mixdog 0.7.17 → 0.8.0

package/src/runtime/shared/config.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,393 @@
+/**
+ * Unified config reader/writer.
+ * Single file: mixdog-config.json with sections such as channels, agent, and memory.
+ */
+import { readFileSync, mkdirSync, existsSync } from 'fs'
+import { join, dirname } from 'path'
+import { createRequire } from 'module'
+import { resolvePluginData } from './plugin-paths.mjs'
+import { renameWithRetrySync, writeJsonAtomicSync, withFileLockSync } from './atomic-file.mjs'
+import {
+  backupUserData,
+  markUserDataInitialized,
+  loadLatestMixdogConfigFromBackup,
+  hasUserDataInitMarker,
+} from './user-data-guard.mjs'
+
+const _require = createRequire(import.meta.url)
+const { getSecret: _getSecret, setSecret: _setSecret, deleteSecret: _deleteSecret } = _require('../../lib/keychain-cjs.cjs')
+
+const DATA_DIR = resolvePluginData()
+
+const CONFIG_PATH = join(DATA_DIR, 'mixdog-config.json')
+
+const GENERATED_KEY = '_generated'
+
+function isPlainObject(value) {
+  return !!value && typeof value === 'object' && !Array.isArray(value)
+}
+
+export function stripGeneratedMarker(data) {
+  if (!isPlainObject(data) || !Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(data, GENERATED_KEY)) return data
+  const { [GENERATED_KEY]: _generated, ...rest } = data
+  return rest
+}
+
+function readJsonFile(path) {
+  let raw
+  try {
+    raw = readFileSync(path, 'utf8')
+  } catch (err) {
+    if (err.code === 'ENOENT') return null
+    // Fail closed on unknown read errors (EACCES, EIO, …). Returning {}
+    // here would let a subsequent writeSection() serialize an empty
+    // object back over an existing-but-temporarily-unreadable config and
+    // erase every other section. Better to surface the read error and
+    // abort the RMW than silently destroy data.
+    process.stderr.write(`[config] readJsonFile: unexpected read error for ${path}: ${err.message}\n`)
+    throw err
+  }
+  try {
+    return JSON.parse(raw)
+  } catch (err) {
+    // Quarantine a malformed mixdog-config.json so the next boot starts fresh
+    // instead of looping on a broken file.
+    if (path === CONFIG_PATH) {
+      const corrupt = `${path}.corrupt-${Date.now()}`
+      try { renameWithRetrySync(path, corrupt) } catch {}
+      process.stderr.write(`[config] mixdog-config.json is malformed (${err.message}). Renamed to ${corrupt}. Restore it or delete to start fresh.\n`)
+    }
+    return null
+  }
+}
+
+function writeJsonFile(path, data) {
+  // R4 data-at-rest: mixdog-config.json holds provider apiKeys; clamp to
+  // owner-only on POSIX via 0o600/0o700 mode bits, AND fail-closed on
+  // Windows where those bits are advisory — `secret: true` makes the
+  // atomic writer apply an owner-only NTFS ACL (icacls) to the file,
+  // temp, lock, and parent dir, throwing if the ACL cannot be enforced
+  // so the key is never left world-readable. 0o700 on the parent dir
+  // restricts directory traversal in shared-home setups on POSIX.
+  mkdirSync(dirname(path), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 })
+  // NOTE: lock:false here — callers that perform read-modify-write
+  // (writeSection/updateSection) hold the lock at the outer RMW
+  // boundary, so the inner write must not try to re-acquire the same
+  // lock file (would self-deadlock on `openSync('wx')`). Direct
+  // whole-config writers go through `writeAllLocked` below.
+  if (path === CONFIG_PATH) {
+    try { backupUserData(DATA_DIR, 'pre-config-write') } catch {}
+  }
+  writeJsonAtomicSync(path, data, { lock: false, fsyncDir: true, mode: 0o600, secret: true })
+  if (path === CONFIG_PATH) {
+    try { markUserDataInitialized(DATA_DIR) } catch {}
+    try { backupUserData(DATA_DIR, 'post-config-write') } catch {}
+  }
+}
+
+function readAll() {
+  const parsed = readJsonFile(CONFIG_PATH)
+  if (parsed != null) return parsed
+  // Symmetric with readAllForRmW(): a missing/unreadable config on a data
+  // dir that was previously initialized means the file was LOST (deleted,
+  // failed write), not a fresh install. Self-heal from the newest
+  // structurally-complete backup instead of silently collapsing to {} —
+  // which callers (readSection/getCapabilities) merge with in-memory
+  // defaults, dropping the user's presets/roles/sections. In-memory only:
+  // readAll() runs OUTSIDE the config lock (unlike the RMW path), so we do
+  // not write here to avoid an unlocked-write race; the next writeSection
+  // re-persists the file under the lock.
+  if (hasUserDataInitMarker(DATA_DIR)) {
+    const restored = loadLatestMixdogConfigFromBackup(DATA_DIR)
+    if (restored && isPlainObject(restored)) {
+      process.stderr.write('[config] read: restored mixdog-config.json from latest user-data backup (missing after init)\n')
+      return restored
+    }
+  }
+  return {}
+}
+
+function quarantineMalformedConfig(parseErr) {
+  const corrupt = `${CONFIG_PATH}.corrupt-${Date.now()}`
+  try {
+    if (existsSync(CONFIG_PATH)) renameWithRetrySync(CONFIG_PATH, corrupt)
+  } catch {}
+  process.stderr.write(
+    `[config] mixdog-config.json is malformed (${parseErr.message}). Renamed to ${corrupt}. Restore it or delete to start fresh.\n`,
+  )
+}
+
+function restoreAllForRmWOrThrow(reason) {
+  const restored = loadLatestMixdogConfigFromBackup(DATA_DIR)
+  if (restored && isPlainObject(restored)) {
+    process.stderr.write(`[config] RMW read: restored mixdog-config.json from latest user-data backup (${reason})\n`)
+    return restored
+  }
+  throw new Error(
+    `[config] mixdog-config.json is unreadable and no valid backup was found (${reason}); refusing section write that would wipe other sections`,
+  )
+}
+
+/**
+ * Read-modify-write baseline. ENOENT on a never-initialized data dir → {}.
+ * Malformed on-disk config (or missing config after prior init) → restore
+ * from backup or throw; never silently collapse to a one-section overwrite.
+ */
+function readAllForRmW() {
+  let raw
+  try {
+    raw = readFileSync(CONFIG_PATH, 'utf8')
+  } catch (err) {
+    if (err.code === 'ENOENT') {
+      if (hasUserDataInitMarker(DATA_DIR)) {
+        return restoreAllForRmWOrThrow('config file missing after user-data was initialized')
+      }
+      return {}
+    }
+    process.stderr.write(`[config] readAllForRmW: unexpected read error for ${CONFIG_PATH}: ${err.message}\n`)
+    throw err
+  }
+  try {
+    const parsed = JSON.parse(raw)
+    if (!isPlainObject(parsed)) throw new SyntaxError('config root must be a JSON object')
+    return parsed
+  } catch (parseErr) {
+    quarantineMalformedConfig(parseErr)
+    return restoreAllForRmWOrThrow(parseErr.message)
+  }
+}
+
+function writeAll(data) {
+  writeJsonFile(CONFIG_PATH, data)
+}
+
+// Serialize a read-modify-write under the same file lock. Concurrent
+// processes used to race here: each read the old config, each computed
+// `all[section] = …`, each atomic-wrote — the later writer would
+// silently clobber the earlier section update. Holding the lock across
+// read+modify+write keeps RMW linearizable.
+function withConfigLock(fn) {
+  // secret:true clamps the lock file (which sits beside the API-key
+  // config in a possibly shared home dir) to an owner-only ACL on win32,
+  // fail-closed. POSIX is unaffected.
+  return withFileLockSync(`${CONFIG_PATH}.lock`, fn, { secret: true })
+}
+
+export function readSection(section) {
+  return stripGeneratedMarker(readAll()[section] ?? null) ?? {}
+}
+
+export function readConfig() {
+  return stripGeneratedMarker(readAll()) ?? {}
+}
+
+export function updateConfig(updater) {
+  let saved = null
+  withConfigLock(() => {
+    const current = stripGeneratedMarker(readAllForRmW()) || {}
+    const next = typeof updater === 'function' ? updater({ ...current }) : updater
+    if (!isPlainObject(next)) throw new Error('[config] updateConfig updater must return an object')
+    saved = stripGeneratedMarker(next) || {}
+    writeAll(saved)
+  })
+  return saved
+}
+
+export function writeSection(section, data) {
+  withConfigLock(() => {
+    const all = readAllForRmW()
+    all[section] = stripGeneratedMarker(data)
+    writeAll(all)
+  })
+}
+
+export function updateSection(section, updater) {
+  withConfigLock(() => {
+    const all = readAllForRmW()
+    const current = stripGeneratedMarker(all[section] || {})
+    all[section] = stripGeneratedMarker(typeof updater === 'function' ? updater(current) : updater)
+    writeAll(all)
+  })
+}
+
+// ── Capabilities (B2 central path policy) ───────────────────────────
+// Top-level `capabilities` section in mixdog-config.json. Safe defaults
+// win on missing/malformed input — every cap is OFF unless explicitly
+// enabled. Settings round-trip through the setup UI; the in-process
+// path gate reads them via `getCapabilities()`.
+//
+// homeAccess: when true, file tools may write anywhere under $HOME. When
+// false (default), file tools are cwd-scoped — matches the setup UI's
+// out-of-the-box "OFF" toggle so a fresh install is restrictive until the
+// user explicitly opts in. This ONLY controls the main-agent path gate —
+// bridge role Edit/Write to HOME paths always go through Discord approval
+// regardless (enforced in hooks/pre-tool-subagent.cjs).
+const CAPABILITY_DEFAULTS = Object.freeze({ homeAccess: false })
+
+function readCapabilities() {
+  const raw = readAll().capabilities
+  const out = { ...CAPABILITY_DEFAULTS }
+  if (raw && typeof raw === 'object') {
+    if (raw.homeAccess === true) out.homeAccess = true
+    else if (raw.homeAccess === false) out.homeAccess = false
+  }
+  return out
+}
+
+// Convenience alias requested by B2 call-site plumbing. Returns the
+// same object shape as readCapabilities(); callers that only need a
+// boolean can read `.homeAccess` directly.
+export function getCapabilities() {
+  return readCapabilities()
+}
+
+// ── Secret account names ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// Canonical account strings stored in the OS keychain. Must stay in sync with
+// the migration logic in seed.mjs.
+export const SECRET_ACCOUNTS = Object.freeze({
+  discordToken: 'discord.token',
+  webhookAuth:  'webhook.authtoken',
+  agentApiKey:  (provider) => `agent.${provider}.apiKey`,
+  openaiUsageSessionKey: 'agent.openai.usageSessionKey',
+  opencodeGoAuthCookie: 'agent.opencode-go.authCookie',
+})
+
+export function isDiscordSnowflake(value) {
+  return /^\d{17,20}$/.test(String(value || '').trim())
+}
+
+export function diagnoseDiscordTokenValue(value, config = {}) {
+  const token = String(value || '').trim()
+  if (!token) return null
+  const discord = config?.discord && typeof config.discord === 'object' ? config.discord : {}
+  const appId = String(discord.applicationId || '').trim()
+  if (appId && token === appId) return 'Bot token field contains the Application ID, not the bot token.'
+  const channels = config?.channelsConfig && typeof config.channelsConfig === 'object' ? config.channelsConfig : {}
+  for (const ch of Object.values(channels)) {
+    const channelId = String(ch?.channelId || '').trim()
+    if (channelId && token === channelId) return 'Bot token field contains a Channel ID, not the bot token.'
+  }
+  if (isDiscordSnowflake(token)) return 'Bot token field contains a numeric Discord ID, not the bot token.'
+  return null
+}
+
+// ── Secret-aware getters ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// Read order: ENV MIXDOG_<UPPER_SNAKE> → OS keychain → null.
+
+function _envKey(account) {
+  // 'discord.token' → 'MIXDOG_DISCORD_TOKEN'
+  return 'MIXDOG_' + account.replace(/[.\s]+/g, '_').toUpperCase()
+}
+
+function _readSecret(account) {
+  const envVal = process.env[_envKey(account)]
+  if (envVal) return envVal
+  try { return _getSecret(account) } catch { return null }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Returns the Discord bot token.
+ * Priority: MIXDOG_DISCORD_TOKEN → keychain('discord.token') → null
+ */
+export function getDiscordToken() {
+  return _readSecret(SECRET_ACCOUNTS.discordToken)
+}
+
+/**
+ * Returns the ngrok/webhook authtoken.
+ * Priority: MIXDOG_WEBHOOK_AUTHTOKEN → keychain('webhook.authtoken') → null
+ */
+export function getWebhookAuthtoken() {
+  return _readSecret(SECRET_ACCOUNTS.webhookAuth)
+}
+
+// Standard provider env names take precedence so existing OPENAI_API_KEY-style
+// exports keep working, then MIXDOG_AGENT_<P>_APIKEY, then the OS keychain.
+// SSOT for agent API-key providers: setup-server.mjs and config-merge.mjs import
+// this so UI key-presence detection uses the exact same predicate the runtime
+// loads from. Add a provider here and every path picks it up.
+export const AGENT_PROVIDER_ENV = Object.freeze({
+  openai: 'OPENAI_API_KEY', anthropic: 'ANTHROPIC_API_KEY', gemini: 'GEMINI_API_KEY',
+  deepseek: 'DEEPSEEK_API_KEY', xai: 'XAI_API_KEY', 'opencode-go': 'OPENCODE_API_KEY',
+})
+
+// Last-resort env aliases honored AFTER the standard env / MIXDOG_AGENT_* /
+// keychain sources. GROK_API_KEY is the established xAI alias elsewhere in the
+// repo (search discovery, xai-api/grok-oauth backends), so honoring it here
+// keeps provider discovery and dispatch resolving the same credential.
+export const AGENT_PROVIDER_ENV_ALIASES = Object.freeze({
+  xai: ['GROK_API_KEY'],
+})
+
+/**
+ * Returns the API key for an agent provider.
+ * Priority: <PROVIDER>_API_KEY env -> MIXDOG_AGENT_<PROVIDER>_APIKEY -> keychain('agent.<provider>.apiKey') -> alias env (e.g. GROK_API_KEY for xai) -> null.
+ * Never reads mixdog-config.json — provider keys are keychain-only.
+ */
+export function getAgentApiKey(provider) {
+  const std = AGENT_PROVIDER_ENV[provider]
+  if (std && process.env[std]) return process.env[std]
+  const fromStore = _readSecret(SECRET_ACCOUNTS.agentApiKey(provider))
+  if (fromStore) return fromStore
+  for (const alias of AGENT_PROVIDER_ENV_ALIASES[provider] || []) {
+    if (process.env[alias]) return process.env[alias]
+  }
+  return null
+}
+
+export function getOpenAIUsageSessionKey() {
+  return process.env.OPENAI_USAGE_SESSION_KEY
+    || process.env.OPENAI_DASHBOARD_SESSION_KEY
+    || process.env.OPENAI_SESSION_KEY
+    || process.env.MIXDOG_OPENAI_USAGE_SESSION_KEY
+    || _readSecret(SECRET_ACCOUNTS.openaiUsageSessionKey)
+}
+
+export function getOpenCodeGoAuthCookie() {
+  return process.env.OPENCODE_AUTH_COOKIE
+    || process.env.OPENCODE_GO_AUTH_COOKIE
+    || process.env.MIXDOG_OPENCODE_AUTH_COOKIE
+    || _readSecret(SECRET_ACCOUNTS.opencodeGoAuthCookie)
+}
+
+/**
+ * Persist a secret to the OS keychain. Throws on failure.
+ * Never writes to mixdog-config.json.
+ */
+export function saveSecret(account, value) {
+  try {
+    _setSecret(account, value)
+  } catch (err) {
+    // On WSL/headless Linux (and any host missing a usable keychain backend,
+    // e.g. keytar/libsecret not installed or no running Secret Service) the OS
+    // write throws a cryptic backend error. Surface an actionable message that
+    // points at the env-var read path the getters already honor, instead of
+    // silently writing the plaintext secret to mixdog-config.json.
+    const envKey = _envKey(account)
+    const agentMatch = String(account || '').match(/^agent\.([^.]+)\.apiKey$/)
+    const stdEnv = agentMatch ? AGENT_PROVIDER_ENV[agentMatch[1]] : null
+    const envHint = stdEnv ? `${stdEnv} (or ${envKey})` : envKey
+    const e = new Error(
+      `[config] could not save secret to the OS keychain: ${err && err.message ? err.message : err}\n` +
+      `  No usable keychain backend on this host (common on WSL / headless Linux without libsecret).\n` +
+      `  Set the ${envHint} environment variable instead — the runtime reads it directly.`
+    )
+    e.cause = err
+    throw e
+  }
+}
+
+export function deleteSecret(account) {
+  _deleteSecret(account)
+}
+
+/**
+ * Whether a secret is stored in the OS keychain for `account` (ignores env).
+ * Lets the setup UI show "Set" WITHOUT ever sending the secret value to the
+ * browser.
+ */
+export function hasStoredSecret(account) {
+  try { return !!_getSecret(account) } catch { return false }
+}
+
+export { CONFIG_PATH }

package/src/runtime/shared/err-text.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+export function errText(e) {
+  if (e == null) return String(e);
+  if (typeof e === 'string') return e;
+  if (e instanceof Error) return e.message || e.name || String(e);
+  // ErrorEvent / event-like / plain object (NOT instanceof Error)
+  if (typeof e.message === 'string' && e.message) return e.message;
+  if (e.error != null && e.error !== e) return errText(e.error);
+  if (e.reason != null && e.reason !== e) return errText(e.reason);
+  if (typeof e.type === 'string' && e.type) return `${e.type} event`;
+  try { const j = JSON.stringify(e); if (j && j !== '{}' && j !== 'null') return j; } catch {}
+  return String(e);
+}
+
+function oneLine(value) {
+  return String(value ?? '').replace(/\s+/g, ' ').trim();
+}
+
+function stripErrorPrefix(value) {
+  return String(value ?? '')
+    .replace(/^\s*(?:\[[^\]]*error[^\]]*\]|error)\s*[:\-]\s*/i, '')
+    .trim();
+}
+
+function extractJsonError(text) {
+  const value = String(text ?? '').trim();
+  if (!value.startsWith('{') && !value.startsWith('[')) return '';
+  try {
+    const parsed = JSON.parse(value);
+    if (parsed && typeof parsed === 'object' && !Array.isArray(parsed)) {
+      if (typeof parsed.error === 'string' && parsed.error.trim()) return parsed.error;
+      if (typeof parsed.message === 'string' && parsed.message.trim()) return parsed.message;
+      if (parsed.error != null) return errText(parsed.error);
+    }
+  } catch {}
+  return '';
+}
+
+function extractEmbeddedError(text) {
+  for (const line of String(text ?? '').split(/\r?\n/)) {
+    const match = /^\s*(?:error|failure|failed)\s*[:=]\s*(.+?)\s*$/i.exec(line);
+    if (match?.[1]) return match[1];
+  }
+  return '';
+}
+
+function formatDurationMs(value) {
+  const ms = Math.max(0, Number(value) || 0);
+  if (ms >= 60_000 && ms % 60_000 === 0) return `${Math.round(ms / 60_000)}m`;
+  if (ms >= 1_000) return `${Math.round(ms / 1_000)}s`;
+  return `${ms}ms`;
+}
+
+function subjectForSurface(surface) {
+  const value = String(surface || '').toLowerCase();
+  if (value.includes('search') || value.includes('web')) return 'web search agent';
+  if (value.includes('bridge') || value.includes('agent') || value.includes('task')) return 'agent';
+  return 'tool';
+}
+
+function capText(value, max) {
+  const text = String(value ?? '').trim();
+  const limit = Math.max(32, Number(max) || 240);
+  return text.length > limit ? `${text.slice(0, Math.max(1, limit - 3))}...` : text;
+}
+
+export function presentErrorText(error, options = {}) {
+  const surface = options.surface || options.tool || '';
+  const subject = subjectForSurface(surface);
+  const max = options.max ?? 240;
+  let text = errText(error);
+  const jsonError = extractJsonError(text);
+  if (jsonError) text = jsonError;
+  const embeddedError = extractEmbeddedError(text);
+  if (embeddedError) text = embeddedError;
+  text = oneLine(stripErrorPrefix(text));
+  if (!text) return 'Unknown error';
+
+  if (/\bBRIDGE_CONTEXT_OVERFLOW\b|bridge context overflow|latest turn cannot fit|context budget|context window/i.test(text)) {
+    return 'Context too large.';
+  }
+  if (/\bcompact(?:ion)?\b.*\b(?:failed|error|overflow)\b|\b(?:failed|error)\b.*\bcompact(?:ion)?\b/i.test(text)) {
+    return 'Compact failed.';
+  }
+
+  const firstResponse = /(?:bridge\s+)?first response stale\s*\((\d+)ms\)/i.exec(text);
+  if (firstResponse) {
+    return `No first response from the ${subject} within ${formatDurationMs(firstResponse[1])}.`;
+  }
+
+  const stale = /bridge task stale\s*\((\d+)ms[^)]*\)/i.exec(text)
+    || /task stale\s*\((\d+)ms[^)]*\)/i.exec(text);
+  if (stale) {
+    return `The ${subject} went stale after ${formatDurationMs(stale[1])} without new stream/tool progress.`;
+  }
+
+  if (/Session\s+"sess_[^"]+"\s+closed:\s*aborted during call/i.test(text)) {
+    return `${subject[0].toUpperCase()}${subject.slice(1)} stopped while waiting for a response.`;
+  }
+
+  if (/Session\s+"sess_[^"]+"\s+closed:\s*closed during call/i.test(text)) {
+    return `${subject[0].toUpperCase()}${subject.slice(1)} stopped before the response completed.`;
+  }
+
+  if (/parent signal aborted/i.test(text)) {
+    return `${subject[0].toUpperCase()}${subject.slice(1)} was cancelled by its caller.`;
+  }
+
+  text = text
+    .replace(/Session\s+"sess_[^"]+"\s+closed:\s*/gi, 'Session closed: ')
+    .replace(/\bsess_[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\b/g, 'session')
+    .replace(/\brun_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\b/g, 'run')
+    .replace(/\s+/g, ' ')
+    .trim();
+
+  return capText(text || 'Unknown error', max);
+}
+
+export function errorLine(error, options = {}) {
+  const text = presentErrorText(error, options);
+  return /^error\s*:/i.test(text) ? text : `Error: ${text}`;
+}