolCalls.map((tc) => {
+        if (!tc || typeof tc !== 'object') return tc;
+        const out = { ...tc };
+        if ('arguments' in tc && tc.arguments != null) {
+            const redacted = redactToolCallArgumentsValue(tc.arguments);
+            if (redacted !== tc.arguments) { out.arguments = redacted; changed = true; }
+        }
+        if (tc.function && typeof tc.function === 'object' && tc.function.arguments != null) {
+            const redacted = redactToolCallArgumentsValue(tc.function.arguments);
+            if (redacted !== tc.function.arguments) {
+                out.function = { ...tc.function, arguments: redacted };
+                changed = true;
+            }
+        }
+        return out;
+    });
+    if (!changed) return m;
+    return { ...m, toolCalls };
+}
+
+// Scrub an array of messages that are kept verbatim through compaction so a
+// recent assistant tool call carrying a secret (e.g. `authorization: Bearer
+// ...`) cannot survive into the returned compacted transcript. Only assistant
+// toolCalls argument VALUES are touched; structure/order/pairing is preserved.
+export function redactToolCallSecretsInMessages(messages) {
+    if (!Array.isArray(messages)) return messages;
+    return messages.map((m) => redactMessageToolCallSecrets(m));
+}